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1 2 3 IPPERWASH PUBLIC INQUIRY 4 5 6 7 ******************** 8 9 10 BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE SIDNEY LINDEN, 11 COMMISSIONER 12 13 14 15 16 Held at: Forest Community Centre 17 Kimball Hall 18 Forest, Ontario 19 20 21 ******************** 22 23 24 June 27th, 2005 25

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1 Appearances 2 Derry Millar ) Commission Counsel 3 Susan Vella ) (np) 4 Donald Worme, Q. C ) (np) 5 Katherine Hensel ) (np) 6 7 Murray Klippenstein ) (np) The Estate of Dudley 8 Vilko Zbogar ) (np) George and George 9 Andrew Orkin ) (np) Family Group 10 Basil Alexander ) (np) Student-at-Law 11 12 Peter Rosenthal ) Aazhoodena and George 13 Jackie Esmonde ) Family Group 14 15 Anthony Ross ) Residents of 16 Kevin Scullion ) Aazhoodena (Army Camp) 17 William Henderson ) Kettle Point & Stony 18 Jonathon George ) Point First Nation 19 Colleen Johnson ) (np) 20 Cameron Neil ) (np) 21 22 Kim Twohig ) (np) Government of Ontario 23 Walter Myrka ) 24 Susan Freeborn ) (np) 25 Michelle Pong ) (np)

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1 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 Janet Clermont ) Municipality of 3 David Nash ) (np) Lambton Shores 4 5 Peter Downard ) (np) The Honourable Michael 6 Bill Hourigan ) (np) Harris 7 Jennifer McAleer ) 8 9 Ian Smith ) (np) Robert Runciman 10 Alice Mrozek ) (np) 11 Harvey Stosberg ) (np) Charles Harnick 12 Jacqueline Horvat ) 13 Douglas Sulman, Q.C. )(np) Marcel Beaubien 14 Trevor Hinnegan ) 15 16 Mark Sandler ) Ontario Provincial 17 Andrea Tuck-Jackson ) Ontario Provincial Police 18 Leslie Kaufman ) (np) 19 20 Ian Roland ) (np) Ontario Provincial 21 Karen Jones ) (np) Police Association & 22 Debra Newell ) K. Deane 23 Ian McGilp ) (np) 24 Annie Leeks ) (np) 25 Jennifer Gleitman )

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1 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 3 Julian Falconer ) Aboriginal Legal 4 Brian Eyolfson ) Services of Toronto 5 Julian Roy ) (np) 6 Clem Nabigon ) (np) 7 Adriel Weaver ) (np) Student-at-Law 8 9 Al J.C. O'Marra ) Office of the Chief 10 Robert Ash, Q.C. ) (np) Coroner 11 12 William Horton ) Chiefs of Ontario 13 Matthew Horner ) 14 Kathleen Lickers ) (np) 15 16 Mark Frederick ) (np) Christopher Hodgson 17 Craig Mills ) (np) 18 Megan Mackey ) 19 Erin Tully ) (np) 20 21 David Roebuck ) (np) Debbie Hutton 22 Anna Perschy ) (np) 23 Melissa Panjer ) 24 Danya Cohen-Nehemia ) (np) 25

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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 Page 3 Exhibits 6 4 5 JOHN FREDERICK CARSON, Resumed 6 Continued Cross-Examination by Mr. Peter Rosenthal 8 7 8 Cross-Examination by Mr. William Horton 110 9 10 Certificate of Transcript 249 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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1 EXHIBITS 2 No. Description Page No. 3 P-478 Police Services Act, - Special 4 Investigations Unit - Standard 5 Operating Procedures. Pages 165 6 - 168, April 14/92. 110 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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1 --- Upon convening at 10:30 a.m. 2 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 4 now in session. The Honourable Mr. Justice Linden 5 presiding. Please be seated. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 7 morning, everybody. Good morning, Deputy, nice to see 8 your feeling better. 9 THE WITNESS Thank you. 10 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Good morning, 11 Commissioner. Good morning, Deputy Commissioner. Mr. 12 Rosenthal continues today, Mr. Commissioner. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 14 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Thank you, Mr. 15 Millar. Good morning, Mr. Commissioner. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 17 morning, Mr. Rosenthal. 18 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Good morning, 19 Deputy Commissioner. 20 THE WITNESS: Good morning. 21 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I hope that you're 22 feeling better today. 23 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 24 25 JOHN FREDERICK CARSON, Resumed:

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1 2 CONTINUED CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 3 Q: Continuing the examination that we 4 last participated in a week ago today, June 20th and 5 towards the end of that day, the last thing I had asked 6 you about was about the justification for holding Pierre 7 and Carolyn George overnight. 8 And it was the fact that they had taken 9 their brother to the hospital and that in your view -- 10 and that in your view meant that they might have been 11 involved and you answered, Correct. And then we broke 12 for the day. 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: Now I should like to turn if I may to 15 Exhibit 444B, the logger tapes, volume 2 thereof, and Tab 16 62. 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 A: Which tab, sir? 21 Q: 62, sir. And Tab 62 is a transcript 22 of a telephone call between yourself and Superintendent 23 Parkin on September 7, 1995 at 02:37; that means just 24 after midnight I gather; is that correct? 25 A: Correct.

