11 2 3 IPPERWASH PUBLIC INQUIRY 4 5 6 7 ******************** 8 9 10 BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE SIDNEY LINDEN, 11 COMMISSIONER 12 13 14 15 16 Held at: Forest Community Centre 17 Kimball Hall 18 Forest, Ontario 19 20 21 ******************** 22 23 24 May 10th, 2006 25
21 Appearances 2 Derry Millar ) Commission Counsel 3 Susan Vella ) 4 Donald Worme, Q. C ) (np) 5 Katherine Hensel ) (np) 6 Megan Ferrier ) 7 8 Murray Klippenstein ) The Estate of Dudley 9 Vilko Zbogar ) (np) George and George 10 Andrew Orkin ) (np) Family Group 11 Basil Alexander ) 12 13 Peter Rosenthal ) Aazhoodena and George 14 Jackie Esmonde ) Family Group 15 Amanda Rogers ) Student-at-law 16 17 Anthony Ross ) (np) Residents of 18 Cameron Neil ) (np) Aazhoodena (Army Camp) 19 Kevin Scullion ) 20 21 William Henderson ) (np) Kettle Point & Stony 22 Jonathon George ) (np) Point First Nation 23 Colleen Johnson ) 24 25
31 2 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 3 4 Kim Twohig ) (np) Government of Ontario 5 Walter Myrka ) (np) 6 Susan Freeborn ) (np) 7 Sheri Hebdon ) Student-at-law 8 9 Janet Clermont ) Municipality of 10 David Nash ) (np) Lambton Shores 11 Nora Simpson ) (np) Student-at-law 12 13 Peter Downard ) (np) The Honourable Michael 14 Bill Hourigan ) (np) Harris 15 Jennifer McAleer ) 16 17 Ian Smith ) (np) Robert Runciman 18 Alice Mrozek ) (np) 19 20 Harvey T. Strosberg, Q.C.) (np) Charles Harnick 21 Jacqueline Horvat ) (np) 22 23 24 25
41 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 3 Douglas Sulman, Q.C. ) Marcel Beaubien 4 Mary Jane Moynahan ) (np) 5 Dave Jacklin ) (np) 6 Trevor Hinnegan ) 7 8 Mark Sandler ) (np) Ontario Provincial 9 Andrea Tuck-Jackson ) Ontario Provincial Police 10 Leslie Kaufman ) (np) 11 12 Ian Roland ) Ontario Provincial 13 Karen Jones ) Police Association & 14 Debra Newell ) K. Deane 15 Ian McGilp ) (np) 16 Annie Leeks ) (np) 17 Jennifer Gleitman ) 18 Robyn Trask ) (np) 19 Caroline Swerdlyk ) 20 21 22 23 24 25
51 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 Julian Falconer ) Aboriginal Legal 3 Brian Eyolfson ) (np) Services of Toronto 4 Kimberly Murray ) (np) 5 Julian Roy ) 6 Clem Nabigon ) (np) 7 Linda Chen ) (np) 8 Chris Darnay ) (np) 9 Sunil Mathai ) (np) 10 Adriel Weaver ) (np) Student-at-Law 11 12 Al J.C. O'Marra ) (np) Office of the Chief 13 Robert Ash, Q.C. ) (np) Coroner 14 William Horton ) (np) Chiefs of Ontario 15 Matthew Horner ) (np) 16 Kathleen Lickers ) (np) 17 18 Mark Fredrick ) (np) Christopher Hodgson 19 Craig Mills ) (np) 20 Megan Mackey ) (np) 21 Peter Lauwers ) (np) 22 Erin Tully ) (np) 23 Michelle Fernando ) (np) 24 Maanit Zemel ) 25 Patrick Greco ) (np)
61 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 3 David Roebuck ) (np) Debbie Hutton 4 Anna Perschy ) 5 Melissa Panjer ) (np) 6 Adam Goodman ) (np) 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
71 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 PAGE NO. 3 List of Exhibits 4 5 WADE ALAN LACROIX, Resumed 6 Continued Cross-Examination by Mr. Julian Falconer 12 7 Cross-Examination by Mr. Peter Rosenthal 104 8 Cross-Examination by Mr. Kevin Scullion 215 9 Cross-Examination by Ms. Colleen Johnson 281 10 Cross-Examination by Mr. Ian Roland 330 11 Re-Direct Examination by Mr. Derry Millar 387 12 13 GEORGE EDWARD HEBBLETHWAITE, Sworn 14 Examination-in-Chief by Ms. Susan Vella 395 15 16 17 18 19 Certificate of Transcript 424 20 21 22 23 24 25
81 EXHIBITS 2 No. Description Page 3 P-1467 Examination for Discovery of Mark 4 Wright, page 117-122, June 27, 2001. 46 5 P-1468 Document number 1000001. OPP Technical 6 Identification Services Unit Master 7 Exhibit Continuity/Examination list 8 re. School bus and Chrysler, 9 October 14, 1995. 92 10 P-1469 Document Number 1000073. Description 11 of Item seized and detained re. 1982 12 Chrysler New Yorker (Brown), 13 September 27, 1995. 92 14 P-1470 Reports On The Use of Force, Section 14.5, 15 subsection 1 to 6. 178 16 P-1471 Document Number 1005733. Affidavit of 17 Norman Peel, 1998 203 18 P-1472 OPP Police Order 56.1 re. District 19 Commander and 57.1 re. Detachment 20 Commander. 350 21 P-1473 Excerpts from Police Orders Dealing with 22 Peer Counselling, sections 41.1 to 43.3, 23 January 1987. 361 24 25
91 List of Exhibits (cont'd) 2 Exhibit No. Description Page No. 3 P-1474 Document Number 2005536. Resume of 4 Sgt. George Hebblethwaite 395 5 P-1475 Document Number 2000347. Lesson Plan 6 cover page, Training Course; Emergency 7 Response Team; Lesson Subject: Crowd 8 Management 405 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
101 --- Upon commencing at 9:10 a.m. 2 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 4 now in session. The Honourable Mr. Justice Linden 5 presiding. Please be seated. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 7 morning, everybody. 8 Yes, Mr. Falconer...? 9 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Good morning, Mr. 10 Commissioner. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 12 morning. 13 14 WADE ALAN LACROIX, Resumed 15 16 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Good morning, Mr. 17 Lacroix. 18 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir. 19 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Before I start with 20 cross-examination, Mr. Commissioner, Mr. Sulman on behalf 21 of Mr. Beaubien brought a matter to my attention this 22 morning that I wish to very briefly address for the 23 purposes of counsel's references without repeating 24 evidence or questions. 25 It's to be found at page 259, line 7. A
111 suggestion was made to the Witness that I understand from 2 Mr. Sulman at the time he did not hear; that is, he did 3 not hear me make the suggestion and would have risen at 4 the time had he heard me. 5 And I accept it. That is a very -- very 6 fair point and he was courteous enough to raise it with 7 me first thing morning. On reflection, looking at page 8 259, line 7, I want to say that it's my view that the 9 suggestion I made in terms of the wording was not 10 appropriate; that what I intended to say was that Mr. 11 Beaubien was not to be taken seriously. 12 But I used inappropriate wording to say 13 that. And so I withdraw the form of wording I uttered at 14 the time and simply ask that the record reflect the 15 clarification I've just made. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 17 very much, Mr. Falconer. I didn't hear the comment 18 either. It was brought to my attention this morning and 19 I'm glad to hear your remarks. 20 Yes, Mr. Sulman...? 21 MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: Thank you, Mr. 22 Commissioner. I think that's an appropriate remedy for 23 the problem. 24 I just -- I think it's important to bear 25 in mind that inappropriate language is sometimes used in
121 times of stress and I guess we've heard that a lot during 2 this -- this Hearing and it's during times of high stress 3 that happens. During times of low stress it does too 4 sometimes. So I'm -- 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 6 very much. 7 MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: -- satisfied with 8 the it's resolved. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 10 very much. Let's carry on. 11 12 CONTINUED CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 13 Q: If I could ask you, sir, to have 14 before you Exhibit P-444B. So I would ask for Mr. 15 Clerk's assistance on that. P-444B for Bob. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Mr. Commissioner, I 20 haven't made copies of each one of these for you because 21 it's my belief that the passages I refer aren't going be 22 extensive and are well known. Notice was given of course 23 but -- 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 25 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- I expect to move
131 quite quickly through this material. Brief indulgence. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 6 Q: If you could turn to Tab 48, please. 7 And for your information, Mr. Lacroix, what's in front of 8 you is a transcript which is a telephone conversation 9 between Mark Wright and John Carson. And you'll notice 10 from the time of the telephone conversation that it -- 11 it's reflected as 19:58. Do you see that? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: September 6th? 14 A: Yes, sir. 15 Q: And we're using the -- the premise of 16 a delay of up to seven (7) minutes so can assume the 17 conversation happens as late as 20:05, all right? 18 A: Yes, sir. 19 Q: And times are going to matter in a 20 little while, that's why I'm being careful about telling 21 you this. 22 Now, at Tab 48 is a conversation, and -- 23 and we've already heard evidence from both Mr. -- Officer 24 Carson and Officer Wright about the nature of the 25 conversation, but the bottom line is Mark Wright is
141 speaking to John Carson about what is going on in the 2 sandy parking lot and the decisions or -- or lack thereof 3 of Dale Linton top-date. That's the context, all right? 4 I'm simply telling you this. And the 5 calls happening from the Command Post; that is Mark 6 Wright is speaking to John Carson from the Command Post. 7 What I wanted to draw your attention to 8 and raise with you is first of all you'll keep in mind 9 your evidence to-date, that you believe you were 10 contacted by Stan Korosec at 20:00 hours, in other words, 11 at 8:00 p.m.? 12 A: Yes, sir. 13 Q: And the only matter I want to draw 14 to your attention is this conversation appears to be 15 happening at 20:05; 8:05 p.m. Do you see that? 16 A: Yes, sir. 17 Q: All right. If you could turn your 18 attention please to page 309, and you see the page 19 numbers in the bottom left-hand corner. 20 A: Yes, sir. 21 Q: And at page 309 -- and I don't 22 suppose there is an extra P-444B for the Commissioner, is 23 there? 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Apparently-- 25 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Oh, thank you.
151 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- 2 somebody's looking for it for me. 3 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: All right. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I have my a 5 copy. Here it comes. Here it comes. 6 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: If 444A and 444B 7 could be gotten for the Commissioner at somebody's 8 convenience I'll just keep going? 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's just 10 coming here. 11 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Thank you. And I 12 apologize. I should have warned you beforehand. 13 14 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 15 Q: The bottom of the page says -- and 16 this is Mark Wright reporting to his superior Incident 17 Commander Carson, "WRIGHT". 18 It's Tab 48, Mr. Commissioner. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 20 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Page 309. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm with 22 you. 23 24 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 25 Q: So Wright says to Carson:
161 "And I got the whole day shift here 2 with K-9." 3 Do you see that? 4 A: Yes, sir. 5 Q: "CARSON: Okay. So what's Dale want 6 to do then? 7 WRIGHT: Oh, fuck, I don't know, 8 waffle. We'll be til fucking daylight 9 figuring it out and daylight's a 10 wasting." 11 Now, you see something different in -- in 12 what you're reading but the corrections leave us to 13 there. Are the corrections reflected in page 309? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: They are, good. So what you see by 16 that exchange, and I'm bringing to your attention, is 17 that Detective Sergeant Wright at the time had exercised 18 his authority along with Stan Korosec to hold the day 19 shift ERT back, all right? 20 A: Hmm hmm. 21 Q: That's why I'm bringing this to your 22 attention. And I -- I do want to understand one (1) 23 thing. You had made reference to Mark Wright's authority 24 yesterday as, excuse me, criminal investigations because 25 I put it to you that he was John Carson's second in
171 command and you had been careful to particularize what 2 your understanding of Mark Wright's role. 3 Do your remember giving evidence about 4 that? 5 A: Yes, sir. 6 Q: Would you agree with me though that 7 it -- it would be consistent with him as the second in 8 command in that situation to exercise authority to hold 9 an entire day shift back of ERT; that would be consistent 10 with being second in command? 11 A: Even still, I believe, you have to 12 run it by the IC. You have to brief the IC that you did 13 it. 14 Q: After the fact? 15 A: He could do it and then brief him 16 that he -- what he's done. 17 Q: All right. That would be consistent 18 with his authority as second in command? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: But you'd agree with me that's quite 21 a bit more than simply running investigations? 22 A: Yes, that's beyond the normal 23 investigative role. 24 Q: That's right. And in this -- and 25 it's not an issue that he did that --
181 A: No. 2 Q: That he made the call; that is, he 3 made the decision that he thought it should be done and 4 did it in consultation with Stan Korosec. 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: All right. And so we're clear for 7 context, this is taking place at 8:05 p.m. and the day 8 shift ended in and around 7:00 p.m., so the idea is all 9 of the ERT officers that would ordinarily have gone home 10 at 7:00 p.m. are being told to stay back. 11 A: Right. 12 Q: And that's consistent -- 13 MR. DERRY MILLAR: I don't think that's-- 14 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Oh, I'm sorry. 15 MR. DERRY MILLAR: I don't think that the 16 timing is quite right. If you look at the -- if you look 17 at the -- I don't think the briefing, for example, 18 debriefing, was until after that. 19 I don't want to interrupt My Friend but -- 20 but the -- the times -- the people would come in for 21 debriefing off the road and then the other people would 22 go out. So it's not -- the people would go out, the 23 other people -- the day shift would come in. So it's not 24 as cut and dried as My Friend suggests. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It didn't
191 occur at once -- 2 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That's very fair. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- specific 4 time. 5 MR. DERRY MILLAR: That's right. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 7 MR. DERRY MILLAR: There's a range of 8 times. 9 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: But -- and that's 10 very fair and I hear Mr. Millar. 11 12 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 13 Q: What I'm trying to put to you as part 14 of the conta -- context with Mr. Millar's clarification, 15 is that you have a group of officers, and they may not 16 all leave at exactly the same time, that represent the 17 day shift, right? 18 A: Right. 19 Q: And the idea was, that those officers 20 instead of going home as they ordinarily would, are asked 21 to stay onsite and basically do overtime; fair enough? 22 A: Stay on, yes. 23 Q: That's right. And essentially, the 24 idea is that in order to form up a CMU, would you agree 25 with this, you would need more than, for example, fifteen
201 (15) officers that might represent a day shift? 2 You would need more than that? 3 A: You need a minimum of thirty (30). 4 Q: And in order to make up the thirty 5 (30) you would need to keep teams that were allocated 6 during the day to stay on at night and that's exactly 7 what happened and Mark Wright gave that direction, all 8 right? 9 A: Yes. Yes. 10 Q: All right. Now, moving on to the 11 next page of this transcript. After Mark Wright has 12 communicated that step that he took about holding back 13 the ERT shift with K-9; and the K-9, of course, are the 14 dog units, yes? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: If you go to page 310, the next page 17 of P-44B Tab 48, near the bottom it says: 18 "Right. Okay, well, what if he asks me 19 what did you say, what do you want me 20 to tell him?" 21 Now you can check the context, but they're 22 talking about Linton; that is, they're talking about what 23 do you want me to say that you, Carson, want Linton to 24 do. 25 A: Right.
211 Q: Do you see that? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: Yeah, I want you -- to ask you 4 something, so I understand. An alternate commander, 5 who's an alternate Level 2 commander, such as Dale 6 Linton, while he isn't the principle commander for the 7 whole operation, once he takes over, isn't he in charge? 8 A: Yes. He'd be the night shift 9 commander. 10 Q: Right and this call happened in the 11 Command Post, all right. 12 A: Right. 13 Q: So you know, there's not an issue. 14 A: Right. 15 Q: It happens in the Command Post and it 16 actually happens in the presence of Dale Linton who's 17 some number of feet away, all right? 18 A: Okay. 19 Q: You're shaking your head, because 20 you'd agree with me, it's somewhat -- it's an interesting 21 dynamic to have a so-called second in command, Mark 22 Wright, call the other Incident Command and refer to the 23 fact that the Incident Commander who's onsite is 24 waffling. 25 That's somewhat unusual, isn't it?
221 A: Not -- yeah, I'd say it'd be unusual. 2 Q: And it's certainly -- if you were a 3 Level 2 Incident Commander who was on the night duty and 4 you saw Detective Sergeant Mark Wright on the phone with 5 John Carson, couldn't be more than 5 to 10 feet away from 6 you, and I'm going to establish in a second it's within 7 earshot of you, I'm about to establish that. 8 It wouldn't give you a feeling of comfort 9 to know that Mark Wright was describing you as waffling, 10 though we have no evidence that Dale Linton heard those 11 words. 12 It wouldn't give you a feeling of comfort, 13 would it? 14 A: I'd probably speak to him about it, 15 if I had heard it myself, if I was the number -- if I was 16 the number 2 on night shift, I'd have a talking to him. 17 Q: And what would you say to him? 18 A: I would ask him why he was talking 19 about me to another Incident Commander and if he had 20 something to say, to say it to me. 21 Q: Fair enough. And that's because 22 exercising authority involves a line of command, correct? 23 A: Yes, sir. 24 Q: And when you're the Incident 25 Commander on duty that night, you're in charge and it's
231 up to you when you do certain things, correct? 2 A: Yes, sir. And the normal turnover is 3 from the Incident Commander day shift to the Incident 4 Commander night shift; Inspector to the Inspector. 5 Q: Fair enough. And if John Carson has 6 a problem he takes it up with you as a Level 2 Incident 7 Commander being Dale Linton, right? 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 Q: It doesn't happen through Mark 10 Wright? 11 A: Not normally, sir. 12 Q: All right. Now what I want to ask 13 you -- we're going to keep reading. 14 "Okay, well what if he asks me what did 15 you say, what do you want me to tell 16 him? 17 CARSON: Well it's not my..." 18 Do you see that? 19 "Well it's not my right. 20 Don't you say we go get those fucking 21 guys? 22 CARSON: Well we got to deal with 23 them, we can't let them out in that 24 area with that stuff." 25 Do you see that?
241 A: Yes, sir. 2 Q: And then he says: 3 "WRIGHT: No. 4 CARSON: So if he wants I'll come back 5 but he's got to make that call for me 6 to come back." 7 Do you see that? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: So you'd agree with me that John 10 Carson is -- is in essence actually acting consistent 11 with your evidence just a minute ago, isn't he? He's 12 deferring to the Incident Commander onsite. 13 A: There's been a handoff is what... 14 Q: And he's deferring by telling Mark 15 Wright "That's not for me to say, that's his call." 16 A: Yes, yes. It's for that Incident 17 Commander to call me back. 18 Q: That's right. Now the conversation 19 goes on and this is what I want to bring to your 20 attention. At page 312, the conversation's still going 21 and they discuss meeting later. 22 But you'll see at page 312, "Yeah" -- they 23 give phone numbers to contact each other if you look two- 24 thirds (2/3's) of the way: 25 "WRIGHT: Okay. And that -- give it
251 to me again, John, your cell phone." 2 Do you see that? About a third of the way 3 down the page on 312. 4 "Okay. Give it to --" 5 A: 671, that part there? 6 Q: Right. 7 A: Oh, no, 312? 8 Q: Yeah. Page 312. 9 A: Yeah, yeah. 10 Q: "Okay, well you call me if I'm not -- 11 okay, I'm on my cell. 12 Okay, give it to me again, John, your 13 cellphone." 14 Do you see that? And they exchange 15 numbers. Right after that, do you see what Wright says? 16 He says: 17 "He's calling out TRU. [Loud humming 18 noise] okay so I'll call you. What 19 time if I'm not there?" 20 Do you see that? 21 A: Yeah. 22 Q: Now a correction was made where 23 Carson says "What". Okay? And Wright says: 24 "Okay I'll call you, what time I'm not 25 there."
261 Do you see that. Then Carson: 2 "Quarter to 9:00. 3 "WRIGHT: Okay. 4 CARSON: If he's calling out TRU -- 5 WRIGHT: Yeah? 6 CARSON: -- you advise him I should be 7 notified. 8 Okay." 9 Now we heard evidence from Mark Wright 10 that in fact as he's talking to Carson, he hears Dale 11 Linton giving instructions to call out TRU. Do you 12 understand? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: That's the nature of the evidence 15 from Mark Wright that in fact he had no involvement in 16 the decision to call out TRU. He was on the phone with 17 John Carson and heard Linton doing it. 18 A: Hmm hmm. 19 Q: Fair enough? 20 A: Okay. 21 Q: Now you agree with me it doesn't take 22 a leap of logic that if Mark Wright can hear Dale Linton 23 talking, it's equally conceivable that Dale Linton can 24 hear Mark Wright talking, agreed with that? 25 A: Possible.
271 Q: Sure. I just -- in terms of logic. 2 I'm not saying for you to speculate. But you'd agree 3 with me that it helps you inferentially in terms of 4 whether somebody's in ear shot. 5 If one party can hear the other party 6 talking, it's conceivable the vice versa applies. Would 7 you agree? 8 A: It is conceivable but I'm not -- 9 Q: Sure. And at that time then and I 10 want to bring this to your attention, you've testified 11 that you believe you were contacted at 20:00 by Korosec 12 about being in place to head up the CMU team potentially, 13 correct? 14 A: Yes, sir. 15 Q: Now what I'm bringing to your 16 attention is in and around 20:05 a conversation occurs 17 and you can see that we are talking about minutes past 18 20:05 -- 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: -- so I would respectfully suggest to 21 you that logic tells us somewhere around 20:08 to 20:12, 22 right, Dale Linton has made a decision to call out TRU, 23 all right? 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: And we know that because we have this
281 conversation. Now I want to take you in terms of what I 2 want to ask you about, that decision to call out TRU 3 could be for different reasons, agreed? 4 It could be to -- to support a CMU, 5 correct? 6 A: Yes as long as there's a threat of 7 violence. 8 Q: Right. Or it could be for another 9 purpose. And I want to ask you about this because of 10 your role in this matter. 11 I want to take you, if I could, to P-444B, 12 Tab 52. So you're in the same book. If you could switch 13 to 52 please. And I don't mean to be convoluted about 14 this, Mr. Commissioner, but I need to take the Witness to 15 the context asking the questions. 16 Now this is a conversation between Dale 17 Linton and John Carson, all right? 18 A: Okay. 19 Q: That is September 6th, 1995 at 20:15 20 as it's reflected, do you see that? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: Do you have that? 23 A: It's 20:15. 24 Q: It's Tab 52, P-44B. 25 A: Yep. Right.
291 Q: And it's a conversation between Dale 2 Linton and John Carson, it shows as 20:15 so we bump that 3 to 20:22 based on our delay evidence, all right? 4 A: Okay. 5 Q: So add seven (7) minutes. Now I want 6 you to have context and the context is simply this. The 7 original call starts at Tab 51 at 20:20, all right? But 8 they get disconnected, all right? 9 A: Okay. 10 Q: And they decide to move to a hard 11 line. I just want you to know that for some context. 12 A: All right. 13 Q: All right. And the context of this 14 call is that Linton in contacting Carson, all right? 15 Linton is contacting Carson but the 16 context is Carson's doing the call-back at Tab 51 saying 17 Linton was asking for me and they are now going to have a 18 conversation about how the crew is proposed to be used by 19 Linton and that's what I want to ask you about, all 20 right? 21 So where I am at Tab 52 in terms of my 22 questioning of you, sir, is that I'm giving you the 23 context of Linton's explanation for the use of TRU. 24 A: Okay. 25 Q: Do you understand?
301 A: Yes. 2 Q: All right. So the conversation that 3 I'm trying to bring to your attention starts with Wright 4 two-thirds (2/3's) of the way down page 1. 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: "WRIGHT: It's John, he's on a 7 hardline." 8 Do you see that? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: So Mark Wright's at Command Post 11 standing around with John Carson talking to Linton. Do 12 you see that? 13 A: Hmm hmm. 14 Q: "LINTON: Hello? 15 CARSON: Yeah. 16 LINTON: Yeah, Jesus, sir, I don't 17 know what they're doing but they're -- 18 they're building up for something down 19 there because their stuff is set up. 20 CARSON: Okay. You guys, you were 21 saying you were going to -- you were 22 going..." 23 Now, does your page -- mine's cut off. 24 MR. DERRY MILLAR: It's cut off. 25 THE WITNESS: Yeah, it's cut off.
311 2 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 3 Q: The corrections were made on the 4 record but unfortunately it seems that the copy I have 5 right now has -- does yours have the completion of the 6 sentence? 7 A: It just ends as: 8 "Ah, you were..." 9 Q: All right. Could you please hear me 10 out on what's to be added. It's the last line. It 11 should say: 12 "Okay. You were saying you were going 13 to --, ah you were going to calling 14 out TRU." 15 All right. 16 A: Yeah. 17 Q: Calling out TRU. 18 A: Calling out TRU. 19 Q: So Carson's saying I understand 20 basically you're -- you're going to call out TRU. And 21 then go to the next page. Linton says -- 22 A: Yeah. 23 Q: "Yeah." 24 Do you see that? 25 A: Yeah.
321 Q: Carson says: 2 "What are you going to do with them? 3 LINTON: Well, TRU is probably going to 4 end up by going in and doing an arrest. 5 CARSON: Dale, don't do that. 6 LINTON: No? 7 CARSON: Don't do that. If you do that 8 we are in trouble, okay. And are you 9 asking my advice or you're just 10 informing me here? We better get this 11 straight." 12 Now, first of all, would you agree with me 13 that the approach Carson has taken in terms of respecting 14 the command is appropriate? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: In other words he wants to know -- he 17 -- he accepts or acknowledges that an alternate commander 18 is entitled to make this call and simply notify John 19 about it, right? 20 A: That's right. 21 Q: Alternatively the Incident Commander 22 could be asking for John's advice. So John wants to know 23 what's happening? 24 A: That's right, which is it? 25 Q: And you'd agree with me that the
331 suggestion by Linton here, 2 "Well TRU is probably going to end up 3 going in and doing an arrest," 4 is different than TRU supporting CMU? 5 A: At that -- yes. Those words -- 6 there's no mention of CMU. 7 Q: That's right. And in fact at 20:22 8 that night in the initiation of this conversation when 9 they talk about what Linton intends to do, it appears 10 that Linton is calling out TRU to do arrests, agreed? 11 A: But I don't know where. I mean it 12 doesn't say -- 13 Q: We'll keep reading in a minute. 14 A: Okay. Okay. 15 Q: All right. 16 "CARSON: Dale, don't do that. 17 LINTON: No. 18 CARSON: Don't do that. If you do 19 that we're in trouble and are you 20 asking my advice?" 21 And he says: 22 "Let's get this straight. 23 LINTON: No, we need to discuss this. 24 CARSON: Okay. Do you want me to come 25 in?
341 LINTON: Well, what's -- what's -- why 2 shouldn't we use like that -- like what 3 we've got? 4 CARSON: Well, what -- what you're 5 going to achieve by using TRU that ERT 6 can't do?" 7 Do you see that? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: "CARSON: Well, what -- what are you 10 going to achieve by using TRU that ERT 11 can't do?" 12 A: Right. 13 Q: So you see that Carson's putting to 14 him why can't we use ERT to do this? 15 A: Right. 16 Q: "LINTON: Well -- 17 CARSON: If somebody goes down then -- 18 then what are you going to do? 19 LINTON: Like, I think you got a build- 20 up inside and that's my concern. It's 21 not going to address these eight (8) 22 guys. We were going -- oh, oh. 23 LINTON: With ERT once we got a 24 statement my concern is you have the 25 school bus moving down there. You've
351 got the dump truck moving down there. 2 You've got people in the kiosk pulling 3 the blinds all down and I think 4 there's, you know, a threat here of 5 maybe sniper fire or like they're doing 6 something inside getting ready for us. 7 CARSON: Okay. Well, that's fine. 8 Let's evacuate those houses if you 9 think -- 10 LINTON: Okay. There's a threat of 11 that nature but don't go in there with 12 TRU. If you go in with TRU and 13 somebody gets hurt we have nobody else 14 to get them out." 15 Now, stopping there do you see that 16 Linton's explanation for using TRU is his belief that the 17 occupiers might resort to sniper fire against arresting 18 officers? Do you see that? It's at page -- 19 A: I think -- I -- 20 Q: It's at page 332. 21 A: It mentions that they may be using 22 sniper fire; talking about the kiosk. 23 Q: That's -- well, what he says is, 24 right? 25 A: No --
361 Q: Two-thirds (2/3's) of the way down 2 page 332: 3 "With ERT, once we got a statement my 4 concern is you have the school bus 5 moving down there. You've got the dump 6 truck moving and you've got people in 7 the kiosk --" 8 A: Right. 9 Q: "-- pulling the blinds and I think 10 that, you know, a threat here of maybe sniper fire." 11 A: Right. 12 Q: Do you see that? 13 A: Yes, sir. 14 Q: Now, would you agree with me that 15 that is consistent with what Dale Linton says at 21:41 to 16 Superintendent Parkin about the existence of an arsenal 17 of weapons and the danger of sniper fire. 18 Do you remember what I put to you 19 yesterday? 20 A: You put that to me yesterday? 21 Q: Yes. I showed you -- 22 A: Oh, with the list of AK-47s and -- 23 Q: That's right. 24 A: It would be consistent with him 25 having some kind of knowledge of weapons.
371 Q: And -- but in particular what I drew 2 to your attention, I don't blame you, there's a number of 3 things that were drawn to your attention, I drew a 4 conversation to your attention between Dale Linton and 5 Superintendent Parkin, where Dale Linton at 21:41 says to 6 Parkin he believes there's this risk of sniper fire. 7 Do you remember my drawing that to your 8 attention? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: You'd agree with me then, whether 11 we're talking 8:22 p.m. or 9:41 p.m., Dale Linton has 12 this concern about the occupiers using weaponry against 13 the officers, yes? 14 A: It would seem to be so, yes. 15 Q: Right. And in that context, let me 16 ask you this, and this is why the buildup to this 17 question; as someone who was a TRU team leader in the 18 London area -- correct -- 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: -- that was you? 21 A: Yes, sir. 22 Q: And as someone in charge of running 23 CMU, you were in a unique position to help us juxtapose 24 or compare the uses of the different units, correct? 25 A: I would suppose, yes, sir.
381 Q: Would you agree with me that if there 2 was a realistic prospect of sniper fire down at the fence 3 line from the occupiers that it would be a logical usage 4 of TRU to effect arrests, because CMU is not designed to 5 go in, in the face of sniper fire? 6 A: I would agree that CMU are not -- 7 it's not their mandate, they're not equipped, nor 8 trained, to go in to make arrests under sniper fire. But 9 I don't know if TRU was the best group to use in one 10 sense, because John Carson makes a valid point, he had 11 one (1) team, if he commits them, he has nothing in 12 reserve, he has nothing to pull any officers down, out. 13 So, it -- if -- if we -- going with your 14 logic, if you felt that that's what you were facing, if 15 anything, we should have been calling out the other two 16 (2) TRU teams. 17 Q: All right. So your point is, first 18 of all, you don't use CMU? 19 A: No. 20 Q: Second of all, you may have to use 21 more TRU teams? 22 A: If you actually think you're facing a 23 sniper threat and a weapons threat that large, it would 24 take even more than one (1) TRU team. 25 Q: And you'd agree with me, based on
391 what I showed you of the Linton statements to his 2 Superintendent at 21:41 and the statements I'm showing 3 you here at 20:22 on the night of September 6th, 1995, 4 Dale Linton indeed thought he faced that threat, correct? 5 A: It seems that Dale Linton did, I'm 6 just not sure yet what John Carson believes. 7 Q: Right. 8 A: It seems by the conversation you're 9 showing me, that Dale Linton had made an assessment that 10 he was facing a firearms threat. 11 Q: And that assessment, first at 8:22 12 p.m. we see, but also at 9:41 p.m., later, right? 13 A: Yes, sir. 14 Q: Okay. And we also know that Skinner, 15 the head of TRU that night, who was in the TOC centre 16 communicating with you, he believed that there was a fair 17 probability of that same threat, yes? 18 A: From what you showed me yesterday, 19 but not from conversation to me. 20 Q: I understand. Now, what I want to 21 ask you is this: Would you agree with me then, if you 22 look at this transcript as of page 334, that there -- it 23 is apparent, based on the explanations being offered -- I 24 apologize. 25 As of page 332, because we've only gotten
401 to 332. As of 332 -- and that's a page number, not a 2 time. 3 As of page 332, it's apparent that -- as 4 of page 332, it's apparent that it's Dale Linton's view 5 that the appropriate resort is to TRU, yes? 6 A: Yes, because if he thinks there's a 7 firearms threat, that is TRU's mandate. 8 Q: Right. And so there's no -- from 9 this transcript and all you have is the transcript, 10 there's no indication to you as of post-20:22 that Dale 11 Linton has resorted to CMU or thinks CMU should be 12 resorted to; just based on looking at this transcript. 13 A: Other than I know he's called me out 14 at 20:00. There's no conversation of CMU here. 15 Q: Right. Well -- and you said, 16 "other than I know he's called me out 17 at 20:00." 18 I do want to clarify one thing; that is a 19 very fair inference for you to draw, based on what you 20 knew at the time, right? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: But you did candidly acknowledge 23 yesterday to the Commissioner that you didn't actually 24 speak to Dale Linton -- 25 A: No, that's true, sir.
411 Q: -- and you only spoke to Stan 2 Korosec? 3 A: That's true, sir. 4 Q: So what you really only know is that 5 Stan Korosec, under an apparent authority of Dale Linton, 6 called you out, right? 7 A: Yeah, that's correct. 8 Q: And to be fair to Stan Korosec, he 9 didn't use the words, when he called you, and he might 10 have said Wad or Waddie, he might have said that. 11 A: Yeah. 12 Q: He didn't say, Waddie, I am relying 13 on the authority of Dale Linton -- 14 A: No. 15 Q: -- for you to come down. That's not 16 how you guys talk to each other. 17 A: No. He probably said, Linton wants 18 you here. 19 Q: Or he might have just said, We need 20 you here' and you assume that Linton had okayed it 21 because that's the steps that's suppose to be taken, 22 right? 23 A: Yes. Except for the fact I did some 24 -- in my mind I knew that I was working for Linton. 25 Q: Fair enough.
421 A: And I didn't know that -- what time 2 the turnover took place. I knew I was going up to work 3 for Linton, not Carson. 4 Q: That's very fair. But that could 5 have happened just by, for example, Korosec saying, 6 Linton's in charge now, right? 7 A: Yeah. 8 Q: Linton's on command and we need you 9 down here. 10 A: Yes, sir. 11 Q: There's no recollection you have of 12 Korosec actually saying the words to you, Linton has 13 directed me to direct you to come down. 14 A: I wrote in my notes I was being 15 called under the authority of Inspector Linton. 16 Q: Right. 17 A: Somehow I knew I was going into work 18 for IC Linton. And I was being called out as a CMU 19 Commander. 20 Q: Thank you and that's helpful. I -- I 21 appreciate it. Now, what I want to now bring to your 22 attention is the remainder of the call. There's a threat 23 of that nature but don't go in there with TRU, do you see 24 that, at 332? 25 "If you go in with TRU and somebody
431 gets hurt, we have nobody else to get 2 them out." 3 A: Right. 4 Q: "LINTON: I know what I'm doing is 5 I'm getting TRU to come here. 6 CARSON: Well, I wouldn't even do 7 that. 8 LINTON: No? 9 CARSON: If you -- if you bring that 10 team up, you got to be ready to deploy 11 them." 12 Then you go to the next page at the top of 13 333. 14 "Well my thought there -- 15 LINTON: Is if I send -- I send the 16 ERT guys to arrest these eight (8) 17 people? 18 Yeah. 19 And all hell breaks loose. 20 Yeah. 21 And I've got TRU suited and close by. 22 Well that's fine but I would leave them 23 in the Pinery Park. They're closer 24 from the Pinery. They're from Forest 25 and you're going to create a media
441 event with the TRU team truck sitting 2 in town here. 3 Okay. So -- 4 LINTON: I'll suit them up and leave 5 them in Pinery then. 6 CARSON: I wouldn't do any more than 7 that for the time being. 8 LINTON: Okay. And then we'll do the 9 arrest with the ERT guys? 10 CARSON: I would -- I'd call out sixty 11 (60) of them if you have to. 12 LINTON: Yeah. 13 CARSON: Whatever is necessary we'll 14 do that but would I -- 15 All right. 16 CARSON: I tell you, keep them in 17 reserve. 18 LINTON: Okay. 19 LINTON: All right. That's what we'll 20 do. 21 CARSON: Okay." 22 So you see between pages 333 and 334 it 23 appears that Carson has convinced Inspector Linton to 24 reconsider and change his approach, would you agree? 25 A: Yes.
451 Q: And it appears that what starts as a 2 conversation of 20:22, I'm going to use TRU to go in 3 there and do these arrests, turns into okay we'll use 4 her, right? 5 A: Right. But what are you saying if 6 you -- you go with -- to be fair, if you go with TRU and 7 you only have one (1) TRU team on station at that time 8 you have no reserve. 9 I mean you -- that's it. You've taken the 10 higher order team and committed them and ERT doesn't 11 backup TRU. TRU backs up ERT. So you're -- you're right 12 he's convinced him not to commit TRU but I think I see 13 some of his logic. It's... 14 Q: Now -- 15 A: TRU does officer rescue on uniform 16 personnel. ERT are basically uniform personnel. Uniform 17 personnel don't do any officer rescue on a TRU team 18 though. 19 Q: Would you agree with me and -- and 20 this -- yesterday I referred you to a passage from Mark 21 Wright, from a discovery that I asked your -- your views 22 on and you explained what you agreed with and didn't 23 agree with. 24 And by the way, Mr. Commissioner, for the 25 record I think this should be filed as an exhibit. I
461 didn't yesterday. It's Mark Wright's discovery excerpt 2 which is pages 117 through 120. I have my copy here. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. You 4 referred to it yesterday. 5 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: It was also 6 distributed electronically, you should know. 7 THE REGISTRAR: Is that June 27th, sir? 8 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: It is dated 27th 9 day of June 2001, yes. 10 THE REGISTRAR: P-1467, Your Honour. 11 12 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1467: Examination for Discovery of 13 Mark Wright, page 117-122, 14 June 27, 2001. 15 16 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: And I should note 17 for the record that P-1467 has some side-barring. It 18 reflects the passages that I read to the Witness and if - 19 - if a cleaner copy is needed, I'd be happy to take steps 20 to do that. I just thought I'd notify My Friends of 21 that. Just the sidebar, no notes. 22 23 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 24 Q: Now you saw yesterday what Mark 25 Wright's view of the usage of CMU down in the sandy
471 parking lot. I -- I put that to you, do you remember? 2 A: This was the part about the 3 diversion? 4 Q: Yes -- No. 5 A: Oh. 6 Q: Mark Wright spoke to having CMU going 7 down there and the officer presence would be a formidable 8 presence -- 9 A: Oh yes. 10 Q: -- and would cause the crowd to 11 scatter and take off. 12 A: That -- that is a normal -- I mean, 13 that is a tactic or it -- it does work. I mean, it is -- 14 officer presence does have that affect. 15 Q: All right. 16 A: No different than a bar fight. If 17 the police cars show up, the people leave. 18 Q: But in particular what we had was an 19 insight into Mark Wright's belief. 20 And -- and what I want to ask you is this. 21 It would be logical, would it not, if Mark Wright has 22 decided to hold back the ERT day shift to create this 23 platoon you need a leader, right? 24 A: Right. 25 Q: And so you get a call you say at
481 20:00. I'm going to take you to some other information 2 and we'll see if we can refresh your memory, but you say 3 at 20:00. 4 But basically, the evidence appears to be 5 -- first of all I've taken you to the passage at 8:05 6 p.m. and it confirms that as of 8:05 p.m. I, that is "I" 7 being Mark Wright, had held back the day shift. You saw 8 that? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: So we know that before 8:05 p.m. Mark 11 Wright's taken those steps, all right? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: The evidence appears to be that those 14 steps would have been taken between 7:50 p.m. and 8:05 15 p.m. basically. 16 We can -- Mr. Millar can probably do a 17 much better job than I can getting it right down to the 18 minute but we know that's when it happens, between 7:50 19 p.m. or 7:45 p.m. and 8:05 p.m., fair enough? 20 A: Yes, that's... 21 Q: And if Mark Wright's made the 22 decision to hold back the day shift and -- and create 23 these platoons in your mind, just knowing officer 24 procedures, would it not be logical to need a leader for 25 those platoons?
491 A: Yes, that's what I was trying to say. 2 The day before I don't if everybody at the Command Post 3 knew that the new policy was if you went to a CMU which 4 is two (2) ERT teams together you now, by policy, have to 5 have a staff sergeant, Level 1 Incident Commander, he has 6 to be in command. 7 So whether or not he knew that at that 8 time I don't -- I don't know. 9 Q: Now, if he was acting, therefore, 10 according to policy your point is he would need that, 11 correct? 12 A: Yes, he would, yes. 13 Q: All right. And therefore to you it's 14 completely logical that in addition to holding back the 15 TRU's, just from looking at the development of the facts 16 -- I'm sorry, it would be completely logical to you that 17 in addition to holding back ERT he would find a leader? 18 A: He'd have to find a leader, yes. 19 Q: Now, what I want to put to you is the 20 scribe note that reflects the timing of when you're 21 called out. It's a handwritten scribe note and Mr. 22 Millar's going to assist me on what tab it's at. I had 23 it -- I noted it a minute ago and I was struggling -- 24 MR. DERRY MILLAR: That was 12. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm sorry,
501 what tab? 2 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Tab 12. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 12? 4 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: If you turn to Tab 5 12, please? I appreciate Mr. Millar's assistance. 6 MR. DERRY MILLAR: It's Exhibit 427. 7 It's also in Exhibit 426. 8 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: So Exhibit P-426 9 but it's reproduced as Tab 12 of your... 10 MR. DERRY MILLAR: That's 427. 11 THE WITNESS: That's 427 on Tab 12. 12 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: All right. 13 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Handwritten scribe 14 notes are Exhibit 427. 15 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Thank you. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 20 Q: If you could have regard to the 21 handwritten scribe notes that are reproduced at Tab 12 22 and in particular look in the top right-hand corner of 23 page 475? 24 So if you look in the top right corner you 25 see page numbers? If you flip through the page numbers
511 about six (6) or seven (7) pages in there's a 475 in the 2 top right corner; it's a faded 475. Do you see that? 3 And the top of the page starts, "MW". 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: Do you have that in front of you? 6 A: Yes, MW. 7 Q: So the top of that page: 8 "MW: We have possession of weapons." 9 A: Weapons, yes. 10 Q: Do you see that? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: Now, the -- the -- there is a 13 discussion that the scribe is picking up where Mark 14 Wright is saying things and: 15 "MARK WRIGHT: We have possession of 16 weapons dangerous with bats and 17 mischief with a bat. They're -- 18 they're preventing people from passing 19 through." 20 And then you see, "DL". 21 "DALE LINTON: I want something in 22 writing." 23 Do you see all that? 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: Now, you know about Dale Linton's
521 thinking based on the transcripts, but what I want to 2 direct your mind to or direct your attention to, do you 3 see where it says 20:21 -- sorry, 20:20? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: "John Carson called back Dale Linton. 6 Dale Linton advised him of current 7 situation. Tim has -- TRU has been 8 called in." 9 A: Right. 10 Q: Right? And do you see how then -- 11 that's 20:20, then 20:22 three (3) lines down: 12 "DL: On 10-21 to John Carson." 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: All right. What's happening, just so 15 I'm dove-tailing this transcripts we looked at with the 16 scribe notes, what's happening is that first call where 17 they got disconnected happens at 20:20 and then they 18 resume at 20:22. Do you see that? 19 A: Hmm hmm. 20 Q: Now, 20:21 is how the scribe has it: 21 "SK called Wade Lacroix to attend. 22 Advise MW and DL. DL take off four (4) 23 off Delta. Move off of 'B', 24 So what you're seeing is a reflection of 25 DL's giving directions about movements of checkpoints,
531 right? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: But in the midst of that, at 20:21, 4 Stan Korosec is calling you in. 5 A: Right. 6 Q: Now, you've got it at 20:00 but 7 whether it's 20:00 or 20:21, would you agree with me that 8 it's, certainly based on the scribe notes or your time, 9 is before Dale Linton has his mind changed about having 10 TRU going in to do arrests; would you agree with that? 11 A: It would seem to be, yes. 12 Q: And I'm going to ask you this: If 13 Dale Linton is of the view that TRU should go in and make 14 arrests, that is showstopper for CMU going in, agreed? 15 A: Yes. If TRU has the lead, if they're 16 in there, we would not be involved in their operation. 17 Q: Fair enough. Now, you know that Mark 18 Wright didn't agree with the calling out of TRU. You 19 could hear it in the transcript. 20 Mark Wright's on the phone with Carson 21 saying: 22 "He's calling out TRU." 23 Do you see that? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And we've heard from Mark Wright that
541 he didn't think it was good idea when he testified in 2 front of the Commissioner. 3 So Mark Wright holds back the ERT shifts 4 and you get a call from Korosec and we know that Mark 5 Wright and Korosec talked. We know that, we've heard 6 evidence about it. 7 But what I want to ask you is this: When 8 you came in, the first person who briefed you was who? 9 A: Outside in the parking lot it was 10 Stan Korosec, briefed me on what was -- who I had, what 11 units I had and -- 12 Q: Fair enough. 13 A: -- et cetera. 14 Q: The first person who briefed you was 15 Stan Korosec? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: And the second person that briefed 18 you was who? 19 A: It would be inspector Carson. 20 Q: Well, that wasn't your evidence 21 yesterday. Yesterday, with respect, sir, you had said 22 that the first person that briefed you was Korosec and 23 the second person that briefed you was Mark Wright. 24 I made that suggestion to you because it's 25 consistent with your statement.
