1 2 3 IPPERWASH PUBLIC INQUIRY 4 5 6 7 ******************** 8 9 10 BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE SIDNEY LINDEN, 11 COMMISSIONER 12 13 14 15 16 Held at: Forest Community Centre 17 Kimball Hall 18 Forest, Ontario 19 20 21 ******************** 22 23 24 May 9th, 2006 25


1 Appearances 2 Derry Millar ) Commission Counsel 3 Susan Vella ) (np) 4 Donald Worme, Q. C ) (np) 5 Katherine Hensel ) 6 Megan Ferrier ) (np) 7 8 Murray Klippenstein ) The Estate of Dudley 9 Vilko Zbogar ) (np) George and George 10 Andrew Orkin ) (np) Family Group 11 Basil Alexander ) 12 13 Peter Rosenthal ) Aazhoodena and George 14 Jackie Esmonde ) Family Group 15 16 Anthony Ross ) (np) Residents of 17 Cameron Neil ) (np) Aazhoodena (Army Camp) 18 Kevin Scullion ) 19 20 William Henderson ) Kettle Point & Stony 21 Jonathon George ) (np) Point First Nation 22 Colleen Johnson ) 23 24 25


1 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 3 Kim Twohig ) (np) Government of Ontario 4 Walter Myrka ) (np) 5 Susan Freeborn ) (np) 6 Sheri Hebdon ) Student-at-law 7 8 Janet Clermont ) Municipality of 9 David Nash ) (np) Lambton Shores 10 Nora Simpson ) (np) Student-at-law 11 12 Peter Downard ) (np) The Honourable Michael 13 Bill Hourigan ) (np) Harris 14 Jennifer McAleer ) 15 16 Ian Smith ) (np) Robert Runciman 17 Alice Mrozek ) (np) 18 19 Harvey T. Strosberg, Q.C.) (np) Charles Harnick 20 Jacqueline Horvat ) (np) 21 22 23 24 25


1 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 3 Douglas Sulman, Q.C. ) Marcel Beaubien 4 Mary Jane Moynahan ) (np) 5 Dave Jacklin ) (np) 6 Trevor Hinnegan ) (np) 7 8 Mark Sandler ) (np) Ontario Provincial 9 Andrea Tuck-Jackson ) Ontario Provincial Police 10 Leslie Kaufman ) (np) 11 12 Ian Roland ) Ontario Provincial 13 Karen Jones ) (np) Police Association & 14 Debra Newell ) K. Deane 15 Ian McGilp ) (np) 16 Annie Leeks ) (np) 17 Jennifer Gleitman ) (np) 18 Robyn Trask ) (np) 19 Caroline Swerdlyk ) (np) 20 21 22 23 24 25


1 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 Julian Falconer ) Aboriginal Legal 3 Brian Eyolfson ) (np) Services of Toronto 4 Kimberly Murray ) (np) 5 Julian Roy ) 6 Clem Nabigon ) (np) 7 Linda Chen ) (np) 8 Chris Darnay ) (np) 9 Sunil Mathai ) (np) 10 Adriel Weaver ) (np) Student-at-Law 11 12 Al J.C. O'Marra ) (np) Office of the Chief 13 Robert Ash, Q.C. ) (np) Coroner 14 William Horton ) (np) Chiefs of Ontario 15 Matthew Horner ) (np) 16 Kathleen Lickers ) (np) 17 18 Mark Fredrick ) (np) Christopher Hodgson 19 Craig Mills ) (np) 20 Megan Mackey ) (np) 21 Peter Lauwers ) (np) 22 Erin Tully ) (np) 23 Michelle Fernando ) (np) 24 Maanit Zemel ) 25 Patrick Greco ) (np)


1 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 3 David Roebuck ) (np) Debbie Hutton 4 Anna Perschy ) 5 Melissa Panjer ) (np) 6 Adam Goodman ) (np) 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25


1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 PAGE NO. 3 List of Exhibits 4 5 WADE ALAN LACROIX, Resumed 6 7 Continued Examination-In-Chief by Mr. Derry Millar 12 8 Cross-Examination by Ms. Andrea Tuck-Jackson 140 9 Cross-Examination by Mr. Douglas Sulman 141 10 Cross-Examination by Ms. Anna Perschy 163 11 Cross-Examination by Mr. Julian Falconer 188 12 13 14 15 16 Certificate of Transcript 359 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25


1 EXHIBITS 2 No. Description Page 3 P-1457 Topographical map marked and signed 4 by Mr. Wade Lacroix showing passage 5 of bus and car; September 22, 1995. 27 6 P-1458 Photographs - 0021, 0022, 0023, 0028, 7 0031, 0032, 0035 and 0038. 45 8 P-1459 Drawing by Wade Lacroix indicating 9 Cordon formation movements on September 10 06, 1995, August 18, 1997. 52 11 P-1460 Document Number 5000041. General 12 Occurrence Report: Complainant: Wade 13 Lacroix Re. Assault with weapon on 14 September 06, 1995, with added mischief 15 occurred; Use of Force Report, December 16 12, 1995. 122 17 P-1461 Document Number 3000846. R. v. 18 Nicholas Abraham Cottrelle:: Wade 19 Lacroix Examination-In-Chief and Cross- 20 Examination; Trial transcript, 21 pages 26-79 or Wade Lacroix's testimony, 22 March 25, 1997. 123 23 24 25


1 EXHIBITS (Con't) 2 No. Description Page 3 P-1462 Document Number 1004972. R. v. Warren 4 George/David George: Wade Lacroix 5 Examination-In-Chief by Mr. Van Drunen; 6 Trial transcript pages 77-125, September 7 29, 1997. 125 8 P-1463 Document Number 1004973, R. v. Warren 9 George/David George: Wade Lacroix 10 Examination-In-Chief completion, Cross- 11 Examination and Re-Examination, September 30, 12 1997. 125 13 P-1464 Document Number 1004978. R. v. Cecil 14 Bernard George, Transcript of OPP 15 witnesses, July 15, 1996. 126 16 P-1465 Wade Lacroix audio. 139 17 P-1466 Document Number 2000715. OPP Operational 18 Plan for Occupation of CFA Ipperwash; 19 memo to Inspector Dave Scott from Eileen 20 Hipfner June 02, 1993; Logistical and 21 Communications Plans to London and Chatham 22 OPP Superintendents, June 1993; Letter 23 from Rob Black to Wade Lacroix, 24 June 03, 1993. 184 25


1 --- Upon commencing at 9:02 a.m. 2 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 4 now in session, the Honourable Mr. Justice Linden 5 presiding. Please be seated. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 7 morning. 8 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Good morning, 9 Commissioner. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 11 morning, everybody. 12 13 WADE ALAN LACROIX, Resumed 14 15 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Before we begin on -- 16 I just wanted to clarify something with respect to 17 Exhibit P-438 which is the transcript of the logger tape 18 that starts at 10:27 p.m. and runs til 11:10 p.m. on 19 September the 6th. 20 And the first voice heard on the logger 21 tape was Mr. Lacroix's and the transcript now reads: 22 "CMU advanced, slow pace." 23 Should be: 24 "tenth (1/10) of a K." 25 And Mr. Lacroix listened to it this


1 morning and I listened to it last night and it should 2 read: 3 "CMU advance, slow pace..." 4 Then should be: 5 "...eight tenths (8/10's) of a K." 6 And is that correct, Mr. Lacroix? 7 THE WITNESS: Yes. 8 MR. DERRY MILLAR: And then on page 8 or 9 page 9, the -- the bottom of page 8 it says: 10 "Shots fired, shots fired." 11 And that's at approximately thirty-five 12 (35) minutes into the tape. And then there's a second 13 shouting by Mr. Lacroix at approximately 35:09. Again: 14 "Shots fired, shots fired." 15 And you heard both of those -- 16 THE WITNESS: Yes. 17 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- Mr. Lacroix? 18 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 19 MR. DERRY MILLAR: So that at the bottom 20 of the page 8, there should be an additional line: 21 "LACROIX: Shots fired, shots fired." 22 And that's approximately thirty-five (35) 23 minutes and nine (9) seconds into the tape and I've 24 discovered that there's a couple of seconds off, if you 25 use a different player.


1 But at any rate, that's -- I just wanted 2 to correct that, sir. 3 4 CONTINUED EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 5 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Now, yesterday we were 6 at the point in time when you had -- you told us about 7 the interaction. You told us of -- we reviewed Exhibit 8 P-438 and I'm not going to ask you to review all your 9 notes, but I -- I had asked you last night to review your 10 notes and is there anything else that you wish to add 11 about this part of the interaction from your notes? You 12 captured it all? 13 A: Well, I believe we've covered it all. 14 I believe I brought into evidence about my shield being 15 busted. 16 Q: Yes, you told us that your shield had 17 been broken. 18 And then can you tell us, after you -- 19 when you retreated -- when you left the sandy parking 20 lot, you were on East Parkway Drive and you called for a 21 count? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: Could you just start there and tell 24 us what happened then? 25 A: I basically stood out in the middle


1 of the road. I came out from that wooden box, that 2 garbage container, and I stepped back down the road to 3 enough space for the unit to form up in front of me. 4 So I had them form up in their four (4) 5 squads; front contact, left cover, right cover. 6 And I believe it was -- it was either I 7 formed in a stack formation first, which is two's. I 8 believe I did change some point in there into a box. But 9 I asked each of the sergeants to come here and I told 10 them I would like them to check to ensure they had all 11 their people and what the injuries were. 12 So they did that. They came back and told 13 me all accounted for. I believe it was left cover had 14 ankle -- an ankle injury. There was people complaining 15 about sore shoulders, minor aches and pains, but I was 16 quite surprised that there was no -- didn't appear to be 17 broken bones or serious injuries reported. 18 Again, it -- just because of the violence 19 of what had all happened, I mean just with -- with the 20 bus and the car and the shooting I -- I guess -- I guess 21 I couldn't believe the report and so I made them do it 22 again. 23 And I believe at that time, I think all 24 the sergeants come on me so there would have been four 25 (4) sergeants plus sergeant -- acting Sergeant Deane


1 report to me as well. I believe he was off to my left, 2 standing a little huddle in front of the formation. 3 I asked him then to go back, south ditch, 4 north ditch, and make sure we had nobody down in the 5 ditch on either side, either a police officer or one of 6 the protesters, because I couldn't be sure that people -- 7 I mean, I believed that they were inside of vehicles, 8 because I, myself, did not see anyone on the road. I 9 didn't see any protesters that far down. 10 So what I still wanted to make sure that 11 we check both ditches to make sure there was no 12 casualties of either side. So they went off and did 13 that. I believe they only went down about 30 metres 14 down, as far as probably where the split had taken place; 15 not all the way to the bend in the road -- 16 Q: Yes? 17 A: -- about half way down. They came 18 back, all accounted for. I asked them to cover us. So 19 they basically went to the rear of the formation, facing 20 the bus and the car; I believe were still sitting on the 21 sandy parking lot. 22 I already had them facing me. I was 23 facing back towards the Park. They were facing me in a 24 box formation. I turned around and gave a quick march. 25 Q: And you returned to the MNR parking


1 lot? 2 A: Yeah, in three (3) -- four (4) 3 minutes, maybe no more than, maybe five (5) at the most. 4 Q: And after you returned to the MNR 5 parking lot what did you do? 6 A: My recollection is I basically 7 marched them right in -- into that parking lot area right 8 up to where the TOC van and the -- they were using a 9 trailer, a St. John's Ambulance trailer I believe as a 10 bit of a makeshift command post as well and I marched 11 them right up close to those -- those two (2) vehicles 12 and halted. 13 I told the team leaders to take care of 14 any injuries of their people and I'll make sure that, you 15 know, that I reported some minor injuries. I said take 16 care of the injuries. I knew there had been some 17 ambulances when we left. I remember seeing at least a 18 St. John's ambulance and possibly a county ambulance on 19 the way in. 20 I -- John Carson had come out and I 21 believe he was standing to my left when I addressed the - 22 - the troops and I said -- the members -- I said, I would 23 like anybody who fired their weapon to come forward to me 24 after the break-off, you know, because of course now this 25 will become an SIU investigation so those weapons will


1 become evidence. So when we break off come over here to 2 me. 3 Q: And why would it at this point become 4 an SIU investigation because of the shots were fired? 5 A: Well, I believe any time, yes, that 6 we use lethal force, we'd use firearms, so... 7 Q: At this point in time -- 8 A: I -- I didn't know of any injury. 9 Q: Yeah. At this point time -- when you 10 say "lethal force" at this point in time when you're back 11 in the MNR parking lot the -- what did you know about the 12 injuries if any sustained by the protestors? 13 A: None. So in retrospect you're right. 14 I was saying that there would be an investigation of some 15 kind I guess really, but I was saying either internal or 16 external -- 17 Q: And -- 18 A: -- but even internally because the 19 weapons the OPP would certainly investigate. 20 Q: So you asked for those -- those who 21 had fired their weapons to identify themselves and what 22 about the use of their weapons? 23 A: Yeah, I asked -- I said -- so I had - 24 - other than myself I had six (6) come forward; three (3) 25 of the Crowd Management Unit and three (3) TRU team.


1 Q: And then what happened with their 2 weapons? 3 A: Like I say John Carson was standing 4 beside me. I think there was like a quick discussion 5 that since we were still very much operational, that this 6 occurrence was not over. It didn't end in a normal 7 fashion. I mean, if -- if there is such a thing as a 8 normal fashion. 9 I mean it wasn't like, you know, a high- 10 speed chase or something where shots are fired and we 11 controlled the scene, right, and you take the two (2) 12 officers away. We did not control the scene. The 13 situation was still very much what it was before we went 14 down the road. As a matter of fact it was worse. 15 So it was still very much operational. So 16 we basically just said that under the circumstances we 17 will not seize their weapons, because one (1) of the OPP 18 policies especially for an operational situation for the 19 psyche of the officer and for officer safety you 20 shouldn't take his weapon unless you can replace it. 21 Well, we certainly didn't have seven (7) 22 additional weapons down at the TOC; the forward TOC. So, 23 I mean, there just a very quick discussion of what under 24 the circumstances okay, they've identified it and I -- I 25 believe I told them to make sure their team leaders


1 identified their rooms. 2 I think that John stepped in, into the 3 conversation and said basically, Stand down, you know, 4 take off -- take off your equipment, meaning all your 5 hard TAC, meaning he wasn't going to use them in that 6 role again. So take it all off, pack it up, go back to 7 your hotel rooms and wait further instruction. I believe 8 that was the end of the discussion. 9 Q: And did you speak to -- have any 10 discussion with Kent Skinner when you were back at the 11 TAC (sic) at -- in the MNR parking lot? 12 A: I don't recall any. 13 Q: Did you have any discussion with 14 Acting Sergeant Deane, Kenneth Deane? 15 A: No, because -- no, I -- I don't 16 remember speaking to Deane because he would have -- mind 17 you he ended up at the TOC but he trailed us. As I say 18 they went out in defence behind us, so they stayed one 19 (1) tactical parameter, about 25 metres behind our 20 formation all the way back. 21 Q: And when you were on the road, on 22 East Parkway Drive and you asked Acting Sergeant Deane to 23 check the road -- 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: -- back towards the intersection of


1 Army Camp Road and East Parkway, did you have any 2 discussion with him at that point about what he had seen 3 or done? 4 A: I don't recall having a discussion 5 about -- the only time I knew who fired is when I said, 6 Those officers who fired come forward and Ken Deane was 7 one of the officers who came forward back at the TOC. 8 So do not remember any discussion about 9 him firing or what he seen, no. 10 Q: He simply identified himself as one 11 of the people that fired? 12 A: Yes, at the TOC. But back at the 13 original scene, no. 14 Q: And did you have any discussion with 15 Kenneth Deane or any of the other officers who fired 16 their weapons at the TOC when you were in the MNR -- in 17 the MNR parking lot? 18 A: The only discussion I remember having 19 with anybody was my Number 2, George Hebblethwaite, who 20 of course was always right beside me walking back and the 21 discussion was more like, What just happened? 22 I -- I remember -- 23 Q: When you were walking back? 24 A: Yeah. I remember having a discussion 25 going what -- what was that? And you know, did I -- did


1 what happened -- did I -- do I think what happened just 2 happened? I think we were both a little bit of talk -- 3 like, kind of not really sure what we just went through 4 what we went through. 5 And that's about the only discussion I 6 remember with anybody. 7 Q: Okay. 8 A: And that -- we were all walking out. 9 I was more kind of -- did we just go through that? And 10 are we actually walking out of this alive? It was kind 11 of that discussion. 12 Q: And if I could just take you back, 13 the evidence that we've heard is that the bus and the car 14 went back into the -- went back into the -- into the 15 Provincial Park after the -- they reversed down the road. 16 And the -- went from -- the point you were 17 looking at, is -- are you sure that the parking -- that 18 the bus and the car were not back in behind the -- the 19 page wire fence? 20 A: My recollection was they were sitting 21 in the sandy parking lot, but that's the last time that I 22 -- I saw them. But I guess, I just say this to you, is 23 that being the Commander, even though I was facing down 24 the road, I was also the one that would turn to say, Left 25 cover do this, I would turn to right cover, I would --


1 Q: So you weren't observing the -- 2 A: I was not 100 percent watching -- 3 stand -- just standing on the road watching the car. 4 Q: Yeah. 5 A: I did several different events within 6 that twenty (20) seconds and I was the one yelling, 7 "Cease fire", then I was the one to say "On me", you 8 know, "come over here, reform" so I wasn't in a position, 9 just be standing there watching the car and the bus. 10 Q: And the -- after you said, and it's 11 on Exhibit P-438, when the -- the person who you 12 identified yesterday as yourself at approximately 35:21, 13 "hold your fire" -- 14 A: Right. 15 Q: -- the -- when you made that command, 16 you told us yesterday that all of the firing stopped; is 17 that not correct? 18 A: I had believed -- when I yelled it, I 19 was -- I was now behind the garbage container box. There 20 seemed to be a lull in the gunfire and I -- and I yelled 21 it out at that time because I saw the bus and the car 22 backup. 23 And I just wanted to make sure that, you 24 know, there was actually -- the unit was on two (2) sides 25 of the road, there had been a fair amount of gunfire


1 already so I -- I believe there was a lull when I yelled 2 out, "hold your fire". 3 Q: And there was no more gunfire? 4 A: No. 5 Q: And when the bus -- when you first 6 observed the bus, how fast was the bus going, Mr. 7 Lacroix? 8 A: When I first saw it coming, I mean 9 because I was standing right at center of the road and it 10 was coming directly at me, like in the sense of it, it 11 was coming out through the gate I was lined up perfectly 12 with it. It looked to be coming fairly -- fairly 13 quickly. Like I say, you know, normal street speed. 14 Twenty-five (25) thirty (30) miles an hour. 15 But after it went over Army Camp Road and 16 went off onto the grass, I remember the tandems bumping, 17 by the time it went by me the first time I would say it's 18 reduced its speed substantially. I -- now it was like 19 maybe fifteen (15). 20 Q: Fifteen (15) miles an hour? 21 A: Yeah, I'd say about that. 22 Q: Or less? 23 A: Yeah, ten (10), fifteen (15) mile per 24 hour by the time it was like right beside me. And then 25 when it came back, in reverse, I'd say about ten (10)


1 miles an hour. 2 Q: Ten (10) miles an hour. And the car, 3 when you first saw the car, how fast was it going? 4 A: The car actually didn't -- because I 5 only saw a glimpse of it. I -- again, I don't know if 6 it's because my attention was on the bus or it was 7 somehow behind the bus, but when I saw it, it was as I 8 described it as swerving about 30 metres away from me and 9 it was trying to swerve towards the members so I don't 10 know, 10/15 miles an hour. 11 Q: Okay. And then when it came up 12 beside you, how fast was it going? 13 A: Well then it went at that speed; 14 10/15 miles an hour right into the CMU standing there, 15 like direct in. 16 Q: And then when it -- it -- you told us 17 yesterday it stopped, you -- it went into reverse. 18 A: Well, it stopped when it hit the 19 officers, collided with three (3) -- at least three (3) 20 officers. 21 And then, yes, it seemed to go -- it 22 slammed into reverse and backed up. 23 Q: And then what happened after it 24 backed up? 25 A: It backed up about a -- about, like I


1 say, a half a car length and it -- then it seemed like it 2 slammed into drive, because I saw the car, the front end 3 lift, the rear end drop and then it rocked back forward. 4 It started its motion back again. 5 So it was like very quick -- it was like, 6 in reverse, back up about half a car length and in drive. 7 Q: And it was at this point that you ran 8 over and fired the shots? 9 A: I have already made my move. I mean, 10 I was watching this. I was running towards the car as 11 this manouevre was -- was happening. 12 Q: And -- 13 A: I got there about the time that it, 14 like popped into drive. 15 Q: And then what did the car do? 16 A: Well, after it took fire -- and I 17 believe it took fire from more than myself. It just -- I 18 knew there was gunfire. It must have got back in reverse 19 and they got out of there. 20 Q: And how fast did you observe it going 21 backwards? 22 A: It seemed to get out of there fairly 23 quickly then. 24 Q: And how... 25 A: I didn't get to watch it very -- very


1 long, because then the bus almost hit me from the rear. 2 Q: Okay. Then behind you on the easel 3 there is a drawing... 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 Q: After you've -- after you fired your 8 weapon, Mr. Lacroix, into the -- at the car -- Mr. 9 Lacroix? 10 A: Yes? 11 Q: The car went into reverse and went 12 backwards? 13 A: That's my recollection. Then it went 14 into reverse and it left the scene. 15 16 (BRIEF PAUSE) 17 18 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Excuse me for a 19 minute. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Sure. 21 22 (BRIEF PAUSE) 23 24 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 25 Q: On the screen, but it's better on


1 the... 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 Q: It's easier to read, actually for 6 you, Mr. Lacroix on the -- the actual -- the copy of the 7 drawing. This is a drawing that's dated September 22nd, 8 1995. 9 And does your signature appear in the 10 upper right-hand corner of the drawing? 11 And, Commissioner, what we've done, we 12 have the actual drawing but we had it copied and mounted 13 on the -- the board to make it easier to use. 14 A: Yes, sir, that's my signature. 15 Q: Could you just pick up the -- the 16 microphone, Mr. Lacroix, the hand microphone? 17 A: Yes, that's my signature. 18 Q: And do you recall today the 19 circumstances under which this document was created? 20 A: No, I don't. 21 Q: And the -- this document -- and 22 perhaps we could mark this the next exhibit, 23 Commissioner? 24 THE REGISTRAR: P-1457, Your Honour. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 1457.


1 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1457: Topographical map marked and 2 signed by Mr. Wade Lacroix 3 showing passage of bus and 4 car; September 22, 1995. 5 6 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 7 Q: And P-1457 appears to be showing the 8 bus -- the passage of the bus and the car; is that 9 correct? 10 A: Yes, it appears to be the line of 11 advance of the bus from out of the Park down the road and 12 then back, and the car. 13 Q: And there is a -- you will see that 14 the car -- there appears to be a drawing of a car under 15 1B -- unfortunately at point one eight six (.186) -- this 16 is a topographical map. Do you see the car? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: And it's -- go a little forward. 19 A: And then in the ditch. 20 Q: In the ditch? And beside that there 21 is a -- initials "WL"? 22 A: Right. 23 Q: And are these your -- did you make 24 this -- was this done in your handwriting or is this 25 your drawing?


1 A: That -- that looks like the way I 2 would draw; that's my, "Lost sight of bus." 3 "WL", looks like me. 4 "Bus in reverse", looks like my printing. 5 Q: And so it -- it indicates that the 6 bus -- the car turned into the ditch, towards the ditch 7 and was that the point where you told us that it turned - 8 - it hit -- it was going towards the CMU members? 9 A: Yes, they were standing up against 10 this fence. 11 Q: Now, you're pointing to the fence 12 where? 13 A: The page wire fence to the south. 14 They were up against the -- 15 Q: I'm talking about the car. 16 A: Oh, sorry, the car. Yes, sorry. The 17 officers were standing huddled in the north side. I 18 think there was a bunch of bushes they couldn't get 19 through, and just to the east of the laneway there; they 20 were right in that area. 21 Q: And -- 22 A: Ten (10) or so of them. 23 Q: And it appears that there's a circle 24 and then with "WL" and then an "X" and an arrow towards 25 the "X".


1 Do you recall today what you were trying 2 to indicate by that, right beside the car? 3 A: Well, the "X" is where I believe I 4 was standing when the car drove off into the officers. 5 The circle is where I ran to and then the arrow back to 6 the "X" I retreated back to my original position. 7 So I ran up, fired two (2) rounds -- 8 two/three (2/3) rounds and then I backed up to 9 approximately the same spot, about the middle of the road 10 in -- in line with this driveway. 11 Q: Okay. And then the car backed up? 12 A: Right. The car backed up. I lost 13 sight of it on the sandy parking lot. I kind of wandered 14 back a little bit so I was a little -- down between the 15 two (2) driveways when I almost got hit by the bus. 16 Q: And the bus in reverse -- the bus 17 backed up. This drawing shows arrows out and then arrows 18 back but the bus didn't turn around, it simply backed up? 19 A: It was coming back in reverse. 20 Q: And -- 21 A: So it went off into the -- it went 22 westbound. I released it in the night. I don't know how 23 far down the road it went, but when it was coming back I 24 -- I was -- I definitely was looking at the rear of the 25 bus; it was in reverse.


1 Q: And then it says on the right-hand 2 drawing -- part of the drawing by the -- the -- I think 3 it's one eight three point one (183.1) the elevation: 4 "Lost sight of bus." 5 A: Right. And -- in there, yes. 6 Q: So that on September 22nd, 1995, you 7 had indicated that you had lost sight of the bus as it 8 went into the sandy parking lot? 9 A: That's right. I -- the last time I 10 saw the bus and the car they were in this area. 11 Q: And then, just above the elevation 12 one eighty-two point six (182.6), just at the point -- 13 the curve of East Parkway and Army Camp Road -- 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: -- there's a drawing of a car. Do 16 you see that? And the -- what was that intended to do? 17 A: That was when I had first picked up 18 on the car. And as I said, I think in evidence-in-chief 19 yesterday, I believe there was one (1) CMU member alone 20 standing about where that swerve, and I said that I saw 21 the car swerve to the right towards him and I saw him 22 jump out of the way. 23 Then the car went out in the middle of the 24 road, a hard right and back into the group on the north 25 side.


1 Q: Where you've marked it on this -- 2 A: Yeah so that to me was the path I saw 3 it come out, big swerve to the right, back to the left 4 and into the ditch. 5 Q: And then backed up and went back? 6 A: And then backed up, reverse. I think 7 -- I know for a fact I fired, I believe there was other 8 gunfire at that time and then it reversed out of there. 9 Q: Okay. You can just sit down for a 10 moment. The -- when -- you told us yesterday with 11 respect to the car that you saw some muzzle flashes when 12 you were close to the car, did you see a firearm, whether 13 a handgun or a long gun in the car? 14 A: No. I just saw -- seemed to be a 15 silhouette and I thought I could see a left arm which 16 would, you know, put it near what you expect a -- a 17 weapon to be but I did not see a weapon. I saw a muzzle 18 flash. 19 Q: And the muzzle -- the -- you told us 20 yesterday that the muzzle flash that you saw was on the 21 windshield near the mirror? 22 A: Yeah, around the out -- exterior 23 mirror -- driver side exterior mirror. The lower corner 24 of -- of the driver's window and up into the lower left 25 corner of the windshield.


1 So around the front left pillar, you know, 2 roof pillar, the flashes were in that -- where it all 3 comes together, the flash was in there. 4 Q: And the -- but as you said, you saw 5 no firearm whether a handgun or a long gun? 6 A: No. 7 Q: Did you see any protester with a 8 firearm that evening? 9 A: No, sir, I did not. 10 Q: Now the -- you told us that you broke 11 your -- your shield was broken, do you know, was there 12 anyone else's shield broken? 13 A: I recollect seeing at least another 14 shield on the ground because and I saw pieces of shield. 15 So it -- there had to be at least one other. 16 Q: We know that there was a second 17 shield broken but did you know about it at the time? 18 A: Just seeing a piece of shield on the 19 ground. I mean -- 20 Q: Okay. And the -- prior to this, the 21 evening of September the 6th, how long had you or -- and 22 the other officers been using these types of shields; the 23 plexiglass shield? 24 A: My -- my recollection is they were 25 issued when we took the training in the fall of '04.


1 Q: In October of 19 -- 1994? 2 A: 1994. I received that shield new in 3 the box. 4 Q: And when you were practising with the 5 shield during the training, were any of them broken? 6 A: No. No, sir, and I never remembered 7 seeing a shield get broken. 8 Q: And have you used a shield 9 afterwards? 10 A: Yes, sir. 11 Q: And in deployments with CMU? 12 A: Yeah, quite a few years later. 13 Q: Oh, okay. 14 A: Not at that time. 15 Q: Not at that time. Now, on September 16 the 5th when you went down to Forest, had you driven by 17 the sandy parking lot? Did you go down to the sandy 18 parking lot? You were asked to go to Forest, do you 19 recall on September -- 20 A: During the night of, sir? 21 Q: No. The -- on September the 5th, the 22 day before? 23 A: No, I did not, sir. 24 Q: And were you familiar with the area 25 of the sandy parking lot, East Army Camp Road and East


1 Parkway Drive? 2 A: Fairly familiar, sir. I was -- I had 3 just taken my grandparents there and I -- I knew that 4 Park. If you park there you didn't have to pay to go 5 into the Provincial Park, so. I -- I was aware that if 6 you parked out there he could walk down and use Ipperwash 7 Provincial Park without paying the day fee. 8 Q: And you had -- so you were familiar 9 with -- prior to the evening of September 6th you were 10 familiar with the -- with that area? 11 A: Yes. And I always took my family, 12 actually to the Army Camp Beach which would be just the 13 other side. 14 If you go around Matheson Drive, right 15 around the Park, and there was parking over on the army 16 beach, that you could walk in. So I spent a lot of my 17 own family picnics at either side of Ipperwash Provincial 18 Park and in -- I've camped in Ipperwash, too. 19 Q: Now, Let me show you some photos. 20 And just before I do, there's -- there's a package there 21 in the beginning. 22 The -- after September the 7th, did -- 23 were you down in this area after September the 7th? 24 A: No, sir. 25 Q: Did you go down into the area after -


1 - for the investigation, September 18th/19th? 2 A: I believe from my notes, sir, they 3 asked me to come and assist SIU Ident. But I believe I - 4 - and it's funny, because that's a different a date, I 5 briefed them of the scene and the events but I believe I 6 stayed at Forest Detachment in case they needed me. 7 I do not believe I went down to the scene. 8 Q: Okay. 9 A: I just briefed them on major events 10 so they could go and do expert exams to try to find 11 evidence. But I do not believe I went. 12 Q: And photo 21 is a photograph of the - 13 - facing west, showing East Parkway Drive and this isn't 14 the best photo, but do you recognize this scene? 15 A: Yes, sir, that would be the entrance 16 to the sandy parking lot. 17 Q: On the right? 18 A: Yeah, I mean, this would be coming up 19 Parkway Drive, the way we marched. 20 Q: Yes. 21 A: That would be the page wire fence I 22 spoke about. We -- this is when we crossed into the 23 sandy parking lot and I changed from box formation into 24 cordon. 25 When we backed up, that piece of fence was


1 the -- turn in the fence was the concern that it was 2 right behind us. That would be Army Camp Road when there 3 1 contact squad spread out and there's that kind of, I 4 called it a driveway, but that's where the left cover 5 would be kind of standing. 6 Q: So that -- 7 A: So that's where a lot of it took 8 place. 9 Q: And you're pointing to, on the left 10 hand side of the photograph 21, is a page wire fence? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: At the corner. On the right hand 13 side, lower right-hand side, is the entrance to the sandy 14 parking lot? 15 A: Right. 16 Q: And the -- and on the left hand side 17 is Army Camp Road? 18 A: Right. 19 Q: Then the next photograph is 20 photograph 22. 21 22 (BRIEF PAUSE) 23 24 Q: And this photograph is facing west, 25 showing East Parkway Drive. And can you -- at the


1 foreground on the right hand side is the entrance to the 2 sandy parking lot. 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: And the -- using this photograph, can 5 you tell us where -- when you went behind the box, where 6 the box was? 7 A: Here's the box right there, sir. I 8 was on the west side of it. I ended up using it as 9 cover, so I was on the opposite side. 10 Q: And you're pointing to the box that 11 is on the right hand side of the photograph, just -- it 12 appears to be just beyond a mail box. 13 A: By there's an entrance. 14 Q: And an entrance to a -- 15 A: The mail box -- then the box. 16 Q: And then on the right hand side of 17 the photograph are the bushes? 18 A: Yes. The officers were congregated 19 in the grassy shoulder. It looked to me like they were 20 trying to get through these bushes. They were right in 21 here. 22 Q: And you're pointing -- 23 A: When the car -- 24 Q: -- to the area between the 50 25 kilometre sign and the, what appears to be a mail box or


1 a -- 2 A: Yeah. They were on this side of that 3 -- the mail box is on the opposite side of a little 4 laneway. 5 Q: Yes. 6 A: They were just ahead of the laneway, 7 standing -- where they were struck was right there. 8 Q: Right -- just on the foreground where 9 the little laneway is? 10 A: Yes. And I think -- 11 Q: Excuse me? 12 A: I think you'll find that page wire 13 fence is like right about here. As I'd said, this 14 pavement would be about 20 -- 20/21 feet if it's -- if 15 that's it, and it'd be lucky to be a lane of grass 16 shoulder on either side, 9/10 feet. 17 That page wire fence is, like, right there 18 and the bus came out and when -- right down that. 19 Q: I'll take you to photograph 23. 20 Photograph 23 again is -- it shows the curve at Army Camp 21 Road and it says West Parkway but it's East Parkway 22 Drive. 23 And the page wire fence is the fence in 24 the -- the middle of the photograph on the left-hand side 25 of East Parkway Drive?


1 A: I -- here it is here, sir. Yeah, 2 okay, sorry. This is it. 3 Q: Do you recognize that? 4 A: Yes, that's the -- at the time this 5 is what I was referring to. A new -- we were marching 6 in. I noticed that this fence was relatively new. It 7 doesn't look that new now. And there's the -- it bent 8 around the corner so when we were lined up here and I 9 looked behind me that was the nose of the fence that gave 10 me concern. 11 Q: Okay. 12 A: And that's the -- 13 Q: And you're pointing to the fence just 14 at the corner at -- it's on the left-hand side and then 15 goes into the background of the -- the photograph? 16 A: Yes, Army Camp Road goes this way, 17 Parkway back -- back there. 18 Q: Back...? 19 A: And there's that grass shoulder right 20 here. I'd refer to it as ditch but it's -- it's really 21 a... 22 Q: And then I'm going to take you to Tab 23 -- Photo 28. 24 25 (BRIEF PAUSE)


1 Q: And this is a photo facing north on 2 Army Camp Road showing the curve at East Parkway Drive 3 and do you recognize this photograph? 4 A: So the entrance to the sandy parking 5 lot is right here? 6 Q: The entrance to the sandy parking lot 7 is -- appears to be where the shadow of the tree is 8 across the road? 9 A: Right, this is the -- what they call 10 the grassy knoll. 11 Q: And you're pointing to the right. 12 Now, there's a -- a cement block in the photograph on the 13 right-hand side; that wasn't there on the evening of 14 September the 6th. There's -- did you notice any cement 15 blocks in that -- 16 A: No, there was no cement blocks there 17 at that time. 18 Q: And the grassy knoll you were 19 pointing to is to the right of the cement block that's 20 just on the right-hand side of the -- 21 A: Yeah, I believe it -- 22 Q: -- the road? 23 A: -- it rises up a bit there -- 24 Q: Thank you. 25 A: And -- yeah.


1 Q: And actually the -- as you will see 2 in the next picture the -- that cement block is actually 3 on the far side, Commissioner, of the -- of the sandy 4 parking lot. The -- you're looking straight, 5 Commissioner, on this photograph to the -- the cottage 6 and the entrance to the cottage -- 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 8 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- down the... 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 13 Q: And this is a photograph. Do you 14 recognize this scene? It's facing north on Army Camp 15 Road, shoulder showing entrance to the -- it's called the 16 Beach Road but it's the sandy parking lot? 17 A: I believe this is Army Camp Road 18 where it bends into East Parkway Drive and there's the 19 entrance into the sandy parking lot. 20 Q: And the berm that you were talking 21 about is -- appears on the west -- 22 A: Yes, sir. 23 Q: -- the right-hand side? 24 A: There was also a -- a berm up where 25 there's a cottage.


1 Q: Pardon me? 2 A: There's -- I thought I called this a 3 grassy knoll. 4 Q: Okay. 5 A: There's a berm that goes up, what I 6 call like a sand dune. 7 Q: Along the -- 8 A: All the way -- parallel to Parkway 9 Drive and the lake there's a -- a berm or a sand dune up 10 here. 11 Q: Along the -- the border between the 12 sandy parking lot and the cottage? 13 A: Yes, it goes up. 14 Q: And -- and on the right-hand side of 15 the entrance to the sandy parking lot is what you called 16 the grassy knoll? 17 A: Yeah. This is quite a bit lower. 18 It's just a little -- 19 Q: Yeah. 20 A: -- hillock. 21 Q: And I'm now going to take you to 22 Photo 32. And in this photo there's some -- a pile of 23 sand and a cement block; again, that was not there on the 24 evening of September the 6th. But it's facing north on 25 the curve showing entrance to the beach road or the sandy


1 parking lot. 2 And do you recognize that? 3 A: Yes, that's what I call the entrance 4 to the sandy parking lot. It's where we -- as we crossed 5 into this area, I gave the cordon formation and I think 6 we could -- once you get by this fence and this crop we 7 could spread out to walk across. 8 I don't believe all that sand was there as 9 you say, and that was not there. 10 Q: And that being the sand on the right 11 hand side and the cement block on the left hand side. 12 A: It was fairly clear once we came 13 through this kind of -- this gap I was referring to, we 14 could spread out and we marched across to -- I believe 15 those poplars are in with the page wire fence. I believe 16 that's the boundary. 17 Q: The pop -- the poplars are -- run 18 along the page wire fence -- the boundaries of Provincial 19 Park? 20 A: Yes. I believe that's the actual 21 boundary to the Park. And the parking lot of course 22 bends to the left, goes down to the lake. 23 Q: And then one (1) last photograph, 24 Photograph 35. And this again shows East Parkway Drive 25 and it's identified as showing this -- north shoulder at


1 number 6842 and this photograph again shows -- 2 A: This -- this is where when the -- 3 when I split the formation, so the left side of the 4 formation would have gone to the north shoulder. So they 5 would have been standing in here ahead of that laneway 6 when they were struck. 7 Q: And ahead of the yellow -- it looks 8 line some yellow police tape? 9 A: Yeah, ahead of this yellow police 10 tape. They were in this area. I ended up on the 11 backside of that garbage container. 12 Q: And the -- and the garbage can is -- 13 you were pointing to the ground. 14 A: Yeah it's either a sand box or 15 garbage. It's a wooden -- 16 Q: Wooden -- wooden box? 17 A: Wooden box. 18 Q: And I would ask -- there's an extra 19 photo of photo 36 in the back when I'm -- I'm not going 20 to use that, so perhaps we could mark that and photo 37, 21 we're not going to use. 22 But photo 38, I'd like you to just take a 23 look at photo 38. And this is facing south on East 24 Parkway Drive showing the south shoulder at Army Camp 25 Road. Do you recognize that?