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1 Q: Now if we could turn please to pages 2 -- page 375 of that transcript. You're explaining to 3 Superintendent Parkin what you understood as to what had 4 happened that night. And I would like to pick it up two- 5 thirds (2/3) of the way down the page. 6 "Carson: Out of both vehicles the car 7 and the bus were both being shooting 8 from. 9 Tony: So the snipers fired? 10 Carson: Yeah. 11 Tony: And so then we suspect that the 12 people that were hit would be the 13 people in the car or the bus." 14 Continuing the next page. 15 "Carson: One of the other [I presume 16 it was one or the other]. Yeah, I mean 17 they just opened fire and returned just 18 like you know." 19 So am I correct in understanding, sir, 20 that at this point you had assumed that the person or 21 persons who had been hit would have been people who were 22 either on the school bus or on the car that had advanced 23 towards the CMU officers on the night; right? 24 A: Well, there'll be a presumption that 25 they were likely hit.

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1 Q: Yes. 2 A: Right. 3 Q: Yes. And so at this point you didn't 4 realize that in fact the person who had been hit was 5 somebody who was standing in a quite different position? 6 A: I'm not sure that would be the case 7 because at 23:09 or roughly 23:09, I had received 8 information that someone had been shot, and ran back into 9 the Park. 10 Q: I see. But that was at 23:09, sir? 11 A: Correct. In my other notes, at 23:09 12 I have noted that shots were fired, a Native was shot, 13 ran into the Park. So that's not -- that's not related 14 to the car and the bus. 15 Q: That would seem to be so. But then 16 why did you answer Superintendent Parkin that -- going 17 back then, he at the bottom of page 375 said: 18 "So then we suspect that the people 19 that were hit would be the people in 20 the car or the bus. 21 Carson: One (1) or the other, yeah. I 22 mean they just opened fire and retuned 23 just like yeah." 24 A: Because that's what we were talking 25 about was the car and the bus. We're just -- we're just

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1 talking about the -- the -- both vehicles, the car and 2 the bus. And so he was asking about that. 3 Q: Okay. I'll move on, sir. Now could 4 you turn to the scribe notes please. And the scribe 5 notes are Exhibit 426 to these proceedings. Inquiry 6 Document Number 1002419. 7 And sir, I understand that you have a 8 slightly different pagination of these notes, but I -- 9 for those that have the same pages that I do, I'll be 10 looking at page 32 for a moment. 11 A: 32? 12 Q: And that's -- sir, it's at -- it's 13 the -- the last entry under 11:04, and the -- the entry 14 just before 11:15 hours that I wish to look at. 15 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Page 32. 16 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Page 32 of your 17 version as well, Mr. Millar informs me. 18 19 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 20 Q: Now just before 11:15 -- perhaps I 21 should sing this part, Mr. Commissioner, rather than say 22 it. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: If you are 24 up for it, let's go. 25

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1 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 2 Q: Just before 11:15, there's the 3 following paragraph: 4 "Detective Sergeant Wright stated that 5 Inspector Robertson is concerned about 6 private enterprise, in case they get 7 shot at. 8 Inspector Carson said to contact them 9 just for availability. Meeting ended." 10 Now, what was meant by "private 11 enterprise" there, sir? 12 A: Oh, it relates to the paragraph 13 earlier when they're talking about trying to secure a 14 helicopter, and if one of the helicopters that we may -- 15 be made available to us was one that we would rent from a 16 private company, as opposed to our own helicopter. 17 Q: I see. I think I now understand. In 18 other words, his concern was that if you have a privately 19 rented helicopter, that could be a problem if they get 20 shot at? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: I see. Okay, thank you. I -- I had 23 no inkling as to what that meant, thank you. 24 Now, if we could turn to, what's page 42 25 in our version, the same document, and this is at 16:07

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1 hours, and there are a number of entries -- 2 A: Actually, I think that was corrected 3 to 18:07. 4 Q: I'm sorry? 5 A: I think that was corrected to 18:07 6 hours. 7 Q: I see, thank you. Okay, so it's 8 18:07 hours? 9 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Yes. 10 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 11 12 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 13 Q: Now, there are a number of entries 14 under that time heading, and I'm going to be looking at 15 one that's approximately in the middle of the long list, 16 and it -- the paragraph begins, "Inspect -- I-N-S-P 17 Carson" and it begins: 18 "And Inspector Carson wants people with 19 night vision glasses." 20 I'm not interested in that sentence so 21 much, but I want us to all find that paragraph. So it's 22 the paragraph that begins: "Inspector Carson wants people 23 with night vision glasses", and the part I'm interested 24 in is the last part of that paragraph: 25 "Inspector Carson stated that if the

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1 First Nations get lippy, don't take too 2 much. If they become pushy, arrested 3 them and get them out of there." 4 Do you see that, sir? 5 A: Correct. 6 Q: It's a question of tense there and so 7 on. Do I understand that what that is reporting is that 8 you were instructing your officers that if the First 9 Nations persons get lippy, or be -- and if they become 10 pushy, they should be arrested and taken away? 11 A: Yeah, if there's altercations, I 12 don't want them to -- we had the incident on the Monday 13 night where various things were thrown at them, and -- 14 and whatever, so if they get into altercation, I'd expect 15 them to take the appropriate action, and so if they do 16 get pushed or assaulted, to take the appropriate action, 17 arrest them, and move them out. 18 Q: Yes, but it doesn't say pushed or 19 assaulted, does it, sir? It says, "if they get lippy or 20 become pushy", right? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: Now by "lippy" you meant talking back 23 to the officers, is that correct? 24 A: Well there has to be more than just 25 verbal discussion, I mean...