551 A: But -- okay. I thought I said 2 yesterday that when I come in the room, Mark Wright was 3 on the phone and Dale Linton was sitting in the corner. 4 I got briefed by John Carson and then Mark Wright got 5 involved on the discussion mainly around arresting and 6 for what -- 7 Q: Could you turn -- 8 A: -- and who. I thought he was on the 9 phone when I went in the room. 10 Q: Could you turn to Tab 28, which is 11 your SIU statement, please? 12 A: Sure. 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 A: Tab 48? 17 Q: 28. 18 A: Oh, 28, sorry. 19 Q: This is your statement to SIU on 20 September 8th, 1995. 21 A: Hmm hmm. 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 A: Page 3?
561 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 A: Page 3, halfway down -- 4 Q: If you start at page 1 -- 5 A: Oh, okay. 6 Q: I want to -- because I'm going to -- 7 there's other questions I want to ask about this 8 statement. So I'm going to quickly take you through it 9 and try to be efficient. 10 A: Okay. 11 Q: So... 12 13 (BRIEF PAUSE) 14 15 Q: At page 1, it says, "Okay". It was 16 the 6th of September, 1995. Do you see that? 17 A: The page 1... 18 Q: Page 1 of your -- 19 A: Okay. 20 Q: -- SIU statement. 21 A: Oh yeah, okay. Was this -- is this 22 Richer -- Kennedy, the 6th of September? 23 Q: Yeah, and then you say "Lacroix", 24 half way down the page: 25 "Okay, it was the 6th of September."
571 A: Yes. 2 Q: I'm just trying to go to where -- 3 A: Okay. 4 Q: -- you say what happened. 5 A: All right. 6 Q: This is Exhibit P-1153. 7 "Okay, it was the 6th of September, 8 Wednesday evening. I completed my 9 regular tour of duty at 4:30. I was 10 home with my family when I received a 11 phone call from Sergeant Stan Korosec 12 the Number 1 ERT team leader in the 13 Command Post at Forest. 14 He advised me there had been a further 15 escalation to the situation at 16 Ipperwash Provincial Park involving a 17 civilian motorist that at some time 18 during the day, I took it, that there 19 had been a -- the demonstrators had 20 actually taken up a position in the 21 public, I call it the public access 22 parking lot. It was actually outside 23 the Provincial Park. 24 I know where it is, there is a bend in 25 the Army Road.
581 They had taken up a position there, at 2 a curve, and there had been some 3 involvement the night before..." 4 And you describe the rock throwing, right? 5 A: Hmm hmm. 6 Q: And then you say, "Wednesday", half 7 way down the page: 8 "Wednesday it had escalated to a 9 civilian motorist having his vehicle 10 pelted with rocks and hit with baseball 11 bats." 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: "That day we were forming two (2) ERT 14 teams; Number 3 and Number 6 into a 15 CMU, Crowd Management Unit, and 16 required a trained unit commander to be 17 on standby with them at the Command 18 Post." 19 And that was you, is that correct, Mr. 20 Lacroix? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: "I was called, but recalled to duty 23 and at that, I believe it was Inspector 24 Linton, who was really, ah, calling me 25 out as the on-duty Incident Commander.
591 I changed into tactical clothing." 2 Stopping there, do you see how you draw an 3 inference that since it was Linton on-duty, he would have 4 been the one calling you out, fair enough? 5 A: True. 6 Q: But you describe it as an inference 7 and when you say, on September 8th, I was called out, all 8 you really say is Korosec called me and told me I was 9 needed because we had these problems, right? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: And then at the next page you say: 12 "I believe it was Inspector Linton who 13 was really calling me out as the on- 14 duty Incident Commander." 15 You go on to say: 16 "I changed into tactical clothing, went 17 to the Detachment, picked up sidearms, 18 baton, helmet, all of my hard TAC, what 19 we call hard TAC equipment. Proceeded 20 to Forest Detachment and arrived at 21 about 9:30 where I was briefed by 22 Sergeant Korosec while I was dressing. 23 The CMU Crime Management Unit was 24 already formed up behind the detachment 25 for roll call. They were undergoing
601 roll call by Sergeant Hebblethwaite and 2 I -- they were equipping themselves. I 3 was briefed by Sergeant Korosec, then 4 Staff Sergeant Mark Wright, Acting 5 Detective Sergeant Wright, as to the 6 events since Monday. I come back from 7 vacation on Tuesday." 8 But do -- do you see: 9 "I was briefed by Korosec then Wright?" 10 Do you see that? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: So would you agree with me on 13 September 8th, 1995, you probably have a better memory 14 for the order of your briefing two (2) days later than 15 you would -- what are we now? How many years later? 16 A: Almost eleven (11) I think. 17 Q: Yeah, eleven (11) years later. Your 18 memory would probably be better on September 8th, 1995? 19 A: It should be, yes. 20 Q: All right. So you'll agree with me 21 then that the order of events was that you were briefed 22 by Stan... 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25
611 Q: So in terms of process you never, and 2 we've already established that, we have this order of 3 events, Korosec, Wright, Carson, Linton just doesn't 4 enter the piece for you, fair enough? 5 A: I do not remember being briefed by 6 Inspector Linton. 7 Q: Fair enough. Now, what I want to 8 understand, because you were briefed by Korosec first is, 9 first of all, in terms of process what Korosec actually 10 told you, do you have a recollection of what he actually 11 told you as part of that first briefing? 12 A: The -- the gist of his entire 13 briefing was the units that I had, who was going to be my 14 number 2, you know, that they were out back right now 15 going through their equipment checks. 16 You know, he would not be going with me 17 because he was going to stay at the -- at -- as the ERT 18 TOC he would stay but it would be George Hebblethwaite; 19 that -- that was the essence of his briefing, more of the 20 -- the logistical part of CMU. 21 Q: And in terms of what you were told, 22 do you recall anything else? 23 A: I just -- I believe he reiterated the 24 same fact that a civilian car had been pelted with rocks 25 and -- and damaged and -- and down the Army Camp Road and
621 that's why I was being called out; that's -- that's it. 2 And then it went into, just like I say the 3 -- the two (2) units. I was satisfied with that because 4 I'd done my training with 3 and 6. And -- 5 Q: Now, would you agree with this that - 6 - and it's consistent with your statement to SIU on 7 September 8th, 1995, that you felt the triggering event 8 for calling out CMU was the attack by First Nations 9 persons with baseball bats against a private citizen's 10 motor vehicle? 11 A: I took that that was the escalation; 12 first a police car rear window busted out the night of 13 the occupation; three (3) cars -- police cars stoned; now 14 a civilian car stoned. 15 So I took it as the -- yes, now a civilian 16 vehicle has been damaged on a county road; that was the 17 trigger event to -- to at least go down and control that 18 intersection. 19 Q: That was the triggering event for 20 calling out CMU? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: And as the lead of CMU it's important 23 that you know what the triggering event is, correct? 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: And certainly on September 8th, 1995,
631 when you gave your statement to SIU that was your view, 2 yes? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: And it remains your view today, May 5 10th, 2006? 6 A: Yes, sir. 7 Q: All right. Now, in terms of what you 8 were told by Korosec I want to explore if I can very 9 briefly with you whether he told you additional 10 information. I want to see if I can refresh your memory 11 about that. 12 If I could have your attention drawn 13 please and I apologize for the exhibit number missing. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 Q: I'm referring to the Korosec/Jacklin 18 September 5th, 1995, telephone call at 23:32. I'm 19 putting a copy of them and I'll have exhibit numbers for 20 you in a minute, in front of the Witness and the 21 Commissioner. 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 Q: The first thing I'm bringing to your
641 attention is P-1154 which is a call of September 5th, 2 1995, P-1154 and it's a call between Stan Korosec and 3 Wayde Jacklin. 4 And to be fair to Mr. Korosec to the 5 extent one needs to be, Mr. Korosec was woken up in a 6 manner of speaking. That is he had to -- his pager went 7 off and he called back and he was very angry at McLean 8 Hunter because they gave him an old page and he was 9 tired. 10 So he calls back Wayde Jacklin thinking he 11 was being contacted, all right? I just want you to know 12 that because that's the context. 13 A: Okay. 14 Q: Now I want to know, because this is 15 what's said at September 5th, 1995, less than twenty-four 16 (24) before Korosec calls you and then -- and 17 specifically less than twenty-four (24) hours before 18 Korosec briefs you. 19 And I want to know if he said these things 20 to you or brought these things to your attention, all 21 right? 22 If you could go to page -- the top of page 23 3. If you can go to the top of page 3, you see Korosec's 24 reporting, there's damage to windshields and they had a 25 little damage to some of the hoods of the cars too.
651 "KOROSEC: Little fuckers." 2 Now this is referring to the damage that 3 happened the -- the September 5th encounter or September 4 4th encounter. In other words, it's the pelting of rocks 5 and the breaking of windshields that you pointed out. 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: All right. And Wayde Jacklin: 8 "Yeah. The Inspector's in here 9 anyway." 10 Now stopping you there, so -- so we're 11 clear. Wayde Jacklin of course is -- was one of the 12 members of the CMU unit and the head of your arrest team, 13 correct? 14 A: Of the support. 15 Q: Yes. And so -- and Korosec's the 16 head of ERT, correct? 17 A: Number 1 District ERT Team. 18 Q: Yes. So he's in fact speaking to a 19 subordinate, that is Korosec, as the guy in charge of ERT 20 is speaking to a subordinate, fair? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: And -- and -- and Korosec says: 23 "Rocks? 24 JACKLIN: He's aware of it, yeah. 25 Well I guess somewhere between and a
661 rock and a boulder. Pretty good size I 2 guess. 3 KOROSEC: Yeah well, where did this 4 happen? In front of the gate? 5 JACKLIN: No, by the -- more towards 6 the main gate of the Provincial Park. 7 KOROSEC: Yeah, the main gate? 8 JACKLIN: Oh that's what you were 9 thinking, okay, yeah. 10 KOROSEC: Okay well, did the guys go 11 down there for something? 12 JACKLIN: Well yeah, there was some 13 stuff they put, you know, on the road I 14 guess and there was a fire down there. 15 KOROSEC: Yeah. 16 JACKLIN: So they went down to check 17 it out and got pelted. 18 KOROSEC: Yeah. They were baited. 19 JACKLIN: Yeah. 20 KOROSEC: Well, live and learn, live 21 and learn. This -- their day will 22 fucking come. 23 JACKLIN: Yeah. 24 KOROSEC: I was talking to Mark Wright 25 tonight.
671 JACKLIN: Hmm hmm. 2 KOROSEC: We want to amass a fucking 3 army. 4 JACKLIN: Hmm hmm. 5 KOROSEC: A real fucking army and do 6 this. Do these fuckers big time. But 7 I don't want to talk about it because 8 I'll get all hyped up. 9 JACKLIN: And you won't be able to 10 sleep. 11 KOROSEC: And I won't be able to 12 sleep." 13 Do you see that? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: Now what I want to ask you is that in 16 the briefing you received less than twenty-four (24) 17 hours later from Stan Korosec, did he talk to you about 18 either he or Mark Wright planning to amass an army? 19 A: Absolutely not. 20 Q: Did he talk to you about -- in 21 addition to that question, I want to ask you, did he talk 22 to you about that army doing these fuckers big time? 23 A: No, sir. 24 MR. IAN ROLAND: If he didn't talk to him 25 about an army, he can't talk about that army.
681 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Okay, fair enough. 2 Let me back up. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fair. 4 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That's fine. 5 That's a good point by Mr. Roland. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fair. 7 8 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 9 Q: Let me back up. He didn't talk about 10 an army? 11 A: No, sir. 12 Q: Separately, did he talk about, to you 13 on September 6th when he briefed you, doing these fuckers 14 big time? 15 A: No, sir. 16 Q: Now -- 17 A: As a matter of fact you did make a 18 recollect -- something in the conversation. What I got 19 it -- from Stan Korosec actually when he was telling me 20 what units I had and that he wouldn't be going with me he 21 was very apologetic for having -- for calling me out. 22 Like, you know, sorry I had to call you 23 out tonight, I know you're at home. I won't be going 24 with you, but George Hebblethwaite will. 25 I remember that part of a conversation.
691 Nothing of, you know, amassing an army or go, you know, 2 rah, rah, go down there and get these guys. It was more 3 of a -- I know, you were home, I know you're off-duty, 4 almost apologetic for having to call me in. That's what 5 I remember. 6 Q: But you'd agree with me that Stan 7 Korosec was someone who -- Stan Korosec was someone who 8 wondered if he'd done the right thing when he removed 9 himself from the Park in the face of the occupiers on 10 September 4th. 11 I mean we're talking about an individual 12 who's talking on September 5th and let me ask you -- 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm sorry, I 14 missed that last line there. 15 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: All right. By the 16 way, Mr. Commissioner, I am going to -- to an area that 17 this officer has personal knowledge of so if you'll bear 18 with me. 19 20 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 21 Q: You'll agree with me that Stan 22 Korosec, the Stan Korosec you talked to on September 6th, 23 1995 and the one we see in this tape transcript, was the 24 same officer who himself -- who himself had, in essence, 25 right, been wondering if he'd done the right thing about
701 leaving the Park on September 4th, to your knowledge? 2 I just want to know about your knowledge 3 of it. 4 Would you agree with that? 5 A: No, not necessarily. I mean, I just 6 -- no, I don't -- I can't totally agree with that at all. 7 I mean, I think that -- I remember the conversation with 8 Stan about that, you know, I think he just wanted to 9 reassure or something and I said to him better -- 10 discretion's the better part of valour and he agreed. 11 Q: When -- 12 A: Discretion's the better part of 13 valour. 14 Q: When you say "reassured," who were 15 you referring to? 16 A: Sergeant Korosec, that he had left 17 the Park and did the right thing. 18 Q: So you found yourself in a position, 19 following Stan Korosec leaving the Park on September 4th, 20 1995, of Stan Korosec following that incident, reaching 21 up to you -- 22 A: I don't know if he did. I just told 23 him he did the right thing. 24 Q: You don't know if he reached up to 25 you?
711 A: I don't believe so. I just remember 2 telling him, You know, you did the right thing. 3 Q: Could you please direct your 4 attention to Tab 7 of Commission -- 71, sorry, Tab 71 of 5 Commission Counsel documents. 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE) 8 9 Q: This is a transcript of proceeding of 10 July 15th, 1996 where you were testifying on the Cecil 11 Bernard George trial. 12 A: Yes, sir. 13 Q: And the particular aspect I'm 14 interested in starts at page 10 of that trial transcript, 15 during your examination-in-chief; page 10 of the trial 16 transcript, in respect of your examination-in-chief. 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 Q: Now, you're asked some questions by 21 Mr. Van Drunen, the Crown, and you answer at line 15 22 about your knowledge, all right? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: This is you, Mr. Lacroix. 25 A: Yes.
721 Q: "A: Yes." 2 This is at line 15. 3 "I certainly was not in attendance on 4 Monday night or Tuesday, so I was 5 basically -- I was informed that there 6 had been a near clash. It had come 7 almost to a physical clash and the 8 officers left the Park. They felt that 9 they were outnumbered. 10 They had left. All of the civilians 11 first were allowed to get out. The 12 officers pulled back to outside the 13 Park, I believe, and set up perimeter. 14 So I was aware on Tuesday morning we 15 were in a bit of a further escalation, 16 meaning that the initial occupation of 17 the Army Base was now -- had expanded 18 to be the Provincial Park." 19 Do you see that? 20 A: Yes, sir. 21 Q: So you're speaking to the issue that 22 you had become familiar or had been briefed, at least to 23 the point of knowing about the occupation and knowing 24 that the officers had been outnumbered and chosen to 25 leave, fair enough?
731 A: Right. 2 Q: Now, if you could flip to the next 3 page, page 11, line 20. Do you see that? Line 20? 4 A: Yeah, yes. 5 Q: Answer, by you again then. This is 6 you speaking, Mr. Lacroix. 7 A: Yes, sir. 8 Q: "A: So then I went back to my 9 regular duties Tuesday and my 10 recollection is that I wasn't involved 11 any further that day. Other than 12 Sergeant Korosec did come back and had 13 briefed me a little bit on what had 14 happened that night again, back on the 15 Monday night. 16 He was the sergeant in charge and I 17 think it was more of a reaching up to 18 me to see if he'd done the right thing 19 by vacating the Park. 20 And it was my feeling that he had done 21 that right thing, that the citizens 22 were out and that he really, rather 23 than push a confrontation, you know, 24 discretion being the better part of 25 valour."
741 A: Yes, sir. 2 Q: So on July 15th, 1996, less than a 3 year after the incident, you recall Stan Korosec reaching 4 up to you, yes? 5 A: Yes. And putting it into context, a 6 junior officer -- I'm saying that I felt a junior officer 7 was looking to see if the boss agreed that by him 8 vacating the Park at that time was the right thing to do 9 and I just assured him that it absolutely was. 10 I don't mean that he was like -- I mean, 11 he was looking for a positive reinforcement that, as you 12 and I said yesterday, how many -- I forget now, a hundred 13 (100) acres of pine trees -- 14 Q: That's right. 15 A: -- it was like, I shouldn't have, you 16 know, put us in jeopardy over a hundred (100) acres of 17 pine trees on the end of the season, the campers had 18 gone. 19 I said, Absolutely not. That was 20 absolutely the right thing to do. 21 Q: And -- and this is only to say this, 22 that granted the logic of your views on it being the 23 right thing to do, Stan Korosec as a junior officer in 24 your mind, is reaching up to you to get that reassurance? 25 A: Yeah. Just -- every day officers
751 that work for you -- I had sixty (60) of them working for 2 me -- 3 Q: Sure. 4 A: -- when they took decisions out on 5 the road, the next morning they might tell you a little 6 story. They wanted to see if you agreed with their 7 actions. 8 Q: And you described it as reaching up 9 to you, yes? 10 A: There I did, yes. 11 Q: Yes. And so you agree with that now? 12 A: Positive reinforcement. 13 Q: Fair enough. 14 A: I think he was looking for positive 15 reinforcement. 16 Q: Fair enough. And so that same 17 officer who needed that positive reinforcement, we -- 18 we've looked at a conversation of September 5th and it's 19 your point that on September 6th he never gave you that 20 information. But I want to ask you about a second 21 statement by Stan Korosec and I want to know if that 22 information was passed on to you. 23 And I'm going to ask Mr. -- Mr. Clerk to 24 pass this on to Mr. Commissioner and -- and the Witness; 25 it's a very brief statement.
761 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I just want 2 to remind you, Mr. Falconer, you indicated you'd be an 3 hour and a bit. It's just about an hour and a bit now so 4 just keep that in mind. 5 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I appreciate it and 6 I'm -- I'm getting near the end of this area. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just keep 8 that in mind. 9 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I have -- I -- I 10 must admit I have about two (2) more areas after this 11 that are quick areas. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 13 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: So -- thank you. 14 15 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 16 Q: Now, in terms of this other statement 17 this is a statement made by Mr. Korosec not when he's 18 upset about being woken up by a pager and I'm -- I was 19 given a sticky with the exhibit numbers and then I -- 20 it's Exhibit P-1155. 21 And I'm referring to Exhibit P-1155 at 22 page 1. Do you -- do you have that in -- in front of 23 you, sir? 24 A: The one you just handed me? 25 Q: Yeah, it --
771 A: Is this -- 2 Q: -- it says -- that's right, the one 3 he just handed you, Region 21, September 6th, 1995. It's 4 Exhibit P-1155. 5 Now, the -- the simple fact is that from 6 Command Post at 20:25 plus seven (7), so 20:32 -- 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: -- all right? At 20:32 Stan Korosec 9 is on the phone with an operator trying to make calls, 10 all right? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And the evidence is is that Korosec 13 is at Command Post, fair enough? 14 A: Hmm hmm. 15 Q: And what I'm going to put to you, 16 sir, is the statement by Stan Korosec at the start of 17 this call that is picked up by the tape and the statement 18 is as follows, by Korosec. Quote: 19 "Lacroix is on his way up to do these 20 guys." Close quotes. 21 And you see how that statement is made at 22 20:32? 23 A: Yes, sir. 24 Q: Now again, sir, you -- you recall the 25 reference by Korosec in the last passage I referred to:
781 "Do these fuckers big time." 2 Do you see that -- that last passage? 3 A: Yes, sir. 4 Q: Now, the next day Korosec says: 5 "Lacroix is on his way up to do these 6 guys." 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. Just 8 before you finish. 9 Yes, Mr. Roland...? 10 MR. IAN ROLAND: This Witness wasn't part 11 of the conversation. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No. 13 MR. IAN ROLAND: Stan Korosec has already 14 testified what he meant. He -- this Witness, Mr. 15 Lacroix, wasn't part of the conversation and can't be 16 asked to interpret a conversation he wasn't part of. 17 Stan Korosec has already interpreted his 18 conversation. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 20 MR. IAN ROLAND: So it's not fair to ask 21 for an interpretation from someone who wasn't part of 22 it -- 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 24 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- who didn't engage in 25 it, when we've already been given in evidence what Stan
791 Korosec meant -- 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 3 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I -- I don't -- 4 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- from Stan Korosec 5 himself. 6 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- I don't want an 7 interpretation. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm not sure 9 he's asking for an interpretation. 10 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I'm not asking for 11 an interpretation. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I haven't 13 heard that yet, but all right. 14 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I -- I'm very 15 tempted to discuss how compelling Stan Korosec's 16 interpretation of being -- 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well -- 18 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- but I'm not 19 going to. I'm not going there. 20 MR. DERRY MILLAR: That's, you know -- 21 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Fine. That's fine. 22 All -- I don't want an interpretation. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just -- 24 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: All I want is to 25 know if these words --
801 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: All right. 2 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- were used in his 3 briefing. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: In his 5 briefing. 6 All right. 7 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That's right. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Ask. 9 10 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 11 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Now, do you see the 12 words, quote: 13 "Lacroix is on his way up to do these 14 guys?" Close quotes. 15 A: Yes, sir. 16 Q: And again I -- and I -- and the only 17 reason because I was interrupted I just need to refocus 18 the question. Having a regard to what you saw in Exhibit 19 P-1154, quote, "Do these fuckers big time", close quotes, 20 does that refresh your memory as to whether Stan Korosec 21 used these words in briefing you? 22 A: Never. 23 Q: Sorry? 24 A: Never. 25 Q: He did not?
811 A: No, sir, absolutely. 2 Q: Okay. And I don't want you to 3 interpret these words because it's not for you to 4 interpret something Lacroix said to someone else. 5 A: All right. Of course. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 7 8 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 9 Q: But it's not for you to interpret 10 what Korosec said to someone else, but what I want to ask 11 you is this: Would you agree with me that as of, whether 12 it's 20:00 or 20:21 as reflected in the scribe notes, you 13 were on your way to the Command Post? 14 A: Yes, sir. 15 Q: And if we could just look at for a 16 moment those scribe notes again, please. It's Tab 12. 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 Q: Brief indulgence. 21 22 (BRIEF PAUSE) 23 24 Q: I'm realizing the passage that I was 25 looking for isn't reproduced at Tab 12 so what I'm going
821 to ask is for the Witness to have P-426 placed in front 2 of him which is the typed notes. 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 Q: At P-426. 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 Q: It's Tab 5 of P-426 and it's page 74. 11 I apologize, sir, I thought we could use the same tab but 12 it just doesn't happen to have that. 13 So have you've got P-426? If you could 14 turn to Tab 5 which is just page 74. So you see typed 15 page numbers in the typed scribe notes. 16 A: Yes, sir. 17 Q: Page 74, if you find that for me of 18 P-426, do you have that? 19 A: I think that's it. Yes. 20 Q: All right. And what I -- what I 21 simply want to bring to your attention is, do you see the 22 reference to "20:29, John Carson arrived"? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: All right. Now so you have the 25 setting, you see the same reflection in the typed notes:
831 "20:21 Stan Korosec called Lacroix". 2 You see that?" 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Now, "20:29, John Carson arrives." 5 So John Carson has come back to -- to the Command Post, 6 right? 7 A: Hmm hmm. 8 Q: "Trevor Richardson reports person in 9 kiosk. Mark Dew reports kids are about 10 to be picked up as women feel 11 something's about to happen. 12 JOHN CARSON: We should have TRU 13 dropped off at neighbouring area. 14 DALE LINTON: Update John Carson as to 15 Mark Wright report of mischief. 16 JOHN CARSON: What if we back up and 17 evacuate some neighbouring cottages? 18 We want to answer none. Guys are 19 injured if they're setting us up." 20 Do you see all that? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: All right. I take it you know, 23 certainly as of 9:30, how hectic things were at the 24 Command Post? 25 A: Yes.
841 Q: Do you recall a certain feeling or 2 urgency or escalation? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Now John Carson appears at 8:29 and 5 you can tell from the typed scribe notes, he's being 6 briefed, yes? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: All right. Would you agree with 9 this, between 8:29 and 8:32, there's no reference in the 10 scribe notes to John Carson speaking to Stan Korosec? 11 A: It doesn't appear to be. 8 -- 8:29 12 to...? 13 Q: 8:32. The three (3) minutes. 14 A: Yes it doesn't. 15 Q: Within the three (3) minutes of John 16 Carson arriving, it looks like in those first three (3) 17 minutes, just from the scribe notes, he's pretty busy, 18 agreed? 19 A: Yes. He doesn't appear to be -- be 20 briefed by Korosec, no. 21 Q: But do you recall what I put to you a 22 few minutes ago, Exhibit P-1155, where Stan Korosec 23 states as the fact, 24 "Lacroix is coming here to do these 25 guys."
851 Do you recall that? 2 A: Yeah. 3 MR. DERRY MILLAR: But, this is all 4 argument. 5 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: No, no. I'm about 6 to ask him a question. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You're 8 setting it up for argument, but you just -- you have to 9 ask questions that this Witness can help you with. 10 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: And I am about -- 11 and I am about to ask him a question. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. I mean 13 I assume -- 14 15 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 16 Q: Can you assist the Commission as to 17 how in view of the fact that Carson hasn't given any 18 directions in the first three (3) minutes of his arrival? 19 Can you assist the Commissioner, if you 20 know, as to where Stan Korosec would have gotten the -- 21 the decision that you were attending to do these guys? 22 A: I said to you before, I was under the 23 understanding that I was being called out by Dale Linton, 24 not Carson. And now there seems to be a shift changer 25 here.
861 So I -- it would seem to me that maybe 2 John Carson didn't know I was on the way. 3 Q: All right, thank you. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Okay. Move 5 on. You're beyond your time now so try to bring it to a 6 conclusion. 7 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Thank you. 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 12 Q: You made reference with respect to 13 the scene; that is your description of the events. You 14 made reference to the fact that in your mind -- in your 15 mind you felt that a firearm had been discharged in the 16 car that you fired at. 17 Do you remember saying that? 18 A: I -- I saw the -- I saw -- the car 19 that I fired at -- that I felt a weapon had been 20 discharged? 21 Q: Yes. 22 A: Yes by muzzle flash, but I cannot say 23 that I -- did you just say -- no I did not, I cannot say 24 I heard a discharge. 25 Q: All right. So all --
871 A: But there was noises of discharge 2 around me. 3 Q: Do you recall Wayde Jacklin's 4 evidence that I put to you yesterday about the limited 5 visibility arising from people moving around, the lights 6 and the shield on his helmet? 7 A: Absolutely. 8 Q: And did you agree with Mr. Jacklin? 9 A: I agree with that and I also -- and 10 realize when you're under stress you can have auditory 11 exclusion. 12 Q: Okay. And would you agree with me 13 that you also had a helmet with that same shield? 14 A: I did, sir. 15 Q: And that you also had your vision in 16 and around the time the car was going by, your vision was 17 subject to the same kinds of difficulties that Wayde 18 Jacklin described? 19 A: We were blinded, we had Lexan face 20 shields, quite large, up in front of our face. It seemed 21 like those lights brought out every scratch that you 22 didn't know you had in those lenses. 23 As a matter of fact, I didn't even hear 24 the bus almost hit me because of the helmet. The helmets 25 are like a motorcycle helmet. They are a full helmet;
881 they're not like a partial helmet. So, yes, your sensory 2 perception is affected. 3 Q: Now, you know that one of the things 4 that police or forensics are able to do is analyse items 5 to determine if there are gun residue on them? 6 That's one of the things that is used as a 7 mechanism for determining if a firearm was discharged 8 close to an item or around an item. 9 You know that? 10 A: I know they can do certain things 11 with residue, but I'm not -- I'm not a forensic analyst 12 or nor am I -- 13 Q: All right. 14 A: -- nor am I ident trained. 15 Q: Did you -- given your evidence about 16 seeing a muzzle flash -- 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: -- did you ever learn whether or not 19 a examination by the Centre for Forensic Sciences or by 20 the police was made of the vehicle as to whether there 21 was evidence of a gun being discharged in the vehicle? 22 A: I never did hear. But I don't know - 23 - I would assume that it was done. 24 Q: All right. I'm referring, for 25 Counsel's sake, to Document Number 1000073 and Document
891 Number 1000001, page 38. In both these cases, there is a 2 reference to a gun powder residue examination being done 3 and we've heard no evidence of any positive finding. 4 Is that consistent with your 5 understanding, that there was no gunpowder residue found 6 in the vehicle? 7 A: I have never been debriefed and never 8 been allowed to sit through an entire trial at any time, 9 so I have never heard what you just said to me until now. 10 Q: All right. And you'd agree with me 11 that based on your experience as a TRU team leader, a 12 police officer of extensive tactical experience, that the 13 existence of gunpowder residue can be an indication of 14 something, correct? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: But the absence doesn't necessarily 17 mean there's no gun, right? 18 A: No, especially when they get the -- I 19 only -- it seems to me, the crimescene was turned over 20 something like ten (10) -- I was called into work with 21 SIU something like the 19th. That crime scene was quite 22 a bit old and I know that those things actually do have a 23 -- you know, an effect. I mean, that has an effect. 24 So, I mean, it might have been examined, 25 but, yes, I don't know what they found and didn't found
901 and I don't know how long those residue stay. 2 Q: Fair enough. I'm going to propose to 3 file these two (2) reports as I've referred to them as -- 4 as the next two (2) exhibits, Mr. Commissioner. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 6 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: And as I said, the 7 first report is Document Number 10000001, page 38. And 8 appropriate notice was given to My Friends and the 9 Witness. 10 And the person who tests this report -- 11 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Actually, I don't know 12 if it's necessary to be repeating it. Whether notice is 13 given or not doesn't make anything -- 14 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well, that's -- 15 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- to do with what -- 16 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: No, that's fine. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 18 We're trying to get to the end though, so get to it. 19 MR. IAN ROLAND: If this Witness doesn't 20 know anything about any -- 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: This Witness 22 hasn't -- 23 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- of that -- 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- done 25 anything --
911 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- and I gather Stan 2 Thompson -- 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It doesn't 4 matter if it goes through this Witness or some other way, 5 though. 6 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Yeah. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Let's get 8 the exhibits in and move on. 9 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: The second document 10 -- so the first one is the listing of the Chrysler New 11 Yorker vehicle that was tested and the second document is 12 Document Number 1000073, pages 495 to 497, which is the 13 itemization of the return of the warrant in relation to 14 the vehicle, is the next exhibit, please. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 16 Now, I presume you're on your last area? 17 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I -- I'm moving 18 fast through the two (2) -- 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, I'm 20 saying that you've used up more than your time and I'd 21 like you to try to bring it to a conclusion. 22 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Thank you. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: There are 24 other lawyers, there are other parties who can ask some 25 of these questions as well, Mr. Falconer.
921 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Fair enough. I 2 hear you, Mr. Commissioner. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 4 THE REGISTRAR: Document Number 100001 5 (sic) is P-1468. 6 7 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1468: Document number 1000001. OPP 8 Technical Identification 9 Services Unit Master Exhibit 10 Continuity/Examination list 11 re. School bus and Chrysler, 12 October 14, 1995. 13 14 THE REGISTRAR: And Document Number 15 1000073 is P-1469. 16 17 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1469: Document Number 1000073. 18 Description of Item seized 19 and detained re. 1982 20 Chrysler New Yorker (Brown), 21 September 27, 1995. 22 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 24 25 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER:
931 Q: I just wanted to inquire about one 2 (1) other matter, without taking you through all your 3 notes. 4 There's a reference to the February 1995 5 incident involving Daryl George in February 1995. You 6 were involved in that incident? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And you make reference in your notes 9 to a failure to follow standing operating procedure; do 10 you recall that? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: Now, I just want to understand. You 13 testified yesterday about how it -- it is difficult -- it 14 is a difficult fit, you didn't use these words. I'm just 15 summarizing. 16 A: Right. 17 Q: It's a difficult fit to apply the CMU 18 model to controlling the Aboriginal community in the way 19 it was applied on September 6th. 20 Do you remember talking about that? 21 A: There seems to be a different 22 cultural perception and reality. 23 Q: Would you agree that on Feb -- in 24 February 1995, when efforts were made to deal with the 25 Daryl George incident, again you encountered a difficulty
941 in dealing with the Aboriginal community through standard 2 police practices? 3 A: Absolutely. 4 Q: Explain. 5 A: I mean this -- this whole Project 6 Maple says contain and negotiate. Okay? The word 7 'contain' I talked about the other day, it means 8 perimeters. 9 The whole idea is to keep the public from 10 wandering into the occurrence, you know, to keep the good 11 people out and keep the bad guy in; that's what it means. 12 It means all kinds of things like megaphoning the house, 13 Give up, give up, give up. 14 We went into the First Nation community in 15 Kettle Point. People took offence to the checkpoints. 16 We almost had to bring out an ERT team to keep people 17 away from the checkpoints. 18 We were being harangued for being on the 19 reserve; and you're not reserve police; and what are you 20 doing here; and what are you doing to that guy in the 21 house; to the brother trying to come through the 22 perimeters on a skidoo to pick him up; to ride him off 23 into the sunset; to a neighbour coming out to the back 24 window and yelling in to him, The cops are over there 25 taking away invisible deployment; to the Band Chief -- or
951 not the Band Chief the police chief driving in through 2 the -- both perimeters to pick them up in his car against 3 all standard operating procedures in every police college 4 in North America and the western world. 5 So I would say the contain and negotiate, 6 that we know of, does not work. 7 Q: And the reasons it does not work are 8 the reasons you enunciated yesterday, about the different 9 style of community you're dealing with and the different 10 interests they have? 11 A: Not too many places I would say in 12 Ontario that everybody in that little subdivision are 13 related. You know, they're all related and of course 14 they -- they become emotional. They see police 15 surrounding their cousin. 16 They're -- they're all of one (1) race. 17 They're all of one (1) heritage, related. It's a small, 18 tight community. It -- our tactics do not work in a 19 First Nations community. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You made 21 these points yesterday. You made these points. 22 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: No, but this is in 23 the context -- 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, that's 25 fine. That's why you've gone -- but now you're
961 repeating. 2 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: And -- and thank 3 you. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Up until now 5 it's been fine. 6 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Fair enough. This 7 is -- I understand I'm about to push my luck. I'm asking 8 for three (3) minutes for a last area that -- that is a 9 last area I want to -- it's -- it's a wrap-up finished 10 area. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: If you say 12 three (3) minutes, that's fine. 13 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Okay. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: But I 15 sometimes think if you say three (3) minutes you don't 16 mean it, but let's -- 17 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well -- 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- let's see 19 how we can do it. Three (3) minutes. 20 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I don't have a lot 21 of credibility on this, I -- 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I mean this 23 is important. You're bringing out some important 24 matters. I'm -- 25
971 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 2 Q: To -- to finish, Mr. Lacroix -- 3 A: Yes, sir. 4 Q: -- to finish. You've seen and we've 5 examined all the different informations that different 6 officers had about firearms that you didn't have when the 7 CMU marched, correct? Do you remember? 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 Q: All right. And you've seen and we've 10 heard from Inspector Skinner that he made a point of 11 passing on to his TRU team this information about 12 firearms; fair enough? 13 A: Yes, sir. 14 Q: In your time as a TRU team member and 15 TRU team leader, did you ever have to take responsibility 16 for thirty (30) to forty (40) officers marching in the 17 dark who potentially faced being fired upon by sniper 18 fire the way that TRU team did that night? 19 A: You mean CMU? 20 Q: As -- no. Back up. Put yourself for 21 a moment -- 22 A: As a TRU team leader? 23 Q: That's right. 24 A: No, sir. 25 Q: All right. And would you agree with
981 me that if there was a reasonable belief, as we've heard 2 evidence of, they had a belief, right? It doesn't matter 3 that it's not true, they had a belief that there could be 4 snipers with AK47's or imitation AK47's behind trees, 5 fair? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: That makes the officers marching down 8 the road somewhat sitting ducks, fair? 9 A: If you truly believe that those 10 weapons are there, they would be marching into an ambush. 11 Q: And the persons responsible for 12 protecting those officers, the sitting ducks, would be 13 the TRU team members? 14 A: That's their role; that's what they 15 were there for. 16 Q: And you'd agree with me that's a very 17 heavy responsibility in terms of compared to being 18 invisibly deployed on your own as TRU team? 19 A: That would be probably the most 20 difficult assignment that a TRU team member could face. 21 Q: It might cause you to be twice as 22 careful as to what people are holding as those officers, 23 as sitting ducks, march down the road, true? Correct? 24 You might be -- 25 A: I would think you're cautious at all
991 times, but I -- I mean you would feel the burden, let's 2 say, of command. 3 Q: And would you agree with this? It 4 wasn't -- it wasn't -- there is no piece of information 5 that I have shown you, so far, to show how incident 6 command cleared up the misapprehension about the 7 existence of firearms? I haven't shown you a piece of 8 information about how command cleared that up? 9 A: No, you haven't shown to me and 10 that's what I've been a little bit reluctant and reticent 11 to speak to, is because obviously John Carson would have 12 all of the pieces, and Mark Wright would have pieces that 13 I -- I mean I -- I don't know what else there was there. 14 I mean, the pieces you're showing me, I 15 would agree with you, but I mean I don't know what other 16 intelligence and what other conversations. They were 17 there all day. I -- I don't -- 18 Q: But assuming -- 19 A: I don't know how they reconciled that 20 in their mind, or did they believe the intelligence or, 21 you know, did they feel it was concrete enough. 22 Q: But I took you -- and I'm just 23 finishing. I took you to Skinner -- 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: -- who said he believed it fair
1001 probability, correct? 2 A: That was his statement. 3 Q: Right. And all I want to ask you is 4 this. 5 A: But everything's risk management, I'm 6 sorry. 7 Q: Sure. But you said it would be a 8 heavy burden for those TRU officers tasked with 9 protecting those officers walking down the road, right? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: And you'd agree with this, that in 12 terms of an alternative, you could either 1) clarify and 13 confirm your intelligence before anybody marches, right? 14 A: Yes. If you could clear it up to the 15 inth degree, or whatever, yes. 16 Q: So that, for example, Ken Deane 17 wouldn't feel that heavy burden, correct? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Or you could not march at all, so 20 that Ken Deane wouldn't feel that heavy burden, right? 21 A: You could delay, yes. 22 Q: And you can see how a person without 23 night vision, that is a person who doesn't have the 24 benefit of a Beauchesne night vision scope, right? 25 A: Right.
1011 Q: Would be with that heavy burden 2 seeing every occupier with a stick who might have a gun, 3 right? 4 A: If some of the men were thinking 5 there was guns out there, it could make you jumpy. 6 Q: And in making you jumpy, the one 7 person who could stop that level of jumpiness would be 8 the Incident Commander, agreed? 9 A: My briefings were that they did not 10 feel that there was weapons there. Then I was giving TRU 11 in support to be doubly sure. I was asked if I was 12 satisfied with that, having two (2) sniper observer 13 teams, plus two (2) flank teams. 14 Myself weighing out the risk on 15 unsubstantiated, unconfirmed intelligence report, I 16 didn't get the AK47. I had shots heard, shots, but that 17 had been going on since the beginning of this, around the 18 Army Camp. 19 I felt satisfied that the risk was not 20 that great and I was well in good hands with one (1) TRU 21 team covering us. So I took that risk. 22 Q: And you didn't -- 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Please end 24 it, Mr. Falconer. Please end it. 25 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I am.
1021 2 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 3 Q: And with Mr. Commissioner's 4 direction, I simply put this to you, that was your state 5 of mind, but based on what I showed you yesterday, you'd 6 agree with me apparently that was neither Inspector 7 Skinner's state of mind nor his TRU team's state of mind, 8 agreed? 9 A: But they must have come to some place 10 where they had somehow reconciled within themself that 11 the risk was not -- somehow it was unsubstantiated. I do 12 not -- I know both John Carson, I know Mark Wright, 13 they're both -- especially John Carson, he's an, you 14 know, extremely conscientious, very deep thinking man. I 15 mean he was a negotiator with me for years. He was the 16 one that did the negotiations. 17 I can't see John Carson sending us down 18 the road if he truly believed the threat was that high. 19 Q: But you saw nothing that night, nor 20 have I shown you anything where that thinking, that the 21 threat wasn't that high, was passed on to those TRU team 22 members in charge of the CMU protecting them. 23 A: From what you showed me. 24 Q: Thank you, sir. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you
1031 very much, Mr. Falconer. We'll take our morning break 2 now. 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 4 for fifteen (15) minutes. 5 6 --- Upon recessing at 10:31 a.m. 7 --- Upon resuming at 10:50 a.m. 8 9 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 10 resumed, please be seated. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 12 morning, Mr. Rosenthal. 13 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Good morning, Mr. 14 Commissioner. Before I begin, may I introduce somebody 15 who's going to be helping Ms. Esmonde and me in the home 16 stretch. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 18 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Amanda Rogers is 19 sitting where Ms. Esmonde normally sits. And she's a 20 student who just finished second year law at the 21 University of Toronto and will be assisting us for a 22 couple of months. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Welcome. 24 Welcome to our Inquiry. 25 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Thank you, Mr.
1041 Commissioner. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You 3 originally estimated three (3) hours, Mr. Rosenthal. 4 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Has that 6 changed at all in view of Mr. Falconer's examination or-- 7 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I'm going to try -- 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- are you 9 still on that -- 10 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- to be -- come in 11 at less than three (3) hours -- 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 13 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- lets's see how I 14 do. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 16 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I shall try my best 17 to better that estimate then. 18 19 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 20 Q: Good morning, sir. 21 A: Morning. 22 Q: I'm Counsel for some of the Stoney 23 Point people of the name Aazhoodena and George Family 24 Group. 25 A: Thank you, sir.
1051 Q: Now, I want to take something out of 2 order that I observed when you were answering questions 3 from Mr. Falconer just a few minutes ago. 4 Do you recall that he put to you the 5 statement that Mark Wright had made to Inspector Carson 6 about Linton waffling, and he asked you if that was 7 appropriate and if that was usual. 8 You recall that? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: And when he asked you, Was that a 11 usual thing? I observed you to say, Ah, not, ah; and you 12 were smiling as you said that. And then you said, Yes. 13 Now what I thought was going through your 14 mind and I'd like to know, is you were thinking, well, 15 not if you know Mark Wright, that wouldn't be so unusual, 16 right? 17 A: No. I was just thinking that you 18 wouldn't normally do that in front of another command 19 officer. If you were a staff sergeant -- 20 Q: Yeah. 21 A: -- you wouldn't be speaking within 22 earshot of an inspector about he's a waffler. 23 Q: Yes. I -- so that's why you were 24 smiling, thinking about that. 25 A: Yeah.
1061 Q: Okay. 2 A: I thought it would be a career- 3 limiting move. 4 Q: Well, Mark Wright has become 5 Inspector since then. 6 A: That's right. 7 Q: So I guess that doesn't work like 8 that, always. 9 In any event, according to your CV you 10 were on sabbatical from October 2002 to May 2005. I 11 didn't realise that the OPP had sabbaticals. And could 12 you tell us -- 13 A: Well, I was just trying to use -- 14 it's actually called a leave of absence without pay. 15 Q: I see. A leave of absence without 16 pay. 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: I see. Okay. Thank you. Now if you 19 could please turn to your Tab 10, which is Exhibit P-418 20 to the Inquiry, and it's Inquiry document 1012239. 21 And this includes the letter that Mr. 22 Marcel Beaubien wrote to Mr. Harnick, Attorney General, 23 on August 14, 1995. 24 I should like to ask you a bit about that 25 document, sir.