1 A: Yes. This is Parkway Drive going 2 this way. Around the bend is Army Camp going back up to 3 Highway 21. That's that fence nose or whatever that I 4 felt was in my back. 5 Q: And you're pointing to the fence that 6 -- that it turns -- curves around at the intersection of 7 Army Camp Road and East Parkway Drive? 8 A: Right. And this -- when I saw the 9 bus, it came across the pavement and just followed along 10 this grass strip. 11 Q: And the grass strip on the background 12 between the paved road and the fence? 13 A: And the -- and the officers that it - 14 - were split, the right side of the formation that was 15 split to the south were I think was just off this photo, 16 but they were standing on this grass strip up against 17 this fence. 18 Q: Up against the fence. Commissioner, 19 I'd ask that we -- these ones -- eight (8) photos, being 20 photo 21, 22, 23, 28, 31, 32, 35 and 38 be marked the 21 next exhibit. 22 THE REGISTRAR: P-1458, Your Honour. 23 24 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1458: Photographs - 0021, 0022, 25 0023, 0028, 0031, 0032, 0035


1 and 0038. 2 3 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 4 Q: Now, as I understand it, Mr. Lacroix, 5 September 6th, 1995 was the first time that you had acted 6 as a senior commander? 7 A: That's correct. 8 Q: And I also understand that September 9 6th was the first time that the CMU had been deployed 10 since it had been formed in the fall of 1994? 11 A: This was the first time that these 12 tactics had ever been used and it was the first time that 13 this new constituted Crowd Management Unit had ever been 14 deployed. 15 Q: And do you -- were you aware of any 16 training that had been given at this time for Level 2 17 Incident Commanders? By -- as of September 6th, 1995? 18 A: For CMU? 19 Q: Yeah, I meant for the CMU. 20 A: Not -- there was not a commander's 21 course for Level 2's is -- at this time. 22 Q: And did one -- was one created and 23 provided after this? 24 A: Yes, later, quite a bit later. 25 Q: Quite a bit later.


1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: Now, at Tab 50 of the book in front 4 of you... 5 A: 50? 6 Q: It's a -- it's the very last tab. 7 There's a copy of Inquiry Document 1004458. And the 8 notes that appear as part of 1004458, are those your 9 notes, sir? 10 A: No, sir. 11 Q: And they're dated August the 18th, 12 1997 and there's three (3) pages, four (4) pages and then 13 another page that -- actually six (6) pages and the 14 seventh page in is in another page dated August 18th, 15 1997. 16 Are those your notes, sir? 17 A: No, it doesn't look like my -- my 18 writing at all. It -- my... 19 Q: And the drawing at the back of the 20 page, the last page? 21 A: That looks like mine, sir. 22 Q: That's yours. And do you recall 23 meeting -- we believe that these are notes of 24 Commissioner -- from the SIU -- investigator from the 25 SIU.


1 And do you recall meeting with the 2 investigator from the SIU in August of 1997? 3 A: I do -- I do remember meeting with 4 SIU. I can't remember if that was August, after the 5 fact, like two (2) years after the fact. 6 Q: And do you recall... 7 A: I haven't got that notebook, I don't 8 think. 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 Q: Do you re -- do you recall creating 13 the drawing that's at the last page of 1004458? 14 A: I vaguely remember that there was 15 another SIU interview sometime later on my, you know, 16 some of my material from my first interview, and I 17 vaguely remember drawing this on a coffee table of almost 18 what we went through. But this is -- this is showing the 19 Crowd Management Unit in the cordon formation, I -- I 20 believe, in the sandy parking lot. 21 But it's -- it looks like I'm talking and 22 I'm -- I'm doodling while I'm talking. I'm trying to 23 explain how it happened. I've got arrows going forward 24 and arrows coming back. 25 Q: And the handwriting at the bottom,


1 Jacklin, Slomer, TRU medic, is that -- or the printing, 2 is that yours, sir? 3 A: That's mine, yes. 4 Q: And the -- the drawing at the top of 5 this drawing is the -- appears to be a tree. Can you 6 just describe what you -- what you were... 7 A: I think I'm trying to draw here is 8 that full formation punchout and we're all up back in our 9 position at the fence. And I think I'm doing all the 10 scribbling, showing that it was either the arrest team or 11 Jacklin's team that were actually doing arrests, because 12 arrests in that situation always come from the rear, and 13 how the formation would be forward, you know, looking at 14 the protesters that were back inside the Par. 15 And I think I'm drawing -- I think that's 16 a prisoner van there and all that circle, circle, circle 17 is that arrests take place on the rear of the formation. 18 I -- I believe I was just trying to show 19 them the tactic on how it works. 20 Q: And was -- and on this drawing on 21 the... 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 A: That's all, I don't know.


1 Q: Pardon me? 2 A: I just -- that's what it looks like. 3 I mean it... 4 Q: On the upper part of the drawing, do 5 you recall today what the line represents at -- near the 6 top of the page from left to right? 7 A: I could only assume it's the page 8 wire fence. 9 Q: And on the right there's a square. 10 Do you recall today what that represents? 11 A: I would assume that's the Trisel 12 dumpster. 13 Q: And to the right there's a line 14 running down from the square to the edge of the page? 15 A: Where's that, sorry? 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 A: I -- I have no idea. 20 Q: And the arrows coming straight, do 21 you recall... 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 Q: The -- the arrows that are coming


1 down, directed down? 2 A: Well, I -- I think I was showing, 3 what I testified yesterday in-chief, of this line of 4 protestors running out towards the formation and then us 5 doing a punchout. So I probably started out drawing 6 those lines and then drew the formation going forward. 7 Q: But you're -- you can't remember -- 8 A: I can't remember. I remember there 9 was a discussion. They were trying to understand, if I 10 remember correctly, how the arrest took place and I was 11 explaining the tactic that arrest -- you know, I don't 12 think they understood that we don't just stop and make 13 that arrest. 14 Like, the front Contact Squad does not 15 stop even though yes, technically it's an arrest team. 16 But on a punch-out the entire formation stays together; 17 runs 50 feet forward. We do not make arrests. Arrests 18 take place at the rear of the formation. 19 I believe that's what this discussion was 20 about. So they understood that, why there's thirty-two 21 (32) people not involved in an arrest and why their 22 attention's forward. I believe that's what this whole 23 discussion was about. 24 Q: And was this intended to depict what 25 actually happened on the evening of September the 6th?


1 A: No, I think it was a discussion on 2 how Cecil Bernard George could be arrested at the rear of 3 the formation and how three (3) squads wouldn't know 4 anything about it. 5 Q: Okay. Simply -- I would ask that we 6 just mark this part of the -- the drawing as the next 7 exhibit? 8 THE REGISTRAR: P-1459, Your Honour. 9 10 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1459: Drawing by Wade Lacroix 11 indicating Cordon formation 12 movements on September 06, 13 1995, August 18, 1997. 14 15 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 16 Q: Then please turn to your notes at Tab 17 9, Mr. Lacroix. And if you could go to page 30. 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 Q: And the notes appear to indicate -- 22 and these I think -- the -- these notes were made on 23 September the 8th, I believe you said yesterday? 24 A: Yes, the -- 25 Q: It's in the new book?


1 A: Yes, they'd the new books. That'll 2 be the 8th. 3 Q: And then at the bottom of page 30 it 4 reads: 5 "Under instructions of the IC, Incident 6 Commander, we were advised to load our 7 equipment and return to our hotels to 8 rest and await for instructions. There 9 was no debrief." 10 A: That's correct. 11 Q: And what are you referring to there? 12 A: Well, it's normal standard operating 13 procedure on any type of an event like this that the 14 Incident Commander calls a full operational debrief, you 15 know, where you call in everybody into an auditorium and 16 you go through start to finish. 17 If not you at least have all your unit 18 commanders, all the sergeants in and each of them speak 19 about what they were briefed and then what -- how the 20 plan unfolded, what they saw. What -- and from that it's 21 an op-ex experience, operational experience, we try to 22 glean the mistakes and, you know, to effect training for 23 the future. That's our best -- that's our best way to 24 effect how we do it. So -- 25 Q: So that the purpose of is to see what


1 happened, learn what went wrong, and learn from the 2 mistakes? 3 A: That's right, yes. 4 Q: Or what went wrong at any rate? 5 A: Or what went right. 6 Q: And what went right. And so there's 7 no debrief. You indicate: 8 "I asked all members [as you've told 9 us] who had discharged their firearms 10 to report to me." 11 And then: 12 "I did not seize any firearms as we 13 were still operational." 14 and then it goes on to say: 15 "At the Command Post, I turned my 16 personal firearm over to Staff Sergeant 17 Bill Dennis and went home to bed." 18 So you were off-duty at two o'clock? 19 A: Yes, sir. At that time I just wanted 20 to go home and be with my family. 21 Q: And so you went home to Petrolia? 22 A: Yes, sir. 23 Q: And I would ask that you turn to Tab 24 20 in the black book in front of you. And at page 83. 25 And this is extracts from Exhibit 426, Commissioner, of


1 the scribe notes. 2 And at 0:38 on the morning of September 3 the 7th there's an entry: 4 "Kent Skinner arrived advising he 5 brought back Wayde Lacroix. John 6 Carson had a discussion with Kent 7 Skinner about getting guns. 8 Dale Linton will seize weapons. Wade 9 Lacroix arrived. ERT, Lacroix, 10 Hebblethwaite, two (2) three (3) ERT 11 guys and four (4) TRU members, Klym, 12 Deane Beauchamp." 13 And when you -- did you travel back with 14 Kent Skinner, do you recall? 15 A: I don't recall. As I said yesterday, 16 I thought I went down in my own car. This looks like I 17 travelled back with Kent or else he travelled back with 18 me, but I don't recall that. 19 Q: You don't recall. And do you recall 20 any discussion with Kent Skinner on the way back or -- 21 A: I -- I don't remember any -- I just 22 remember being fairly traumatized, or just -- I don't 23 remember saying too much. 24 Q: Okay. And at 00:45, it's recorded, 25 Wade Lacroix to Dale Linton:


1 "There's no doubt about it, they tried 2 to kill us." 3 Do you recall having a discussion with 4 Wade -- with Inspector Linton 5 A: I don't remember that discussion but 6 I -- that was my feeling at the time. 7 Q: And do you recall -- so you don't 8 recall any discussion with Inspector Linton? 9 A: The only one I remember is walking 10 over to Bill Dennis and saying, Here's my weapon, it's 11 going to be evidence. I want you to take it because I'm 12 going home and I don't want people coming in and waking 13 me up looking for it. So could you please hold onto this 14 for me. And I left. 15 Q: Okay. And at 1:34 hours at page 85 16 which is the next page, there's an indication Wade 17 Lacroix to John Carson: 18 "We just had reports of a large number 19 of Natives from Kettle Point en route 20 to Army Camp. Went through checkpoint. 21 JOHN CARSON: We have to treat it as a 22 crime scene, but I don't want to see 23 anyone getting injured over it." 24 Do you recall having that discussion with 25 John Carson?


1 A: I must have hung around there for a 2 little bit. This is 1:34. My notes show I left at two 3 o'clock. I must have hung around the Command Post for a 4 it. I don't remember that. 5 Q: Okay. Then back at Tab 9. On 6 September the 7th it appeared that you went on duty at -- 7 at seven o'clock? 8 A: Find Tab 9. 9 Q: It's page 31, it's the second last 10 page of your notes at that Tab 9, it's Exhibit P-1448. 11 A: Yes. I -- yeah, I came back on at 12 7:00, yeah. 13 Q: And then it appears you travelled to 14 Pinery Park: 15 "Re. Meet lawyer Norm Peele. 16 8:30 arrived Pinery Park, introduced 17 ERT members to Mr. Peele. 18 09:30 moved to Pinedale Motel to be 19 interviewed by Norm Peele. Stayed with 20 TRU members. 21 Ken Deane, Mark Beauchesne, Bill Klym, 22 Brian Sharp and Kevin." 23 That would be Kevin York? 24 A: I believe so. 25 Q: "And Number 3 District ERT."


1 A: Right. 2 Q: What does that refer to? Was 3 Number -- 4 A: Those -- those three (3) -- or those 5 two (2) gentlemen were Number 3 District ERT members. 6 Q: Brian Sharp and Kevin York? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And Mr. Deane, Mr. Beauchesne and Mr. 9 Klym were TRU team members. 10 A: TRU team members. 11 Q: And the -- what was happening on 12 September 7th? What was this about? 13 A: My recollection is that I may have 14 called the duty officer -- the Association provides legal 15 counsel for the members, the non-commissioned officers 16 and the constables, which I was a non-commissioned 17 officer. 18 I was a Staff Sergeant, so I was in the 19 association. 20 Q: And you're referring to the Ontario 21 Provincial Police. 22 A: In the Ontario Provincial Police. So 23 I mean, you're supposed to, because the protocol with SIU 24 is that either the Duty Officer which can be a 25 commissioned officer, or the Detachment Commander which


1 in one sense, I was the local Detachment Commander, or 2 the Incident Commander, it's prescribed that someone 3 should call the Association and ask for legal counsel for 4 any officers that are about to be involved in an SIU 5 investigation. 6 My recollection is on the way home, or 7 before I left, I called the Association and got the Duty 8 Officer; told him that there had been a -- an incident at 9 Ipperwash, SIU had been -- I know SIU, I think, had been 10 dispatched by that time, and asked for legal counsel. 11 I can't remember if they mentioned to me 12 who it would be at that time or not, but they said -- I 13 believe I was involved because they said where would this 14 person meet? And I said -- because I knew -- because I 15 was the Detachment Commander at the whole County for a 16 bit, since the opening of Grand Bend, the old Pinery Park 17 Detachment had become like somewhat mothballed and I knew 18 Forest would not be a good place, because it was the 19 command post. They had a lot of activity. 20 I believe when I called the Duty Officer, 21 I said, There had been an incident, we'll need legal 22 counsel for the Members of the Association. And they 23 said, Well, where could this lawyer meet you? And I 24 said, Well, we could meet at the Pinery Park because it's 25 a basically not used Detachment.


1 And they said, Okay, what time? I believe 2 I must have said 8:30. Have -- have the lawyer meet in 3 there and then they can talk to each individual officer 4 involved before SIU interview them. 5 Q: And the lawyer was Normal Peele? 6 A: It was Norm Peele that showed up. I 7 don't remember talking to Norm over the night. It was 8 Norm that showed up at the Pinery. 9 Q: And then at 9:30: 10 "Moved to Pinedale Motel to be 11 interviewed by Norm Peele." 12 So you moved to the Pinedale Motel? 13 A: Yeah, and I don't -- somehow that 14 must have came to us, because I certainly didn't book the 15 Pinedale. It came to us that you will move to the 16 Pinedale, so that must have been where either SIU or CIB 17 said this is where you will -- this is where you will go 18 to await SIU. 19 So somehow in there, you know, this was 20 just getting -- I think I picked Pinery as well because I 21 knew all the officers were staying in those motels in 22 that immediate area. TRU team was staying right in 23 Pinery Park; this Detachment's right out the front gate, 24 and I think the ERT members were in close proximity. 25 So we had that quick meeting and somehow


1 it -- we got a message to -- as I got here, move to 2 Pinedale Motel to be interviewed. But I should have 3 said, instead of interviewed by Norm Peele, it would have 4 been interviewed by SIU because I think that's the 5 direction was to go there and await SIU. 6 Q: Okay. And when did you learn that 7 someone had died? 8 A: Sometime during that day watching the 9 -- well, actually, I watched the news. But, no, when I 10 did learn it's -- it's not in my notes, but why my notes 11 go 07:00, even though I tried to give my weapon over and 12 to try to get at least a couple of hours sleep, I got 13 woken up by, I believe, a member of the Petrolia 14 Detachment and told to go back up north that -- to be 15 interviewed. 16 And I believe I might have known that 17 there was a fatality then. 18 Q: During the night? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And the -- did you learn of the 21 fatality, do you recall, before leaving the Command Post 22 or Forest at two o'clock? 23 A: No. No, not at two o'clock, no. 24 Q: And -- 25 A: And then when I got to Pinedale, of


1 course, we're sitting in the room, I remember seeing the 2 car and the bus, and I think it was announced on the news 3 already that this gentleman by the name of Dudley George 4 had -- was deceased. 5 Q: And did you know Dudley George prior 6 to September the 6th, 1995? 7 A: No, sir, never met. 8 Q: And had you received any information 9 about Dudley George before September 6th, 1995? 10 A: No, sir. 11 Q: Then the -- I would ask you to turn 12 to Tab... 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 Q: ...24. And at Tab 24 is a copy of 17 Exhibit P-1361. And the -- this is a telephone call 18 that's logged in at 18:45 hours on September 7th and so 19 it perhaps needs seven (7) minutes added to it. 20 And just so that everyone understands 21 there is a -- this is when the conversation starts with 22 Brian Deevy. There's a three (3) minute call just -- 23 that this is part of where it appears Mr. Lacroix is, 24 Commissioner, is phoning in and is waiting to speak to 25 Mr. Deevy.


1 And then Mr. Deevy comes on the line at 2 this point and that's what we've created the -- the 3 transcript for and that's what I'm about to play. 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 Q: I'm just going to start it again at 8 the beginning, Commissioner. 9 10 (AUDIOTAPE PLAYED, TRANSCRIPT TO FOLLOW) 11 12 [WL = Staff Sergeant Wade Lacroix] 13 [BD = Staff Sergeant Brian Deevy] 14 [AA= Andrew Archibald Comm. Operator] 15 16 BD Hello. 17 WL: Deeve why are you always talking? 18 BD Me?! 19 WL: Yeah. 20 BD: Okay. 21 WL: Listen Buddy... 22 BD: Yeah? 23 WL: ...I'm here with Tex and the boys. 24 BD: Yeah - Waddie! 25 WL: Yeah, it's the Wad!


1 BD: [laughs] How are you Bud? 2 WL: Sorry to get you into this Deevs 3 BD: No, that's fine. 4 WL: Listen Buddy. 5 BD: Yeah 6 WL: What's the - we want to know what the 7 injuries are. From the autopsy 8 [inaudible]. 9 BD: I don't know - one guy got shot in the ass 10 I understand? 11 ??: [background] Yeah. 12 BD: Do we know spec - specifically what the 13 injuries were on the three -ah - targets 14 - suspects? 15 ??: [background] I don't know... 16 [inaudible] 17 ...shot in the back or the ass 18 BD: [speaking to someone on premises] Oh yeah, 19 that was the guy shot in the ass. [back to 20 main phone conversation] I heard that one 21 guy had a - some type of head injury, but 22 I'm not sure if I heard this in the press, 23 or where I heard it. And the other guy I 24 heard got shot in the chest. Umm - the 25 left side of the chest, above the heart.


1 Two - two shots. That's what I heard. Yeah 2 I don't know where I heard it, and it 3 could be a crock of shit. 4 WL: And you don't know what the autopsy 5 results are or - 6 BD: I don't know that yet. And - and as far as 7 the type of round or anything, they don't 8 know that yet. 9 WL: Okay. 10 BD: You have to wait for that. 11 WL: We don't - we don't know yet. 12 BD: We don't know. 13 WL: Injuries are - to -like we heard - in the 14 chest. 15 BD: [interrupting] That's speculation. Like, 16 that' what I heard, but - I don't I 17 couldn't even tell you who I heard it 18 from. 19 WL: Yeah, I heard that too. Two in the chest 20 ... I heard sucking chest wound and I 21 heard a - You heard an ass shot - I heard 22 a kidney shot. The one guy. 23 BD: Okay. 24 WL: Like a crease job. 25 BD: Like that - some kind of head injury. But


1 that guy got out. 2 WL: [inaudible] ...some kind of head injury... 3 BD: So it couldn't have been that serious. 4 WL: ... got out... [inaudible] 5 BD: He's released. Yeah. Or he's - I guess 6 maybe he's still in the hospital but he's 7 not serious. 8 WL: The other two are going to live. But then 9 Dudley of course, is gone, right? 10 BD: Right. 11 WL: Dudley only had two holes on him? 'Cause I 12 think a lot of us - [inaudible] ...I think 13 he was the guy in the car. He got hit by 14 [inaudible] 15 BD: [interrupting] Well I heard that - 16 somebody said that he was lit up by a 17 light. And he got shot - a lot. But then, 18 I heard from somebody that there were two 19 rounds in the chest. And then, I saw a 20 native being interviewed, and he said he 21 got shot in the chest, he was really 22 pumping out in the chest area with ah a 23 very serious wound so. I could - I don't 24 know. 25 WL: So what's happening now, Deev?


1 BD: Well, there's a lot of activity, a fair 2 bit of activity during the day. There's 3 natives coming in from all over the place. 4 There's weapons speculated to be coming in 5 from all over the place. There's ah - I 6 think a hundred, a hundred and fifty 7 warriors coming in from -umm - Oneida 8 area. There's a big warrior meeting in the 9 afternoon where they planned their 10 strategy. All the different bands are 11 united now where they never were before. 12 There's some people coming in from 13 Cornwall, there's people coming in from 14 Oka, there's two busloads coming in from 15 the States. All kinds of weapons. Ah -they 16 did intercept one vehicle outside of 17 London. Pulled it over. Two warriors 18 inside. A trunk full of guns. So those two 19 were arrested. So we did ah - you know we 20 got overrun at one point today? 21 WL: Yeah, the TOC. 22 BD: Well, we got information that ah - I guess 23 they ah - had a line tapped or something 24 and this is real good information that one 25 of their plans was if they could get


1 enough people in, they were going to get 2 behind our position and cut us off. And 3 have their way with us. At the different 4 checkpoints. And the TOC was especially 5 vulnerable. So we heard that and we 6 instructed the TOC to tear down and move 7 back because we really weren't serving any 8 useful purpose where they were... 9 WL: Right. 10 BD: ...at that point. Well, obviously they 11 monitored our communications because as 12 soon as that was broadcast, they just 13 converged on the TOC location in the 14 process of us tearing it down. Probably 15 about forty or fifty of them. They were 16 dropping off two men fire teams. No 17 weapons seen but just the way they 18 deployed in the bush. Like - it was like 19 a - 20 WL: Military? 21 BD: ...planned attack almost. You know? So we 22 bugged out and then ended up leaving a 23 fair bit of equipment behind just to get 24 out of there. Because we thought they 25 might have guns. Based on what we heard. I


1 think the guys that were pulled out 2 weren't too impressed because they took a 3 lot of verbal abuse and you know the 4 Indians were spittin' on them and 5 everything else as they pulled back. But 6 they got out and that was our main 7 objective at that point. 8 WL: How many cruisers did we lose? 9 BD: We left the ERT TOC - was left behind, I 10 guess. 11 WL: Yeah. 12 BD: ...That big - ah - 13 WL: [interjects] Van 14 BD: ...Command - that big van they had there. 15 Umm. The Essex prisoner van. 16 WL: Yeah 17 BD: ...was left behind. 18 WL: All torched? 19 BD: Naw. I think they moved that to the - ah 20 Base because they've heard sirens going 21 off at the base so they think they got the 22 Essex prisoner van on the base now. 23 ??: Or the ATV 24 BD: Or the ATV. I guess that has sirens too. 25 There's two AV- ATV - marked ATV's. That -


1 they could be over there too. Its hard to 2 say. So I don't know what they've ah - but 3 I - but we left a fair bit of equipment - 4 we did get out of there. That was the plan 5 and we pulled back quite a bit because we 6 wanted to make sure that they couldn't - 7 they couldn't close in on any particular 8 checkpoint. They wanted - we picked - we 9 picked checkpoints with lots of escape 10 routes but the problem is we now have 11 pulled back enough that they really can 12 get in there without us seeing them. So 13 they really have free access now to Kettle 14 Point. And to the base, and to the Park. 15 And they don't go by us. If they know 16 where they're going. Most of them do. Also 17 the press have free access. And the press 18 - are right in there. Like dirty shirts. 19 We've seen - we've gathered - probably 20 most of our hard intelligence from 21 watching - not listening 'cause they're 22 really biased of course in their 23 editorials. But just from their - their 24 video footage. We saw the bus on TV. And 25 the car and everything else. And that was


1 the first time we saw those things. I'm 2 sure you've seen that too. 3 WL: There it is right now. Recap. 4 BD: Yeah. 5 WL: Okay. So - 6 BD: [interrupting] So we've pulled back - 7 really - we're maintaining observation 8 umm- depending upon how they come in. You 9 know. They're probably going to run into a 10 checkpoint, but if they know where they're 11 going - they can get around, and in, 12 without running into a checkpoint. 13 WL: We're not going to avoid - set up so they 14 can't? 15 BD: Well, the - the - I know what you - you 16 probably heard that at one point there was 17 about two hundred of them walking down the 18 road? 19 WL: Yeah 20 BD: To - to the base. To show support or 21 whatever. A decision had to be made. The 22 decision basically was - we'll - we'll ask 23 them to stop but if ah- if there's going 24 to be a major confrontation to get them to 25 stop - we'll let them go in. So they


1 allowed that to happen. Because it would 2 have been - and - and at that point 3 actually we didn't have enough to stop 4 them There's two hundred of them coming 5 in. It - it would have - we would have 6 been run over. Like we would not have - we 7 would have picked a fight that we couldn't 8 win. 9 WL: I wonder what's the government saying. 10 BD: Ahh - I don't know what the government's 11 saying. I really don't know what the 12 government's saying. 13 WL: [inaudible] Ovide Mercredi's in 14 BD: Yeah, he's - he's in there. 15 WL: They're meeting tonight to try and resolve 16 it. 17 ?? [unknown - in background] Oh really?! 18 WL: [inaudible] I heard we're going to have a 19 bad night though. 20 BD: Well, tonight, things could be rough. Now, 21 in anticipation of this, ah - Rick's been 22 kind of running the ERT side. I've been on 23 the TRU - TRU side. Anyway we've got ah - 24 WL: Rick? 25 BD: Rick Derus.


1 WL: Okay. 2 BD: We've got eight ERT teams in here now. 3 WL: Right. 4 BD: Four on the days, four on the nights. So 5 we've got a full CMU standing by to 6 respond. 7 WL: Who's the leader of that? 8 BD: Umm - I think Huntley? 9 WL: Oh, Huntley is? 10 BD: I think he is. Umm - [speaking to someone 11 off the phone line] Who's the leader of 12 the CMU on the night shift? 13 AA: That we haven't decided. That's - someone 14 from Nine or Ten District. 15 BD: Okay. We don't know yet. We've also got 16 two other full ERT teams and also a pretty 17 good number of uniforms. So uniform 18 checkpoints are all manned by uniforms 19 obviously. But each one have support by 20 ERT and the ERT guys are starting to 21 deploy into the bush. So the uniforms are 22 out, and they're visible but they have - 23 they have ERT guys on the ground doing 24 observation so they have - they won't get 25 snuck up on. And ah - then we have like a


1 full ERT just to sort of hang and -hang 2 loose and do whatever needs to be done, 3 two full ERT teams, a CMU at the - Command 4 Post here - everything's out of here now 5 so we don't have a separate TOC anymore. 6 WL: 'kay. 7 BD: And ah - our coms are going to be great 8 for TRU. We've done all kinds of tests 9 during the day and we've got our repeaters 10 set up with antennas in our grey van. And 11 comms are really good. 12 WL: Oh good. 13 BD: We're on our own channel now. 14 WL: So Woody and the boys down too? 15 BD: Yeah, they're down. We've got all - 16 everybody down. We're bringing all the 17 recruits down. By the time we've got 18 everybody down here, we'll have thirty-six 19 people here. We'll have eighteen on days 20 and eighteen on afternoons. Shifts are 21 running eight to eight. I've been up for 22 about 36 hours now so I'm gonna - 23 WL: Deev, go to bed will you?! 24 BD: ...go to bed in about two minutes. 25 WL: Okay. I'll leave you alone.


1 BD: No problem. How're you doing? 2 WL: I'm doing all right. 3 BD: How'd it go? Everything okay? 4 WL: I think it went - under the circumstances 5 - ah - it couldn't - it could - I mean - 6 BD: Sounds like a - 7 WL: ...political side - it couldn't have been 8 better. 9 BD: I think you're right! 10 WL: Ah 11 BD: I think - we're getting beat up in the 12 press Big Time. I think we could have 13 handled the press a little better there. 14 Personally. 15 WL: I was out there man and boys - both down 16 in TRU and the CMU like - it was very 17 professional. 18 BD: Yeah. 19 WL: We took a barrage of rocks, we repulsed a 20 full attack - about fifteen-twenty with 21 clubs. Guy broke my shield right in half 22 with a steel pole. I cold-cocked him. 23 BD: Good! 24 WL: Few boys - we hammered - we hammered them 25 - like we cut'em down - like [inaudible]


1 with the sticks. 2 BD: Good. 3 WL: And then I guess we finally realized we 4 got their leader, they're a little choked 5 then. 6 WL: I think they were setting us up. 7 They wanted it - they wanted it. 8 BD: [interrupting] Sure they did. This - them 9 - I'm sure they're all wailing and 10 everything but this is the best thing - as 11 far as they're concerned - that could ever 12 happen. They've taken the limelight away 13 from Hundred Mile House, squarely on 14 Ipperwash. Ah - one of the guys are saying 15 that his mother-in-law in Florida - its 16 front page news in Florida. Its Big News, 17 everywhere. Its what they want. But ummm - 18 WL: One of the TRU guys stepped in - and you 19 know. They were going to mow us down. And 20 we had to take them out. We took out 21 Dudley George who's a jerk. [inaudible] 22 BD: So TRU stepped in, to support CMU, who 23 were under fire? 24 WL: Yeah, we... 25 BD: [interrupting] And then - and then -


1 WL: You know that I fired, you know I fired 2 too eh? 3 BD: Yeah 4 WL: [inaudible] 5 BD: I guess maybe we should talk about this 6 face to face. 7 WL: Yeah. 8 BD: Okay. 9 WL: Well, [inaudible] 10 BD: Huh? 11 WL: Taped? 12 ??: [someone near the phones] ...on the taped 13 line? 14 BD: [spoken to someone away from the 15 telephone] Yeah, yeah. Yeah. Okay. Yeah, 16 yeah. [back to main telephone 17 conversation] So, anyways, we'll get 18 together. And - don't leave yet because 19 other people want to talk to ya. But ah - 20 are you coming back in tonight - or later? 21 WL: I want to talk here to somebody 22 BD: Ah - your buddy? 23 WL: Yeah. 24 BD: Okay. That's good. Okay, Waddie, I'll see 25 you whenever you get in, I'll be here for


1 a while. Okay? 2 WL: 'kay. 3 BD: Talk to you later. So hang on. 4 WL: Thanks. 5 AA: Waddie. 6 WL: Yes. 7 AA: You talk to Mrs. Waddie? 8 WL: How long ago? 9 AA: Umm - since first thing this morning. 10 WL: Yeah, I called her about five. 11 AA: Okay, good. 'Cause she was quite concerned 12 this morning 13 WL: Oh. 14 AA: 'Cause she got fed some wrong information 15 so she was a little concerned. 16 WL: Oh. 17 AA: And so I alleviated that concern but I 18 told her the first time I saw you I would 19 have you call and I haven't seen you. I 20 just wanted to make sure you had been in 21 touch. 22 WL: Yeah, I called about five o'clock. 23 AA: Okay! 24 WL: Okay? 25 AA: Sorry to bother you.


1 WL: No. This line's on the reel to reel, is 2 it? 3 AA: Yup. 4 WL: Is it? 5 AA: Yup. Next time call 1262. 6 WL: 'kay. 7 AA: Okay? 8 WL: Okay. 9 AA: And then you won't have that problem. 10 WL: 'kay. 11 AA: Okay? 12 WL: All right. 13 AA: All right-y. 14 WL: 'kay. Bye. 15 AA: Bye. 16 17 End of Conversation 18 19 (AUDIOTAPE CONCLUDED) 20 21 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 22 Q: Now, the voices that are heard on 23 this transmission and this telephone call, the tape, are 24 your voice? 25 A: Yes, sir.


1 Q: Brian Deevy? 2 A: Yes, sir. 3 Q: And Brian Deevy was a staff sergeant 4 at the time? 5 A: Barrie TRU team, yes. 6 Q: And he was the leader of the Barrie 7 TRU team? 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 Q: And I think it's Andrew Archibald, 10 the Communications Operator? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And at Tab -- at page 4, there is an 13 "XX" on this transcript but it appears that that was 14 spoken by Brian Deevy; that whole paragraph, do you 15 recall? 16 A: Oh, yeah. 17 Q: So if we could change the "XX" on 18 page 4 to BD. And then on page 8 the fifth set of 19 initials down, it says, "BD". 20 "I think they were setting us up". 21 But I believe that was you? 22 A: That was me, yes. 23 Q: And if we could change that on the 24 transcript from "BD" to WL; that's page 8 of 10. The 25 fifth set of initials down, WL:


1 "I think they were setting us up." 2 Now, the... 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 Q: And I'm -- Ms. Newell indicates that 7 on the first line -- at the second line, "Hello", then 8 "WL", where it says, "It's the Inquiry", a voice talking, 9 that -- it should be: 10 "Deeve, why are you always talking?" 11 A: Right. 12 Q: Is that what you heard? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: So we could change that to, "Deeve, 15 why are you always talking"? 16 A: That -- yeah, that's what was said. 17 Q: Okay. Then on page 2... 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 Q: On page 3 in the third paragraph 22 down: 23 "BD: Well I heard that somebody said 24 he was lit up by a light and it may 25 have been lit up by lightning --


1 lighting -- lit up by lighting." 2 Lightning? 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 Q: Well, perhaps -- what I'll do is I'll 7 check that -- that particular one at the next break, 8 Commissioner, and... 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 Q: And on page 4 how many -- where it 13 says, "WL" the second entry: 14 "How many cruisers were there?" 15 It was: 16 "How many cruisers did we lose?" 17 Did you hear that? 18 A: That was I what I thought the 19 inference but... 20 Q: So it should be: 21 "How many cruisers did we lose?" 22 Now, where were you calling from, Mr. 23 Lacroix, when you made this call? 24 A: I was in my motel room at the 25 Pinedale Motel in Grand Bend.


1 Q: And who were you with? 2 A: My notes indicate that I was with Ian 3 McGregor who was the peer counsellor, traumatic -- post 4 traumatic counsellor. 5 Q: And anyone else? 6 A: No that I can remember. I -- I 7 remember prior to this passing out on my bed, a knock at 8 the door, and it was Ian MacGregor who was a trauma 9 counsellor. My notes show he came into my room at 16:00. 10 I mean did I call to some of the other -- 11 because we were -- all the people that had fired were 12 sent to Pinedale; at least I know that many. So did I 13 call them to let them know the peer counsellor was here 14 at the hotel, because also it was part of the protocol 15 that they be given an opportunity. I cannot recall if I 16 did or I didn't. 17 But Ian MacGregor shows to be in my room 18 right until I go home. I make this phone call at 18:45 19 and fifteen (15) minutes later I leave and go home -- 20 Q: Okay. Perhaps -- 21 A: -- to Petrolia. 22 Q: Perhaps to assist you it hadn't been 23 my intention to play the first part of this call but I'm 24 going to play -- we don't have a transcript for it but 25 I'm going to play the first part of the call before Brian


1 Deevy got on the phone. And I would ask you to listen, 2 Mr. Lacroix, because you will hear some voices in the 3 background. 4 Now, you'll hear voices in the background 5 on both sides of the call. There'll be voices in the 6 background on your side of the call and I believe 7 there'll be voices in the background on the other side of 8 the call. 9 A: Okay. 10 Q: And this call, the time I have for it 11 is 18:42:37. It's approximately a minute long, but I 12 think it's a little longer than that and I'll just play 13 it now. 14 15 (AUDIOTAPE PLAYED, TRANSCRIPT TO FOLLOW) 16 (AUDIOTAPE STOPPED) 17 18 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 19 Q: And you can hear the voices in that 20 point are voices on the Command Post side -- 21 A: The Command -- Command Post. 22 Q: -- of the call. 23 A: Right. 24 Q: And that's your voice asking for 25 Brian Deevy?


1 A: Yes. 2 3 (AUDIOTAPE CONTINUED, TRANSCRIPT TO FOLLOW) 4 (AUDIOTAPE STOPPED) 5 6 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 7 Q: So at that point you're put on hold? 8 A: Right. 9 10 (AUDIOTAPE CONTINUED, TRANSCRIPT TO FOLLOW) 11 (AUDIOTAPE STOPPED) 12 13 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 14 Q: And it appears that you're talking to 15 someone in -- in the room? Do you recognize the voice in 16 the background? 17 A: I mean to -- 18 Q: You'll hear another -- 19 A: Okay. 20 Q: -- we'll play it some more. 21 22 (AUDIOTAPE CONTINUED, TRANSCRIPT TO FOLLOW) 23 (AUDIOTAPE STOPPED) 24 25 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR:


1 Q: You also hear a TV in the background. 2 A: Yeah I think that's what caused the 3 conversation. 4 5 (AUDIOTAPE CONTINUED, TRANSCRIPT TO FOLLOW) 6 (AUDIOTAPE STOPPED) 7 8 THE WITNESS: That's the news, right? 9 10 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 11 Q: Yeah what you're hearing at this 12 point is the news in the background, there's news on a 13 television. 14 15 (AUDIOTAPE CONTINUED, TRANSCRIPT TO FOLLOW) 16 (AUDIOTAPE CONCLUDED) 17 18 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 19 Q: Do you recognize the voice in the 20 background? 21 A: The one voice sounds like Ian 22 McGregor and I can't be 100 percent sure but one might 23 have been Mark Beauchesne. 24 Q: And perhaps what we'll do at the 25 break, Commissioner, is -- I -- I've got a pair of


1 earphones that are better and I'll ask Mr. Lacroix to -- 2 to listen to it. 3 Does that assist you with who you were 4 with when this call was made? 5 A: Well as I say, it -- when Ian 6 McGregor showed up and his job is to provide service as a 7 peer counsellor, he showed up at my room. It's very -- I 8 can't remember calling other members, but I would have -- 9 it's very possible I would notify them the peer 10 counsellor is here. 11 And they could come to my room and of 12 course if they want to talk to him in private, you know, 13 he was there for, I've got four (4) hours. So it's very 14 possible that some of them come over. 15 Most would have known Ian McGregor but I 16 don't know if the younger ones would know Ian. He had 17 been TRU team way back in the early '80's, so I don't 18 know if they knew him. 19 Q: And the -- he, Mr. McGregor's role 20 was to give counselling to the members who had been 21 involved in the incident? 22 A: That's right. 23 Q: And was he a psychologist? 24 A: No. He is one of the -- he -- the 25 next day, Dr. Hoath, the psycho -- the Force psychologist


1 showed up, or else he could have even come down with Ian, 2 I'm not sure. 3 But I didn't see the Force psychologist 4 until the following day. But Ian works with the 5 psychologist as a peer counsellor. 6 Q: I see. 7 A: They do have training. 8 Q: Yes. 9 A: It's usually somebody who has been in 10 a traumatic event themself, so they know how to relate. 11 Q: And you indicate to Mr. Deevy: 12 "I'm here with Tex and the boys." 13 A: Yeah. And I don't know if that 14 inference wasn't that -- I'm sure being the duty TRU team 15 leader, as he goes on later about this is the status, he 16 would know that one whole element of the London team was 17 missing. 18 So I could be just saying I'm at the 19 Pinedale Hotel. But the co-ordinator for all TRU would 20 know one of his elements is -- is gone somewhere. 21 Like... 22 Q: Was Mr. Deevy the coordinator for all 23 of TRU? 24 A: I believe that on day shift, yes. 25 Q: And the -- then you go on to say:


1 "What's that? We want to know what the 2 injuries are from the autopsy." 3 A: Yeah. That's actually -- that's -- 4 well, it's an inappropriate word to use. That's not 5 really what I meant. We're sitting in a room watching 6 this on the news. They're showing the bullet holes in 7 the cars and the bus, giving out that one's dead, one's 8 injured. 9 What I was really looking for was the 10 ballistics released. And what I was after was, from the 11 ballistics you could simply tell the officers, all the 12 officers that were there, who was a subject officer and 13 who was a witness officer, because up to that point we 14 had -- nobody had come over, no one had spoken to us and 15 nobody had indicated to us that. 16 And the part of the protocol is by, I 17 think, twenty-four (24) hours, now it's not twenty-four 18 (24) hours yet, somebody is supposed to tell us that. 19 So I think we're sitting around watching 20 all this stuff on news and we're going, if they've got 21 all that out, they got pictures of the cars and pictures 22 of the bus and they knew how this one is dead and one is 23 injured, why don't we know, you know, why don't we know 24 who shot, because we're supposed to give notice -- be 25 given notice, because there are, obviously, different --


1 there are different -- you're treated in a different way 2 as a subject officer from a witness officer. 3 So that, I remember, was the discussion. 4 So it sounds pretty ghoulish there, but I wasn't looking 5 for an autopsy report. 6 Q: But you were -- so the person who 7 discharged his weapon, or her weapon, but in this case 8 his weapon, that was fatal, was an officer who would be a 9 subject officer? 10 A: It was 1:38 there, that night. My -- 11 if the deceased died from a .38 round, I was the subject 12 officer. 13 Q: And the -- at page 2 you again ask: 14 "And you don't know what the autopsy 15 results are?" 16 A: Yeah. Again, I think Brian picks up 17 on what I'm saying 'cause then he comes out and says as 18 far as the type of round, he -- I think he knew... 19 Q: But he says: 20 "As far as the type of round or 21 anything, they don't know that yet." 22 A: Right. So I go: 23 "Okay." 24 Q: And then -- 25 A: "You'll have to -- you'll have to


1 wait for that." 2 Q: Then you go on to say: 3 "Injuries are to, like we heard, in the 4 chest?" 5 And where did you hear that, sir? 6 A: It was on, like he said, there was 7 interviews, like I couldn't believe it. I knew -- it was 8 really strange because we knew we didn't have the crime 9 scene. 10 We had too much press. We're sitting in a 11 room waiting for SIU and there's all kinds of media. 12 They're showing the car all shot up, the bus all shot up. 13 14 But we know SIU doesn't have the crime 15 scene, yet it's out that a man's dead and how he died and 16 we're sitting in a room going, That's nice. 17 Q: And at this point, no one had told 18 you anything? 19 A: No, sir. 20 Q: And so what you're getting is what 21 you -- the information you're receiving is what's on the 22 television? 23 A: Yeah. What I -- and just so you know 24 what I was looking for, I mean it was a poor, poor choice 25 of words to say an autopsy report.