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1 Q: Well, what -- what did you mean by 2 "lippy", sir? It was your word, right? 3 A: Yeah, it's --it's into an 4 altercation; we're talking about an altercation. 5 Q: So "lippy" meant an altercation? 6 A: Correct. If they start mouthing off, 7 and pushing and shoving, and they can arrest them. I -- 8 I don't want them to just there and -- and be pushed and 9 shoved, and have -- where they have the grounds to 10 arrest, then go ahead and arrest. 11 Q: Well, sir, are you saying that the 12 word "lippy" implies pushing and shoving? 13 A: No, it's all in the context of the 14 whole discussion. 15 Q: Yes. Well, the whole sentence, sir, 16 says "If they get lippy, if they become pushy", right? 17 A: Right. 18 Q: It doesn't suggest anything about an 19 assault being required, right? 20 A: I didn't use the term "assault". 21 Q: I'm sorry? 22 A: I say I didn't use the term, 23 "assault". 24 Q: No. And "lippy" has -- doesn't 25 require an assault does it, sir?

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1 A: Correct. 2 Q: And being pushy doesn't require an 3 assault, does it? 4 A: Well, if someone pushes an officer it 5 is an assault. 6 Q: Being pushy and pushing someone are 7 two (2) different expressions, are they not, sir? 8 A: Well, you can break it down however 9 you like. 10 Q: Yes. 11 A: The officers knew what we were 12 talking about; we were talking about an altercation. 13 Q: Sir, I -- you might say I've been a 14 bit pushy in my cross-examination of you, would you; some 15 people might use that term for that? 16 A: Some might. 17 Q: Yes. So, being pushy doesn't mean I 18 -- doesn't mean a physical assault, does it? 19 A: Not necessarily. 20 Q: And so you were -- I put it to you, 21 sir, that you were telling your officers to arrest these 22 people if they mouthed off, isn't that fair? 23 A: No, it's not fair. 24 Q: I see. You're saying that this 25 instruction required an assault before they'd arrest

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1 people? 2 A: The officers understand what the 3 grounds to arrest are. 4 Q: I see. 5 A: And they would make those 6 determinations. What I didn't want them doing was 7 accepting behaviour that -- that was assaultive in 8 nature, where they were being pushed around when they had 9 the grounds to make an arrest. 10 Q: Now, sir, I'm going to a different 11 matter, then. 12 I -- I might have misheard or 13 misunderstood your evidence some time way back, but when 14 Mr. Millar was examining you, I -- I believe you 15 indicated that in 1995 there was no regulation or policy 16 of any kind within the OPP about whether officers should 17 speak to politicians, is that correct? 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: And has there been any regulation or 20 policy put in since then, sir? 21 A: No. 22 Q: Has there been any discussion about 23 the possibility of such a policy? 24 A: Not specifically that I'm aware of. 25 Q: I see. Now...

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1 A: The reality is we report to numerous 2 police service boards and communities, and we do a lot of 3 our work under contract, and it's an essential part of 4 our business that we do deal with politicians, generally 5 speaking. 6 Q: Now, sir, regarding the question of 7 removing people from the Sandy Parking Lot, you were 8 concerned, you told us, greatly concerned, about getting 9 an injunction before you moved against the people in the 10 Park, and we have had extensive evidence about that. 11 A: Right. 12 Q: Now, it appears that you didn't 13 investigate at all, the situation with respect to an 14 injunction or ownership of the Sandy Parking Lot, is that 15 fair? 16 A: That's fair. 17 Q: You just moved against them without 18 any knowledge even as to who might have owned the Sandy 19 Parking Lot, right? 20 A: Yeah. It was my understanding it was 21 township -- township or county property, I forget which. 22 Q: But you didn't really know, did you? 23 A: No. 24 Q: And in fact, you didn't know the 25 legal owner of that parking lot, right?

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1 A: Correct. 2 Q: Now, if you could turn, please, to 3 Exhibit P-477, it's Inquiry Document 1004972, and it's 4 the transcript of the trial of Mr. Warren George, and 5 it's at your Tab 29, I believe, sir, of your -- your two 6 (2) -- two (2) volume brief of documents that -- you have 7 the exhibit copy, that's fine. 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: I should like to turn, if I may, to 10 page 67 of that transcript. And first I'll ask if you 11 gave the indicated answers to the indicated questions. 12 And I'll begin at about line 9 of page 67. 13 "Q: Now, I anticipate that we will 14 hear some evidence from members of the 15 CMU that when they arrived on the 16 scene, whatever individuals were -- had 17 been in the parking lot, went into the 18 Park; is that your understanding as 19 well? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: And what was Officer Lacroix to do 22 once that had been achieved? 23 A: Well, he called back that that, in 24 fact, had happened, and he was told 25 just to stand. Just to take a point

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1 of, at that particular spot, and just 2 wait for a few moments to see if there 3 was any issues, any problems developed. 4 Q: And how long was he to wait there? 5 A: Until I told him to back out. 6 Q: And how long was it? Did you tell 7 him to backup? 8 A: No. At that point, before I had 9 that opportunity, the occupiers started 10 hurling rocks and so on." 11 Now, Sir, my first question is, did you 12 give those answers to those questions at the Warren 13 George trial as indicated? 14 A: That appears correct, yes. 15 Q: And you were under oath at the time, 16 sir? 17 A: Sure. 18 Q: And would you agree that that's an 19 accurate description of that aspect of the situation, 20 sir, now? 21 A: Yeah. It appears to be, yeah. 22 Q: So that Officer Lacroix was following 23 your instructions and standing there, not retreating, not 24 -- not leaving the area once the persons had gone back 25 into the Park?