1071 A: Right. 2 Q: Now, you were asked about this during 3 your examination in-chief. 4 A: Right. 5 Q: I'd like to see if we can reconcile 6 your evidence and Mr. Beaubien's evidence about this. 7 A: Okay. 8 Q: Now, if you look at the second page 9 of that letter, there are points 2, 3 and 4 on that page. 10 A: Hmm hmm. 11 Q: And you indicated, you agreed there 12 was consensus about the other points but you had a 13 problem with number 3; do you recall that? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: And then if we look towards the 16 bottom of that page, the last paragraph reiterates some 17 of the points enumerated in the numbered paragraphs. 18 And I should like to just give you a 19 little bit of an excerpt of Mr. Beaubien's testimony 20 about that last paragraph. 21 Sir, could you please give a copy of this 22 to the Witness and one (1) to the Commissioner. 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25
1081 Q: This is an extract of Mr. Beaubien's 2 testimony on January 19, 2006, beginning page 45. 3 MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: Do you have an extra 4 copy. 5 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Oh, I'm sorry. 6 MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: Thank you. 7 8 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 9 Q: And Mr. Beaubien has read that last 10 paragraph as detailed to Ministers Hodgson, Harnick and 11 Runciman. 12 "We will take the following position 13 until further instruction is received 14 from the Ministries. We will be 15 legally prepared to uphold Ipperwash 16 Park. Enforcement is a short term 17 solution and we need the Ministries to 18 give clear guidelines to the OPP for 19 enforcement. 20 I would like a negotiated settlement. 21 Failing that, a clear stand on what are 22 provincial matters, and that the law 23 will be upheld. This is an opportune 24 time if the elected First Nation 25 officials are supportive in upholding
1091 the law." 2 That quotation is read to Mr. Beaubien, 3 and then he's asked: 4 "Now first of all, who are you 5 referring to when you use the term 'we' 6 as in 'we will take the following 7 position and we will be legally 8 prepared to uphold Ipperwash Park,' et 9 cetera?" 10 And he answers: 11 "Well, you know, I -- we had a -- I had 12 a meeting with those three (3) or four 13 (4) individuals, so I imagine that I'm 14 speaking on their behalf, and maybe I 15 shouldn't be speaking on their behalf, 16 but that's basically -- I would imagine 17 that's consequently to the meeting we 18 had." 19 Now, the three (3) or four (4) 20 individuals, as you know, include Wade Lacroix? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: Now, you told us on May 8th, a couple 23 of days ago, I have a bit of an extract from your 24 testimony. 25
1101 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: On page 152, beginning at line 19, on 4 May 8th; so then the next consensus: 5 "Ministers involved have to give the 6 OPP clear guidelines for law 7 enforcement." 8 And then you say: 9 "It doesn't look like he agreed with 10 what we had to say, because he's 11 obviously saying somebody else has to 12 tell the OPP after we described that, 13 like, on West Ipperwash Beach trespass 14 does not apply because it's a land 15 claim, because it's in the civil 16 courts, and there's a colour of right 17 issue. 18 Q: And do you recall agreeing with 19 the Ministries -- agreeing that the 20 Ministries have to give the OPP clear-- 21 A: No, that -- that's what I'm 22 saying. It seems like he heard us on 23 number 2, but then on number 3 he's 24 saying somebody's got to give us clear 25 direction. But we were explaining that
1111 it's not clear because it's in the 2 courts, there's a colour of right 3 issue. 4 Q: So you don't agree that we had 5 consensus, obviously? 6 I don't think we had consensus." 7 Now, sir, what I would suggest to you is 8 maybe Mr. Beaubien meant something slightly different 9 than you interpreted, and maybe you would agree with him, 10 namely as follows. I mean you indicated in your answer 11 that you explained to him that there are some problems 12 because of colour of right and so on, right? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And so isn't it possible then, 15 thinking back, that that's part of what should have been 16 cleared up by the ministries, according to the consensus; 17 in other words, that the discussion was between you, your 18 fellow officers, and Mr. Beaubien, there are various 19 problems here, the colour of right issues, there are all 20 sorts of issues here. 21 A: Right. 22 Q: And we need some clear guidelines. 23 And the various ministries, Solicitor General, Natural 24 Resources, whoever, have to get together, figure this 25 out, and give us some clear guidelines.
1121 Wouldn't that be a possible reconciliation 2 of your evidence and Mr. Beaubien's evidence? 3 A: It could be a reconciliation, I just 4 -- all I meant was that the one (1), two (2), and four 5 (4) from our presentation, was we were explaining to a 6 brand new minister -- 7 Q: Right. 8 A: -- that this is a very complex issue, 9 it's not as simple as just going down there and evicting 10 these people from a campground. 11 Q: Right. 12 A: I don't remember us, say, appealing 13 to him or pitching to him that if you could get some 14 clear direction from other ministries to us, we could 15 maybe do more, as this infers. 16 We were telling him we have all the 17 direction we need, it's just not that clear. We're 18 before the courts and once we get the court injunction, 19 then, okay, the court will give us direction. 20 But I -- I don't remember us telling him 21 we needed other ministries to give us direction. 22 Q: Well, if you -- if you putto him, We 23 have all the direction we need but it's not clear, 24 doesn't that suggest a possible request to clarify. 25 A: And I guess we did explain to him
1131 that it wasn't as clear or as clearly -- it wasn't as 2 simple as that, somebody just telling us get, like, say, 3 the Ministry of -- of Natural Resources just had to give 4 us direction. I think we were telling him, It's not that 5 simple. It's not a ministry thing, it's a court thing. 6 Q: So in any event you -- you had 7 consensus on the other three (3) items? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: But on this -- on -- on item number - 10 - I can't remember what number it is. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Three (3). 12 13 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 14 Q: Three (3). You don't think he 15 correctly interpreted your position, or he may not have 16 correctly interpreted your position? 17 A: Yeah, he -- I don't think he totally 18 understood what we were saying to him, in that one (1) 19 area that -- maybe he did, as you're -- if I hear you 20 correctly, he may have thought we were saying we need 21 more direction. 22 But I know we were trying to tell him that 23 it's not going to be direction from the Solicitor General 24 or the MNR or anybody else; it's going to be direction 25 from the courts.
1141 Q: Okay. Thank you. Now, if you could 2 turn to your Tab 21, please, which is P-438. And that's 3 the logger tape of the crucial time that night, marching 4 down the road. 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Now you explained to us, sir, that 7 some of what's recorded there was intentionally recorded 8 because you pressed the button purposely to make a 9 transmission, whereas other parts of it might have been 10 unintentionally recorded, just because someone left the 11 mic open. 12 Do you recall that, sir? 13 A: Yeah. Usually, the ones that are 14 intentional, you'll see -- you always preface CMU to TOC, 15 TOC to CMU. If you see some communications where there's 16 no prologue -- 17 Q: Right. 18 A: -- it's more than likely secondary 19 conversation. 20 Q: Yes. So that's how we can 21 distinguish which -- whether it was an intentional 22 communication or an accidental communication? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: Now, now we understand there was a 25 separate TRU line of communications. And that wouldn't
1151 necessarily be recorded on this, right? 2 A: No. It's a separate line, yes. 3 Q: But what would be recorded on here is 4 all communications between CMU and the Tactical Operation 5 Centre, during that time period, and some additional, 6 accidental remarks, right? 7 A: That's -- theoretically all 8 communication should have been picked up by that logger. 9 Q: Yes. Now, on the very first page of 10 that there's communication attributed to you: 11 "Good news. They've got rocks and 12 sticks piled up. We all know we can 13 beat that. Rocks and sticks, that's in 14 our bailiwick. All we have to worry 15 about is little brown stocks and black 16 barrels." 17 Now from your other evidence, and from 18 this, am I correct in interpreting that, that you were 19 reflecting your understanding that they did not have any 20 firearms at that point? 21 A: That's right, I had just gotten an 22 update just before this communication. 23 "Good news. The sighting coming from 24 the TOC is rocks and sticks. No -- no 25 guns."
1161 Q: Right. And people who have AK47's 2 aren't going to resort to rocks, probably. 3 A: I wouldn't think so. They wouldn't 4 be spending that time, yeah. 5 Q: I'm sorry, sir? 6 A: They wouldn't be taking time to pile 7 up rocks. 8 Q: If you have an AK-47, that's a much 9 more effective weapon that a rock. 10 A: Yeah. 11 Q: Now, as you marched down on the road 12 that night, leading the CMU team, you were instructed to 13 go part way down the road and then stop and not continue 14 until you got further permission; isn't that right? 15 A: It was go to the 300 metres out and 16 check in, is what I understood it to be. 17 Q: And get permission, right? Before 18 proceeding, right? 19 A: As I described, the normal context of 20 that, though, is there's more to it than that. Yes, I 21 was told to go 300 metres, check in; that's called a 22 phase line. 23 That's kind of a last line of -- we call 24 it recall authority. It's easier to recall up that you 25 do go to that point, you check in, you get an update of
1171 intelligence. If all systems are go, it's carry on with 2 the plan. 3 But at the same time, the Incident 4 Commander can recall you at any time. 5 Q: Yes. 6 A: But yes, there is this -- there is 7 this, Go this far, check in. 8 Q: And get permission before proceeding, 9 right? 10 A: It's -- it's more of a check up to 11 make sure all things are go. 12 Q: Now, sir, if you could please turn 13 then to Tab 28 of your brief. 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: Which is Exhibit P-1153. 16 A: Hmm hmm. What was that, 28? 17 Q: Tab 28. It's you interview by 18 Sergeant Richardson on September 8, sir. 19 A: Yeah, and the page? 20 Q: Sorry? I haven't told you a page 21 yet. 22 A: Oh, okay. 23 Q: But now I shall request that you look 24 at page 5 of that. At the bottom of page 5, three (3) 25 lines from the bottom, it says:
1181 "So we moved back on the road, I got 2 permission from TOC to proceed. 3 We're talking back and forth about what 4 it was, and I got permission to proceed 5 to within three hundred (300) yards of 6 the parking lot." 7 A: That's the bottom of page 3? 8 Q: The bottom of page 5. 9 A: Oh, 5. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You may have 11 a different copy, I don't see that -- 12 THE WITNESS: Yeah. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- on page 5 14 either. 15 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Oh, I'm sorry. I 16 may have a different pagination. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. I 18 don't see that on page 5. 19 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Hmm. 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 24 Q: Sorry. It's the anticipated 25 evidence. Do you have the anticipated evidence document,
1191 sir? It's Sergeant Richardson's interview of you, is 2 that -- 3 A: Right. Yeah, I have that. 4 MR. DERRY MILLAR: I don't know if it's - 5 - see he's got this. 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE) 8 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: What we're 10 looking at is a taped interview of September 8th -- 11 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Oh, sorry. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- of 13 Sergeant Lacroix. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You're 18 looking at the same thing as I am? 19 THE WITNESS: Yes. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 21 THE WITNESS: Nothing on page 5. 22 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Yeah, the document 23 that My Friend is looking at is different than what's at 24 Tab 28. And it may be that My Friend can use Tab 28, but 25 Exhibit P-1153 is what's at Tab 28.
1201 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I have a different 2 Inquiry document number which purports to be the same 3 interview. 4 And with -- 5 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Do you want to use 6 this? 7 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: If I could borrow - 8 - thank you, Mr. Millar. I'm using his copy. 9 Sorry, Mr. Commissioner, someone -- 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 11 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- put a different 12 Inquiry document number in my book here. So with your 13 indulgence, I'll find that in here, hopefully. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes. 18 19 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 20 Q: If you could look at page 11, then, 21 sorry, sir, it's about a third of the way down. 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 Q: It's interesting, Mr. Commissioner,
1211 my document number purports to be the same interview, and 2 is quite the same but has some different words in it, and 3 I'm not sure about that. 4 But anyway, if we could look about a third 5 of the way down on page 11. 6 "So we moved back on the road. I, ah, 7 got the permission to proceed. We were 8 talking back and forth, back and forth 9 about what it was, and I got permission 10 to proceed to within 300 yards of the 11 parking lot." 12 A: Right. 13 Q: So that was correct, wasn't it? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: Permission to proceed was to within 16 300 yards of the parking lot. 17 A: That's right. 18 Q: And you had no permission to go any 19 further at that point? 20 A: Yes. I guess all I'm saying to you 21 is that you're briefed a mission, and the OPP then says, 22 Along this line check in. 23 Okay, there's a mission; go do the 24 mission. Then there are these checkpoints along the 25 line. And yes, you're supposed to check in at that
1221 point. 2 Q: And the permission to proceed would 3 have emanated from the TOC, right? 4 A: Yes, from -- from the incident 5 commander, yes. 6 Q: Yes. From the incident commander, 7 and we understand mainly through, I believe he was at the 8 time, Staff Sergeant Skinner, correct? 9 A: Kent Skinner was being the voice of 10 the Incident Commander in the TOC. 11 Q: Yes. But it was Skinner's voice as-- 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: -- on behalf of the incident 14 commander? 15 A: That's right. They -- the two (2) of 16 them would be in the -- in the vehicle together, I 17 believe. 18 Q: And then if you turn to the next 19 page, 12. 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 Q: It says: 24 "So I said they know, ah, where, and I 25 sought permission to proceed and was
1231 given permission to proceed as -- as 2 planned, which was to clear the parking 3 lot." 4 A: Right. 5 Q: So you needed to get explicit 6 permission, right? And you sought it and were given it, 7 is what you told Mr. Richardson the day after this event, 8 right? 9 A: Yeah, I -- you're -- I know how 10 you're reading it. You'd have to take OPP Level 2 11 incident command to understand it is -- this permission 12 is you're planned to do a mission, as briefed. There are 13 stage lines and there are these check-ins. 14 The permission is not this hard -- you 15 know, you only go that far, you check in at that time, if 16 all things are lined up you carry on. So the -- there is 17 the permission is a soft permission, it's not a hard 18 permission. 19 But yes, I -- I needed permission to carry 20 on. It's a time to stop and say, We still good? Like 21 both sides are going, Are you still good? 22 Q: Sir -- 23 A: TOC command and commander. 24 Q: Are -- 25 A: I'm at this point, How we doing;
1241 that's what it is. 2 Q: You said it's a soft permission? Did 3 I hear your correctly, sir? 4 A: Yeah. It's -- it's a -- it's not at 5 300 metres you're going to stop, you know, and change the 6 whole mission. You go out with the plan; that's what 7 you're going to -- you're going to go clear this parking 8 lot. Yes, sir, I'm going to go clear the parking lot. 9 Okay, along the way check in with me. 10 The whole idea is if intelligence may come 11 in the mission may change. It usually changes to recall 12 you or something, it's not a -- it's not a hard line. 13 You -- you are to check in, okay, it's a Comms check -- 14 Q: So are you -- your statement to Mr. 15 Richardson the day after this event was that you sought 16 permission to proceed and were given permission to do so? 17 A: Yep. 18 Q: And that was when you were 300 yards 19 out? 20 A: That's what it says here I believe, 21 yeah. It could have been a little closer. It was hard 22 to tell at that -- I think it might have been even two- 23 fifty (250). I think I moved one (1) -- one (1) 50 yard 24 pole ahead. 25 MR. IAN ROLAND: It actually reads:
1251 "To proceed with -- to within 300 2 yards." 3 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: No, that's the -- 4 that's the earlier one. My Friend is talking about page 5 11. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 7 THE WITNESS: Yeah, on the page 4 I said: 8 "We proceeded in box formation until we 9 got about two (2) to three hundred 10 (300)." 11 It's hard to say because there's no 12 distance estimation so I stopped. Seemed to be about 13 four (4) or five (5) power poles. I figured we were 14 about 50 yards so it could have been two-fifty (250) 15 anyway. 16 So I mean I was between two-fifty (250) 17 and three hundred (300) I guess. 18 19 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 20 Q: Yes, but just to clarify the point 21 raised by your counsel. On page 11 you were reporting -- 22 you had gotten permission to proceed -- to within 300 23 yards, right? 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: But then on page 12 you were stating,
1261 were you not, to Mr. Richardson, that you sought and 2 received permission to proceed further; is that correct? 3 A: That was my recollection, yes, sir. 4 Q: Not to stay with -- 300 yards out but 5 to proceed closer than 300 yards is what you were 6 telling -- 7 A: Right. 8 Q: -- Sergeant Richardson on page 12, 9 right? 10 A: Right. 11 Q: Now, if we could please look at Tab 12 52 of your document brief and I hope I have the same 13 document as you do at that brief, at that tab, 52, the 14 transcript of Warren George. An excerpt from the 15 proceedings of Regina and Warren George which has been 16 entered as P-1462, the excerpt has. 17 And if you could look please at page 91 of 18 that excerpt? 19 20 (BRIEF PAUSE) 21 22 Q: Are you at page 91, sir? 23 A: Yes, sir. 24 Q: Beginning at line 11: 25 "So we carried on. I had originally
1271 been briefed to stop about 200 yards 2 out to let our presence be known so 3 that any occupiers would know that we 4 were there and that we were in hard TAC 5 equipment." 6 And then continuing further on at line 21: 7 "So I was briefed to stop at about 200 8 years out and seek permission to carry 9 on from that time." 10 Now, did you give that evidence under oath 11 at the trial of Warren George? 12 A: I did. 13 Q: And was that accurate evidence at the 14 time, sir? 15 A: Yes, it is. 16 Q: And was that a soft permission that 17 was required to carry on or actual permission? 18 A: I'm just telling you, sir, the way it 19 works... 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 A: The way that it works with that 24 permission -- Yes, there's permission, sir. I was under 25 the Incident Commander. He at any time can say, Halt.
1281 Q: But this required explicit permission 2 from the Incident Commander to go closer than 2 or 300 3 yards, right? 4 A: It was to go up to 200 yards to be in 5 sight of the occupiers. 6 Q: Well, you said 200 yards, you said 7 300 yards the day afterward to Mr. Richardson. 8 A: 300 yards, yeah that's right. Well, 9 I'd have to figure out how much time there was between 10 this trial and that trial. 11 Q: Yes. So I'm not trying to quibble 12 over a 100 yards, okay? 13 A: Right. 14 Q: But I am suggesting that it's clear 15 from your statement to Sergeant Richardson the day 16 afterward and from your testimony a couple of years later 17 at this trial -- 18 A: Yes, it is. 19 Q: -- that you required explicit 20 permission to go closer than 3 or perhaps 200 yards to 21 the sandy parking lot. 22 A: And my evidence is that maybe that 23 was a bad choice of words on my behalf because it's known 24 to be a phase line or a checkpoint for further 25 instruction to stop
1291 Q: Is it -- 2 A: before going in and engaging and 3 check in. 4 So permission, yes, you always need 5 permission but your permission was given at the Command 6 Post. When that Incident Commander took sixty (60) 7 people in full Crowd Management equipment and released 8 them onto Parkway Drive, he had given permission. 9 Q: In fact you were not given any 10 permission after you were 300 yards away, were you? At 11 that point -- 12 A: I think what ends up happening, don't 13 we -- we become engaged or right up at that point? 14 Q: You weren't given any permission at 15 all in the course of you marching down the road, right? 16 A: I think there's several check-ins 17 along that -- if we go through the whole log, there's all 18 kinds of contact back and forth looking for cover, Do we 19 have cover, do we have cover. 20 Q: Yes. 21 A: That was a part of it and then 22 finally, Yes, you've got cover. Yeah, I think a Sierra 23 team and an Alpha team. Okay, good to go. You know, 24 word 'permission' no, but we were also then sighted. 25 They -- the Incident Commander were
1301 telling us from their other channel, TRU team you have 2 been sighted. Look at this paragraph here. We were to 3 go within 200 yards to let our presence be known. 4 Q: Yes. 5 A: If you go back in the radio log, the 6 TOC is saying, You've been seen, the sentries are 7 retreating. Prior to that they tell us, We've got ya, 8 you got a Sierra team, two (2) Alpha teams. 9 That check-in 300 metres was about being 10 covered, it was about, Stop until you couldn't be seen 11 and then -- and you proceed after that. 12 That's what it was all about. That's what 13 the briefing was. 14 Q: But you -- 15 A: Proceed to 300 yards to within sight 16 of. 17 Q: Okay. Now, sir, did you at any 18 point, now you may not have required this, I'm not sure 19 if I fully understand your evidence as to the extent that 20 you required explicit permission, but -- 21 A: I didn't require explicit permission. 22 Q: You didn't require explicit 23 permission and you didn't receive it, right? 24 A: No. I -- I needed to check in. 25 Q: But you didn't receive any permission
1311 to continue down the road -- 2 A: It's -- it's implied. It's called -- 3 can we get the -- I could help you with this, is I notice 4 that the course training standards are here for ERT, is 5 the course training standard here for TRU team? 6 Q: Yes. 7 A: Under Level 2 Incident Commander, 8 it'll tell about -- the whole thing is called Recall 9 Authority. 10 And what it states is if you don't get 11 told by the Incident Commander to come back, you have 12 implicit implied go-ahead with the plan as briefed. It's 13 called Recall Authority. 14 Q: Now, sir, in other words you 15 incorrectly informed Sergeant Richardson that you needed 16 permission? 17 A: I used general language to an 18 untrained person. 19 Q: Sergeant Richardson was an untrained 20 person? 21 A: He's not an Incident Commander, Level 22 1, Level 2 or TRU team or ERT. 23 Q: Oh, I see. And you told him you 24 sought permission. 25 A: That's right.
1321 Q: But that wasn't true? 2 A: The truth of the matter is -- what I 3 should have said is that I checked in. 4 Q: But you didn't seek permission? 5 A: No, it's not that way. It's not that 6 way. It's a last line of calms before going into battle 7 so to speak. 8 Q: Whether it's that way or not, you 9 agree you did not seek permission, right? 10 A: I believe that the inference of, you 11 got -- your covered, is a -- good to go, you're in sight; 12 so all the parameters I was briefed on to move to 300 13 metres for were met. 14 That conversation is saying it's been met. 15 There's no, Backup, backup. There's -- there's no call 16 sign that says we don't -- we have call signs for 17 everything. There was no call sign, there was no code 18 word, red dog, at 300 metres. Or -- okay, so there was 19 no -- 20 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I'm -- I'm 21 reluctant to but the Witness off -- 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We've gotten 23 as much out of this as we can. 24 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Mr. Commissioner, 25 I'm worried about time and I'm also reluctant to be seen
1331 to cutting the Witness off. 2 THE WITNESS: I'm just trying to go into 3 how it really works and it's not, You now have 4 permission. It doesn't happen. I've been at two hundred 5 and twenty-one (221) occurrences, it never happened. 6 7 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 8 Q: Okay so it never happened and it 9 didn't happen this time that you sought permission, 10 right? Okay I just want that clear. 11 A: Doesn't work that way. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, you're 13 saying one (1) thing -- 14 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Therefore -- 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You're 16 saying one (1) thing, Mr. Rosenthal, and he's saying 17 another thing and I don't think it's going to change if 18 you ask it again. 19 MR. IAN ROLAND: Just so that we're clear 20 and we've been through this in-chief -- 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 22 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- the -- the 23 transmission between the command post and Lacroix has it 24 that Lacroix says: 25 "TAC 1 CMU, 2 to 300 yard -- metres
1341 out, awaiting instructions." 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 3 Instructions. 4 MR. IAN ROLAND: I mean, that's in there. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well -- 6 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes, I appreciate 7 that. 8 MR. IAN ROLAND: And we've been through 9 that -- 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 11 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Well I -- 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think 13 you've done as much on this point as you can, Mr. 14 Rosenthal. 15 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Well, with great 16 respect, Mr. Commissioner, we have the evidence of staff 17 -- of Staff Sergeant, as he then was, Skinner. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 19 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: And in fact, the 20 tactical operations centre never gave permission for them 21 to continue down the road. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 23 THE WITNESS: He wasn't at the briefing 24 in Forest, sir. 25 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I'm sorry?
1351 THE WITNESS: He was not -- 2 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: He wasn't at the 3 briefing in Forest. 4 THE WITNESS: -- at the briefing with 5 John Carson, when John Carson told me what to do. 6 7 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 8 Q: Okay, so your evidence, sir, is that 9 John Carson told you to go down and clear the parking lot 10 without any further permission, right? 11 A: It was -- that was my mission. Go 12 down and clear -- 13 Q: Mission. 14 A: -- that parking lot. 15 Q: Right. 16 A: If they do not move, arrest them. 17 Arrest them for this. Yes, sir. 18 Q: That's your -- 19 A: Are you okay? Are you good? Yeah, 20 I'm good. You have enough support? Yeah, I feel good. 21 A little bit extra. 22 Q: Right. 23 A: How about I give you this? Good 24 stuff. Down at the TOC he said check in 300 metres out 25 because I --
1361 Q: Yeah. 2 A: -- want to make sure you're seen. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I -- 4 5 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 6 Q: And that's your evidence that you 7 were supposed to go all the way without seeking any 8 further permission, right? I just want to -- 9 A: Check in and -- 10 Q: -- be clear on this. 11 A: -- seen. 12 Q: Sorry? 13 A: Stop out enough to make sure I got 14 seen. I don't think he wanted to shock anybody or 15 overly, you know -- it says right here, so we carried on. 16 I originally had been briefed to stop 300 metres out to 17 let our presence be known so the occupiers would know 18 that we were there and that we were in hard TAC, that we 19 were wearing helmets and shields, et cetera. 20 That condition was met. 21 Q: And just to clarify and then I will 22 move on, Mr. Commissioner, but this is a key point. Why 23 did they march down the -- 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Clarify and 25 move --
1371 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- road and kill 2 Dudley -- 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- on. 4 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- George. But -- 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, just a 6 minute. 7 MR. DERRY MILLAR: It doesn't help, you 8 know, we know why we're here. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 10 MR. DERRY MILLAR: And it doesn't help -- 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We all do. 12 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- for these kind of 13 editorial comments -- 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It doesn't. 15 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- by Counsel. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Ask the -- 17 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Counsel has the 18 opportunity to submit argument, to make argument. We all 19 know why we're here. We don't need Mr. Rosenthal to 20 remind us why we're here. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You're 22 absolutely right. 23 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Well, with 24 respect -- 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Ask the
1381 question and let's move on. 2 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: With respect to Mr. 3 Millar, I was explaining -- I do need to make argument as 4 to why I'm continuing one more time in this area and 5 that's what I was doing and I shall make argument at the 6 end. 7 8 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 9 Q: But just to clarify this point, sir. 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: Your evidence today is that you 12 misspoke yourself on September 8th to Sergeant Richardson 13 when you said you sought permission, and you misspoke 14 yourself when you testified under Oath at the Warren 15 George trial that you were briefed to stop 200 yards out 16 and seek permission to carry out -- carry on. 17 A: I disagree. What I did is I gave it 18 to a police officer -- regular detective. I summed it up 19 in one (1) word. I did not take him into what all that 20 means in tactical parlance that a Level 2 incident 21 commander would understand, Level 1 incident commander 22 would understand, a TRU team would understand. 23 I knew he was none of those things, and I 24 said I was told to go 300 metres. I didn't give him the 25 rest of the story was to wait 'til I was -- my presence
1391 was known and, you know, make sure that all the things 2 like support were lined up. 3 I didn't -- so I -- okay, what did I do? 4 I didn't -- I -- I was too simple in my answer. 5 Q: I see. And you're clarifying it now? 6 A: I'm clarifying it now. I was waiting 7 for this day to clarify it and now I'm clarifying it. 8 Q: It's good this day has come, sir. 9 So, you were following what you understood to be your 10 instructions from the command post earlier on from John 11 Carson, that you were going to lead the team down the 12 road and clear the sandy parking lot, right? 13 A: That's right. That was my mission. 14 Q: And you did not at all ever get the 15 understanding that if people were just having a campfire 16 in the sandy parking lot or just behaving in some other 17 innocuous way, you were not to interfere with them. 18 You didn't get that understanding at all? 19 A: Yes, I did. 20 Q: You did get that understanding? 21 A: Oh, yes. I was told that -- okay, 22 let's back up. Go down to the sandy parking lot. When 23 John and I talked, it was if they're there and let's work 24 it back. 25 I'll try -- I'll try to do how -- what's
1401 the wording you were saying, let me go back. How the 2 lawyers say -- 3 Q: Well, we have -- 4 A: We said, if they will not leave, the 5 implication was, we walk up to them and say, look -- if 6 they're just sitting around a campfire, we would explain 7 to them that you shouldn't be out here, this is private 8 property, we'd like you to move along. 9 He said, by his instructions, if they will 10 not leave on their own volition at that time arrest them. 11 I said for what? For unlawful assembly and this 12 discussion took place. It was go down there and move 13 them out of that parking lot. 14 Q: Right. 15 A: If they were passive resistant which 16 means just sitting around and singing Kumbaya, we would 17 walk up and say, You know, you really can't do that here 18 right now, would you please move over to the other side 19 of the fence. 20 If they were active resistant and they 21 were chained to picnic tables, that's why I asked for 22 bolt cutters, we would go over and tap them on the 23 shoulder and say, You're under arrest. We're going to 24 cut these things free and remove you. 25 I was told to clear the parking lot.
1411 There's -- there's four (4) different types: Passive, 2 active resistant, you know, all those come into that. 3 Q: Yes. And you were told to clear the 4 parking lot even if all they were doing was having a 5 campfire in the parking lot? 6 A: Yeah. But by first saying, Could you 7 please -- 8 Q: You would talk to them? 9 A: Yeah. 10 Q: And if they didn't leave you would 11 arrest them? 12 A: And arrest them. 13 Q: That was your understanding of your 14 order? 15 A: That was my understanding. 16 Q: Thank you. Now, did you -- in the 17 conversation where you say you were given that order by 18 Inspector Carson -- 19 A: Sorry? 20 Q: -- did -- did -- sorry? Did you get 21 any understanding from Inspector Carson as to how the 22 First Nations people might learn, as you approach, so 23 that they wouldn't think you were approaching to attack 24 them, that all you wanted was them to go back into the 25 Park from the sandy parking lot.
1421 A: I got a sense from that -- I'm -- my 2 recollection is that I understood Marg Eve, who I knew to 3 be a negotiator, and I think Mark Wright had gone down to 4 try to talk to the occupiers, but were having -- I 5 remember my briefing was that they didn't feel they had 6 gotten through because no real identifiable leaders had 7 come forward -- 8 Q: Right. 9 A: -- to -- so I knew negotiations had 10 been tried. 11 Q: Yes. And you knew -- 12 A: And I knew that uniformed patrols had 13 gone in the day before to try to move a camp -- 14 apparently the same campsite was -- it turned out the 15 night I was there, though, it wasn't really in the 16 parking lot, was it? 17 But the day before there was pup tents and 18 picnic tables in that parking lot; uniformed patrol cars 19 pulled up, said, You can't be here, and I think they 20 hauled off the picnic tables. 21 So I was aware that dialogue had taken 22 place, attempt at negotiation had taken place. 23 Q: And you were also aware, were you 24 not, that officers had informed the people in the Park 25 that they were regarded by them as trespassers and they
1431 should leave the Park too, right? 2 A: I -- I don't -- no. The impression I 3 got is that we were only taking action on the people out 4 in that sandy parking lot corner where the road is. 5 Q: Yes. 6 A: I didn't know if anybody inside had 7 been told. 8 Q: Now that night your instructions were 9 not to go into the Park, right? 10 A: Absolutely. 11 Q: But in the previous couple of days 12 you were aware the people had been told to leave the 13 Park, by OPP officers, right? 14 A: I did not know that. 15 Q: You weren't aware of that? 16 A: No, sir. 17 Q: In any event, did you and Inspector 18 Carson discuss, for example, the possibility of your 19 having a bullhorn as you marched down the road saying, 20 Get back into the Park, otherwise we're going to come and 21 clear you from the sandy parking lot? 22 A: Did not. 23 Q: You didn't discuss informing them in 24 any way before you marched on them? 25 A: No.
1441 Q: And you didn't realize that people 2 might take it, when there are a large number of officers 3 marching down the road on them, in this situation, that 4 you are there to evict them from the Park? 5 A: I think that was the reason, as it 6 said here, to stop, let them see you, let them see the 7 equipment you're wearing. 8 Q: Yes. 9 A: It's that soft tactic. It's called 10 show of force theory. 11 Q: Yes. 12 A: I think this -- this hard TAC 13 formation was now all on soft. It was a show of force 14 that this big officer presence would convince them to go 15 back in the Park. 16 Q: Well why would it convince them to go 17 back into the Park? 18 A: Because it's a pretty ominous looking 19 thing. 20 Q: Yes, but wouldn't they assume, if -- 21 if they had known -- you weren't aware of this, but if 22 they had been told in the previous couple of days they 23 were regarded as trespassers in the Park -- 24 A: Hmm hmm. 25 Q: -- wouldn't it not be a reasonable
1451 conclusion on their part that you were coming to evict 2 them from the Park? 3 A: I -- I don't know what the negotiator 4 got across. 5 Q: Yes. But you didn't discuss -- 6 A: I understood the negotiator went 7 right up to the fence and had a talk with them. 8 Q: And you didn't discuss any of that 9 with Inspector Carson? 10 A: No, sir. 11 Q: And if you had understood that, you 12 might have understood why they would resist you marching 13 down the road to evict them from the Park, right? 14 A: If that's what they thought we were 15 coming to do, I could -- yes, I could understand that. 16 Q: And you talked about projectiles 17 starting to come as you got closer, right? 18 A: Yes, sir. 19 Q: And if I tell you that we've had 20 evidence at this Inquiry that people in the Park thought 21 you were coming to evict them that night, you would now 22 understand why there might be projectiles coming your 23 way, right? 24 A: Yeah. I mean, from their perspective 25 I can -- I can understand.
1461 Q: Yes. And people -- people thought 2 they were defending their land. You understand that now, 3 right? 4 A: Yes, I do. And I didn't have a 5 megaphone but I -- I can see what you're saying. 6 Q: Now, in your testimony at this 7 Inquiry on May 8th, you told Mr. Millar that you -- you 8 heard pop, pop, pop at around the time you fired your 9 weapon; is that correct? 10 A: Yes. Yes. I think -- well even 11 before that, because I heard -- I think some of the 12 testimony I said I -- I -- pretty sure heard popping 13 when the was coming down the right -- the right shoulder. 14 I never fired until the car, and the car come out from 15 behind the bus. 16 But at the time of I was firing at the 17 car, there was also shooting noises. 18 Q: Now, I might have missed it, but am I 19 correct that you didn't report any such pop, pop, pop in 20 the interview with Sergeant Richardson or in any other 21 documents prior to May 8th. 22 A: It doesn't say in there -- 23 Q: Sorry? 24 A: It doesn't say in there that I heard 25 gunfire?
1471 Q: I don't believe it says that you 2 heard gunfire at that point, but -- oh and then -- 3 there's certainly no pop, pop, pop. 4 A: The difficulty with that whole is I'm 5 describing all those events in about -- the whole problem 6 with this thing, there's probably seventy (70) pages and 7 it took twenty (20) seconds. 8 Q: But you -- you attributed the pop, 9 pop, pop to gunfire from the bus? 10 A: I took -- no, I took -- I took it 11 either us firing at the bus or firing from the bus. 12 Q: Oh, I see. So it might have been 13 officers firing at the bus? 14 A: Oh yeah. It could have been officers 15 trying to stop the bus. 16 Q: Sorry. Okay. Thank you. 17 A: There was -- there was gunfire prior 18 to me firing, is all -- 19 Q: I see. 20 A: And I would never dare try to figure 21 out who was firing. 22 Q: Right. Now as you testified during 23 the trial of Warren George, and as you reaffirmed during 24 your questioning by Mr. Falconer yesterday, you 25 understood it would have been improper to discuss any
1481 details of what happened with fellow officers before the 2 SIU interviews, right? 3 A: Yes, sir. 4 Q: And that's important because you -- 5 as an officer you know how such discussions can perturb 6 other people's evidence, right? 7 A: Can. 8 Q: And at the time immediately 9 afterward, you thought you might be a subject officer? 10 A: That's right. 11 Q: And you thought you might, in fact, 12 end up being charged with killing the driver of the car, 13 right? 14 A: I thought I'd be an accused person, 15 yes. 16 Q: And you -- you might be accused of 17 murder, or manslaughter, or some other very serious 18 charge with respect to the death of the driver of the 19 car, you thought, right? 20 A: If, in fact, yeah -- I mean, it -- 21 there had been a homicide, right, and SIU would be 22 investigating a homicide. And dependant upon their 23 investigation, yes, you could be found guilty of criminal 24 negligence or any number of offences. 25 Q: Now I should like to point to some
1491 evidence of Officer Jacklin, with your assistance, sir. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 Q: This is some testimony of Officer 6 Jacklin on April 26th, 2006 at page 218, beginning at 7 page 218. And reading from his notes at line 16: 8 "After the occurrence we were walking 9 back to the TOC area. I was with Wade 10 Lacroix, George Hebblethwaite and 11 possibly Rob Huntley. They were 12 talking about a hand coming out of the 13 car with a gun. 14 And that was followed by a flash. 15 There was a great deal of discussion 16 and I drew the conclusion that they may 17 have discharged their firearms; that 18 being Lacroix and Hebblethwaite. 19 Did I read that correctly? 20 A: That's correct. 21 Q: And that was a true statement that 22 you made? 23 A: Yes, it was. 24 Q: So right after the -- and the 25 occurrence, of course, was the killing
1501 of Dudley George and the surrounding 2 events, right? When you say after the 3 occurrence, you mean just -- that's on 4 the evening of September 6th, 1995? 5 A: That's correct. 6 Q: Right after the events that you've 7 testified about, right? 8 A: That's correct. 9 Q: So you walked back to the TOC area 10 with Lacroix, Hebblethwaite and 11 possibly Huntley? You're not sure if 12 Huntley was in the group? 13 A: That's correct. 14 Q: And you had considerable 15 discussion as 16 to what happened, right? 17 A: I did not. There was a lot of -- 18 the whole CMU was moving to the rear at 19 the time. 20 Q: Well you wrote there was a great 21 deal of discussion. 22 A: That's right. 23 Q: Do you -- but when you say 'I did 24 not' you mean you didn't say anything? 25 A: I didn't say a whole lot, no.
1511 Q: Or didn't say much? 2 A: That's correct. 3 Q: But Lacroix and Hebblethwaite were 4 very excitedly talking about it; isn't 5 that fair? 6 A: Yes. There was discussion. 7 Q: It was animated discussion. They 8 were just involved in this rather 9 momentous event and they were telling - 10 - saying what happened in great detail, 11 right? 12 A: Well, I think everybody just went 13 through a very traumatic event, yes. 14 Q: And they were talking about it a 15 great deal? 16 A: Yes. There was some conversation, 17 yes. 18 Q: And in particular, one of the 19 inferences you drew from what they were 20 saying is that they, meaning Lacroix 21 and Hebblethwaite, might have 22 discharged their firearms in the course 23 of this, right? 24 A: That was possible." 25 Now, sir, taking your mind back to the
1521 evening of September 6th, 1995, the early morning of 2 September 7, 1995, do you agree that Mr. Jacklin was 3 telling us the truth when he described walking back to 4 the TOC with you and Mr. Hebblethwaite? 5 A: Yes, sir, I just -- in evidence in- 6 chief, I believe yesterday I said that we were walking 7 back and I had a discussion with George Hebblethwaite 8 about did -- what happened, happened. 9 We had a talk about, Did we just go 10 through what we went through? What happened there? How 11 did the crowd management event erupt into what we just ex 12 -- lived through? 13 I understand that lawyers would love this. 14 You know, immediately we go in a clone (sic) of silence 15 and we all go to separate hotels and, you know, whatever, 16 we're walking back. 17 This conversation would have taken four 18 (4) minutes to get to that TOC. 19 Q: Sir -- 20 A: At a full march. So it was -- 21 Q: Sir -- 22 A: -- like, Did that just happen? 23 Q: Is this a fairly accurate account of 24 the conversation? 25 A: I don't remember it. But would there
1531 have been discussion? I'm sure there was some 2 discussion. 3 Q: Sure there would have been. And 4 including a description of a gun coming out of the car, 5 and so on? 6 A: I do not remember any of that. 7 Q: You don't remember that? But that 8 you used your firearm? 9 A: I might have been talking to my 10 number 2, saying, Weapons had been fired. Okay, the -- 11 the only person is a commander that would realize there 12 was a lot of gunfire. 13 So we have to identify who fired and we 14 have to get a hold of those weapons as evidence. So who 15 am I going to talk to? My number 2. 16 My number 2 is George Hebblethwaite, who 17 was standing immediately beside me while we're getting 18 our head together, walking from the scene back to the 19 TOC, which was three (3) or four (4) minutes away. 20 So I will admit that, could a conversation 21 have taken place between me and my number 2 about we just 22 were involved in a shooting, et cetera. And we got a -- 23 and he then maybe said to me, Well, you're going to have 24 to seize my gun. And I might have said to him, Well, 25 you're going to have to seize my gun.
1541 Could that have happened? Absolutely. 2 Q: Sir, would you please turn to Tab 41. 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 Q: There are several different copies of 7 this document. I believe I have the right one at Tab 41, 8 is your use of force report, sir. 9 Is that correct? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: And I believe it's P-1460, Inquiry 12 document -- and the version I have is 5000041. 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 Q: Now, sir, this report was filled out 17 by you; is that correct? 18 A: It looks like it was reviewed by me. 19 Q: Reviewed by you, but not filled out 20 by you? 21 A: I have no recollection of filling out 22 this report. 23 Q: And you can't assist us as to who 24 would have filled out the report? 25 A: I can assume who might have.
1551 Q: Well, perhaps if you could suggest 2 who might have, we can ask that person when and if he or 3 she appears at this Inquiry. 4 A: Okay. Can I just reconstruct this 5 out loud? 6 Q: Certainly. 7 A: This type of form is not designed for 8 the kind of event that we're all dealing with, 'cause the 9 kind of event that we are dealing with today -- 10 Q: Right. 11 A: -- very rarely happens, thank God. 12 This is a report for an individual officer on the road 13 with his partner at Grand Bend weekend, and he pulls out 14 his pepper spray and he uses it. 15 That individual officer fills it out. It 16 goes into the training division. It's retained for 17 training purposes. The little name gets -- Wade Lacroix 18 in the bottom is ripped off and shredded somewhere, and 19 the top part is held on file for -- for training 20 purposes. 21 Anyway, I think what happened, if I do 22 remember this part, a few of the individual officers 23 might have start -- that fired, might have started 24 filling this out. 25 All I remember is getting a phone call
1561 going, Wait a minute, wait a minute, we've got some but 2 we don't have them all. I did -- I remember a decision 3 was made to do it by unit, not individual and not by the 4 incident commander. 5 So I got a phone call as the CMU commander 6 to do one for CMU, therefore one (1) for TRU, one (1) for 7 uniform and one (1) for, maybe, detectives. 8 I don't remember if I was, at that time, 9 shipped several individual ones that maybe individual 10 officers had attempted to fill out. 11 I don't remember if I got one (1) from 12 each of the sergeants, which could have also happened 13 from 1, 2, 3, 6 ERT, because they are NCO's, and when 14 they went back to their home locations, didn't fill it 15 out. And then I just calculated and computated it to -- 16 to make this master. 17 And I have a feeling that I actually 18 delegated this to the Number 1 District ERT sergeant, 19 Stan Korosec, who worked in my building, to call all 20 other sergeants to try to calculate and computate this 21 form. 22 Then I reviewed it and said, Yeah, it 23 looks pretty close. 24 Q: Okay. Now, sir, did you, yourself 25 fill out a personal Use of Force Report?
1571 A: No. A decision was made, under the 2 circumstances, that's not the way to go with this. 3 That's the whole discussion that took 4 place is, How are we going to do this? Fill out seven 5 (7), eight (8), nine (9) of these? A decision was made 6 to do it by unit. 7 So each unit commander took responsibility 8 to make sure one (1) went in. And then because I'm a 9 staff sergeant and had four (4) sergeants under me, I 10 think I had them put it together. 11 So I did not fill out one (1) for me. 12 Q: Am I incorrect in understanding that 13 you understood at the time that regulations, pursuant to 14 the Police Services Act, required each individual officer 15 who drew, much less fired a handgun -- 16 A: Right. 17 Q: -- to fill out a Use of Force Report? 18 A: That's right. 19 Q: That was a requirement, right? 20 A: That's a requirement. 21 Q: And that requirement was not met in 22 this case, you're telling us? 23 A: It was met. 24 Q: Did you fill out a Use of Force 25 Report?
1581 A: No, I'm saying before -- okay, under 2 a normal circumstance, yes, there's a requirement. But 3 when you get SIU involved and CIB and all that, this is 4 an administrative requirement; it would take a second 5 tier to the evidence, doing your notes, statements, et 6 cetera. 7 In the time before we got around to 8 getting back to our home detachment to fill this out, a 9 decision was made to not do them individually, but do 10 them by unit. 11 Q: And who made that decision? 12 A: The phone call I believe I got was 13 from the In-Service Training section, at the time was 14 Brad Seltzer, called to say, We're not doing individuals, 15 we're -- you are being told as a unit commander to ensure 16 there's one (1) for the unit. 17 Q: And -- and you didn't have any 18 discussion with that person, Am I not required, pursuant 19 to regulations under the Police Services Act? 20 A: That regulation is designed for you 21 on the road alone with your partner, nothing like this. 22 It's an -- it's -- yes, it's under the Police Act, you do 23 it. It's an administrative requirement. It's a training 24 requirement. It's not a, within twenty-four (24) hours, 25 forty-eight (48) hours. So somebody way above me decided
1591 to make it out as a unit. 2 Q: When -- 3 A: It's fulfilled, and done. 4 Q: Now you say you don't believe you 5 filled out this report, but you did review it; is that 6 correct? 7 A: I -- at the bottom I checked off the 8 box, "reviewed," and I didn't even sign it for some 9 reason. 10 Q: And I -- can you assist us at to what 11 date that would have been that you would have reviewed 12 this, sir? 13 A: The top day -- mine's blocked out, I 14 can't see it. 15 Q: I'm sorry? 16 A: The date's gone up here, up in the 17 right-hand corner. I think review date -- 18 Q: Would you be able to determine that 19 from your notes, or in some other way, sir? 20 A: If I'm looking at this right, it 21 looks like the date portion is somehow -- it's marked: 22 "Team Report, Crowd Management Team, 23 number of officers, forty-two (2)." 24 I would think the time and date of the 25 incident...