1 But if the ballistics was known, I was 2 really looking for that official. Like, you know, where 3 I was going with that is like, are we ready to -- is 4 somebody going to release, you know, what happened, like, 5 officially, instead of all of this? 6 Q: And then the -- there's a discussion 7 about the other wounds, the one (1) guy you say: 8 "Like a crease job." 9 And where did you get that information? 10 A: I think, again, I think there was 11 quite a bit on the news. 12 We're sitting there watching -- I think in 13 one place here I say, Hey, they're going to recap again. 14 We're there watching it. 15 Q: And -- 16 A: Picking up bits and pieces of what... 17 Q: And -- and the other -- at the bottom 18 of page: 19 "The other two (2) are going to live 20 but then Dudley of course is gone, 21 right?" 22 A: Right. 23 Q: And then at the top of page 3 Brian 24 Deevy says: 25 "Right.


1 WADE LACROIX: Dudley only had two (2) 2 holes on him because I think a lot of 3 us [and it was inaudible] I think he 4 was the guy in the car. He got hit by 5 [and it's inaudible]." 6 And at this point in time you thought that 7 Dudley George had been in the car? 8 A: Absolutely. I had not heard of any 9 man on the road. I knew nothing of a man on the road. I 10 mean in the sense of that -- that's who was believed to 11 be shot. 12 I believe the general discussion was, 13 because you started to pick -- pick up or you knew that a 14 lot of fire went into the car, I think those couple of 15 people there we figured that Dudley George, who I did not 16 know, never met, I was almost 100 percent sure Dudley 17 George was the driver of that car. 18 Q: And the person you were firing at? 19 A: Yes. And so when I said -- I want to 20 say to Sam right now when I made that comment about 21 Dudley being a jerk I didn't know Dudley, but I was 22 referring to the fact that the guy who drove into my 23 people in front of me with a car, that's what I felt at 24 that time, and I did not know the true circumstances. 25 So when I made that reference my entire


1 conversation, I think the driver of the car is deceased. 2 Q: And then you -- 3 A: Which would make me a subject 4 officer. 5 Q: Would make you a subject officer. 6 And the -- then you go on to -- at page 5 at the top: 7 "There it is..." 8 Brian Deevy's talking about the video 9 coverage: 10 "We saw the bus on TV and the car and 11 everything else and that was the first 12 time we saw those things. I'm sure you 13 seen that too. 14 WADE LACROIX: There it is right now, 15 recap." 16 And that's what you're referring to on the 17 television? 18 A: We were watching -- we were going 19 through the channels watching all this so-called evidence 20 which we later find out isn't evidence. 21 Q: And then down the page: 22 "WADE LACROIX: I wonder what the 23 Government's saying?" 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And Brian Deevy:


1 "I don't know what the Government's 2 saying. I really don't know what the 3 Government's saying." 4 And why were you asking about the 5 Government? 6 A: Because who also came into our hotel 7 when we were staying at the Pinedale Hotel was all the 8 government officials including Ovide Mercredi, showed up 9 at the hotel and went into a back room and had some kind 10 of ceremony. 11 So I knew that high level -- to me this 12 whole thing takes the Federal, Provincial, and First 13 Nations government. It's not a police matter. We can 14 never solve this. 15 And I saw them come into the hotel and I 16 was glad and I realized they had some kind of a 17 consultation going on in there and I was hoping that 18 something was going to come out that, that police 19 officers were going to get pulled off the line. 20 Q: And so you indi -- you saw going into 21 the Pinedale Motel, who you thought Ovide Mercredi? 22 A: Yeah. 23 Q: Do you recognize anyone else? 24 A: Chris -- Chief Coles, our chief was 25 there. Tony Parkin showed up. I believe I saw -- I


1 don't know -- I can't remember if Marcel Beaubien was 2 there, but there was I -- Federal representatives and 3 they went -- 4 Q: How do know they were Federal 5 representatives? 6 A: Well, I shouldn't say, just a bunch 7 of suits showed up with -- and there was a whole bunch of 8 people down in the room having a big conflab about how to 9 resolve this and I was -- my political interest was, 10 good. 11 Q: But when you said they were having a 12 big conflab about how to resolve this how did you know 13 that? 14 A: Because I went around and peaked in 15 the window. 16 Q: And you saw the people were in the 17 room talking? 18 A: I saw them sitting in a big circle 19 passing the eagle feather and talking. 20 Q: Okay. Then on page 7: 21 "WADE LACROIX: Political side. It 22 couldn't have been better. 23 BRIAN DEEVY: I think you're right." 24 And what were you referring to there? 25 A: Well, I guess there was a sense of


1 frustration on the police that we -- we'd been dealing 2 with this all, like, right up from West Ipperwash Beach 3 all the way through. We were not the ones that could 4 resolve this. 5 So I think we were saying okay, Finally, 6 finally our political masters are here to try to solve 7 this land claim which should have been solved probably 8 back in the '40's so I think we were talking about good. 9 Q: And the -- then on the next page, on 10 page 8, is the comment that you've just referred to. 11 "WADE LACROIX: One (1) of the TRU 12 guys stepped in -- and you know. They 13 were going to mow us down and we had to 14 take them out. We took out Dudley 15 George who's a jerk." 16 And that's the reference you just referred 17 to? 18 A: Yeah I -- I thought that Dudley 19 George was the driver of the car. 20 Q: And the -- then on page -- 21 A: The "mow us down" part I was 22 referring to I think like the car's running into the 23 officers. 24 Q: Okay. And then you wanted to -- on 25 page 9 you're asking:


1 "I want to talk here to somebody. Your 2 buddy." 3 What are you referring to there? 4 A: Well I'm letting him know I have to 5 stay. I haven't been interviewed by SIU. And -- 6 Q: Pardon me? 7 A: I haven't been interviewed -- 8 Q: Okay. 9 A: -- I have to wait for SIU. I'm still 10 waiting. 11 Q: Okay. 12 A: He said, When are you coming over, 13 was it? He wanted me to come over to the Command Post. 14 I said, No, I'm basically still sitting at the hotel 15 waiting for investigators. 16 Q: Okay. And then on page 10 there's a 17 -- you asked: 18 "This line's on reel to reel? 19 Yep [Mr. Archibald says]." 20 You say: 21 "Is it? 22 Mr. Archibald, says: 23 "Yep, next time call 1262." 24 And then down he says: 25 "And then you won't have that problem."


1 And why were you concerned, if you were, 2 about the lines being taped? 3 A: Well, I just say, in normal practice 4 before this call, it was always that there was one (1) 5 line that you called in to do briefings on and get 6 briefings, a recap and all that. 7 I mean, like I say they didn't lock out 8 every line. I'm not saying my phone call was 9 appropriate. I'm not saying that. 10 It's just that if I wanted to talk to 11 another officer during this whole call about my wife or - 12 - or whatever, there was always other lines. But it 13 seemed that on this call, every single line to the 14 Detachment was put on tape. 15 But I don't think everybody knew every 16 single line was put on tape. Because normally the 17 Incident Commander's line, because all info going in and 18 all info coming out and that's what the scribe does. It 19 only records what is said to the Incident Commander and 20 backs, so you could still carry on. 21 Not saying this is normal life but you 22 could carry on a normal conversation about fishing that 23 wasn't on the main taped line. 24 Q: And when did you learn your status as 25 a witness officer as opposed to a subject officer?


1 A: I was the last to be interviewed the 2 following day, and at no time even at that interview was 3 I told I was a subject officer or a witness officer. 4 As a matter of fact, if you look at my 5 statement, Trevor Richardson says, This is your duty 6 report, which under the protocol is not supposed to be 7 said. 8 Q: Okay. And the protocol with the SIU? 9 A: And the OPP. 10 Q: And the OPP. Now on September the 11 6th, 1995 when you were called prior -- you were called 12 to attend in Forest between 8:00 or 8:20 on that evening 13 -- on September the 6th had you spoken to Marcel 14 Beaubien? 15 A: Give me the dates again, I'm sorry. 16 Q: September the 6th you spoke -- 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: -- and we reviewed the conversations 19 with Mr. -- Inspector Carson on September the 5th. 20 A: That's right. 21 Q: There were two (2) conversations you 22 had with him on September the 5th and -- 23 A: Right. 24 Q: -- and the conversations with Marcel 25 Beaubien on September the 5th.


1 A: Right. 2 Q: On September the 6th, before you went 3 to Forest, did you have any conversations with Marcel 4 Beaubien? 5 A: Not that I recall. 6 Q: Did you have any conversations with 7 anyone from the Ministry of the Attorney General before 8 you arrived in Forest? 9 A: No, sir. 10 Q: Did you have -- and by that I mean 11 the Attorney General of the day, Mr. Harnick, or any of 12 his aides? 13 A: No, I spoke to no Provincial official 14 other than Marcel Beaubien on his earlier calls, but not 15 that day. 16 Q: And on September 6th you spoke to no, 17 excuse me, Provincial officials whether from the 18 Solicitor General's Department, the Premier's Office, the 19 Ministry of Natural Resources? 20 A: No, sir. 21 Q: And were you aware on the evening of 22 September the 6th and -- that Marcel Beaubien had been in 23 the Command Post at -- and had a briefing at 24 approximately 18:42 hours? 25 A: No, I wasn't aware he was there, but


1 I did see another politician but I wasn't aware of him. 2 Q: And the other politician you saw, was 3 who? 4 A: Miles Bressette. 5 Q: I mean -- not Miles Bressette, do you 6 mean Tom Bressette? 7 A: Tom Bressette, sorry. 8 Q: And that was in -- after you had 9 returned? 10 A: I believe it was later, yes. 11 Q: After the incident? 12 A: Yes, I believe so. 13 Q: But so were you aware that Mr. 14 Beaubien had been in? 15 A: No, sir. 16 Q: Were you told by anyone on -- when 17 you arrived at the Command Post on the evening of 18 September -- September the 6th that there was political 19 interest in this matter? 20 A: No, sir. 21 Q: Were you advised that Mr. Beaubien 22 had said that the Premier was interested in this matter? 23 A: Well, just other than when it was 24 mentioned to me in the phone call. 25 Q: And -- but did anyone say on


1 September -- I'm focussing on the September the 6th, now. 2 A: You mean at the briefing? 3 Q: Yes. 4 A: No, sir. 5 Q: And what, if anything, did you take 6 from what you were told by Mr. Beaubien on September the 7 5th that the Premier was interested in this matter? 8 A: I really didn't take that much from 9 it at all, sir, just I would expect him to be interested 10 in any kind of event going on in the Province. 11 Q: And as a police officer, what did 12 that -- what did it mean to you, if anything? 13 A: As -- as a line police officer, it 14 didn't mean a thing to me. 15 Q: And why is that? 16 A: Because we don't take direction from 17 politicians. 18 Q: And when you said you -- on September 19 the 6th, you spoke to no government officials, and do you 20 mean -- do you include in that civil servants as well 21 as -- 22 A: Yes, I do and -- 23 Q: -- polit -- 24 A: -- I don't know -- I think that total 25 day I was completely quiet at the office, all day; saw


1 nobody. Yeah, that -- that would include -- are you 2 referring to like, MNR or... 3 Q: Any -- any civil servant. 4 A: Yes. We do not take direction from 5 any other Ministry. 6 Q: And now in your notes, if you could 7 go to Tab 9. It's Exhibit P-1448. 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 Q: Perhaps it would be an appropriate 12 time to take a short break? 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We'll take a 14 morning break now. 15 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 16 for fifteen (15) minutes. 17 18 --- Upon recessing at 10:51 a.m. 19 --- Upon resuming at 11:14 a.m. 20 21 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 22 resumed. Please be seated. 23 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Commissioner, I'm 24 sorry that it took so long but we were listening to some 25 of the audio.


1 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I 2 understand that. 3 4 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 5 Q: And -- well, at Tab 24, if we could 6 go back to Tab 24 for a minute, Mr. Lacroix, and the copy 7 of Exhibit P-1361. 8 The -- there's a couple of -- I wanted to 9 confirm, Commissioner, that at page 4 -- the first entry 10 on page 4, Wade Lacroix, it did say: 11 "How many cruisers did we lose." 12 Then on page 8, the second entry where it 13 says: 14 "WADE LACROIX: You boys..." 15 That should be, "few boys." And in that 16 same line where it says: 17 "We cut them." 18 It is really: 19 "We cut -- cut 'em down." 20 That's really what it says. And then the 21 sixth set of initials down where it says: 22 "They wanted -- they wanted it." 23 There's an "it" after the first, "they 24 wanted". 25 So it's:


1 "They wanted it -- they wanted it." 2 And what were you referring to here in 3 this -- at this point in the conversation, Mr. Lacroix? 4 A: Which exact line? 5 Q: Well, just this point -- 6 A: From where we picked the -- 7 Q: "Repulsed a full attack, about 8 fifteen (15)..." 9 A: Right. I was describing the -- what 10 I'm calling as the attack that came across the sandy 11 parking lot. We were standing -- we've pulled back. 12 We're standing on Army Camp Road. There's a buffer 13 between us and the protestors inside the Park. I'm 14 talking about we took a barrage of rocks. 15 We repulsed a full attack of about fifteen 16 (15) -- twenty (20) with clubs. So I'm saying they 17 attacked us. They ran across at us. A guy broke my 18 shield right in half with a steel pole. 19 And then, unfortunately, I used street 20 conversation here, I said I'd coldcock him; that's the 21 evidence where I hit him in the clavicle or the shoulder 22 point. 23 I said a few of the boys hammered them. 24 We cut them down with the sticks. It was basically a 25 giant -- the two (2) formations met. They had sticks, we


1 had stick. There was quite a few different individual 2 stick fights and all of our guys held the line. 3 What I'm trying to say to them is nobody - 4 - because you have something like that coming on -- on 5 you, they -- they could break; the line could break. 6 They could retreat and run off or get out ahead on their 7 own. They didn't. They held their ground, but then when 8 they were attacked they did what they were trained to do. 9 And I went on to say that we -- we caught 10 one (1) of their leaders. I said -- I'm now going 11 through my mind and I -- I think that's what did 12 perpetrate the bus and the car. They got a little 13 choked. 14 But then I'm sitting in the room and I am 15 starting to think, you know what, maybe we were set up. 16 The whole thing was meant to be exactly what happened. 17 Somebody wanted to put a beating on a big formation, so 18 that's what I'm thinking. 19 Q: And that's what you refer to there 20 about -- 21 A: Yeah, that's what I'm referring to. 22 I'm telling him, You know, I think we might have got set 23 up. 24 Q: But that's after having spent the day 25 in the room thinking?


1 A: That's right. 2 Q: And the -- you indicated just now 3 that the -- their leader -- did you know who the person 4 was that had been arrested at the time? 5 A: No, I did not. 6 Q: And the person who -- when -- as you 7 -- when you say you "coldcocked" the person who broke 8 your shield -- 9 A: Right. 10 Q: -- and you -- you told us yesterday 11 you hit him on the shoulder -- 12 A: Yeah. 13 Q: -- what happened to that person? Did 14 that person go down? 15 A: He went down. I jumped over him. I 16 assumed that he was one (1) of the ones arrested. I 17 thought two (2) had been arrested so I assumed that he 18 had got arrested. 19 At some time later, one (1) of the 20 sergeants come over to me, I can't remember if it was 21 George Hebblethwaite or Wayde Jacklin came -- 22 Q: Get a little closer to -- 23 A: -- came with a radio and said that 24 person that you knocked down, that we arrested, was a 25 leader, and showed me later -- showed me the radio we saw


1 him directing the formation. 2 So that came, but again no name. No one 3 said, That guy that you, you know, that assaulted you, 4 that you cold cocked, is Cecil Bernard George. There was 5 -- there was no conversation of that. There was that -- 6 that person was a leader. Then later I get summoned to a 7 trial. 8 Q: Pardon me? 9 A: Quite later I was summonsed to some 10 trial on Cecil Bernard George for being the person that 11 assaulted me. And in trial I said, I don't know who 12 assaulted me. 13 Q: And at -- you just, a moment ago, 14 said that the -- you thought that you had got a leader 15 and that had then precipitated the car and the bus? 16 A: Yeah. I'm sitting there now thinking 17 why did the crowd -- I mean in our training you'll -- you 18 saw it in the manuals, there's orderly crowd, disorderly 19 crowd, there's -- there's casual, there's all these 20 different kind of crowds. 21 We certainly saw a explosive crowd. In 22 our training they say there are precipitating events that 23 can cause the crowd to explode, right. To go into a 24 riotess, disorderly crowd. 25 So I'm sitting here and I'm going, you


1 know, what probably perpetrated that reaction is, we 2 arrested a leader. 3 Q: And this is the next day you're 4 thinking about this? 5 A: Yeah. I'm just sitting there going 6 through, why did the crowd go so volatile. I mean it 7 became so viol -- it literally did, the terminology is an 8 explosive crowd, the crowd exploded. 9 Q: Okay. Now you listened at the break 10 to the conversation, the first part of the conversation 11 that we don't have a -- when you -- we don't have a 12 transcript for, when you called for Brian Deevy and 13 you're put on hold and there are voices in the 14 background. 15 And were you able to identify any of the 16 voices in the background, on your side of the phone? 17 A: It's very hard because of course 18 there's -- you can hear people talking on the Command 19 Post and I could hear women talking, I believe, on the 20 television. There's one (1) sentence that sounds like it 21 could be Ken Deane, there's only that one (1) sentence. 22 There's other sentences that sound like 23 possibly Mark Beauchesne or it is Ian McGregor. I -- I - 24 - I know Ian was in the room, and that's as close as I 25 can get.


1 Q: And when you were in the room with -- 2 or on the 7th when you were meeting with the other 3 officers at one -- in your notes you have at one point 4 you're with Ken Deane, Mark Beauchesne, Bill Klym, Brian 5 Sharp and Kevin York, did you discuss the incident of 6 what happened on the evening of September the 6th? 7 A: No. My recollection is we met Norm 8 Peele -- I'm sorry, sir, what day are you on? 9 Q: I'm on September the 7th. 10 A: 7th. Norm had a very cursory meeting 11 about what to expect from an SI -- I think we knew SIU 12 was coming out, and then OPP parallel investigation. 13 He had a very quick cursory discussion to 14 the group of what -- what would be expected, you know, 15 about subject officer, witness officer, you know. The 16 end of it was go to your individual rooms and do your 17 notes. 18 And I believe that's the last time I saw 19 Norm. I don't even know if Norm stayed in the hotel. 20 And then I -- I believe I went to do my notes. I came 21 down at lunch. 22 Now -- there possibly some of the other 23 members, this is a small hotel, would have been down at 24 lunch at the same time. I don't remember sitting with 25 them, I don't remember any conversation with them.


1 I know I went back upstairs and I had now 2 -- like I said, I went home at 2:00 in the morning, 3 didn't want to get woke up. I got woke up at the door, 4 get up, go to the Pinedale. I pass out. I remember 5 passing out the whole afternoon until there's a knock at 6 the door and it's Ian McGregor. 7 And then I'm there for those couple of 8 hours and I go home. 9 Q: And at the point in time when you're 10 with Mr. Deane and Mr. Beauchesne and Mr. McGregor, did 11 you talk about the events of the evening of -- 12 A: No. The trauma counsellors were 13 instructed not to -- to go there. I remember Ian was 14 with me first probably an hour before I think we even did 15 call for anybody else to say he was there. 16 And we talked about wives, children, how's 17 things going and how are you feeling? Now how you doing? 18 Q: Then on your notes at page 32, after 19 it says: 20 "Ian McGregor arrive at hotel." 21 There's a line at 19:00: 22 "Return to..." 23 A: Residence. 24 Q: Oh your residence in -- at -- in -- 25 A: Petrolia.


1 Q: -- Petrolia. Then on September the 2 8th you met with the SIU? 3 A: Yes. I met them at -- the interview 4 was around 17:00, around 5:00 p.m. I was interviewed by 5 Jim Kennedy and Sergeant Trevor Richardson of the OPP 6 Crime Squad. 7 Q: And this is the entry on September 8 8th when you picked up your new notebook and had to 9 finish off your notes. 10 A: Right. It looks like I -- I swung 11 into the Detachment to get a new notebook. Like I say, I 12 -- there's no other entry anywhere in my notebooks about 13 picking up a notebook. So I think that's because I ran 14 out. 15 Q: And then you had a meeting with Norm 16 Peel. 17 A: Yes, just before going into my 18 interview. 19 Q: And then during the period of time 20 from 08:00 where it says: 21 "Travel to Pinedale Hotel re. 22 [something] --" 23 A: "Await SIU and CIB investigation." 24 Q: And then what did you do from when 25 you arrived at the Pinedale Hotel until 16:00 when you


1 saw Norm Peele? 2 A: I believe I would have completed -- 3 like, I don't -- because I knew I was going to run out in 4 this notebook, at what point did I -- did I do the note 5 right up to this last page or did I leave a -- did I 6 leave a point where I leave off, but then I've obviously 7 filled in this notebook the remainder of the events, 8 about ten (10) pages' worth. 9 Q: Okay. 10 A: Await -- awaiting SIU. 11 Q: And did you talk with any of the 12 other members -- were the other members of the -- of the 13 -- any other police officers there or... 14 A: I don't remember seeing anybody that 15 day. It was really eerie. I remember, again, I caught a 16 cat nap. And I remember they must have all been one-by- 17 one being pulled into their interviews. 18 I remember by the time I went for my 19 interview -- went to see Norm, went for my interview, I 20 come out there was nobody left. Everybody had left the 21 hotel. I was the last one there and that's when I get 22 invited to dinner with Dr. David Hoath and Ian McGregor, 23 and we went across the street for supper. 24 So I remember, I was in doing notes and 25 really people were all being pulled in one-by-one by SIU,


1 so there was no -- no, I didn't. 2 There was no opportunity to get together 3 and there was nobody really -- I never saw anybody. So 4 they must have been off -- I think there might have been 5 two (2) teams in -- of investigators. 6 Q: And -- okay. At Tab 28 is a copy of 7 Exhibit P-1153. And that's a copy of the statement that 8 was taken on September the 8th. 9 A: What Tab, sorry? 10 Q: Tab 28, sir. 11 A: Yes. Yes, that's the statement 12 Q: And it appears that it started at 13 6:45? 14 A: Right. So actually fifteen (15) 15 minutes before what I show. 16 Q: And then you had dinner that evening 17 with David Hoath and Ian McGregor? And David Hoath was 18 the...? 19 A: Force psychologist. 20 Q: Force psychologist. Now, I 21 understand that in the balance of September that the work 22 that you did related to a possible concern about the 23 Pinery Park; you did some work with respect to Pinery 24 Park in relation to Ipperwash? 25 A: Yes, sir.


1 Q: And I'm referring to, and I'm not 2 going to take them to you -- take to your notes, P-1447. 3 You were off, actually, the 8th, 9th and 10th and then 4 back on duty on the 11th of September. 5 A: Away -- away with my family at 6 Tobermory. And at some point during the weekend I got 7 another uniform car, or whatever they told me to report 8 to, the Grand Bend command post, Chief Coles' Command 9 Post at Grand Bend in the morning of the 11th, I was told 10 to report there, work for Tony Park. 11 Q: And then you also had participated, 12 as your notes said, in -- in trying to set up the 13 investigation on September 18th and 19th? 14 A: You mean when I assisted SIU? 15 Q: Yes. 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: Now, the -- I would ask you to turn 18 to Tab 17. And this drawing, which had been marked 19 exhibit... 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 Q: ...P-1416, do you recognize this 24 drawing? 25 A: No -- no, sir, I do not.


1 Q: And was this a drawing prepared by 2 you? 3 A: No, sir. 4 Q: And at Tab 19 there's another 5 drawing, Inquiry Document 1005027. Do you recognize -- 6 prior to being shown this drawing in preparation for 7 attending here, had you seen this drawing before? 8 A: No, sir. 9 Q: And the -- do you know who prepared 10 this drawing? 11 A: No, sir, I don't. 12 Q: And if -- if you go to Tab 18, at Tab 13 18 is Inquiry Document Number 2000901 and it appears to 14 be -- what is this document? 15 A: It's a Use of Force form that goes 16 into the training section. Basically, any time an 17 officer uses use of force continuum, you fill out this 18 report. 19 It goes to the Training Section and 20 basically they use it for training purposes and for 21 remedial training; that's why if you look at the bottom 22 there's a dotted line. That little slip of who submitted 23 it is supposed to be torn off. So it's just a -- it's a 24 training tool -- 25 Q: Okay.


1 A: -- to see how often we are drawing 2 our weapons, how often we use pepper spray; that's what 3 its intent is. 4 Q: Okay. Now, this document has two (2) 5 items attached; sixteen seven five eight hyphen five 6 (16758-5), sixteen seven five four hyphen one (16754-1). 7 It appears to have it indicated that they 8 were attached. And on this particular document the -- 9 you can't tell what the one (1) page attached, but if you 10 could please turn to Tab 39? 11 And... 12 13 (BRIEF PAUSE) 14 15 Q: ...this is Inquiry Document 1005058. 16 And attached -- this is a letter from Mark Dew to Wayne 17 Allen at the SIU. And attached to it, unfortunately, 18 Commissioner, in reverse order, appears to be the same -- 19 a Use of Force Report for you. 20 And the two (2) attachments are present in 21 this copy, but if you actually turn over to page 41 you 22 will see Inquiry Document 500041 that has these documents 23 in the right order attached to them, although there are a 24 number of things redacted. 25 And do you recall filling out the Use of -


1 - the Use of Force Report? 2 A: I do not. 3 Q: And attached to either Tab 31 -- I 4 mean 39 or 41 are General Occurrence Reports, and the 5 numbers line up to the numbers that are referred to in 6 the cover page of the Use of Force Report. 7 Are the General Occurrence Reports 8 generally filed along with the Use of Force Report? 9 A: In the OPP they tend -- if there's a 10 General Occurrence Report they tend to use that to, you 11 know, to reference, right. That's -- everything we do 12 there's a General Occurrence Report generated, so there's 13 a tendency -- I would think this would be done by Admin 14 staff to put those two (2) references. 15 Q: And the reference -- if you -- if you 16 go to Tab 41 -- 17 A: Hmm hmm. 18 Q: -- Inquiry Document 500041 -- 19 A: Right. 20 Q: -- the first report attached is 21 sixteen seven five four hyphen one (16754-1) and it 22 appears to have been a General Occurrence Report with 23 respect to Gerald George, and it was -- appears to have 24 been filed September 9th, 1995. 25 Have I read that correctly, under General


1 Occurrence Report filed by Constable Martin -- 2 A: Yeah, Chris Martin, yeah. 3 Q: -- September 9th '95? 4 A: Right. 5 Q: And then three (3) pages in there's 6 the other -- sixteen seven five eight hyphen five (16758- 7 5) and a General Occurrence Report filed by Constable 8 Vandenberg on September 11th? 9 A: That's the senior clerical. 10 Q: Pardon me? 11 A: That's the senior administrator. 12 Q: Mr. Vandenberg? 13 A: Janet Vandenberg. 14 Q: Janet. 15 A: She's not a constable. 16 Q: And on September 11th, 1995, and that 17 relates to the assault on you? 18 A: Right. And we're -- I looked at 19 this, the only way they got that information, I think, 20 the one (1) paragraph on my assault came from my WSIB 21 form. 22 Q: And your WSIB was Workers'... 23 A: I put in a Workers' Comp form for 24 being struck over the head. 25 Q: And so that you don't recall


1 providing this information to -- 2 A: Not for this occurrence, no. 3 Q: -- for that particular occurrence? 4 A: No. It would have been compiled by 5 Janet Vandenberg. And if I look at the people at the 6 back, these officers would have known some of the other 7 paragraphs. Like, these are Petrolia people that would 8 have different -- like, Boon, I believe, was at the 9 hospital. Myers was out on the road for the arrest, 10 Zacher. 11 Q: And -- 12 A: So this would have been a collection 13 of materials; she just put it together as a general 14 occurrence. I think she was a scribe; actually had a 15 better overview of any -- than any of us. 16 Q: And the photograph that appears at 17 the last page of this Inquiry Document, prior to this -- 18 looking at this in preparation for the Inquiry, had you 19 seen that photograph before? 20 A: No, sir. 21 Q: Do you recall -- perhaps we'll mark 22 5000041 as the next exhibit. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think it's 24 fifty thousand (50,000). 25 MR. DERRY MILLAR: It's fifty thousand


1 (50,000), excuse me. It's 5000041. 2 THE REGISTRAR: P-1460, Your Honour. 3 4 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1460: Document Number 5000041. 5 General Occurrence Report: 6 Complainant: Wade Lacroix Re. 7 Assault with weapon on 8 September 06, 1995, with 9 added mischief occurred; Use 10 of Force Report, December 12, 11 1995. 12 13 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 14 Q: And at Tab 39, the letter from Mr. 15 Allen with -- 16 A: It's not even signed by me, right? 17 Q: It's not signed. Actually we'll 18 simply do the one at Tab 41, sir. It's -- the home 19 addresses are redacted from it. 20 And normally would it be signed? 21 A: Yeah, well that's strange. I think 22 at the bottom, "Reviewed by Supervisor," which in this 23 case was me. I said, yes, my name's typed in there but I 24 haven't signed it. 25 Q: And --


1 A: So I've reviewed this, it doesn't 2 mean I compiled it. 3 Q: And -- now, you testified, as I 4 understand it, at the Nicholas Cottrelle trial? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And at Tab 46 is a copy of Inquiry 7 Document 3000846, which is the proceedings in the 8 Nicholas Cottrelle trial on March 25th, 1997. And pages 9 1 to 79 is the transcript of your examination. 10 And do you recall being -- attending at 11 the Nicholas Cottrelle trial? 12 A: yes. 13 Q: And I would ask that that be the next 14 exhibit. 15 THE REGISTRAR: P-1461, Your Honour. 16 17 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1461: Document Number 3000846. R. 18 v. Nicholas Abraham 19 Cottrelle:: Wade Lacroix 20 Examination-In-Chief and 21 Cross-Examination; Trial 22 transcript, pages 26-79 or 23 Wade Lacroix's testimony, 24 March 25, 1997. 25


1 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR. 2 Q: And then, as well, you testified at 3 the Warren George trial? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: It's actually pages -- My Friend, Mr. 6 Falconer, kindly pointed out it's pages 26 to 79. I said 7 page 1 to 79, it's pages 76 to 79. 8 MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: 26. 9 10 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 11 Q: And then at Tab 52 there's a copy of 12 your -- of a transcript, and this, Commissioner, is from 13 the Warren Anthony George trial on September 29th, 1997. 14 And do you recall testifying at Mr. 15 George's trial? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: And -- 18 A: It's been a while, but I do. 19 Q: -- pages 77 to 126 is the evidence of 20 Mr. Lacroix, including the examination-in-chief and cross 21 examination. 22 And I'd ask that pages 77 to 126, 23 including the last page, which is really the cover page 24 of the transcript, but it identifies the date, be the 25 next exhibit.


1 And don't worry about this page that says 2 'P-477' because P-477 does not include this material. 3 THE REGISTRAR: P-1462, Your Honour. 4 5 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1462: Document Number 1004972. R. 6 v. Warren George/David 7 George: Wade Lacroix 8 Examination-In-Chief by Mr. 9 Van Drunen; Trial transcript 10 pages 77-125, September 29, 11 1997. 12 13 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 14 Q: And then, lastly, you also, at Tab 53 15 -- again, this is September 30th and pages 1 to 95, that 16 whole tab is your continued examination in the Warren 17 Anthony George and David Abraham George trial. 18 A: Hmm hmm. 19 Q: You had appeared two (2) days? 20 A: I don't recall that. 21 Q: I would ask that it's -- Inquiry 22 Document 1004973 be the next exhibit. 23 THE REGISTRAR: P-1463, Your Honour. 24 25 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1463: Document Number 1004973, R.


1 v. Warren George/David 2 George: Wade Lacroix 3 Examination-In-Chief 4 completion, Cross-Examination 5 and Re-Examination, September 6 30, 1997. 7 8 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 9 Q: And then at Tab 71, it's Inquiry 10 document 1004978, this is from the Cecil Bernard George 11 trial, July 15, 1996. And you test -- do you recall, as 12 you've indicated, you testified at that trial? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And your evidence is from page 3 to 15 page 122. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 Q: And I would ask that Inquiry document 20 1004978, from the front page to page 122, be marked the 21 next exhibit. 22 THE REGISTRAR: P-1464, Your Honour. 23 24 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1464: Document Number 1004978. R. 25 v. Cecil Bernard George,


1 Transcript of OPP witnesses, 2 July 15, 1996 3 4 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 5 Q: Did you learn that mugs and t-shirts 6 had been prepared? 7 A: I later learned -- sometime later. 8 Q: When did you learn that? 9 A: I was -- I believe I was working at 10 the Grand Bend command post when it came to light. And 11 there was, I think, a memo put out that it was 12 inappropriate. 13 And I just remember something about it. 14 Q: Did you purchase a mug or t-shirt? 15 A: No, sir. 16 Q: Did you see a mug or a t-shirt? 17 A: Never seen them, sir. 18 Q: And did you see in the -- in the -- 19 September of -- after September the 11th, did you stay at 20 Pinery Park, in the bunkhouse at Pinery Park? 21 A: No, sir. I believe I went home every 22 night. 23 Q: This is after when you came back on 24 September -- 25 A: Yes. I think I still drove home.


1 Q: Oh, you went home every night? 2 A: Yeah. 3 Q: And -- 4 A: Yeah, travelled to Petrolia on the 5 12th, travelled to Petrolia the 13th. I went home every 6 night. 7 Q: Did you observe or hear about a, in 8 September 1995, a beer can with a feather? 9 A: No, sir. 10 Q: Or a police car, an Ontario 11 Provincial Police car with a bull's eye on the side and 12 an arrow? 13 A: No, sir. I was -- I really wasn't 14 out and about. I was at the main -- the strategic 15 command post and -- and that I didn't -- didn't see it, 16 for sure, and I don't even remember hearing about it. 17 Q: Or some cartoons being posted at the 18 Pinery Park? 19 A: No, sir. 20 Q: And did you take part in any part of 21 the investigation with respect to mugs and t-shirts or -- 22 A: No. 23 Q: -- any of these? 24 A: No, sir. 25 Q: You have to wait until I've finished.


1 A: Sorry. 2 Q: And so you took no part in the 3 investigations? 4 A: No. Neither way. 5 Q: Pardon me? 6 A: Neither way. I wasn't the 7 investigator and I wasn't investigated. 8 Q: Now, at part of Exhibit P-1447, your 9 notes, there's a note... 10 A: Where was that, sorry? 11 Q: P-4 -- it's -- it's a loose set of 12 notes that's over on your left -- 13 A: Oh, these. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 Q: And the last page of that is a note 18 for April 28th, 1997. Do you see that? 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: And that refers to: 21 "Attend Sarnia Court re. Deane's 22 Decision." 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And can you just tell us what this 25 refers to?


1 A: I knew that the verdict was coming 2 out that day. So I also knew that there was the 3 possibility -- I had been briefed there was a possibility 4 of a demonstration one way or the other. 5 Sarnia Court was in my -- my area of juri 6 -- that was the Court for Lambton, so it was in my area 7 of jurisdiction. 8 We had a bit of a security detail over 9 there. We have joint -- joint forces, court officers, et 10 cetera, and we shared -- we shared some responsibilities 11 for security. 12 So I would be responsible -- 13 Q: You shared responsibility with -- 14 A: Sarnia City police. 15 Q: Okay. 16 A: So I'd have some responsibility for 17 the actual security of the Court, plus I knew that Ken 18 Deane had a protection detail on him for the trial. 19 So I just went over to be there. You know 20 I knew Ken of course, I was there, you know, to support 21 him whichever it went. But I did have a job as a 22 detachment commander for that area. It was a big trial 23 and the verdict was coming down that day. 24 So I went over and sat in on the verdict. 25 If I remember correctly Ken Deane's father was on his


1 deathbed, so as soon as the verdict came and it was 2 registered Ken was rushed out of the courthouse by his 3 protection detail and they took him right to the hospital 4 to be at his dad's side because his dad wanted to know 5 the outcome. 6 So that was downtown London. So I -- I 7 can't remember if Norm and Sue Peele had come with the 8 detail so they were kind of left stranded at the 9 courthouse. So I ended up taking them back to their 10 residence and I think just -- there was just a lot of 11 people ended up -- they were just standing around in the 12 -- in the hall kind of not knowing what to do. 13 Lucy was left there too. She couldn't go 14 -- Lucy is Ken's wife; she's a police officer in the OPP. 15 She was left standing there because she wasn't allowed 16 with the protection detail. 17 So it was kind of a very awkward 18 situation. So I volunteered to drive Norm Peele and his 19 wife back to their residence, they have a farm in the 20 north end of London. And I -- I take it a bunch of other 21 people showed up and there was a bit of a -- I don't know 22 what -- I don't know what to call it but there was -- 23 there was people there having a beer and just, you know, 24 what's next? 25 Q: And did you speak to Mr. Deane that


1 day? 2 A: I didn't see -- I think I -- I stuck 3 around. He -- he came to the -- I waited to -- to give 4 him words of encouragement before I left and I think I 5 saw him for a few minutes when he came back from the 6 hospital. He finally did show up at the Peeles' and then 7 I left. 8 Q: And did you participate in the -- did 9 you participate in the investigation of Mr. Deane? 10 A: No, sir. 11 Q: Did you participate in any 12 investigation on behalf of Mr. Deane or Norman Peele? 13 A: No, I don't believe so. 14 Q: And the -- 15 A: I mean, I would have provided -- I 16 mean, I remember providing notes, but usually we'd go 17 through the Crime Unit. Like there was -- for the 18 longest time your notes were being asked and your 19 statements were being asked for either a SIU or a civil 20 suit or another -- so I remember cooperating in the sense 21 of giving my notes and my statement but no, I did not 22 cooperate in investigation. 23 Q: And now, you told us that you had 24 filed a WSIB, that's a Worker Safety and -- 25 A: Insurance.