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1 A: Correct. They were told to take a 2 defensive position. 3 Q: However, after -- I'm done with that 4 transcript, sir, but -- sorry -- after Dudley George was 5 shot, you did instruct your officers to leave the area, 6 is that correct? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: And they did, in fact, make a hasty 9 retreat, one might say, back to the Ministry of Natural 10 Resources parking lot; correct? 11 A: They reassembled and marched back to 12 the parking lot. 13 Q: Yes. Now, sir, you told us that you 14 had them march on the Stony Point people because of your 15 concerns about safety of other people in the area, right; 16 that's a fair general statement, right? 17 A: Fair. 18 Q: Now would you not have felt, sir, 19 that once your officers had killed someone, or perhaps 20 you didn't know that he was dead at that point, but once 21 they had seriously injured someone, the danger of a 22 confrontation would have increased rather than decreased; 23 isn't that fair to say? 24 A: There was certainly some serious 25 concerns, yes.

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1 Q: Yes. You thought it was a much more 2 dangerous situation after the shooting, than before the 3 shooting, right? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: So why didn't you have your officers 6 remain there to protect the cottagers then, sir? 7 A: We -- we did have officers deployed 8 in the -- in that area, that -- they weren't on a 9 checkpoint, but they were deployed and then throughout 10 there. 11 Q: Well, there were a couple of officers 12 hidden in the -- in the woods? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: But you had that before, and you 15 didn't consider that adequate before, right? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: You -- you thought you had to march 18 on the people with a large number of officers, right? 19 A: Right. 20 Q: I'm suggesting to you that that 21 appears rather odd in light of the fact that afterward, 22 when the danger would have been increased, you told the 23 officers to leave the area. 24 A: No, they didn't leave the area. 25 Q: Well, they left the immediate area of

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1 the Ipperwash Park, did they not? 2 A: They -- they weren't in the parking 3 lot, that's correct. 4 Q: And they went back to the Ministry of 5 Natural Resources lot, right? 6 A: Right. And then some officers were 7 assigned to keep observation in and around the area from 8 there, and the cottages were to be evacuated. 9 Q: And at that point you thought that 10 that offered adequate security given any possible danger 11 to cottagers, is that correct? 12 A: It was the best we could do at the 13 time. 14 Q: It was the best you could do at the 15 time? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: What would have been better; what are 18 you suggesting would have been better? 19 A: Well it would have been better if we 20 had the ability to put people on point duty and be right 21 up by the Park, but that just simply wasn't feasible. 22 Q: Why was it less feasible after you 23 shot Dudley George than it was before, sir? 24 A: There had been shots fired, and I 25 didn't want to put anyone in the line of fire. What we

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1 wanted to do was evacuate the cottages so that no one was 2 in harm's way. 3 Q: Sir, I -- I would put it to you that 4 you thought it was a more dangerous situation after the 5 shooting then before, is that fair? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: And I would put it to you that the 8 kind of security that you offered in that situation, 9 namely officers in the Natural Resources parking lot and 10 the several in the woods, would have been sufficient 11 before the shooting, when it was a less dangerous 12 situation, isn't that fair, sir? 13 A: No, it's not fair. 14 Q: Why is that not fair, sir? 15 A: Because there was no -- there was no 16 one in the parking lot. The -- we were trying to deal 17 with the issue of the occupiers in the parking lot 18 earlier. The whole situation changed after the -- the 19 shooting occurred. Obviously the -- the risk level was 20 higher for everyone. It was clearly a totally different 21 set of circumstances. 22 Q: Yes, there was much more danger. You 23 told people, for example, that it was unsafe as hell, a 24 couple -- an hour or two (2) after the shooting, isn't 25 that right?

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1 A: Correct. 2 Q: It was a much more dangerous 3 situation then, right? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: Now, sir, at that point you knew that 6 your officers had killed one of the First Nations people, 7 and you knew that they'd badly beaten up another person, 8 right? 9 A: Knew -- knew that there had been an 10 arrest, yes. 11 Q: Yes. And you knew that they'd 12 arrested the brother and sister of the shooting victim, 13 right? 14 A: Well, there had been arrests at the 15 hospital, yes. 16 Q: Yes. And in spite of what you might 17 assume the First Nations people would have taken as the 18 extreme provocation of that, in fact, they didn't attack 19 any cottagers, did they, sir? 20 A: No. 21 Q: And in spite of your concern that you 22 had to send a large number of officers to the hospital 23 and so on, there was no suggestion that they, in fact, 24 attacked the hospital or came anything close to it, 25 right?