1601 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 A: It doesn't look to be in a box for 4 when it was filled out, just a box of the date of the 5 incident and the time of the incident. 6 Q: Your indulgence, Mr. Commissioner. 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 Q: Thank you. Mr. Millar points out 11 there is -- 12 A: A date in the bottom right. 13 Q: -- a date box for the reviewing, 14 right, along the view -- reviewer line, if you continue 15 all the way to the right of that line -- 16 A: Right. 17 Q: -- it -- it seems to -- 18 A: Date. 19 Q: -- say, "date," right? 20 A: Right. 21 Q: And that would be for you the 22 reviewer to fill in the date on which you reviewed it, 23 right? 24 A: Yeah. 25 Q: But that's blank on this copy?
1611 A: That's right. 2 Q: But this would have been within a day 3 or so of the event, would it? 4 A: I went -- all I know is I went right 5 to the other Command Post at Grand Bend, and that's why a 6 lot of this stuff -- like this call never stopped. Okay, 7 two (2) officers were on patrol to go to a domestic, 8 something happens. Next day they fill this out. 9 This call did not end for days. So I went 10 right back into an operational mode and this being an 11 administrative piece of paper would have got completed 12 when, in fact, the call ended, so it could have been 13 weeks, I -- I don't know. 14 Under normal circumstances it would be 15 done, you know, a day or two (2). But under the 16 circumstances, this call being still operational, I don't 17 know when it finally got done. 18 Q: Now, your responsibility in reviewing 19 a report like this is to ensure its accuracy, is it? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: And if you look at the middle of the 22 report, there's a section entitled, Weapons carried by 23 subjects. 24 Do you see that section, sir? 25 A: Weapons --
1621 Q: Right -- right in the middle in both 2 sentences. Top to bottom and -- 3 A: Okay. Got it, yeah. 4 Q: And it allows for three (3) different 5 subjects, right? 6 A: Right. 7 Q: Three (3) different columns for three 8 (3) different subjects. 9 A: Right. 10 Q: And you've -- you or whoever filled 11 out the report, and you approved it on reviewing it, have 12 ticked off under Number -- Suspect -- "Subject Number 1," 13 you've ticked off the two (2) bottom boxes, right? 14 A: Right. 15 "Baseball bats." 16 And: 17 "Steel poles. 18 Q: And then under Number 2, suspect -- 19 "Subject Number 2," you checked: 20 "Semi-automatic." 21 A: Yeah, that would be a handgun. 22 Q: How did -- who -- who was Subject 23 Number 2 who had a semi-automatic. 24 A: That's my allegation is that they 25 took gunfire from the -- the car, that there was a
1631 sidearm. 2 Q: It's your allegation that the person 3 in the car had a semi-automatic piston? 4 A: That's what I assumed that it was. 5 Q: I see. So that was from you? 6 A: Yeah. So this is prior to SIU's -- 7 this report is what we felt we met that night. 8 Q: Yeah. And this was prior to your 9 interview by the SIU? 10 A: No. It would be after the interview 11 of SIU, but it would be -- 12 Q: Didn't you just tell me prior to the 13 SIU? 14 A: No. Prior to their results. Prior 15 to -- what I'm going to is prior to Ken Deane being 16 charged. So it's what the police felt they met that 17 night. 18 Q: And then under "Subject Number 3," 19 you've checked: 20 "Rifle." 21 A: That would be the allegation of a man 22 on the road with a rifle. 23 Q: Not the man on the road with the 24 rifle that turned out to a stick? 25 A: Yes. Yeah, at this time, this is
1641 prior to trials, this is after SIU statements, prior to 2 SIU's findings, and prior to any trials. This would be - 3 - I don't know, days after. 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 A: This report's used for training -- 8 Q: Turn to Tab 24, please. Sorry, Tab 9 24, please. 10 A: Yes. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm sorry, 12 what tab was that again? 13 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I'm sorry, sir? 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: What tab? 15 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Tab 24. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 24. 17 18 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 19 Q: This is a transcript of the phone 20 call between you and Staff Sergeant Brian Deevy. 21 A: Right. 22 Q: You've been referred to it several 23 times. It's Exhibit P-1361. 24 A: Right. 25 Q: If you could turn to page 8, please.
1651 About a third of the way down page 8, you say: 2 "And then I guess we finally realized 3 we got their leader." 4 Now the person you were referring to as 5 their leader was the person you later found out was known 6 as Cecil Bernard George; is that correct? 7 A: When I'm making that reference I -- I 8 would like to leave the name out because I never knew 9 Cecil Bernard George, who or what he was. I was 10 referring to the man that I was told we arrested with a 11 portable radio. That's who I'm referring to as the 12 leader. 13 If, in fact, at the end of the day, since 14 I never sat through the whole trial, Cecil was the one 15 with the portable, then I'm referring to Cecil. 16 Q: Well, the evidence is that at the 17 scene there was one (1) person arrested. And if that's 18 so, that's the person you're referring to, right? 19 A: Yeah. But my reference is to the 20 fact he was seen giving directions and he had a portable 21 radio. So when I was talking about a leader -- because, 22 again, I also thought two (2) got arrested, so. 23 Q: But it's the man that you coldcocked, 24 right? 25 A: I don't think it was ever proven that
1661 the person that I coldcocked ended up being Cecil Bernard 2 George. 3 Q: But -- I see. So -- 4 A: There's a continuity issue on that -- 5 Q: When you say: 6 "I guess we finally realized we got 7 their leader." 8 A: Yes, I felt that from the portable 9 radio and the fact he was seen to be directing. 10 Q: And when you were saying that on 11 September 7th to Staff Sergeant Deevy -- 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: -- you were referring to the person 14 you had coldcocked, right? 15 A: I didn't know that the person I 16 coldcocked was that pers -- okay, somebody come up to me 17 and said, The one that you had coldcocked, we found this 18 on him and he's a leader. But I didn't know his name. 19 So let's just -- 20 Q: Yes. 21 A: Let's tie two (2) of the pieces 22 together, but I did not know who he was. 23 Q: No, but you didn't know his name. 24 A: No. 25 Q: But when you said the leader, you
1671 meant the person you had coldcocked, whatever name -- 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: -- he may have had, right? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And you said, just before that, We 6 hammered them. 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And we got their leader. 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: So I take it that, putting those two 11 (2) together, you were suggesting that we particularly 12 hammered the leader and that's one of the things -- 13 A: No. 14 Q: -- that helped us to deal with the 15 situation. Is that -- 16 A: When I said we -- 17 Q: -- not fair? 18 A: -- hammered him, I'm talking about us 19 standing in a line at ease on the highway. I'm trying to 20 describe -- see, even Brian Deevy knows that this tactic, 21 it's the first time it's ever been used. 22 We're standing there, back on the 23 pavement. We get attacked and we held our ground and, as 24 a matter of fact, we knocked down the opposition. 25 I was not referring to, We hammered them,
1681 we hammered the leader. I took it to -- okay, let's take 2 it back to paragraph before. 3 "We took a barrage of rocks. We 4 repulsed a full attack; fifteen (15) to 5 twenty (20) with clubs. Guy broke my 6 shield right in half with a steel pole. 7 I coldcocked him. The boys hammered a 8 few. We cut them down with sticks." 9 That was the fifteen (15) to twenty (20) 10 males. 11 Then I go on and say: 12 "Then I guess they realized that we had 13 gotten one of the reader -- leaders in 14 that melee, and that really got them 15 chocked." 16 And then things went, you know, bad to 17 worse. 18 Q: Yeah, so that got them choked. 19 A: Yeah. 20 Q: And what did they do as a result of 21 being choked, in your view? 22 A: They got in a bus and a car and came 23 after them, right through our formation. 24 Q: I see. 25 A: To get them back, or whatever.
1691 Q: I see. 2 A: I'm now realizing maybe we shouldn't 3 have taken that leader. 4 Q: That we should not have taken -- 5 A: Yeah. Maybe not. 6 Q: I see. So that's what you mean? 7 You're maybe -- you're sorry you coldcocked that guy? 8 A: I'm sorry I arrested him, I guess, at 9 that time. 10 11 (BRIEF PAUSE) 12 13 Q: Then -- 14 A: It didn't work -- 15 Q: -- further on you say -- 16 A: -- the way we were trained, I can 17 tell you that. 18 Q: I'm sorry? 19 A: It didn't work the way they teach us 20 or the way we're trained. They say when you take the 21 leader it's supposed to die down, calm down and they all 22 go away. 23 Q: Later on, you say, about -- a little 24 below the middle of the page: 25 "One of the TRU guys stepped in. They
1701 were going to mow us down and we had to 2 take them out." 3 A: That's the car mowing into the -- the 4 officers at the side of the road. And I felt that one of 5 the TRU team guys had also fired. 6 I know when it was all over -- 7 Q: What -- 8 A: -- I looked up; there was all TRU 9 team guys out on the road. 10 Q: And isn't it, in fact, that the TRU 11 guy who stepped in was Ken Deane, who shot Dudley George? 12 A: No. The two (2) I was referring to 13 when I fired at the car, I had Bill Klym and Mark 14 Beauchesne standing beside me and did not see Ken Deane. 15 I was referring to TRU team on the -- when 16 I was on the road -- I thought alone, when I got done, I 17 don't know if I've ever testified to this before, I don't 18 know where George went. 19 I had Mark Beauchesne and Bill Klym 20 standing be -- either side of me. We were the only three 21 (3) standing on the pavement when the gunfire started and 22 ended. 23 Q: At the time you had this phone 24 conversation, you knew that Dudley George was dead; is 25 that correct?
1711 A: I -- I must have. 2 Q: Yes. 3 A: It was on the news, again. 4 Q: Sorry? 5 A: It was the news. 6 Q: Yes. And in this paragraph, you say: 7 "One of the TRU guys stepped in and, 8 you know, they were going to mow us 9 down and we had to take them out. We 10 took out Dudley George, who's a jerk." 11 A: Yeah. And I'm thinking Dudley George 12 is definitely the vehicle driver. 13 Q: But we do know that Ken Deane, a TRU 14 man, did take out Dudley George, didn't he? 15 A: I -- I later find that out. I'm 16 shocked when Ken Deane gets charged, but I'm shocked 17 because if when Ken Deane -- about this man on the road. 18 I never knew that a man had been shot 19 further back down the road. That's why I'm not even in 20 on the trial or anything, because I knew nothing about 21 it. 22 I had no evidence of it, seen -- didn't 23 see anybody. I was shocked to find out that the man that 24 died was actually not in a car, and was actually further 25 back down the road, standing in the road.
1721 Q: I appreciate that's your evidence, 2 sir. But I'm suggesting to you it's ten (10) years 3 later. 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: It's hard to reconstruct matters for 6 everyone. And I'm suggesting to you that you look at 7 this paragraph again. 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 Q: And try to refresh your memory, 10 because it seems to be a very accurate description, 11 except for the adjective applied to Dudley George, as to 12 what happened; namely a TRU guy, Ken Deane, did step in 13 and take out Dudley George on that evening. 14 A: And the only muzzle flash that I 15 remember, because I felt it on my face, was from Mark 16 Beauchesne standing to my right. 17 And I'm referring to he stepped up and 18 fired at this car, along with myself. I'm all focussed 19 here on the car. 20 Q: Thank you. We have your evidence, 21 sir. 22 A: I thought that was the number 1 23 threat. 24 Q: Thank you. Now, you testified 25 earlier that --
1731 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just one (1) 2 minute, Mr. Rosenthal, I think Mr. Roland is trying to 3 get your attention or mine. 4 MR. IAN ROLAND: If My Friend is going to 5 refer to this transcript of -- if My Friend's going to 6 refer to this transcript of what was said and what -- in 7 the context of the transcript what the Witness believed 8 at the time, he should refer him to page 3 as well, in 9 which he says, as recorded: 10 "Dudley only had two (2) holes on him, 11 because I think a lot of us -- I think 12 he was the guy in the car." 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: He's made 14 that clear in his evidence. 15 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: He did say that. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 17 18 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL 19 Q: My Friend has re-examination -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine, 21 Mr. Rosenthal. 22 23 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 24 Q: I'm trying to move on here. Now, 25 you told us, sir, that -- and you gave an apology, you
1741 said, to Sam George, because you said you thought at the 2 time that Dudley George was driving the car; and that's 3 why you said he's a jerk, right? 4 A: Yes, sir. I thought anybody that 5 would come and plow into my officers the way this man 6 did, to me, at that time, sitting in that room, was 7 nothing but a jerk. 8 Q: Yes. And, in fact, anyone who did 9 that deserved to die, in your view, right? 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Oh my -- 11 THE WITNESS: I don't think it went that 12 far, sir, I just said that he's a jerk to do a thing like 13 that. 14 15 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 16 Q: But you seemed to express a positive 17 feeling about the driver of that car, as you understood 18 it, dying, right? Isn't that fair? 19 A: You'd have to talk to the peer 20 counsellor who was in that room with me for three (3) 21 hours, and I could tell you he'll let you know I was not 22 expressing positive feelings. 23 Q: So if Dudley George had been the 24 driver of the car, you wouldn't retract these words? 25 A: Maybe my guilt would be less, yes.
1751 Q: Even though you now understand that 2 these people might well have thought that you were coming 3 to take what they perceived as their land, and they were 4 trying to defend against that? 5 A: The whole situation was a bad 6 situation, sir. It was very tragic, the fact that any 7 man died. I did not expect it to end this way going down 8 the road. I thought it was going to be a disturbance, 9 there might be some sticks and stones. 10 I certainly did not expect it to break 11 into gunfire. I certainly didn't expect to see my men 12 get run over by cars, and we especially did not expect to 13 be taking human life. 14 And as I already testified, I dealt with 15 that after that for two (2) months of post traumatic 16 stress, and I'm not sure I'm done with it yet. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: If you're 18 finished with this section, Mr. Rosenthal -- 19 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes, sir. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- this 21 might be a good time to break for lunch. 22 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Thank you, sir. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Would this 24 be a good time? 25 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: This is a good
1761 time. Thank you, sir. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 3 very much. 4 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry stands 5 adjourned until 1:00 p.m. 6 7 --- Upon recessing at 11:57 a.m. 8 --- Upon resuming at 1:02 p.m. 9 10 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 11 resumed, please be seated. 12 13 (BRIEF PAUSE) 14 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 16 afternoon. 17 18 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 19 Q: Good afternoon, officer. 20 A: Good afternoon. 21 Q: We had some discussion about the 22 filing of use of force reports. 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: You were aware that there was a 25 regulation in effect then, as now, requiring the filing
1771 of such reports; is that correct? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: And the regulation requires a person 4 who draws a handgun, while in the employ of any police 5 force in Ontario, to file a use of force report, right? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: A personal use of force report? 8 A: I think it allows on the report, 9 though, to be a group report. There's a box on there for 10 a unit or a group report. 11 Q: Well, the regulation says that a 12 member of a police force shall submit a report to the 13 Chief of Police, or Commissioner, whenever the Member 14 does a variety of things, including drawing a handgun in 15 the presence of a member of the public, correct? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: You were aware of that? 18 A: Yes, sir. 19 Q: And every officer on the force at 20 least should have been aware of that, right? 21 A: Should be. 22 Q: It's been suggested, Mr. 23 Commissioner, by Mr. Falconer, and I certainly agree, 24 that it would be appropriate to have a copy of that 25 regulation as an exhibit to these proceedings.
1781 And I would suggest, therefore, it be made 2 the next exhibit. 3 THE REGISTRAR: P-1470, Your Honour. 4 5 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1470: Reports On The Use of Force, 6 Section 14.5, subsection 1 to 7 6. 8 9 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 10 MR. DERRY MILLAR: That's actually -- the 11 regulation is Regulation 936, enacted under Police 12 Services Act. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 14 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: You said 36, sir? 15 MR. DERRY MILLAR: 926. I -- 16 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 26. 17 MR. DERRY MILLAR: I said 36, I should 18 have said 926. 19 20 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 21 Q: If I can -- sir, I should like to ask 22 you something about your notes. They're at Tab 9 and 23 they're P-1448. And I don't have the same page numbers, 24 necessarily, as you do, but I'm asking you, in the 25 notebook, the original notebook, page number 93, which is
1791 at 22:30 on the evening of September 6th. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 A: Page what? Sorry. 6 Q: It -- the -- the small notebook pages 7 at the bottom -- 8 A: Oh, okay. 9 Q: -- is 93. 10 A: Right. 11 Q: It's at 22:30 on September 6th, if 12 that assists you in finding it. 13 A: Okay, 93. All right. I see. Yes. 14 The TRU IAP team? 15 Q: It -- it says: 16 "I received final briefing." 17 Right? Perhaps I -- I may not have -- 18 it's hard to read the page numbers but... 19 A: All right. I thought I got 93 and 20 it's talking about the TRU IAP. 21 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Commissioner, it's at 22 Tab 9, Exhibit P-1448. 23 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Right. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I have 25 the right tab, I just can't find the page.
1801 MR. DERRY MILLAR: And it's page 14 in 2 your page, and your page too. There's a 14 at the top 3 and the bottom it's 93. 4 THE WITNESS: Okay. So you're talking 5 about the 22:30 hours? 6 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Yes. 7 THE WITNESS: Okay. 8 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes, thank you. 9 Sorry, Mr. Commissioner, we don't have those numbers in 10 the right-hand corner of ours that you do. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 12 13 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 14 Q: Now, would you read the -- the 15 beginning of the entry at 22:30 please? 16 A: "I received final briefing at the TRU 17 TOC by Inspector Carson and Staff 18 Sergeant Skinner." 19 Q: Yes, that's what I wished you to 20 read, sir, thank you. 21 A: Yeah. 22 Q: So -- and that is correct that at 23 22:30 on the evening of September 6th you were briefed 24 not only by Inspector Carson but also by Staff Sergeant 25 Skinner; is that correct?
1811 A: Yes. 2 Q: Thank you. Now, turning then to the 3 next page, this is in the middle of your marching down 4 the road on page 94 of the notebook pages. You -- it 5 reports you're ordering the CMU to take cover. 6 A: Hmm hmm. 7 Q: And then it says: 8 "We stayed there until TRU TOC advised 9 that the sentry appeared to be carrying 10 a stick." 11 This is when you had had a false report of 12 someone carrying a gun and then -- 13 A: Right. 14 Q: -- found out, in fact, it was a 15 stick, right? 16 A: Right. 17 Q: And then it says -- well, could you 18 read the entry right after that please: 19 A: "I received permission to advance to 20 within 200 yards of the parking lot." 21 Q: Yes, now I just, of course, have a 22 photocopy of this and you're looking at a photocopy. Do 23 you have the original of these notes, sir? 24 A: I should have, yes. 25
1821 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 A: I received a briefing... 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 Q: Do you have that portion of the 8 notes, sir? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: Page 94: 11 "I received permission to advance to 12 within two hundred (200) yards? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: Now, from the photocopy it appears 15 that the "2" in two hundred (200) is written over. With 16 your permission, Mr. Commissioner, I should like to 17 examine the original of these notes. 18 A: Yes, sure. 19 20 (BRIEF PAUSE) 21 22 Q: Thank you. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Are you 24 landlocked, Mr. Rosenthal? 25
1831 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 4 Q: Now, would you agree, sir, that when 5 you look at the originals it also appears clear that you 6 wrote over the "2" there? 7 A: It looks like I certainly made it 8 darker. 9 Q: Well, we've looked at some of the 10 evidence before. Some places you had two hundred (200) 11 yards, some places you had three hundred (300) yards. Is 12 it possible what you did was change the three hundred 13 (300) to two hundred (200)? 14 A: I wouldn't think so but... 15 Q: Well, I don't -- 16 A: To me it's -- it wouldn't be a big 17 deal to me between two (2) and three (3), so why would 18 I... 19 Q: Well, when an officer makes any 20 changes in his notes he's required to explain that and 21 initial any such changes; isn't that fair? 22 A: Yeah, that's fair. But I -- I don't 23 necessarily see a change of a three (3) in behind there. 24 Q: I see. And you can't tell us now 25 when you did that bold writing on the "2"?
1841 A: I would think at the time. 2 Q: You would think at the time? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Well, sir, if you go about five (5) 5 lines down you see another "2" that's bold-face, don't 6 you? 7 A: Yup. 8 Q: Overwritten in some way, apparently, 9 right? 10 A: Just to make it stand out. 11 Q: You wanted to make it stand out? Is 12 that why you did it, sir? 13 A: Well, it stands out. 14 Q: It does stand out. It stands out as 15 suggesting somebody who altered his notes, sir, I would 16 put it to you. 17 A: And I don't see -- I think the little 18 "3" would be sticking out there in the middle of the "2". 19 Q: So it wasn't from a "3". Maybe it 20 was from a "1" that you altered it? 21 A: I don't think I altered it. I think 22 I bolded it. 23 Q: Well can you give us any possible 24 explanation as to why you bolded those two (2) different 25 twos (2's), five (5) lines apart?
1851 A: Because I tend to bold numbers, 2 maybe. 3 Q: You bold numbers? I see. And that's 4 the explanation? 5 A: I have no idea. It just looks that 6 they're bolder. 7 Q: And that's why you bolded the "2", 8 but you didn't bold the zeros that follow the "2", did 9 you? 10 A: No. I must have done a sloppy "2". 11 Q: Can you find some other place where 12 you bolded the numbers here, sir, in your notes? 13 A: Sure, I'll try to find some, yeah. 14 Q: You tend to bold numbers? 15 A: Tend to bold things that don't look 16 right. 17 Q: I would suggest that's a rather bold 18 claim, but -- 19 A: 08 of September -- 20 Q: -- find some other places where you 21 bold -- 22 A: 08 of September '94, I bolded the 23 '94. 24 Q: You bolded the '94. I see. So it's 25 just by coincidence you bolded these two (2), two's
1861 (2's). 2 A: 13 September '94, I bolded the 3 September. 4 Q: Well -- 5 A: 14 September '94 I bolded the whole 6 thing. 17th September I bolded the '94, 18th September I 7 bolded the '94. 8 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Before we leave the 9 page, and I don't wish to interrupt My Friend, but 10 perhaps you could just take a look at the original 11 document if you -- if you wish to, that My Friend had 12 referred to, sir. 13 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Sorry to 15 interrupt. 16 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: You did interrupt 17 me but I appreciate that interruption. And I do agree, 18 Mr. Commissioner, it might be appropriate for you to look 19 at the bolding of the 2's. 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 24 very much. 25
1871 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 2 Q: Going back to the bolding of the twos 3 (2's) on page 94, would you agree that in the first 4 bolding it looks like there's something sticking out, 5 trying to stick out about almost halfway down the "2". 6 A: Yeah. It could look like a smaller 7 "2". 8 Q: I see. Okay. Now continuing with 9 your notes, if you go onto -- you explained to us that 10 there was a new notebook that you needed to switch to 11 after filling up your notes -- your notebook. 12 A: Hmm hmm. 13 Q: And then if we go to the notes of 14 September 7, 1995, at page 10 of the notebook numbers to 15 that. 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: You'll see -- could you read the 18 entry at 08:30, 19 I believe it is, sir. 20 A: 08 -- this is on the 8th? What date? 21 Q: On my copy it says the 7th. 22 A: Oh the 7th, okay. At 08:30? 23 Q: Yes. 24 A: "Arrived Pinery Park, introduced TRU 25 members to Mr. Peel."
1881 Q: Introduced ERT members to Mr. Peel. 2 A: Yeah. 3 Q: And then at 9:30: 4 "Moved to Pinedale Motel to be 5 interviewed by Norm Peel." 6 Right? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: Now did you know Mr. Peel prior to 9 September 7, 1995? 10 A: Yes, sir. 11 Q: How long had you known him? 12 A: I've known him since, oh, mid '80's. 13 Q: Since, sorry? 14 A: Mid '80's. 15 Q: Mid '80's. 16 A: He was a known court lawyer in the 17 London area when I was working London TRU. He was also 18 the association lawyer for the London City Police. 19 Q: Now, if you would turn, please, to 20 Tab 61 of your document brief, it may be in the second 21 volume. At Tab 61 you'll find a document, Inquiry 22 Document Number 1005733, which is an affidavit sworn by 23 Mr. Peel on the 18th day of September 1998. 24 A: Hmm hmm. 25 Q: I should like to ask you about
1891 something on the second page of that Affidavit. 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: Paragraph 4 begins: 4 "My involvement in this case began on 5 September 7 [excuse me] 1995 when I was 6 contacted by Staff Sergeant Wade 7 Lacroix." 8 A: Right. 9 Q: Now, Mr. Peel swore that to be true. 10 That was true, was it? 11 A: As I said in evidence in-chief, I 12 called the duty officer because I know that in a SIU 13 investigation would provide legal advice for our 14 officers. 15 I called the duty officer. I think in 16 evidence in-chief I said -- and I'm not sure if I, then, 17 was directed to call Mr. Peel or they just directed him 18 to Pinery Park. 19 I said in evidence that I called for legal 20 assistance; they brought the forward name Peel. And then 21 I believed I offered up Pinery Park as a place to meet. 22 S+o -- 23 Q: But -- 24 A: -- in fact, if he's saying that I did 25 talk, it's very possible that I spoke to him direct.
1901 Q: Yes. You -- 2 A: That -- that night. 3 Q: He evidently swore that you contacted 4 him. You don't dispute that? 5 A: No, that's what I'm saying. I could 6 very well have called him, after talking to duty officer. 7 Q: And then he indicated that he went to 8 the police operations centre in Pinery Park, where he was 9 briefed by you and Staff Sergeant Kent Skinner. 10 A: True. 11 Q: Now, is that correct, sir? 12 A: Yes. And that would be like an 13 overview briefing of why we're here and -- 14 Q: Yes. But you did give him that 15 briefing on September the 7th -- 16 A: Yes, sir. 17 Q: -- 1995? 18 A: I think that's even in my notes, meet 19 with Norm Peel and -- yes. 20 Q: And then he appears to be reporting 21 at least some of what he learned from that briefing, when 22 he continues: 23 "I was advised that during a life 24 threatening confrontation, a number of 25 serving officers had discharged their
1911 firearms in the area near Ipperwash 2 Provincial Park. 3 Shots had been fired at the driver of a 4 bus, and muzzle flashes, and a man 5 pointed a firearm at officers and at 6 the driver of a car." 7 I should like to stop there. Is that 8 consistent with your memory as to what you and Staff 9 Sergeant Skinner would have advised him at this -- 10 A: I wouldn't -- 11 Q: -- point? 12 A: -- have told him that. He also spoke 13 to each individual officer. So Norm would have more 14 detail than what we gave him. 15 Q: Yes. Well he does say later in his 16 Affidavit that he interviewed individual officers. 17 A: Yes. So we would have given him a 18 very rough overview, not a man -- where was I, a man 19 pointing firearm at officers and a driver of the car. 20 We would have just told him crowd 21 management situation, eleven o'clock at night, CMU went 22 down the road. There was an altercation; pop, pop, pop, 23 shots were fired. 24 Some of this -- there's a little more 25 detail here than anything I think that Kent and I talked
1921 to him about. 2 I think that comes from him speaking to 3 individual officers. 4 Q: So in other words, he is incorrect in 5 his sworn statement that he was advised of these matters 6 by you and Kent Skinner at that point? 7 A: Well, I'm just saying it's got more 8 detail than what I believe we gave him. 9 Q: Okay. So I want to find out exactly 10 what you dispute. 11 MR. IAN ROLAND: Just -- 12 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Did you advise 13 him -- 14 MR. IAN ROLAND: Excuse me. Just to be 15 careful -- 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 17 Roland...? 18 MR. IAN ROLAND: This Witness hasn't 19 waived any solicitor/client privilege with respect to 20 what he said to Norm Peel. 21 So to the extent that we get into -- he's 22 already indicated that much of this information didn't 23 come from him, that it appeared to have come from others. 24 Now, I don't know who those others are; we 25 don't have evidence about that. But there's also no
1931 indication that that solicitor/client privilege has been 2 waived. 3 I don't know whether Norm Peel, in signing 4 this Affidavit, has -- has acknowledged that it's been 5 waived, or not. 6 But there is a solicitor/client privilege 7 issue here that we got to be careful about. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I -- 9 MR. IAN ROLAND: And I don't think My 10 Friend is alert to that. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: On the one 12 (1) occasion -- 13 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I am indeed alert 14 to that. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 16 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: But we have the 17 Affidavit saying that -- 18 MR. IAN ROLAND: What is clear is that 19 this Witness hasn't waived the solicitor/client 20 privilege. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. I 22 think that -- that's fine. And on one (1) -- 23 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: That's clear. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just a 25 minute. On the one (1) occasion that this has come up,
1941 it was made clear that the officer involved wasn't 2 waiving his solicitor/client -- 3 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- 5 privilege. 6 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: But we have this 7 document indicating that at a meeting between this 8 officer and Sergeant Skinner, Mr. Peel was advised of 9 certain things. 10 The Witness has testified that he doesn't 11 believe that he was advised of all those things at that 12 time, and I was on -- at the point of just finding out 13 what he meant by that, which things he meant to be saying 14 was not part of that discussion, and which was part of 15 the discussion. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, if you 17 tread on areas that are within solicitor/client 18 privilege, I'm sure Mr. Roland will object and -- 19 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I'm sure -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- we'll 21 see. 22 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- he will. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Let's 24 proceed. 25
1951 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 2 Q: Now, sir, so I should like to take 3 them one at a time, the allegations of fact that Mr. Peel 4 indicates he was advised of during that meeting and see 5 which you dispute. 6 So he says, well, the first factual thing 7 was that it was a life-threatening confrontation. 8 Would you have advised him that you or -- 9 or Staff Sergeant Skinner have advised him of that during 10 the course of this meeting? 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just a 12 minute. Yes, Mr. Roland...? 13 MR. IAN ROLAND: We're -- we're now 14 treading into the solicitor/client privilege and My 15 Friend is asking what did you tell -- 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: What did you 17 advise -- 18 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- your solicitor? 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- your 20 solicitor. 21 22 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 23 Q: With respect, Mr. Commissioner, had 24 you retained Mr. Peel as your solicitor at this point? 25 A: Yes, sir, I had.
1961 Q: Oh, you had, eh? I see. And then 2 did you -- 3 A: I was probably the first to do so, 4 but... 5 Q: Did Mr. Peel ask your permission 6 before he swore this Affidavit at the Court of Appeal, 7 sir? 8 A: I'd have to call Norm and ask. 9 Q: Well, do you -- sir, the privilege is 10 your privilege as you know, the solicitor/client 11 privilege? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: Did he ask your permission before he 14 swore this affidavit -- 15 A: I don't know. 16 Q: -- to be made a public document and 17 filed with the Court of Appeal? 18 A: I have no recollection of that. 19 Q: Well -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: The last 21 time this came up we took a short break to make sure that 22 the Witness understood. I'm just not sure what it -- 23 MR. DERRY MILLAR: I have a lot of 24 trouble with the relevance of -- 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I do too.
1971 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- of -- you asked 2 this man what is evidence was and what he did. He's told 3 you what he did. This Affidavit filed by Mr. Peel many, 4 many years later -- 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Not many but 6 a few. 7 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Well -- 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 9 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- this '95 -- this 10 affidavit is '97. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think 12 it's -- 13 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: '98. 14 MR. DERRY MILLAR: '98. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Three (3) 16 years. 17 MR. DERRY MILLAR: And the affidavit was 18 filed in the context of an application for fresh evidence 19 which was denied by the Court of Appeal and the 20 conviction of Mr. Deane was upheld. 21 And the -- this Witness spoke to his 22 lawyer, Mr. Peel was his lawyer, gave him some 23 information and most of -- and I just have a lot of 24 trouble with -- with the relevance of it. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Mr.
1981 Rosenthal...? 2 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I'm happy to speak 3 to the relevance, sir, Mr. Commissioner. 4 As this Witness has testified both at 5 another trial and at this proceeding and as other 6 officers have testified the sharing of information 7 between witnesses to events has the potential of 8 contaminating that evidence in a serious way. 9 And here we have a report from -- in a 10 sworn document saying that this Witness and Mr. Skinner 11 shared certain information with him and with each other 12 therefore. Now, the relevance is therefore clear in my 13 respectful submission. Now, speaking to the privilege -- 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well it's -- 15 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- it is well known 16 that once information is publicly expressed the privilege 17 is vitiated. Now, whether this Witness might have an 18 action against Mr. Peel for violating his 19 solicitor/client privilege might be for a different 20 matter but this has already been filed publicly in a 21 court document. 22 It's been -- this document has been 23 produced here. This Witness already answered that some 24 of that information was not what he provided to Mr. Peel 25 at the time and I was simply going to try to understand
1991 which information was exchanged at that point. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: But you have 3 to go into what he told Mr. Peel at that point. 4 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I -- yes -- 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And -- 6 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- with respect to 7 exactly what's here, nothing further. I just want to 8 know -- I -- I was going take them one (1) at a time the 9 allegations -- 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I -- 11 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- listed here -- 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: But -- 13 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- which he said 14 were not all discussed at that time and find out which 15 ones were and which were not. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 17 Rosenthal, the point of all this is regarding collusion 18 of witnesses? 19 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's the 21 whole point of this? 22 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's 24 exactly where you're going? 25 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Of course, yes.
2001 It's information sharing among Skinner and -- 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And whom? 3 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- Lacroix. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Where does 5 it say that Skinner and Lacroix are sharing information? 6 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: It says: 7 "I was briefed by Staff Sergeant 8 Lacroix and Staff Sergeant Kent 9 Skinner. I was advised of [the 10 following]." 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: How do we 12 know that they were together at the time? 13 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Well, I will ask 14 the questions. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I don't want 16 to go into this. This is so far removed from matters 17 that we have to deal with that I don't think it's work 18 pursuing. 19 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: With great respect, 20 Mr. Commissioner, it goes to the question of sharing of 21 evidence which everyone agrees is crucial. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I 23 understand that, but I don't think that you -- you can 24 ask those questions to the extent that you can and did he 25 share his evidence but --
2011 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- try to go 3 behind this and go into an area of solicitor/client 4 privilege to show that, it's just worth it. I just think 5 that you should move on. 6 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Sir, may I just one 7 (1) more time respectfully request that you consider the 8 following? 9 The officer gave us an answer; some of 10 that was and some of that was not discussed at this 11 briefing. And I -- I just wish to clarify which was and 12 which wasn't, otherwise we're left with we know some of 13 it was and some of it wasn't. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: There's no 15 indication that Lacroix and Skinner were sharing 16 information from this document. I don't see any 17 indication from this document -- 18 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Well -- 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- that they 20 were sharing information. 21 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Okay. Well, may I 22 ask -- may I ask -- 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: If there 24 was, then perhaps you'd be entitled to pursue it. 25 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Thank you.
2021 2 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 3 Q: And may I ask, sir, I gather from the 4 way this is described, but you were there and we weren't, 5 that you and Staff Sergeant Skinner were together 6 discussing the matters with Mr. Peel. 7 A: Number 1, I do not recall Kent 8 Skinner at Pinery Provincial Park. The Pinery -- 9 Q: You don't recall him being there at 10 all? 11 A: I do not recall seeing Kent Skinner 12 at the Pinery Detachment. 13 Q: Well -- so are you -- are you 14 suggesting that this in error? This is an error that -- 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, I don't 16 read it that way and I don't know why you would ask it 17 that way. It's perfectly possible from a plain reading 18 of the document that Sergeant Lacroix and Sergeant 19 Skinner spoke to Mr. Peel separately and not with each 20 other and if that's the fact -- 21 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: That cert -- that 22 certainly is possible. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- then I 24 don't think it's worth pursuing any further. 25 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Okay, and I will --
2031 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And that's 2 why I suggested you move on because so far that appears 3 to be the fact. 4 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I take that as a 5 ruling, Mr. Commissioner, and I shall move on. I should 6 however like to make this document an exhibit to these 7 proceedings. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well -- 9 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Document -- Inquiry 10 Document Number 1005733. 11 THE REGISTRAR: P-1471, Your Honour. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 13 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Just the affidavit 14 of Norman Peel. 15 16 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1471: Document Number 1005733. 17 Affidavit of Norman Peel, 18 1998. 19 20 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 21 Q: Now, sir, as you've described in your 22 evidence, some of your main involvement on that evening 23 was with respect to the car and you told us that you 24 fired shots at the car. 25 In fact, you thought you may have killed
2041 the car driver, right? 2 A: Yes, sir. 3 Q: Now that was a brown car, right? 4 A: I don't think I ever described a 5 colour. 6 Q: I'm sorry? 7 A: I don't think I've described a 8 colour. 9 Q: You never described the colour but 10 I'm asking you to now. It was a brown car, right? 11 A: Was it? 12 Q: I'm asking you. 13 A: I have no idea. 14 Q: You have no idea. 15 A: No, sir. A car -- at night time no 16 one has colour vision. 17 Q: I see. So you had no idea at the 18 time and you have no idea now as to the colour of that 19 car? Is that your evidence? 20 A: It's a North American four (4) door. 21 I think that's as close as I can get. 22 Q: It was a four (4) door. Can you 23 assist us as to whether it was a very light colour or a 24 darker colour? 25 A: No. I -- I think at one (1) point I
2051 -- I went light and then dark. 2 Q: I'm sorry? 3 A: I think at one point I said, first of 4 all there was no colour vision at night -- 5 Q: Yes. 6 A: -- and I said it could have been 7 lighter and I think at another time I said it could have 8 been darker. 9 Q: I see. Well, I would put it to you, 10 it certainly was not a white car, right? Because a white 11 car it would have stood out in that -- and with all those 12 lights going around, right? 13 A: The white light hitting the white car 14 you mean? 15 Q: Like in white. It wasn't white 16 whatever other colour it may have been? 17 A: To tell you the truth, sir, I was 18 probably -- my vision was so focussed on a muzzle flash, 19 I don't know if I was looking beyond nine (9) inches at 20 that particular point. 21 But I -- I don't remember the colour of 22 the car. 23 Q: I see. And -- and we have evidence, 24 sir, from Mark Dew that you identified the colour of the 25 car. You don't recall doing that?
2061 A: I do not recall it, no. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 Q: We have evidence from Mark Dew that 6 you identified the colour of the car as white. 7 MR. IAN ROLAND: Can we -- can My Friend 8 refer us to there that is? 9 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes. 10 MR. IAN ROLAND: We're not -- we're not 11 familiar with that. 12 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes. It's at April 13 4, 2006 beginning at page 235. But you don't have to 14 look it up, Mr. Roland, here's a copy. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: If you have 16 it handy, perhaps you'd read the section you're referring 17 to because I don't have a copy of it -- 18 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes, well I -- I 19 wasn't going to bother but I shall, as requested. Would 20 you give a copy please to the Witness and to the 21 Commissioner? 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL:
2071 Q: Mark Dew was asked on April 4th, 2006 2 at page 235: 3 "Q: Sir, I would suggest to you, you 4 don't have to be a wonderful 5 investigator for an effort like that to 6 have succeeded. There was some forty 7 (40) officers involved. Surely you 8 could have gotten to speak to one (1) 9 of them within an hour or two (2)." 10 This is on the question of the colour of 11 the car you'll soon see. 12 A: All right. 13 Q: "Well, the one officer we did have -- 14 who did have something to say about it 15 was Staff Sergeant Lacroix. 16 Q: What did he say? 17 A: And there's a note in my book 18 there that when Goodall and I were in 19 his residence, he remembers one (1) 20 male in white four (4) door with 21 handgun, believes two (2) in bus. 22 Q: So he identified the car as white? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And what time was that, sir? 25 A: 6:50 in the morning."
2081 Now, sir, do you deny that you 2 identified -- 3 A: I don't -- 4 Q: Sorry? 5 A: I don't deny -- I don't recall that - 6 - I don't recall giving him the colour. 7 Q: Did you learn, sir, that the 8 identification of the car as white is apparently one (1) 9 of the elements that led to a brother and sister of 10 Dudley George being arrested at the hospital and being 11 held in custody until the next afternoon? 12 A: Never heard that before, if that's 13 what you're telling me. 14 Q: I see. 15 MR. IAN ROLAND: As I understand it, to 16 be fair to the Witness, the very excerpt shows that this 17 was at 6:50 in the morning on September the 7th. I think 18 that's what the evidence is. 19 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Probably, yes. 20 MR. IAN ROLAND: So it's pretty -- pretty 21 early to get into the issue about -- about the colour of 22 the car at a hospital or anything like that. 23 I mean this -- 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Hmm hmm. 25 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- is -- this --
2091 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: But he 2 can't -- 3 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- he's giving this -- 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- recall 5 saying it and that's -- 6 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- this was given 7 immediately -- 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Pardon me? 9 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- after the event. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. So he 11 can't recall it, so. 12 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Actually, it's more 13 late than early in sense. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 15 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: But I'll move on if 16 I may, Mr. Commissioner. 17 THE WITNESS: I couldn't -- I said in my 18 evidence in-chief that I get woke -- woken up. 19 20 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 21 Q: Yes. 22 A: And I now know who woke me up, 23 because I couldn't even remember in evidence in-chief -- 24 Q: And so -- 25 A: -- of who did wake me up.
2101 Q: So it might have been Mark Dew or Bob 2 Goodall? 3 A: Yeah, it sounds like they've -- 4 they're the ones who come to my door, then. 5 Q: And you might have told them the car 6 was white. 7 A: I think I might have told them I 8 don't know what colour it is, but their recollection is I 9 said it's white, but... 10 Q: And you -- you have no recollection 11 of ever thinking that that car was white, right? 12 A: No, sir. 13 Q: You agree with me, right? 14 A: Yes, sir. I have no recollection of 15 -- of the colour. 16 Q: Now, sir, with what you knew at the 17 time or what you know now, are you aware of any bad 18 consequence that could have eventuated from you staying 19 300 yards from the sandy parking lot that night? 20 A: If I had have stayed 300 metres; a 21 bad consequence? 22 Q: 300 metres or yards. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I sorry -- 24 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- down the road. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I --
2111 MR. DERRY MILLAR: I don't understand the 2 question. 3 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I -- 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm not sure 5 I do either. Let's -- 6 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Sorry, I'll try and 7 rephrase the question. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, please. 9 10 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 11 Q: I suggested to you earlier in my 12 examination of you, sir, that in fact you required 13 permission to go closer than 300 yards or 300 metres from 14 the sandy parking lot. 15 You remember that, right? 16 A: Yeah, yeah. 17 Q: Now, I'd like to suggest to you -- 18 A: Hmm hmm. 19 Q: -- that if you had not proceeded 20 without such permission and such per -- permission had 21 not been granted, there wouldn't have been any problem 22 that resulted from that. 23 Do you agree? 24 A: I disagree so -- 25 Q: As far as you are aware?
2121 A: I would say to you, sir, that within 2 two (2) minutes from -- I know where you're going. 3 You're trying to hold this line in the sand. If all 4 lights lit up which would have been covers in place, this 5 is in place, this is in place, I -- I believe John Carson 6 would have said, thirty (30) seconds later, two (2) 7 minutes later, twenty (20) minutes later, one (1) hour 8 later, proceed down the road. 9 And I think it would have rolled out from 10 there exactly as it did. 11 Q: I see. 12 A: So by me, pause, two (2), three (3) 13 pause, half-hour, pause one (1) hour, I don't think the 14 end result would have changed at all. 15 Q: I see. So whether or not you should 16 have stayed 300 yards away for a longer period of time, 17 it wouldn't have changed things because eventually your 18 understanding is Incident Commander Carson would have 19 ordered you to march down the road in any event, right? 20 A: Because he had ordered me to go down 21 the road and never reneged the order. When he did renege 22 the order, there was gunfire going on and he says at that 23 point, recall, recalled, recalled. 24 And I went, backing up, backing up, 25 backing up.
2131 Q: We have your evidence, thank you. 2 Mr. Commissioner, I hope I get some time 3 in the bank. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Oh -- 5 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I'm going to 6 pleasantly surprise you -- 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You get -- 8 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- and quit early. 9 Thank you. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You get lots 11 of points for this, Mr. Rosenthal. Thank you very much. 12 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 13 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Perhaps, Commissioner, 14 before we start with the next person, the exhibit that we 15 marked, Exhibit 1470, the use of service -- Use of Force 16 Report has, as an attachment, Form 1. 17 And we printed off a copy of Form 1 and 18 perhaps Mr. Hewitt could give one (1) to you, one (1) to 19 -- for the exhibit and one (1) to the Witness. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's part of 21 the exhibit, then now? 22 MR. DERRY MILLAR: It'll be part of the-- 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 24 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- exhibit. It should 25 be part of Exhibit P-1470.