1 Q: -- Board -- 2 A: Board. 3 Q: -- claim? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And that related to -- 6 A: Being struck on the neck. 7 Q: -- struck in your head? 8 A: My -- yeah. When the glance -- when 9 they busted my shield I still took a glancing blow off 10 the helmet. I ended -- after this while I was working in 11 Grand Bend I started to get a problem my neck so I went 12 in and had it checked out and it was deemed to be from 13 that strike. 14 I had old injuries as well so at the end 15 of the day I already had 5 percent pinch and they 16 increased it to ten (10). 17 Q: And I understand as well that you 18 suffered from post-traumatic stress? 19 A: Yes, I did. 20 Q: And that you were diagnosed with 21 that? 22 A: Yes, sir. 23 Q: And were given a -- made a claim with 24 the WSIB which was accepted? 25 A: Yes, it was. I think it was the


1 first one. 2 Q: And as a result you were off-duty for 3 some period of time? 4 A: Two (2) months in the -- it started 5 to be effective after it seemed that all the command 6 posts were broken down, people went back, went to 7 Christmas vacation. All went well then around January I 8 started to feel like a -- just like a burnout so I got 9 diagnosed in January. I was off February/March, back at 10 -- back to work in April. 11 Q: And what about after that? 12 A: There's -- there's times definitely 13 that I see the bus. I have night -- nightmares about the 14 bus. 15 Q: And is there anything else you would 16 like to add, Mr. Lacroix? 17 A: On that? 18 Q: On anything. 19 A: Just that I was really looking 20 forward to this in a sense of they know from post- 21 traumatic shock one (1) of the things you need to do is - 22 - is to do catharsis. And I understand why lawyers, you 23 know, do not want catharsis to take place, you know, 24 because they -- they don't want to see stories be 25 affected but this has been far too long and there's a lot


1 of people out there are hurting. 2 Q: And when you say, "a lot of people 3 out there are hurting," who are you referring to? 4 A: Both sides. This is a good thing but 5 it's the way it is. It's not -- I don't know if it's the 6 catharsis that a lot of people were looking for. 7 We've never debriefed. We've never gone 8 in a room to talk about what we did right or what we did 9 wrong. We've never... 10 Q: With respect to what happened on 11 September the 6th. 12 A: We haven't grieved. 13 Q: And is there anything else you would 14 like to add. 15 A: No, that's it. 16 Q: And Commissioner, that completes the 17 Examination-In-Chief. I appreciate it took a little 18 longer than I had hoped, but we might canvas the parties 19 to see if anyone has any questions. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I suppose we 21 should do that canvassing now. Does anybody have any 22 questions, please indicate? 23 Yes, Ms. Tuck-Jackson, how long? 24 MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: I'm sorry, Mr. 25 Commissioner, five (5) minutes.


1 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Five (5) minutes for 2 Ms. Tuck-Jackson. 3 Ms. Perschy I think is next. 4 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: I believe it's Mr. 5 Sulman. 6 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Oh, Mr. Sulman. 7 Sorry. 8 MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: Fifteen (15) or 9 twenty (20) minutes. 10 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Fifteen (15) to twenty 11 (20) minutes for Mr. Sulman on behalf of Mr. Beaubien. 12 Ms. Perschy...? 13 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: Fifteen (15) to twenty 14 (20) minutes. 15 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Ms. Perschy, 16 Commissioner, fifteen (15) to twenty (20) minutes on 17 behalf of Ms. Hutton. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 19 Klippenstein...? 20 MR. MURRAY KLIPPENSTEIN: The Estate and 21 Family plans to exchange places with Aboriginal Legal 22 Services so the -- pertaining to the order of cross- 23 examination of Mr. Lacroix, so we expect to have half an 24 hour to an hour at the end. 25 MR. DERRY MILLAR: So Mr. Klippenstein,


1 it would be half an hour to an hour. 2 Then, Mr. Rosenthal...? 3 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: About three (3) 4 hours, sir. 5 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Three (3) hours for 6 Mr. Rosenthal. 7 And Mr. Scullion...? 8 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: Reserve an hour and 9 we'll see how it goes... 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Ms. 11 Johnson...? 12 MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: Hour to an hour and 13 a half. 14 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Mr. Scullion, an hour 15 and Ms. Johnson on behalf of the Kettle and Stony Point 16 First Nation and Chiefs of Ontario, sixty (60) minutes to 17 ninety (90) minutes. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 19 Falconer...? 20 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Three (3) to four 21 (4) hours. 22 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Mr. Falconer was three 23 (3) to four (4) hours. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: What's the 25 total, Mr. Millar?


1 MR. DERRY MILLAR: The total is -- 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I use a -- 3 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Ten (10) and a half 4 hours. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Pardon me? 6 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Ten (10) -- 7 MS. KATHERINE HENSEL: Between ten and a 8 half (10 1/2) hours. 9 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Ten (10) and eleven 10 (11) hours. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I use the 12 general rule of thumb. The length of the time that the 13 cross-examination takes is a general -- that the 14 examination-in-chief takes. That's quite a bit more. 15 But often times recently, Counsel have 16 estimated and not used all the time. I was hoping that 17 we could finish this Witness at least by some time in the 18 middle of tomorrow so that we -- no, I think we will, so 19 that we can start the next witness and maybe finish him 20 before the end of the week. That's our plan. But -- 21 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Yeah. I -- I 22 appreciate that, Commissioner. Commissioner, I'm certain 23 all My Friends will attempt to -- to meet that -- your -- 24 your desire that we have Mr. Lacroix finish some time 25 tomorrow.


1 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I realize 2 that this is an important witness and I'm hoping that 3 some of the estimates turn out to be excessive in 4 reality. But I suppose we have to start somewhere, so 5 let's start. Let's start with Ms. Tuck-Jackson. 6 MR. DERRY MILLAR: And before I sit down, 7 I'd like to thank Mr. Lacroix very much for coming and -- 8 and testifying. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We'll thank 10 him after he's completed his cross-examination. We'll 11 thank him at that point. 12 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Oh, and I would like-- 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's now 14 just before twelve o'clock but I think we should start. 15 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Sure. And perhaps we 16 could mark the audio disk of Mr. Lacroix as the next 17 exhibit. Thank you, sir. 18 THE REGISTRAR: P-1465. 19 20 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1465: Wade Lacroix audio. 21 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Ms. 23 Tuck-Jackson...? 24 MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: Good morning, 25 sir.


1 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: 2 Q: Mr. Lacroix, my name is Andrea Tuck- 3 Jackson, I'm going to ask you some questions on behalf of 4 the OPP. 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Sir, you told us earlier this morning 7 that the police do not take direction from government. 8 A: True. 9 Q: On September the 5th and the 6th, did 10 John Carson say anything to you that suggested that 11 political views were influencing his operational 12 decisions? 13 A: Absolutely not. 14 Q: Thank you, sir, those are my 15 questions. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Now, I see 20 you've started by using less time than you estimated. 21 You estimated five (5) minutes and you used one (1). 22 Yes, Mr. Sulman...? 23 MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: Good morning, Mr. 24 Commissioner. We'll see if I can keep that trend going. 25


1 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: 2 Q: Mr. Lacroix -- 3 A: Sir. 4 Q: -- my name's Doug Sulman. I 5 represent Marcel Beaubien. 6 A: Okay. 7 Q: And I have some questions that I'm 8 going to ask you. 9 A: Okay. 10 Q: And I want to focus, to start, on the 11 August 14th letter that was presented to you yesterday. 12 I'm not going to go into a lot of detail on it. 13 A: Okay. 14 Q: If you feel the need to turn it up, 15 it is at Tab 10 and it's Exhibit number P-418, okay? 16 My recollection of your evidence is that 17 you don't have any notes covering the August 11th meeting 18 with Parkin, Linton, Carson and Beaubien, correct? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: Okay. And what recollection you do 21 have of that meeting was it was more of a bringing a new 22 MPP up to date on policing in the area, right? 23 A: Yes, within Lambton County. 24 Q: Okay. Okay. And at that meeting, I 25 take it there were two-way communications; that is, the


1 police officers were updating Mr. Beaubien and Mr. 2 Beaubien was passing on to you gentlemen the concerns of 3 his constituents, correct? 4 A: Absolutely. 5 Q: And this meeting was, as I understand 6 it, consistent with the role of senior officers such as 7 yourself, and those attending the meeting, in their 8 communications with MP's, MPP's, Mayors and Band Chiefs, 9 right? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: Okay. 12 A: It's more like the community level. 13 Q: Yeah. And you described yourself 14 earlier as, in one of your roles, you were the community 15 guy, right? 16 A: It was -- yes, sir. 17 Q: Okay. And my recollection of your 18 evidence yesterday is that you had somewhat limited 19 independent recollection of that August 11th meeting. 20 Have I got that right? 21 A: Yes, sir. I don't specifically 22 remember. 23 Q: So I take it, other than the fact 24 that we're having a hearing here now, there -- that 25 particular meeting didn't really stand out in your mind


1 as a major event? 2 A: No, sir. 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 Q: Okay. And you did have -- My Friend 7 tells me you had some limited notes of that meeting? 8 I'm not going to run through them with you 9 but -- 10 A: Yeah, it was -- 11 Q: -- just to correct the record -- 12 MR. IAN ROLAND: Just so the record's 13 straight, there is, when we've reviewed them, a limited 14 note of the meeting of August the 11th, of who attended. 15 MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: Right. It was just 16 -- it was just notes that indicated who attended, not -- 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That the 18 meeting had taken place. 19 MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: Right. Not the 20 details of the meeting. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 22 MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: I take -- 23 MR. IAN ROLAND: They're just the topics 24 as opposed to the subject. 25 THE WITNESS: Yeah, the topics were


1 there, I believe. 2 MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: Right. 3 THE WITNESS: Ipperwash, West Ipperwash, 4 Walpole and reorg. 5 6 CONTINUED BY MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: 7 Q: Right. And that's the extent of the 8 notes. 9 A: That was the four (4) main issues 10 that were going on in Lambton at that time. 11 Q: Okay. But I earlier correctly 12 characterized them as just talking about updating the new 13 MPP on those issues in the Lambton area, right? 14 A: Yes, sir. 15 Q: Okay. So I believe I asked you, I 16 take it that there wasn't anything particular that stood 17 out in that meeting as a major meeting -- 18 A: No, sir. 19 Q: -- at no point? And I suggest to you 20 also that there was nothing in Mr. Beaubien's comments or 21 conduct in that meeting that influenced how you carried 22 out your policing duties in the summer of 1995, in 23 relation to those topics, correct? 24 A: No, sir. He gave us no direction. I 25 mean, he just passed on to us which we -- a lot of things


1 we knew from the community, that certain elements of the 2 community were frustrated on, you know, the different 3 land claims and how long they'd been going on. 4 He did not -- there was no direction, you 5 know; do this. 6 Q: Right. Okay. And it was just more 7 communication and -- 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 Q: -- him being a conduit for 10 information from his constituents to you gentlemen, 11 correct? 12 A: Exactly. He was just saying that 13 Bosanquet is saying this, what say you, kind of thing 14 and... 15 Q: Okay. And that arising out of that 16 meeting, there was an August 14th letter that you -- and 17 I'm not going to ask you to turn it up -- 18 A: Right. 19 Q: -- but that's the one that was 20 presented to you yesterday at Tab 10. And that was a 21 letter, as I understand it, that was sent to the Attorney 22 General. Maybe -- maybe that would be helpful if you 23 did. 24 A: Yeah. 25 Q: And it's not in the first page of Tab


1 10, but you have to turn in a couple of pages. 2 A: Okay. Okay, yes. 3 Q: Do you have it in front of you, sir? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: Okay. 6 A: Yeah, this is the one I didn't really 7 recognize. 8 Q: Exactly. This is -- this letter was 9 sent, as you can see, to the Attorney General, and if you 10 look to the last page that is the Attorney General, Mr. 11 Harnick. 12 A: Hmm hmm. 13 Q: And it was copied -- it wasn't copied 14 to anyone in the OPP -- 15 A: Right. 16 Q: -- correct? 17 A: That's right. 18 Q: And I take it you didn't see this 19 letter in 1995, right? 20 A: No, sir. 21 Q: And I take it since you didn't see 22 this letter prior to September 5th, 1995, it couldn't 23 have any effect or any influence on your actions on 24 September 4th, 5th, or 6th, right? 25 A: No, sir, it wouldn't have.


1 Q: Okay. And you didn't -- 2 A: And as I said yesterday, I agreed to 3 the discussion, but number 3. 4 Q: Right. But yesterday -- in fact, you 5 hadn't really even read this letter until yesterday? 6 A: No, no. I seen it the first time 7 yesterday. 8 Q: And all you did yesterday, in going 9 through those paragraphs and telling that you agreed with 10 almost everything except paragraph number 3. 11 A: Right. 12 Q: All you were doing at that time was, 13 ten (10) years after the fact, trying to be of 14 assistance, going through the letter, and merely 15 speculating what someone else meant in their paragraphs, 16 in a letter that wasn't even sent to you, right? 17 A: Yes. I was just saying that I 18 believe that the three (3) -- well the topics match what 19 I've got in my notebook, that -- 20 Q: Okay. 21 A: -- you know, the Ipperwash West -- 22 the Beach, you know, about enforcement, how it's only 23 short-term -- like we explained all that -- 24 Q: Right. 25 A: -- about the Trespass Act. So I'm


1 just saying if those three (3), you know, one (1), two 2 (2) and four (4) looked like the conversation I remember 3 being at. Number 3, I don't remember any discussion at 4 that meeting about number 3 or us getting any direction. 5 Q: Okay. Fair enough. And yesterday 6 you were trying to assist the Commission, but all you 7 were doing was speculating on the contents -- 8 A: Yes, it was speculate -- I... 9 Q: All right. Okay. Now, you'll recall 10 Mr. Millar yesterday asking you about -- I'm going to 11 leave that topic and move to September 5th, okay? 12 A: Okay. 13 Q: Just so we know where we're at. And 14 you'll recall Mr. Millar yesterday asking you about 15 scribe notes from September 5th? 16 A: Hmm hmm. 17 Q: And just to set the scene, there were 18 two (2) conversations on September 5th with Mr. Beaubien? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: Correct. And just so I understand 21 it, they were by telephone? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: Okay. And do you recall who 24 initiated the telephone calls or were they...? 25 A: I thought the one -- the first one of


1 the morning came from the MPP. 2 Q: And the second one was a call from 3 you? 4 A: Yes, because I think it -- Inspector 5 Car -- I was calling Inspector Carson to say, He called, 6 do you want me to deal with him or will you deal with 7 him? He said, No, you deal with him, but then get back 8 to me with what he has to say. 9 So I think it was initiated by the MPP. I 10 sought permission to talk to him, was given permission on 11 his -- on the Inspector's behalf. And if he wanted -- 12 and he wanted me to get back to him. 13 Q: Okay. Now, to make sure I've got my 14 notes correct, did you make any notes of -- of either of 15 those two (2) calls? 16 A: I don't believe I did. 17 Q: I -- I thought that was your evidence 18 yesterday. 19 A: Yeah. 20 Q: Okay. And I -- my notes indicate 21 that your -- you testified yesterday you had no specific 22 recollections of the details of the calls; is that 23 correct? 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: However, Mr. Millar was putting to


1 you yesterday the scribe notes, and asking you questions 2 in regard to the scribe notes and you were trying to help 3 him out in that regard? 4 A: Right. Well, I think he had taped 5 conversations -- 6 Q: Okay. 7 A: -- which -- 8 Q: You're -- you're quite correct. And 9 my recollection is that -- that the taped conversations, 10 and then transcribed, indicate that in your conversations 11 with Mr. Beaubien he said: 12 "He wants to brief me and he's going to 13 call the Premier." 14 And you took that to be the Premier's 15 Office; that's my recollection of your evidence 16 yesterday. 17 A: Yeah. 18 OBJ MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well, I object, Mr. 19 Commissioner, that -- that was not the Witness' evidence 20 yesterday. The Witness' evidence was -- 21 MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: Let's play it back. 22 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: The Witness' 23 evidence was: I might have been talking about the 24 Premier's Office, not I was talking about, I might. 25 MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: I don't think that's


1 the evidence, but we can easily bring that up. 2 THE WITNESS: Well -- my inference was -- 3 I'm sorry. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Pardon me? 5 THE WITNESS: When it was mentioned the 6 Premier I took -- I didn't take it as the Premier -- 7 Premier himself, I mean I -- I took it as the Premier's 8 Office. 9 MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: And -- and I believe 10 that's what you told us yesterday. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's what 12 he said yesterday. 13 MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: Exactly. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Something to 15 that effect. I don't know the exact words. Maybe Mr. 16 Falconer has the exact words, I don't. 17 18 CONTINUED BY MR. DOUGLAS SULMAN: 19 Q: But just -- just to clarify the 20 record, I believe you also told us that, by analogy, if 21 you were to call the Commissioner's Office, the 22 Commissioner of the OPP, that by the same token you 23 wouldn't expect to be calling the Commissioner, you'd be 24 calling the Commissioner's Office. 25 A: That's --


1 Q: I think that's the analogy you gave 2 us yesterday. 3 A: Yeah, I said I'd get the EA or 4 Executive Assistant or I'd get somebody like that. 5 Q: Okay, fair enough. But whether it 6 was the Premier or the Premier's Office, I suggest to you 7 it wouldn't come as any surprise to you at that time that 8 the local MPP would be informing the Premier's Office 9 that a Provincial Park was the subject of a hostile 10 takeover in his riding. 11 A: I wouldn't be surprised that they 12 would have communications -- 13 Q: Yes. 14 A: -- going up and down, you know, 15 within their organization, as we do. I wouldn't be 16 surprised if there was reporting relationships and 17 reports being made. 18 Q: Yeah. And it wouldn't come as any 19 surprise to you that the Premier's Office would be 20 interested in the takeover of a Provincial Park and would 21 want to be briefed on it. 22 A: I'm sure it would be an issue of the 23 day. 24 Q: Right. So none of this -- if -- if 25 this information came from Mr. Beaubien, it didn't come


1 as any startling revelation to you. 2 A: No. No, I didn't take it that way. 3 Q: Okay. And that the local Provincial 4 Member of Parliament might be unhappy that the Provincial 5 -- that a Provincial Park in his riding was taken over, 6 that didn't come as any surprise to you either, I take 7 it? 8 A: No. I think he was on the -- he knew 9 before I did and -- 10 Q: Oh, okay. 11 A: -- so. 12 Q: And was that because it was in the 13 local media quite rapidly? 14 A: I don't know. I understand that 15 phone call I received, I just come on duty and he was 16 calling. So it -- 17 Q: Okay. 18 A: -- would have had just happened the 19 night before on a stat holiday. I don't know how he 20 knew. 21 Q: Okay. Let's turn to the second 22 conversation that you told us about. When you asked 23 Carson, Should I call him back or -- or -- 24 A: Right. 25 Q: -- or are you going to? Have I got


1 that -- 2 A: Yeah. That was what I thought was 3 the gist of it. 4 Q: And in calling -- calling Beaubien 5 back, did you tell him anything, as an MPP, that you felt 6 was confidential? 7 A: No. The rule of thumb is normally, 8 if you have a plan, right, about something that's going 9 to happen in the future, I mean that's deemed to be 10 somewhat confidential, I mean you don't let that out -- 11 Q: Hmm hmm. 12 A: -- if you work on a project or 13 something. Once you have the build-up and those cruisers 14 -- like the rule of thumb of the cruisers are in the 15 community, it doesn't take anybody -- it was right across 16 the street here, they realized there was twenty (20) 17 cruisers going through Tim Horton's. 18 I mean the average person knew there was a 19 build-up of OPP cars in the Ipperwash area. So it's -- 20 the usual rule of thumb is it's fine to say, As you're 21 probably aware, we have a buildup of officers in the area 22 to handle it. 23 So, no, I don't think that that was 24 confidential at all. 25 Q: Sure. And I take it you didn't tell


1 him anything that you wouldn't have told the Mayor -- 2 A: No. 3 Q: -- or the MP? 4 A: And the press. 5 Q: The press or the -- the Chief -- Band 6 Chief, Tom Bressette. 7 A: Exactly. I think he was given a 8 similar message that we had a build-up. 9 Q: Okay. And do I understand it 10 correctly that Carson, at the time, was controlling the 11 information that you'd be allowed to tell Beaubien? You 12 may be the communicator, but Carson was controlling what 13 information would go out? 14 A: Absolutely. As the Incident 15 Commander he controls all the media releases and -- and 16 the -- and -- yes, he does control what gets out, who -- 17 that's why I called him right away to say I received a 18 phone call from the local MPP, you know, he -- he wants 19 to talk to you, do you want to talk with him. And I was 20 offering to be a buffer. 21 And he said, No, you go ahead. 22 So everything has to be vetted through 23 that Incident Commander. 24 Q: And while you didn't tell Mr. 25 Beaubien anything confidential, the purpose in your


1 conversations with him was really so -- to inform him so 2 he could handle calls he got from his constituents. 3 A: That was why -- I figured I was 4 giving him some information that when whoever it was were 5 calling him, he could say, Look, the police are taking it 6 seriously and this is -- there is additional resources in 7 the area and there was no need to panic and, you know. 8 So he could help us put down fear. 9 Q: I didn't hear the last part. 10 A: So he could help us to put down fear 11 in the community. I mean there was a certain -- 12 Q: Right. 13 A: -- apprehension. 14 Q: So he could be in a position to calm 15 his constituents -- 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: -- to the extent that he could by 18 telling him the OPP were doing what they could. 19 A: Right. 20 Q: But -- okay. And in these two (2) 21 conversations you had with Mr. Beaubien on September 5th, 22 did you form the impression that Mr. Beaubien was trying 23 to intimidate you into taking any specific action by 24 advising you that he called the Premier's Office? 25 A: No. I got more of a -- of a little


1 bit -- I got it that he was more -- he was more 2 exasperated, you know, by phone calls he's receiving, not 3 -- not, you know, demanding us to do anything. 4 I think he was looking for a little bit of 5 information. 6 Q: From Toronto? 7 A: No, I think for the constituents. 8 Q: Oh, okay. And did you form the 9 impression that he was using his position as the MPP to 10 somehow influence you to do something as an OPP officer 11 that you might not otherwise have done? 12 A: Not at all. 13 Q: Okay. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 Q: Just to be very specific, I take it 18 that Mr. Beaubien didn't ask you to do -- he didn't 19 demand any information from you at any point in time? 20 A: No, sir. No. 21 Q: And he wasn't being belligerent or 22 bullying or intimidating with you? 23 A: No, actually he was being fairly 24 friendly. Like he was just what -- more of a what do you 25 know, what's -- he knew about the occupation and it was


1 like, you know, What can you give me. 2 Q: All right. But the occupation 3 itself, I suggest to you, at that point in time was in 4 the public domain? 5 A: Yes, it was. 6 Q: And it was -- it was something that 7 was of community -- general community interest in the 8 Lambton County area. 9 A: Oh, it was on the news, everybody was 10 aware of it. 11 Q: Okay. And he didn't give you any 12 impression, through his conversations with you, that he 13 wanted you to do anything in particular, it was just that 14 he was getting calls and he wanted to be able to respond, 15 correct? 16 A: Yeah. He was looking for some 17 information about what the police response would be. 18 Q: Right. And throughout, he was 19 supportive of the OPP? 20 A: Yes. I think at one point he told me 21 that I -- once I told him that we had, you know, up to 22 sixty (60) ERT officers already in the area and 23 additional complement, he was very -- very complimentary. 24 He was, Good, that's good to hear. 25 Q: Okay. Finally, on this topic, I just


1 want your view -- just to -- looking back, did you do 2 anything different in the days through September 4th to 3 September 7th, 1995 in your policing duties, as a result 4 of speaking to Mr. Beaubien? 5 A: None whatsoever. 6 Q: Thank you, sir. Now, in this hearing 7 there's been an issue raised, and I may not describe it 8 accurately, but I'll do my best, which, in a summary way, 9 I'm going to describe as allegations of political 10 interference with police operations or politicians 11 attempting to influence police officers' actions in 12 operations, okay? 13 So, that's the framework of the next -- 14 A: Okay. 15 Q: -- couple of questions I want to ask 16 you. 17 A: Okay. 18 Q: And recognizing you haven't been here 19 everyday, but that's -- that's been an issue that's 20 raised, and allegations. 21 A: Okay. 22 Q: Okay. So for my final questions I 23 want to ask you, really because in 1995 you had 24 experience in communicating with politicians, that you 25 were --


1 A: By then I had, yes. 2 Q: Right. That was part of your role. 3 You were the community guy, right? 4 A: From February '93, that's what I -- 5 Q: Thank you. 6 A: -- became. 7 Q: Okay. So first, from your 8 experience, do you believe it's important for Detachment 9 commanders and senior officers, in an incident like this 10 of general community interest, to have open 11 communications with politicians? 12 A: I believe it's in the Police Service 13 Act that the Chief of Police, which a Detachment 14 commander is the Chief of Police, will have interactions 15 with municipal officials and Police Service Boards and 16 will know his community and will interact with the 17 community on policing issues. 18 Q: So rather than be improper, you 19 actually believe it's important to have those 20 communications? 21 A: I think it's my job. 22 Q: Thank you. And even though you agree 23 with that, there's a line that these communications are 24 not to cross -- 25 A: Absolutely.


1 Q: -- correct? 2 A: Yes, sir. 3 Q: And that is, you're not to provide 4 confidential police operational information to 5 politicians, right? 6 A: Yes, sir. 7 Q: And you're not to accept any 8 directions or instructions from them, right? 9 A: That's right, sir. Same with the 10 Police Service Board, you deal with that all the time. 11 They're not allowed to effect day-to-day operation of the 12 police. 13 You inform there's a break and enter 14 problem in the area, you inform them that maybe a drug 15 problem in the area, but you do not tell them how you're 16 combatting it. You do not take direction from them on 17 what to do about it, but you certainly brief the Police 18 Service Board, which includes a Mayor and a Councillor 19 from the local community. 20 And you brief them on the issues of the 21 day? 22 Q: Right. So in those discussions you 23 had with Marcel Beaubien in the days of August 11th 24 through September 7th, you didn't cross that line, 25 correct?


1 A: I do not believe I crossed the line. 2 Q: Okay. And this hearing -- in this 3 hearing the Commission has also accepted recommendations 4 from witnesses such as yourself. 5 And so I'm going to ask you a question 6 that's not dissimilar to the one I asked eleven (11) 7 months ago; when I look back in the transcripts, I 8 suddenly realized it was -- it was eleven (11) months ago 9 that I asked John Carson a similar question. 10 And that is: If an officer found himself 11 or herself in a similar position where there was an 12 incident of community interest such as you faced in the 13 early days of September 1995, would you recommend to the 14 Commission that he or she be free to communicate with 15 political representatives, be they the Native Band Chief, 16 the MP, the MPP or the Mayor? 17 A: I believe at the low level you have 18 to communicate. I mean, you have to tell people what's 19 going on and to a certain degree you have to let them 20 know what you're doing. 21 Q: Okay. And finally, those types of 22 communications, do you feel that they're helpful in a 23 tense situation of this kind? 24 A: I believe if we had of had more of 25 that, we maybe would have avoided what happened.


1 Q: Thank you, sir, those are my 2 questions. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Ms. 4 Perschy...? 5 6 (BRIEF PAUSE) 7 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 9 afternoon. 10 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: Good morning, 11 Commissioner. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 13 afternoon. 14 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: Good afternoon. Good 15 afternoon, Commissioner. 16 17 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. ANNA PERSCHY: 18 Q: Good afternoon, sir, my name is Anna 19 Perschy. I'm one (1) of the counsel for Deb Hutton who 20 at the time was the Executive Assistant to Premier 21 Harris. 22 And I just wanted to take you back and ask 23 you a few questions with respect to 1993. You testified 24 that in 1993 you were involved in planning for 25 contingency purposes with respect to a possible police


1 response within the Army Camp? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: And I wanted to quickly take you to 4 your notes from 1993. If you could turn to page 20, the 5 entry at May 31st, 1993, the entry at 11:30. I believe 6 it says: 7 "Travel to Chatham re meet Inspector 8 John Carson, Incident Commander of Camp 9 Ipperwash occupation --" 10 A: By Stoney Point. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Which notes 12 are these, Ms. Perschy, P-1447 or 1448 -- 13 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: I'm sorry, these are 14 the 1990 -- 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- which of 16 the two (2) exhibits? 17 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: I'm sorry, it's 18 Exhibit P-1447. I should have told you that. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Right. 20 THE WITNESS: What page? 21 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: Page 20, the entry of 22 May 31st. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: May 31st. 24 THE WITNESS: May 31st, page 20? 25 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: Yes.


1 MR. DERRY MILLAR: It's actually -- on 2 the -- the copy that you have it's the very first page, 3 and the page -- 4 THE WITNESS: Okay. 5 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- 20 is at the bottom 6 of that page. 7 THE WITNESS: Okay. 8 MR. DERRY MILLAR: I -- I also added page 9 numbers to that, so. 10 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: Thank you. Thank you, 11 Mr. Millar. 12 THE WITNESS: Okay. 13 14 CONTINUED BY MS. ANNA PERSCHY: 15 Q: I was just having some trouble 16 deciphering your handwriting. 17 A: Yeah, I don't blame you. 18 Q: Mine's equally bad, I assure you. If 19 you could just help me out with the entry at 11:30? 20 A: Right. Right. 21 Q: If you could just read it out for me? 22 A: "Travel to Chatham to meet Inspector 23 John Carson, the IC or Incident 24 Commander of Camp Ipperwash occupation 25 by Stoney Point Band."


1 Q: And then at 12:00? Is that 12:00 2 a.m. -- 3 A: That -- 4 Q: -- or 12:00 p.m.? 5 A: That's 12:00 -- we use the twenty- 6 four (24) hour clock so -- 7 Q: Right. 8 A: -- that's lunch time. 9 "Arrived. Briefed by Inspector Carson. 10 Assisted with prep of the ops plan and 11 the logistics plan." 12 Q: And then you returned to Petrolia at 13 16:30? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: Right. And if you could turn to the 16 entry at page 22 for June 1st? 17 A: Right. 18 Q: And it looks as if at 8:00 a.m. you 19 were on duty. 8:30 -- if you could just help me out with 20 that entry? 21 A: "8:30 I travelled to Number 1 22 District Headquarters. See Inspector 23 Carson. 9:30 I arrive and work on the 24 ops plan and the logistics plan for 25 Camp Ipperwash."


1 Q: And it appears that you resumed that 2 in the afternoon until 16:00 hours? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: And you testified that you looked 5 into accommodation at Centralia College and it appears 6 from your notes of June 3rd -- I won't take you to them - 7 - that you did so on June the 3rd. 8 And then from your notes if you can just 9 follow with me it appears that on June 4th, 7th, and 10 28th, and that's at pages 22 and 26 of your notes -- 11 A: Right. 12 Q: -- you worked on administrative 13 duties and on the logistics plan? 14 A: Right. 15 Q: And then if you could turn back to 16 page 26 the entry for June 28th. If you could just help 17 me out with that entry? 18 A: "Admin at Petrolia re. review the 19 logistics plan for Camp Ipperwash and 20 month end." 21 Q: And then you resumed that again in 22 the afternoon? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And then on June 30th, lower down on 25 the same page, if you could just help me out with that


1 entry. 2 A: Down at the very bottom? 3 Q: Yeah, from 9:00 a.m. 4 A: Oh, from 9:00? 5 "Travelled to the Number 2 DHQ [that's 6 London] reference meet with Inspector 7 Carson and Bill Dennis to review the 8 logistics plan and the Ops plan for 9 Ipperwash." 10 Q: And again at -- 11 A: "Commenced the meeting at 10:00. One 12 o'clock lunch, 13:45 resumed. 13 14:00 continue the meeting, 15:30 14 finish it. Pick up Sergeant Bell. 15 Bill Dennis in 401 on -- on Highway 4. 16 [His vehicle broke down]. 17 And wandered on back to Chatham." 18 Q: That appears to me to finish it. And 19 then finally on the following page on July the 1st, the 20 entry at 9:00 a.m. 21 A: "Rework the Ops plan and the 22 logistics plan from meeting day 23 before." 24 Q: Now, it appears from all of these 25 notes that you had some involvement, not only in the


1 logistics plan but also with respect to the operations 2 plan. 3 A: It would appear that I certainly gave 4 input into the overall plan. 5 Q: And would it be fair to say that in 6 order to prepare the logistics plan, you likely would 7 have had at least some understanding of the operational 8 plan and the various contingencies that had been 9 considered. 10 Is that fair? 11 A: Yes. There wasn't that many 12 contingencies that I remember. What I was given, I 13 remember, I believe was a number of officers and there 14 was -- I believe I was given a maximum of one hundred 15 (100) officers -- 16 Q: Well -- 17 A: -- to work with that. 18 Q: If you -- 19 A: But, I can look at the contingencies 20 and see. 21 Q: Yeah, if you turn actually to your 22 logistics plan, which I believe is Tab 73. 23 A: Hmm hmm. 24 Q: And I'll just quickly take you 25 through that.


1 A: Yes. 2 Q: Exhibit P-1449. You were dealing 3 with accommodations. And the bottom of the first page 4 indicates that arrangements have been made for 5 accommodation at Huron Hall at Centralia College, for 6 approximately a hundred and twenty-five (125) personnel. 7 A: Right. And I remembered it was 8 something like that. I was given a number to work with. 9 Q: And then on the next page it appears 10 that you also looked at further possible accommodation at 11 another residence, which could accommodate another a 12 hundred and twelve (112) personnel. 13 A: Right. 14 Q: And following down on the page you 15 also described making tentative arrangements for TRU at 16 the Pinery. 17 A: Right. That's right. 18 Q: And still further accommodation under 19 the heading, Additional Accommodation, at the Pinery Inn 20 for essential staff such as command staff and media 21 relations. 22 A: That's true. 23 Q: And then at page 4 it indicates that 24 you were also looking at details such as the number of 25 prisoner buses available and road block signage and


1 barricades. 2 A: Right. We were going to re-route 3 traffic around 21. 4 Q: So would it be fair to say that the 5 logistics planning was -- was fairly detailed and took 6 some time to do? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And you indicated that you don't 9 recall seeing the operational plan, which is dated June 10 2, 1993. But in light of your work on the logistics 11 plan, I just wanted to take you to the -- take you to 12 that plan which is P-500 -- sorry, P-555. 13 A: What number -- what number would that 14 be? 15 MR. DERRY MILLAR: It's -- it would be -- 16 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: It was -- I believe it 17 was a loose document that you were -- 18 MR. DERRY MILLAR: It was a the loose 19 document -- 20 THE WITNESS: Oh, it's right here, I 21 think, in front of me. 22 MR. DERRY MILLAR: P-555, the one that -- 23 THE WITNESS: I think that's it. 24 MR. DERRY MILLAR: I believe so. 25 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: Actually, what you


1 have in your hand is Document 2000715, but it also has a 2 copy of P-555 on -- on the top. So you can use that 3 version. 4 THE WITNESS: Okay. 5 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Okay. But if -- just 6 so that we're all on the same page, P-555, I believe, is 7 in the inside cover, Mr. Lacroix, of your -- of the first 8 book that's underneath. You'll see -- 9 THE WITNESS: Oh. P-555, okay. I have 10 three (3) of them. 11 12 CONTINUED BY MS. ANNA PERSCHY: 13 Q: You -- you want one that's entitled 14 Exhibit P-555 -- 15 A: Yeah. 16 Q: -- it's the one that's the June 2nd, 17 1993. 18 A: Okay. 19 Q: And you don't recall the document, 20 but you may -- you may recall the scenarios. If you 21 could turn to page 6 there's a reference to several 22 different scenarios. 23 Scenario 1 dealt with a situation where 24 the Department of National Defence sought and obtained an 25 injunction requiring the OPP to remove the occupiers.


1 And it provided that the occupiers would be instructed to 2 remove themselves and their property, and that if they 3 failed to do so, they would be arrested and charged with 4 violation of the injunction -- 5 A: Hmm hmm. 6 Q: -- although the specific charges 7 would depend on the wording of the injunction and 8 pursuant to which statute the injunction had been 9 obtained. 10 And I take it, in a general way, you -- 11 you were aware that that was the scenario that was -- 12 A: Oh, yes, I -- we did. And those 13 meetings you took me through, those -- those discussions 14 took place at those meetings about what's the best case 15 scenario, what's the worst case scenario. 16 Q: Contingency planning. 17 A: Contingency planning. 18 Q: Precisely. And at page 7 there's a 19 description of some of the staffing that was considered. 20 A: Hmm hmm. 21 Q: And the plan indicates that 22 approximately seventy (70) staff would be required for 23 the scenario 1, including about forty (40) uniformed 24 constables with twenty (20) per shift for the road 25 blocks.


1 And I take it, again, that that would be 2 consistent with your recollection of these sorts of 3 discussions? 4 A: Yeah. There would be like two (2) 5 personnel per road block, so there must have been ten 6 (10) roadblocks. 7 Q: And at page 8, the plan envisioned 8 that if the OPP had to remove the occupiers, they 9 wouldn't -- they would need some additional resources, 10 and those resources included a tactics and rescue team on 11 standby, which I take it is a reference to TRU? 12 A: TRU, yes. 13 Q: And then depending on the number of 14 occupiers, the plan was assuming a 1:1 ratio if the 15 occupiers were passive. 16 A: Right. 17 Q: So if there were fifty (50) 18 occupiers, there would be fifty (50) additional officers. 19 A: Right. 20 Q: A hundred (100) occupiers, hundred 21 (100) additional officers, et cetera. 22 A: Right. 23 Q: And again, in a general way, do you 24 recall the -- that sort of contingency planning? 25 A: Yes, I do vaguely recall those


1 discussions. You know, talking about if somebody goes 2 along with you, you only need one (1) officer, yes. 3 Q: And it also mentions that in the 4 event that there were more than a hundred (100) non- 5 passive occupiers, the second TRU would be brought in? 6 A: Right. 7 Q: Now, again, as you were mentioning, 8 this was sort of worst case scenario -- 9 A: Right. 10 Q: -- planning. Scenario 2, if you 11 could turn -- if you could look further down the page, 12 contemplated the possibility of the Military removing the 13 occupiers themselves, with or without an injunction from 14 the base. 15 A: Right. 16 Q: And were you aware of that scenario? 17 A: Yeah. We thought that was a real 18 long shot, but when you're contingency planning, like you 19 say, you got to look at all eventualities. 20 Would the Military Police do this? They 21 had a fairly big contingent of military police, but we 22 did not feel this was going to happen. 23 Q: And it indicates that the planned 24 response would be the same as scenario number 3, so let's 25 turn to scenario number 3.


1 Scenario number 3 contemplated the 2 occupiers leaving the base, but then occupying either 3 Highway 21 or Ipperwash Provincial Park. 4 A: Right. 5 Q: And the plan envisaged that the 6 Ministry of Transportation or MNR would seek and obtain 7 an injunction. And do you recall some contingency 8 planning around that? 9 A: Just that that would be -- I mean 10 there was some meetings with Les Kobayashi of MNR, that 11 they would immediately -- that their responsibility would 12 be to seek an injunction forthwith. 13 Q: And again, in that scenario, if you 14 turn the page and go to page 9, the plan was to isolate 15 the area, contain it. And it was again envisioned that 16 that would involve approximately seventy (70) officers. 17 A: Right. 18 Q: And it appears very similar, in fact, 19 to scenario number 1 in terms of staffing. 20 And then if you turn to page 10. If the 21 OPP had to remove the occupiers, additional staff would 22 be required, and again, in the same number's contemplated 23 in scenario number 1. 24 And again, is that something that, in a 25 general way, you recall discussing?


1 A: Yes. 2 Q: Could you turn now to Document 3 2000715, which I provided to your counsel last night. 4 It's the big, thick one that you have. I've tabbed it, 5 so we can go through it fairly quickly. 6 A: Which one was that again? 7 Q: It's -- 8 A: Oh, this one -- 9 Q: -- document number -- 10 A: -- with the yellow -- 11 Q: -- 2000715, with the tabs. 12 A: Okay. With the little stickies on 13 it? 14 Q: Yes. It's just it's a bundle of 15 documents, so I've tabbed it for convenience. The first 16 document is another copy of this plan dated June 2nd, 17 1993. 18 A: Hmm hmm. 19 Q: The second is a copy of a draft memo 20 from Eileen Hipfner to Inspector Scott -- 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I -- 22 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Do you have a copy of 23 that? 24 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: Oh, I'm sorry. Yes, I 25 do.