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1 A: Correct. 2 Q: Now, concerning Marcia Simon and 3 Melva George, if we turn to the scribe notes, Exhibit P- 4 426, Inquiry Document number 1002419. 5 And I -- I'll be turning to, in our copy, 6 page 92, and this is at 0453 hours in the -- sorry. 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 Q: Yes, okay. I will stick with that 11 for a moment. This is at 0453 hours on the early morning 12 of September 7th. 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 Q: And there's an entry there: 17 "John Carson off phone. Rob Graham 18 advised female prisoner Marsha -- 19 [Marsha, it says, but it should be 20 Marcia] Simon was taken to golf course 21 to be released. 22 Melba [miswritten, it should be Melva] 23 George was not arrested, and brought 24 here." 25 Now, am I correct, sir, in understanding

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1 that this indicates that you got the information that 2 Marcia Simon had been released shortly before this time, 3 is that correct? 4 A: That's my understanding, I believe, 5 yes. 6 Q: It was some time -- some time between 7 4:00, say, and 4:53 of that morning, approximately, 8 right? 9 A: That's fair. 10 Q: And you were told that her mother, 11 Melva, hadn't been arrested and -- and brought there, 12 she'd been released earlier; is that correct? 13 A: I think she -- 14 Q: In fact, later on -- 15 A: I think she -- 16 Q: -- it says that she was dropped off-- 17 A: -- at her residence. 18 Q: Yes. 19 A: Right. 20 Q: And that's what you understood -- 21 A: By Constable Grandstone, yes. 22 Q: That's what you understood at the 23 time? 24 A: That's what I was told, yes. 25 Q: Now, if we could turn to the logger

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1 tapes, Exhibit P-444(b), and Tab 75 thereof. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 Q: And this is recorded as taking place 6 on September 7 -- 7 A: Which Tab are you referring to sir? 8 Q: -- at 4:42 hours in the morning. 9 A: Which tab, sir? 10 Q: Tab 75. 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 Q: And this is a telephone call between 15 you and Bonnie Bressette. I should like to turn to page 16 460 of that transcript, and towards the bottom of that 17 page, about a quarter of the way from the bottom, Ms. 18 Bressette: 19 "No, no. They -- that's one (1) of the 20 things they asked me to find out, well, 21 one (1) of their mothers was Melva 22 George and Marcia George. They said 23 they were picked up. 24 Carson: Picked up? 25 Bressette: Yeah.

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1 Carson: By whom? 2 Bressette: By the police." 3 And continuing on the next page: 4 "Carson: For what? 5 Bressette: I don't know, but they've 6 been taken some place. 7 [And] Carson: I don't know why, 8 unless it was at a checkpoint. Was 9 there a problem? 10 {And] Ms. Bressette: Melva is an 11 elderly lady. 12 Carson: Melva? 13 Bressette: Yeah. 14 Carson: Okay. Well, I'll see what I 15 can find out. 16 Melva and Marcia..." 17 And then: 18 "Carson: Marcia? 19 Bressette: Yeah." 20 And she spells out, "Marcia." 21 "Carson: Okay. 22 Bressette: They're missing, and 23 somebody told them the police took 24 them, and I told them, okay, I'll find 25 out where they are."

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1 Now, sir, this call, evidently, was 2 approximately ten (10) minutes or so before the scribe 3 note that we see. 4 Am I correct in assuming that you, upon 5 saying goodbye to Ms. Bressette, did do that 6 investigation to find out what happened to Marcia? 7 A: Sure. Sure. I asked questions, of 8 course. 9 Q: You asked the question of some other 10 officers? 11 A: Right. 12 Q: And when you -- do -- do you have any 13 notes, or do you recall, sir, who you spoke to and what 14 happened then, sir? 15 A: Just what's in the scribe notes. 16 Q: Just what's in the scribe notes? So, 17 you don't have any independent recollection now? 18 A: No. 19 Q: Was it the case that you instructed 20 the officers to release Marcia Simon? 21 A: No, no. To -- to -- as far as I 22 know, that had already been done. 23 Q: I see. 24 A: I'm not aware of any information to 25 the contrary.

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1 Q: I see. So, you don't recall your 2 having to instruct an officer to do so? Your 3 recollection is that when you investigated, you found out 4 she had already been released? 5 A: Well, it indicates here that Sergeant 6 Graham advised me that Marcia Simon had been taken to the 7 golf course to be released. 8 Q: Right. But that -- that's at 4:53, 9 some eleven (11) minutes after this phone call. You -- 10 you can't assist us now with any memory as to what 11 happened in the interim? 12 A: No. 13 MR. DERRY MILLAR: In fairness, the -- 14 the timing on this -- the phone call starts in the scribe 15 notes at 4:48; it ends at 4:53 when he's off the phone. 16 In the -- in the transcript it's 4:42; it starts -- it's 17 about six (6) minutes before the scribe notes, and we've 18 talked about the difference in time. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 20 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I'm not trying to 21 make an issue of the precise time, sir, and I think it 22 would be difficult to do so given the problems that Mr. 23 Millar has enunciated. 24 25 (BRIEF PAUSE)

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1 2 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 3 Q: Now, sir, you were asked on June 1st, 4 a long time ago, after your direct testimony, but during 5 your cross-examination by counsel for the OPPA, you were 6 asked about the takedown of Marcia and Melva and you 7 indicated that it would have been appropriate to treat 8 that as a high-risk takedown in the circumstances. 9 Do you recall your evidence, sir? 10 A: Yes. I think the information that I 11 received eventually was that they had ran through, or 12 failed to stop at a checkpoint, and the officers had 13 pursued and -- 14 Q: Yes. 15 A: -- attempted to get them to stop, and 16 they continued to not stop, I guess is the simplest 17 approach? 18 Q: Yes. And so, your evidence was, on 19 June 1st, to the effect of that in that situation, given 20 that there had just been some shots fired as the officers 21 understood, at least, whether correctly or incorrectly -- 22 A: Right. 23 Q: -- they understood there were shots 24 fired, and given that situation, if -- if she had, 25 indeed, went through a checkpoint, it would be