2141 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 4 Scullion...? How are you this afternoon, Mr. Scullion. 5 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: I've been better. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I 7 understand that, so take your time. 8 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: I will. I may go a 9 little bit slower. I may have what Our Witness had 10 yesterday so -- 11 THE WITNESS: I hope not, sir. 12 13 (BRIEF PAUSE) 14 15 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: I would agree with-- 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 17 Scullion, just before you begin the Witness would like a 18 break so I think we'll take a short break now. 19 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: Certainly. No 20 problem. 21 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess. 22 23 --- Upon recessing at 1:35 p.m. 24 --- Upon resuming at 1:38 p.m. 25
2151 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 2 resumed. Please be seated. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Mr. 4 Scullion, carry on. 5 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: Mr. Millar said he 6 won't count those minutes against me so I appreciate 7 that. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Those 9 minutes are not held against you. 10 11 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. KEVIN SCULLION: 12 Q: Yes, Mr. Lacroix. 13 A: Good afternoon. 14 Q: My name's Kevin Scullion, I'm one (1) 15 of the counsel for the Residents of Aazhoodena, all 16 right? 17 And I -- I recognize that you've been 18 asked a lot of questions about one (1) lengthy event but 19 I'm going to go there at times as well just for various 20 items. 21 But what I'd first like you to turn to 22 with me is -- Tab 9 of your binders has a copy of your 23 notes? 24 A: Yes, sir. 25
2161 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: It's been marked as P-1448 but it's 4 your notes from the February '95 time period. 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Okay. If you turn four (4) pages in 7 and this relates to the Daryl George incident on Kettle 8 Point Reserve? 9 A: Right. 10 Q: If you go down to the second last 11 little paragraph does that say: 12 "TRU contains --" 13 A: Residents. 14 Q: "-- residents and evacuates closest 15 neighbours?" 16 A: Yes, sir. 17 Q: All right. So your recollection from 18 that event is that's the -- one (1) of the first events 19 that occurs is a -- a containment and an evacuation? 20 A: Yes, sir. 21 Q: Okay. And that's done by TRU? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: If you skip two (2) pages forward the 24 first page on your note appears to be "reserve" and I 25 think that it's page 43. Do you have that before you?
2171 A: Yes. 2 Q: And if you go down to the third 3 paragraph, can you read that for me? I had a little 4 trouble with your notes? 5 A: "Chief calls for Miles Bressette. 6 Was given permission to go forward to 7 the outer perimeter and talk to George, 8 George being the suspect, using the 9 vehicle PA [that's the PA -- public 10 address system] in an attempt to get 11 George back on the phone." 12 Q: Okay. So there was a vehicle 13 available at that point in time that had a PA system 14 attached to it? 15 A: Most of the cruisers, the external 16 sirens are PA. 17 Q: Okay. So you can use it as a -- a 18 microphone as well as siren? 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: Okay. And so as part of this effort 21 to get the suspect back on the phone presumably to 22 negotiate, Chief Miles was given permission to go up with 23 one (1) of the cars and to try to get him to get back on 24 the phone? 25 A: Yeah. Say, Pick up the phone, pick
2181 up the phone. 2 Q: Okay. Can you read on for me? I -- 3 I have trouble again with your -- 4 A: Yeah, I know. It's too many years 5 standing on the highway writing in little notebooks. 6 Q: Fair enough. 7 A: Okay. So: 8 "The vehicle PA system on. Attempt to 9 interact. And then Chief Bressette 10 drove into the George driveway and 11 conducted face-to-face negotiations 12 with Daryl. George eventually gave up 13 to George and P/C Kaczanowski. Taken 14 to Forest to be fingerprinted and 15 photographed. Debrief with the team 16 leaders, Inspector Linton at Forest 17 Detachment. No one pleased with the 18 outcome as Chief Bressette broke all 19 SOP's of contain and negotiate by -- 20 when he went face-to-face without 21 cover." 22 Q: Okay. By the time this breach of 23 protocol occurred by Chief Bressette -- 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: -- and he went beyond what appears to
2191 be a perimeter -- 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: -- that perimeter had already been 4 broken, correct? 5 A: Attempted. It had not clearly been 6 broken but attempted to be broken. 7 Q: No, but it had already been broken by 8 those on skidoos or relatives or others that had gone 9 within the inner perimeter for TRU. 10 A: Yeah that's what I meant. I don't 11 think that skidoo -- basically there was an altercation 12 with Sierra team and I don't think he got in. He tried 13 to breach. 14 Q: And -- and it's your recollection 15 that there was no breach of the inner perimeter by 16 Reserve residents? 17 A: No, there was three (3) attempts but 18 I don't believe anybody got into like right up to the 19 suspect location. 20 Q: Okay. Were you involved with the 21 debrief from this incident? 22 A: Yes, I was. 23 Q: Was Chief Miles Bressette involved in 24 the debrief? 25 A: I -- I believe he was sitting there,
2201 yes. I think we all went back -- what's it say? It 2 doesn't say where we went, eh? Chief Bressette -- 3 Q: No. And -- and I'll indicate to you 4 that Chief Bressette, Chief Miles Bressette, has 5 testified here that he was not involved -- 6 A: Okay. 7 Q: -- in any debriefing that occurred. 8 And he was a little upset about that because he didn't 9 have an opportunity to address why he did certain things. 10 A: Okay. All right. 11 Q: I heard as part of your -- either 12 examination-in-chief or cross-examination, your opinion 13 that the typical way that the OPP brought to this -- the 14 protocols that they brought to this, didn't work on the 15 Reserve land. 16 A: Right. 17 Q: Right? And that's -- that's 18 consistent I would suggest with your earlier comments 19 from policing First Nation communities, and in fact I 20 think you also coached First Nation teenagers on a 21 football team, it's consistent with your experience that 22 the simple presence of the OPP has a different affect on 23 First Nation communities than it does in general public. 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: Is that fair?
2211 A: Yes, sir. 2 Q: And in fact I think you testified 3 that the formal OPP uniform was viewed very differently 4 by First Nations communities because it was exactly that. 5 It was a formal uniform brought to their land. 6 A: Right. That was -- and that was the 7 old when we used to wear which was the Sam Brown and a 8 very, you know, the military three-quarter (3/4) length 9 coat and the peaked cap and -- I mean, so I don't know 10 how they feel about the one today which is a little more 11 dressed down. 12 Q: Well in your experience, did you find 13 that it changed a lot between this previous uniform and - 14 - and uniformed officers showing up on Reserve? 15 A: I still think they don't like to see 16 us come up with, you know, the -- the brimmed, you know, 17 hat on and the whole bit. Yeah, there's just a -- 18 there's a different opinion towards the uniform. 19 Q: Right. And a lot of the people, in 20 terms of this Darryl George incident, asked you why you 21 were there, why wasn't it Kettle Point police that were 22 dealing with it, why is the OPP need to come onto this 23 land. 24 A: Right. 25 Q: Right? And that's consistent with
2221 your previous experience with First Nation members that 2 there was a significant attachment to the land -- 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: -- they felt that it was their land 5 and they were -- they often times became concerned when 6 people -- 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: -- came onto their land without 9 permission. 10 A: Yeah. We -- of course, but we had 11 permission, but their perception was we were there 12 without permission. 13 Q: I appreciate that. And Chief Miles 14 Bressette has testified that in fact he asked TRU to 15 assist him with this situation -- 16 A: That's right. 17 Q: -- because of course there's a 18 potential that he had an AK-47. 19 A: Right. 20 Q: So I appreciate that distinction but 21 the fact is the people said and you heard questions about 22 why you were there -- 23 A: Yeah. Why we were there, yeah. 24 Q: Right. Okay. 25 A: This wasn't the first one that this
2231 has happened to me on. I think it was actually like the 2 third or fourth. 3 Q: No. And I listened to your evidence 4 in-chief and it sounded like you had a significant amount 5 of experience with policing First Nation communities; is 6 that fair? 7 A: I did a -- this -- I like -- this 8 type of call I did over twenty (2) barricaded gun calls 9 on First Nation communities. 10 Q: Okay. So you'd agree with me that 11 you had a fair amount of experience with them? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: Okay. And if you were consulted on a 14 contingency plan or some sort of plan to deal with a 15 potential incident, that you would have brought in your 16 view, significant experience to the table; is that fair? 17 A: Yes. I had -- I had a lot of 18 experience, yes. 19 Q: You would have had something to 20 contribute? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: Right. And in fact you were 23 consulted with regards to a contingency plan that was 24 arranged for the Base. 25 Do you remember testifying about that?
2241 A: Yes, sir. 2 Q: And do you remember as part of the 3 contingency planning, the use of a field telephone in the 4 event that people didn't want to negotiate face to face? 5 A: Yes, sir. 6 Q: All right. And that was an important 7 part of that contingency plan because there was a good 8 possibility they weren't just going to come out to the 9 fence and talk with you. 10 A: Right. 11 Q: Right? 12 A: That's right. 13 Q: Okay. Were you ever consulted in any 14 way, shape or form for Project Maple, the planning for 15 possible take over of the Park? 16 A: No. I believe I was in Nova Scotia 17 the whole time that was being developed, I believe. 18 Q: Okay. So that's no. 19 A: No. 20 Q: All right. And you'd agree with me 21 that when you're doing contingency planning, the purpose 22 is to attempt to assess what might happen if you take 23 certain actions, correct? 24 A: Hmm hmm. Yes. 25 Q: Right. And in doing that, you're
2251 going to look to previous events and previous experience 2 to see if you can't forecast what might happen in a 3 certain situation. 4 A: Yes, sir. 5 Q: All right. 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE) 8 9 Q: As a result of the debriefing that 10 you had with the Daryl George incident -- 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: -- what did the OPP learn from that 13 incident in terms of how to deal with First Nation 14 communities? Was there discussion about how you could 15 modify your approach -- 16 A: Yes, there -- there was. There was - 17 - I remember the debriefing. It was a bit of a shock 18 that it didn't seem to go well in that there were so many 19 people that didn't understand we deployed that way. 20 So there was a -- there was a -- Inspector 21 Linton took an action to go to First Nations policing 22 branch to say to them it's obvious that the First Nations 23 officers, which are administered by the OPP themselves, 24 did not understand what contain and negotiate really 25 meant.
2261 You know, about the significance of 2 perimeters, frozen zone, we don't face-to-face negotiate. 3 He took that action and I believe he made that contact to 4 a First Nations branch that there should be an 5 educational package done first -- first of all for the 6 First Nations officers to get them online so we're all on 7 the same sheet of music. 8 Then there was further discussion about 9 how do we go into the First Nations communities to 10 explain to them you know, we discussed how it when -- of 11 course, the First Nation community sees these big, white 12 gun trucks; three (3) and four (4) and five (5) of them 13 rolling into the community and then with long guns, 14 getting out with, you know, camouflage uniforms. You 15 know, it looks bad. It looks like, you know, 16 something's going to go wrong. 17 Whereas truthfully, in TRU team calls 99.9 18 percent the person is successfully negotiated out. 19 So we had a talk about how do we get that 20 message to the First Nations communities that, you know, 21 it looks bad but all this equipment is to make sure, you 22 know, for public safety and for even the accused; you 23 know, it's all communications equipment, it's 24 negotiations equipment, it's mobile command post. 25 So it was a big discussion about education
2271 and how we would go about that. 2 Q: Educating who? 3 A: Well, we wanted to educate first the 4 First Nations officers but then we wanted to get the Band 5 Chiefs and Councillors. And we talked about maybe we 6 should be at fairs or like go to a First Nations 7 community and set this all up and -- and let people come 8 out and meet us and see the equipment and hopefully 9 describe it. 10 We just talked around that way, how we 11 could get the message out, you know, first. Contain 12 negotiation is the safest thing to do, but it seemed that 13 there wasn't a connection from that word what it looked 14 like in the First Nations community. 15 Q: Okay. Was there any thought put into 16 educating the officers about this type of reaction or 17 response to the gun trucks, the mobilization of a 18 significant number of forces, that First Nation 19 communities are different in that aspect? 20 A: I think the TRU fellows -- that we'd 21 had enough. I had one (1) happen to me Moraviantown town 22 one happened to me in Walpole. So the London team which 23 I just left this team we were -- they were very aware and 24 they were actually laying in positions; one looking 25 forward, one looking back.
2281 I mean, they were educated that we had to 2 deploy differently and -- and there had to be more of a 3 three-sixty (360) instead of looking in. 4 They were aware. 5 Q: Okay. 6 A: And TRU teams are a very tight unit, 7 so they debrief every call. that's why we do -- is so 8 everybody knows OPEX, operational experience. Like this 9 is what we experienced. 10 So -- so that word would have got out. 11 This report would have been written up and had to be 12 submitted to all TRU teams within a month. 13 Q: Okay. So TRU teams would have been 14 aware when they're setting up their perimeters, that in 15 fact, a different approach needed to be at least 16 considered, for First Nations communities, correct? 17 A: Yes. The TRU teams would have. 18 Q: All right. You're aware that in this 19 instance, the ERT team members were the ones that were 20 managing the road checks -- 21 A: And bre -- the outer perimeter. 22 Q: -- or the checkpoints and the outer 23 perimeter. Are you aware of any kind of training that 24 took place for those officers to educate them on First 25 Nation communities?
2291 A: Not that I'm aware of. Like, the 2 Incident Commander would have had to write a report as 3 well, making recommendations. And I know -- I do know 4 that he raised this to headquarters because I was called 5 in the next day. If you look in my notes, I was brought 6 to headquarters to talk about it further. 7 So I know it did become an issue and went 8 right to headquarters. 9 Q: Right. You'd agree with me that it 10 is an issue and that the ERT officers, if they hadn't 11 been trained, should have been trained -- 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: -- in that way? Okay. 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: Now, we've heard a lot in the Inquiry 16 about people's perceptions that the people occupying or 17 reclaiming the land wouldn't come out and have face-to- 18 face negotiations with the OPP negotiators. 19 Have you heard that or been aware of that? 20 A: I heard more frustration of finding 21 the actual -- one (1) of our tactics is to find out the 22 Parade Marshall or the -- the person in charge. I'd only 23 heard that the -- we were having difficulty finding out 24 who the leaders were to speak to. 25 Q: All right.
2301 A: That was what I heard. 2 Q: All right. You use "Parade Marshall" 3 but realistically -- 4 A: I -- 5 Q: -- you're looking for the leaders? 6 A: The leaders. When I say, "Parade 7 Marshall", I mean that's a labour dispute type 8 demonstration but I mean we were trying to find the 9 leaders. 10 Q: Okay. But you had dealt with West 11 Ipperwash situation and you dealt with the Base 12 situation, correct? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: You were aware that those that were 15 occupying the Base didn't have leaders or didn't identify 16 leaders for the benefit of the OPP, right? 17 A: That's right. 18 Q: Right. You knew that they actually 19 avoided identifying leaders -- 20 A: And -- 21 Q: -- and I'm not going to ask you to 22 guess why but you did know that that was the case? 23 A: It was very frustrating to try to 24 figure out who to deal with. 25 Q: No question. But the fact is you
2311 weren't able to identify the leaders and you didn't have 2 face-to-face negotiations, correct? 3 A: We did not. 4 Q: Not a big surprise to you though 5 because you already did the contingency plan that sort of 6 foresaw that happening, right? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And that's why you had this concept 9 of a field telephone so that it could be anonymous? 10 A: Right. 11 Q: All right. Now, you did mention and 12 I will go the incident, you did mention, I think it was 13 in cross-examination from Mr. Falconer, that when you 14 were called out and you were put in charge of the CMU to 15 march down the road, This is something I don't want to 16 do. Do you remember saying that? 17 A: Well, there was definitely 18 apprehension. 19 Q: No, but why did you say that it was 20 something you don't want to do? It sounds a little odd 21 coming from the Unit Commander. 22 A: Well, I mean I just -- from the 23 events that had happened already I mean I knew we were 24 going to get at least a barrage of rocks or something. 25 There was going to be violence, I just didn't know what -
2321 - what level. 2 Q: Okay. 3 A: You always have apprehension going 4 into that kind of situation. 5 Q: I'd suggest to you that also in the 6 back of your mind was the question; Is this really 7 necessary; what else have we done to see if we can't deal 8 with this without putting four (4) team members on the 9 road and marching down the road; is that fair? 10 A: I thought -- I mean if I was sitting 11 around I might have had that thought. Like in hindsight 12 here I -- I know where you're going, but at the time when 13 I got on scene it -- it -- I just had to go with my trust 14 in my -- my fellow officers, my Incident Commander, that 15 felt it was necessary. I think I just acted on the 16 urgency, that -- that there was an urgency. 17 Q: All right. 18 A: I mean sitting back on it and 19 thinking about it, what you're suggesting, I -- I might 20 have had reservation on -- on certain areas. 21 Q: Well, I appreciate we're eleven (11) 22 years later and we're in a situation of hindsight and 23 we're looking at what could have been done differently. 24 A: Right. 25 Q: All right. I suggest to you that you
2331 were brought out that evening and there was a sense of 2 urgency that something had to be done quickly and you 3 didn't have time to reflect as you just mentioned to me 4 here?; is that -- 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: -- fair? You were put in charge and 7 you were briefed on what you had to do, but they didn't 8 consult you on what your view of what could have been 9 done; is that fair? 10 A: Yes, I was -- I was more under an 11 order. 12 Q: Right. You were ordered to put 13 together the CMU and to take them down in accordance with 14 the briefing that you were receiving from either Carson, 15 Linton, or others? 16 A: Yes, sir. 17 Q: Correct? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Okay. 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 Q: If you turn back to your notes -- I 24 just need to find it here. 25
2341 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: The page appears to be 92 but I'll 4 just count it in from the front. 5 A: 92 in the small...? 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE) 8 9 Q: Looks like page 13. You may or may 10 not have numbers at the top of yours. 11 The first word looks like, "command"? 12 A: Command, yes. 13 Q: Okay. Do you have that? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: Can you read that note down to the 16 words -- words "set-up"? 17 A: "Command a CMU to move the 18 demonstrators back to the Provincial 19 Park property. I was further advised 20 to then hold a position at the Park 21 boundary until relieved by uniformed 22 personnel -- personnel [yeah] and a 23 checkpoint could be set-up." 24 Q: That was part of the briefing that 25 you received, correct?
2351 A: Yeah but there was no time on it. It 2 was like, until. 3 Q: I -- I appreciate that and that's 4 what I'm going to ask you about. When you were going 5 down -- let's -- let's do a hypothetical. It turns out 6 to be true. 7 You get to the parking lot and there's 8 nobody there -- 9 A: Right. 10 Q: -- do I take it from this note that 11 your directions were to simply stand in the parking lot 12 with your entire team and wait for uniformed officers to 13 arrive to set up a checkpoint? 14 A: I think that if I had of called in 15 and said, I've cleared the area, all is safe, nobody's 16 here, it would have been done expeditiously, yes. 17 I -- I would have expected that they would 18 have taken those ERT members that were on other 19 perimeters and moved them or, you know, choked in two (2) 20 checkpoints to that area and I would have stuck around 21 for a while and make sure they were, you know, good and 22 safe and I would have been relieved. 23 Q: Okay. Were you aware that they'd 24 already moved checkpoints from that area earlier in the 25 day?
2361 A: No, sir. 2 Q: All right. They never told you that? 3 A: No, sir. 4 Q: All right. Do you know where they 5 were supposed to be setting up this checkpoint with 6 uniformed officers? 7 A: The one here -- 8 Q: Yes. 9 A: -- you're probably talking about? 10 Q: Yes. 11 A: No. It wasn't. It was just this go 12 down -- it was more of if, it's safe to do so and as soon 13 as we can relieve you, okay, with -- with regular 14 uniformed personnel, you -- you will be relieved. It was 15 open til like eight (8) ten (10) hours. I mean, it was 16 until whenever. 17 Q: But you're not going to stand in the 18 parking lot for eight (8) to ten (10) hours waiting for 19 them to decide to send uniformed officers, correct? 20 A: No. 21 Q: All right. And you're not going to 22 stand there in the middle of the night waiting for 23 uniformed officers to show up? 24 A: No. If it went well I would have 25 expected to be relieved fairly quickly.
2371 Q: Okay. But you appreciate that in 2 this -- in the movements up to this march down the road, 3 you're aware that people are gathering rocks and sticks-- 4 A: Yeah. 5 Q: -- you're aware of the possibility of 6 which you've referred to as firebrands being thrown. 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: I suggest to you that if this plan is 9 carried out as it's intended, you're going to be standing 10 in a parking lot with people throwing rocks, sticks and 11 firebrands at you until uniformed officers show up for a 12 checkpoint. 13 Does that make any sense? 14 A: I know -- I know where you're going. 15 I mean, police officers don't normally hold ground. Like 16 they don't -- it's not about holding a piece of ground. 17 But, yeah I could potentially have been in 18 there taking projectiles for quite a long time. 19 Q: Sure. Holding ground implies that's 20 there a battle over a specific piece of land, right? 21 A: Right. 22 Q: And by holding it, you've already 23 conquered it and you're going to hold onto it until you 24 can secure it, right? 25 A: Right.
2381 Q: Were you aware of any significance to 2 this parking lot? 3 A: The only thing I got was there's a 4 buffer for the parking lot, there was more concern over 5 the actual bend in the road; County road on Parkway Road. 6 Q: Right. Which takes us back to this 7 idea which has since been proven not to have occurred, 8 that a civilian's car had been hit with baseball bats and 9 rocks thrown at it as it went by, right? 10 A: Right. That's -- 11 Q: And so it made sense for you as the 12 Commander of the CMU to be doing something like this 13 because it looked like there had been a progression and 14 innocent people driving by were now affected. 15 A: That was what I thought was 16 happening. 17 Q: Right. It was beyond simply people 18 protesting a Provincial Park or moving into a parking 19 lot, they'd now taken it further at least according to 20 the information you'd given, that innocent people were 21 not being affected. 22 A: Affecting the motoring public now, 23 even. 24 Q: Were you made aware that there were 25 people in this parking lot the night before with a fire
2391 and picnic tables set up around the fire? 2 A: I -- in my -- one of the briefings I 3 was briefed that, yes, there had been a camp -- an 4 encampment with a bonfire, picnic tables in the same 5 sandy parking lot and they had sent down an ERT team to - 6 - to -- 7 Q: The next morning. 8 A: Okay. The next morning -- 9 Q: Right. 10 A: -- to break it up so to speak. 11 Q: Right. Okay. And did they tell you 12 that there was two (2) people in a tent that morning, 13 they'd cleared out of the parking lot when the ERT team 14 arrived? 15 A: Yeah. I think I was told that they 16 had, you know, basically moved off without -- without -- 17 other than car damage, people did leave the area. 18 Q: Okay. So you were aware as you were 19 marching down and certainly when you were in the parking 20 lot, that this parking lot had been used previously -- 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: -- by people out of the Park for 23 various purposes, correct? 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: And at some point when you're down
2401 there, people are telling you that it's their 2 grandfather's land -- 3 A: Right. 4 Q: -- and they'll fight for their land. 5 A: Right. 6 Q: It's their land, get off their land-- 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: -- right? At some point, I suggest 9 to you, it must have occurred to you that there must be 10 some attachment also to the parking lot land as well as 11 the Provincial Park land; is that fair? 12 A: I was aware that Stoney Point was a 13 spiritual centre. Like, I knew the Point had a 14 significance to the First Nations. I was aware of a 15 burial ground that actually now was on the Base. I knew 16 where that was. I was not aware of any significance in 17 this sandy parking lot. 18 I knew we were near, you know, 19 significantly, you know, spiritual centres like -- like - 20 - but not that piece of land. 21 Q: Okay. You were aware that if you 22 drew a line straight down Army Camp Road you'd run right 23 into that cottage adjoining the parking lot? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: Okay. And you're aware that all the
2411 land to the right or northeast, as people have referred 2 to the direction -- 3 A: Hmm hmm. 4 Q: -- was -- could be seen as a block 5 together with the Army Camp all the way -- 6 A: Right. 7 Q: -- up to Highway 21? 8 A: I was vaguely aware of that, yes. 9 Q: Right. Well, I'm suggesting to you 10 that you had the experience. You'd been in First Nations 11 communities. You were aware of their attachment to the 12 land, and I'm suggesting that that may have dawned on you 13 at some point while you were down there; is that fair? 14 A: I think it was even discussion that 15 the cottages would be next. 16 Q: That's a totally separate issue. I'm 17 just suggesting to you that you recognized that perhaps 18 this parking lot in addition to the Provincial Park held 19 some kind of significance for the people? 20 A: That became apparent. 21 Q: Okay. And when -- I understand your 22 evidence; when you went down, people jumped over the 23 fence back into the Provincial Park, correct? 24 A: Yeah. Basically went back through in 25 their own pace, like, you know, quickly, expeditiously.
2421 But they very quickly went to the other side. 2 Q: Right. They moved out. You moved 3 back a bit and people came back into the parking lot? 4 A: Well, I mean, when I first moved back 5 everything was okay. 6 Q: Right. 7 A: But -- 8 Q: But somebody came out and you ordered 9 a punchout -- 10 A: Right. 11 Q: -- and he went back in. 12 A: Right. 13 Q: Right. Then you went back again -- 14 A: Then I went back -- 15 Q: -- more people came out -- 16 A: Right. 17 Q: Right. And it appeared, if I 18 remember your evidence correctly, it appeared that 19 someone came out that looked like the leader, with a 20 stick and was saying the things that you've mentioned 21 here, correct? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: All right. Now, we've heard from -- 24 and I always mix these up, it's -- I thought it was 25 Sergeant Huntley or Officer Huntley.
2431 A: It would be Sergeant Huntley. 2 Q: Okay. He testified, I believe it was 3 April 24. 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 Q: And he's -- his recollection is very 8 similar to yours. If you turn to your Tab 17. 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 Q: And we've had to layout that was 13 prepared, I think, by SIU in their investigation. 14 A: Must be. 15 Q: Okay. They've got you in the center 16 to the right of Hebblethwaite? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: And that's fairly accurate? 19 A: Yeah, that part's accurate. 20 Q: Okay. To the right is Huntley -- 21 A: Right. 22 Q: -- backing up a contact squad of a 23 number of officers? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And --
2441 A: Right -- right cover, yes. 2 Q: That's fairly accurate? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Okay. He testified: 5 "As we got closer and rounded the 6 curve, our team was lit up by 7 spotlights and vehicle had lights from 8 behind the fence in the camp. All the 9 Natives retreated into the Park as we 10 approached. We marched up to 11 approximately seven (7) metres from the 12 fence line." 13 He says: 14 "I was team leader on the right support 15 unit position behind the sixth member, 16 right support unit, and that's really 17 cover unit or cover -- right cover." 18 A: Hmm hmm. 19 Q: And that's accurate, right? 20 A: Right. Yeah, right cover. 21 Q: That's where he was? He says: 22 "Directly to my right was Provincial 23 Constable Peter Osborne. In front was 24 the following: Byron Schwass, Jeff 25 Thorne..."
2451 Who I think is a rover on this diagram, 2 just behind Hebblethwaite. Do you see that name -- 3 A: Oh, yes. 4 Q: -- Thorne? And then we have David 5 Smith, Jim Christie, Chris Cossett and John Spencer, 6 which is the right contact squad, right? 7 A: Hmm hmm. 8 Q: He says: 9 "The arrest team was to my rear. My 10 partner was Peter Osborne. He was a 11 support officer. As we had stopped we 12 began taking objects thrown at us from 13 behind the fence line. The first thing 14 I remember was a burning log being 15 thrown at us. Byron Schwass was hit in 16 the helmet. I got hit in the right 17 upper thigh area. We were blinded by 18 the spotlights on us so we could not 19 see the objects being thrown as a 20 result." 21 They were being thrown from behind the 22 lights, right? 23 A: That's right. 24 Q: "We retreated further as they were 25 behind the fence. One Native started
2461 yelling at us. He crossed a fence and 2 came towards us. The left support 3 punched out on order and the Native ran 4 back into the fence at the Park." 5 That's what we just spoke about. 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: "We continued to retreat. Numerous 8 Natives then crossed back over into the 9 parking lot. There was a lot of 10 yelling and shouting." 11 That's how you recall it? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: Okay. He then says: 14 "One (1) Native who appeared to be 15 leader stood out in front, did most of 16 the yelling and shouting, and drew a 17 line in the sand on the road using a 18 2x4 stick. There were numerous Natives 19 in behind him carrying sticks and logs. 20 The Crowd Management Unit was given the 21 order to punchout and the entire team 22 engaged at a run forward." 23 A: And I do not remember any man coming 24 out drawing a line in the sand and -- I don't remember 25 that part.
2471 Q: Well, you testified -- Mr. Falconer 2 was cross-examining you and you used the term discretion 3 is the better part of valour, right? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And you'd agree with me that if 6 Officer Huntley's recollection is correct -- 7 A: Hmm hmm. 8 Q: -- that people have come out, 9 they're not intimidated by the show of force by the OPP-- 10 A: Right. 11 Q: -- that the proper move at that point 12 in time, appreciating discretion is the better part of 13 valour, is to leave, correct? 14 A: I didn't have orders to leave. 15 Q: I appreciate that. You had to make 16 the call according to your earlier instructions which was 17 to engage, correct? 18 A: To clear that -- to clear that sandy 19 parking lot. So now it's just within thirty (30) seconds 20 filled back up again. But I don't remember anybody 21 coming out and drawing that line in the sand. That 22 doesn't mean it didn't happen. 23 Because you remember correctly all -- no, 24 an arrest has not taken place, but I mean why -- I may 25 not see that is I've also got an obstruction we're taking
2481 down on the right side. So I'm not saying that didn't 2 happen. 3 Q: No, I appreciate that. You didn't -- 4 A: I didn't see it. 5 Q: You're not saying that he's wrong, 6 you just didn't see that part? 7 A: Yeah. I never saw a man out front do 8 that. 9 Q: Okay. But you'd agree with me that 10 the simple act of coming back into the parking lot was 11 something that was always available to the people that 12 were inside the Provincial Park once the police left the 13 area? 14 A: Once I gave it up they could come out 15 and take it again. 16 Q: Right. So the whole exercise of 17 clearing this parking lot doesn't hold much water if they 18 can come back in at any point in time that you leave, 19 correct? 20 A: You -- you just summed up Crowd 21 Management but you're right, it doesn't really seem very 22 sensible, but that's -- that's exactly what happens in a 23 disturbance. 24 Q: Right, but crowd management, as you 25 indicated earlier, is better suited for a soccer match or
2491 a hockey game where the crowd's out of control but 2 they're able to focus on one (1) specific moment, right? 3 A: Hmm hmm. 4 Q: And by dispersing them, by getting 5 them to move out -- 6 A: Right. 7 Q: -- you can get them to lose focus on 8 that particular moment and go home? 9 A: Right. 10 Q: Right. But these people thought they 11 were home? 12 A: Yeah, that's right. 13 Q: Right. So the whole exercise in 14 trying to move them out of the parking lot, again I 15 suggest wasn't all that valuable because they could come 16 back in at point in time. 17 A: Come back in. And if I left and they 18 didn't leave a checkpoint they would be back. 19 Q: Even if you left a checkpoint the 20 uniformed officers are going to be what, two (2), three 21 (3), four (4)? 22 A: And wouldn't be outfitted to handle 23 rocks. 24 Q: No, so they could come back in and 25 the uniforms would call back in and say, Guess what,
2501 they're back in the parking lot. 2 A: We'd get a water break and come back 3 up. 4 Q: Well, fair enough, however you did 5 it. 6 A: I'm agreeing with you in the sense of 7 just clearing the Park once -- if -- if the persons are 8 that determined to come back in, you know, this could 9 have kept going on because we have to backup eventually 10 to give a buffer and to take a rest and if they're 11 determined to come back into the parking lot, they're 12 going to keep coming back into the parking lot. 13 Q: Right. 14 A: So, yeah, this thing could have kept 15 going on for days. 16 Q: Right. But by the third time that 17 this was happening you were on the verge of what I think 18 you've referred to before as an explosive riot? 19 A: It was -- 20 Q: Something you wanted to avoid at all 21 costs? 22 A: It was -- the signs were that it was 23 becoming -- they were becoming more agitated -- more 24 agitated and I think the arrest caused it explode. 25 Q: Well, that's certainly been the
2511 testimony from all those who came back into the parking 2 lot after the arrest was made, okay? 3 A: However, the tactic is as taught I 4 think to this day, is the way to break up a normal crowd 5 of any -- any type of crowd, disorderly crowd, is to 6 pinpoint the leaders and one (1) by one (1) arrest them 7 and try to disperse the crowd by having avenues of escape 8 which we never trapped them. We always left them out to 9 the beach and back into the Army Camp. The worst thing 10 you can do is trap them, sandwich them, which we never 11 did. 12 So the tactic of the day, even today is to 13 arrest the leaders. 14 Q: Right. But you -- and that's the 15 approach that you were taking, right? 16 A: That's right. 17 Q: But the fact is by squeezing your box 18 formation into the parking lot and then expanding in the 19 -- this Cordon formation you trapped yourself, right? 20 A: We ended up getting trapped with that 21 fence, yeah. 22 Q: Right. There was no easy way out for 23 you -- 24 A: No. 25 Q: -- if a confrontation occurred.
2521 A: I could only go so far back. You're 2 right, I was limited in my manoev -- ability to manoeuver 3 after getting down there because as you said before, 4 there was no wheeled recy. Hopefully I would have picked 5 up on that. 6 Q: But Mr. Falconer's gone through all 7 of the aspects of reconnaissance that didn't occur, but 8 I'm suggesting to you that just going into that parking 9 lot was a highly risky manoeuvre, that it seems that you 10 appreciate at this point in time, but you weren't advised 11 at that time that it could come to this; is that fair? 12 A: That's fair that it was an extremely 13 risky manoeuvre and I was not fully aware of all of the 14 factors. 15 Q: Right. But it was in an appropriate 16 manoeuvre if in fact you had an opportunity to arrest 17 some of the people especially if they were leaders. 18 A: If that would make the others go home 19 it would be effective. 20 Q: Right. If I can shift one (1) more 21 here over to your testimony that you gave regarding the 22 car. 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: Okay. 25 A: Which one?
2531 Q: How many cars were involved in this? 2 A: Well, I testified on the car four (4) 3 times now, so. 4 Q: All right. So we're regarding one 5 (1) car but we'll cover off four (4) times, okay? 6 A: Okay. I was afraid you were going to 7 say that. 8 Q: One of my clients was driving the car 9 so that's why we're going there. 10 A: Okay. All right. 11 Q: Okay. When this car was coming 12 towards you on the road, do I take it you were standing 13 in or about the middle of the road with your weapon 14 drawn? 15 A: When the car came I had already drawn 16 it -- drawn it for the bus so -- 17 Q: Right. 18 A: -- we would have been -- I can't say 19 I didn't put it back in my holster. I believe I still 20 had it hanging at my side. 21 Q: Well you testified at trial that your 22 gun, your weapon, was still out. 23 A: Okay. So I think it was down at my 24 side. 25 Q: A car's bearing down on you, you have
2541 a weapon available at your side, I suggest that you put 2 your weapon up at the car at that point in time. 3 A: I can't remember pointing at the car 4 when I first saw it. 5 Q: You're not going to stop the car with 6 your body? 7 A: No. 8 Q: Right. You didn't get out of the 9 way? 10 A: No, but it was a very -- you want to 11 get the diagram out, I'll show you with the "S" there. I 12 looked at it for an instant coming at me but then it very 13 quickly swerved to the right towards a member standing on 14 the road. 15 So it swerves away from me, it comes back 16 on the line and then swerves away from me again into the 17 ditch, so it's just an instant that I'm lined up with it. 18 Q: The driver was Warren George, okay? 19 Which you were advised that in the course of the criminal 20 proceedings. 21 A: Right. 22 Q: He testified here for My Friends, 23 December 8, 2004. Sorry, Mr. Commissioner. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Please don't 25 remind me.
2551 2 CONTINUED BY MR. KEVIN SCULLION: 3 Q: He testified that he: 4 "Followed the bus out into the pavement 5 and they seen a crowd of officers where 6 I assumed Slippery would be." 7 Slippery being the one that was arrested. 8 A: Arrested. 9 Q: "And I headed towards them and an 10 officer stepped in front of me and 11 pointed a gun at me. I turned the 12 wheels to the right and stepped on the 13 brakes." 14 Now is that consistent with what you saw 15 the car do as it approached you? 16 A: Not me stepping in front of him with 17 a gun, but I saw a car swing into the ditch. 18 Q: Right. With the brakes on, right? 19 You testified that the front went down. 20 A: The front went down, yes. 21 Q: Right. The brakes were on? 22 A: I couldn't see the brakes -- were 23 sideways to me now. 24 Q: Right. And he says: 25 "And I hit -- I hit a number of
2561 officers and knocked a couple of them 2 down and backed up -- started backing 3 up." 4 A: Right. 5 Q: That's consistent with your memory? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: Right. Then he's asked: 8 "At what point in time, Mr. George, did 9 you hit a couple of officers and knock 10 them down? Is that the location that 11 you drove -- drew and marked Number 9 12 on P-112 behind you?" 13 That's the exhibit that we have here. 14 "Yeah that's when I stopped. 15 You indicated that you turned your 16 wheel to the right and that therefore 17 the direction that you drew your 18 vehicle in? 19 Yes. 20 All right. 21 And the officer that drew his weapon 22 and pointed it at me -- 23 What happened? 24 He started shooting at me. 25 And what did you do?
2571 Reversed and cranked my wheel to the 2 right to distract him, with my front 3 bumper, from shooting at me. 4 How many times were you shot at by the 5 officer, to your recollection, Mr. 6 George? 7 Four (4) or five (5) times. 8 Okay. 9 From that officer. And I -- 10 And can you tell us what happens next? 11 I was backing up and I heard a lot more 12 shots go off. I was on my elbow on the 13 middle of the seat and one (1) hand on 14 the steering wheel. I backed up to the 15 edge of the pavement in the sandy 16 parking lot, stopped and waited for the 17 bus. I could hear gears grinding like 18 he was trying to get it in reverse, so 19 I waited 'til he started to back up and 20 then I could feel my tire going flat, 21 losing traction, so I knew I had to get 22 back into the Park. I backed into the 23 Park and parked my car." 24 Okay, that's what he testified to as to 25 what occurred.
2581 Now, you testified that you shot twice 2 into the driver's side. 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Do you remember saying that? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: At what point in time did the 7 driver's window shatter? 8 A: I don't remember the window 9 shattering. I thought in one statement -- that's why I 10 thought it was open. 11 Q: All right. So he's testified that 12 the window shattered and, in fact, the car had a 13 shattered window. You don't recall it shattering at all? 14 A: No. No, I -- when I fired, I was 15 sure it was open; like, no glass. 16 Q: And you saw one (1) silhouette in the 17 car? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Right. Lit from lights that are back 20 in the Park? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: Right. You didn't see anybody else 23 in that vehicle? 24 A: No. 25 Q: You didn't see people in the back
2591 seat, people in the passenger seat? 2 A: No, sir. 3 Q: Right. You saw a silhouette. And 4 was he sitting up in the passenger side, driving the 5 vehicle? 6 A: In the passenger side? 7 Q: I'm sorry. In the driver's seat. 8 A: No. The person I saw was sitting 9 behind the wheel in the driver's side. 10 Q: Okay. 11 A: 'Cause it pulled in front of me, so 12 that was right -- the driver's door then pulled up right 13 in front of me. 14 Q: Okay. And was Officer Beauchesne 15 beside you at that point in time? 16 A: I wasn't aware of it, but as I said 17 before, I became -- I forget which testimony I -- I 18 became aware that I had TRU team members standing right 19 beside me. 20 Q: Well -- 21 A: When the smoke cleared, so to speak, 22 I had two (2) TRU team members standing to my right. 23 Q: Okay. 24 A: I believe Beauchesne and Klym. 25 Q: Smoke clearing being a couple --
2601 A: Well, I mean -- 2 Q: -- a little while later? 3 A: Like just seconds after the gunfire 4 and the car took off and the bus had gone through. 5 Q: You don't recall them being beside 6 you when you were shooting into the driver's side -- 7 A: No, I felt all alone at that time. 8 Q: Okay. 9 A: But I was aware of gunfire. I think 10 I testified that somewhere, around me, and that's when 11 you can't detect if it's coming at you, coming outbound 12 or inbound. 13 Q: Okay. Well we've got four (4) -- we 14 got pictures and they -- 15 A: Okay. 16 Q: -- were shown to you in direct. 17 There's four (4) shots where bullets are lodged in the 18 side of the car. 19 A: Okay. 20 Q: Okay. There's one (1) that ricochets 21 off of the car. There's at least one (1) to two (2) in 22 the pillar on the driver's side. 23 A: Right. 24 Q: And there's a shattered window. 25 Okay, so that's a lot more than you shot with your gun,
2611 right? 2 A: I know I fired four (4), but only two 3 (2) or three (3) at the car. 4 Q: Okay. So at best, at least two (2), 5 three (3), four (4) or more were fired by others at that 6 car at the drier's side? 7 A: And I had that sense, that's what I 8 was saying before, about we -- I felt that the car was 9 the deceased, because I just had the sense that -- when 10 the smoke cleared, I believe there was an officer up with 11 a gun drawn to my left, and at least two (2) to my right 12 standing on the pavement as it was exiting. 13 So there was three (3) or four (4) of us 14 standing there with our weapons still drawn on that car. 15 Q: Right. And you've got in your notes, 16 and I can take them to you if you want, a four o'clock 17 position for you to the car. 18 A: Right. 19 Q: And you've testified at a number of 20 criminal trials with a ten o'clock location, which I'd 21 suggest to you depends on which way you're looking -- 22 A: Yeah, I might have been -- 23 Q: -- at the car. 24 A: -- putting it off the car or off me. 25 Q: I appreciate. It depends on which
2621 way you're looking at the car. The four (4) and the ten 2 (10) are still off to the side a bit -- 3 A: Right. 4 Q: -- from directly on the driver. 5 A: The angle I had is the directly what 6 I have to you right now. 7 Q: Right. And you're ten (10) to 8 fifteen (15) feet away with, what was your gun again? 9 A: .38 revolver. 10 Q: All right. Something you'd used 11 before. 12 A: No. 13 Q: Something -- you'd never used that 14 gun before? 15 A: There's a long, bad story about that 16 weapon. 17 Q: I'm not going to get into that part. 18 But you'd never used that gun before? 19 A: That was the issue weapon of the 20 Force. 21 Q: All right. 22 A: But I was TRU team and TRU team were 23 issued semi-automatic. Only TRU team had semi-automatic. 24 I left TRU team in '93, 'cause I went to an admin job and 25 they gave me a wheel gun, which I hadn't carried in a lot
2631 of years. 2 And the troops were getting semi- 3 automatics, and I said, Look, you know, I'm a semi- 4 automatic man, just give me the new gun. 5 They said, We'd rather you not do that 6 Wad, because it looks good for the troops that you carry 7 the old gun, 'cause we're issuing them out to the troops 8 first. 9 So I was out there that night with a 10 weapon I hadn't carried in about thirteen (13) years. 11 Q: You were an administrative officer -- 12 A: That's what -- 13 Q: -- right? 14 A: -- I was by day. 15 Q: Right. You called yourself, you 16 equated yourself with the Chief of Police for the area. 17 A: That's right. 18 Q: Right. You did a lot more diplomatic 19 work than anything in the field? 20 A: That's what I'd become. 21 Q: All right. I suggest to you that was 22 also on your mind when you were appointed head of the CMU 23 to walk these guys down the road? 24 A: That I was carrying that gun? 25 Q: That you were an administrative
2641 officer; what am I doing in this position right now? 2 A: No, there was enough of the old 3 Emergency Services still in me that -- I was still young 4 enough that I felt that -- now the -- the people that did 5 my job, the admin job at that time, were like in their 6 fifties and sixties. I was a young administrator; I was, 7 like, forty-two (42). 8 Q: All right. Let's go back to your 9 gun, is it a semi-automatic? 10 A: No, it was -- it's a revolver, six 11 (6) shots. 12 Q: Okay. 13 A: That's why I know I fired four (4). 14 Q: And you'd agree with me that it's 15 important for the, not only to know how many shots they 16 fired, but how many shots they -- or how many bullets 17 they had in their gun when they go out at night? 18 A: That's right. 19 Q: All right. When was the last time 20 you checked how many bullets you had in that gun before 21 you went out the night of September the 6th? 22 A: Just -- well, I would have checked it 23 when I picked it up and loaded it, and I would have 24 checked it before I went down that road. 25 Q: Okay. So you checked it that night?