1 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Do you have one for 2 the Commissioner? 3 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: Yes, I have a copy. 4 My apologies, Commissioner. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 6 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: I was getting ahead of 7 myself. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 CONTINUED BY MS. ANNA PERSCHY: 13 Q: So the first document is the 14 operational plan dated June 2nd, 1993. The second 15 document is a memo or draft memo from Eileen Hipfner to 16 Inspector Doug Scott, which is copied, you'll see at the 17 end, to Detective Superintendent Wall, among others. And 18 it deals with the authority and obligations of the OPP 19 with respect to trespass at the Camp. 20 Do you recall seeing this memo? 21 A: Never. 22 Q: Okay. And the third document is a 23 letter to the Superintendent at Chatham -- sorry, 24 Superintendent at London, attention Superintendent Wall, 25 and that's dated June 9th, 1993 and it encloses the


1 logistics and communications plans? 2 A: Right. 3 Q: And it appears, if you turn to the -- 4 the next page, the letter dated June 4th, 1993 from K. W. 5 Sharp, the Staff Sergeant? 6 A: Right, Chris Sharp, or I mean -- 7 Q: Yeah. It appears from that letter 8 that you were involved in discussing -- discussions with 9 Inspector Carson and others regarding communications, and 10 it, in fact, attaches a communications plan -- 11 A: Right. 12 Q: -- as part of the appendices. Do you 13 recall seeing a communications plan? 14 A: I do. I remember going out with him 15 too, to site where the TOC vehicles should be. 16 Q: And again, that would have been part 17 of your involvement in these -- in this contingency 18 planning? 19 A: Yes. It kind of fell over the 20 logistics side, I guess, but not totally. 21 Q: The -- on the letter dated June 4th, 22 1993 it indicates, on -- on the side, that it's being 23 forwarded to the Superintendent Number 2, attention 24 Inspector J. F. Carson. And it's being forwarded for 25 your information and dissemination. And it's signed by


1 Superintendent. 2 And I'm just wondering if you recognize 3 the signature on that? 4 A: That's the back of which one now? 5 That's the -- 6 Q: That's just the -- the letter of June 7 4th, 1993 from Ken W. Sharp or K. W. Sharp. 8 A: June 4th? 9 Q: There's a little box on the side, the 10 second page of this -- this third document, the first -- 11 the first page being the letter from Inspector Carson. 12 A: I'm having a hard -- a hard time 13 finding it, for some reason. Oh, okay. All right. 4th 14 of June Chris Sharp, yeah, communication plan Camp 15 Ipperwash? 16 Q: That's the one. And -- 17 A: Yes? 18 Q: -- there's a little box on the left- 19 hand side and I'm just wondering if you recognize the 20 signature, the -- just above, "Superintendent?" 21 It wasn't clear to me if it was perhaps 22 Superintendent Randall or perhaps Superintendent or 23 Detective Superintendent Wall. 24 A: I can't -- 25 Q: Okay.


1 A: I can't recognize... 2 Q: The fourth document in the bundle 3 appears to be the logistics plan that you previously 4 identified. Do you recall to whom you would have 5 provided copies of the logistics plan? 6 A: If it's a contingency plan it would 7 have gone to John Carson only, to be held on a shelf if 8 required. I mean I'm sure there would have been maybe 9 two (2) copies. I would have kept my rough notes. 10 Q: Okay. 11 A: Bill Dennis would have had maybe 12 rough notes. But it would have gone to John Carson and 13 he would have had the master and kept it in case he 14 needed it. 15 Q: Okay. And in the fifth document in 16 this bundle is a June 3rd, 1993 letter to you from Rob 17 Black, and it's just following up on conversations that 18 you had regarding the use of the Centralia College 19 facilities, and it encloses a proposed menu. 20 A: No. 21 Q: And I take it you recall getting that 22 letter? 23 A: Yes, I do, that was -- I asked him to 24 give me a letter quoting, you know, what it would cost. 25 I'd gone and done a tour. And the nurse's station, I


1 liked that idea for a lock-down for weapons. So I asked 2 him to give me a quote for whole package and that's what 3 this would be. 4 Q: And there's also -- there's maps of 5 Centralia College and document dealing with room capacity 6 and -- 7 A: They would have been put into the 8 joining instructions to the officers when and if they 9 were called. 10 Q: Okay. 11 A: So they would have been faxed out to 12 the different Detachments: Here's your joining 13 instructions, proceed to Centralia College, check in at 14 that booth area there. 15 There was an administrative area we had 16 set up in the barracks where they would check in. 17 Q: And with respect to this letter from 18 Rob Black, do you know, do you recall to whom you would 19 have provided this correspondence? I mean obviously you 20 would have had a copy, but do you know...? 21 A: Any -- everything would have gone to 22 John Carson. 23 Q: Okay. 24 A: As the Incident Commander overall in 25 charge.


1 Q: And then finally there's a document 2 entitled, "Operational Plan," with the subheading, 3 "Primary Investigative File Co-ordinator." 4 And that appears to deal with issues such 5 as: The composition of the arrest teams, transportation 6 of prisoners, location of the detention and release 7 centre in Forest, and a sample of the arrest report, and 8 the right to counsel. 9 And do you recall seeing this document? 10 A: I don't recall this part. This would 11 have been added by the crime -- there would have been a 12 crime rep on the team, you know, I was the logistic rep, 13 there would have been a crime rep to look at that -- 14 these minor details. 15 Q: As part of the operational planning. 16 A: As part of the op -- like John would 17 have delegated it out to crime ops. 18 Q: Okay. I understand. I was wondering 19 if you could have -- make this document the next exhibit. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: The bundle 21 of documents? 22 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: Yes. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: The package? 24 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: Because it is -- it is 25 one -- I think it is one document.


1 THE REGISTRAR: P-1466, Your Honour. 2 3 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1466: Document Number 2000715. OPP 4 Operational Plan for 5 Occupation of CFA Ipperwash; 6 memo to Inspector Dave Scott 7 from Eileen Hipfner June 02, 8 1993; Logistical and 9 Communications Plans to 10 London and Chatham OPP 11 Superintendents, June 1993; 12 Letter from Rob Black to Wade 13 Lacroix, June 03, 1993. 14 15 CONTINUED BY MS. ANNA PERSCHY: 16 Q: And we haven't found any other 17 versions of the operations plan, other than the one from 18 May and then this one of June 2nd, 1993. 19 I take it you're not any -- aware of any 20 other copies of the Operational Plans for 1993. 21 A: No. That -- what was that note on 22 the -- what was the last note I had on -- 23 Q: Well they do go forward. 24 A: -- about reviewing. 25 Q: Yeah. They -- I think the last date


1 was July the 1st. 2 A: July the 1st was the last date of a 3 review? So I mean, obviously, what would happen, that 4 would become the final copy; as -- as revisions were made 5 it would be shredded and the final product would be the - 6 - would be the plan. 7 Q: But you're not aware of any -- of any 8 other documents? 9 A: No. 10 Q: Okay. 11 A: No, there would have only been one 12 (1) -- one (1) plan, one (1) master. 13 Q: Now finally, just turning very 14 briefly to 1995. You testified that you don't recall 15 seeing a copy of Project Maple, of the operational plan, 16 but Mr. Millar took you to your call with Inspector 17 Carson on September 5th in the morning at 8:20. 18 I believe the transcript is at Tab 4 of 19 your materials. It's Exhibit P-44(a). And you could 20 look at it if you want. I don't think you need to. 21 But it does appear from the transcript 22 that Inspector Carson advised you that the objective was 23 to try and contain the situation -- 24 A: Right. 25 Q: -- and -- and to negotia -- and to


1 try and negotiate. 2 A: Which was the same mission from 3 before. 4 Q: And -- and I take it, by containment, 5 you understood that the idea was to sort of limit the 6 situation? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: Avoid having it spread beyond the 9 Park and also prevent additional people from coming into 10 the Park to make it a bigger situation? 11 A: When you read "contained," the 12 acronym is ICE. Whenever you read contain in the OPP it 13 means ICE. 14 Q: And ICE is an acronym -- 15 A: To isolate it. 16 Q: Isolate. Right. 17 A: With inner and outer perimeters. To 18 keep outsiders from getting in, to keep the innocents 19 from wandering in, to keep reinforcements from getting 20 there. 21 The 'C' is to control access, checkpoints 22 and that. 23 And then the 'E' is evacuate. So evacuate 24 anybody in harm's way. So whenever you say contain it's 25 really meaning all three (3).


1 Isolate it, control movements to and fro 2 and evacuate the innocents. 3 Q: Okay. Thank you. And during this 4 phone call with Inspector Carson you inquired as to an 5 injunction, and he responded: 6 "Yes, Natural Resources are addressing 7 that as we speak." 8 And again, I take it that you had the 9 general understanding that the plan was that the OPP 10 would contain, as you said, ICE, and try and negotiate. 11 And at the same time the OPP wanted MNR to go and seek an 12 injunction. 13 A: Yes. That was my understanding. 14 Q: Those are all my questions. Thank 15 you, Commissioner. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 17 Ms. Perschy. We'll adjourn for lunch now. 18 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry stands 19 adjourned until 1:45. 20 21 --- Upon recessing at 12:41 p.m. 22 --- Upon resuming at 1:53 p.m. 23 24 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 25 resumed, please be seated.


1 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 2 Good afternoon, Mr. Falconer. 3 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Good afternoon, Mr. 4 Commissioner. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Is Mr. 6 Roland in the room? Oh, okay, I didn't see him. 7 Mr. Roland is here. 8 9 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 10 Q: Good afternoon, Mr. Lacroix? 11 A: Good afternoon. 12 Q: I act on behalf of Aboriginal Legal 13 Services of Toronto. My name is Julian Falconer. 14 A: Yes, sir. 15 Q: Mr. Lacroix, I understand you're -- 16 you're going to be somewhat brave this afternoon, you're 17 not feeling that well. So if there's a point in time you 18 need a break would you let me know? 19 A: I'll get my hand up or you'll see me 20 heading for the men's room. 21 Q: All right. But it's important that 22 we have your evidence clear from your mind. So you're 23 comfortable to proceed? 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: All right. Could I ask you, sir, if


1 you could turn to Tab 52 of the Commission counsel 2 binders that you have in front of you? It's the -- 3 Exhibit P-477. It's the trial evidence of Mr. Lacroix on 4 the Warren George trial, September -- 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We're 6 calling this P-1462 now, Mr. Falconer. 7 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Oh, all right. 8 Sorry about that. My apologies. 9 10 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 11 Q: Do you have that in front of you? 12 A: Tab 52, yes. 13 Q: Yes. Now, Mr. Millar had tendered 14 your evidence from three (3) different trials. You'll 15 recall before the lunch break your evidence with respect 16 to the Warren George trial -- 17 A: Right. 18 Q: -- the Cecil Bernard George trial, 19 and the -- the final trial involving Mr. Cottrelle. Do 20 you -- do you remember Mr. Millar doing that? 21 A: Yeah, vaguely, not -- so what's that, 22 five (5), six (6), seven (7) years ago? 23 Q: No, no. I'm -- I'm asking you if 24 your remember Mr. Millar -- 25 A: Oh, what he asked me about before?


1 Oh, yeah. Yes, yes. 2 Q: -- tendering your evidence of that? 3 A: Yes. Yes. 4 Q: That was just an hour ago. 5 A: Yes, sir. 6 Q: All right, good. And in respect of 7 that I -- I know Mr. Millar, I'm sure, assumed it, but in 8 each case that he filed your trial evidence as an 9 exhibit, I take it we can all rest assured that you did 10 your best to tell the truth in each one of those trials? 11 A: Best I could at the time. 12 Q: Right. And you're still comfortable 13 today that those trial transcripts are accurate? 14 A: Accurate as they could be. 15 Q: All right. Fair enough. Thank you. 16 With respect to the Warren George trial, I just want to 17 ask you, if you could, to turn to page 124. 18 And I'm going to slightly parse your 19 answer, but it's meant to save us time. But I do not 20 want you to feel uncomfortable about going backwards, 21 when I show you where I want to ask you about. 22 If you turn to page 124, you should see W. 23 A. Lacroix in-chief, do you see that? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: Now, you prefer to be called Lacroix


1 and not Lacroix, correct, sir? 2 A: I'm good with either one. 3 Q: My sister's a former French teacher 4 and I need to explain to her on the record why I would be 5 calling you Lacroix. 6 A: Because you're in southwestern 7 Ontario, so. 8 Q: Fair enough. Line 24, page 124, 9 you'll -- you'll see at line 24 you're in the middle of 10 an answer, and that's why I want to be careful that 11 you're comfortable with what I'm doing, but you're 12 explaining, during your examination in-chief by the 13 Crown, you're explaining how you turned the list of names 14 of the officers who discharged their firearms over to 15 invest -- to Inspector Carson, and then you refer to the 16 SIU involvement, all right? 17 And that's where I am starting with you. 18 It starts: 19 "I turned that list..." 20 Do you see that? 21 A: Yeah. 22 Q: I turn -- quote: 23 "I turned that list over to Inspector 24 Carson, of the seven (7) members that 25 identified had used their firearms.


1 Made sure we had that, we had the 2 medical attention taken care of and 3 that was it. No debrief because, of 4 course, it would become an SIU mandate, 5 so there wouldn't be a debrief." 6 A: Right. 7 Q: So just pausing there, I want you to 8 go -- look backwards very quickly, that you're 9 comfortable that that -- I don't need to go backwards in 10 terms of quoting you out of context. 11 You were explaining that you didn't 12 debrief because you knew there would be an SIU 13 investigation, correct? 14 A: And as I said today, SIU or CIB. I 15 mean obviously there was going to be an investigation. I 16 mean, did I really know SIU would be coming in? 17 I knew there was going to be an 18 investigation because lethal force had been used. 19 Q: All right. Well just to go backwards 20 a little bit on that same page. I don't want to be 21 overly picayune about this, but at line 9 on the same 22 page. 23 A: Hmm hmm. 24 Q: This is you again, speaking. 25 A: Right.


1 Q: "I halted them, basically told them, 2 because, I mean, I certainly was aware 3 that there had been gunfire." 4 A: Right. 5 Q: "I said that, you know, I was aware 6 that we had fired so I said that it 7 would now become an SIU mandate, 8 probably, and that I wanted the members 9 who had fired their weapons to identify 10 themselves to me." 11 A: Right. 12 Q: "Come over to me when I broke them 13 off and identify themselves --" 14 A: Right. 15 Q: "-- which seven (7) did." 16 So again, it's fair to say that you 17 expected it would probably involve an SIU investigation? 18 A: Yeah, I'm using that -- this is after 19 the fact that I know SIU was involved. At that time, the 20 night of, I knew that there was going to be an 21 investigation. 22 So two (2) years after the fact I'm 23 referring to something I know to be the fact, that SIU 24 did come in and do an investigation. 25 I'm re -- I am -- the essence of what I'm


1 saying is, I'm -- I expect an investigation to be 2 conducted. 3 Q: You have made reference to the copy - 4 - if we go to -- the Commissioner and a copy to the 5 Witness. You made reference to the SIU protocol 6 involving the twenty-four (24) hour notion of an officer 7 knowing within twenty-four (24) hours that he's a subject 8 officer. 9 You remember that? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: You also made reference to what you 12 expected was protocol with respect to SIU about 13 references to your duty report. 14 Do you remember saying that? 15 A: Right. 16 Q: You also testified about the use of 17 force report and how your view, your opinion of the use 18 of force report, was that it was something meant for 19 training purposes, correct? 20 A: That's my -- that was my 21 understanding, yes. 22 Q: You also testified that the Police 23 Services Act, as far as you were concerned, required or 24 created a duty on a Chief of Police to have interactions 25 with politicians.


1 Do you remember testifying to that? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: It's fair to say that over the number 4 of years that you served as a police officer, you'd 5 become familiar with the functions and obligations you 6 have under the Police Services Act, yes? 7 A: I mean, on a day-to-day basis, yes. 8 Q: Right. And -- 9 A: I'm not an expert in it -- 10 Q: Fair enough. And you, in your day- 11 to-day knowledge, know that, in particular -- and I'm 12 putting Section 113(5), with respect to Special 13 Investigations Unit of the Police Services Act, in front 14 of you. 15 The direct quote: 16 "The director may, on his or her own 17 initiative, and shall, at the request 18 of the Solicitor General or Attorney 19 General, cause investigations to be 20 conducted into the circumstances of 21 serious injuries and deaths that may 22 have resulted in criminal offences 23 committed by Police Officers." 24 A: Right. 25 Q: You know that in the circumstances of


1 serious injury or death, where a police officer is 2 involved, the SIU mandate's invoked; you know that? 3 A: That's right. 4 Q: And you knew that back then? 5 A: That's right. 6 Q: All right. Now, so when you tell Mr. 7 Commissioner, as you just did, that when you testified at 8 the trial involving Warren George, that you were really 9 looking back at it -- at the time, back several years and 10 you'd already known that SIU had gotten involved. 11 Isn't it fair to say that, as the head of 12 the Crowd Management Unit, who yourself had discharged a 13 firearm, in circumstances where you knew at least one (1) 14 person had left in an ambulance, isn't it fair to say 15 that -- that you would have expected the SIU mandate to 16 be invoked? 17 A: Oh, yes, I'm in agreeing with that -- 18 Q: All right. 19 A: -- I just -- I don't know that that 20 night I used, SIU will come, because we did not know of 21 any fatalities, but I knew that there was definitely 22 going to be an investigation. 23 And yes, under the circumstances you gave, 24 I would expect SIU to be called. 25 Q: Right. But the circumstances I gave


1 were circumstances to your knowledge. 2 A: Right. 3 Q: First of all, a gentleman had left in 4 an ambulance, and you knew that? 5 A: I'm not sure I knew he left in an 6 ambulance. 7 Q: You didn't know there was an 8 individual arrested by your arrest team and placed, 9 ultimately, in an ambulance? You didn't know about that? 10 A: I heard them calling for an ambulance 11 and -- 12 Q: Right. 13 A: -- I -- I know when we got back to 14 the TOC he was looked at, but I have no knowledge that he 15 left in the ambulance. 16 Q: You knew that you had, as you put it, 17 in your -- in your transcript -- you used the colloquial 18 in your transcript of September 7th, 1995, you knew you 19 had coldcocked someone, as you put it? 20 A: Right. 21 Q: You knew they went down when you 22 coldcocked them? 23 A: That's right. 24 Q: You knew that people had been injured 25 and you knew that guns had been fired?


1 A: That 's right. 2 Q: So can you and I agree that it was a 3 likelihood that SIU was going to be involved? 4 A: We can agree that there was a 5 likelihood that SIU would be involved. 6 Q: Thank you. Now in the testimony that 7 you gave on the Warren trial, if we could just turn back 8 to it very quickly, please? 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 Q: In the testimony that you gave where 13 I read from page 124, you stated that you didn't debrief 14 because of that likely involvement, correct? 15 A: Right. It had become OPP policy not 16 to debrief when it was the subject of an investigation. 17 Q: Right. And I take it the whole point 18 is, is that an investigation by SIU, as far as it goes, 19 is, in essence, a criminal investigation, isn't it? 20 A: Yes, sir. 21 Q: And it's no less important a criminal 22 investigation because they're investigation police 23 officers, is it? 24 A: No. 25 Q: And so that, like any criminal


1 investigation, you would hope the basic rules surrounding 2 integrity of evidence would be respected; is that fair? 3 A: That's fair. 4 Q: So would you agree with me that a 5 classic example of protecting the integrity of evidence 6 would be ensuring that witnesses, for example, who are 7 eye witnesses to an incident, are segregated; that would 8 be an example? 9 A: Yes, sir. 10 Q: And in any standard investigative 11 protocols you've invoked, just to do criminal 12 investigations, it's preferable to do that, right? 13 A: Yes, sir. 14 Q: And that's part and parcel of the 15 rationale you used yourself when you were explaining 16 during the Warren George trial why people didn't debrief. 17 They didn't debrief because you didn't want people's 18 versions getting merged into other versions, right? 19 A: Right. 20 Q: The danger is that people, for 21 innocent reasons, might subconsciously take on the 22 recollections of others, correct? 23 A: That's right. Well, actually that's 24 up for a lot of discussion, because there's lots of 25 people say a debrief helps you to really put things in


1 perspective, but, you're right, there can be cross- 2 recollection. 3 Q: And you knew, whatever the literature 4 you're referring to is, you knew that OPP policy and 5 protocol was not to debrief in the face of an SIU 6 investigation? 7 A: That's right. 8 Q: And so as a senior officer, in fact, 9 the ranking officer in charge of CMU, which was what, 10 thirty (30) to forty (40) police officers? 11 A: Over that, yes. 12 Q: As the senior officer of thirty (30) 13 to forty (40) police officers, not the entire senior 14 officer, you had Incident Commander Carson, correct? 15 A: Right. That's correct. 16 Q: But you were a very senior officer in 17 the ranks, right? 18 A: Senior within the CMU, yes. 19 Q: Yes. You knew that it was important 20 that you gave appropriate direction. And that's what you 21 tell us at page 124 of the George trial, correct? 22 A: Hmm hmm. 23 Q: Sorry? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: All right. Now, I want to read on


1 though. At -- at line 29, page 124 of the George trial, 2 I'm still at Tab 52, Mr. Commissioner. 3 "Q: Why would it become an SIU 4 mandate? 5 A: Well because I felt -- I mean I 6 knew that there had been quite a bit of 7 gunfire, and I felt that somebody 8 probably was injured. I felt, if 9 anything, the driver of the car was 10 injured and they would be calling 11 either SIU or our own Criminal 12 Investigation Branch. I knew it would 13 become the subject of an investigation, 14 so we don't want to get into a debrief, 15 you know, actually getting into 16 collusion or something like that. I 17 knew that the members would want to be 18 sent to their own rooms and they would 19 be contacted by the investigators." 20 That is all true, correct? 21 A: Yes, sir. 22 Q: Now, if you could please direct your 23 attention to the remaining excerpt of your trial 24 transcript from the same tab, which is P-1462, but now at 25 page 56. Oh, I'm sorry, page 438, there's page numbers


1 on top. 2 I'm sorry, it's at Tab 53. It's my fault, 3 I gave you the wrong tab number, my apologies. If you go 4 to Tab 53. 5 A: And what was the page? 6 Q: Yeah. And that would be Exhibit P- 7 1463. 8 A: Hmm. Tab 53 -- 9 Q: Do you have that? And it's your 10 cross-examination during the George trial. And it should 11 be page 56. Can you find that? 12 A: I'm trying. 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 Q: So you have page 56 in front of you? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: Now this is a cross-examination by 19 defence counsel in the Warren George case, and I just 20 want to draw your attention to a question at line 14. 21 "Q: And when you say, just now, that 22 you debriefed the officers, what does 23 that mean? 24 A: Usually after an action we have an 25 after action report and we go through


1 the whole operation to see where we can 2 learn from it, what we do different 3 next time. 4 It's an operational debrief, not a 5 court debrief. But it has been deemed 6 there's never been a decision about 7 whether, like it's actually policy to 8 do it. But, unfortunately, when 9 something goes wrong, the one that you 10 actually could learn from, they don't 11 want you to do debrief because if 12 lawyers come along and said that it was 13 collusion, and you got together, and 14 you fabricated your story, so we 15 decided not to debrief. 16 Q: Okay. Well just so I understand 17 this, so there was an operational 18 debrief; is that right? 19 A: No. I said there was no, none, 20 none. 21 Q: No debrief of any sort? 22 A: Of any sort. The normal debrief 23 is an operational debrief and it was 24 decided not to have an operational 25 debrief."


1 Top of page 57. 2 "Q: Do I understand that your unit 3 was lodged at a specific motel; all of 4 you? 5 A: I was pulled in from home, I was 6 not lodged anywhere. I presume they 7 were up in the Grand Bend area staying 8 in different hotels. 9 Q: You don't know where they were? 10 A: No, sir. Their team leaders did. 11 They were turned back over. When I 12 broke that formation from CMU, I handed 13 them over to their ERT. They'd now 14 break back into fifteen (15) man units. 15 They have NCO's responsible for each of 16 the four (4) ERT teams that were on 17 scene that night. 18 You know, break off, if you don't 19 understand the military terminology, 20 you know, it's a little bit of a -- 21 this is the way it will be, break off. 22 They break off under the command of 23 their own NCO's. 24 They reverted back to their team 25 leaders who had them lodged and given


1 orders to go to their room, rest and 2 await further instruction. 3 Q: Okay. And were you present when 4 anyone told them not to discuss this 5 with anyone? 6 A: I believe that was part of the 7 debrief. That they're to go to their 8 rooms and not to discuss it, and 9 they're to wait until either CIB or SIU 10 came to take a statement." 11 Is that accurate, sir? 12 A: Yes, sir. 13 Q: All right. Again, this is consistent 14 with the principles you and I discussed before, correct, 15 Mr. Lacroix? 16 A: Yes, sir. 17 Q: Now reading on: 18 "Q: Did you order them to do that? 19 A: I very well could have. 20 Q: Do you know whether you did? 21 A: I probably did. That's policy to 22 say you were not to discuss the case." 23 You were asked those questions and you 24 gave those answers? 25 A: Right.


1 Q: Do you consider the autopsy results 2 of the person allegedly shot by the police, part of the 3 case? 4 A: If I was looking for the autopsy 5 report, I would say it's part of the case. And I would 6 say the ballistics report would be a part of the case. 7 Q: How about who you hit and how you hit 8 them, would that be part of the case? 9 A: I imagine it would be a part of the 10 case. 11 Q: And would you agree with me that 12 discussing that with the present TRU leader who is on 13 duty, being Brian Deevy, Staff Sergeant Brian Deevy, 14 correct? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: Would be discussing the case? 17 A: In some fashion, yes. 18 Q: Now, if other persons involved in the 19 investigation were present with you, on your side of the 20 telephone, and could hear your discussions, would you 21 agree that would involve them hearing your discussion of 22 the case? 23 A: If they were within ear shot, it 24 could. 25 Q: And would you agree that when you


1 answered questions by Mr. Millar before the lunch break 2 about who you could hear in the background, you told Mr. 3 Millar that possibly Ken Deane was one of those people in 4 the background whose voice you could hear on the tape. 5 A: I said there's one (1) sentence there 6 that sounds like it could be Ken Deane. 7 Q: And, in fact, that would be pretty 8 consistent with Tab 24, wouldn't it? Could you turn to 9 Tab 24 for a minute? 10 11 (BRIEF PAUSE) 12 13 Q: Now what's Ken Deane's nickname? 14 A: Tex. 15 Q: And you knew it was Tex? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: You referred to him as Tex? 18 A: I refer to all TRU team members 19 usually by their nickname. 20 Q: And you were Waddie or the Wad? 21 A: Yeah. 22 Q: And so at the start of this 23 conversation, when it says, half way down the page, 24 you're talking to Staff Sergeant Brian Deevy, right? 25 A: Yeah.


1 Q: And Brian Deevy, at the time you're 2 talking to him, is in charge of the TRU operation at 3 Ipperwash Park; he's on duty, right? 4 A: That's right. 5 Q: He's at the command post, right? 6 A: That's right. 7 Q: And you've called him, correct? 8 A: Yes. Yes, sir. 9 Q: And you say, half way down the page, 10 quote: 11 "I'm here with Tex and the boys." 12 Do you see that? 13 A: Yes, sir. 14 Q: Would you agree with me that, as you 15 put it, it's possible that you heard Ken Deane in the 16 background, as you said about the tape, right? 17 A: Hmm hmm. 18 Q: Yes? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And that possibility is somewhat 21 enhanced with your statement to Mr. Deevy, quote: 22 "I'm here with Tex and the boys." 23 A: Yeah. But I also said that it could 24 be when I'm over at the Parkdale, because that's where 25 Alpha team was.


1 But, after listening to that tape, I said 2 there was one (1) line in there that sounds like that 3 could be Ken Deane. 4 Q: Which would be consistent with: 5 "I'm here with Tex and the boys." 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: And since we now know that, in 8 listening to the tape, that you can hear the voices of 9 others behind you, including the television, yes? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: You hear a female and a male voice 12 from the television in your room, yes? 13 A: Right. 14 Q: You hear the voice of the gentleman 15 who was a former TRU member, helping you or counselling 16 you. His name is Ian...? 17 A: McGregor. 18 Q: McGregor, yes. You hear his voice? 19 A: Yeah, I'm -- I'm trying to decide if 20 it's his I hear. There's definitely another voice there, 21 a male voice. 22 Q: So if we can hear their voices, it's 23 fair to say they likely can hear your voice, right? 24 A: Possible. It seems to me I was in 25 the corner with the telephone and they were all over


1 critiquing the tele -- if you listen to it, they're 2 critiquing the news. 3 Q: So you can hear them critiquing the 4 news? 5 A: Yeah, on the microphone of the -- of 6 -- it doesn't mean they hear me speaking into it -- into 7 a telephone, but -- 8 Q: Did you give them any instruction 9 that they were to leave the room and not listen to you 10 debrief with Staff Sergeant Deevy? Did you instruct -- 11 A: No, sir. 12 Q: -- them to? 13 A: No, sir. 14 Q: Did you tell them, don't listen 15 because I'm discussing the case right now? 16 A: No, sir. 17 Q: And might I ask you, your explanation 18 for this discussion aside, in other words, just for a 19 moment leaving what you've told us this morning for why 20 you would have made these inquiries of Staff Sergeant 21 Brian Deevy, when you testified at the George trial, did 22 you know about this transcript? 23 A: I didn't -- I didn't remember this 24 phone call. 25 Q: I see. So at the time that you


1 testified at the George trial, when you said no one 2 debriefed, and you, in fact, think you may have 3 instructed your officers not to debrief, you wouldn't 4 know that there was a tape of you doing just that, would 5 you have? 6 A: I don't recall this phone call until 7 I seen it. 8 Q: When did you first see it? 9 A: I don't know, about a month ago. 10 Q: Has the OPP in -- I take it, if you 11 didn't know about this taped call until a month ago, it's 12 fair to say the OPP never brought this taped call to your 13 attention? 14 A: Not -- no, not that I know of. 15 Q: And therefore not only did they not 16 bring it to your attention, you were in no way 17 reprimanded or disciplined about this phone call? 18 A: No, sir. 19 Q: All right. Now, you did say to Mr. 20 Millar, and I believe this was a quote, you were 21 attempting to explain some part of the call and you went 22 on to say, quote: 23 "I'm not saying this phone call was 24 appropriate." 25 Do you remember saying that to Mr. Millar?


1 A: That's -- that's right. 2 Q: What did you mean by that? 3 A: Well, I -- my intent in making the 4 phone call was, and I put it in context what I'm saying 5 is, I've been involved -- well, first of all, I'm going 6 to back up and say exactly where I was at. 7 I was on vacation. I come home from 8 vacation, I get called out to an altercation where I go 9 down a road, get hit in the head with a rock and I get my 10 shield busted in half. I get almost run over by a bus. 11 I believe I get shot at, almost run over by a bus again. 12 And then I get sent to a hotel to wait for 13 SIU, who don't show up. And I'm sitting in the room, 14 watching this, knowing that if SIU were there, I'm very 15 possibly a subject officer. 16 You're right, I'm aware of the policy. So 17 I'm sitting there, what is all this on the news? We're 18 supposed to know why we're sitting in this hotel. 19 What are we? Are we subject officers or 20 witness officers? So I made the phone call to find out 21 if the ballistic report was out. 22 I said, looking at it now, it looks very 23 inappropriate. But all I was trying to find out is: Was 24 I a subject officer? Was I an accused person? 25 Q: Well, let me ask you this: You said


1 you were familiar with the twenty-four (24) hour 2 protocol? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Twenty-four (24) hours hadn't 5 expired? 6 A: No, that's right, twenty-four (24) 7 hours -- 8 Q: And -- and you also knew that they 9 hadn't secured the scene? 10 A: That's right. It was a very 11 different crime scene. 12 Q: So you're not blaming SIU, are you, 13 for the delays in the first place, since they couldn't 14 actually get to the scene and seize -- 15 A: They never got to the scene for 16 twelve (12) days or something. 17 Q: Right. So you don't blame SIU for 18 that? It was an -- 19 A: Well -- 20 Q: -- unsecured scene. 21 A: I guess I'm saying it's awfully -- 22 I've been around long enough to know that somebody can go 23 see the officers that are sequestered. I can also tell 24 you most times I've never -- I've never waited two (2) 25 days to be interviewed. You're usually interviewed right


1 away. 2 Q: You went home that night. You turned 3 in your gun and you went home? 4 A: Because there was nobody saying stay 5 here to be interviewed. 6 Q: And that's what you needed to do? 7 You -- 8 A: Yeah. I needed -- 9 Q: -- needed someone to tell you to 10 stay? 11 A: -- to go home and rest. That's 12 usually what happens, sir. Usually an investigator says 13 you're in the interview room, you're sequestered and 14 you're going to be interviewed right away. 15 Q: All right. The next day, on 16 September 7th, twenty-four (24) hours hasn't passed and 17 you don't know whether you're a subject officer, correct? 18 A: That's right. 19 Q: I'd like to review with you, if you 20 don't mind, what you did know as of 6:45 p.m. Would you 21 agree with me that you knew you had discharged your 22 weapon, a .38 revolver, into the side, the driver's side 23 of a car? 24 A: Yes, I did. 25 Q: Would you agree with me that no other


1 officer was standing beside you discharging his or her 2 weapon into that side of the car? 3 A: That I was aware of. 4 Q: Yes. And would you also agree with 5 me that you believed at that time that Dudley George, who 6 you had learned had died, was driving the car? 7 A: I had believed he was the driver of 8 the car. 9 Q: He was the driver of the car that you 10 had shot through the driver's side door? 11 A: That's right. 12 Q: And there was no other individual in 13 that car? 14 A: No. 15 Q: Would you agree with me that, based 16 on that alone, it looked like you would probably be a 17 subject officer; would you agree? 18 A: I was -- I was certainly feeling that 19 way, yes, sir. 20 Q: Yes. All right. So there's no 21 chance that it's because you simply thought you were a 22 witness that you called Mr. Deevy at 6:45 on September 23 7th, right? 24 A: I could have been a witness. 25 Q: But you know, and I know, that based


1 on your knowledge at the time, it looked like you were 2 probably going to be a subject officer, correct? 3 A: That's right. And if I was I'd like 4 to know it, because there are certain rights to subject 5 officers. 6 Q: Sure. Is one (1) of those rights 7 contacting the TRU team leader on duty and getting 8 details of injuries you otherwise wouldn't have access to 9 through normal channels? 10 A: No. The right is then you can tell 11 your lawyer you're a subject officer and you could have 12 him present for the interview, or you can refuse to -- to 13 produce your notes and you can refuse to go to the 14 interview. 15 Q: So one (1) of the rights isn't to 16 contact the -- 17 A: No. 18 Q: -- presiding TRU team leader and 19 debrief on what he knows about injuries? 20 A: I already said to you, you've asked 21 me and I'll go back up, I said, twice, the phone call was 22 inappropriate. 23 Q: All right. And it was inappropriate 24 not because SIU hadn't told you you were a subject yet or 25 not, it was inappropriate because you shouldn't have been


1 discussing the case with a senior TRU team leader who's 2 on duty at the time and getting information you didn't 3 otherwise have access to, correct? 4 A: I think it's inappropriate because of 5 the way it appears now, but... 6 Q: All right. So it's really more of an 7 appearance issue, true? 8 A: I was just trying to find out 9 something that we're supposed to be told. We're supposed 10 to be informed of why we're sitting in a hotel, our 11 status. I was just getting ready to go home. I sat that 12 day, no problem. I sat the next day. And even on the 13 second day no one told me if I was a subject or a witness 14 officer. 15 Q: I'm going to read you the evidence 16 provided by Mr. Skinner during his examination on April 17 19th, 2006. I'm at page 351, page 351 April 19th, 2006. 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 22 23 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 24 Q: April 19th, 2006. Mr. Skinner, he's 25 -- he's a reputable, credible senior officer, yes?


1 A: Yes, sir. 2 Q: I showed him this tape, sir, and I 3 asked him the following questions. I mean I showed him 4 your conversation with Staff Sergeant Brian Deevy. And 5 I'm at the top of 351 line 4: 6 "Q: If you could look four (4) lines 7 from the bottom of the first page what 8 we want to know, what the injuries are 9 from the autopsy. 10 Do you see that question?" 11 Mr. Skinner answers: 12 "I see that. 13 Q: Right and then you see Brian Deevy. 14 I don't know. One (1) guy shot in this 15 ass I understand. 16 Yeah. Do we know specifically what the 17 injuries are?" 18 So we're quoting from the transcript, do 19 you see that? I go on: 20 "See the question, right? And there's 21 background and there's a discussion if 22 you go through it. Now, this is what I 23 want to ask you. 24 If, and this is a hypothetical because 25 you weren't there, if Tex and the boys


1 refers to Ken Deane, would it be 2 appropriate for Ken Deane to be along 3 with Wade Lacroix making inquiries the 4 following day about what was in the 5 autopsy results?" 6 His answer: 7 "No, sir. 8 Q: And why would that be 9 inappropriate? 10 A: Clearly that could taint what 11 their statements would be. 12 Q: And explain that please. 13 A: If there was, again, I'm 14 surmising, but if there was information 15 from an autopsy report that may be 16 different or confirmed either/or, their 17 statements would be -- it could 18 possibly taint their statements. 19 Q: And would you agree with me that 20 given that Ken Deane was the shooter as 21 in the subject officer who would 22 discharged his weapon against Dudley 23 George and Wade Lacroix led the CMU 24 team that night, it would be tainting 25 the statements of key witnesses, yes?


1 A: Certainly they would be key to the 2 -- yes. 3 Q: It would be tainting the 4 statements of a subject officer, yes? 5 A: Ken was the subject officer, yes, 6 sir. 7 Q: And you'd agree with me that 8 tainting the statement of a subject 9 officer and tainting the statement of a 10 leader of CMU could taint the 11 investigation? It could? 12 A: It certainly could. 13 Q: All right. And that's why it's 14 inappropriate? 15 A: It's inappropriate. 16 Q: Unprofessional? 17 A: Yes, sir. 18 Q: And you don't know, you didn't 19 know about this til today? 20 A: No, sir." 21 Would you agree with Kent Skinner, 22 Inspector Kent Skinner's interpretation of your conduct 23 in respect of the conversation with Staff Sergeant Brian 24 Deevy as inappropriate and unprofessional? 25 A: I already said I felt it was


1 inappropriate. 2 Q: Would you agree that it was 3 unprofessional? 4 A: I'm not sure if I want to go that 5 far. 6 Q: Now -- 7 A: Because as -- all this is 8 hypothetical because as it turns out I never received any 9 of this information. I never did anything with this 10 information so was it inappropriate? Yes. Nothing came 11 of it. 12 Q: I want to look at, for a moment, your 13 evidence that you gave the Commissioner under oath today 14 about what you were really inquiring about. 15 Do you see how it says that -- you say 16 two-thirds (2/3's) of the way down the page: 17 "What's the -- we want to know what the 18 injuries are from the autopsy." 19 I'm back at Tab 24, sir. 20 A: Right. 21 Q: Now you told the Commissioner today 22 that you weren't really looking for the autopsy results, 23 you were looking for a ballistics report. Do you 24 remember saying that? 25 A: That was my recollection as I wanted


1 to know the ballistics. 2 Q: You really weren't concerned about 3 the specifics of injuries, were you? 4 A: No. Because I -- I had figured that 5 there would be lots of injuries. 6 Q: Sure. 7 A: Both -- both sides. 8 Q: And you'd agree with me that in 9 addition to -- leaving aside the -- the questionable 10 nature of getting ballistics reports when you're a 11 witness, if you were to get the nature or specifics of 12 injuries, that would give you insight into objective 13 evidence that could indeed impact your account of the 14 event. 15 Would you agree with that? 16 A: No. 17 Q: All right. 18 A: Not with sixty (60) police officers 19 and twenty (20) occupiers and all the different events 20 that happened. I mean, if this was a roadside stop and 21 my partner and I get into some kind of an altercation, 22 maybe. 23 To try to piece that all together. All 24 the different angles and shots and injuries of -- of 25 eighty (80) ninety (90) people, I'm sorry I don't agree.