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1 appropriate to regard any takedown as a high-risk one, 2 correct? 3 A: Correct. 4 Q: And therefore, the officers be 5 prepared for the possibly that the occupants might have 6 firearms, for example, and it might be dangerous? 7 A: That -- that's fair. 8 Q: And that would have, in your view, as 9 you've expressed it to us, justify the officers having 10 their guns drawn as they made that takedown, right? 11 A: Right. Right. 12 Q: Now, sir, the evidence is that they 13 did do that takedown in the way that you've described, 14 more or less, but that they found, of course, no weapons 15 on the persons of, or in the car that they'd been 16 driving, or the persons they took down. 17 And nonetheless they retained them in 18 custody for several hours after that. The exact time may 19 be debatable, but at least several hours after that. 20 Would you agree, sir, that even if they 21 had, for the reasons you indicated, been justified in 22 making a high risk takedown, once they determined that 23 these are two (2) women who are looking for an ambulance 24 to help anybody that might be -- that might be hurt, and 25 who have no weapons anywhere near them, or in the car,

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1 and one of them is a very elderly woman, and the other is 2 her daughter just looking for an ambulance, they should 3 have released them, rather than holding them for several 4 hours; do you agree with that, sir? 5 A: First of all, I don't have any idea 6 how long they were held, and as I understand it the one 7 lady was driven to a residence so I'm not sure what the 8 grounds were for continuing to hold or bring the one lady 9 back to Forest. I -- I don't have the facts related to 10 that. 11 Q: I see. 12 A: So -- 13 Q: But you did -- you did know before 14 the OPPA counsel asked you, you knew about this case, 15 right; you knew that she was talking about Marcia Simon? 16 A: I know that now, but when I got the 17 phone call from Bonnie Bressette, I had no idea of what 18 the circumstances were. 19 Q: No. But I'm asking you now, if the 20 OPPA counsel, asked you was the high risk takedown 21 justified, and you said, yes, right; on June 1st of this 22 year. 23 A: Right, yes. Yes, I did. 24 Q: Now I'm asking you on June 27th of 25 this year, would you agree, knowing everything you know

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1 now, that it was improper to hold Marcia Simon for those 2 several hours that she was held after that? 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Mr. 4 Sandler? 5 MR. MARK SANDLER: We haven't heard all 6 the evidence on that issue yet. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, we 8 haven't. 9 MR. MARK SANDLER: And all Deputy Carson 10 has said, based on the hypothetical put to him by the 11 OPPA, certain facts obtained. And I'm just not sure how 12 helpful this is without all the evidence on point. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, I 14 think -- 15 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: With respect, Mr. 16 Commissioner, there was no objection to the OPPA, that 17 listed in the evidence,, that what the officers did was 18 justified up to that point. 19 And we have had some significant evidence 20 about this, and the fact -- and Officer Carson had 21 investigated that incident. He knew about it before June 22 1st of this year, when he testified, without difficulty, 23 that the officers were appropriate in doing a high risk 24 takedown. 25 It is certainly within my right, I would

36

1 suggest to you, sir, to ask him does he not consider it 2 inappropriate for them to have held Marcia Simon for 3 several hours afterward. He may -- may decline to answer 4 but -- 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Based on 6 the -- 7 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- I have the right 8 to ask that question, sir. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Based on the 10 facts as you've put them, in other words, the facts as 11 you've indicated. 12 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: There may be 14 other facts that we don't know about. 15 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Well, based on 16 whatever he knows -- he -- he, evidently, according to 17 his testimony when the OPPA counsel was examining him, he 18 knew something about this incident, and he came to the 19 conclusion that it was justified. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. Horton 21 is trying to get your attention. 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 MR PETER ROSENTHAL: I mean with respect,

37

1 Mr. Commissioner, it might be difficult for Deputy Carson 2 to separate what he knows about this incident from any 3 hypothetical. 4 But in any event, in the totality of the 5 circumstances, as he understands them, can he find any 6 justification for keeping Marcia Simon in custody several 7 hours after they did a thorough examination of her and 8 her vehicle? 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well you've 10 asked the question. 11 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I ask that 12 question, sir. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You've asked 14 the question. 15 16 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 17 Q: And sir, may you answer that 18 question? 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Based on the 20 information that we know now. 21 THE WITNESS: I -- I don't know what 22 facts the officers used to continue the arrest, sir. I'm 23 at a loss to know what it was. If they were satisfied 24 that there was no need to continue the arrest, they 25 should -- they should discontinue the arrest. But I

38

1 don't -- I have not done a personal investigation to ask 2 those questions of any of the officers involved. 3 All I know is that vehicle didn't stop for 4 a checkpoint, and was followed down the road to 5 McPherson's Restaurant, I believe, is where it occurred. 6 The circumstances around what happened at McPherson's, 7 and why they brought them back to Forest, I don't have 8 that answer. 9 10 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 11 Q: Then I -- I would switch to a 12 hypothetical, if I may, sir, and ask you hypothetically, 13 if in fact the officers at the time had the understanding 14 that Marcia Simon might have run a checkpoint, and that 15 she was coming from the area, at least roughly where some 16 shooting had occurred, and based upon that they did do a 17 high risk takedown. 18 And if they then upon examining the 19 vehicle and its occupants, found no firearms of any kind, 20 no weapons of any kind, and found that they were people 21 who were insisting that they were trying to call an 22 ambulance, and if they had no other evidence to suggest 23 that these people might have been involved in any way in 24 the shooting, would you agree, in that hypothetical 25 circumstance, it would be improper for them to hold