2651 A: Yeah. 2 Q: And you checked it afterwards. I 3 think we've heard you -- 4 A: Yeah. 5 Q: -- gave a couple of shells to -- 6 A: I know I had four (4) empties and to 7 live. 8 Q: All right. So you put four (4) into 9 the side of that car? 10 A: Yeah. No, no, I believe I actually - 11 - if you watch what I'm saying in my testimony, I go two 12 (2) to three (3) in the car, and I later go one (1) in 13 the bus. 14 The more I -- the more I really think 15 about it today, we're trained to do what you -- what you 16 call 'double tap'. You never fire one (1) bullet, you 17 always fire two (2) to make sure you stop. 18 What makes logical sense to me is I fired 19 two (2) at the car and two (2) at the bus, a total of 20 four (4). 21 Q: All right. But you don't know? 22 A: But I testified two (2) to three (3) 23 at the car. 24 Q: All right. And when you say, Into 25 the car, there's a difference between what we see in the
2661 car, which are four (4) in the panelling and what could 2 have been into the driver of the car? 3 A: That's right. 4 Q: What do you recall doing when you 5 shot? 6 A: Because I had this .38, it has -- the 7 new guns have got Tritium light night sights; that's also 8 why they were going to them, so you can see sights. I 9 had no sights, okay, and I knew it, so I was firing 10 instinctively. 11 And I was fearful of a ricochet so I ran 12 to get close, and I stood tall and fired low, because I 13 had no sights. So I wasn't looking for the driver, in 14 the normal sense, I was trying to put them into the 15 driver's compartment. 16 Q: Okay. 17 A: When I told CA -- SIU I probably 18 fired low; that's me calling my shots, saying, if 19 anything, because I was trying to keep them down, they 20 probably went low. So my shots were probably in the 21 door. 22 Q: All right. But you're not shooting 23 from your hip, are you? 24 A: No, no. 25 Q: All right.
2671 A: I'm shooting high from the shoulder. 2 Q: It's up front so you can see where 3 you're shooting, correct? 4 A: Yeah. There's no night sight so you 5 can't see anything, all you're doing -- 6 Q: Well extend your arm. Show me how 7 you -- 8 A: So how I did it was I approached, I 9 got up, and fired down like this. 10 Q: All right. The end result of that 11 shot is about two (2) feet away, correct? 12 A: Two (2) -- three (3) feet away, yes. 13 Q: So that's how close you were to the 14 car? 15 A: That's right. 16 Q: Okay. All right. I'm reminded that 17 we're also bound by a written record. Let me just 18 summarize what we did say and -- 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You have to 20 describe -- 21 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: -- you can correct 22 me if I'm inaccurate. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You have to 24 describe it in words. 25
2681 CONTINUED BY MR. KEVIN SCULLION: 2 Q: But you've -- you've stood up, you 3 extended your arms fully -- 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: -- and you had a downwards motion, 6 two (2) hands on the gun -- 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: -- into what you say was the side, 9 the driver's side of the car? 10 A: Driver's compartment. 11 Q: The driver's compartment. Your gun 12 was held approximately three 3 1/2 feet high, 4 feet 13 high? Is that about right? 14 A: Waist height; 3 feet. 15 Q: Well you're a little bit higher than 16 waist height, you're about stomach height, right? 17 Q: Okay. Three (3), four (4) feet the 18 weapon was up. 19 Q: All right. 20 A: On a forty-five (45) degree angle 21 down. When I said from the chin, I told him the chin, I 22 was not up trying -- because I could not see sights, so I 23 did an instinctive shot. 24 I lined it up, instinctively, and fired. 25 I deliberately fired low, because I didn't want it to
2691 ricochet. So I felt, if anything, my shots would be in 2 the door. 3 Q: Okay. Shooting into the door isn't 4 going to do much to prevent the driver from doing what 5 you thought he was going to do, correct? 6 A: I was -- yes. I -- I just meant I 7 after critiqued myself and said I probably fired low. 8 Q: No I -- I appreciate that, but I'm 9 trying to -- 10 A: But I was trying to stop the driver. 11 Q: When you do what you just did, it 12 looks like you're right on top of the driver -- 13 A: That's right. 14 Q: -- shooting at him -- 15 A: That's right. 16 Q: -- he's alive and here today. 17 A: Right. 18 Q: Testified at the Inquiry. 19 A: Right. 20 Q: How did you miss him? 21 A: That's what happens in stressful 22 situations, sir. 23 Q: I appreciate that, but you're a 24 couple of feet away from him and you've now also 25 testified that while doing all of that in a stressful
2701 situation -- 2 A: Hmm hmm. 3 Q: -- missing him, right? 4 A: Yeah. 5 Q: Because you obviously missed him. 6 A: That's right. 7 Q: He also fired at you two (2) to three 8 (3) times from the driver side? 9 A: I said I saw a muzzle flash, two (2) 10 to three (3) muzzle flashes from the driver's side. 11 Q: Right. But you appreciate, if you're 12 firing at him, and you've got your gun a couple of feet 13 away from him, what he says here that, I ducked and had 14 my elbow on the middle of the seat to get out of the way, 15 it's probably pretty accurate, right? 16 A: I'm not going to doubt that he didn't 17 do that. 18 Q: Right. To get out of the way. 19 A: The truth of it is, I'll just tell 20 you about gunfight theory, exactly what we went through, 21 happens. I also get in close because if you compress the 22 suspect, he too will miss. It's not what most people 23 think. You don't want to stand back and be timid. If 24 you get in close and compress them, a lot of people are 25 not that steady, and they end up missing.
2711 Q: Right. But you just told me that -- 2 A: I had body armour on so I also fill 3 the window with body armour. 4 Q: Which is fine. You've just told me 5 that you're at the side of his car. 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: Right. You've got a full revolver, 8 feet away from him, correct? 9 A: Yeah. 10 Q: You say that you saw muzzle flashes 11 from him in the car. 12 A: I said I saw muzzle flashes. 13 Q: All right. You don't know where they 14 came from? 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No? 16 THE WITNESS: No, I do not. I think at 17 one point I must have even said -- somebody asked me, 18 Could they have been from another weapon? I said, Could 19 be. 20 21 CONTINUED BY MR. KEVIN SCULLION: 22 Q: It could be reflection of another 23 weapon? 24 A: It could be a reflection? 25 Q: It could be a reflection of your
2721 weapon? 2 A: Could be. 3 Q: You've testified, and in your notes 4 it refers to off the windshield, there's the mirror 5 somewhere in there. 6 A: Yeah. That's the exact angle I was 7 running at, firing. 8 Q: Okay. So at some point you unload a 9 couple of shots into the car, the front end of the car 10 comes around. Does it hit you? 11 A: No. He was backed straight out; 12 straight in, straight out. 13 Q: He couldn't have backed out 14 straight -- 15 A: Okay. On a -- on an angle -- 16 Q: -- if what you're saying initially is 17 true that he's perpendicular with the road. 18 A: An angle to the left, yes. 19 Q: Right. He's got to spin the wheel -- 20 A: Right. 21 Q: -- turn it around and back down the 22 road. 23 A: That's right. 24 Q: Correct? 25 A: Right.
2731 Q: So the front end, when you spin the 2 wheel, has to come at you, because you're standing beside 3 the left front bumper, right? 4 A: Two (2), three (3) feet away. 5 Q: So did you jump out of way or did it 6 hit you? 7 A: I think I had already started walking 8 backwards. 9 Q: You'd already gotten out of the way 10 then? 11 A: Yeah, I'm out of the way. 12 Q: Okay. So what he says in his 13 testimony, that he was down, spun the wheel and backed 14 out of the area, is consistent with what you're now 15 telling me occurred? 16 A: Yeah, I think that's what I've always 17 said, is he backed out right then. 18 Q: Okay. We've also heard from Sergeant 19 Jacklin, who was the head of your arrest team. 20 A: Hmm hmm. 21 Q: That he was out on the road as well, 22 and he had a fogger, and he sprayed the fogger at the 23 door of the bus to stop it. 24 A: I think I heard that later somehow. 25 Q: Yeah. Do -- do you recall?
2741 A: I didn't know I had a fogger, and I 2 never knew he did that, but. 3 Q: Do you recall him being in the street 4 beside you? 5 A: It might have been Wayde that yelled, 6 Look out, when the bus came back. I have -- 7 Q: Okay. 8 A: -- a feeling that I saw him sometime 9 at the time the bus went by the second time. 10 Q: But you didn't see him with a fogger 11 chasing the bus? 12 A: No, sir. 13 Q: Okay. Now when you... 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 Q: I'm not familiar with the fogger. If 18 a fogger's used, what's the after effect? 19 A: Pretty bad. 20 Q: What does that mean? 21 A: OC spray is made from, you know, 22 chili peppers, right? And it's in an inert substance. 23 It's in -- it used to be in alcohol, it's not in alcohol 24 now -- distilled water, and it's meant to get it into 25 your eyes.
2751 If you get in your eyes, I mean, as police 2 officers we used to have to take -- take it in the eyes, 3 so we knew what it did to you in case you cross 4 contaminate it. 5 And I have sworn to never go through that 6 ever again, because it is one of the most excruciatingly 7 painful experiences. And your eyes swell and shut and 8 you need water badly for about twenty (20) to thirty (30) 9 minutes. 10 Q: Okay. And that's if you're hit 11 directly with the fogger spray? 12 A: If you get a good shot of it. 13 Q: And if a fogger spray, hypothetically 14 bounces -- 15 A: Hmm hmm. 16 Q: -- off a closed door to a bus, what 17 would occur with it? 18 A: It can dissipate pretty quick. If 19 there wasn't somebody standing right there. You can get 20 a secondary spray of it, which isn't as bad as the one I 21 talked about, full on. 22 And in the outside, like we were, bouncing 23 off a bus, it could dissipate pretty quick. 24 Q: Does it smell? 25 A: No, not really, no. It's kind of
2761 inert, except it's got the actual Oleo -- Oleo capsicum 2 resin, which is the hot part of a chili pepper in it, and 3 it's just in distilled water. 4 Q: Okay. I take it, then, from your 5 evidence, that you weren't aware of any dissipation that 6 was occurring on that street from a fogger, while you 7 were there? 8 A: Never detected it, no. 9 Q: Okay. Now, in terms of your report, 10 that goes back to either the TOC or the command post, I 11 take it you reported that there was a person in the 12 vehicle that you shot at? 13 A: I think I reported that we took shots 14 from a car, didn't I? 15 Q: Right. But you would have also 16 reported that you put two (2) shots into the car. 17 A: Not over the radio. 18 Q: No. But when you're -- came back to 19 the TOC or to the command post and you -- 20 A: No, I only asked them to identify who 21 had shot. I didn't get into shots. I didn't do, Where 22 did you shoot; How many did you shoot? I just asked 23 officer -- officers who had discharged their firearm 24 report to me. 25 I got those names, told them those weapons
2771 were evidence. Under normal circumstances we'd probably 2 take them, however, operational, and no replacement, hold 3 on to them. 4 And John was right there, too, I think, to 5 get the list of seven (7). I never -- I never then went, 6 When did you shoot; How many did you shoot? I didn't -- 7 Q: Okay. Regardless of -- 8 A: Oh, I think I just told them to keep 9 the guns in the condition they were in, which would mean 10 the mags would have the empty casings and the full 11 casings. 12 Q: Okay. 13 A: Like, they were not to touch the 14 guns. 15 Q: Regardless of the number of shots 16 that were fired into the car, I take it you reported back 17 that there was one (1) person in the car that you thought 18 you got shots from that direction? 19 A: Yes. I think I said we were fired at 20 from the car. 21 Q: But there was one (1) person in the 22 car. You didn't report that there was three (3) or four 23 (4) people in that car? 24 A: No. That message you showed me I now 25 -- that's when I did get interviewed early in the morning
2781 about that car description. 2 They wanted to know, yeah, one (1) male in 3 a four-door car, and believed to be two (2) in the bus. 4 That would be -- they'd come looking for me within hours. 5 Q: And -- 6 A: But I didn't walk up to John and say, 7 This many people in the car, this many shots. 8 Q: Right. But you were -- 9 A: The investigators -- 10 Q: You were concerned that the driver of 11 the car would be charged or could be potentially charged 12 with attempted murder -- 13 A: Right. 14 Q: -- with the car, right? 15 A: Right. 16 Q: And you would have reported that 17 there was one (1) person in that car. 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Right. And that's the report that 20 you would have brought back to the TOC or the command 21 post? 22 A: Right. 23 Q: You wouldn't have said that there's 24 three (3) or four (4) people in that car -- 25 A: Oh, no.
2791 Q: -- it would have been one (1). 2 A: No, no. I, no, I gave one (1) just 3 like I did here. One (1) male in a North American four- 4 door car. 5 Q: All right. Are you aware that there 6 was four (4) people arrested later on, in a North 7 American car, at the hospital, and charged with attempted 8 murder? 9 A: I was not aware until quite some time 10 later. I may -- I think I read it in the paper. 11 Q: Okay. So you weren't aware that 12 night? Nobody reported back to you that we're arresting 13 four (4) people for attempted murder in this car? 14 A: No, sir. I think I was home in bed. 15 I was gone by 2:00. 16 Q: I won't get into that. I'm -- 17 A: Okay. 18 Q: -- finished my questions. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 20 Mr. Scullion. 21 Ms. Johnson...? 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Oh, I think
2801 we should take a break. We had a short break. Do you 2 think we should take a break or do you... 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Let's take 7 another short break and then we'll deal with Ms. Johnson. 8 Am I correct, Mr. Alexander, that you don't have any 9 questions. 10 MR. BASIL ALEXANDER: None, unless 11 something comes up in the next few minutes. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 13 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 14 for fifteen (15) minutes. 15 16 --- Upon recessing at 2:36 p.m. 17 --- Upon resuming at 2:50 p.m. 18 19 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 20 resumed, please be seated. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Ms. 22 Johnson...? 23 MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: Good afternoon. 24 25 (BRIEF PAUSE)
2811 2 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: 3 Q: Good afternoon, sir, my name's 4 Colleen Johnson and I'm here for the Chippewas of Kettle 5 and Stony Point, as well as for the Chiefs of Ontario 6 today. 7 You've indicated that you have a fair bit 8 of experience in policing First Nations; would you agree 9 with that? 10 A: I think others have, but I've been -- 11 I've been around. I think it was mentioned to me that I 12 had a lot, but. I'd say comparatively, yes. 13 Q: Have you had any specific training 14 with regards to policing First Nations? 15 A: Not 'til after this event. 16 Q: Okay. And would you agree that 17 you've never actually worked for a First Nation? 18 A: No, I've never worked for a First 19 Nation government or reserve, no. 20 Q: So the extent of your experience is 21 simply through your employment with the OPP? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: Okay. And First Nations often are in 24 a position of working closely with the OPP? 25 A: Yes.
2821 Q: Okay. Now you indicated that you had 2 some knowledge, that you had learned some things about 3 warrior traditions; is that correct? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And you indicated that you had some 6 experience working near the Six Nations Reserve? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And it would be -- I would submit to 9 you, sir, that -- that the information that you've 10 gleaned regarding warrior traditions would have been 11 shared with you by someone from the Six Nations Reserve; 12 would that be accurate? 13 A: I believe it was, yes. 14 Q: Okay. And you indicated also that 15 you policed the New Credit Reserve; is that correct? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: Okay. And would you agree that the 18 Six Nations people and the New Credit people are 19 different peoples? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: Okay. Would you agree that the Six 22 Nations people are Hau de no sau nee peoples with very 23 different traditions than Anishnaabeg peoples? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And the New Credit peoples are
2831 Anishnaabeg; is that correct? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: Okay. And the Kettle and Stony Point 4 people, are you familiar with who they are? 5 A: Yes, they are Anishnaabeg or 6 Chippewa? 7 Q: Okay. And the warrior traditions 8 that you learned of had to do with Hau de no sau nee 9 peoples; is that correct? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: Okay. Now, you indicated that you 12 had been involved with the tripartite agreement from my 13 home community, Walpole Island? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: And you indicated that you had worked 16 with Chief -- at the time Chief Joseph Gilbert in that 17 regard? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Do you recall -- do you know Ron 20 George, sir? 21 A: Ron George? From -- 22 Q: He's an inspector now? 23 A: Yes, I know Ron, yes. 24 Q: Okay. At the time I would submit to 25 you that he was a lawyer, he was a practising lawyer and
2841 not at the time of the tripartite negotiation? 2 A: Yes, I think he was a lawyer for 3 Kettle. Or was he independent? I'm -- 4 Q: Do you recall him being involved with 5 the tripartite negotiations for Walpole Island? 6 A: I believe he was, but he was not at 7 the same meetings I was at. I don't remember being at a 8 meeting with him. He was at the higher level where it 9 really -- where it was -- where the negotiations were 10 taking place. 11 Q: If I suggested to you that he was 12 representing Walpole Island at that time, as a lawyer, 13 would you find that to be true? 14 A: Yes. Actually, I believe that that 15 was the case. 16 Q: And he was integrally involved with 17 the tripartite negotiations; is that right? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Now it would seem to me that Mr. 20 George would have had a significant amount of experience, 21 being that he already had years of OPP experience; would 22 that be accurate? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: Did you have a close relationship 25 with him at all?
2851 A: I knew him when he was a First 2 Nations constable and then he went back to school. I 3 lost track of him. And then of course he went to be a 4 lawyer in the time period you're talking about. 5 And the next thing I saw him he was an 6 inspector in the OPP as a special advisor to the 7 Commissioner, so I'd see him on a part-time basis. So I 8 knew of him. I probably knew him more -- I think you 9 used the word intimately -- more intimately back in the 10 '80's, when he was a First Nations constable, on a more 11 regular basis. 12 Q: Okay. You did not see him during the 13 tripartite negotiations or drafting of -- of the proposal 14 for Walpole Island; is that correct? 15 A: When I -- when I went to meetings, I 16 think I even had in my notes a minute ago, I went to a 17 meeting, I remember it was Dale Linton represented the 18 region, John Carson was there at one time, Tony Parkin 19 from, you know. And then the Contract Policing Branch, I 20 believe, was Colleen Cosgrove (phonetic) and it was Chuck 21 Wesley. 22 Now, Ron would have been the lawyer, as 23 you say, on the other side. But I mean I think we were 24 down explaining what it would look like on the ground. 25 We were not in a negotiation, financial negotiation, we
2861 were in how it would look, how many officers, cars, 2 building. 3 So I -- I -- he may have been at the 4 meeting I was at, but I wasn't dealing with him at my 5 level. Maybe -- maybe Superintendent Fox might have 6 been. 7 Q: So your level would have been clearly 8 with the OPP, as opposed -- 9 A: Yeah. Yeah. 10 Q: -- to with the First Nations. 11 A: Absolutely. I was dealing with the 12 Band Chief. Like I said, they set up almost like a -- I 13 don't know if they still have it, they set up almost like 14 a police service board but they called it Civil 15 Authority. 16 So I -- 17 Q: So it's the committee, the Civil 18 Authority Committee; would you agree with that? 19 A: Yeah. Yeah. It's a committee. So I 20 dealt more with them, Shirley Tooshkenig. They would ask 21 me on how I thought, you know, say this clause, what it 22 would look like in reality. 23 So I dealt with them as an advisor on 24 number of cars and scheduling and the building. I didn't 25 deal in the financial side.
2871 Q: And clearly, it was from an OPP 2 perspective, not a of First Nation perspective. 3 A: Purely from an OPP perspective. 4 Q: Thank you. So would you agree that 5 it would be fair to say that all of your experience, with 6 regards to First Nations, is from an OPP perspective? 7 A: Absolutely. 8 Q: Thank you. On the evening that you 9 marched down the road to the sandy parking lot, that was 10 clearly your area of expertise? 11 A: That's my background, I spent most of 12 my career in emergency measures. 13 Q: Okay. How many people did you have 14 directly under your authority that evening? 15 A: It would have been forty-two (42), 16 forty-five (45). 17 Q: Now we've hard evidence that there 18 were -- there was a middle section and then a left 19 section and a right section; is that accurate? 20 A: Yeah. Yeah. Front contact squad, 21 you're talking about? 22 Q: Hmm hmm. 23 A: Left cover, right cover and the rear, 24 yeah. 25 Q: I'm sorry, if I might just...
2881 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: I believe that at your Tab 17 you 4 have a drawing; is that correct? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And you've also provided us with this 7 Cordon information, and this was Exhibit P-1455. 8 A: Yeah, it's the one I -- that's out of 9 the manual. This is done by SIU, I think. I didn't draw 10 this up. 11 Q: Perhaps you could refer to your 12 drawing and just use Tab 17 as a reference. 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 A: Gone through a lot of paper here 17 today, I'll have to... 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Okay? 22 THE WITNESS: Yes. 23 24 CONTINUED BY COLLEEN JOHNSON: 25 Q: If you might, sir, I'm going to ask
2891 you to mark this drawing again. If you might label where 2 you are in the drawing and indicate for us. 3 A: OIC is me. 4 Q: Okay. 5 MR. DERRY MILLAR: This was -- actually 6 was a -- the example of the cordon formation and the box 7 formation, and he would identify, as he said, OIC officer 8 in charge. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 10 11 (BRIEF PAUSE) 12 13 CONTINUED BY MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: 14 Q: And next to you would be? 15 A: George Hebblethwaite, my 2/IC. So if 16 you look at this other diagram that matches up with the - 17 - it's the same. 18 Q: I'm sorry. 19 A: If you look at this other diagram you 20 referred to, they match up. 21 Q: Okay. And that's what -- I'm just -- 22 I'd like it to match up, but if you can indicate, from 23 your recollection, where the other individuals of your 24 squad are. 25 A: I only have me and George. I don't
2901 have a squad. 2 Q: Okay. Then the support squad or the 3 -- I'm sorry, the contact squad behind you is -- who is - 4 - who is directly in authority of that? 5 A: And that diagram there is a little 6 messed up, 'cause I -- I don't know who drew that 7 circular-looking thing. That doesn't -- that doesn't 8 look correct. 9 If you look at my diagram, there was a 10 support squad, such as I've drawn, with six (6) -- three 11 (3) sets of two (2). 12 I can't remember who had that one. Then 13 there was eight (8) in support and that was Wayde 14 Jacklin. 15 Q: Okay. 16 A: And that -- that seems to line up 17 with this line. Yeah, he's -- 18 Q: Yes. 19 A: -- got Jacklin route. That -- so 20 that circle of six (6) I do not believe would have been - 21 - or five (5), I don't -- my recollection is they 22 wouldn't have travelled like that and I don't -- I don't 23 recognize who was in charge of that. 24 That's called support or arrest squad, 25 that's a part of the formation. I don't...
2911 Q: I'm sorry. You're looking at the 2 support squad that -- that Wayde Jacklin was... 3 A: No, I'm looking at that little group 4 that SIU's drawn. 5 Q: Okay. 6 A: The way they've drawn it, it's not 7 the way they would deploy. 8 They've got five (5) names in a little 9 circle. 10 Q: Perhaps we could look at the cordon 11 formation. 12 A: Okay. 13 Q: And perhaps you could tell us who you 14 think -- who you recall being in the contact squad; if 15 you could identify the members of that. 16 A: I can't recall anyone. 17 Q: Not at all? 18 A: No. I knew Rob Huntley had the right 19 cover. Dave -- 20 Q: Okay. 21 A: Dave McLean, Sergeant Dave McLean had 22 the left cover. I knew where the sergeants were, and 23 that's it. 24 Q: So at no point do you ever recall 25 where individuals are?
2921 A: No, it doesn't work that way. It's-- 2 Q: That are sergeants. 3 A: I have -- for me, at my level, I have 4 four (4) squads in the CMU and a squad in reserve. I 5 know who the team leaders of the squads are. At night 6 they're all in black uniforms, black helmets. They now 7 put badge numbers on the back, but back then we didn't. 8 There's just a bunch of black men, black 9 silhouettes. So I knew who the squad leaders were, then 10 they knew where individual members within the squads 11 were. I had no idea. 12 Q: Do you recall a few minutes ago you 13 testified that someone had been hit in the head with a 14 log? Someone had -- one of the demonstrators had thrown 15 a log. Do you recall that? 16 A: Yeah, there was lots of logs thrown, 17 yeah. I -- I said that? You mean when... 18 Q: That you saw a log hit someone in the 19 helmet. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I -- 21 THE WITNESS: I think it might have 22 been -- 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm not sure 24 if this Witness said that. 25 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I don't think --
2931 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Some 2 evidence was read to him where that was said by somebody 3 else. 4 MR. IAN ROLAND: Yeah, I don't think he 5 said it. I think it was read to him by Mr. Scullion. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 7 MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: All right. I 8 apologize. 9 10 CONTINUED BY MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: 11 Q: Huntley, I hear My Friends saying 12 that it was Huntley. You don't recall seeing that? 13 A: I mean I -- I was hit square in the 14 head with a rock, and I was hit with a log, and I was hit 15 in the ankle, and I think I was hit in the shoulder. And 16 I think every individual out there, if I'm not mistaken, 17 got hit in one form or another. 18 And I am aware of that, and I was aware of 19 a lot of broken shields, but to say I saw a individual 20 log hit a individual officer out of forty (40), I cannot 21 recall specifically when. 22 Q: I'm sorry. And you just said you 23 were aware of a lot of broken shields. Is that what you 24 said? 25 A: Yeah, I saw pieces of broken shield
2941 on the ground. 2 Q: And I -- I heard earlier your shield 3 was broken. 4 A: Right. 5 Q: And you thought there may have been 6 another shield broken. 7 A: Yeah, so that's four (4) pieces. 8 Q: Okay. So that's two (2). 9 A: Yeah. And four (4) pieces. So when 10 you're running by you're seeing four (4) pieces of 11 plastic on the ground, so you're... 12 Q: You've indicated that you've never 13 been allowed to sit through an entire trial. 14 A: No. 15 Q: With regards to Cecil Bernard George. 16 A: Right. 17 Q: And certainly, your testimony was 18 that at -- at the trial of Cecil Bernard George, that you 19 never identified him as being the person specifically 20 that you first came in contact with? 21 A: True. 22 Q: Is that correct? 23 A: I've never identified him. 24 25 (BRIEF PAUSE)
2951 A: I see somebody in different 2 Occurrence Reports have identified him for me. There's 3 one (1) in the tab where -- but if you look and see it 4 was filed, but I wasn't -- filed -- but I was the 5 Complainant and you'd have to look who filed the report; 6 investigators. I've never alleged Cecil Bernard George 7 struck me at any time. 8 Q: That's fine. And you were not clear 9 as to what Cecil Bernard George's position was that 10 evening, but you assumed later that he was their leader; 11 is that correct? 12 A: Somebody -- no, we just took the 13 evidence of his -- his movements and the fact that he had 14 a portable radio, you know, just like I was the one 15 waving my arms around and talking on the radio, you would 16 assume that I might have been the leader of the CMU. 17 Q: Okay. 18 A: So my men watched somebody else do -- 19 look a lot like me, so they assumed that that 20 person might be my counterpart. 21 Q: Okay. 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 Q: I'm just going to read you a portion
2961 of Cecil Bernard George's testimony. And for My Friends' 2 assistance this is from December 7th, 2004, and it's page 3 63: 4 "I heard other comments being yelled at 5 them about Mayflower, then I couldn't 6 hear anymore." 7 And he goes on: 8 "When a human being reaches that point 9 I had feelings I can't really put. I 10 couldn't hear anything anymore. All I 11 could see were these police officers in 12 front of me. I can see their eyes 13 right through the shield. I've seen 14 the eyes. I wanted to run. I had 15 nowhere to go. My friends were there. 16 My family was there. I had to defend 17 them. I had to defend myself. And 18 they charged. They came forward. I 19 couldn't hear the people that were 20 behind me anymore. 21 I heard one (1) voice saying, Punchout. 22 When I heard that voice saying, 23 Punchout, I knew they were coming to 24 punch me and punch everyone else that 25 was in their way because they had no
2971 feelings. They were full of fear. 2 They were scared of the Indians. The 3 Indians had sticks and stones and they 4 had guns." 5 The term 'punchout' in the normal use of 6 the term 'punch' it means an act of aggression against an 7 individual, would you agree with that? 8 A: If you're a Canadian. 9 Q: Okay. As a police officer, the term, 10 'punchout' means something very different? 11 A: If you're Canadian. 12 Q: Well, okay. We're in Canada and 13 we're talking about Canadians here. 14 A: The -- the tactic came from England 15 and it was carried over, that punchout was the British 16 doing the -- in a line, in a punchout movement. So -- 17 Q: And you're indicating -- 18 A: -- in Canada -- 19 Q: -- with your hands. 20 A: In Canada you're inferring that a 21 punchout would be a good fight, Donnybrook, but that term 22 is a Brit term that was brought to us with the tactics. 23 And I don't think that's what they meant. 24 Q: That's fine, I'm asking you about Mr. 25 Cecil Bernard George's testimony, that when he heard the
2981 term, "punchout," he thought that you were intending an 2 act of aggression. 3 A: Yeah. I can see from his perspective 4 he might think he's about to get punched out. 5 Q: And that's my question. 6 A: We'll have to review those terms. 7 MR. DERRY MILLAR: He can't really say 8 what Cecil Bernard George thought. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Cecil 10 Bernard thought. 11 MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: That's fine. Cecil 12 Bernard George did say what he thought. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, we 14 heard his evidence, it's on the record. 15 MR. IAN ROLAND: To be fair to the 16 Witness, if she's going to read all of his -- read the 17 evidence, she's left out a considerable amount of what he 18 said he felt and thought and did. 19 MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: That's fair. All I 20 wanted was that he accepts -- 21 MR. IAN ROLAND: You've got -- you've got 22 half the -- 23 MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: -- that there could 24 have been a misinterpretation of the term 'punchout'. 25 And he's agreed with that. That's as far as I'm going
2991 with that. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Okay. Fine. 3 Move on. 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 CONTINUED BY MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: 8 Q: Now your evidence is that you struck 9 him, the individual in front of you, who I take it you're 10 now accepting was Cecil Bernard George? 11 A: I -- you know what, the more I hear 12 it I don't think I did strike Cecil Bernard George at 13 all. 14 Q: All right. Okay. 15 A: Because I heard other evidence that 16 my officers thought that I was the one with my -- there 17 was two (2) shields busted, and that I had turned my back 18 and was being hit with a 2x4. And they seemed to align 19 that situation with the arrest of the person that was 20 later found to be in custody, which is Cecil Bernard 21 George. 22 And I at no time was struck with a 2x4 and 23 bent my back. So I -- I'm confused. I don't really know 24 that the guy I struck is Cecil Bernard George. 25 Q: All right. You indicated that you
3001 struck an individual who was out front. 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: And you believe you struck him on the 4 clavicle. 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: The shoulder area. 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: Okay. Now it's happening fast; is 9 that correct? 10 A: Very fast. 11 Q: All right. Is it possible that your 12 blow did not land on the shoulder, that it landed in the 13 neck area or the head area? 14 A: Not the head. Absolutely not. 15 Q: The neck or the side of the head? 16 A: No. 17 Q: The neck area? 18 A: Clavicle is -- it all depends what 19 you want to call neck. When I say clavicle, I was aiming 20 for the shoulder point. 21 Q: Hmm hmm. 22 A: And the clavicle; some people call 23 the clavicle neck. 24 Q: Could it have struck him on the neck 25 by --
3011 A: I did not strike him -- 2 Q: -- the shoulder? 3 A: We're trained, in all of our 4 training, e not to go anywhere near the head. 5 Q: Okay. 6 A: And I know I deliberately -- and I'm 7 fairly accurate with it, I deliberately avoided his head. 8 Q: Okay. Could it have struck him on 9 the neck near the shoulder? 10 A: Like you're talking like in here? 11 Q: And you're pointing to where the neck 12 connects with the shoulder, yes. 13 A: I could -- I'll go as far as the 14 clavicle near the bottom of the neck. 15 Q: All right. That's fine. After that, 16 do you see that individual at all? 17 A: No I -- 18 Q: You run over him? 19 A: He drops. 20 Q: Okay. And you run over him? 21 A: I jump over him. 22 Q: Okay. And then where do you see an 23 individual on the ground, following that? 24 A: I thought I saw one off to the right. 25 And I thought I saw another altercation, I don't know if
3021 he went down to the left. 2 Q: Okay. 3 A: I'm pretty sure I saw one on the 4 ground to the right, as I'm running forward. But I run 5 by it pretty quick, too. 6 Q: Okay. And after you've run by it and 7 your -- you've gone forward, is there a point where you 8 turn around? 9 A: Not right away, because a big guy 10 comes out at us by the -- the Trisel dumpster with a big 11 stick, calling, Coward, coward. And I remember the front 12 contact squad, it got a little bit too far -- you will 13 hear it on the tape, the front contact squad is a little 14 bit too far close. 15 So I'm going, Back, back, back, dressing 16 on the left, dressing on the right, because they're all 17 arriving at different times. 18 A guy comes out, Coward, coward, coward. 19 I've got an awful lot on my focus to the front for all 20 that time. 21 Q: And can you see the front contact 22 squad at that point? 23 A: They're right smack in front of me. 24 Q: Okay. And do you see the front 25 contact squad around an individual on the ground?
3031 A: No. 2 Q: Never. 3 A: No. Now, are you talking when we 4 first started the -- the punchout? Because there was 5 altercations immediately. So -- 6 Q: Through the entire altercation, do 7 you see the front contact squad around an individual; one 8 (1) individual on the ground? 9 A: No, because I see several clashes and 10 they do their job; they release and keep running. So 11 nobody stops to get around anybody. 12 But there are altercations, stick to 13 shield, stick to stick, and a lot of running and a lot of 14 screaming and then we end up, up front of this fence. 15 Q: I'm going to read you a portion of 16 the testimony of David George. And this is from October 17 20th, 2004. And I'm beginning at page 112. And I'm at 18 line 23. 19 "There was a -- I don't know who else 20 was -- was there, but I remember maybe 21 one (1) or two (2). 22 Q: Okay. So Mr. Cecil Bernard George 23 was caught by the police, and then what 24 happened -- or what then happened?" 25 And the answer:
3041 "They -- they -- they just started 2 clubbing the hell out of him." 3 And the question is: 4 "When you say they started clubbing the 5 hell out of him -- " 6 The answer is: 7 "I seen him go down on his -- " 8 And the question: 9 "Who are you referring to as 'they'?" 10 I seen him go down on his back. They 11 just run him right over and he kind of 12 -- he was still looking at them. He 13 was trying to talk to them right at the 14 moment they run him over and he went 15 down on his back like this, and he had 16 his hands up like that. Because they 17 were -- they just run him right over. 18 And I think they may have -- two (2) of 19 them might have clubbed him on the head 20 and he fell backwards and he was trying 21 to use his arms to cover himself and he 22 landed right on his back. And his legs 23 came up and he tried to make himself 24 into a ball because they just 25 surrounded him, like, right as soon as
3051 they run him over." 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 Q: "There was some guys behind him that 6 kind of filled the gap where those 7 officers were that first encountered 8 him and they started beating the hell 9 right out him like they were clubbing 10 him all different angles. They 11 surrounded him. He was -- there was a 12 full circle right around him and there 13 was people -- I could see people trying 14 to jump over the cops trying to get in 15 a -- a shot. 16 And how many police officers did you 17 observe around Mr. Cecil Bernard 18 George? 19 I'd say there was at least -- at least 20 ten (10) cops on him." 21 A: Would you like me to interpret that? 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think 23 you're going to be asked a questions. 24 MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: I'd like for you 25 to --
3061 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think 2 you're going to be asked a question now. 3 MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: Yes. 4 THE WITNESS: Oh. 5 6 CONTINUED BY MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: 7 Q: I would like for you to indicate if 8 at any point during the altercation between the 9 protesters and the CMU that evening, you saw anything 10 like that occur? 11 A: Yes and no. Yes, because I heard the 12 first part of what you said. So if Mr. Cecil Bernard 13 George, if you look at your cordon formation form here, 14 if Mr. Cecil Bernard George was standing at the very 15 center of when the -- the whole formation went forward, 16 if he was right smack in the middle, he would have made 17 contact with the middle pair. 18 They would have, you know, possibly dealt 19 with him, swung around him. He would have then dealt 20 with the team leader of the front contact squad. 21 They might have had a -- 22 Q: The front -- 23 A: They might have had -- front contact. 24 Q: Okay. 25 A: They might have had a quick
3071 altercation as I think I heard you say, they ran and 2 swarmed all around him. 3 Then he would have run into me which I 4 admit to breaking the pole, hitting him in the clavicle. 5 He could have run into the edge of the left cover, right 6 cover. Team leaders on the back end of the left cover. 7 Then he would have hit the rear couple in the support 8 squad. No team leader there followed up to be arrested 9 by Jacklin's squad. 10 So he would have been dealt with by two 11 (2), four (4), six (6), eight (8), ten (10), twelve (12) 12 officers and finally circled to be arrested. 13 So, judging where the person was, swarming 14 and running and being dealt with, you know, actually 15 having -- if he stood up and had an altercation with each 16 team as they went by, swinging whatever he -- I could 17 describe it almost maybe that way. 18 It could look that way. 19 Q: Following his altercation with you, 20 he went down; is that correct? 21 A: I don't know he didn't get back up. 22 I ran forward and stopped at the fence and I never looked 23 back. I was in the middle of the formation of forty (40) 24 officers; twenty (20) ahead of me and twenty (20) behind 25 me.
3081 So I don't know what happened. It was a 2 melee. There was at least twenty (20) First Nations and 3 thirty-two (32) policemen in the main formation. I'm not 4 a mathematician. I think My Friend over here's a 5 mathematician. Someone figure out the odds of twenty 6 (20) times thirty-two (32). Sorry. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I know 8 you're trying to be helpful, but I think -- 9 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- it's 11 better if you answer the questions. 12 THE WITNESS: All right. I -- no. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just carry 14 on, Ms. Johnson. Have you got a question? 15 16 CONTINUED BY MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: 17 Q: And if I suggested to you that Dr. 18 Alison Marr testified on April 26th, 2005 that when Cecil 19 Bernard George was brought in he had twenty-eight (28) 20 blunt force trauma injuries, would you agree that that -- 21 that Mr. David George's testimony indicates that he was 22 struck by a large number of officers. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I mean -- 24 MR. DERRY MILLAR: No, but I'm not sure 25 he can answer --
3091 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- you don't 2 have to refer to -- 3 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- that question. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- David 5 George. 6 MR. DERRY MILLAR: That it -- because -- 7 MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: Okay. That's fair, 8 I can rephrase it. That's fair, I can rephrase it. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 10 11 CONTINUED BY MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: 12 Q: As I indicated, Dr. Marr testified 13 that he had a significant number of blunt force trauma 14 injuries. 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: She also indicated that he had been 17 struck with a blunt object and one that had a linear 18 shape to it, according to some of the bruising on his 19 body. Would you agree that -- that those injuries could 20 have resulted from numerous hits by police officers that 21 evening? 22 A: No. Just sitting here myself -- 23 MR. IAN ROLAND: This -- this -- 24 THE WITNESS: Sorry. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes...?
3101 MR. IAN ROLAND: Really, this -- this 2 Witness didn't see it. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Didn't see 4 it. 5 MR. IAN ROLAND: He isn't a medical 6 expert. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 8 MR. IAN ROLAND: He didn't see the 9 injuries. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Right. 11 MR. IAN ROLAND: I mean, really, this 12 is -- 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It doesn't 14 help us at all. 15 MR. IAN ROLAND: It doesn't -- 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We have the 17 evidence of the doctors. 18 MR. IAN ROLAND: All of this is something 19 that's beyond the experience -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Of this 21 Witness. 22 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- of this Witness. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think 24 you're right, Mr. Roland. 25 MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: If I might just
3111 have your indulgence. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 CONTINUED BY MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: 6 Q: Sir, can you indicate would the 7 injuries that I've described be consistent with the 8 action that you would expect your officers to take that 9 evening? 10 A: The actions that my officers -- I'd 11 like to answer it this way. 12 Q: Hmm hmm. 13 A: Without my PPE one (1) rock in the 14 head, one (1) rock in the shoulder, busted shield through 15 my radio head, one (1) in the instep, one (1) on the 16 upper leg plus I got hit with a stick. I'm -- so without 17 my protective equipment being in the same altercation I 18 would have several blunt trauma injuries; five (5) or six 19 (6) from rocks and a couple from sticks. And I would say 20 that would be the average of any person there. 21 Q: You -- 22 A: Police or otherwise. 23 Q: You didn't have those injuries though 24 because you went in protected, correct? 25 A: Yeah, because I have to in the
3121 Ministry of Labour protect myself for hazards. 2 Q: That's fair. 3 A: If I didn't have that equipment 4 though I would have similar injuries and every one (1) of 5 my men would have similar injuries -- 6 Q: But the -- 7 A: -- from rocks, from sticks, from... 8 Q: But the people that you came upon 9 that evening were not protected; is that correct? 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes...? 11 MR. IAN ROLAND: Mr. Commissioner, let me 12 say this, that this Witness didn't -- wasn't involved in 13 any of the investigation of the -- of the events that 14 focussed upon Cecil Bernard George -- 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, he 16 wasn't. 17 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- at all. We know in 18 evidence -- it's in evidence is the report of the SIU 19 which concluded that there were no reasonable grounds 20 discernible in the evidence capable of supporting a 21 belief -- 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No. 23 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- that the application 24 of force upon Cecil Bernard George's person was 25 unjustified in the circumstances.
3131 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: This isn't 2 the time to make the argument. 3 MR. IAN ROLAND: That was the result of 4 the -- of an investigation. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I understand 6 that but -- 7 MR. IAN ROLAND: And so for My Friend to 8 ask this person to put themselves in the place of an 9 entity who did investigate is simply not helpful. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, I'm 11 not sure how much this Witness can help us with these 12 injuries. We do have medical evidence of the extent of 13 the injuries and where they were and I'm not sure that 14 this Witness can be of much assistance. 15 MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: That's fair. I'll 16 move on a bit. 17 18 CONTINUED BY MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: 19 Q: You testified at the trial and I 20 believe you have a transcript of your testimony there, 21 Tab Number 71 of Cecil Bernard George; is that correct? 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: What tab is 23 this, Ms. Johnson, 71? 24 MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: I believe it is. 25 71.
3141 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 71. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Exhibit 6 1464? P-1464. 7 8 CONTINUED BY MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: 9 Q: If you could look at page 34 of that 10 testimony? 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 Q: At line -- well, it would be 27 I 15 suppose. The sentence starts: 16 "About that time a fairly short 17 individual" 18 Do you see that? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: Go ahead and read that for me please. 21 A: "About that time a fairly short 22 individual probably five foot five/five 23 foot six (5'5"/5'6"), fairly 24 overweight, large belly, came through 25 the turnstile to my immediate left with
3151 a large pole. 2 To me he seemed to be somewhat either 3 intoxicated or he was just -- I don't 4 know, he was either intoxicated or 5 really emotional because he was 6 screaming and hollering and going on 7 about, Get off this land; we're 8 desecrating the forefathers land. You 9 have no right here. 10 He came forward to the front rank. The 11 member which would be on the immediate 12 left, there's eight (8) members, it 13 would be the immediate left, the 14 closest to the turnstile; he come 15 swinging this at waist level back and 16 forth and he's going for that member. 17 That is kind of a typical thing in a 18 crowd." 19 Q: That's fine, thank you. If you could 20 look at Tab 9 and that's your notes. 21 A: Tab 9 in...? 22 Q: Yes, your -- your own notes. 23 A: Oh. 24 25 (BRIEF PAUSE)
3161 Q: And I will say that my photocopy is 2 not the best, but I believe that the number at the bottom 3 of your page would be 83. I'm sor -- at the bottom of 4 the note page, the little number in the corner. 5 A: 83? 6 Q: Yes. 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 MR. DERRY MILLAR: It must be 93. 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: Okay, 93, I'm 15 sorry. 16 MR. DERRY MILLAR: It's page 17, 17 Commissioner. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Page 17? 19 MR. DERRY MILLAR: 17 on the right hand 20 corner, Commissioner. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I -- 22 THE WITNESS: Right. 23 24 CONTINUED BY MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: 25 Q: If you could read that beginning with
3171 "overweight" -- well beginning with "then a lone male". 2 A: "And then a lone male, overweight, 3 yielding a large wooden club came 4 through a turnstile to my immediate 5 left screaming that we're on the land 6 of his forefathers. He's swinging the 7 club wildly back and forth and appeared 8 to be intoxicated. 9 Ordered the left contact squad to 10 punchout which caused him to retreat 11 back through the turnstile." 12 Q: That's fine. Where -- where did the 13 information -- or where did you come up with that he was 14 intoxicated? What evidence did you have in that regard? 15 A: Just twenty-eight (28) years of 16 police work I guess. It sounded like slurred speech and 17 it seemed to me he was staggering a bit. 18 Q: Okay, now those are common things 19 that we hear when we do trials for people who are 20 intoxicated. 21 A: Right. 22 Q: Such as driving. 23 A: Right. 24 Q: That evening you don't make any notes 25 that he has slurred speech or anything like that; is that
3181 correct? 2 A: I wasn't planing on arresting him for 3 impaired driving. I just made an assessment. I thought 4 he might be intoxicated or emotional. 5 Q: Well, later you say emotional in the 6 trial. You don't say emotional in your notes; is that 7 correct? 8 A: Yeah. 9 Q: In your notes you say he's 10 intoxicated. 11 A: Appeared to be. 12 Q: Later in -- in the trial you say he's 13 either intoxicated or really emotional. 14 A: Hmm hmm. 15 Q: You don't say anything about his 16 speech being slurred. 17 A: No. 18 Q: Don't say anything about him 19 staggering. 20 A: I usually put all those notes in 21 after I arrest somebody for impaired put down the rest of 22 the evidence. I just made an assessment. It wasn't like 23 I was going to take him for LLA or... 24 Q: So very simply you made an 25 assessment?