1 Q: Did eighty (80) or ninety (90) people 2 discharge their firearms? 3 A: No. But I'm talking -- you said 4 injuries. 5 Q: Yes. 6 A: So you have a CMU of forty (40) plus 7 people, twenty (20) protesters, sixty (60) plus people; 8 to try to take the injuries and use that to figure 9 anything out, in the night I would never, you know, it 10 would -- 11 Q: All right. 12 A: -- not be beneficial. 13 Q: So that wasn't the point of the call? 14 A: No. 15 Q: I'd like to read on if I can. It 16 says: 17 "We want to know what the injuries 18 are." 19 You make mention to Tex and the boys about 20 ten (10) lines above that, now you say "We want to know 21 what the injuries are." Who's the "we"? 22 A: Well every one of us sitting there 23 that day. The seven (7) shooters were all potentially 24 subject officers and/or witness officers. 25 Q: So that what you meant by,


1 "We want to know what the injuries 2 are"? 3 A: Yeah. You're in it -- we were in a 4 psychological debriefing. You're not suppose to go into 5 the events but what happens is the peer counsellor says, 6 How are you feeling? 7 And of course, you say, How do you think 8 I'm feeling, sit in this hotel, looking at that on the 9 news and not knowing if I actually committed homicide. 10 So very quickly the conversation goes to , I'm not 11 feeling very good at all. 12 And then it goes to, I wonder which of us 13 is the subject officer and I wonder which of us is a 14 witness officer. 15 Q: And that's why you use the term, 16 "We want to know." 17 A: That's right. 18 Q: And the idea was that for the group 19 you would get that information so that could be sorted 20 out. 21 A: Yeah. It -- so some people could 22 actually sleep that night. 23 Q: Sure. 24 A: And some could actually go see Norm 25 and say, we need to talk, Mr. Lawyer, because I now know


1 I am a subject officer. 2 Q: And was it the counsellor who told 3 you to turn on the TV to watch the news? 4 A: No, sir. I don't even know if he's 5 still in the hotel. 6 Q: Who would it have been -- who's -- it 7 was whose room again? 8 A: I believe they came over to my room. 9 Q: All right. And you were the senior 10 officer in the room? 11 A: That's right. 12 Q: And you could have turned off the 13 television? 14 A: This -- this is the twentieth century 15 and when somebody sequesters you, I don't remember 16 anybody saying to us, no phone, no television, no radio. 17 I never saw SIU and I never saw the investigators and 18 there was no list of do's and don't's. 19 Q: Sure, I understand. So is -- could 20 that be one (1) of the reasons you contacted Staff 21 Sergeant Brian Deevy because no one told you not to? 22 A: I just said watching all that stuff 23 we were starting to feel, what is going on? 24 Q: I'm asking you, though, could one (1) 25 of the reasons be that you contacted the on duty TRU team


1 leader be that no one told you not to contact him? 2 A: I figured, by the way the press was 3 rolling out there should -- there should be some 4 information ready to be released. They start showing the 5 bus and the car, the injuries of the -- of the 6 assailants, of -- of -- you've got to believe that 7 there's something out there. 8 There's got to be some information. 9 Q: Now, I'm -- 10 A: Unbeknownst to me, I didn't realise 11 that that wasn't SIU parading the cars. 12 Q: Now, you -- you made mention that the 13 injuries weren't the focus of your attention, so I'm -- 14 you've given me your answer, so I'm going to move on. 15 Mr. -- Staff Sergeant Deevy says: 16 "I don't know. One (1) guy got shot in 17 the ass, I understand." 18 You say, "Yeah", correct? 19 A: Right. 20 Q: Then Deevy says: 21 "Do we know specifically what the 22 injuries were on the three (3) target 23 suspects?" 24 Do you see that? Now, who asks that 25 question?


1 A: Where's that again? 2 Q: At the bottom of page 1. 3 "Do we know specifically what the 4 injuries are on the target suspects?" 5 A: I don't know what he means by that. 6 He'd be referring, I guess, to the three (3) people he 7 knew had injuries. 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 Q: And you'd agree that you didn't say 12 to him, No we don't want to know specifically what the 13 injuries are on the three (3) target suspects? 14 You don't say -- you don't discourage him 15 from talking, do you? 16 A: No. 17 Q: All right and then -- 18 A: The things he was saying, though, 19 were -- I was acknowledging, I had heard the same thing 20 on the news. 21 Q: Yes, I understand that. But you did 22 not say, for example, let's not talk about injuries, 23 let's talk about ballistics. 24 You didn't do that? 25 A: Right.


1 Q: You -- he talked on about injuries, 2 right? 3 A: Right. 4 Q: Where he describes where one (1) guy 5 is shot and then he describes a head injury and he hears 6 about two (2) guys -- two (2) shots in the chest. 7 Do you remember all that? 8 A: Vaguely. I mean, I don't know how 9 much I was paying attention really because -- 10 Q: Fair enough. But you don't tell him 11 to stop talking? 12 A: No. 13 Q: And then you say: 14 "And you don't know what the autopsy 15 results are." 16 Do you see that? 17 A: Yeah. 18 Q: Do you say ballistic results? 19 A: No, as I said, I made a mistake. But 20 obviously Brian knows what I'm talking about, because I 21 go, "or" and then he says: 22 "I don't know that yet and as far as 23 the type of round or anything, they 24 don't know that yet." 25 and I go, "Okay".


1 Q: Well, stopping there. I'm just -- I 2 -- I hear you and that's fair that you've said that, but 3 you -- on the first page, refer to the autopsy. 4 "We want to know what the injuries are 5 from the autopsy." 6 Do you see that on page 1? 7 A: Yeah. 8 Q: And now we're on page 2 and again, 9 you repeat: 10 "And you don't know what the autopsy 11 results are or..." 12 Don't you? 13 A: Yeah. 14 Q: You repeat that. 15 A: Yeah. Bad choice of words, I already 16 told. I wouldn't know what to do with an autopsy report. 17 Q: I see. So you were -- you were a 18 ranking member of a TRU team for years on end, yes? 19 A: For five (5) years. 20 Q: Yeah. And you described yourself as 21 occupying a position similar to a Chief of Police, as 22 head of Petrolia Detachment and other detachments -- 23 A: Yes, sir. 24 Q: -- leading up to this incident. But 25 as a Chief of Police and as a ranking member of the TRU


1 team, you don't think you knew what an autopsy report is 2 or what you'd do with it? 3 A: I wouldn't know what to do with it. 4 All I needed to know -- 5 Q: How many firefight incidents have you 6 been involved in, in your career as a police officer up 7 until 1995? How many? 8 A: How many have I been directly 9 involved in? 10 Q: How many have you been involved in as 11 a ranking officer, an investigator, or as the shooter? 12 How many? 13 A: Involved in, five (5). 14 Q: Five (5). And you don't know what an 15 autopsy -- 16 A: I don't know -- 17 Q: -- report is? 18 A: -- how to interpret an autopsy report 19 about the way a bullet passes through human flesh, et 20 cetera, et cetera. 21 A ballistic report that says, .9 22 millimetre, 40 cal, .223, I can understand that. 23 Q: All right. So I understand your 24 explanation. The Commissioner has it. We're a third of 25 the way down page 2. It says -- and this is Deevy


1 speaking: 2 "I don't know what -- that yet." 3 Do you see -- you ask about autopsy 4 results and he says: 5 "I don't know that yet." 6 Do you see that? 7 A: Yeah, but that's after he says as far 8 as the type of round. 9 Q: No, no, sir. He -- he -- you say: 10 "You don't know what the autopsy 11 results are or..." 12 A: Right. 13 Q: And he says: 14 "I don't know that yet." 15 A: Right. 16 Q: Okay. So he's told you now he 17 doesn't know the autopsy, right? 18 A: Right. 19 Q: And then he goes on to say: 20 "And as far as the type of round or 21 anything they don't know that yet." 22 A: Right. 23 Q: And you say, "Okay". He says -- 24 A: And that kind of ends that 25 discussion.


1 Q: Right. You have to wait for that. 2 A: Yeah. 3 Q: We don't know yet. We don't know. 4 A: Yeah. So I'm -- so I'm -- I'm 5 realizing okay, so it's not common knowledge. 6 Q: Fair enough. 7 A: So it's not out. 8 Q: So that's it? 9 A: That's it. 10 Q: Puts an end to it. 11 A: That's it. 12 Q: Because on the basis of the version 13 you told the Commissioner this morning the real reason 14 you'd called came to an end, correct? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: Let's read on. Your next line is: 17 "Injuries are to -- like we heard, in 18 the chest." 19 Do you see that? 20 A: Hmm hmm. 21 Q: Who are you talking about? Are -- 22 are you referring to the case? Are you referring to the 23 case? You're referring to the interaction with occupiers 24 and that someone has suffered injuries in the chest; is 25 that what you're referring to?


1 A: I'm referring to this upper paragraph 2 where Brian said I heard two (2) -- somebody got shot in 3 the chest. 4 Q: Right. 5 A: And I was saying yeah, that's what 6 the news is saying. 7 Q: And then you go on. You don't say 8 anything about the news in that line do you? You say: 9 "Injuries are to -- like we heard, in 10 the chest." 11 Do you see that? 12 A: Yeah. 13 Q: Then he says: 14 "That's speculation, like what I heard, 15 but I couldn't even tell you who I 16 heard it from." 17 Then you say: 18 "WADE LACROIX: Yeah, I heard it too; 19 two (2) in the chest. I heard sucking 20 chest wound. I heard -- you heard an 21 ass shot. I heard a kidney shot, the 22 one (1) guy. 23 Okay. 24 WADE LACROIX: Like a crease job. 25 Like that's some kind of head injury."


1 And you then discuss the fact that one (1) 2 of the people were taken to the hospital. At the bottom 3 of the page: 4 "The other two (2) are going to live, 5 but then Dudley of course is gone, 6 right?" 7 And the top of the next page, page 3 is 8 "right". 9 A: I think Brian Deevy said, I guess 10 maybe he's still in the hospital. 11 Q: And you say at the bottom of the 12 page: 13 "The other two (2) are going to live, 14 but then Dudley of course is gone, 15 right." 16 A: Yeah. 17 Q: The top of page 3: 18 "Right." 19 So it appears, sir, that one (1) of the 20 things you've decided to do is to continue to discuss the 21 injuries after you determined that the ballistics wasn't 22 available; is that fair? 23 A: That's fair. 24 Q: Now, you go on to say: 25 "Dudley only had two (2) holes on him?"


1 Is that a question? See there's a 2 question mark there. 3 A: Yeah, because again I'm thinking he's 4 in this car and I'm thinking there was a lot of gunfire 5 went into that car. 6 Q: Sure. So you're asking Mr. Deevy 7 about the holes in Dudley George, right? 8 A: Yeah. Yeah, how many, yeah. 9 Q: Yeah. 10 A: How many times was he hit. 11 Q: You know you're not getting anything 12 on ballistics from Mr. Deevy by now, right? 13 A: Hmm hmm. 14 Q: But you seem interested in how many 15 holes are in Dudley George, correct? 16 A: Well, the -- if there's more holes 17 the odds there are more officers involved because -- 18 Q: And we're at page 3 of a ten (10) 19 page transcript and it may be of some relief to Mr. 20 Commissioner I'm not going to do each line, I promise. 21 But I want to point out to you, sir, once 22 you got the information about the -- all the injuries 23 that Mr. Deevy has to tell you, page 3, you then go and 24 have a lengthy discussion with Mr. Deevy from page 3 page 25 5 about the threat to the TOC Centre, right --


1 A: Hmm hmm. 2 Q: -- Tactical Operational Command 3 Centre -- 4 A: Hmm hmm. 5 Q: -- and the present status of things, 6 is that fair, right through to page 5? 7 A: Yeah. 8 Q: You haven't ended the conversation 9 have you? 10 A: No. 11 Q: In fact you found out way back at 12 page 2 that the ballistics wasn't available, right? 13 A: Right. 14 Q: But you're still talking, correct? 15 A: So now -- because we're still 16 operational. 17 Q: Sure. 18 A: So it switches into what's the 19 status? I don't know that I'm not going to get an 20 interview and end up right back out there that -- in an 21 hour. 22 Q: So you did discuss the case? 23 A: This part's not the case, this is 24 what's going on. 25 Q: Sure. If we could go --


1 A: As matter of fact the first thing 2 that happens to me, I'm told to go do this on Monday 3 morning and I'm assigned to the Grand Bend Detachment. 4 I'm told to go to Forest to get a tactical update to 5 brief the Chief. 6 Q: So the purpose of the rest of this 7 conversation, in contrast to the previous parts, the 8 purposes of the rest of this conversation is to get a 9 status update so that you can perform duties in the 10 future; is that -- 11 A: I think I'm going to be called back 12 out that night. 13 Q: Fair enough. So that's the point of 14 the rest of the call? 15 A: Yeah. 16 Q: All right. 17 A: As soon as I get my statement done I 18 think I'm back in uniform and I'm out there. 19 Q: When you ask at page 5 as you do of 20 Mr. Deevy, quote: 21 "I wonder what the Government's 22 saying." 23 Do you see that? 24 A: Yeah. 25 Q: Is that because you need a status


1 report to go do your duties? 2 A: No, I'm just -- I know that they -- 3 on the news again that the Government are involved. 4 Q: But you do take an interest in the 5 government. I mean, you were the point man with Marcel 6 Beaubien, the local MP, right? 7 A: Yeah, I guess if you might call it 8 the point man. I'm the local guy, he's the local MP. 9 Q: Sure. And he tells you and you pass 10 on to Carson, The Premier takes a personal interest in 11 this so I guess we'll be evicting. 12 He tells you that and you tell Carson, 13 right? Yes? 14 A: If the Government gets involved and 15 the media gets involved, I figure that it would end up 16 that we would. If we had the injunction there would be 17 pressure to evict. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just a 19 minute. 20 Yes, Ms. McAleer...? 21 OBJ MS. JENNIFER MCALEER: Sorry. I do have 22 an objection to the way Mr. Falconer phrased that last 23 question. I think if he's going to use the quotes from 24 the audio logger tape, I'd like him to actually use those 25 quote because he put together two (2) separate sentences


1 with respect to the Premier being involved. 2 And -- and -- 3 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Very fair. I can 4 help My Friend. Sure. 5 MS. JENNIFER MCALEER: So if we could 6 just keep them separate. 7 8 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 9 Q: Exhibit P-444A, I'm going to read 10 to you what you told John Carson on September 5th, 1995 11 at 16 -- it's of the P-444A, it's Tab 22. 12 Could P--444A be put in front of the 13 Witness please? 14 MR. DERRY MILLAR: It's Tab 13 of your 15 book, sir. Actually he's on the second call so it's Tab 16 14 of your book. 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 21 Q: If you look at page 182, and I'm 22 sorry, Mr. Commissioner, I'd hope not to -- but My 23 Friends asked me to take the Witness directly to the 24 page. 25 Page 182. Now, would you agree with me


1 that September 5th, 1995 would be one of the first times 2 that you're speaking to Carson about the takeover of the 3 Park because you were away, right? 4 A: Right. 5 Q: So this is one of the first times 6 you're talking to Carson? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And Carson's the Incident Commander? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: And in that conversation at page 182, 11 three (3) pages in, you say, second line, quote: 12 "Harris is involved himself and uh, 13 quite uptight about it." 14 Where do you think you learned that, 15 quote: 16 "Harris is involved himself and uh, 17 quite uptight about it." 18 A: The only place I would have got it 19 was from my phone call from Marcel. But that's probably 20 my street talk. You know, Marcel saying to me that 21 Harris has taken an interest in it, so I go and say that 22 comment. 23 Q: But your -- your street talk. You're 24 not going to suggest to the Commissioner that your street 25 talk goes so far as to say that when you said "Harris"


1 you meant Harris' office? 2 A: Oh, no, no, no. I -- I did repeat 3 something that I was -- I'm repeating what was said to 4 me. 5 Q: So there is no doubt when you said -- 6 A: I'm saying the "quite uptight" part 7 would be my lingo. 8 Q: That's fair. And -- and that's 9 because you may have been translating what Beaubien had 10 told you that Mr. Harris was anxious about it or upset 11 about it. 12 A: Yeah. I'm sure the MPP would have 13 used words like that that, you know, he's taken an 14 interest in it or he's, yes. 15 Q: Well but you said "quite uptight" so 16 would you agree with me that implies an anxiety level? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: So the message translated to you from 19 Marcel Beaubien, the MP, is that the Premier personally 20 was anxious or upset about the incident? 21 A: That's -- I must have got that 22 inference. 23 Q: And the inference would only have 24 come from the local MP Marcel Beaubien, the new 25 Conservative MP for the area?


1 A: I would believe so. That would -- I 2 just got back from vacation and only had this phone call. 3 Q: That's right. And the actual phone 4 call you have with Beaubien is referred to in the 5 previous page. So it's a followup directly on that phone 6 call. 7 Do you see the previous page at the 8 bottom? 9 "Marcel got a brief a half an hour 10 ago." 11 Okay? 12 A: Hmm hmm 13 Q: And he's got: 14 "He's going to get briefed again in 15 five (5)." 16 Do you see that? 17 A: Hmm hmm. 18 Q: "This is not an Indian issue but an 19 MNR issue and a Provincial issue." 20 Do you see all that? 21 A: Yeah. 22 Q: Now you just got back from holiday. 23 A: Right. 24 Q: You didn't -- you didn't come up with 25 that wording while you were basking on a beach, fair?


1 A: No, I didn't. 2 Q: Okay. So you would have got the 3 wording: "This is not an Indian issue, 4 but an MNR issue and a Provincial 5 issue." 6 You would have got that directly from 7 Marcel Beaubien, the political MP, yes? 8 A: That would be the only place I could 9 assume it would come from. 10 Q: Right. And again, this wasn't some 11 colloquial or some street talk, this: 12 "This is not an Indian issue but an MNR 13 issue and a Provincial issue." 14 That is language you were passing on 15 pretty accurately from Mr. Beaubien to the Incident 16 Commander, correct? 17 A: I was trying to tell him what the 18 local MPP thought the issue was. 19 Q: And you were trying to be accurate? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: Because you saw that as your job? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: It wasn't your job to put a spin on 24 it, correct? 25 A: No, no. I was just telling him --


1 yeah, so I was passing on the essence of the phone call. 2 Q: Fair enough. And then the next line 3 right after is where you say: 4 "Harris is involved himself." 5 Have you ever been involved in a situation 6 where the Premier was involved directly, personally in 7 something you were doing? 8 A: Never. 9 Q: Must have been quite a responsibility 10 that you felt to get it right when you passed it on to 11 the Incident Commander? 12 You wanted to get it right? 13 A: Just that he was showing an interest 14 in the whole -- the whole affair, yeah, I mean -- 15 Q: And you took from the interest that 16 was being described to you by Mr. Beaubien, you took from 17 that interest, not only that Harris was quite uptight or 18 anxious or upset, you also took that he's involved 19 personally. Do you see that? 20 "Is involved himself." 21 Yes? 22 A: Hmm hmm. 23 Q: Sorry? 24 A: Yes. I see what you're getting at -- 25 Q: And then --


1 A: -- Harris has involved himself. 2 Q: Yeah. And then you also took, quote: 3 "I would say the signal is that we're 4 going to end up evicting." 5 Right? 6 A: Right. But I also meant if we get 7 this Court order, et cetera, there's going to come 8 pressure. I -- my inference there was as it's heating 9 up, because we were doing contain and negotiate until 10 whenever. 11 But as it becomes -- when I say political 12 the press played into that, too. So, like, if it becomes 13 a really hyped up. I was saying to him, we get that 14 Court Order, there's going to become pressure to actually 15 evict, is what I felt my inference was. 16 Q: Sure. And by the term 'pressure' you 17 just described two (2) sources of pressure. You said -- 18 A: That's right. 19 Q: -- pressure from the Premier 20 personally, himself. You said that. Nut you also added 21 the media as well? 22 A: Yes. It gets going in the papers and 23 people start to, you know, feed it. There's more 24 pressure on the police to do something. 25 Q: And your interpretation of that was


1 there would be an injunction but there would be, I think 2 you just said it, there would be pressure to act quickly? 3 A: Yeah, because I knew we were going 4 for an injunction. 5 Q: Sure. 6 A: Right. However, I knew that there's 7 obviously a twin-edged sword to everything. I knew that 8 once we'd got the injunction, there would become pressure 9 to act upon the injunction. 10 Q: Yes. And that's what you meant by, 11 "end up evicting"? 12 A: Right. Eventually we're going to 13 probably -- yeah. Because before that, I know that the 14 discussion was, what's the big deal; the Park closes down 15 Labour Day weekend; cottagers, most of them go home. 16 It's going into fall, it's not a big deal. 17 Q: A 109 acres of pine trees, right? 18 A: That's right. 19 Q: And that's what everybody thought of 20 it as before different dynamics started to surface, 21 right; a 109 acres of pine trees? 22 A: That's right. And it'll be like -- 23 and then it'll be 100 acres of 10 foot of snow, very 24 shortly thereafter. 25 Q: Right. But you pointed out what your


1 -- you were like a local Chief of Police, and you were 2 pointing out to Carson what you sensed from the dynamics, 3 whether it was the Premier personally or the media, you 4 sensed from the dynamics that you would end up evicting, 5 notwithstanding that, right? 6 A: Yeah, when we got the injunction. 7 Q: Yeah. Now, one other thing I wanted 8 to ask you -- 9 A: It was a concern I had. 10 Q: One of the things I wanted to ask you 11 about is about half way down this paragraph at page 182. 12 You also say: 13 "In the Ministry, I guess the Solicitor 14 General, I imagine, is to do a press 15 release, momentarily or soon, saying 16 the law will be upheld no matter who is 17 involved." 18 Now, how would you have learned that? 19 A: Well, that had to be passed on to me. 20 Q: From whom? 21 A: From my phone call from the Member. 22 Q: That would be the phone call with 23 Marcel Beaubien? 24 A: That would be the only place that I 25 would have received it.


1 Q: So Marcel Beaubien, on September 5th 2 at 16:24 -- by September 5th at 16:24 would have not only 3 given you the views of the Premier personally, but he 4 would have also passed on that, and to be fair to you, it 5 says: 6 "...the Ministry, I guess the Solicitor 7 General, I imagine, is to do a press 8 release on upholding the law." 9 Right? 10 A: Right. 11 Q: Okay. The one (1) thing I would ask 12 you, though, would you agree with me that even though I 13 hear you when you refer to the pressure of the media, if 14 you look at that paragraph, you point out about Harris' 15 personal involvement, you point out what the Solicitor 16 General's going to do, and then you say, quote: 17 "So I would say the signal is that 18 we're going to end up evicting." 19 You don't refer to the media here, do you? 20 A: No. No, I'm saying that I'm -- I'm 21 concerned as it becomes more media hype, as it becomes 22 more of an issue, right? 23 I mean, in the House and in the press it's 24 going to put pressure on us to actually evict. But we 25 were talking that we would not evict, no matter what. So


1 I'm just saying to him, I hope that's not what's going to 2 happen here and I think he says, I would -- I would 3 agree, or I would suspect. I was just picking up on 4 whatever. 5 Q: You were picking up on the pressures 6 you could sense Mr. Beaubien was relaying to you, 7 correct? 8 A: Well I believe he was under pressure, 9 I think, from his constituents, is what I also picked up 10 from him. 11 Q: Fair enough. 12 A: Is that how come we're not doing 13 anything? 14 Q: Could you turn to the next page, 15 please, 183? 16 Would you agree with me that if you did 17 take action, one (1) of the things you took comfort on -- 18 in -- I'm going to rephrase the question. 19 Would you agree with me that if you did 20 take action, that is evicting, one (1) of the things that 21 you took comfort in is that it sounded like the 22 Government was on side? Would you agree with that? 23 A: Where is that at? 24 Q: Well, no, I'm asking you, just to sit 25 back for a moment, I'm putting to you as a proposition


1 that this notion of evicting, that is action after an 2 injunction -- 3 A: Right. 4 Q: -- there is a choice. You -- as you 5 quite fairly put it, you could just leave the 109 acres 6 of pine trees -- it's pine trees, right? 7 A: Mostly, I believe. 8 Q: Yeah. Yeah. Not maple? It's not a 9 whole bunch of maples, it's pines, right? Sorry? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: Yeah. The idea is you could have an 12 injunction in hand but you could -- the OPP could choose 13 to exercise their discretion not to move against the 109 14 acres of pine trees, or the OPP could act pursuant to 15 that injunction; that is, take a pro-active role and 16 evict. 17 And it would be important to you, wouldn't 18 it, that if you did that latter action that the 19 Government was on side? That would matter to you, 20 wouldn't it? 21 A: No, not really. I don't think I've 22 ever considered the Government in any occurrence I've 23 ever been in. 24 Q: Well, you're obviously considering 25 them right now --


1 A: Yeah. There is -- 2 Q: -- because -- 3 A: Well, I received a phone call from an 4 MP -- an MP. I've never -- I've never taken that into 5 account when we go to do a -- an operation -- 6 Q: Sure. 7 A: -- a tactical operation or anything 8 else. To me I was not looking forward to evicting. 9 Again, I don't think this could be solved by police. 10 Q: Fair. But what I'm asking you, and 11 is -- is your real point, can I take from what you're 12 saying that, among other things, this was a very unusual 13 situation? 14 You don't have the MP's telling you what 15 the Premier thinks and -- or Solicitor General is going 16 to do; that does not enter your scope of activity? 17 A: Not -- never before. 18 Q: So this was highly unusual? 19 A: I -- I don't remember, on any 20 tactical call I was ever on, ever getting called by a 21 mayor. 22 Q: And it's never happened again? 23 A: No. 24 Q: No? Or it has? 25 A: No, it has not happened again.


1 Q: So this is -- as far as your career 2 was concerned this is somewhat of a one (1) in a million? 3 A: It was different. 4 Q: All right. And the reason I ask you, 5 given how unusual it was, can you help me? Didn't it -- 6 didn't it matter to you that the Government would be on 7 side if you took this action? Didn't that matter? 8 A: I think I know where you're going, 9 but no, to tell you the truth -- 10 Q: Okay. 11 A: -- it doesn't give me comfort to know 12 that the Government's behind me when I'm going down the 13 road -- 14 Q: All right. 15 A: -- to do something that I really 16 don't want to do. 17 Q: All right. The reason I ask you that 18 is if you go to the bottom of page 183 -- 19 A: Okay. 20 Q: -- that page, you say -- about the 21 fifth to last line, you say: 22 "I don't know so anyway the Chief told 23 him he had concerns of some kind." 24 Do -- do you see that? The Chief told 25 him?


1 A: Yeah. 2 Q: You're talking about Marcel Beaubien? 3 A: Yeah. I think he talked to Chief 4 Coles, I believe. 5 Q: Right. So the Chief talks to Marcel 6 Beaubien. You talk to Marcel Beaubien and the Chief 7 talks to Marcel Beaubien, right? 8 A: Right. 9 Q: And then Carson says: 10 "Oh." 11 And then you say: 12 "I don't imagine -- I don't know what I 13 imagine I could figure out what they 14 are but -- 15 CARSON: Huh?" 16 You say: 17 "So anyhow, ah, it sounds like the 18 Government is onside. 19 Oh, good." 20 A: Yeah. And I'm not sure -- 21 Q: Now, it sounds like the Government 22 being onside mattered in that telephone conversation, 23 didn't it? 24 A: It sounds that way but I can't 25 remember what the reference was there.


1 Q: And the Incident Commander, John 2 Carson, he thought it was a good thing that the 3 Government was onside, just by what he said, would you 4 agree? 5 A: I can't interpret what John -- I mean 6 I... 7 Q: When he says, "Oh, good," can you go 8 with me to the extent -- 9 A: Yeah. 10 Q: -- that he's not saying it doesn't 11 matter or that's bad news? 12 A: Well at least it's not, I guess, not 13 grief or whatever. He's not going to get grief. 14 Q: That's right. And you've -- you've 15 handled high pressure situations before and it doesn't 16 help the situation to get grief, does it? 17 A: No, you do not need a lot of media or 18 you don't need a lot of political interference; that 19 doesn't help. 20 Q: Right. And so if you hear you're not 21 going to get political interference by doing -- 22 A: Right. I think -- 23 Q: -- a certain approach, that would 24 make you happy? 25 A: Yes. I think that's kind of what


1 he's talking about, but just going back to one (1) thing 2 you said a minute ago is, I didn't -- I don't think we 3 have -- you almost made it sound, a second ago, like we 4 would have an option to evict if we got the injunction. 5 My understanding was if we got a court 6 order it basically instructed the OPP to do something. 7 Q: Yes, you would have to do it 8 immediately -- 9 A: Yeah. Yeah. 10 Q: Is that right? 11 A: Yeah, that's what I thought. 12 Q: Right. 13 A: So I thought you just said something 14 a minute ago before this conversation, that somehow I 15 could sit on that. 16 Q: Or that the -- no that's -- I didn't 17 use the word 'sit on it' but you're quite right that I 18 proposed in a suggestion to you a different scenario 19 whereby the OPP didn't act immediately. 20 But it was your understanding that there 21 was an obligation to act immediately once you get the 22 injunction. 23 A: Well, back then I -- I thought we had 24 to. Now, I'm watching one going on and they're not. But 25 I thought we had to. That was my --


1 Q: And -- 2 A: -- recollection at the time. If we 3 got that court order there was no if, ands or buts, you - 4 - it was court order. 5 Q: Right. 6 A: And would you agree with this, that 7 whether or not that was your thinking, you didn't tie the 8 fact of evicting to the obtaining of an injunction. 9 On page 182 at the top you tied the act of 10 evicting to the personal views of the Premier. You said: 11 "So I would say the signal is that 12 we're going to end up evicting." 13 A: Yeah. And I'm going to -- and I'll 14 tie those two (2) together now. Okay? 15 Q: Okay. Now -- 16 A: So to me, I am -- I'm saying that if 17 we get this court order and the Government really want to 18 see something done, I would guess that means we're going 19 to evict. 20 Q: Fair enough. And that was what was 21 in your mind on September 6th, 1995 at 9:30 p.m. when you 22 were donning the hard TAC in order to lead thirty (30) to 23 forty (40) police officers and K-9's. That was your 24 state of mind at the time, yes? 25 A: That I --


1 Q: That if you had an order -- 2 A: Yeah. 3 Q: -- you would have to follow it. 4 A: That's right. 5 Q: Yeah. Now where we were when we left 6 this was I was querying you because of what you asked 7 about what the Government was saying. 8 A: Right. 9 Q: And I'm sorry to go back, Mr. 10 Commissioner, I expect to be very quick with the rest of 11 this statement but I -- I -- but I have to weave with the 12 Witness and the Witness took me somewhere else. 13 It's page 5 of -- of the ten (10) page 14 statement at Tab 24. Mr. Millar's going to help me with 15 the exhibit number even though I should be -- I'm the one 16 who made it an exhibit, I've repeated P-1361 a hundred 17 times but Lord knows, I still don't remember it. 18 So P-1361 at Tab 24. If you could go to 19 page 5, you will see in particular at the bottom of page 20 5, what you and I were discussing. 21 A: Right. 22 Q: Where you say: 23 "I wonder what the Government's 24 saying." 25 Right?


1 A: Yeah. 2 Q: Now even though it may seem like 3 light years between the September 5th conversation in the 4 afternoon and this September 7th conversation in the 5 later afternoon, we're really talking about a mere two 6 (2) days later, aren't we? 7 A: Yeah. 8 Q: And so you're discussing the 9 Government with John Carson on September 5th at 4:24 p.m. 10 A: Hmm hmm. 11 Q: Yes? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And now Staff Sergeant Brian Deevy, 14 the current head of the TRU squad at Incident Command is 15 discussing again the views of the Government: 16 "I wonder what the Government's 17 saying." 18 Right? 19 A: Right. 20 Q: You -- you didn't -- you're not a 21 robot, you didn't automatically cleanse your mind of all 22 the information you got from Marcel Beaubien, a matter of 23 a mere forty-eight (48) hours earlier. 24 You didn't just cleanse your mind of it, 25 it wasn't gone. Is --


1 A: In one way I think I did. 2 Q: All right. 3 A: I -- I don't want to put down Marcel 4 Beaubien, okay? I -- I mean I know Marcel Beaubien. 5 Marcel Beaubien, I knew him more as the Mayor of 6 Petrolia. 7 Q: He was a bit of a clown. 8 A: No. But I mean he just -- he just 9 made MP. He was an MP -- 10 Q: Yeah. 11 A: -- just I think -- just before this 12 event. 13 Q: Yeah. 14 A: He was the local MP. I don't think 15 he had Cabinet, he was -- certainly wasn't the Solicitor 16 General or the Attorney General or, you know, he was the 17 local man on the scene, okay? 18 So he made a phone call, what's going on? 19 Q: So you didn't take him seriously? 20 A: I didn't take that -- that 21 conversation was dealt with with me on my Detachment 22 Commander, day job, community, he gets a call from the 23 Mayor of Bosanquet, you know, it's happened, it's 24 happened, we've lost the Park, what are the police doing, 25 and a phone call comes in.


1 I pass that up the line to the Incident 2 Commander. That -- I did sever that to this discussion. 3 What I'm going on here I'll let you now ask me the 4 question about this. I watched Ovide Mercredi come into 5 that hotel and I knew that these were heavy hitters that 6 were coming into deal with the situation. 7 Q: And the heavy hitters included the 8 Provincial Ministers? 9 A: I -- I believe so. 10 Q: And you believed it at the time? 11 A: I believe that this looked like the 12 Federal, the Provincial and the First Nation, you know, 13 national members ones, could to get together to come up 14 with a solution. 15 16 (BRIEF PAUSE) 17 18 Q: Mr. Lacroix, I want to be clear to 19 you, I suggested, Mr. Lacroix, I suggested to you that it 20 was your view at the time and I'm making a suggestion to 21 you that -- 22 A: Okay. 23 Q: -- you're free to agree with or 24 disagree with. 25 A: All right.


1 Q: It was your view at the time that 2 representatives of the Provincial and Federal Government 3 were meeting with Mr. Mercredi, yes? 4 A: That's what I thought I saw come into 5 the lobby of the Pinedale Hotel. 6 Q: All right. And -- that helps me, 7 thank you. What I would like to know, is when you said, 8 I wonder what the Government's saying, that's a different 9 question that, Geez, the Government better fix this. 10 You're actually wondering, you in your own 11 mind, want to knew the views of the Government? 12 A: I want to know that somebody's going 13 to put an end to this. 14 Q: Fair enough. So you wonder what the 15 Government's saying, yes? 16 A: Well, I'm hoping they're saying, You 17 know what, we should give you back the base. 18 Q: Right, okay. And in addition to 19 that, is it fair to say that you're also concerned that 20 politically, things go well for you as -- as an OPP set 21 of officers who've moved in on the occupiers of the Park? 22 Don't you want to know that things are 23 politically going well? 24 A: I've never -- never thought that way 25 -- I think you probably know I'm not -- I'm not that way.


1 I am not politically motivated that way. I wasn't 2 worried about my career or what it would do for me at 3 all. 4 Q: Well, there's -- you'd agree with me 5 there's a number of different ways that things like 6 political support can manifest themselves. It doesn't 7 just mean -- from a political side, it doesn't just mean 8 that your job is made better. 9 A: Right. 10 Q: It might mean that you have support 11 from the government that you didn't have before, right? 12 A: That's right. That's right -- 13 Q: Right. 14 A: -- yeah. 15 Q: But you -- you wanted to know that 16 you had that political support from this Harris 17 Government for what you were doing, didn't you? 18 A: Actually, this right here, are we 19 still referring to page 5? 20 Q: No, I'm about talking about -- 21 A: Okay. 22 Q: -- your state of mind at the time. I 23 am looking at that quote, but I'm asking you a general 24 question. 25 A: When I look at this quote, my state


1 of mind is thank God the calvary have arrived and I'm 2 hoping that the Fed and the province and First Nation 3 leaders like Ovide Mercredi can go into that room and 4 come up with some kind of an answer to this. And those 5 young police officers can get pulled back off the line 6 and the young First Nations people can go back to the 7 community and we can all go home. 8 That's exactly what I was thinking. 9 Q: And it didn't matter to you, and let 10 me rephrase. I apologize. Did it not matter to you, 11 that in the clash you had with the occupiers the night 12 before, that you had political support from the political 13 side? 14 Didn't that matter to you? 15 A: I'm a long-serving member. It's 16 awful hard to send me to Mooseanee. I had twenty-five 17 (25) years on. 18 Q: Right. 19 A: I was a staff sergeant. I didn't -- 20 I only had a few to go. I was not really too concerned 21 about a northern posting or I -- I -- suggesting -- what 22 you're talking about -- some kind of a, what were they 23 going to do to me? 24 Q: Could you turn to page 7, please. 25 you see how you, from 5 to 7, you have that status


1 discussion you talked about with Deevy about the state of 2 affairs and -- and where things are at in terms of who's 3 got the ERT teams, et cetera. 4 And then at page 7 you switch from that 5 status of what's going on in terms of police functions, 6 and you say -- you see: 7 "Deeve, go to bed, will you." 8 You see that? 9 You see that, top of the page? 10 "Deeve, go to bed, will you." 11 A: Yeah. 12 Q: All right. Then he says: 13 "Go to bed in about two (2) minutes. 14 Okay, I'll leave you alone. 15 No problem, how are you doing?" 16 Now, the "no problem, how are you doing", 17 comes from Brian Deevy, right? 18 A: That's right, comes from -- 19 Q: Then you answer: 20 "I'm doing all right." 21 And he says: 22 "How'd it go? Everything okay?" 23 Your answer: 24 "I think it went, under the 25 circumstances, it couldn't -- it


1 couldn't -- I mean... 2 A: Sounds like a political side. 3 It couldn't have been better. 4 I think you're right. 5 Ah." 6 So you'd agree with me that what you told 7 Staff Sergeant Deevy in terms of how things went, was 8 that from the political side, it couldn't have gone 9 better. 10 A: Hmm hmm. 11 Q: You did tell him that? 12 A: Yeah. 13 Q: That -- 14 A: It's -- 15 Q: -- that's the officer talking for 16 whom it doesn't matter at all, that's you, right? 17 A: That's right. Let me just interject 18 one (1) thing here. 19 Q: Yeah. 20 A: Let me just tell you what the biggest 21 politics that Deevy and I would be worried about. 22 Q: Please. 23 A: We'd be more worried about internal 24 politics than external politics. 25 Q: So you believe that what you were


1 referring to here, "from a political side, it couldn't 2 have been better", would have been the internal politics 3 of the running of the OPP? 4 That's what you were talking about here? 5 A: I just -- talking about that we -- 6 I'm thinking that we come under fire and not knowing that 7 the crime scene and everything else was going to become 8 the way it happened, is that we -- we were holding our 9 line and we felt we got under attack. 10 Q: Would you -- 11 A: And we weren't the aggressors, so I'm 12 referring to, we are in a good position, in the sense 13 that we didn't do anything. 14 Q: And so when you said, "political 15 side", you weren't referring to the Government? 16 A: No. 17 Q: I see. Would you forgive me for 18 confusing that because of your statement two (2) pages 19 earlier: 20 "I wonder what the Government's 21 saying?" 22 A: Yeah, when I say "government", that's 23 government. 24 Q: All right. So you said: 25 "Political side, it couldn't have been


1 better." 2 So that's all you were concerned with, 3 right, is the -- is the -- what your boss is thinking, 4 correct? 5 A: Well, just that there was, as far as 6 I was concerned at that time, we come under attack. We, 7 you know, returned fire, and it was not -- we did our 8 job. 9 Q: And you -- and you refer to how 10 Superintendent Parkin or Chief Coles views you as doing 11 your job as the, quote, "political side", that's how you 12 describe your superior officers in the Ontario Provincial 13 Police? 14 A: Yeah, the internal politics kind of 15 thing, yeah. 16 Q: Yeah. And then -- and that would be 17 your only concern, yes? 18 A: As a career officer you're concerned 19 about you're -- you're looked upon by your peers. 20 Q: And that's -- that was all you were 21 concerned that day? 22 A: I believe -- I believe here that's 23 the -- the reference. 24 Q: All right. Because then you go on: 25 "I think we're getting beat up in the


1 press big time. I think we could have 2 handled the press a little better there 3 personally." 4 Do you see that? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: I apologize. I apologize. This is 7 Brian Deevy speaking. 8 A: Yeah. He said that, yeah. 9 Q: "I think we're getting beat up in the 10 press big time. I think we could have 11 handled the press a little better there 12 personally." 13 A: Right. 14 Q: It was you that was referring to the 15 political side, it couldn't have been better, right? 16 A: But I felt the way -- the way that 17 the units had conducted themselves in the sense of nobody 18 turned and ran or nobody fell apart or... 19 Q: You -- you mean the -- the Support 20 Team or the Contact Team? 21 A: All of it. 22 Q: They would be the political side. 23 Couldn't have been better? 24 A: No, the sense that the units worked 25 well together in the sense --


1 Q: And so politically they worked well 2 together? 3 A: Yeah. 4 Q: In the cordon formation? 5 A: The whole thing, the combination of 6 TRU working with ERT and the -- 7 Q: Is that part of your training to 8 refer to your units, your contact group, your arrest 9 team, your support team, your second in command as the 10 political side? 11 A: No, I wouldn't say it is, no. 12 Q: Now, you go on and -- and you state: 13 "I was out there man and boys -- both 14 down in TRU and the CMU like -- it was 15 very professional." 16 Now, you're talking about your officers, 17 right? 18 A: Right. 19 Q: You're not talking about political 20 anymore, correct? 21 A: No, I'm talking about that 22 professional, that internal part. 23 Q: "We took a barrage of rocks. We 24 repulsed a full attack about fifteen 25 (15) -- twenty (20) with clubs. A guy


1 broke my shield right in half with a 2 steel pole. I coldcocked him." 3 What's Deevy's response to you coldcocking 4 him -- the top of page 8? 5 A: He says, "Good". 6 Q: Good. I take it that it was your 7 view, based on Staff Sergeant Brian Deevy's response to 8 your advice that you had coldcocked this individual that 9 he thought that was a good thing, correct? 10 A: Under -- he understood the 11 circumstances. Let's read the whole paragraph. 12 "We took a barrage of rocks." 13 Q: Hmm hmm. 14 A: "Repulsed an attack. We were 15 attacked by fifteen (15) to twenty (20) 16 with clubs." 17 I got a shield broken in half, that's with 18 a steel pole. 19 Q: Hmm hmm. 20 A: And then I coldcocked the person. So 21 then he goes: 22 "Good." 23 In the sense you defended yourself and 24 you're okay. 25 Q: And you coldcocked him?