39

1 Marcia Simon for several hours after that point? 2 A: If everything you said was exactly as 3 it was, I mean, that makes sense that they'd release them 4 on the spot. 5 Q: And they should have done that, and 6 it was inappropriate not to, would you agree, sir? 7 A: If -- if that was the information 8 they were working on. 9 Q: Yes, you agree? 10 A: Sure. 11 Q: Thank you. 12 13 (BRIEF PAUSE) 14 15 Q: Now, the OPPA counsel also asked you, 16 sir, about an arrest of Kevin Simon, and you may recall 17 that in the course of your discussion with her about 18 that, it was discussed somewhat abstractly for a while, 19 and then Mr. Falconer, I believe, asked that it be 20 clarified as to what person was being talked about, and 21 it was Kevin Simon. 22 Do you recall that interchange, sir? 23 A: Which -- I'm not sure if I know which 24 incident you're speaking of. 25 Q: This is when Kevin Simon was arrested

40

1 on the grounds that he might have been a person for whom 2 there was an outstanding warrant. 3 This is not on -- in September, this is -- 4 A: Oh -- 5 Q: -- a couple months earlier. 6 A: Oh, I'm sorry, I -- I thought you 7 was -- 8 MR. DERRY MILLAR: It's not -- it's not a 9 couple of months earlier. The evidence is, it's during 10 August in the Park. 11 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Sorry. 12 MR. DERRY MILLAR: August 1995. 13 14 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 15 Q: That's it -- I should -- I meant a 16 couple of weeks earlier. Yes, it's in August '95 -- 17 A: Oh, this -- this -- this was the 18 individual who failed to identify himself? 19 Q: Yes. 20 A: Okay, all right. I'm just not sure 21 which event you were talking about. 22 Q: I see. Well, when you were examined 23 by the OPPA counsel, one got the impression that you were 24 quite familiar with that incident, is that correct, sir? 25 A: If you're talking about the -- the

41

1 incident where he was arrested in the Park, because they 2 got an outstanding warrant, I -- I -- I now know what 3 you're talking about. 4 Q: Yes, oh, thank you. Okay, yeah, 5 sorry, I didn't -- 6 A: And -- 7 Q: -- express it very well. 8 A: You were talking about McPherson's 9 incident. I thought this was related to that. 10 Q: Sorry. Okay, but -- but -- so, now 11 that we're talking about the same incident -- 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: -- you -- you were somewhat familiar 14 with that incident prior to your testimony here on June 15 1st -- 16 A: I knew it had occurred, yes. 17 Q: Yes. 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Now -- and as you indicate, the 20 evidence is that an officer asked Kevin Simon for his 21 name, and he refused to give his name, right? 22 A: Right. 23 Q: And the officer evidently had an 24 outstanding warrant for some person, in some -- some 25 name --

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1 A: Right, that he believed -- 2 Q: -- of -- 3 A: -- was the person he had before him. 4 Q: Yes. 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Now, is it not the case, sir, that 7 for an officer to arrest someone on a warrant, the 8 officer must have reasonable, probable grounds to believe 9 that the person being arrested is the person named in the 10 warrant? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: And if he asked someone their name, 13 and the person declines to give their name, that would 14 not establish, in and of itself, certainly reasonable 15 probable grounds to arrest someone on that warrant; is 16 that not fair? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: And when you learned about this 19 incident, sir, did it come to your attention that the 20 officers had anything else that might have suggested that 21 Kevin Simon was the person involved in the warrant, other 22 than him being a First Nations person, and being in the 23 area, and refusing to indicate what his name was? 24 A: My understanding of the -- of the 25 circumstances, was that the officer believed that he was

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1 the person named in the warrant, that -- that he believed 2 that's who he was. 3 Q: But did you understand there to be 4 any other evidence in support of that belief other than 5 Mr. Simon refusing to give his name and his sitting in 6 the Park on that occasion? 7 A: I'm not sure that refusing to give 8 his name was the issue. The issue was that he thought he 9 was the officer -- or the person named in the warrant. 10 Q: And what was your understanding of 11 the basis for his thinking that it was the person named 12 in the warrant? 13 A: Oh, I have no idea. 14 Q: I see. 15 A: I -- 16 Q: And you knew -- 17 A: I found out -- I mean, I wasn't 18 there. 19 Q: No. But you did answer counsel for 20 the OPP -- 21 MR. DERRY MILLAR: OPPA. 22 23 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 24 Q: -- A, thank you. That you knew that 25 the -- the individual was taken to another officer, and

44

1 asked is -- who is this person, right? 2 A: That -- that was my understanding, 3 yes. 4 Q: And you testified -- and this is on 5 June 1st on page 94: 6 "While normally [at line 16] while 7 normally, if the officer believes that 8 this is, in fact, the right person, 9 normally you would arrest, return that 10 individual to the detachment and begin 11 the process for the documentary 12 evidence to support that identity." 13 Correct? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: And that normal procedure was not 16 followed in this case is your understanding, right? 17 A: Apparently he took them to a First 18 Nations officer to try and confirm the identity. 19 Q: Yes. And in fact, was told it was 20 not the right person? 21 A: That's my understanding. 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 Q: Mark Wright is an officer that you