3191 A: Yes. 2 Q: And you agree with your testimony 3 that he could have simply been really emotional? 4 A: Yeah. 5 Q: Would you agree that there was no 6 evidence that he was intoxicated whatsoever? 7 A: If this has offended in any way, then 8 it's -- he just seemed to be acting erratic and so I just 9 put in an assessment, "may be intoxicated". 10 Q: Which could be consistent with being 11 really emotional? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: Okay. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 Q: I'm going to take you to just one (1) 18 line and it's Tab 24 I believe, P-1361. And I'm going to 19 ask at page 8 -- I'm sorry, that it be played and that 20 you just listen to the second line of that page. 21 Do you see the line? 22 A: Yes, I do. 23 Q: And we've made some corrections there 24 already. Is that correct? 25 A: A few, yeah.
3201 Q: And it -- it starts with the word 2 "few". 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Okay. If you could just listen to 5 this line for me. 6 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Now, it's not going to 7 be perfect. 8 9 (AUDIOTAPE PLAYED, TRANSCRIPT TO FOLLOW) 10 11 [WL = Staff Sergeant Wade Lacroix] 12 [BD = Staff Sergeant Brian Deevy] 13 14 BD: Good! 15 WL: Few boys - we hammered - we hammered them 16 - like we cut 'em down - like [inaudible] 17 with the sticks. 18 BD: Good. 19 WL: And then I guess we finally realized we 20 got their leader, they're a little choked 21 then. 22 23 (AUDIOTAPE CONCLUDED) 24 25 CONTINUED BY MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON:
3211 Q: And the last part of that sentence 2 was: 3 "And then I guess we finally realized 4 we got their leader." 5 Would you agree that that line indicated 6 we hammered him? 7 A: No. 8 Q: Go ahead. 9 A: No. I already answered that before. 10 I take it from the -- the line before -- I think I run 11 into one (1) full sentence where I say we took a barrage 12 of rocks, we repulsed a full attack. I am mentally 13 standing on the road after disengaging, pulling back, 14 giving a buffer zone between me and the people in the 15 Park and we -- I -- I say I repulsed a full attack. 16 Somebody attacked us, I didn't attack 17 them. About fifteen (15) to twenty (20) with clubs. It 18 was an even fight, I guess. 19 Guy broke my shield and -- right in half. 20 You cannot break those shields right in half without a 21 fair amount of -- of striking force. Luckily, I had a 22 forearm pad on underneath that or I'd probably have a 23 busted radial head. 24 Q: If I might -- 25 A: That's what I'm expressing. With a
3221 steel pole and he coldcocked -- then I coldcocked him. I 2 knocked him down. And a few of the boys hammered them, 3 the ten (10) to fifteen (15). 4 We cut them down with the sticks. 5 Q: And if I might, I coldcocked him. 6 A: Yeah. 7 Q: Could you play it one more time, 8 please. And you're talking about him, I coldcocked him. 9 A: And then I'm talking about them. 10 Q: If you mind -- 11 A: Okay. 12 Q: -- just listen. 13 14 (AUDIOTAPE PLAYED, TRANSCRIPT TO FOLLOW) 15 16 [WL = Staff Sergeant Wade Lacroix] 17 [BD = Staff Sergeant Brian Deevy] 18 19 BD: Good! 20 WL: Few boys - we hammered - we hammered them 21 - like we cut 'em down - like [inaudible] 22 with the sticks. 23 BD: Good. 24 WL: And then I guess we finally realized we 25 got their leader, they're a little choked
3231 then. 2 3 (AUDIOTAPE CONCLUDED) 4 5 CONTINUED BY MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: 6 Q: So I'm going -- it's my submission to 7 you, sir, that at the bottom of page 7, you indicate: 8 "The guy broke my shield right in half 9 with a steel pole. I coldcocked him. 10 Few boys, we hammered them." 11 And then the next thing that you say is: 12 "And then I guess we finally realized 13 we got their leader." 14 You're talking about an individual. 15 A: I said we ham -- that we hammered 16 them. 17 Q: That's fine. The tape stands on its 18 own. 19 20 (BRIEF PAUSE) 21 22 Q: You worked for a fair bit of time 23 with Vincent George; is that correct? 24 A: I came on the job with him and then, 25 no, cause I went -- I'd say for a couple of years.
3241 Q: Okay. And professionally, what was 2 your position with regards to him? 3 A: A good officer. 4 Q: Were you ever his supervisor? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Can you tell me about that period of 7 time; when it was, like that? 8 A: It was just recently. He had gone 9 off, I think, he left Forest. He was a Forest -- he was 10 at Sombra when I was not Detachment Commander in Sombra-- 11 Q: Okay. So you worked together in 12 Sombra? 13 A: No. He was at Sombra -- 14 Q: Okay. 15 A: -- when I was not -- 16 Q: Okay. 17 A: -- Detachment Commander. I was in 18 Petrolia. He went to Forest when I didn't run Forest, 19 then he went off to, I think, Casino. He got promoted 20 and went to Rama and he wanted to be -- get back on a 21 compassionate -- to be transferred back to the area. And 22 I was the one that sanctioned it, brought him back, 23 because then I was responsible for the greater County. 24 He went to Forest as a sergeant, one of my 25 shift supervisors, when I was the County Commander. But
3251 he worked out of the Forest office most of the time. I 2 worked out of Petrolia. 3 I think at the very end, before I left, I 4 brought all the sergeants in to the Petrolia admin. 5 centre. So we -- we would have worked together directly 6 for about one (1) year. 7 Q: Okay. And during that one (1) year 8 were you his supervisor? 9 A: Not immediately. I had a staff 10 sergeant in between me and him. 11 Q: Okay. 12 A: I was two (2) above him. 13 Q: Okay. Do you ever recall having a 14 conversation with him regarding the incident with Cecil 15 Bernard George? 16 A: I do not. 17 Q: Do you ever recall indicating to him 18 that you had been the first one to come in contact with 19 that protestor? 20 A: There's a possibility that I might 21 have said something about that I came in contact with a 22 protestor. 23 Q: Do you recall that conversation with 24 him? 25 A: No, but I did come in contact with a
3261 protestor. 2 Q: Yes. 3 A: I would have had a -- 4 Q: That's fair. 5 A: -- conversation that I was there that 6 night and happened to get my shield broke and yes, I -- 7 but not -- I'm not -- remember this was Vince, but I 8 would possibly have been in a conversation about -- 9 Q: But you don't recall that? 10 A: No. 11 Q: Okay. You can't testify to something 12 you don't recall. 13 A: Good. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 Q: You were asked by Commission Counsel 18 with regards to the t-shirts and mugs -- 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: -- as to whether you had ever 21 purchased one and you indicated that no, you had not. 22 A: No. 23 Q: We've heard evidence from Inspector 24 Carson, for one, that some of those items were given to 25 the commanders, the people in command. He in fact
3271 received one. Did somebody give you any item like that? 2 MR. DERRY MILLAR: I don't think there 3 was evidence from Inspector Carson -- 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I don't 5 remember that. 6 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- that he was given 7 one. Inspector Carson said he had one. That -- that 8 wasn't the evidence that it was -- it was given to him. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I don't 10 remember him -- 11 MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: Okay. That's fine. 12 My question to you is -- 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You can 14 still ask him your question. 15 MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: There's some -- 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You can 17 still ask him your question. 18 19 CONTINUED BY MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: 20 Q: Was -- was a T-shirt ever given to 21 you? 22 A: The only thing that was said to me 23 was at one (1) time during that event and I didn't even 24 know what it was. After this event was gone and when I 25 went to Grand Bend Command Post was one (1) of the ERT
3281 guys said we have a T-shirt for you, okay? Now, was it - 2 - and I never saw it -- was it the t-shirt in question, 3 because I know there was other t-shirts. 4 There was a T-shirt with 1 District, 2 5 District, 3 District, 6 District, you know, logos, so a 6 comment, We have a t-shirt for you -- never got it. So I 7 don't know if the one they had for me is the one you're 8 interested in. 9 Q: And what about the mug? Did you ever 10 receive the mug? 11 A: Never received a mug, seen a mug, or 12 bought a mug. 13 Q: Never saw the T-shirt? 14 A: Never saw it. Heard it looked like 15 -- am I right that it had an anvil, -- 16 Q: That -- 17 A: -- an eagle feather, and a TRU team 18 crest? 19 Q: If you didn't see it, you didn't see 20 it, sir. 21 A: I didn't see it. 22 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Just -- My Friend Mr. 23 Falconer indicated that perhaps my recollection was 24 wrong, that he indicates that some -- Mr. Carson said 25 someone gave him a T-shirt which he put in a trunk.
3291 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I don't 2 remember that but if that's what the recollection is 3 that's fine. Ms. Johnson...? 4 MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: Those are my 5 questions. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 7 very much, Ms. Johnson. 8 Mr. Alexander...? 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 MR. BASIL ALEXANDER: Mr. Commissioner, I 13 can advise that we have no questions. My Friends have 14 covered our areas. Thank you. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 16 Mr. Alexander. That brings us to Mr. Roland. 17 MR. IAN ROLAND: Maybe we could take a 18 five (5) minute break and then I'll set up and -- 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: A five (5) 20 minute break? 21 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- I'll be probably half 22 an hour, forty (40) minutes, something like that. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Okay. We'll 24 take a five (5) minute break. 25 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess
3301 for five (5) minutes. 2 3 --- Upon recessing at 3:38 p.m. 4 --- Upon resuming at 3:48 p.m. 5 6 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 7 resumed. Please be seated. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Mr. 9 Roland. 10 11 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 12 Q: Mr. Lacroix, I have a few questions 13 for you in re-examination. The first deals with your -- 14 your mission. And you've described -- you've talked 15 about your mission throughout your testimony. That is 16 the mission with respect to the CMU with you as the 17 leader. 18 Let me first indicate to you the evidence 19 you gave on May the 8th, that's now two (2) days ago. 20 And I'll give the page references for the record and My 21 Friends. At page 194, line 7 -- sorry line 8, you said: 22 "Our mission was to move the 23 demonstrators back onto the Park 24 property and ensure the safety of local 25 residents and motorists using Army Camp
3311 Road." 2 Do you recall giving that evidence? 3 A: Yes, sir. 4 Q: At page -- the bottom of page 196 of 5 May 8th, you say at line -- starting at line 24: 6 "Q: And so your instructions were to 7 move the people out of the sandy 8 parking lot back -- back into the Park 9 but not to go into the Park? 10 A: Yes." 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: Do you recall giving that evidence? 13 A: Yes, sir. 14 Q: And then finally at page 221 you 15 testified that, starting at line 2: 16 "Q: And then what happened? 17 A: So I'm basically standing there 18 assessing the situation." 19 This is when you've arrived -- CMU's 20 arrived at the -- at the parking lot. You carry on: 21 "Realizing there on the property, 22 Provincial property [referring to the 23 demonstrators] my mission to clear the 24 sandy parking lot is now done." 25 Do you recall giving that evidence?
3321 A: Yes, sir. 2 Q: I'm going to take you to some 3 evidence that you gave yesterday in response to some 4 questions by Mr. Falconer. This is in transcript May 9, 5 2006 at page 306. I'll start at -- actually 305, line 6 20, Mr. Falconer asked you: 7 "And so, in their unsuccessful attempts 8 to find out whether there's weapons 9 there, the idea was to put your men and 10 you halfway down the road in harm's way 11 as it were. Does that make any sense? 12 A: If -- if that's -- I think I 13 answered yes in the evidence in-chief. 14 If it would make no sense -- if that's 15 what we were nothing but a diversion. 16 However, if we're going down to the 17 Park -- [sorry] if we. However if 18 we're going down -- [sorry, let me 19 start that again.] 20 This is line 2, page 306. Sorry, I'm 21 mangling this a bit. Let me start again. 22 "However, if we were going down to do 23 the mission that I was told to do, go 24 down and clear the Park to use us as a 25 screen of some kind, a diversion to get
3331 the Sierra team into it's final 2 position I can understand that." 3 And then just a little further down at 4 line 10, Mr. Falconer says: 5 "And in particular you'd agree with me 6 that it's an improper use of the CMU to 7 have as your job to go halfway down the 8 road and create that diversion, not to 9 go all the way to the Park and clear 10 the Park as you've just said which 11 would be a primary mission, right?" 12 A: That was the mission I was given." 13 So do you remember those questions and 14 giving those answers? 15 A: Yes, sir, I do. 16 Q: All right so in -- so in your 17 examination-in-chief, you said you're -- a number of 18 occasions your mission was to clear the sandy parking lot 19 and in this extract I've just read to you from 20 yesterday's evidence in questioning Mr. Falconer, you 21 said your mission was to clear the Park. 22 Would you please tell us what your mission 23 was? 24 A: It was to clear the sandy parking lot 25 in the outside of the Provincial Park on the -- what I
3341 call the road allowance. 2 Q: All right. Did you ever have a 3 mission to clear the Park? 4 A: No. I was strictly told not to go 5 into the Park under no circumstances. 6 Q: Thank you. So when you said to Mr. 7 Falconer that your mission was to clear the Park, how did 8 you come to say that? 9 A: Tired. 10 Q: Okay. Are you saying you misspoke 11 out of tiredness? 12 A: Yes, I -- yeah, I transposed parking 13 lot to Park. I meant my mission was to clear the sandy 14 parking lot outside Ipperwash Provincial Park. 15 16 (BRIEF PAUSE) 17 18 Q: Let me take you to another matter and 19 this is the role of Mark Wright. You were asked 20 yesterday and again today by Mr. Falconer about Mark 21 Wright's authority and his role in the incident command 22 structure. 23 I'm going to ask that Exhibit 424 be 24 provided to you. This is Project Maple. You've told us 25 that you didn't have any role in preparing Project
3351 Maple -- 2 A: No. 3 Q: -- and that you, in fact, hadn't seen 4 Project Maple. 5 A: No, I -- 6 Q: Or the document at all up to and, 7 indeed, after the events. 8 MR. DERRY MILLAR: It's at -- it's also 9 at Tab 11 of his book. 10 MR. IAN ROLAND: Is it? Okay, thank you. 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 CONTINUED BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 15 Q: So this is, and I think your evidence 16 was you -- you really weren't aware of this until 17 preparation for the testimony at this Inquiry. 18 If you -- if you look at the third page 19 in, you'll see the -- the command structure with the 20 officer in charge shown at the top as Superintendent 21 Coles and then the -- the Incident Commander, the CIT 22 commander is Inspector Carson. 23 You see that? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And then under that is CIT commander
3361 assistant, acting Detective Staff Sergeant Wright. 2 You see that? 3 A: Yes, sir. 4 Q: And would you agree with me that this 5 is a particular command structure for this particular 6 project -- 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: -- that was created for the purpose 9 of this -- 10 A: Well, it makes sense, sir, as soon as 11 you see the title and the OPP that this is a co-ordinated 12 investigative team. 13 Q: Yes. 14 A: Okay, so it has an incident 15 commander, but this is an investigative team, not your 16 normal incident command. 17 All I was trying to refer to, to Mr. 18 Falconer was, in the OPP incident command, it's an 19 integrated command so you would have an investigative 20 rep., a TRU team rep., a negotiative rep. 21 You have all these different reps. Not 22 realizing that 'til that shows that I did not know this 23 plan. This plan, therefore, is written as a co-ordinated 24 investigative team. 25 Q: And it --
3371 A: Which would certainly stay to the 2 investigative side and if you look under Mark Wright, his 3 2/IC's are both investigators. 4 So this makes perfect sense that he would 5 be the number 2 on an investigative incident. 6 Q: And that's how this incident was 7 characterized -- 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: -- by this plan? 10 A: Yes, sir. 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 Q: And it shows, I take it you'd agree, 15 a direct -- 16 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I'm sorry, Mr. 17 Commissioner, but it was the last question that caused me 18 to rise and I apologize for interrupting My Friend. But 19 that last question was: 20 "And that's how this incident is 21 viewed?" 22 Well, this officer, with respect, was not 23 involved in the preparation of the plan or the 24 preparation beforehand. The only thing you could do now 25 is talk about what this -- this paper says not --
3381 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Should be -- 2 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- how the 3 incident -- 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's how 5 this investigation was organized. 6 MR. IAN ROLAND: That's fine. The 7 document speaks for itself. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Or a better 9 word. 10 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That's right. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 12 MR. DERRY MILLAR: I agree with Mr. 13 Falconer. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, that's 15 fine. 16 17 CONTINUED BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 18 Q: You didn't -- when you were asked 19 about the reporting relationship earlier, Mark Wright to 20 John Carson, you weren't aware of this -- 21 A: No. 22 Q: -- organizational chart? 23 A: No. 24 Q: Right. And I take it this 25 organizational chart now gives you information you didn't
3391 have until you had a chance to look at it? 2 A: That's true. I was going on what 3 would be normal under a normal incident command without a 4 sub-structure like this. 5 Q: Right. And in a normal incident 6 command, I take it you don't have an assistant incident 7 commander? 8 A: No, and I -- no. 9 Q: All right. Which you do have in this 10 case with Mark Wright? 11 A: Right. 12 Q: Thank you. Let me just clear up a 13 couple of other things, Tab 39, the Use of Force Report. 14 Could you turn to Tab 39? 15 16 (BRIEF PAUSE) 17 18 Q: Do you see at the beginning of 39 19 there's a -- there's a covering letter? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: And you'll see it's dated December 6 22 1995? 23 A: Hmm hmm. 24 Q: Does that letter assist you in 25 determining when the incident -- when the Use of Force
3401 Report was prepared? 2 A: I believe it was prepared before 3 December 6th. 4 Q: Yeah. You indicated that it could 5 have been prepared in your view or likely prepared 6 several weeks after the events of September? 7 A: Yes, because I don't think we all go 8 back to our regular jobs until four (4) or five (5) weeks 9 after. 10 Q: Okay. And so what I'm ask -- simply 11 asking is does this -- the date of this letter assist you 12 in -- in better refreshing your memory about when this 13 report was likely completed? 14 A: Some time between the 6th of 15 September and the 6th of December. 16 Q: Okay. Fair enough. Let's turn to 17 the report itself. 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: And you'll see at the -- you'll see 20 at the top of the report in a line near the -- near the 21 top there's -- there's a... 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 Q: All right. All right. My Friend
3411 wants you to go to Tab 41 and -- and -- rather than Tab 2 39 so would you turn to Tab 39 -- 41? 3 MR. DERRY MILLAR: And that's Exhibit P- 4 1460. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, because 6 it has a front page -- 7 MR. IAN ROLAND: Right. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- the other 9 one doesn't. 10 11 CONTINUED BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 12 Q: And you'll see in that -- this is the 13 same report form, but I'm -- what I'm interested in, Mr. 14 Lacroix is the report form itself, not for the moment 15 what's filled in but the report form. 16 And if you look in what is the second line 17 of the report it indicates a box for individual report. 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Do you see that? 20 A: And a team report. 21 Q: Length of service, rank, and then it 22 indicates in the middle of that second line, Team Report 23 and -- 24 A: Right. 25 Q: -- an "X" in that?
3421 A: Right. 2 Q: And did that indicate to you that a 3 report could either be an individual report or a team 4 report? 5 A: Yes, and that was the nature of the 6 phone call I was given -- 7 Q: Right. 8 A: -- was we were to do it as a team 9 report. 10 Q: Right. And we know from the 11 regulations that the -- the report is to be submitted in 12 Form 1 and that this is Form 1? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: All right. Let me turn to another 15 topic and that is the issue of an injunction to be 16 obtained or that you told us I think in response to 17 questions in-chief that you were aware on September the 18 6th that there was steps being taken as you understood it 19 to seek an injunction soon thereafter, the next day or 20 soon thereafter? 21 A: I -- I believe I was told the next 22 morning -- 23 Q: Yeah. 24 A: -- in Sarnia Court. 25 Q: Right. And I think in response to
3431 some questions from Mr. Falconer you indicated that your 2 general understanding was that when a court order was 3 issued it was to be acted on right away? 4 A: My understanding was it was a court 5 order from a judge telling us to take action and it had 6 be acted upon. 7 Q: And that I take it was your general 8 understanding of court orders? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: But I gather you didn't have any 11 discussion with -- we haven't heard of any discussion you 12 had with John Carson to that effect? 13 A: No. 14 Q: That is you -- no? 15 A: Not specifically, now. 16 Q: All right. That is there was no -- 17 you didn't have any understanding from anything that was 18 said to you by John Carson or indeed anybody else if a -- 19 that a court order was obtained when it would be acted 20 upon? 21 A: No. 22 Q: No. 23 A: I just knew that was the next step, 24 was to get a court order. 25 Q: Yeah. Let me take you to another
3441 topic, evidence that you gave in response to questions 2 from Mr. Falconer about Stan Korosec's feelings about the 3 Park occupation on September the 4 -- that occurred on 4 September the 4th, '95, at the end of the day. 5 And he asked you about your testimony in 6 the Warren George trial and he took you to Tab 71, page 7 11, in which you testified that: 8 "I think it was more [than] a reaching 9 up to me [this is Stan Korosec speaking 10 to you] to see if he [meaning Stan 11 Korosec] had done the right thing by 12 vacating the Park, and it was my 13 feeling that he had done the right 14 thing." 15 16 (BRIEF PAUSE) 17 18 Q: And what you were testifying to is 19 what you thought. 20 A: That's what I thought. 21 Q: Yeah. 22 A: He -- he didn't say that to me, I 23 just felt that -- 24 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I'm sorry, Mr. 25 Commissioner, I know My Friend didn't mean to but he
3451 misquoted the evidence. It was not "more than a reaching 2 out." I think it was "more" -- 3 MR. IAN ROLAND: "Of a reaching" -- 4 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- "of a reaching 5 up." 6 MR. IAN ROLAND: Sorry, I misread that. 7 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That's right. 8 9 CONTINUED BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 10 Q: "I think it was more of a reaching 11 up." And what you were expressing was your own thoughts, 12 your own interpretation of -- of why you thought Stan 13 Korosec spoke to you about September the 4th? 14 A: Yeah. It was just my impression from 15 being a -- a commander that quite often your subordinate 16 NCO's will tell you the action they took, and they just 17 want to hear the boss say, Good job, or, you know, or, 18 Yeah, you know, That was the thing to do. So it was my 19 assessment. 20 Q: Did Stan Korosec ever express to you 21 any -- himself, any reservation about what he'd done? 22 A: No. He -- no. He just was basically 23 telling me that, This is what happened and we got out. 24 And I said, Yeah, Sounds like you did the right thing. 25
3461 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: In your testimony you talked about 4 the -- in your testimony you talked about the 5 responsibility of a Detachment Commander... 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE) 8 9 Q: ... the role of a Detachment 10 Commander and you described it as someone who is 11 functioning like a chief of police. 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: Referring, I take it, to a municip -- 14 A: Yeah, a -- 15 Q: -- analogous to a municipal chief of 16 police? 17 A: Yes, sir. 18 Q: And that the role of the Detachment 19 Commander was to be part of the community and community 20 structure? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: All right. 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25
3471 Q: I'm showing you a page taken from the 2 police orders of the OPP, and you'll see there's a 3 heading, "Detachment Commander at Order -- Police Order 4 57.1." 5 And for the record, Mr. Commissioner, 6 you'll see the date at the end of it, November '85. That 7 was the date that that came into play and it was in 8 effect in 19 -- September 1995 and up to then. 9 And it says that: 10 "The Detachment Commander is 11 responsible for the effective 12 operational and administrative 13 management of the detachment in 14 accordance with OPP and district 15 policy. In this respect, the provisions 16 of Section 56 apply in their entirety 17 to the Detachment Commander. 18 Additionally, the Detachment Commander 19 must be aware that notwithstanding the 20 OPP connection, they are a senior 21 police command presence in the 22 jurisdiction for which they are" -- 23 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I'm sorry. I'm 24 interrupting because I -- if I could get a copy so I 25 could follow My Friend's questioning. Thank you. I
3481 apologize, I haven't seen it before. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You were up 3 to "command presence in a jurisdiction." 4 5 CONTINUED BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 6 Q: "In the jurisdiction for which they 7 are responsible and in many instances, 8 actually fulfils the function of a 9 chief of police. In this role the 10 Detachment commander is an integral 11 component of the community structure." 12 And is this the -- the order that you were 13 referring to? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: That described your role as a 16 detachment commander? 17 A: Yes, sir. 18 Q: Okay. That -- that will be 19 circulated to the parties by e-mail today or tomorrow, so 20 they -- 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It should be 22 an -- 23 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- have a copy. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- exhibit 25 as well?
3491 MR. IAN ROLAND: Would you mark it as an 2 exhibit? 3 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Mr. Commissioner, 4 my only concern is My Friend -- it's very fair that My 5 Friend raises this, but he ought not to say is that the 6 order you were referring to, because the evidence of the 7 Witness was that the Police Services Act -- 8 MR. IAN ROLAND: No, he said -- 9 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- so mandated. 10 And so all I want to be clear is what he's now reading is 11 not a section of the Police Services Act for what it's 12 worth -- 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's an 14 Order made subject -- 15 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- technically. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- to the 17 Police Services Act. 18 MR. IAN ROLAND: Yeah. 19 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: What it is, is an 20 order made by the - a Commissioner of the OPP -- 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Fine. 22 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: --- presumably, 23 pursuant to his powers under the Police Services Act. I 24 just wanted to point that out -- 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine.
3501 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- for what it's 2 worth, technically. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: What's the 4 exhibit number? 5 THE REGISTRAR: P-1472, Your Honour. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: P-1472. 7 8 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1472: OPP Police Order 56.1 re. 9 District Commander and 57.1 10 re. Detachment Commander. 11 12 MR. IAN ROLAND: I may stand corrected by 13 the record, but I thought the Witness referred both to 14 the orders and to the Police Services Act. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, in any 16 event, it's been clarified. 17 MR. IAN ROLAND: And this is -- sorry, 18 the number was...? 19 THE REGISTRAR: 1472. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 1472. 21 THE REGISTRAR: Is there a document 22 number on that, Mr. Roland? 23 MR. IAN ROLAND: No. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No. 25
3511 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 THE WITNESS: I think that's why they 4 sent me off to school 5 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Mr. Lacroix, you'll have to speak -- 6 THE WITNESS: Sorry, I -- 7 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- closer into the 8 mic., because it won't pick you up. 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 THE WITNESS: I just said the first 13 course they sent me on to become a detachment commander 14 was on community policing, so I think that was -- their 15 intent was to... 16 17 CONTINUED BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 18 Q: And you referred as well to the 19 Police Services Act, Mr. Lacroix, and I'm going to show 20 you, if we could, an excerpt from the Police Services 21 Act, in particular, Section 1 of the Police Services Act. 22 Is that the section you were referring to 23 when you talked about the role of the -- part of the role 24 of the district commander? 25 A: Yeah, I was refer -- I mean, I've
3521 referred obviously to Section 1 talking about the whole 2 event, but I was referring to Section 3, the need for co- 3 operation between the providers of police services and 4 the communities they serve. 5 Q: That's -- sorry, that's the proper 6 reference is Section 1 subsection 3. 7 A: 1 subsection 3, okay. 8 Q: Thank you. 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 A: Okay, yeah. 13 Q: All right. 14 A: 1 is the need to ensure the safety 15 and security of all persons and property in Ontario. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 Q: Now, in acting as a detachment 20 commander, were you carrying out your responsibilities in 21 that role when you were speaking with Chief Tom Bressette 22 and Marcel Beaubien and others in the community about 23 issues, policing issues, in the communities? 24 A: It was my belief that that's what I 25 was doing. That I was bringing them an awareness of
3531 issues, of the real issues. 2 Sometimes the, you know, different 3 politicians that we think that maybe we have a really bad 4 drug problem or something but that wasn't necessarily the 5 issue. 6 Q: And on September the 5th, 1999 (sic) 7 when you spoke with Marcel Beaubien, were you doing so 8 both in your role as a detachment commander and as 9 someone who had been requested to do so by the incident 10 commander? 11 A: I would say both. I think when 12 Marcel reached out to me, he was reaching out to the 13 community guy. He was reaching out to the local 14 detachment commander. 15 But I knew that it affected an incident. 16 I called John Carson to see if he wanted me to run -- you 17 know, run interference, so to speak. 18 Did he want me to call him back or not? 19 That was John's call then, because it dealt with a 20 specific incident. 21 Q: Okay. Now, you also talked about 22 peer counselling and the fact that -- and that you'd met 23 with Ian McGregor on September the 7th, 1995. 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: I'm showing you a police order --
3541 excerpts from Police Orders dealing with peer counselling 2 and... 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 Q: ...so that we have this identified 7 I'm particularly referring you to 41.1 -- 8 A: Right. 9 Q: -- and following. Are -- are these 10 the -- the orders that were as you understood the 11 foundation for the provision of psychological trauma or 12 peer counselling? 13 A: Yes, this is the human side of what 14 happens when a policeman's involved in an event. They 15 started to recognize that probably only around this time, 16 '87. 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 Q: And we see, Mr. Commissioner, that 21 under 41.1 there's a date January '87. Again that's as I 22 understand it when this came into force and it was in 23 force at the time of the events we're talking about in 24 September 1995. 25 We'll provide an e-mail copy to the
3551 parties as well. Let me for the record read out what 2 41.1 says: 3 "Police officers may experience 4 psychological trauma due to their 5 involvement in a traumatic incident." 6 Stopping there I -- I take it you agree 7 this -- the events of September the 6th, 1995, were a 8 traumatic incident? 9 A: They were to me. 10 Q: "When police officers resort to 11 excessive suppression of their emotions 12 remaining unaware of the symptoms of -- 13 of post traumatic stress the potential 14 for serious long-term delayed stress 15 reactions increases. Trauma support 16 providers are the first line of defence 17 for officers who have experienced a 18 traumatic incident. They facilitate 19 emotional expression in a supportive 20 atmosphere and provide stress 21 management information of immediate 22 concern, therefore it is imperative 23 that a member involved in a traumatic 24 incident meet with a trauma support 25 provider as soon as practicable."
3561 And I gather from your evidence that you 2 were aware and -- and attuned to this expectation in a 3 traumatic incident that this order would be invoked? 4 A: Yes, we had lectures on it as well as 5 TRU team leaders. We were also informed that the first 6 forty-eight (48) hours was the most crucial time. 7 Q: And then under 42.1 there's a 8 definition of a traumatic incident: 9 "It includes but not limited to 10 killing or seriously injuring someone, 11 being shot, being shot at, being 12 critically injured or a fellow member 13 being critically injured." 14 And Sub 2: 15 "Trauma Support Provider means a member 16 who has experienced a traumatic 17 incident and who has been trained to 18 provide support and assistance to other 19 members experiencing emotional trauma." 20 And I take it as you've told us that was 21 the role of Ian McGregor at that time? 22 A: Yes, because he had been in an event 23 himself and then was trained. The volunteers had to have 24 been through a traumatic event themselves. 25 Q: And then if we go under the heading,
3571 Notification, 43.1: 2 "When members are involved in a 3 traumatic incident their District 4 Commander or Branch Director shall 5 contact the closest available trauma 6 support provider forthwith." 7 Now, sorry, were you the person that 8 undertook that responsibility? 9 A: I believe I may have -- you could 10 also ask the District Association Duty Officer and I 11 think I might have mentioned it to him -- 12 Q: Okay. 13 A: -- when I called for legal support. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Do you want 15 to just stop? 16 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Excuse me. Mr. 17 Commissioner, I don't understand why we weren't given 18 notice of this document ahead of time. 19 And I recall that when we had Kevin Simon 20 here who was my witness and I was counsel, this Counsel 21 rose and said he was concerned about the possibility that 22 I might introduce evidence in re-examination that he 23 wouldn't have the opportunity to cross-examine about and 24 it was agreed that I would put anything like that in- 25 chief and then have a re-examination.
3581 And now we have a -- a document that's 2 dealing with one (1) of the central issues and we haven't 3 even been disclosed of it ahead of time and now he's 4 putting it in re-examination. So surely at least we get 5 the right to re-cross-examine on this document. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: This isn't 7 re-examination, this is the only examination that Mr. 8 Roland gets and this is our procedure. 9 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We -- 11 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: No, but the 12 procedure is -- 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- 14 bifurcated. 15 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: The procedure 16 requires prior notification with respect to documents, 17 Mr. Commissioner. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It does. 19 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Just -- just -- Mr. 20 Rosenthal is correct in -- with respect to the issue and 21 when it first arose, that matters that were -- that 22 should be in -- were, in fact, matters in-chief, should 23 be led before the cross-examination. And with Mr. Simon, 24 Mr. Rosenthal did that. 25 Now, this issue of the trauma counsellor
3591 came up during -- and what the -- during the cross- 2 examination, or I asked about it in-chief but not to the 3 extent it was in cross-examination. 4 MR. IAN ROLAND: I'm putting this in, Mr. 5 -- Mr. Commissioner, because it seemed from the cross- 6 examination there was some question of whether Mr. 7 McGregor should be there. And -- and -- 8 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: And that's -- Mr. 9 Commissioner, that was my very concern, that this seemed 10 to be the direction of the questioning. I want to be 11 clear, I was very careful in my cross-examination. I 12 believe Mr. Rosenthal was as well. 13 No one, at any time, first of all, sought 14 to get disclosure from this officer about his 15 confidential sharing of information with the trauma 16 counsellor, Number 1. 17 But Number 2, the issue was the 18 conversation with Staff Sergeant Brian Deevy at the 19 Command Post -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 21 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- that was the 22 only issue that we were concerned was canvassed. No one 23 questioned the propriety of getting trauma counselling. 24 So I -- I simply -- I want to be clear 25 that it's fine and good to say, here are the orders, and
3601 frankly, you know -- 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's all 3 we should do. 4 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That's right. 5 Because if we're going to get in to the trauma 6 counselling, the nature of it, that's problematic. I 7 heard this officer respond to the questions about Deevy. 8 I heard him respond, I was getting trauma counselling. 9 But frankly, it's a disconnect, because 10 what we were concerned with is the conversations with 11 Deevy -- 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 13 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- not the 14 conversations with the trauma counsellor. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, thank 16 you. You've put the document in -- 17 MR. DERRY MILLAR: I think that's fair. 18 I think Mr. Falconer -- if My Friend wants to mark this, 19 I have no objection to it and I don't think -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Then let's 21 just do that and move on. 22 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- Mr. Falconer does 23 because that sets out the trauma counselling. But -- 24 MR. IAN ROLAND: And I haven't asked 25 about what was said with the trauma counsellor.
3611 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: All right. 2 Then just put the document in and let's move on. And -- 3 THE REGISTRAR: P-1473, Your Honour. 4 5 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1473: Excerpts from Police Orders 6 Dealing with Peer 7 Counselling, sections 41.1 to 8 43.3, January 1987. 9 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- in 11 future, Mr. Roland, if you can anticipate the document 12 that you're going to be introducing, I would appreciate 13 it if you would follow the rules. 14 Some others haven't followed them as well 15 either, but it's important that we try to be fair to 16 everybody. Let's go on. 17 You passed your half hour, by the way. 18 You said a half hour to forty (40) minutes. But you are 19 in that time line now. 20 MR. IAN ROLAND: I guess I have ten (10) 21 minutes left. 22 23 CONTINUED BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 24 Q: With respect to the Deevy call, you 25 were asked a number of questions about the call to Brian
3621 Deevy and you described your motivations for making the 2 call. In particular because of the information that had 3 been reported in the media, including that one (1) man 4 had been killed. 5 And you were -- you've told us you were 6 concerned that whether you had caused the death, that 7 death, right? 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 Q: Yeah. 10 OBJ MR. JULIAN FALCONER: No. I object. If 11 the -- there's going to be a summary of evidence, with 12 respect, a summary of evidence should be accurate. And 13 this gentleman testified that he called Brian Deevy 14 because he didn't know if he was a subject officer or 15 not. 16 And he wanted to let -- he wanted himself 17 to know, and he wanted the rest of the officers to know 18 who was subject officers and who was witnesses officers. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Right. 20 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That was the 21 general rationale he gave for why he made the call. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. I 23 think that's right. 24 MR. IAN ROLAND: Yeah. But he also said 25 that he was concerned. He said it later that he --
3631 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That he 2 might a subject officer. 3 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- that he was the person 4 that -- that was subject -- was subject officer. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. That's 6 fine. 7 MR. IAN ROLAND: And he -- and he said 8 that in, as I recall it, in the context of thinking that 9 the person who was -- who was dead was the person driving 10 the car. 11 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 12 13 CONTINUED BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 14 Q: Now, you -- and you -- we've seen 15 from the recording that you received some information 16 from Brian Deevy during the call, and you discussed your 17 understanding of the injuries. 18 Based on that information that you 19 received, did you change what you recorded in your notes? 20 A: No, sir. 21 Q: Did the information that you received 22 change the account that you gave of the incident to the 23 SIU? 24 A: No, sir. 25 Q: Did you provide the information you
3641 received to anyone in order to change their account of 2 what transpired on September the 6th? 3 A: No, sir. 4 Q: And did you discuss what you'd heard 5 or the information you received from Brian Deevy at all 6 with Ken Deane? 7 A: No, sir. 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 Q: Now, Mr. Rosenthal asked you about 12 the -- the possible perception of some of the 13 demonstrators, that the crowd management unit was going 14 into the Park to evict the demonstrators from the Park. 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: You recall that line of questioning 17 from Mr. -- 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: -- Rosenthal? 20 A: Yes, sir. 21 Q: And you indicated that that wasn't 22 something that, at the time, you were aware of, that -- 23 of that -- that they would have or could have that 24 perception? 25 A: Right.
3651 Q: And you've testified about the CMU 2 going down to the parking lot, and its first venture into 3 the parking lot, going up to the fence line, at least the 4 contact squad going up close to the fence line, and the 5 demonstrators going back into the Park. 6 From that point on, having the contact 7 squad and the rest of the CMU having stopped in the sandy 8 parking lot, did it occur to you, at that stage, that any 9 demonstrators would think that you're there to do other 10 than clear the sandy parking lot? 11 A: Well, by the fact that we halted, you 12 know, the front squad was at least 20 feet from the 13 fence, and as a matter of fact, I think the front contact 14 squad, if you hear the tape, I -- I made sure they backed 15 up a little bit. 16 We stood at an ease position. I -- I 17 mean, we took no aggressive action at that time. I 18 don't, I couldn't -- I couldn't see what would have given 19 them the idea that we were going to come flying over the 20 fence or -- but. 21 Q: All right. Thank you. Let me turn 22 to what you've said, I think, in response to Mr. Falconer 23 at the end of his cross-examination about John Carson, 24 that you knew John Carson. 25 A: Yes.
3661 Q: And you'd had experience with him as 2 an incident commander in the past. 3 A: John was actually in the OPP, you 4 know, with the integrated command. John was our 5 negotiator, and I'd worked with John as a negotiator, as 6 a TRU team leader for -- all through the '80's. 7 Q: Hmm hmm. 8 A: And I'd worked -- worked for him as 9 an incident commander on several occurrences. 10 Q: And as the incident commander of this 11 incident on September the 6th, when you were called in, 12 did you understand that John Carson had an -- would -- as 13 the incident commander would have a lot, or all of the 14 information generally available about the events? 15 A: Well, John had -- 16 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Mr. Commissioner. 17 My Friend elicited some evidence, and we don't get to re- 18 exam and I don't -- 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I know, it's 20 an awkward procedure. You'd better speak to the mic, 21 that's all I'm saying. 22 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I apologize. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, it's an 24 awkward procedure -- 25 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I apologize for
3671 that. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- we have 3 here, that he comes last. 4 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That's right and 5 that's fair. And so I'm trying to manage it and not 6 interfere. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 8 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: The witness just 9 testified that he'd had experience with John Carson as an 10 incident commander in the past. 11 I'd understood the nature of the evidence 12 to be that this was John Carson's first incident command. 13 MR. DERRY MILLAR: No. 14 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: No. Okay, then I 15 misunderstood the evidence. I'm sorry. I -- I tried to 16 check that out -- 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Okay. 18 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- and that's why I 19 say that, unfortunately, we're managing a process where-- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 21 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: And it's my 22 apologies then, because I -- 23 MR. DERRY MILLAR: It was -- it was the 24 first time. I think the evidence was that Inspector John 25 Carson could -- called out the crowd management team.
3681 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: The first 2 time that he called out a crowd management unit, not the 3 first time he'd been an incident commander. 4 5 CONTINUED BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 6 Q: And indeed I think the Witness said, 7 in response to Mr. Falconer, that he had experience with 8 John Carson in the past as an incident commander. 9 Is that -- 10 A: Yeah, yes. 11 Q: -- accurate? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: That is accurate that you did have 14 such experience? 15 A: Yes, I did. Yes. Both working as a 16 -- in a command post as parallels and as him as a 17 commander. 18 Q: All right. And what was your 19 experience with -- with John carson as an incident 20 commander? 21 A: John was an extremely cautious 22 individual, very organized, well -- you know, a deep 23 thinker. He's an excellent incident commander; very 24 calm. 25 Q: And what was your experience with
3691 respect to John's attention to public safety and office - 2 - officer safety in managing an incident? 3 A: John was always very -- first of all, 4 very concerned about public safety and very closely 5 behind, I'd say, officer safety. 6 Q: And before Mr. Falconer got up, I'd 7 asked you and you hadn't answered it, I asked you the 8 question about the information that an Incident Commander 9 would have. 10 And when you arrived on September the 6th, 11 did you assume that John Carson, as the -- when you found 12 him there, as the Incident Commander, would have had all 13 or virtually all of the information that was available 14 about the incident? 15 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well -- 16 THE WITNESS: If -- 17 MR. IAN ROLAND: Did you assume that? 18 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That's just calling 19 for sheer speculation. I mean he -- he -- it's just -- 20 and I don't know how helpful it is to you. I mean the 21 point is -- 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm not sure 23 if it's all that helpful. I mean I can see that. 24 MR. IAN ROLAND: Did you -- the question 25 is: Did you assume it because of his role as Incident
3701 Commander? 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's his 3 role as an Incident Commander. Yes, continue? 4 MR. DERRY MILLAR: I think that's fair to 5 ask about what his assumption was. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. It's 7 the role of an Incident Commander. Yes, okay. Carry on. 8 9 CONTINUED BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 10 Q: And was that your assumption? 11 A: My answer would be that I was called 12 out at the very beginning to work West Ipperwash Beach, 13 which John Carson worked closely with me on. 14 When the Army occupation took place it was 15 John Carson. So what I'm trying to get to is John Carson 16 was probably the most knowledgeable of any Incident 17 Commander in the province of Ontario on the West -- on 18 the entire Ipperwash area and had been on it for a solid 19 two (2) years. So -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yeah. 21 THE WITNESS: -- when I arrived on the 22 6th, I felt, if anybody, John would be up to speed on the 23 issues. 24 I'm sorry. Is that... 25
3711 CONTINUED BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 2 Q: I'm not sure it's entirely 3 responsive, but I'll move on. 4 A: All right. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Are you 6 still going? I thought you were about -- 7 MR. IAN ROLAND: I've got a little bit 8 more to go. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: A little bit 10 more? 11 12 CONTINUED BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 13 Q: And in your experience with John 14 Carson as an Incident Commander, and your general 15 knowledge about the role of an Incident Commander, can 16 you tell us what, if any, assumption you had about his 17 assessment of the threat of firearms in the -- in the 18 context of the incident and sending the CMU down the 19 road? 20 What was your assumption about it, if you 21 had any? 22 A: Well, just knowing John and knowing 23 his demeanour, et cetera, if John had a real concern I 24 believe that John Carson would have shared -- 25 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well, I'm sorry,
3721 Mr. Commissioner. I wait until I get to the microphone; 2 I have to remember that. I apologize Madam Reporter. 3 Mr. Commissioner, the question was close 4 to the line, but all it did was elicit sheer speculation. 5 And in -- and in fairness to My Friend, it wasn't 6 necessarily the question that elicited it, but that's 7 what we got. 8 And I think what we have do, with respect, 9 is take a step back and reformulate a question that 10 doesn't just elicit sheer speculation, which is what's 11 happened. 12 And -- and I'm just trying to -- because 13 otherwise you get this -- I'm sure he wouldn't have, but 14 he could have, but there's no actual observation evidence 15 of any kind. 16 MR. IAN ROLAND: No, that wasn't the 17 question. The question was: Did you have an assumption, 18 and if so, what was it, in this respect? 19 MR. DERRY MILLAR: He can ask him what 20 his assumption was. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: All right. 22 Carry on. Just be careful that we don't get in the realm 23 of pure speculation. 24 MR. IAN ROLAND: No, no, it's not 25 speculation, it's about his assumption.