1 A: I think it's more like you survived. 2 Q: Right. And then you say to him: 3 "You boys, we hammered -- we hammered 4 them, like we cut them down, like with 5 the sticks." 6 A: Right. 7 Q: And there's a correction to that. 8 MR. DERRY MILLAR: A few boys. 9 THE WITNESS: A few. 10 11 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 12 Q: All right. At the start of the 13 sentence it should read, Few boys? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: "We hammered -- we hammered them." 16 Yes? 17 A: That's right. 18 MR. DERRY MILLAR: "We hammered 'em. We 19 hammered them." 20 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I'm sorry. I 21 apologize. I tried to do the correction when Mr. Millar 22 did it and I didn't -- didn't do well on this one. 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25


1 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 2 Q: So with Mr. Millar's assistance the 3 appropriate quote from you, Mr. Lacroix is, quote: 4 "Few boys. We hammered -- we hammered 5 them. Like we cut 'em down, like with 6 the sticks." 7 A: And that's in reference to: 8 We took a barrage of rocks and we 9 repulsed a full attack. About fifteen 10 (15) to twenty (20) attacked us with 11 clubs. They broke my shield [blah, 12 blah, blah]. We hammered 'em. We cut 13 them down." 14 So there was a stick fight between twenty 15 (20) people on twenty (20) people and we repulsed it. 16 And, you know, it's two (2) guys talking. It might sound 17 a little, you know, whatever, but I'm saying to him -- 18 when I say, "We cut them down," basically I'm telling him 19 the formation and tactics worked. 20 We took a full on attack and we repulsed 21 them. 22 Q: The bottom of page 2 you -- you 23 remember apologizing to Mr. Sam George this morning -- 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: -- about referring to Dudley as a


1 jerk? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: And you explained the reason you had 4 done that is you thought Dudley was driving the car? 5 A: I thought that the deceased person 6 was -- I just felt that that person had to be the driver 7 of the car. 8 Q: Fair enough. But either way, whether 9 you thought he was driving or not you knew that someone 10 had died, yes? 11 A: Right. 12 Q: As a result of the use of force by a 13 combined effort of a CMU team you led and a TRU team that 14 Kent Skinner led, yes? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: You knew that someone had died less 17 than twenty-four (24) hours earlier, yes? 18 A: That's right. 19 Q: And you knew that and it's shown at 20 page 2. 21 "The other two (2) are going to live 22 but then Dudley of course is gone, 23 right." 24 You knew that. 25 A: Right. That's right.


1 Q: And at page 8 you say: 2 "Few boys. We hammered -- we hammered 3 them. Like we cut 'em down, like with 4 the sticks." 5 That's not an objection operational 6 discussion, that's a victory lap isn't it, sir? 7 A: When you were saying that you feel 8 that you just about died, you have a different emotion 9 than the way you're standing there now. I already said, 10 yeah. 11 I came back from vacation, just wanted to 12 go about my job, I get called out to an incident, I'm hit 13 in the head with a rock, I'm hit in the ankle with a 14 rock, I get a shield busted in half, I get almost run 15 over by a bus, I almost get run over by a car, I get shot 16 at by a car and almost by the bus again. 17 And after I felt we were attacked. So at 18 that point, sitting in a hotel room, waiting to be 19 interviewed, I wasn't exactly objective. 20 Q: Could you please turn to Tab 13, 21 please? 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 Q: The very first conversation you have


1 with John Carson after you returned from holidays, is the 2 next day after your holiday and you speak to John Carson 3 at 8:20 a.m. in the morning. And it's reflected as a 4 September 5th, 1995 conversation at 8:20:42 and you 5 should add seven (7) minutes, so call it 8:27 a.m. All 6 right? Do you have that? 7 A: 8:20, yeah. September 5th -- 8 Q: In the morning. 9 A: Right. 10 Q: Now, you say that the attitude you 11 were displaying after someone's died, is attributable to 12 basically you being injected into a situation you didn't 13 want to be in, right? 14 A: Right. 15 Q: At 8:20 a.m. on September 5th if you 16 could turn to page 10 which is the third page in. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Which tab is 18 this again, Mr. -- 19 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: It's Tab 13 -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 13. 21 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- in your binder 22 materials, Mr. Commissioner. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 24 Page 10. 25 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: And it's Tab 4 of


1 Exhibit P-44A. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 7 Q: After page 1 where you tell Mr. Carson 8 that Marcel Beaubien, you say: 9 "The MPP quite irate, not at us." 10 Right. The -- the next page, do you see 11 where you refer to the fact that Mr. Beaubien: 12 "He wants me to brief and he's going to 13 call the Premier and say this is 14 ridiculous." 15 Do you see that? The next page. 16 A: Right. 17 Q: Yeah. And then you're told by Mr. 18 Carson: 19 "Well, okay, and so that you know we 20 have four (4) ERT teams; two (2) were 21 on the ground all night and two (2) new 22 ones are in there now." 23 You say: 24 "Okay. We're just trying to contain 25 it.


1 Okay. 2 And so our objective here is to contain 3 and negotiate a peaceful resolution 4 with this whatever that may be. 5 Okay. 6 And we have adequate resources this 7 time to address all public concerns. 8 Okay." 9 And then you say at the bottom: 10 "Um, we'll address we're going for an 11 injunction? 12 A: Yes. Natural Resources are 13 addressing that as we speak." 14 Do you see that? 15 A: Yeah. 16 Q: Now at the top of the next page, John 17 Carson says: 18 "We have 1, 2, 3 and 6 here." 19 And that's the ERT teams from the 1, 2, 3 20 and 6 Districts; is that correct? 21 A: I had four (4) teams, yeah. 22 Q: And then you say: 23 "The only reason I'm asking is if it's 24 a large formation, I was -- I'm one of 25 the ones -- I'm just wondering who


1 you've got doing that. 2 CARSON: I'm sorry? 3 For a large formation of ERT there's 4 suppose to be a -- a Staff Sergeant. 5 I'm just wondering if -- 6 Well, at this point we've got them on 7 standby. 8 Well get them on standby. 9 No, they're here. 10 No, I mean but I mean what you're going 11 to do with that. I mean the only 12 reason I'm asking is I'm one, I just 13 wanted to know. 14 You mean as a Crowd Control operation? 15 Yeah. 16 Well we don't intend to go to that 17 mode." 18 You made a point of telling John Carson 19 that you're a Staff Sergeant who can run CMU, right? 20 A: It was a brand spanking new policy. 21 I didn't even know if he knew it, that he can't have that 22 many ERT without a CMU staff. 23 Q: And you told him first and foremost, 24 you didn't say the other names you shared with us the day 25 before yesterday or yesterday. You said, "I'm one".


1 I'm one who can run that formation, right? 2 A: Just let him know that I'm -- I'm 3 trained. 4 Q: Didn't sound very reluctant there, 5 sir. On September 5th, it sounded like you wanted John 6 Carson to know that you could do this job. 7 A: Reluctance to go up to the command 8 post and hang around is different than walking down that 9 road. 10 Q: Fair enough. So you're saying that 11 what you wanted to do was go to the Command Post and hang 12 around? 13 A: Yeah, I wanted to go up there and see 14 everybody. 15 Q: All right. That was the real reason 16 that you were saying that to John Carson? 17 A: I was trying to inform him that there 18 was a brand new policy. I didn't think he knew it. I 19 was just letting him know. 20 He said, I've got four (4) full ERT teams. 21 I was trying to find out what his intentions were and 22 then he -- and once he said, "Oh, okay", he didn't 23 realize it, that he needed staff if he's going to do CMU. 24 And as soon as he said, "I'm not going 25 there", I think that was the end of the discussion.


1 Q: The reason I'm asking is "I'm one". 2 I just wanted to know. 3 Now, your evidence to the Commissioner 4 today, though, is that you didn't want to do this and 5 that you were injected into it unwillingly, right? 6 A: No police officer wants to walk down 7 the road in the middle of the night into a disturbance, 8 in their right mind. 9 You're trained to do it. 10 Q: I'm sorry, in their what? 11 A: In their right mind. 12 Q: Thank you. 13 A: You're trained to do it. You rely 14 upon your training. You rely upon your equipment. You 15 rely upon, you know, the other officers. 16 What I'm getting at, if you're sitting at 17 home at eight o'clock at night like I was with your wife 18 and children, you're not hoping the phone will ring so 19 you'll run out to a disturbance. 20 Q: Now, I'm back at page 8. You've said 21 that the reason we said we hammered them and the answer 22 to my suggestion to you that you were doing a victory lap 23 in the wake of the death of Dudley George. 24 You answered that you were forced into 25 this situation after your vacation.


1 Do you remember that's where we were? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: Mr. Commissioner, I expect to maybe 4 another three (3), four (4) minutes with this tape and 5 this may be an appropriate time after that for a break. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, do you 7 wait until you've finished with this tape and -- 8 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Yeah, if you don't 9 mind. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- take the 11 break? 12 13 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 14 Q: So, at page 8 -- 15 A: Where we at again, sorry? 16 Q: At page 8 of Tab 24, which is Exhibit 17 P-1361. 18 A: Hmm hmm. 19 Q: You see after you say: 20 "Few boys. We hammered -- we hammered 21 them. Like we cut 'em down, like with 22 the sticks." 23 A: Right. 24 Q: Staff Sergeant Deevy repeats: 25 "Good".


1 Is that right? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: Just like he repeated -- like he said 4 "good" after you coldcocked him; is that correct? 5 A: Yes, sir. 6 Q: Then you say: 7 "And then I guess we finally realized 8 we got their leader. They were a 9 little choked then." 10 And you continue: 11 "I think they were setting us up." 12 A: That's right. 13 Q: "They wanted it, they wanted it." 14 A: That's right. 15 Q: You still think that today? 16 A: I think that there was actually -- it 17 was -- it was building to a showdown. I think that they 18 wanted to engage a larger formation, but I don't believe 19 that they knew the -- well, they didn't know the new 20 tactic and they didn't know the equipment we had, so I 21 think they were surprised. 22 Q: Well -- 23 A: But I believe that there was the 24 buildup was to draw -- why build all those rocks? Why 25 pile up rocks and sticks?


1 So, yes, I think that there was some 2 individuals, not all, were looking for a big 3 confrontation with a larger OPP formation. 4 Q: "DEEVY: Sure they did. This -- 5 them -- I'm sure they're all wailing 6 and everything but this is the best 7 thing - as far as they're concerned - 8 that could ever happen. They've taken 9 the limelight away from Hundred Mile 10 House, squarely on Ipperwash. Ah -- one 11 of the guys are saying that his mother- 12 in-law in Florida -- its front page 13 news in Florida. Its Big News, 14 everywhere. Its what they want. But 15 um" 16 And then you say, Wade Lacroix: 17 "One of the TRU guys stepped in and, 18 you know, they were going to mow us 19 down and we had to take them out. We 20 took out Dudley George who's a jerk. 21 DEEVY: So TRU stepped in to support 22 CMU who were under fire? 23 Yeah." 24 Now, I just want to stop. And then you 25 say, "Yeah, we..." and then he says, "And then, and then"


1 and you say: 2 "You know that I fired? You know I 3 fired, too, eh?" 4 And he says, "Yeah." 5 Now, I take it the reason you told Mr. 6 Deevy that you fired, the reason you told Staff Sergeant 7 Deevy that you fired was that, obviously, you weren't at 8 all certain that he knew that you fired your weapon; is 9 that fair? 10 A: No, I felt that he knew. 11 Q: Well, why would you bother telling 12 him then, at page 8 of this conversation? 13 "You know that I fired? You know I 14 fired, too?" 15 Why would you tell him that? 16 A: Because he would understand how you 17 feel, if you been in that situation. 18 Q: I'm going to suggest to you, sir, 19 that you didn't know whether he knew. You wanted him to 20 know. And that your version of events about a ballistics 21 report and Deevy understanding the ballistics falls very 22 flat when you have regard to the fact that Deevy didn't 23 even know you'd discharged your weapon up until page 8. 24 Isn't that so? 25 A: No, I said, yes, he did know.


1 Q: No. He answers you: 2 "You know that I fired. You know I 3 fired two (2)." 4 And he says, Yeah. 5 Q: Now, you continue: 6 "I guess maybe we should talk about 7 this face to face. 8 Yeah, okay. Well,..." 9 Top of the page: 10 "Huh?" 11 And then you ask: 12 "Taped?" 13 Do you see that? Do you see the top of 14 page 9 you ask if it's taped? 15 A: Hmm hmm. Yeah. 16 Q: On the taped line: 17 "Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Yeah." 18 Do you see where you refer to the tape 19 line? 20 A: Yeah. 21 Q: Then there's a conversation about 22 letting Mrs. Lacroix know information. And then the next 23 page you say it again. 24 "No, this line's on the reel to reel is 25 it?


1 Yeah. 2 Is it? 3 Yeah." 4 Now, am I right in inferring from pages 9 5 and 10 that when you learned it was taped you repeated 6 the question again to the next page? This is on the reel 7 to reel? 8 You didn't know it was taped did you? 9 A: No. 10 Q: Now, in addition to the first time 11 where you talked about what you said ballistics, but 12 referred to the autopsy report twice -- this is going to 13 be a long question but it's the last question pretty well 14 on this statement. 15 In addition to the first part where you 16 referred to autopsy report but you tell us that you meant 17 ballistics and then the part where you discussed the 18 status of the event and then you went back to discussing 19 injuries and then you went back to the status and then 20 you went back to injuries again. 21 Would you agree with me that there was 22 literally no limits on where this conversation went for 23 the entire ten (10) pages, you talked about everything? 24 A: I've known him for many years, kept 25 talking and talked about a lot of things.


1 Q: And you knew him for many years and 2 in fact you'd worked on TRU team with him at the London 3 TRU team, didn't you? 4 A: Yes, sir. 5 Q: And you knew when you called him at 6 Command Post that he would give you what you wanted, 7 isn't that right? 8 A: No, I just -- I knew he was there. 9 Q: You knew he was there and that was 10 why you called, correct? He was your friend? 11 A: I just asked who was at the Command 12 Post and they said Deevy's here. 13 Q: You even knew that you were putting 14 him in a difficult position didn't you? You knew you 15 were putting him in a difficult position? 16 A: I didn't want him to give me anything 17 that wasn't released, that wasn't out. 18 Q: You specifically apologized to him 19 at the start of the conversation. You said, quote: 20 "Sorry to get you into this Deeve." 21 "Deeves" is his nickname, isn't it? 22 A: Yeah. 23 Q: See at page 1 halfway down: 24 conversation. You said, quote: 25 "Sorry to get you into this Deeves."


1 A: Yeah, I think we laughed because that 2 was -- he got pulled in because Southwestern Ontario 3 couldn't handle it and Central Region had to come in. 4 That was a bit of a... 5 Q: Now, based on everything you've said 6 to-date, especially based on the evidence you gave Mr. 7 Commissioner a little while ago about how those officers 8 were entitled to know, the ones that didn't know they 9 should -- ones should know whether they were subject and 10 the others should know whether they're a witness. 11 Remember telling the Commissioner that? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: I take it, it's fair to say you would 14 have passed this information on to those fellow officers 15 in the room. There was nothing stopping -- 16 A: I didn't get what I -- what I wanted 17 was. I didn't get who was a subject officer. 18 Q: Fair enough, sir. This is a good 19 time for a break. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 21 Mr. Falconer. We'll take an afternoon break. 22 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 23 for fifteen (15) minutes. 24 25 --- Upon recessing at 3:20 p.m.


1 --- Upon resuming at 3:36 p.m. 2 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 4 resumed. Please be seated. 5 6 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 7 Q: It was your evidence, Mr. Lacroix, 8 that on September 5th when you spoke to John Carson, 9 Incident Commander, you were talking about as you put it 10 "a brand new CMU"; is that right? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And in discussing this brand new CMU, 13 you were concerned that John Carson wouldn't have the 14 familiarity you would have with it, correct? 15 A: No. I didn't know that he -- I -- I 16 wasn't sure that he would know the new policy that if you 17 actually bring two (2) ERT teams together for a crowd 18 management problem, you had to have a Staff Sergeant 19 trained. 20 Q: That -- but that is somewhat of an 21 important detail as to who's suppose to take command. 22 That's somewhat significant, would you agree? 23 A: On the chain of command it would be 24 good to know who the Number 2 is at a CMU role. 25 Q: Do you mind, if you could, if you


1 could be a little closer to the mike. I know you're not 2 feeling that well but -- or bring the mike closer to you 3 if want to lean back that's fine too. It's just is a 4 strain. 5 A: I'll just -- I'll sit like this. 6 Q: I don't know if Mr. Clerk can help. 7 But if you want to lean back, that's fine. 8 A: It's fine, I'll sit here. 9 Q: You and I are agreed that part of the 10 responsibilities of deploying any form of unit, 11 investigative or enforcement unit, is to understand the 12 chain of command in the unit? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And you were concerned that because 15 of the brand new nature of this Crowd Management Unit 16 concept that John Carson would not know about it? 17 A: That's true. I -- I wasn't -- I was 18 not sure that he knew that it'd completely been 19 reconfigured and there was this new rule. New policy. 20 Q: Right. And in fact you told Mr. 21 Millar during his examination of you yesterday, or 22 actually this morning, I apologize, that to your 23 knowledge as far as you knew at the time, there was 24 actually no training as -- as of September 6th, 1995 when 25 you led the CMU that night, there was no training for


1 Incident Commanders of the rank of John Carson in respect 2 of the new CMU, correct? 3 A: That's correct. 4 Q: So even if John Carson had wanted to 5 know about it, there -- there would be no logical ready 6 available way for him to be trained on it, right? 7 A: There was no course for his level but 8 they could of course attend at the training. I mean they 9 could go to observe. 10 Q: To your -- 11 A: But there was no course. 12 Q: There was no course. And to your 13 knowledge, did he attend at the training when you were 14 there? 15 A: No. 16 Q: All right. Now it's apparent from 17 the conversation I quoted to you before when you talked 18 to John Carson and I'm at P -- you don't have to go back 19 because you'll remember right away, it's just a one (1) 20 liner. 21 At P-444A, Exhibit P-444A, Tab 4 there's a 22 reference by John Carson quote: 23 "Well we don't intend to go into that 24 mode." Close quotes. 25 A: Right.


1 Q: So the message sent to you by John 2 Carson on September 5th, 1995 at 8:20 in the morning, is 3 we're not going there. 4 A: We're not going there and we're not 5 doing Crowd Management. 6 Q: Right. And it wasn't stated as 7 amusing, it was stated as a statement of fact, a 8 declaration, right? 9 A: Right. 10 Q: And I take it you took from that, 11 that was the end of that? Crowd management wasn't going 12 to be deployed by this Incident Commander, right? 13 A: That's what I -- yes, that's what I 14 took it. 15 Q: And so it's not surprising, to be 16 fair to you, that you didn't go and scope East Parkway 17 Drive or Army Camp Road to figure out whether a cordon 18 formation would work in the sandy parking lot. 19 You'd just been told, on your first 20 conversation with the incident commander, that that was 21 not going to be used, right? 22 A: Right. 23 Q: So you would have no reason to do, 24 for example, a site walk, to see how your formation would 25 do in there, correct?


1 A: Exactly. 2 Q: And that's why did you didn't, 3 correct? 4 A: Exactly. 5 Q: And in addition to that, you would 6 have no reason to go and get a copy of Project Maple and 7 make sure you know it well enough, because you're now, 8 potentially as a -- as a local staff sergeant trained to 9 run this new CMU, you could be looking at running that 10 thing. It could be at night, it could be in tricky 11 circumstances. 12 You might ordinarily go get a copy of 13 Project Maple, but you'd just been told, we're not going 14 there, correct? 15 A: Correct. And I don't think Maple 16 even covered CMU. But -- 17 Q: But you wouldn't have known -- 18 A: I wouldn't have known it, you're 19 right. 20 Q: But you didn't have to worry -- 21 A: No. 22 Q: -- because that wasn't going to be 23 your job? 24 A: I got the distinct impression that's 25 right, that that -- we were not going there, there was no


1 need. 2 Q: And the first time you got a new 3 impression would have been the next day at 8:00 p.m. 4 September 6th, when you got a call from Stan Korosec? 5 A: Right. 6 Q: Suit up, you're running CMU. 7 A: It was -- yes, I was being ordered to 8 come there under the authority of Inspector Linton. 9 Q: Yeah. 10 A: But even at that point, I believe it 11 was to stand by. 12 Q: Right. But it was to run a CMU? 13 A: That's right. 14 Q: And you got there at 9:30 at night? 15 A: Right. 16 Q: It was dark? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: So between September 5th and night 19 time, September 6th, there would have been no preparatory 20 steps taken by you because nobody brought you into a 21 planning process that involved you, right? 22 A: True. 23 Q: So you were -- we have to avoid the 24 word 'true' because I don't want to -- 25 A: Sorry.


1 Q: -- confuse the transcript. 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: It's all right. And of crucial 4 importance to all of this, is that preparatory steps only 5 get taken by people who expect to be deployed, right? 6 A: Yes, sir. We only usually do a 7 recognisance if you actually think you're going to do a 8 mission. 9 Q: That's right. And John Carson went 10 out of his way to tell you, you weren't? 11 A: Right. 12 Q: What kind of recognisance, ha, I said 13 recognisance. 14 I don't want you to issue a paper 15 against me, please. What kind of reconnaissance would 16 you have engaged in, I think in TRU language it's a recy. 17 Q: A recy. I would have done it at 18 least a wheeled reccy. You know, gone down -- which is 19 you go down and you scope out the terrain. 20 I mean, obviously if I could have got out, 21 if it was safe enough to get out and basically pace it 22 off and walk the terrain, I would have liked to have done 23 that. 24 You -- if you have lots of time, you ask 25 for video surveillance.


1 Q: Okay. 2 A: Depending how much time that you 3 have, there's more and more things you can do. 4 Q: Now, we heard extensive evidence from 5 John Carson. I recall certainly Mr. Klippenstein 6 examining on it as well as Mr. Millar, that things were 7 fairly stable, it was status quo, for many hours on 8 September 5th and September 6th, right up until when John 9 Carson went to dinner in and around 7:29 p.m. on 10 September 6th, 1995, all right? 11 A: That's my recollection. 12 Q: And we've heard that at one (1) or 13 two (2) points in the process, different officers for 14 different reasons were in and around the sandy parking 15 lot and in and around the fence line, all right? 16 A: Yes, I heard of different officers 17 being sent down for different missions, yes. 18 Q: So you'd agree with me that based on 19 what you know today and maybe what you would have learned 20 in the days that followed this incident, there really 21 would have been nothing stopping you from peacefully 22 going down there, by yourself, not invisible deployment, 23 necessarily, just going down there and walking things off 24 and pacing them and getting to know the area. 25 A: Prior to.


1 Q: That's right. 2 A: Like on the -- on the 5th and the day 3 of the 6th? 4 Q: That's right. 5 A: Yes, I would -- I would agree. 6 Q: It was quite feasible. In other 7 words, you haven't learned of anything since, any 8 circumstances since that would have negated that 9 possibility? 10 A: No. 11 Q: One (1) of the reasons I'm asking you 12 this is because you testified about some difficulties you 13 found yourself in during deployment of CMU. 14 Let me give you an example. You testified 15 to Mr. Millar that you realized your back, that is, the 16 formation's back, was against a fence line -- 17 A: Right. 18 Q: -- as you put it, you had nowhere to 19 go? 20 A: Right. 21 Q: Now, that's something you wouldn't 22 have had in your mind on the morning of September 6th, 23 1995? 24 A: No. 25 Q: And I'm not trying to confuse you,


1 I'm just saying -- 2 A: No, no, I'm... 3 Q: Because you weren't' going to be 4 deployed, right? 5 A: No. 6 Q: And there's no way you can fix it in 7 the dark on September 6th, 1995, when the situation has 8 allegedly gotten hot down at the sandy parking lot. 9 You can't fix it then? 10 A: No, you have to go with what you 11 have. 12 Q: You have to go with what you got, 13 right? 14 A: Yeah. 15 Q: And you didn't have what was the 16 standard recy intelligence for a CMU commander, correct? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: In addition to the fence line and -- 19 and being backed against the fence line, am I wrong? I 20 was having trouble following because Mr. Millar and you 21 know the facts much better than I so one (1) of the 22 problems is that every time I was shown a picture I got a 23 bit confused. 24 A: Okay. 25 Q: I'm sure the Commissioner has been


1 following closely so he's better at this than I am but 2 the sense I had was that as you moved eastward on East 3 Parkway Drive -- 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: -- and you turned that corner your 6 cordon formation had to spread across the opening to the 7 sandy parking lot, am I right? 8 A: Yeah. They broke out into that 9 formation as -- as we crossed into the sandy parking lot, 10 the narrows there. We broke out. 11 Q: And you had to make your way around 12 that corner, right? 13 A: Yeah. I guess a light jog to the 14 left but that -- that's very deceiving those pictures 15 because there's a bunch of sand there. 16 Q: That's why I'm not even bringing the 17 picture up. 18 A: And those cement things weren't 19 there. It was more of a straight shot. 20 Q: But you talked about a bottleneck. 21 A: Yeah. It -- it narrowed as you came 22 off of the pavement off either Army Camp or Parkway. It 23 narrowed slightly and then broke out into the sandy 24 parking lot. 25 Q: Right. And you -- it was your word


1 that described it as a bottleneck? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: All right. So it's not just a light 4 jog, it bottlenecks at that point, doesn't it? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And you also testified yesterday in 7 answer to Mr. Millar question that you had to get your 8 formation around that corner where the bottleneck was, 9 yes? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: And all of that would have been 12 something that you had to do on the fly so to speak 13 because you didn't have the benefit of a standard CMU 14 recy, correct? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: And that's not just you, that's the 17 poor officers who are marching in the dark trying to make 18 their way around that corner, correct? 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: While keeping their eyes looking out 21 for -- what did you refer to some of the occupiers as, 22 sentries? 23 A: Well, I thought that the two (2) with 24 the floodlights that were out front were -- they seemed 25 to be acting like a sentry --


1 Q: Fair enough. 2 A: -- an advance team. 3 Q: And so they would have to naturally 4 it would be part of their job, it would be a matter of 5 officer safety among other things to be looking out for 6 that -- those people, yes? 7 A: Yes, sir. 8 Q: While they make their way in the dark 9 around these corners that they haven't reconnoitred in 10 any way, correct? 11 A: Yes, sir. 12 Q: Did you ever talk to John Carson 13 about the wisdom of doing it this way, after the fact? 14 A: Never. I've never discussed this 15 call with John Carson, after the fact. 16 Q: I'll -- I'll tell you why I ask. 17 More than just the obvious point about being told on 18 September 5th that we're not going there so you, Wade 19 Lacroix, don't have to worry about it. 20 We have this odd development in the 21 evidence before the Commissioner I would -- I put to you, 22 sir, about this notion of -- of using the Crowd 23 Management Unit as a diversion in circumstances in which 24 you were to simply go halfway down the road, create 25 enough of a diversion so that the occupiers would have


1 their attention attracted towards you and your officers 2 so that in turn Sierra, which is the TRU team members -- 3 A: Right. 4 Q: -- the advance TRU team members could 5 get into position to do proper observation as a Sierra 6 team to gain intelligence about what was going on down 7 there in the dark. 8 You -- you know that that has been 9 advanced by Kent Skinner and Officer Zupancic, Kent 10 Skinner being the head of the TRU operation that night -- 11 A: Hmm hmm. 12 Q: -- and Officer Zupancic who was the 13 Communications Officer as part of TRU that night. 14 A: Right. 15 Q: They offered that explanation as to 16 how CMU was intended to be used, all right? 17 A: And I was not present for any such 18 conversation. 19 Q: And in particular, Mr. Millar asked 20 you if that was the case and you -- your words were, I 21 would have a problem with that. 22 Do you remember saying that? 23 A: Yes. If we -- if that's what my 24 mission really was -- 25 Q: Yes.


1 A: -- first of all I'd want to know it-- 2 Q: That's not a bad idea. 3 A: -- and I mean that's an awful big 4 ruse to get one (1) Sierra team in place. 5 Q: Forty (40) -- thirty (30) to forty 6 (40) men in the dark incapable of defending themselves 7 against weaponry, right? 8 A: Right. 9 Q: And -- and for animal lovers let's 10 not leave out the dogs. 11 A: Right. 12 Q: Right. Going down the road in order 13 to create a diversion in circumstances which you're 14 hoping to get TRU team members in place to see if there 15 are people with AK-47's at the fence line, right? 16 A: Right. 17 Q: And so if that is the idea, if Kent 18 Skinner, the head of TRU -- and Kent Skinner, in addition 19 to being the head of the Tactical and Rescue Unit that 20 was operating that night, he was sitting in the talk 21 centre communicating with your CMU, right? 22 A: Yes, sir. 23 Q: He was actually being the go-between 24 for John Carson, the Incident Commander; correct? 25 A: Yes, sir. He was the voice on the


1 radio for the Incident Commander. 2 Q: So he had this impression that this 3 is what you were to do -- I can read it to you from the 4 evidence but My Friends will agree with me that was the 5 gist of his evidence. 6 Now, in the circumstances, you appreciate, 7 don't you, that if there was a possibility that AK-47's 8 were in the hands of occupiers, a possibility which has 9 never been proven in any way in evidence, but if there 10 was a possibility, I guess a single person with a single 11 AK-47 in the dark in those circumstances could have done 12 horrible damage to your officers, true? 13 A: Could -- a thirty (30) round magazine 14 could kill the entire CMU. 15 Q: And if that person with the AK-47 had 16 a murderous intent and was hiding behind a tree, so a 17 well placed sniper with an AK-47, you could go down and 18 be all the diversion you wanted but if that person was 19 there you'd end up with a horrible tragedy on your hands, 20 with a lot of dead officers, yes? 21 A: Yes, sir. As I stated, our body 22 armour would not stop an AK-47 round. 23 Q: Or an imitation AK-47 round? 24 A: Depending what the imitations is. I 25 mean, there are imitation AK-47's that are .22's,


1 converted .22's, our armour would have stopped that. 2 Q: But the bottom line to all this is 3 you're not there to take those kind of chances? 4 A: No, sir. 5 Q: That's not the point of CMU? 6 A: No, sir. 7 Q: And you know and you've heard that 8 the version of Kent Skinner and Officer Zupancic is that 9 in order to find out if those weapons were there they 10 needed to put the Sierra team into proper observation 11 position to see if there were weapons there; you know 12 that? 13 A: I was aware that the Sierra was in, 14 that's what I thought it was doing, was to get update 15 intelligence on any weapons, numbers, et cetera. 16 Q: But the positions of these officers 17 before this Commissioner is that not only was that their 18 role but that they couldn't fulfill it. 19 A: Right. 20 Q: And so in their unsuccessful attempts 21 to find out whether there's weapons there, the idea was 22 to put your men and you halfway down the road, in harm's 23 way as it were; does that make any sense? 24 A: If -- if that's -- I think I answered 25 yes in the evidence in-chief, if -- it would make no


1 sense if that's what we were, nothing but a diversion. 2 However, if we were going down to do the 3 mission that I was told to do, go down and clear the 4 Park, to use us as a screen of some kind, a diversion to 5 get that Sierra team into its final position, I can 6 understand that. That's just -- that's just good, you 7 know, concurrent activity. 8 But I agree, if -- if that's all I was, 9 that's not a proper use of a CMU. 10 Q: And in particular you'd agree with me 11 that it's an improper use of CMU to have as your job to 12 go halfway down the road and create that diversion, not 13 to go all the way to the Park and clear the Park, as 14 you've just said, which would be a primary mission; 15 right? 16 A: That was the mission I was given. 17 Q: Right. But if that wasn't your 18 mission, if your mission or the intention of your 19 commanders was to go halfway down that road in 20 circumstances where they don't know if there's weaponry 21 at the fence line, that would not be a proper use of CMU? 22 A: It would not be a proper use. 23 Q: And you would have stopped it, 24 wouldn't you? 25 A: Yes, sir. An AK-47 round, sir, is


1 accurate to up to a mile. 2 Q: Well, the reason I -- I spend so much 3 time on this is that there is a portion of the evidence 4 that is -- is confusing to me. I'm going to be 5 suggesting to you, sir, frankly, that it appears that you 6 went further than you were supposed to go, first of all. 7 I'm going to suggest to you that as the 8 head of CMU you were supposed to only go halfway down 9 that road, and you did go too far? 10 A: I was supposed to go down halfway, 11 that's called the phase line, and check in. And I think 12 that, if you look through the tapes, there's all kinds of 13 conversation, I don't want to go any further until I have 14 the high ground, Kent Skinner -- I think yesterday in the 15 evidence, You've got a Sierra and an Alpha, and then we - 16 - we went, Good, So now we've got the high ground, and we 17 went engaging. Go look at the radio comm. 18 Q: Well, sir, to be fair, the 10:37 19 exchange -- 10:37 p.m. exchange, you acknowledge you 20 heard, Sierra are not in position and -- 21 A: Where's that at, I'm sorry, the log? 22 Q: 10:37 of -- let me put a proposition 23 to you, you might agree with me, when you're not having 24 to dig paper, but if -- if you want to go there, I'm 25 happy to.


1 A: Right. 2 Q: You testified -- you testified 3 yesterday that at the 10:37 mark, that is 10:37 p.m. 4 mark, when you were told Sierra is not in position, you 5 said, quote: 6 "We are on our own." Close quotes. 7 Was that not your impression when you were 8 told Sierra could not be in position? You said, okay, 9 well we are on our own. 10 A: Then read on, doesn't TOC -- 11 Q: You said -- 12 A: -- tell me -- 13 Q: -- advance one (1) hydro pole. 14 A: That's right. And then after the 15 advance one (1) hydro pole -- 16 Q: Yes. 17 A: I finally get, you've got cover. I 18 think it's 1 Sierra and 1 Alpha. 19 Q: That's true. Your flanks and your 20 fronts are being covered by them. 21 A: Covered. 22 Q: But the observation never happens. 23 You're told they can't get into position. 24 A: We keep asking for the intelligence. 25 We keep asking, we're not getting it.


1 Q: And we are on our own. That's what 2 you said yesterday. That's a quote from you, sir. 3 A: In the sense of the intelligence, 4 it's obvious that he hasn't got an eye. 5 Q: And he doesn't have an eye, meaning 6 you went forward -- 7 A: Right. 8 Q: -- without the eye, correct? 9 A: No, I think at the very end I get a 10 message from TOC, 1 Sierra -- to me, 1 Sierra has the eye 11 and 1 Alpha team on the flank. 12 Q: Would it surprise you to learn that 13 Kent Skinner has testified in these proceedings that they 14 never got the eye? 15 That as you went down, they did not have 16 the eye. And he maintained in the face of questioning 17 by Ms. Tuck-Jackson that the idea was not for you to go 18 forward without the eye, but that CMU went forward. 19 Now, sir, I'm going to suggest to you and 20 give you an opportunity to rebut this. I'm going to 21 suggest to you that you improperly continued your mission 22 in the face of information that told you that your 23 observation team was in no position to ascertain whether 24 there was weaponry or not. 25 What do you say to that?


1 A: I say first of all, CMU never trained 2 with TRU. It's not a normal mission for TRU to be there. 3 So in all the training I was conducted at Meaford and all 4 the exercises I did, TRU was never in attendance. 5 They were never built into any tactic at 6 any time, therefore CMU would deploy and do its mission 7 expecting never to have TRU. 8 So this night I had TRU, so they're a good 9 asset. I kept asking and asking. They never did get the 10 eye. 11 So then it comes back to we're on our own, 12 if that's what I say, back to the -- it's always back to 13 the mission. 14 The five hundred (500) metres, John Carson 15 being a Level 2 Incident Commander would know that's 16 called a phase line. 17 What a phase line does, is you check in at 18 a phase line; up to that phase line, it is extremely easy 19 for the Incident Commander to recall, because he knows 20 you're not yet engaged. He can recall at any time. 21 He can recall after the phase line, but he 22 knows that it becomes more difficult. So the mission and 23 no message come out saying, scrub the mission, change the 24 mission. 25 I mean, we were offered this additional


1 resource we wouldn't normally have called Sierra. We 2 were hoping to get something from them. 3 So I rebut it that -- that that was not 4 built into the plan. I was not briefed to wait until the 5 Sierras release you to do this, because I was briefed by 6 John Carson at Forest. 7 Kent Skinner and Zupancic were not present 8 and no such discussion took place in my original brief. 9 Q: Kent Skinner testified before this 10 Commissioner that he and John Carson discussed this very 11 strategy. 12 What your evidence is, is that you were 13 not included in those discussions, correct? 14 A: I was not included in any such 15 discussion. 16 Q: Now, there's something else I want to 17 inquire of you. So far, in terms of what I would 18 respectfully suggest is your inventories of important 19 information. 20 The first thing we know is that the 21 Incident Commander Level 1 didn't have available to him 22 training to deal with the new CMU in terms of how -- 23 MR. DERRY MILLAR: That's -- 24 25 CONTINUED BY MR JULIAN FALCONER:


1 Q: Level 2, I apologize. I said Level 1 2 and I didn't -- I meant Incident Commander Level 2 -- 3 A: Right. 4 Q: -- did not have available to him 5 training to deal with the new CMU. That's the first 6 important piece of information, I suggest to you, we've 7 brought out in the last little while. 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: And the second important piece of 10 information is that you and the -- Mr. Millar brought 11 that piece of information out. 12 And if I said "we", it's the royal we, 13 'cause it's a Royal Commission. 14 A: Okay. 15 Q: And the second important piece of 16 information that Mr. Millar and other questioners, maybe 17 even me, have brought out from you is that there is a 18 difference in opinion on what the mission of CMU was at 19 the time; that is, Kent Skinner sees it one (1) way and 20 you see it another. 21 Now, there's a third piece of information 22 I want to canvass with you that Mr. Millar looked at. 23 And that's when he asked you about the weapons. 24 You -- you testified quite clearly 25 yesterday that you had no information of weapons down


1 there, because that's not what CMU does, right? 2 A: That's correct. 3 Q: Now, when I say weapons, I -- I want 4 to take -- I want to take two (2) steps backwards, 5 because lawyers are allowed to do that; we misspeak 6 ourselves -- 7 A: Okay. 8 Q: -- firearms. 9 A: Firearms. 10 Q: Had no -- that's Mr. Roy, he's 11 listening closely. You had no information that there 12 were firearms down there, right? 13 A: That is correct. 14 Q: You had no -- no one came to you and 15 said there's intelligence that there's firearms down at 16 the fence line? 17 A: No, the only thing I remember was 18 this -- that this vagueness about -- and it wasn't that 19 night where shots had been fired back on the Army Camp. 20 I believe it even came from the earliest briefing but 21 that night there was no briefing of firearms, sighting, 22 shooting, or by make, model. There was no discussion of 23 firearms. 24 Q: All right. What I'm going to ask you 25 to do is have regard to Exhibit P-1351 and that is a


1 conversation between Kent Skinner and Officer Zupancic. 2 A: Which tab is that? 3 Q: I have copies of it here. 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 Q: I apologize, if you'll bear with me. 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 Q: I'm handing a copy of Inquiry 12 Document Number 1001992 which is Exhibit P-1351. I have 13 a copy for the Commissioner and a copy for you, sir. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 15 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. 16 17 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 18 Q: Now, you arrive on scene at 9:30 19 p.m., correct? 20 A: And -- and so our -- our context is 21 quite clear. By that I mean you are -- according to your 22 notebook called out at 8:00 p.m. on September 6th, 1995, 23 to potentially head up the CMU and you pick up your gear 24 at the Detachment and attend at Command Post at 9:30 25 p.m., correct?


1 A: Yes, sir. 2 Q: Now, this is a transcript of a 3 conversation between Kent Skinner who heads up the TRU 4 part of that contingency, all right? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: The tactical part, right? 7 A: Okay. 8 Q: And Officer Zupancic who's wrongly in 9 the transcript at 21:02 described as Trepanzic, all 10 right? 11 A: Right. 12 Q: Now, I simply want to take you 13 through it because what this represents is what the head 14 of TRU team tells his TRU officers in order to have this 15 passed on to the other TRU officers who are going to 16 march with you -- 17 A: Right. 18 Q: -- all right? And it happens at 19 21:02 before you get there and before all of TRU and CMU 20 marches, all right? 21 A: Okay. 22 Q: "ZUPANCIC: Hello? 23 SKINNER: Hello? 24 ZUPANCIC: Yes? 25 SKINNER: Where are you?


1 We're in Northville right now." 2 Now, what's happening here is Zupancic is 3 coming out with the TRU team in the gun trucks, all 4 right? 5 A: Right. 6 Q: "SKINNER: Are you going to -- 7 heading for the TOC? 8 Yes, we're to meet ah, 9 Tex there. 10 Tex at Ravenswood. 11 Okay. I can't get a hold of Tex so I 12 passed this to you. Okay? 13 Okay. 14 SKINNER: Weapons? 15 Yes. 16 Apparent four (4) imitation AK's. 17 Yes. 18 Ruger 14's? 19 ZUPANCIC: Okay. Let me repeat this. 20 Four (4) imitation AK-47's. How many 21 mini Rugers? 22 Ruger 14's don't know. 23 Mini Rugers. 24 Scoped hunting rifles [says Skinner]?" 25 ZUPANCIC: Scoped hunting rifles.


1 Molotov cocktails 2 Molotov cocktails. 3 Yeah, okay. 4 Okay. 5 When you guys get there Tex will fill 6 you in on what we want to do. 7 Okay. 8 Okay. 9 Yeah. 10 So other than that, that's what I got 11 to pass on right at the moment. 12 Okay. I've logged our three (3) 13 vehicl es on. 14 I know, they were telling me here." 15 All right? So this -- you -- you worked 16 on TRU for many years? 17 A: Yes, sir. 18 Q: This is standard operating procedure 19 for the head of the TRU team to pass onto his TRU members 20 the latest intelligence about -- about firearms, correct? 21 A: Yes, sir. 22 Q: The Tactical and Rescue Unit is 23 heading into a scene, the same scene you're heading 24 into -- 25 A: Yes, sir.


1 Q: -- and they're getting the most up- 2 to-date information and the information that you see 3 passed on in this transcript is an inventory of weapons, 4 correct? 5 A: Yes, sir. 6 Q: Now, you'd agree with me that to the 7 extent -- and I -- and I want to put this carefully to 8 you because I have a mind to what you said yesterday. 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 Q: I apologize. I'm taking a step back 13 so I can ask this question properly. 14 To the extent that these firearms that 15 have been listed represent a fairly good probability of 16 being in the hands of the occupiers, all right, that 17 would be something you would want to know? 18 A: Yes, sir. 19 Q: And the reason I said "fairly good 20 probability" is I ask you that because you said 21 yesterday, Well if the information is unconfirmed; right? 22 A: Right. 23 Q: That's what you told Mr. Millar? 24 A: Right. I mean, if it's just 25 innuendo --


1 Q: Right. 2 A: -- there had been all kinds of 3 rumours floating around ever since the beginning of all 4 this of weapons. 5 Q: But if the TRU team leader saw this 6 as information for which there is a fairly good 7 probability that it was accurate, you would want to know 8 that? 9 A: Definitely. 10 Q: And the reason you say "definitely" 11 is it would be your responsibility to put the brakes on 12 CMU right there and then, wouldn't it? 13 A: Yes, sir. We're not equipped for 14 those weapons. 15 Q: All right. I want to ask you to have 16 regard to a transcript of April 19th, 2006, which is 17 Inspector Kent Skinner -- is it Staff Inspector or 18 Inspector, I -- 19 A: Inspector now I think. 20 Q: Inspector Kent Skinner who's 21 testifying and answering to questions by Ms. Vella. It's 22 April 19th, 2006 for My Friends. And I'm just going 23 to... 24 25 (BRIEF PAUSE)


1 2 Q: If these two (2) extracts could be 3 handed out to the Commissioner and to the Witness, 4 please. 5 Now, just a very quick piece of evidence 6 that I just want to bring to your attention by Inspector 7 Skinner. 8 During examination-in-chief by Ms. 9 Vella, at page 164 -- and you see the way it works, 10 there's page numbers halfway down the page? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: All right, two (2) page numbers per 13 page. 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: So 164, you see how the very thing 16 that I've just read to you is played for Inspector 17 Skinner? You see, just -- 18 A: Yeah. 19 Q: All right. So Ms. Vella asked some 20 questions based on the very same exhibit I just read to 21 you: 22 "Q. All right. Now, can you tell us 23 who the voices on that transmission 24 were? 25 Yes, it's Rick Zupancic.


1 Q. So it's erroneously identified as 2 Trepanzic? 3 That's correct. 4 All right. And yourself, you're 5 accurately identified? 6 Yes. 7 All right. And just for the record, 8 I've said 21:02 we're told to add 9 seven (7) minutes to that or 10 approximately seven (7) 11 minutes to that for real time. 12 And here you're passing along the 13 information you've received with 14 respect to the existence of possible 15 weapons in the -- in the -- from where, 16 in the Park or the Camp? 17 A. In the -- well, it would be in the 18 Park. 19 Q. In the Park. 20 And do you recall who provided you 21 with this information? 22 A. I believe it was Inspector Linton, 23 it came from Linton. 24 Q. Inspector Linton? 25 A. Yeah.


1 Q. And did -- what degree of 2 reliability did you attach to the 3 accuracy of this information? 4 A. Well, it was information that came 5 through us, it was -- I would say it's 6 a probability. It's not a -- it's not 7 confirmed until we've seen the weapons 8 or have evidence of the weapons but 9 it's a fairly good probability. 10 Q. All right. So it's now an 11 expectation? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. That there are likely these kinds 14 of weapons in the Park? 15 A. Yes." 16 Now, what I'd like to ask you, sir, is if 17 the head of TRU that's at the TOC has that expectation of 18 this kind of weaponry, isn't it something you should have 19 had? 20 A: Yes, sir. 21 Q: And would you agree with me that this 22 kind of mis-communication is not only bad form, it can 23 cost lives? 24 A: Yes, sir. It can cost lives, yes. 25 Q: That, in fact, on the night in --


1 A: If in fact these weapons existed, 2 yes. 3 Q: Yes. Well, but do you see how 4 Inspector Skinner had an expectation that they existed? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: He viewed it as a fairly good 7 probability? 8 A: That's what I had asked yesterday to 9 Mr. Millar, is -- 10 Q: Of course. 11 A: -- has this been, you know, 12 substantiated by someone, a police officer or a witness? 13 Q: He viewed it as a fairly good 14 probability. I want to leave out whether he was right or 15 wrong, that's irrelevant. 16 But the TRU team leader that's in TOC is 17 communicating with your CMU and giving your CMU support; 18 you're working together, right? 19 A: Yeah. 20 Q: He's got one (1) set of facts, an 21 expectation of weapons, and you have an entirely 22 different set; is that fair? 23 A: I would say so. 24 Q: And -- and it's a difference in 25 information that is crucial, would you agree?


1 A: The -- the availability of assault -- 2 these are assault weapons. An AK-47 is an assault rifle, 3 MA-14 is an assault rifle. If they were on scene it 4 would be not a CMU formation, it would probably be all 5 three (3) TRU teams. 6 Q: In fact -- in fact, CMU should never 7 march down that road, if Kent Skinner believes what he 8 believes, correct? 9 A: If he really believes that, we should 10 have been stood down. 11 Q: Sorry? 12 A: If he really believed that those 13 weapons were there, we should have been stood down. 14 Q: And the reason you should have been 15 stood down is CMU is not designed to march down the road 16 in the dark, with those kind of weapons at a fence line? 17 A: No, sir. 18 Q: And would you agree with me that it 19 makes it all the more important to have, quote, unquote, 20 "eyes", as you march down that road? 21 A: Yes, sir, absolutely. 22 Q: Would you agree with this, that it 23 now becomes understandable why Kent Skinner thought you 24 were only supposed to go half way down the road, until 25 you got eyes?


1 A: If -- yeah, if he thought we were 2 walking into harm's way, he would certainly want to know 3 that all his sniper teams were in position to cover us 4 and the flank teams were also very close. 5 Q: And it now becomes understandable how 6 you were in error in marching all the way to the sandy 7 parking lot. 8 A: But I was going on my briefing at 9 Forest which was to go down to the sandy parking lot and 10 remove the protesters. 11 Q: And you were going on your briefing 12 that there were no weapons? 13 A: That's right. 14 Q: Now, one (1) of the most important 15 things that you rely upon is communication and see how 16 Skinner talks to Zupancic and has Zupancic pass the 17 information on to the rest of his team? 18 Is that right? 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: And you're used to that in -- you 21 were on TRU? 22 A: Yes, sir. 23 Q: It's no different for a Crowd 24 Management Unit is it? 25 A: No. No, it shouldn't be, no, sir.


1 They're all trained in the same way. 2 Q: And -- 3 A: In the sense of intelligence and 4 briefings. 5 Q: And you -- and you briefed your 6 contact team and your arrest teams as the leader of those 7 teams, right? 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 Q: And the idea is to make sure that the 10 information you have, they have? 11 A: Especially to do with the risk. 12 Q: And vice versa? 13 A: Yes, sir. 14 Q: So a properly managed, properly run 15 CMU is operating on the same information, true? 16 A: On the best available. 17 Q: And I used the word "true", it's my 18 fault, correct? 19 A: Yes, and CMU, yes. 20 Q: And would you agree with me that the 21 people that are your hierarchy of consultation in terms 22 of within Crowd Management Unit is your second in 23 command, Hebblethwaite? 24 A: Yes, that's true. 25 Q: And then your team leaders.


1 A: Yes, the sergeants, yes. 2 Q: And one of your team leaders that 3 night was Wayde Jacklin? 4 A: That's right, sir. 5 Q: I want to ask you to have regard to 6 the evidence of Sergeant Jacklin. He's evidence -- I 7 apologize. his evidence can be found on April 25th, 8 2006. 9 And if you'll bear with me, I'll pull the 10 copies out for you. 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 Q: I meant page 247. 15 A: 247? Is that the little piece at 16 the top? 17 Q: Yes. If you'll bear with me. Do you 18 have that? Mr. Millar's just going to get it for us on 19 the screen. 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 Q: Now, if you have regard to this line 24 of questioning on April 25th, 2006, this is Wayde Jacklin 25 who was the person in charge of your arrest team, so one


1 (1) of the units within the Crowd Management Unit 2 marching down the road, right? 3 A: Hmm hmm. 4 Q: Now, at line 18, Ms. Vella's asking 5 him questions on April 25th, 2006: 6 "Q: And you were aware as to whether 7 or not there had been..." 8 And I apologize. 9 "Q: And were you aware as to whether 10 or not there had been any stacking, if 11 you will, or collecting of weapons of 12 any kind within the Park? 13 A: Yes, I was. 14 Q: What was the extent of your 15 knowledge on that? 16 A: The information that I had heard - 17 - received, it's a large number of 18 rocks had been gathered or dropped off 19 in that area, that there was a school 20 bus in that area. A back hoe had been 21 working, appeared to be digging maybe 22 fortifying positions. I was aware 23 earlier a vehicle had been stopped and 24 turned back." 25 And there's an objection in exchange


1 between Ms. Vella and I. And then going to the next 2 page, at page 250 line 16: 3 "Q: All right. And you mention 4 knowledge about a bonfire -- bonfires. 5 Could you be a little more specific 6 what you knew about bonfires on the 7 evening of the 6th?" 8 He explains the bonfire. And then at the 9 next page, page 251, starting at line 5: 10 "Q: I believe you testified as the 11 source of your information with respect 12 to the fifty (50) to a hundred (100) 13 rounds of gunfire we listened to that 14 radio transmission. 15 A: That was personal contact, a voice 16 communication I had with Larry Parks on 17 the evening of the 5th. 18 Q: All right. And the comment or 19 the information that women and children 20 left the Park and Army Camp? 21 A: That is correct. 22 Now, that came from where? 23 That came from one (1) of the 24 checkpoints. I believe that was Delta. 25 All right. And the collection or


1 gathering of the weapons in the Park, 2 where -- was the source of that 3 information? 4 I believe it was through radio. 5 Q: All right. And was there any 6 representations made to you during the 7 course of the briefing with respect to 8 whether or not there was a concern that 9 there might be firearms in -- used 10 against the CMU during the course of 11 this deployment? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And what was that? Can you tell 14 us what was told? 15 A: I don't remember what specifically 16 was told but I know there was a 17 likelihood or a very viable threat that 18 there could be weapons involved. 19 Q: In the form of firearms? 20 A: In the form of firearms, yes. 21 Q: And was it any more specific than 22 that in terms of types of arms? 23 A: I don't know if I got that 24 information during the briefing or it's 25 from a prior knowledge."


1 And do you see the reference to a 2 likelihood or a very viable threat of firearms? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Now, would you agree with me that it 5 appears that Wayde Jacklin was operating on different 6 information than you were? 7 A: Yes. If I understand it as well he 8 would not have been up at Forest either in the original 9 briefing, he was out on checkpoint and when I asked for 10 an additional support I think he got pulled in at the 11 last minute. 12 But sure -- I mean so anyway I'm answering 13 your question first that yes, it looks like he had 14 different information than certainly I had. 15 Q: And would you agree that in having 16 that different information he refers to a briefing? 17 A: Yes, over the radio though wasn't it? 18 Q: "I don't know if I got that 19 information during the briefing or it's 20 from a prior knowledge." 21 Now, could you also turn -- I'm going to 22 just read you a very brief passage that I read to him or 23 I asked Mr. Jacklin during my cross-examination and for - 24 - for purposes of Counsel it's April 26th, 2006, same 25 day. It's at page 327. It's very brief, line 15.


1 So this is just a couple of paragraphs if 2 you could just listen, sir? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: It's pretty straight forward. 5 "Q: All right." 6 And this is me asking Mr. Jacklin about 7 marching in the dark, all right? Line 15 page 327: 8 "Q: All right. You were expected to 9 march down a road where it was 10 difficult to make out a lot with 11 limited visibility when you didn't know 12 if the people at the fence had AK-47's, 13 am I correct?" 14 Answer at line 19 page 327: 15 "A: A lot of the visibility problems 16 we had were created by people moving 17 and of course by the spotlights and 18 looking through shields and helmet 19 shields and that was part of the 20 problem, yes. 21 Q: But is the gist of my question to 22 you correct that you were expected to 23 do that when you didn't know of the 24 people at the fence line had AK-47's, 25 am I correct?


1 A: Yes. 2 Q: Without meaning to be dramatic 3 that must have been quite frightening? 4 A: It was, it was very unnerving, 5 yes." 6 So the head of your arrest team had this 7 fear of what he called in his words a very viable threat 8 that you didn't know about? 9 A: No, sir. 10 Q: Is that acceptable in terms of how 11 the CMU should be run? 12 A: I mean -- I mean the biggest -- the 13 biggest part of any operation, you know, the Americans 14 call a C3I, Command, Control, Communications and I, 15 Intelligence and that's where they're spending I think a 16 trillion -- trillion dollars. The -- the better the 17 intelligence, the better the command, the control, the 18 communications. 19 Whenever you find an operation goes wrong 20 usually it's in C3I. There's a breakdown in 21 communication, you know, laterally or command, control, 22 or intelligence. 23 So what you're telling me is there's -- 24 there's -- it looks to be some kind of a breakdown here 25 and is that a concern? Yes, it's a concern in every


1 operation that -- that's the one (1) that can fail. 2 Q: And in addition to it being 3 hypothetically a concern, you and I can both agree that 4 thank God that intelligence was wrong, correct? 5 A: Absolutely. It would be pretty -- 6 pretty bad. 7 Q: But if we look at the quality of the 8 operation we don't look to sheer luck? 9 A: Right. 10 Q: That's not the way to measure the 11 quality of an operation, is it? 12 A: No. You go -- but you do go with the 13 best intelligence that you have at the time. But it 14 sounds like there was some pieces here. 15 Q: Well, Inspector Linton was the person 16 you said you thought brought you in at 8:00 p.m. on 17 September 6th, 1995? 18 A: I was told authority of Inspector 19 Linton and I felt -- I knew that he was the night shift 20 inspector, so therefore I thought I was coming in to work 21 for him. That -- yes, that's what I said. 22 So when I got there and found out John was 23 back on duty, I was -- you know, not -- not surprised in 24 the sense it was John is the senior of the two (2), he's 25 the senior incident commander, he's been involved for


1 three (3) years, but just that I thought I was coming in 2 to work for Inspector Linton, that it was under his 3 authority. 4 Q: But you didn't actually get briefed 5 by Inspector Linton, correct? 6 A: No. He was there, but I was briefed 7 by Inspector Carson. 8 Q: And you never did get briefed by 9 Inspector Linton? 10 A: No. I don't believe he came down to 11 the TOC even. I think he stayed -- I don't remember 12 seeing him at the TOC. 13 Q: But the point is, it wasn't just at 14 the TOC, the tactical operation centre, you were at the 15 command post, but it was not Inspector Linton that 16 briefed you, right? 17 A: No. That's right. He was there but 18 he did not brief me. 19 Q: And your statement to SIU of 20 September 8th, 1995, I can take you to it if you want, 21 refers to first being briefed by Stan Korosec? 22 A: Yeah. And that briefing was more the 23 one I talked about out in the parking lot. 24 Q: Fair enough. Then being briefed by 25 Mark Wright?


1 A: Yes. And his was more all around the 2 charges. 3 Q: Sure. And then finally being briefed 4 by John Carson? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: So you had three (3) layers of 7 briefing, if you will? 8 A: Right. 9 Q: And none of them involved Linton? 10 A: No. There was no -- no. 11 Q: You saw how Linton is the one that 12 briefed Skinner on the firearms? 13 A: Yeah. I noticed that, yes. 14 Q: And Exhibit P-469, which is a 15 conversation between Linton and Parkin at 21:41, where 16 Linton reports to Superintendent Parkin as the last 17 report to the superintendent before your CMU marches, 18 represents the last conversation we have between Linton 19 and his superior; will you take my word for that? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: Mr. Commissioner had to go through 22 that line by line and I'm trying to avoid him having to 23 go through it today. In Exhibit P-469, at 21:41, which 24 is Document 1000016, at page 4, and it's a conversation 25 between Linton and Parkin.


1 I'm going to give you three (3) or four 2 (4) paragraphs, just to give a flavour, all right? 3 A: Okay. Yeah. 4 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Tab 22. 5 THE WITNESS: Tab 22. 6 7 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 8 Q: It's at Tab 22 of your materials. 9 Terrific. Sorry. I thought we'd have to do it the 10 faster way. Tab 22. 11 A: Okay. 12 Q: At page 4. 13 A: Yes. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: P-469, 15 right? 16 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Yes. Thank you, 17 Mr. Millar. 18 19 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 20 Q: So now, just so we're clear, so we 21 have some context, by this time, 21:41, you've actually 22 arrived on site? 23 A: True. I'd be out getting my gear out 24 of the car, I believe. 25 Q: Right. You're there?


1 A: Yes. 2 Q: Now Linton is briefing his 3 superintendent Parkin, and he's saying the following, at 4 page 4: 5 "But the ones down below are out of -- 6 we're -- we've got -- TRU is down at 7 the TOC. I've got two (2) Sierra teams 8 doing surveillance. We just want to 9 know what we got. We don't want to go 10 in there and arrest the guys out -- out 11 in front of Ipperwash if we're going to 12 get sniper fire." 13 See the reference to sniper fire? 14 A: Yeah. 15 Q: Now you -- you do appreciate that the 16 context is not sniper fire from TRU? 17 A: Right. 18 Q: Right. He's talking about the 19 occupiers? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: Then Parkin says: 22 "Well, and the other thing is too, 23 probably, if you start sending people 24 down there, they're going to retreat 25 back into the Camp, into the bush."


1 Then Linton says: 2 "Well, they may. But the other thing 3 was, we had a whole list of automatic 4 weapons that somebody gave us this 5 evening, too, that's supposed to be 6 down there." 7 You see that? 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 Q: And again, Linton never tells you 10 this? 11 A: No, sir. 12 Q: Carson never tells you this? 13 A: No, sir. 14 Q: Now you don't have a lot of time to 15 sort out the quality of the intelligence gathering 16 operation at that command post, because the first time 17 you're told you're going to be used as the head of CMU, 18 is at 8:00 p.m. on September 6th, 1995, correct? 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: And the first time you're told, at 21 8:00 p.m., it's, Get your gear we may have to use you? 22 A: Yeah. And then when I arrived at the 23 Detachment we were dressing. 24 Q: Things are actually, as you put it 25 yesterday, escalating?


1 A: Yes, sir. 2 Q: And again, sheer luck, these 3 automatic weapons are a fairy tale, they didn't exist, 4 right? 5 A: Yeah, again, well, even like looking 6 here it -- again, it seems to be innuendo. You know, 7 automatic weapons that somebody gave us this evening, 8 too, that's supposed to be down there, like there's -- so 9 maybe that's why. I don't know why they didn't pass it 10 on. I don't know. 11 But, no, I did not get a briefing on 12 multiple full automatic assault rifles. 13 Q: And Wayde Jacklin did, from someone. 14 A: Right. 15 Q: Part of your team thought they were a 16 viable threat, yes? 17 A: It sounds like it, from the 18 transcript. 19 Q: And the head of TRU, who was in the 20 command post, thought they were there, yes? 21 A: Sounds like it. 22 Q: Everybody was just operating on fairy 23 tale intelligence they didn't bother to pass on to you, 24 correct? 25 A: I didn't receive any intelligence of


1 weapons. 2 Q: Now, the reason I spent the time is 3 we were going over an inventory of difficulties with the 4 operation, and we had talked about the fact that your 5 Level 2 incident commander had not worked with a CMU of 6 this type before. 7 Do you remember talking about that? 8 A: That's right. It was brand new, so. 9 Q: We also talked about the fact that 10 the head of TRU, who's at TOC, giving instructions, has a 11 different view of your mission than you do, correct? 12 A: If, in fact, that's what he thought 13 we were doing, was just a diversion. 14 Q: And now it appears that the head of 15 TRU was op -- and the -- one of the incident commanders, 16 Linton, was operating on a different set of information 17 than you were operating. 18 A: Yes, sir. 19 Q: And that that set of information was 20 a show stopper. You would have stood CMU down if you'd 21 known that was true. 22 A: We would not have advanced from 23 Forest Detachment. 24 Q: Because that's your responsibility, 25 isn't it?


1 A: Yes. It was my responsibility to 2 know the mandate and TRU -- and of CMU, its role, where 3 you're committed. So, yes, it was my job to say that's 4 not a job; at this point it's not a job for CMU. 5 Q: Until you get eyes and disprove the 6 existence of automatic weapons at the fence line? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: Instead, you marched on, not knowing 9 one whit what Skinner believed was a fair probability 10 back in that TOC, correct? 11 A: Well I kept asking for Sierra 12 updates, and the one I got was sticks and stones. That's 13 when I used the words, It's our bailiwick, like, 'cause 14 there was no guns seen. 15 Q: But at the phase line -- 16 A: Right. 17 Q: -- where you say you have the choice 18 to stop; this is where the Level 2 incident commander, 19 John Carson, can put the brakes on, right? 20 A: That's right. 21 Q: You had the impression, as you put it 22 yesterday, we are on our own? 23 A: That's -- we were on the mission. 24 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Well, he didn't quite 25 put it that way. He put it, So you're also a little bit


1 on your own. 2 It's page 72. 3 4 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 5 Q: All right. So you had the impression 6 you were also a little bit on your own, yes? Page 72. 7 A: Again, in the context that -- CMU 8 does not, if it's -- if it's -- if it's a CMU mission, 9 and I have a CMU team going down the road, we do not 10 normally expect to have Sierra teams in support. 11 So, you know, I mean, so I'm -- I mean, it 12 was nice to have them and I'm checking in and they're not 13 -- you're right, they're -- there was some things going 14 on. 15 They can't seem to get into position. The 16 intelligence isn't coming. So, yeah, we're at the phase 17 line. And 1, there's no updated intelligence, but I 18 think I do get an eye from Kent. 19 But then it's also, Nobody changes my 20 mission. The incident commander at a phase line can give 21 updated intelligence, or he can recall, or he can hold 22 you. 23 So I checked in at the 500 metre mark. He 24 can then say, hold your position, as happens later when I 25 get up to the fence, you hear those, Hold, and then, Move


1 back to defensive position, like, do you know what I'm 2 saying? 3 These phase lines are just a physical 4 point where you check in. They're not a no-go. I mean, 5 unless he says, Okay, hold. 6 You know what I'm saying? So -- 7 Q: Thank you. All of this is to say 8 that the role of TRU was not something that had been 9 integrated in your training to run a CMU? 10 A: No, sir. 11 Q: Do you agree with me? 12 A: Yes, sir. 13 Q: And am I right that, to some extent, 14 TRU and CMU are incompatible in terms of deploying on a 15 mission? 16 A: It shouldn't be, sir, and it isn't 17 now. They're completely -- all TRU team are completely 18 trained with CMU. 19 They're not totally incompatible because 20 CMU are ERT, and ERT use TRU team's call signs, they use 21 SMEAC, TRU team's colour code system, diamond formation. 22 So they're not incompatible. Week 1-2 ERT is week 1-2 23 TRU. Like those components -- K-9 backup is done the 24 same. They -- they are actually very compatible in -- 25 Q: I was --


1 A: -- in the way that their tactics are. 2 Q: But in terms of their deployment? 3 A: In deployment they had not yet worked 4 together and the -- the bugs of communication and who 5 does what and deployment, no, were not worked out. 6 Q: And did John Carson ever speak to you 7 about that challenge that night? 8 A: No, I -- you know to John's credit I 9 don't even know if he know -- he knew that that formation 10 looked the way it did now. Like that whole re-work -- we 11 were the first units in the county to just finish the 12 training. 13 I think there was a lot of people running 14 around thinking the old Crowd Management, you know, one 15 (1) line, shuffle, shuffle. I don't think a lot of 16 people knew what it looked like or how we were equipped. 17 Q: And what you're telling us is that 18 nothing that you learned that night, or subsequently, has 19 told you that John knew about those new things? 20 A: There's been no discussion. 21 Q: But nothing you heard from him that 22 night -- 23 A: That's right. 24 Q: -- told you he knew about it? 25 A: Right. I don't believe he's attended


1 that new training. There wasn't an Incident Commander 2 program for Level 2's I think until '99 -- '99/2000. 3 So, yeah, there's nothing that would lead 4 me to believe that he would absolutely know intimately 5 those tactics. 6 Q: But more importantly, and this is the 7 part that I'm trying to -- to draw out of you, if I can, 8 is that that night, in your exchanges with him in the 9 briefing he gave you, because of the way you've just 10 testified, there was nothing he said that night that 11 signalled to you, Hey, he does know this stuff? 12 A: Right. 13 Q: Okay. One (1) of the things about 14 your evidence at one (1) of the trials, and I can pull it 15 up if -- if you want, but it would seemed to be a 16 repeating theme at a number of the trials, is you were 17 surprised at the response of the crowd, given how crowds 18 usually respond when you punch-out? 19 A: Right. 20 Q: And what I got from your evidence -- 21 I'm trying to avoid loading us with paper -- what I got 22 from your evidence was that this crowd did not seem to 23 react the same way that crowds that you've been trained 24 on historically react; is that true? 25 A: Yes. They -- first of all, I've only


1 been at one (1) mission, but in the training they showed 2 us live footage from England and from Ireland and even 3 some Metro Toronto stuff where they used that punchout. 4 The crowds -- it was -- it -- because there's an element 5 of surprise, people don't expect it, it's a whole new 6 tactic the way we look, they run away. 7 So, yes, and then when we played bad guy 8 against each other, that's what we would do. I mean, 9 when the punch-out came everybody would run away. 10 So when that didn't happen it was a 11 surprise, that we actually ended up colliding full speed, 12 if that's... 13 Q: And there's a couple of components 14 about that. Would you agree with me, on reflection, that 15 the contextual realities that would attach to occupiers 16 involved in Aboriginal land claims, could well be part of 17 the unexpected reaction? 18 A: I would say definitely. If I ever 19 was debriefed on this, I would say that, yeah, you have 20 participating factors and you have these, what's the 21 word, contributing factors. I would say the fact that 22 Aboriginal, from one (1) community, a lot of them 23 related, with a common purpose, a common belief, an 24 emotional belief, I -- I would say definitely that 25 effected that crowd.


1 Q: And that wasn't something you were 2 trained for? 3 A: It had never been discussed in the 4 Aboriginal context. 5 Q: One (1) of the -- and -- and I'm not 6 leaving that, just so you know, Mr. Commissioner, because 7 I want to ask you a few more questions and get your 8 assistance on that. But one (1) of the -- the probably 9 most -- the tightest, or sort of tightest statement about 10 the expectation of CMU that night, comes from a passage 11 from Mark Wright. 12 And you may not agree with it, and you'll 13 just tell me you don't agree with it and then we'll put 14 it away, or you might, I don't know. But I -- I want to 15 put it to you and ask you if you agree or disagree with 16 it. 17 It's Mr. Wright testifying at the 18 examination for discovery about what he thought the CMU 19 would accomplish that night. And you recall Mark Wright 20 as the second in command? 21 A: Yes. He was in charge of the, you 22 know, the criminal -- the criminal -- criminal 23 intelligence, and also the prosecution -- 24 Q: Did you know that John Carson viewed 25 him as a second?


1 A: I think I heard that through this -- 2 Q: All right. 3 A: All I'm saying about that is, I mean, 4 yes, I -- just so you know, the OPP has an integrated 5 command, there's a second level is commander, so then 6 he's got TRU and he's got ERT -- 7 Q: I knew I was asking for trouble -- 8 A: I know, but what I mean is, yes, if 9 the thing happens to go -- so he's got all these staff 10 sergeants with their expertise. At that time, when it 11 was investigative, I would say, yes, Mark Wright was his 12 right-hand man, for sure. 13 Q: Okay. Okay. 14 A: And then it changes when you go to, 15 say, TRU team or whatever, each phase. 16 Q: At page 118 of the examination for 17 discovery which is dated June 27th, 2001 -- and I'm going 18 to have a document number in one second for My Friends. 19 I apologize. 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 Q: It's Exhibit -- I apologize. I -- I 24 have an extra copy for My Friends but I'm afraid I don't 25 -- I've given one to Mr. Roland. I'm at line 20 -- it's


1 not a very long passage. Page 118, line 20. 2 Do you have 118 there, sir? 3 A: 118? 4 Q: Yeah. 5 A: Okay, yes. 6 Q: Line 20: 7 "Now, the whole idea of CMU..." 8 Do you see that? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: "Now, the whole idea of CMU, our 11 crowd management unit, is based on the 12 English model. And the idea of a CMU 13 unit is to show a large group of 14 uniformed police officers in a 15 formation with the plexiglass riot 16 shields and the helmets and the batons, 17 so that it demonstrates an intimidating 18 presence." 19 And the top of page 119: 20 "And the idea of that is when people 21 see this presence, they evacuate the 22 area rather than get into a 23 confrontation with what appears to be a 24 very highly organized formidable group 25 of individuals, police officers.


1 That's the goal. That's how CMU is 2 used. And they hit the shields in 3 unison and they will say, Move back, in 4 unison, and they all move as a group. 5 And, like I said, it's a very 6 intimidating scene. And that's the 7 whole point, it's no violence, this is 8 overwhelming, it's time to leave." 9 You see that? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: Do you agree with that? 12 A: Not totally. 13 Q: All right. Which part don't you 14 agree with? 15 A: Well, the new context of the new CMU 16 crowd management, and now changed to public order, is we 17 want to get out on the street early, that we do not have 18 to get to hard TAC, we want to be out there in fatigues, 19 walking in amongst people, you know, How is it going, 20 Nice day, and we want to try to avoid using the crowd 21 management team at all. 22 What he's referring to, there is a thing, 23 if you want to go to your -- if you want to go into your 24 ERT program, there's a thing that he's referring to, it's 25 called SOFT.


1 Q: Yes. 2 A: And it's -- he's referring to is, 3 show of force theory. 4 Q: But, stopping there for a minute -- 5 A: For -- 6 Q: -- you're talking about gradations. 7 Would you agree with me that when you donned the hard TAC 8 at 9:30 p.m. -- 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: -- and you convened the CMU unit, 11 that the way Mark Wright describes it is the way it was 12 expected to operate? 13 A: I took it that, because the lead up 14 was that I understood that the officers that were in the 15 Park, when the occupation took place, were in regular 16 uniform and a -- and a rear window got busted out with a 17 bat, that's called bristling. 18 Q: Right. 19 A: That's called bristling. Then I 20 understood there was an encamp -- an encampment out on 21 the sandy parking lot at some point, I think that was 22 Satur -- or the 6th morning. And officers went in, your 23 know, in regular uniforms or possibly fatigues, that's 24 called soft tact, let's take down the tents, let's move 25 the tables. Three (3) cruisers gets damaged.


1 Then if you believe this part about the 2 car gets pelted, and baseball bat, I took it, it had 3 progressed to hard TAC, it was no longer uniform, it was 4 no longer soft TAC. It was hard tact because we were 5 definitely going to take projectiles. 6 Therefore, officer safety is, you've got 7 to put on the protective equipment. You've got to bring 8 out shields and helmets because you can't put officers in 9 that role, even under Ministry of Labour, if you think 10 you're going to get hit with a rock. 11 So I felt that it had progressed to a full 12 hard TAC situation, is what I call it. Is it 13 intimidating? Yes. Does that work on a normal crowd? 14 It has an effect. You see all that black and the 15 shields, most people say, Oh, they must be serious. I 16 think that's what Mark is kind of going on about. 17 Q: All right. 18 A: And they will move off. 19 Q: And that was your point before about 20 interactions with the Aboriginal community; it appears to 21 be -- to provoke a different reaction? 22 A: Well, it obviously did. It 23 obviously, in hindsight, did not work the way. I mean, 24 if I think about right from the first punch out, really, 25 it just got worst and worst, right?


1 It just -- the tactics did not have the 2 effect on the Aboriginal community that they do on coal 3 strikers in England, I can tell you. 4 Q: Or a soccer crowd? 5 A: Or a soccer crowd. 6 Q: The soccer crowd gets a real rough 7 shake, don't you find? 8 A: Yeah. And I thought these -- and I 9 understand that these tactics, before we took them, Metro 10 had used them as well. 11 Q: Hmm hmm. 12 A: At Nathan Philips and they worked 13 very well down at Nathan Philips and you know the other 14 place down there. 15 But they sure didn't work this night. 16 Q: And on reflection, you appreciate 17 that the reality of even the words exchanged when you got 18 down to the fence line, my grandfather's land -- 19 A: Yeah. 20 Q: -- our burial grounds, our right to 21 protect our burial grounds. These were all sentiments -- 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: -- that reflected a very different 24 state of mind than you were trained on. 25 Q: Well, they would be -- what they told


1 us is a crowd is, okay, like you and I or whatever, all 2 of us in a mall are a crowd. 3 We are a crowd, but we are -- we are there 4 with a common purpose, right? We're going to get in and 5 get something and get out. 6 Then you get a crowd, like, say, at a 7 hockey game or let's say that soccer game, they can 8 become a riot if something goes wrong, right? 9 That's what happened with Canada -- with 10 the Grey -- not the Grey Cup, the Stanley Cup in 11 Vancouver. Those people were out to enjoy a good 12 evening, to watch the Stanley Cup. 13 A ref made a bad call, their team lost and 14 it just spontaneously became a riot. They didn't go 15 there with that intent. 16 But they were -- they were a crowd. They 17 were a group. I would say in answer to what you're 18 saying here now is those people that I met that night, 19 they firmly believed that they were on sacred ground. 20 They were of one (1) mind. They were 21 committed; they were family and it reacted very 22 explosively very quickly. 23 Q: And unlike the hockey crowd, unlike 24 the -- 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just a


1 minute. I'm seeing Ms. McAleer rising to her feet. 2 MS. JENNIFER MCALEER: Well, just to 3 clarify. I believe the Witness is giving evidence as to, 4 perhaps, what his impression was -- 5 THE WITNESS: Okay. 6 MS. JENNIFER MCALEER: But he's -- he was 7 speaking as if he knew what was in the mind of the 8 occupiers, I just -- 9 THE WITNESS: No, sorry. 10 MS. JENNIFER MCALEER: -- would like to 11 make that point -- 12 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I just want your 13 impressions. 14 MS. JENNIFER MCALEER: -- clarified. 15 16 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 17 Q: My Friend's quite fair on that issue. 18 I want your impressions and I took it that's what you 19 were giving, sir, your impression? 20 A: My impression was this was not what I 21 expected from my training. 22 Q: And when you tell us what you saw, 23 you're giving us the benefit of your observations of how 24 the group of occupiers responded in contrast to the 25 crowds you were trained on, in your training; yes?


1 A: Yes. Everything we tried didn't seem 2 to work. 3 Q: And may I add something to that? 4 Would you agree with me that another very strong 5 distinction between, for example, the upset hockey fans, 6 leaving soccer alone for a minute. 7 The upset hockey fans and the occupiers is 8 -- there is no long, historical -- 9 A: Right. 10 Q: -- oppression? These people are not 11 fighting for their grandfathers or grandmothers or 12 children, the hockey fans. 13 A: Right. 14 Q: Whereas the occupiers may well see 15 themselves as fighting for their grandfathers, their 16 grandmothers or their children. 17 Would you agree with that? 18 A: The precipitating factors are, 19 historical; some of them are political; some of them are 20 racial. 21 You're right. So all of those factors, in 22 hindsight, were there. 23 Q: And we know that John Carson didn't 24 have what you had for CMU training, but I take it, it's 25 gainsaid that is it's -- we can assume it, that you and


1 he never discussed this dimension that night on September 2 6th 1995? 3 A: No, sir. 4 Q: And in fairness to you, there was no 5 time. You showed up at 9:30 and you were putting hard 6 TAC gear on, correct? 7 A: Yes, sir. 8 Q: And then you were out on a road? 9 A: Yes, sir. 10 Q: And then you were marching in the 11 dark? 12 A: Yes, sir. 13 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Mr. Commissioner, I 14 see it's 4:45. It's not dark yet, but I -- my instinct 15 on this is this gentleman has stood up very well. He's 16 not well and we've had a long day. 17 I expect to be another hour tomorrow and 18 finish. But -- 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Another hour 20 or so? 21 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: An hour. I expect 22 to be an hour. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Then I think 24 that that being the case, I was going to try to go until 25 5:00 and then --


1 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I -- 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- adjourn. 3 But I think this would be an appropriate time to adjourn 4 and we'll have you complete your examination tomorrow. 5 Thank you, are you -- you're all right? 6 It's been a long day for you. We'll adjourn now. We'll 7 reconvene tomorrow morning at nine o'clock. 8 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 10 11 (WITNESS RETIRES) 12 13 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 14 adjourned until tomorrow, Wednesday, May the 10th at 9:00 15 a.m. 16 17 --- Upon adjourning at 4:44 p.m. 18 19 Certified Correct, 20 21 22 23 ___________________ 24 Carol Geehan, Ms. 25