3731 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's an 2 assumption, based on information. 3 MR. IAN ROLAND: He's -- he's -- 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 5 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- going to be leading 6 the CMU down the road. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 8 MR. IAN ROLAND: And I'm asking did he 9 have any assumptions about -- 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 11 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- about John Carson 12 performing his role as Incident Commander, and if so, 13 what were they -- 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yeah, okay. 15 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- in this respect? 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: All right. 17 Just be careful that we just answer the questions. 18 19 CONTINUED BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 20 Q: Do you want me to repeat the question 21 or do you understand it, Mr. Lacroix? 22 A: Let me try to answer it this way; 23 hopefully I get it. 24 I detected no misapprehension or undue 25 fear from Inspector Carson when he dispatched me down the
3741 road, when he gave me a mission. 2 Q: All right. 3 A: Of the mission, I did not detect in 4 him grave concern. 5 Q: All right. And let me ask you about 6 Kent Skinner in the same respect, and I'm going to take 7 you through this. 8 Did you know Kent Skinner before this 9 incident? 10 A: Yes, sir. 11 Q: And how well did you know him? 12 A: I trained him when he was in TRU 13 team? 14 Q: Sorry? 15 A: I had trained him as a young TRU team 16 member. 17 Q: And how long had you known him? 18 A: I had known him about ten (10) years. 19 Q: And did you know him as an 20 experienced TRU team leader? 21 A: I had never been around him as a 22 leader. 23 Q: I see. 24 A: I had left when he became a leader. 25 Q: All right. You know him -- you knew
3751 him as a TRU team member, did you? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: All right. And what, if any, 4 assumption did you have about Kent Skinner's assessment, 5 his role as -- that he had there as a TRU team leader, 6 and what assumption did you have in -- in him performing 7 that role in respect of carrying out a firearms 8 assessment, before participating in the decision to send 9 the CMU down the road? 10 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Mr. Commissioner -- 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's getting 12 removed. 13 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- I don't see how 14 this is helpful as evidence, because if he's -- if he's 15 trying to ask, Did you assume everybody you were working 16 with were competent professionals -- 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 18 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- just ask the 19 question and I'm sure he'll get the answer he wants -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 21 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- and we'll move 22 on. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm not -- 24 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: But to do anything 25 more than that, it's just not helpful to the process.
3761 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm not sure 2 how helpful it is at this point, Mr. Roland. 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 CONTINUED BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 7 Q: Okay. Just one (1) last line of 8 questioning, and then I'm done. And if you could, Mr. 9 Lacroix, take Tab 21 and Tab 28 -- put your finger on Tab 10 21 and 28, I want to take you through the sequence of 11 events going down the road from the TOC using both your 12 taped interview with the SIU and the logger tape, so that 13 we have the sequence for -- with respect to this, going 14 through both documents. 15 A: Yes, sir. 16 Q: Mr. Commissioner -- 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm just 18 thinking this is going to -- 19 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- I see you're shaking 20 your head on this. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, I'm 22 just thinking this is going to take some time. 23 MR. IAN ROLAND: Yes. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: This isn't a 25 quick exercise.
3771 MR. IAN ROLAND: Yes. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You've been 3 almost forty-five (45) minutes now and I'm just -- this 4 is going to take some time but it's important to you to 5 do this. 6 MR. IAN ROLAND: Yeah. Well, I think 7 it's important to understand the sequence. It's a bit 8 complicated and I'm not sure it's entirely clear, the -- 9 the sequence, and this is the Witness who I think can 10 help us make sure that it's clear. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, let's 12 proceed. 13 14 CONTINUED BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 15 Q: Now, if you go to your -- your taped 16 interview, first of all, which is Tab 28, at page 5, 17 you'll see about two thirds (2/3's) of the way down it's 18 -- you said in that interview: 19 "I was told the London TRU team would 20 also be in support of our endeavour, 21 which was standard operating 22 procedure." 23 And what did you mean by, "standard 24 operating procedure?" 25
3781 And to perhaps speed it up, is the next -- 2 the next four (4) lines what you were referring to as 3 standard operating procedure? 4 A: Yes. That they would provide 5 hide/cover in the case of -- of becoming a firearms 6 occurrence, which we're not equipped to handle. TRU team 7 is involved in any occurrence where there's a high 8 propensity of violence, usually perpetrated by firearm. 9 So if there's a threat of a firearm, it 10 would be standard operating procedure to have TRU team at 11 least on scene. 12 Q: All right. And the -- before you 13 left the TOC, if you turn to page 6, the other 14 information that I understand you had, that's recorded in 15 this taped interview, beginning about halfway down page 16 6, you say: 17 "And the other team was to take a 18 position in the field across from the 19 kiosk because there was some kind of 20 device that gave us intelligence that 21 there was a Native in the kiosk and we 22 didn't know what he was up to. So we 23 were going to watch the kiosk for any 24 kind of movement there." 25 What were you referring to was if -- was
3791 the threat when you talk about a Native in the kiosk? 2 A: Well, I -- I had said before that CMU 3 has got two (2) main threats to worry about, sniper 4 threat and fire threat. There was a man seen to be in 5 the kiosk, he was off to our right flank, it was unknown 6 if he had a firearm. TRU team was assigned to cover that 7 off. 8 So that, you know, I was quite satisfied 9 that TRU team had covered off that threat. 10 Q: Then if you turn to page 9 of -- at 11 Tab 26 -- 28, sorry. At the top you say: 12 "Acting Sergeant Kent Skinner advised 13 me that Sierra 1, I believe, advised 14 one (1) to ten (10) males with clubs 15 and some were, I believe it was -- " 16 A: Ten (10) to fifteen (15). 17 Q: "-- ten (10) to fifteen (15) males 18 with clubs. And somewhere, I believe 19 it was in that briefing, I was advised 20 that they were seen to be piling up 21 rocks." 22 And I -- we've heard that was information 23 you had before you left the TOC? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: Okay.
3801 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: And if we turn to Tab 21, on the 4 first page, about half way down, we've already seen the 5 quote about: 6 "Good news, they've got rocks and 7 sticks." 8 Did that confirm what you'd heard before 9 you left the TOC? 10 A: Yes. That was just further 11 confirmation of the threat was apparently rocks and 12 sticks, not firearms. 13 Q: Right. 14 A: The identifiable threat, the one that 15 could be seen. 16 Q: And then at the top of that page, you 17 indicate that: 18 "TOC to CMU, we're advancing to within 19 three hundred (300) -- to within, ah, 20 three hundred (300)" 21 A: Right. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 23 24 CONTINUED BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 25 Q: And was that --
3811 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Mr. -- 2 just before you continue, Mr. Roland. 3 MR. DERRY MILLAR: I went through all of 4 this -- 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I know 6 that -- 7 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- in-chief. Now -- 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- and I'm 9 not comfortable with this process. 10 MR. DERRY MILLAR: There may have been -- 11 there's some questions asked by Mr. Rosenthal that might 12 need clarification, but I went very carefully -- 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 14 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- through this whole 15 procedure -- 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 17 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- with Mr. Lacroix 18 in-chief. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: This isn't 20 the purpose. I mean, we seem to have gotten our process 21 twisted around a bit. If you're going to do this kind of 22 an examination, you really should do it at the front end 23 and give counsel an opportunity to cross-examine. 24 MR. IAN ROLAND: I think it got a little 25 confused, or somewhat confused by the cross, and I'm
3821 trying to straighten it out, Mr. Commissioner. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, I 3 don't feel that that's what you're doing at this time. 4 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Well, but if -- if 5 he's -- if he wants to straighten something out in a 6 cross -- 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 8 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- then go to it. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You've done 10 that. 11 MR. DERRY MILLAR: This -- I went 12 carefully through this in chief. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, you did 14 that, Mr. Millar. 15 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Mr. Rosenthal and 16 others asked some other questions. Excuse me, 17 Commissioner. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Oh, I'm 19 sorry. 20 MR. DERRY MILLAR: And he should try to 21 clear that up, but he's doing exactly what we did in 22 chief. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I think 24 that's what's happening, Mr. Roland, and that's not the 25 way this procedure should work.
3831 You've clarified -- 2 MR. IAN ROLAND: Well, let me -- 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- a number 4 of areas at the beginning of your examination, which 5 you're entitled to do. But if you're going to just lead 6 your evidence which has already been done by Commission 7 Counsel, it's not useful, helpful, and it's not fair. 8 It's not fair to the other counsel. 9 10 CONTINUED BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 11 Q: All right. Let me, then, see if I 12 can speed it up. Let's go to the -- to page 2 of the 13 logger, Tab 21, about half way down, and ask you about 14 the transmission from Kent Skinner. 15 And let's first read the transmission. 16 "CMU: Ah, ah, TOC 1 be advised you've 17 been spotted by their forward observers 18 and their forward observers are 19 retreating." 20 Now, is that -- let me ask you that. Is 21 that consistent with the idea of the CMU on the roadway 22 diverting the attention of the people down the road? 23 A: Well, it's consistent with what we 24 expected. What you'd expect your crowd management to do 25 is that the demonstrators would retreat when they see
3841 this hard TAC team. 2 I mean, it's consistent in that it was 3 causing a dispersion, I guess, that people were backing 4 up. 5 6 (BRIEF PAUSE) 7 8 Q: All right. And if you turn to the 9 next page, page 3, at the top you say, four (4) lines 10 down: 11 "TAC 1, CMU, two to three hundred (200- 12 300) metres out, awaiting 13 instructions." 14 And what were those instructions that you 15 were awaiting for, in the context of going down the road 16 at that stage? 17 A: I was still waiting for more update, 18 like, from the Sierra teams. You know, intelligence on 19 what -- what exactly the threat was ahead. 20 Q: Right. 21 A: And, you know, of course, the final - 22 - when I say the final go, it was everything was lined 23 up, Sierras were in position, Alpha teams were in 24 position. It was -- the threat was not firearms. 25 Q: All right. And if we look to the
3851 bottom of the page where Skinner says, in response: 2 "CMU to TAC, advise Sierra 1 and Sierra 3 2 are not, repeat not, in position." 4 I take it that was in -- responsive to 5 what you were looking for? 6 A: Yeah. I'm asking them for an update; 7 they're telling me they're still not in position. So I - 8 - I'm not getting -- I'm not getting the eye. There's 9 not anybody in position to give me a direct... 10 Q: And as I understand it you're 11 continuing, though, to move down the road? 12 A: I move one (1) hydro pole further. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I have the 14 impression that you're continuing to proceed with the 15 examination -- 16 MR. IAN ROLAND: Okay. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- in 18 exactly the way we described earlier. I don't feel that 19 you're clarifying matters that aren't clear at the 20 moment, Mr. -- 21 MR. IAN ROLAND: All right. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- Roland. 23 24 CONTINUED BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 25 Q: Well, let me go to -- let me go to
3861 the -- the very end of this then if I could, because I 2 think this is one (1) of the critical issues on this. 3 What did you understand at page -- at the bottom of page 4 5 and particularly the top of page 6 where Skinner says: 5 "Alpha and Sierra 2 can cover your 6 position." 7 Do you see that -- 8 A: I understood -- 9 Q: What was that -- what did that tell 10 you? 11 A: I was good to go. 12 Q: And what do you mean by good to go? 13 A: I had and Alpha team and a Sierra now 14 in position that could cover me, that, you know, in case 15 something happened, and I had eye on the ground. 16 Q: So you say, Could cover you if 17 something happened. What it -- tell us what you mean or 18 what you understood by, "cover?" 19 A: Cover is that if there was a weapons 20 threat, TRU team could step in and take care of it. If 21 we had an officer down, they were in a position to do 22 something about that. 23 And Sierras are observer teams; they were 24 able to, you know, cover for counter sniper and they were 25 able to provide me up-to-the-minute intelligence.
3871 They would be able to cover me if I had to 2 retreat. 3 It's what I'd asked for back at Forest to 4 ask for a TOC, and was asking for all the way down the 5 road, Are they in position yet? 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That -- 7 MR. IAN ROLAND: Thank you for you 8 patience or what patience you could have with my cross- 9 examination, or my re-examination. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 11 very much, Mr. Roland. 12 Now, this is re-examination. This is 13 classic re-examination. 14 MR. DERRY MILLAR: I think I know that, 15 Commissioner. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I think 17 you do. 18 19 RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 20 Q: Now, just a couple of questions. You 21 were asked by Mr. Falconer, and some other of My Friends, 22 with respect to an injunction and what might happen after 23 the injunction. Do you recall that? 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: Whose decision would it have been as
3881 to what was done, assuming an injunction had been granted 2 with respect to the actions of the OPP? 3 A: I would think it would be the 4 Incident Commander. 5 Q: And the -- you -- My Friend Mr. 6 Falconer, with respect to the discussion relating to Mr. 7 Mercredi and Pinedale, put a question -- and this is at 8 page 260 line 70. And he -- the question was: 9 "And the heavy hitters include the 10 provincial ministers?" 11 And your answer was: 12 "I believe so." 13 And my question is: On what basis do you 14 say that there were provincial ministers at the meeting? 15 A: It just looked to me like a lot of 16 heavy hitters. 17 Q: And did you know any of the, quote, 18 "heavy hitters," other than Mr. Mercredi? 19 A: Ovide -- Ovide Mercredi and my own 20 Chief Superintendent. 21 Q: But did you know any of the other 22 people? 23 A: No. 24 Q: Then you were asked the question 25 about the...
3891 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: ...by Mr. Falconer yesterday, and it 4 was in relation to John, excuse me, John Carson and the 5 Crowd Management Unit, and this is at page 345, line 72 - 6 - line 17: 7 "Q: And what you're telling us is 8 that nothing that you learned that 9 night, or subsequently, has told you 10 that John knew about those new things? 11 A: There's been no discussion." 12 On September the 6th, 1995 did you have 13 any information as to what John Carson knew or did not 14 know with respect to the new CMU formations? 15 A: I had not discussion with him about 16 the new CMU formations. 17 Q: So you didn't know what he knew? 18 A: No, I did not know what he knew. 19 Q: Then in response to a question by My 20 Friend Mr. Falconer, with respect to Tab 24, Exhibit P- 21 1361. The Deevy conversation and Mr. Falconer's question 22 arose out of the conversation. 23 "You were asked with respect to the 24 words, they wanted it, they wanted it, 25 that's right.
3901 Do you still think that today? [this is 2 at page 282] 3 A: I think that there was actually -- 4 it was building up -- building to a 5 show down. I think that they wanted to 6 engage a larger formation. But I don't 7 believe that they knew -- the -- well 8 they didn't know the new tactic and 9 they didn't know the equipment we had 10 so I think they were surprised. 11 Q: Well -- 12 A: But I believe that there was a 13 build-up was to draw -- why build up 14 all those rocks? My -- why pile up 15 rocks and sticks? 16 So yes, I think that there was some 17 individuals, not all, were looking for 18 a big confrontation with a larger OPP 19 formation." 20 Do you recall -- 21 A: Yes, sir. 22 Q: Now on the question, 'why pile up? 23 Why -- the answer, why build up all those rocks, why pile 24 up rocks and sticks? The information you had was that 25 the rocks and sticks were inside the Park. Is that not
3911 correct? 2 A: Yes, sir. 3 Q: And did you consider on September the 4 6th, that the people in the Park might have been 5 concerned that the OPP was going to enter the Park and 6 evict them from the Park? 7 A: No. No, I didn't consider that, no. 8 Q: And that the decision by the 9 occupiers to pile up stones and rocks, might have been to 10 defend themselves if the OPP entered the Park? Did you 11 consider that? 12 A: I mean, I hear where you're going, 13 but to me it would be the same thing. I mean I guess 14 they were piling them up to use them as weapons. But -- 15 Q: But -- but there's a difference 16 between wanting -- 17 A: Yeah. 18 Q: -- to get into a -- your -- the 19 thesis behind your answer to Mr. Falconer's question and 20 the thesis behind what's in Exhibit 1361, is that the 21 occupiers or the protestors were looking for a fight with 22 the OPP. 23 And there's a difference between the OPP 24 coming into the Park and the OPP being outside the Park. 25 Would you agree with that?
3921 A: Yes. 2 Q: Those are my questions and thank you 3 very much, Mr. Lacroix, for your attendance here. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 5 very much, Mr. Lacroix for coming and giving us the 6 benefit of your testimony. It's never easy and I 7 appreciate your coming. 8 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. 9 MR. DERRY MILLAR: And just before we 10 move on there was one (1) item. The Use of Force Report 11 that we marked at Tab 30 and before Mr. Lacroix leaves, 12 is at Tab 41, Exhibit P-1460, that particular photocopy 13 has the top part -- there are two (2) boxes that are 14 missing. I just realized this. 15 They appear at Tab 18 and the copy at Tab 16 18 there's a box for police service and it says "Ontario 17 Provincial Police" and then there's a box for location 18 code that says "01-20". 19 I don't think we need to -- to mark Tab 18 20 but I just wanted to alert everyone that in the 21 photocopying when Exhibit P-1460 was created, the 22 imaging, the top box came off. Thank you, Mr. Lacroix. 23 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. 24 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Mr. Commissioner, our 25 next witness is Mr. Hebblethwaite.
3931 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 2 you're free to go. 3 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. 4 5 (WITNESS STANDS DOWN) 6 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 8 I would like to start with -- is it Sergeant 9 Hebblethwaite? 10 MS. SUSAN VELLA: I just need a couple of 11 minutes to set up. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Do you want 13 us to take a short break or should we just stay in place? 14 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Perhaps a very short 15 break. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Let's take a 17 very short break. I know we're not going to get that far 18 but I think it's worth a start and get as far as we can. 19 You'll decide Ms. Vella when you think we've gone as far 20 as we can. 21 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Certainly. 22 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess. 23 24 --- Upon recessing at 4:53 p.m. 25 --- Upon resuming at 5:00 p.m.
3941 2 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 3 resumed. Please be seated. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We'll go 5 until about half past 5:00. Is that all right, Ms. 6 Vella? 7 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Certainly, thank you. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And that's 9 as far as we'll go. There's a lot of staff people, I 10 know the lawyers work deep into the night, but there's -- 11 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Oh, I -- 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- also a 13 lot of staff people who have a lot to do after we've 14 finished, moving exhibits in and out and so on, so I 15 think half past 5:00 is about as far as we'll go. 16 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thank you, 17 Commissioner. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Then we'll 19 stop. 20 MS. SUSAN VELLA: I appreciate that. The 21 Commission calls as its next witness, George 22 Hebblethwaite. 23 24 GEORGE EDWARD HEBBLETHWAITE, Sworn 25
3951 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 2 Q: Good afternoon. 3 A: Good afternoon. 4 Q: I understand that you are currently 5 the acting staff sergeant in charge of the Port Credit 6 office of the Ontario Provincial Police? 7 A: That's correct. 8 Q: And I understand further that if you 9 turn to Tab 1, this is Inquiry Document 2005536. 10 Is this your current, up to date resume? 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 A: Apart from my current position, yes. 15 I'm a -- I am assigned to the Cambridge Detachment of the 16 OPP and I'm temporarily at the Port Credit site. 17 Q: All right, thank you. I'd like to 18 make this the next exhibit, please. 19 THE REGISTRAR: P-1474, Your Honour. 20 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thank you. 21 22 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1474: Document Number 2005536. 23 Resume of Sgt. George 24 Hebblethwaite. 25
3961 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 2 Q: I understand that you first joined 3 the OPP in 1977 and was posted to Nipigon? 4 A: That's correct. 5 Q: Next, in October of 1979 you were 6 transferred to the Moosonee Detachment? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: And I understand that this is on the 9 tip of James Bay. 10 A: Yes, it is. 11 Q: And involved strictly a position of 12 policing First Nation people in that area? 13 A: Primarily, yes. 14 Q: Primarily? October of 1981 you were 15 transferred to the Guelph Detachment? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: November of 1982 you were then 18 transferred to the Kitchener Detachment? 19 A: That's correct. 20 Q: In 1983, you became part of the Crowd 21 Control Unit as a constable? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: And do I understand that that unit to 24 be the predecessor of the Crowd Management Unit? 25 A: Yes, it was.
3971 Q: I understand that you were a member 2 of the -- sorry, the initial crowd control training in 3 1983 and remained in that role until 1986? 4 A: Correct. Yes, that's correct. There 5 was a -- a transfer from the Kitchener office of the OPP 6 to the Mount Forest Detachment. 7 Q: Yes, and that occurred in March of 8 1985, is that right? The transfer? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: And you were promoted to corporal at 11 that time? 12 A: That's correct. 13 Q: And in February of 1990, you were 14 transferred to the Cambridge detachments? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And in the fall of 1990, you assumed 17 control of the Crowd Control Unit in the Mount Forest 18 District? 19 A: Yes. We missed one(1) posting and 20 that was a secondment in June of 1986. I was seconded to 21 the recruitment unit up at headquarters and that turned 22 into a full transfer in January of 1987. 23 I was a recruitment officer for the 24 Ontario Provincial Police. 25 Q: Thank you for clarifying that. Now,
3981 in 1993, I understand that your role with respect to the 2 Crowd Control Unit evolved into what became known as the 3 Emergency Response Team program? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And you become second in charge of 6 the Mount Forest ERT? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: I understand that you were a member 9 of the Emergency Response Team for approximately nine (9) 10 years in total? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And would you just kindly tell me 13 what district in 1995 were you in during -- which is the 14 material time frame. 15 A: Yes, District Number 6 headquartered 16 out of Mount Forest. 17 Q: Thank you. So that was District 18 Number 6 ERT in Mount Forest? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: I understand that you also were a 21 Crowd Management instructor and trainer? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: Over what -- what years were you an 24 instructor and trainer? 25 A: 1994 until I left the program in June
3991 of 2002. 2 Q: I further understand that you were -- 3 had some input in the re-writing of the course training 4 standards when the Crowd Control Unit evolved into the 5 Crowd Management Unit? 6 A: Yes, I was part of a group of 7 officers that re-wrote the program. 8 Q: And did this -- this occurred in or 9 around 1993 to 1994? 10 A: Yes, my involvement began I believe 11 late '93 and continued into 1994. 12 Q: Now, perhaps you would explain if you 13 will the underlying approach and philosophy of the Crowd 14 Management Unit and how that was different from the 15 former Crowd Control Unit philosophy and approach? 16 A: Well, they -- in the 1980's the Crowd 17 Control Unit was a rather strict approach to -- to crowd 18 control. It was a matter of officers in generally 19 shoulder-to-shoulder fashion dealing with a crowd. There 20 was -- it lacked a lot of flexibility. It lacked a 21 fluidity and generally the officers in the Crowd Control 22 Unit would only appear on the scene when things were 23 quite out of control. 24 That compared to the Crowd Management 25 Unit which the name itself infers and rightfully so,
4001 management meaning early stage involvement prior to 2 things getting out of hand. 3 So what Crowd Management differs from 4 Crowd Control is that we need to and we do plan to get 5 involved in crowd situations in the very early stages 6 with a view to have officer present -- presence, officer 7 involvement, and not let the crowd get out of control. 8 So getting in early, managing that crowd 9 successfully such that controlling it in the latter 10 stages like we would have in the years previous, it 11 doesn't occur. 12 Q: So just as an example whereas under 13 the Crowd Control Unit regime the -- typically the unit 14 would wait until there was actually a disruption or a 15 riot-type situation before it would make its first 16 appearance on the scene? 17 A: Typically, yes. 18 Q: And whereas with the Crowd Management 19 Unit as soon as there was a crowd situation whether it be 20 a passive crowd if you will or a more aggressive crowd, 21 Crowd Management gets in there and -- and makes its 22 presence known? 23 A: That's correct. And -- and in 24 different uniforms potentially and with -- with different 25 numbers and different locations. It's a -- it's a pro-
4011 active approach to handling crowds at all levels of 2 order. 3 Q: Now, I wonder if you would just 4 explain in a general way the selection and qualification 5 process that applied to applicants for the Crowd 6 Management Unit in the '94/'95 time frame? 7 A: Well, the members of the Crowd 8 Management Units, Mr. Commissioner, came from the 9 established Emergency Response Teams, it was another of 10 our core functions. And the functions of Emergency 11 Response officers included containment, search and 12 rescue, the Crowd Management, K-9 backup, witness 13 protection, VIP security. 14 So it was another function of -- of ERT. 15 So it wasn't their only role as being Crowd Management 16 members it was one (1) of a number of roles that we 17 filled. So the selection process for Emergency Response 18 Team members involved physical fitness criteria, it 19 involved applications and recommendations from detachment 20 commanders, it involved interviews in some cases. 21 And there was an element of consideration 22 given to geography such that we wouldn't have five (5) or 23 six (6) members of a sixteen (16) officer team from one 24 (1) detachment, it would just not be fair to that one (1) 25 office in certain situations having to give up six
4021 members; it just wasn't practical. 2 Q: All right. And was there nonetheless 3 then any distinctive training component which addressed 4 the function of CM -- of -- of ERT members discharging a 5 CMU function? 6 A: Yes, the Emergency Response Team 7 course is now six (6) weeks. In 1994 -- '93 when I took 8 it, it was a five (5) week course with week 6 being the 9 Crowd Management component. And in the early stages of - 10 - of the '93 timeline week 6 had not been established in 11 terms of its course training standard. 12 By 1994 that had been established and 13 approved and we started training regional ERT teams, 14 district ERT teams of which there were sixteen (16) in 15 the province. We started training four (4) teams at a 16 time in June of 1994. The first session was in Brampton, 17 at our training academy there. 18 In the fall of 1994 we trained another 19 four (4) teams at the military base in Meaford. 20 And in the spring of 1995 we trained the 21 remaining eight (8) teams in the May time period; four 22 (4) in Kingston and the remaining four (4) in Sault St. 23 Marie. 24 So as of the end of May of 1995, all 25 sixteen (16) emergency response teams of the OPP were
4031 trained in crowd management. 2 It's a one (1) week course. 3 Q: All right. And just for clarity, did 4 all of the CMU members receive the new training, 5 notwithstanding the fact that they may have been members 6 of the crowd control unit, prior? 7 A: That's correct. They all received 8 the new training. 9 Q: All right. Thank you. And I 10 understand that you also had input into the written 11 materials for the training courses that were developed 12 for the crowd management unit? 13 A: The course training standard, yes. 14 Q: Yes. I wonder if you would look at 15 two (2) documents. The first is Inquiry Document 16 2000348, it is entitled, Ontario Provincial Police Course 17 Training Standard, Emergency Response Team Course. 18 And it is Exhibit P-1453, the one with the 19 small print, if you will. 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: All right. And is that -- is that 22 the training standard manual that was in place in 23 '94/'95? 24 A: It would have been in place in '95. 25 In '94, again, the crowd management component had not
4041 been established. 2 Q: Okay. I just -- I see that it has 3 the Commissioner's approval as of July of '94, but it 4 wasn't implemented until '95? 5 A: No. It was implemented in '94. 6 Q: Okay. 7 A: The emergency response team training 8 on the other components began in 1992 actually, and '93 9 as well. So a number of teams had received training on 10 the other components of emergency response, and not crowd 11 management, that came at a later time period. 12 Q: All right. And just for 13 clarification, Part 6 in this, or Phase 6, is the crowd 14 management unit component of your training program; is 15 that correct? 16 A: That's correct. 17 Q: Okay. And that's what was in place 18 in '95? 19 A: It was in place in mid '94. 20 Q: Thank you. And then the other 21 document, just quickly to look at for the time being, is 22 2000347, and this -- this is another -- you'll have it in 23 the binder in front of you, the black binder. And the 24 first page is entitled, "Lesson Plan Cover Page." 25 A: Yes, I have that.
4051 Q: And can you just kindly identify what 2 this document represents? 3 A: It's a lesson plan for the 4 introduction of crowd management. It's basically the 5 blueprint for the beginning of the course, the beginning 6 of the week, an introduction to those trainees. 7 Q: And so this is actually the lesson- 8 by-lesson program, if you will, used by the instructors 9 and trainers for the CMU? 10 A: Without having gone page by page, 11 yes. I would say yes. 12 Q: Okay. And I'd like to make this the 13 next exhibit, please. 14 THE REGISTRAR: P-1475, Your Honour. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 1475. 16 MS. SUSAN VELLA: It's entitled, 17 "Training Course, Emergency Response Team, Lesson Subject 18 - Crowd Management." 19 20 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1475: Document Number 2000347. 21 Lesson Plan cover page, 22 Training Course; Emergency 23 Response Team; Lesson 24 Subject: Crowd Management 25
4061 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 2 Q: Now, I wonder if you can just in an 3 overview -- well, let me ask you this: 4 Do you know what, if anything, prompted 5 the shift from the then traditional crowd control unit 6 approach to the new crowd management approach? 7 A: Yes. I was familiar with how things 8 evolved from one to the other. There were officers from 9 the Toronto Police Service and the Peel Regional Police 10 Service had attended London, England, and undergone the 11 crowd management training in Britain. 12 It was a very progressive, very dynamic, 13 very modern way of dealing with crowds. And in England 14 they -- they tend to deal with a lot of crowds. And it 15 was one -- the British model was the one that we -- we 16 preferred over the rather rigid model that we had been 17 following. 18 The two (2) officers from the respective 19 forces returned. Some of our members began watching, 20 observing, partaking in the training that the Toronto 21 Police Service started, that incorporated the British 22 model. 23 And through discussions, I'm sure with 24 senior command, we ended up sitting down together as a 25 group, and modelling ourselves after the British model
4071 which, in turn, had been received and accepted in 2 Toronto. 3 The net result was that we -- we changed 4 mind sets, we changed gears and went to a more proactive 5 approach, for a lot of reasons. 6 It was a -- a very well-defined program. 7 It was proven in umpteen situations, as well as the fact 8 that it provided us an opportunity to work in a mutual 9 aide capacity with other police services. 10 It became a standardization of approach to 11 crowd management. And if you are going to get into 12 significant crowds, I'll give you a quick example. 13 The OAS gathering in Windsor in 2000, June 14 of 2000, where we had over two thousand (2,000) police 15 officers involved in security and crowd management, that 16 couldn't have occurred until we were all on the same 17 page, with -- utilizing the same theory, the same 18 functions and orders and commands and formations. 19 MS. SUSAN VELLA: All right. And... 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 MS. SUSAN VELLA: All right. And in a 24 general -- a general way, could you -- well, let me ask 25 you this:
4081 Is that approach, proactive approach that 2 you referred to, still the approach that informs the 3 handling of crowd situations today by the OPP? 4 A: Yes, it is. 5 Q: Is there a different name though, 6 now, to the unit? 7 A: Yes. It's been standardized in name 8 only, to the Public Order Unit. 9 Q: Okay. All right. Now, I wonder if 10 you could give us a very -- an overview, if you will, of 11 how it is the crowd management unit determines, in a 12 particular scenario, what approach to use, what tactic to 13 use. And we'll go through the manual a little bit more 14 carefully after that. 15 But I just want a general sense, you know, 16 what are the -- what are the steps that are undertaken in 17 analysing what kind of approach to take in terms of 18 tactics and formations? 19 A: One of the first things that needs to 20 be done is to simply to identify the type of crowd you're 21 dealing with. 22 And there -- there's different types. The 23 primary designations are orderly crowds and second to 24 that is disorderly crowds. 25 Q: Okay.
4091 A: And when you're dealing with orderly 2 crowds, there can be different types, and it's very 3 dependant upon the purpose of the gathering. 4 In some situations there's -- there's no 5 purpose, it just happens to be a group of people in a 6 recognizable area, which is the definition we use for 7 crowds. 8 An example, quickly, could be shoppers in 9 a store. It could be a very large store with a lot of 10 people, but they're a crowd, but they're no really 11 together cohesive with a leader and that type of thing. 12 They're just independent of each other but they are 13 together in a large area. 14 Q: All right. 15 A: Next to that you could have a 16 cohesive crowd which would involve people for a common 17 purpose, not necessarily with leaders. 18 An example of that could be considered a 19 sports event, be it a hockey game, football game, 20 whatever. 21 Next with that, you could have crowds 22 involved with each other in -- in a more aggressive 23 fashion. It could involve demonstrations; strikes are 24 typically considered in that area; people that have a 25 very common agenda, very strong belief.
4101 And in those situations you will 2 definitely see leaders, or a leader at least, bringing 3 people together for that common purpose. 4 So you've gone from -- in those three (3) 5 levels, you've gone from groups that are just happen to 6 be in an area, coincident to each other, to others to an 7 area for a common purpose to enjoy a sporting event or a 8 concert. 9 And then you have people gathering 10 together with, in their minds, they want to protest or 11 they want to get together to support or demand changes 12 for this or that. 13 But it's a very cohesive, very obvious 14 reason why they're together, and it's -- it's -- it's a 15 common bond between the majority of people at a given 16 event. 17 Q: All right. And so the first step is 18 to characterize what kind of crowd? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: Once you've characterized the nature 21 of the crowd, how does that inform the -- the formations 22 and tactics deployed? 23 A: Yes. Depending on the nature of the 24 crowd, of course, then there's certain things the police 25 need to do and -- and need not to do. In -- in the most
4111 benign example, nothing needs done. It's just a normal 2 human behaviour to be involved with each other, 3 interacting, and really I don't even expect to accept if 4 it's coincidental to see a police officer there. 5 In a example, the National Hockey League 6 game that's playing tonight, you'll see police officers 7 standing at different venue -- or at different points 8 throughout the venue, and that's simply as a presence and 9 to deal with the occasional disruption, disagreement that 10 may erupt. 11 But overall it's a -- it's a group of 12 people there to enjoy an evening's entertainment of 13 sports. And the police are there as -- as an expression 14 of control and expression of -- of order because, 15 potentially, as -- as we've seen in -- in jurisdictions 16 throughout this country and others, sporting events can 17 lead, if -- if unmanaged, and -- and there appears to be 18 a lack of order, can lead to some very serious rioting. 19 Q: Sure. Like if the Leafs' winning 20 game goal is called back? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: Okay. And -- all right. And what 23 you're explaining is that there are certain responses and 24 certain levels of force will be dictated by the type of 25 crowd situation you find yourself in. And sometimes just
4121 a visible presence is sufficient show, if you will, of 2 force, to deter any disruptive behaviour. And sometimes 3 you have to go further than that. 4 A: Correct. Yeah. We -- we call that a 5 graduated application of force or GAF. 6 Q: Okay. 7 A: And there's also another acronym that 8 we use, Mr. Commissioner, it's called SOFT; that's the 9 Show of Force Theory. 10 And the two (2) combined are dictated by 11 what the crowd is doing, what is deemed by the members in 12 charge of a given event, the security of it, what's 13 deemed to be the -- the appropriate response in terms of 14 where the officers are, how they're dressed, what they 15 may do, what their numbers might be. 16 Q: Okay. So why don't we turn to the 17 manual then, Exhibit P-1453. This is the -- the one 18 that's loose in front of you. And if you would kindly go 19 to -- essentially to Phase 6, Commissioner, at page 6.2, 20 and it's towards the back of the document. I think 21 you've got very -- the complete document in front of you. 22 And the first step then, or the first 23 lesson, if you will, that all CMU members receives is a - 24 - a lesson on various -- basically the -- the legal 25 statutes that may be implicated in their -- in their
4131 involvement? 2 A: Yeah, that's correct. It lists the 3 different -- or the relevant sections of the Criminal 4 Code and other statute law, provincial and federal, such 5 as the Trespass to Property Act. 6 Q: And -- 7 A: The -- the different authorities that 8 we would have to gather and -- and present to our -- our 9 people. 10 Q: All right. And I was -- yes, I note 11 that the Trespass to Property Act is one (1) of them. 12 And also the Section 32 of the Criminal Code with respect 13 to suppression of riots, use of force, duties of officers 14 if rioters and Section 33 about non dispersal -- 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: -- of people. Okay. And the -- if 17 you go to 6.3, the next page, this sets out the primary 18 purpose of the Crowd Management Unit? 19 A: That's correct. 20 Q: In particular as being: 21 "The role of developing a group of 22 trained personnel to pro-actively 23 manage crowds at all levels of order." 24 And that just is what you've -- you've 25 explained to us, disorderly versus orderly and the
4141 various degradations within those groups? 2 A: Correct. And one (1) of the -- what 3 might help even explain this more clearly is -- is one 4 (1) of the things I asked the -- the students on the 5 course is why do they suppose we put levels of order 6 instead of levels of disorder? 7 And it usually draws some comments and 8 some -- some questions and -- and the reason is, again, 9 it's how we've gotten away from only getting involved 10 when there's disorder. It's a matter of being in there 11 early, preemptively, when order still prevails. And 12 that's the goal; to maintain order. 13 Q: And just so I understand, this order 14 -- what's the minimum threshold, if you will, to -- to 15 characterize a crowd from order to disorder? 16 A: It could be a number of things, but 17 it would likely be quite obvious. You -- you'd have 18 fights breaking out. You'd have damage beginning to 19 occur. You'd have obvious pockets of lawlessness or 20 activity that could be considered riotous. 21 Q: So gatherings not that necessarily 22 are just may be illegal, but gatherings that have the 23 potential to pose a real threat to personal property or 24 persons? 25 A: Yes.
4151 Q: And if we go to six point four (6.4) 2 next, I understand that this sets out the basic 3 composition of the Crowd Management Unit, and in 4 particular the elements that comprise a Crowd Management 5 Unit. 6 Can you just explain that for us, please? 7 A: Yes, the Crowd Management Unit 8 consists of thirty-two (32) officers at this time. And 9 that -- if -- if the Emergency Response Team consists of 10 sixteen (16) members, then that means that two (2) 11 Emergency Response teams come together to form the 12 thirty-two (32) officer Crowd Management Unit. 13 It consists of four (4) squads of eight 14 (8) members. The squads are name the Contact Squad, and 15 that would be the leading element of -- 16 Q: The element in front? 17 A: Yes. The element at -- at the lead 18 or the front of the unit. Then if -- typically, if you 19 look at this from above and think of it as an airplane, 20 that would be the nose. 21 And then we would have the wings of the 22 airplane, would be the Left Cover Squad, another eight 23 (8) members. The Right Cover Squad, another eight (8) 24 members. And at the tail you'd have the support squad, 25 also called the Arrest Squad, at the tail.
4161 Q: All right. And just briefly now, 2 what are the functions of the Contact Squad versus the 3 Left and Right Cover Squad? 4 A: Their named but their functions are 5 all the same. And what I just gave a description of was 6 a certain formation and I may have jumped the queue a tad 7 there. 8 But the four (4) squads themselves have 9 different positions and different formations. The one 10 (1) I just described was the cordon formation. 11 Q: Yes. 12 A: But the composition of the members 13 themselves, the numbers are eight (8), eight (8), eight 14 (8) and eight (8). In addition you would have the Staff 15 Sergeant in this case in charge, the crowd management 16 leader on the ground, so that would be the thirty-third 17 person. 18 Q: Okay. And from time to time does the 19 -- the canine unit and prisoner van units become part of 20 the CMU or form part of it? 21 A: It's augmented based on preparation 22 and planning for a given event. And, yes, we have used 23 canine at different events. There have been prisoner 24 vans or buses or transport vehicles made available at 25 different functions as well.
4171 Q: All right. On page 6.5, this sets 2 out the -- the basic command structure. And perhaps you 3 can just advise who has the authority to call out the CMU 4 and under what circumstances? 5 A: I don't have 6.5. 6 Q: Ah. Okay. Sorry. 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 A: I'm missing 5, 6, 7 and 8. 11 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Do you have it, 12 Commissioner? 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I do. 14 I have it. 15 16 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 17 Q: Thank you. We're at 6.5. 18 A: Okay. I have it. 19 Q: Thank you. And my questions were, 20 Who has the authority to -- to call out the CMU and under 21 what circumstances? 22 A: Well, the CMU is called out by the 23 area commander. Normally it's requested based on the 24 anticipation of a -- of a gathering of a -- of a crowd 25 for whatever purpose. And once the unit is called out,
4181 it requires a Level 1 Incident Command and the training 2 crowd management tactics. 3 If there is an anticipation of violence, 4 then there is the requirement to have a Level 2 Incident 5 Commander overseeing the operation. 6 Q: All right. And what are the 7 essential responsibilities and duties of the officers 8 while engaged in a CMU matter? 9 A: It depends if you're dealing with an 10 orderly crowd or a disorderly crowd. 11 Q: All right. I note at the bottom -- 12 are there -- are there certain standard obligations 13 whether or not there are disorderly or orderly crowds? 14 A: I'm sorry? 15 Q: I'm looking at -- at the bottom of 16 the 6.5, "Responsibility and Officer Duties." 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: Is that only in the context of one 19 (1) type of crowd or any type of crowd? 20 A: Well, at the bottom here it refers to 21 speaking with the crowd, remaining impartial, identifying 22 potential leaders, and facing the crowd. That would be a 23 -- a scenario of orderly crowd management. 24 Q: All right. I understand that there 25 are various formations that a CMU can undertake, and by
4191 formation I take it means basically the -- the shape, if 2 you will, or the -- the shape of the unit? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: And can you just explain in -- in a 5 very general way, I see -- item 2, there are a number of 6 possible formations? 7 A: Yes. There's different formations 8 for different levels of crowd activity, whether they be 9 orderly or disorderly. We have filter cordons, closed 10 cordons, single belt cordons, double belt cordons, stack 11 file position, a box formation, a cordon formation. 12 And we have different approaches. There's 13 -- if you're reading that document, then I'll comment on 14 the attack from the rear. 15 It's simply a -- an approach or a protocol 16 to follow, should there be a -- an attack from the rear 17 when we're dealing with disorderly crowds. 18 Q: All right. And if you go to page 6.8 19 this is an expansion of the types of formations and the 20 type of crowds that would be recommended to those 21 particular formations. 22 And I note that the distinction is drawn 23 between a passive crowd and a disorderly crowd and is 24 passive crowd mean the same thing as an orderly crowd, to 25 use your...?
4201 A: Yes, it does. 2 Q: Okay. And in particular can you just 3 go to page 6.10 under the "Disorderly Crowd Tactics" and 4 you've indicated that that requires a certain elevation 5 or threat, at least, to property or personnel. 6 Could you explain what the cordon 7 formation is and why it is seen to be recommended for 8 disorderly crowds? 9 A: Yes. The cordon formation is set up 10 in the fashion that I explained with the airplane 11 analogy. There's separation of members, front to rear 12 and side to side. 13 The squad itself, if one were to take a 14 look at it from the front, you would see six (6) officers 15 in full crowd management equipment which includes 16 shields, helmets and protective gear. 17 Q: Is that hard TAC? 18 A: Yes. We refer to that as hard TAC. 19 Q: All right. Yes. 20 A: The six (6) officers directly behind 21 them would be their squad leader and that officer also 22 has a support officer, so there's two (2). 23 So, yes, in essence, you've got four (4) 24 pairings per squad and the officers are spaced such that 25 the left and right cover squads would fill, ideally, the
4211 given area that you're trying to control. 2 So it could be from fence line to fence 3 line. It could be from side walk to side walk, depending 4 on the venue. 5 Q: All right. And there's two (2) 6 police officers behind the front -- the contact squad, so 7 six (6) and then two (2) -- 8 A: Two (2). 9 Q: And then would it be twelve (12), the 10 next line? Taking into account both... 11 A: It would still be a six (6), two (2) 12 ; six (6) two (2) but it would be they're so spread out 13 they are autonomous squads. They're not working as 14 twelve (12). They're working six (6) and six (6) -- 15 Q: Okay. 16 A: With their support squad leaders. 17 Q: And what -- what is the advantage, 18 tactically, in deploying a crowd management unit in the 19 cordon formation? 20 A: The advantage is it presents the 21 crowd, a very imposing picture. They refer to it as the 22 mass principle in the course training standard. It -- if 23 you stand in front of it, which I have done, you would -- 24 you would guesstimate the number of officers on scene to 25 be probably double or more what actually exists.
4221 You have depth, you have width. They are 2 spread out and from a safety standpoint, unlike the -- 3 the formations of the 1980's where you would be shoulder- 4 to-shoulder, in a line diagonal, a wedge, here you are 5 spread out and in the event that you have objects thrown 6 at you or -- or items that you need to get around, step 7 by, it's very easily accomplished in that formation, than 8 if you were standing shoulder-to-shoulder. 9 It's easier to get around different 10 objects. 11 Q: And how -- in what way is the cordon 12 formation intended to proactively manage a disorderly 13 crowd? 14 In other words, what's the message that -- 15 that's -- that's attempted to be sent by this formation? 16 A: Well, ideally your presence and -- 17 and uniformed as I described, should be enough to 18 dissuade most people from continuing the behaviour that 19 has resulted in the members being deployed in that 20 fashion. 21 Q: So in other words, it -- by its 22 presence -- 23 A: Its presence, yes. 24 Q: -- it's intended to be intimidating? 25 A: Yes.
4231 Q: And therefore deter the crowd from 2 doing what they're doing, without any contact or use of 3 physical force? 4 A: That's -- that's the hope of it. We 5 -- we want to accomplish regaining order and peace with 6 using the least amount of force possible. 7 Q: And what is -- what is the downside 8 of employing a cordon formation in a disorderly crowd 9 situation? 10 A: It can be seen as antagonistic. 11 Q: Meaning? And what's the consequence 12 of that? 13 A: Meaning that it may -- may cause some 14 persons to see this as an opportunity to engage the Crowd 15 Management Unit. 16 Q: So as a challenge as opposed to a 17 deterrent? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Thank you. 20 MS. SUSAN VELLA: I could certainly go 21 on, Commissioner, but perhaps -- I know I've exceeded my 22 time already, perhaps we'll break for the day. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think this 24 would be a good point to stop for the day and continue 25 tomorrow morning.
4241 MS. SUSAN VELLA: We will, thank you. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 3 very much. 4 5 (WITNESS RETIRES) 6 7 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 8 adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, May the 11th at 9:00 9 a.m. 10 11 --- Upon adjourning at 5:35 p.m. 12 13 14 15 Certified Correct 16 17 18 19 ________________________ 20 Carol Geehan 21 22 23 24 25