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1 knew well before this incident, sir? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: For approximately how many years? 4 A: I've probably known Mark since, well, 5 since he was promoted to sergeant, which would have been 6 in the mid/latter 80's, probably '87/'88-ish. 7 Q: So, it's safe to say you knew him for 8 five (5) or six (6) years at least prior to September 9 1995? 10 A: Yeah. He was a supervisor at Sombra 11 when I was a first-line supervisor at Chatham detachment. 12 It was my first -- when I would have first met him. 13 Q: And did -- would you say you knew him 14 fairly well or...? 15 A: Prior to this? 16 Q: Yes. 17 A: Not particularly. I mean -- 18 Q: No? 19 A: -- he was -- he was a colleague, but 20 we weren't what you would call... 21 Q: You weren't close friends or 22 anything? 23 A: No, no. We knew each other because 24 we were both supervisors. 25 Q: Now, did he have the nickname:

46

1 Popcorn? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: And I understand that that nickname 4 referred to the fact that he might be sort of explosive, 5 is that the -- the genesis of the notion, Popcorn? 6 A: That's not how I understand it. 7 Q: I see. How did you interpret that 8 nickname, sir? 9 A: Mark Wright is a very -- very 10 intelligent, smart, knowledgeable officer who is very 11 able to digest information, and -- and come to a 12 conclusion very quickly, and he likes to get things done, 13 and he's one of those individuals who is a -- a very 14 hardworking individual, and he -- he does a lot of work, 15 so he's a go, go, go kind of person. So, that's kind of 16 where this Popcorn nickname came from. 17 Q: So, Popcorn, to you, meant 18 intelligent, hardworking? I'm suggesting to you that the 19 aspect of popcorn that got him that name was explosive, 20 meaning reacting quickly, let's say, is that fair? 21 A: He -- he's able to react quickly, 22 sure. 23 Q: And if we could turn to the scribe 24 notes, Exhibit P-426 at about page 78 -- 25

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1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: -- And I'm looking at -- at the time 4 21:28. I should indicate that this is the evening of 5 September 6th, 21:28, we're talking 9:28 in the evening; 6 is that correct, sir? 7 A: Right. 8 Q: And the last entry under that time 9 is: 10 "Mark Wright: Let's arrest all for 11 mischief that are there." 12 You were aware that that was his view at 13 that time of the evening, sir? 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 A: I don't believe I was part of that 18 discussion. 19 Q: But you -- I asked you were you aware 20 that that was his attitude at that point, arrest them 21 all? 22 A: I can't say I was or I wasn't, quite 23 frankly. 24 Q: I see. Okay, well perhaps we could 25 turn to the -- the logger tapes, Exhibit P-444(b), Tab 48

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1 of that exhibit. 2 Now, this is evidently a little bit 3 earlier that evening, it indicates it's September 6th, 4 1995 at 1958 hours, so shortly before eight o'clock on 5 the evening of September 6th; is that correct, sir? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: And this is a call between you and 8 Officer Wright, and I should draw your attention to page 9 309 of that document. 10 And at this point, of course, sir, you are 11 away from the site, and being updated by Mark Wright; is 12 that correct, sir? 13 A: Right. 14 Q: And Inspector Linton, in your 15 absence, is the officer in charge of the site? 16 A: Right. 17 Q: Now, most of the way down page 309 18 you ask: 19 "Okay, so what's Dale want to do then?" 20 And Officer Wright responds: 21 "Oh, fuck, I don't know, waffle. I'll 22 be here 'til fucking daylight figuring 23 it out, and daylight's a waste." 24 Now, is that a more or less accurate 25 transcript of part of that interchange between you and

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1 Mark Wright -- 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: -- at this time, sir? 4 A: Correct. 5 MR. DERRY MILLAR: "I'll" is to "We'll" 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: The "all" 7 has been changed to "we'll", right? 8 MR. DERRY MILLAR: "I'll be" is to 9 "we'll" -- 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We'll -- 11 MR. DERRY MILLAR: "-- be here." 12 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Thank you. I did 13 say more or less, and that's a little bit less than I 14 thought. 15 16 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 17 Q: So it should read, in other words: 18 "Oh fuck, I don't know, waffle. We'll 19 be here 'til fucking daylight figuring 20 it out, and daylight's a waste." 21 Did I get it correct this time, sir? 22 A: Right. 23 Q: So you ask him what Dale wants to do. 24 Dale is, of course, Inspector Linton? 25 A: Right.

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1 Q: And he says, "Oh fuck, I don't know, 2 waffle. I'll be here 'til daylight." 3 Now, am I correct in understanding that he 4 was telling you that in his view, at least, Inspector 5 Linton was not going to be decisive enough and quick 6 enough in his action? 7 That's what he means by "waffle", and 8 being "here 'til daylight", right? 9 A: That's fair. 10 Q: So he's expressing to you, you ask 11 what is Inspector Linton going to do, and he says 12 "waffle", right? 13 A: Right. 14 Q: And then, continuing on the next 15 page, in his discussion about you and he getting 16 together, and where you are, and then the last entry 17 attributed to Officer Wright on page 310 is: 18 "Don't you say we go get those fucking 19 guys?" 20 Right? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: Now, that was a relatively aggressive 23 remark, is that not fair to say, sir? 24 A: Sure. 25 Q: And you respond:

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1 "Well, we got to deal with them. We 2 can't let them out in that area with 3 that stuff." 4 Right? 5 A: Right. 6 Q: Now this same Officer, Wright, known 7 as Popcorn, who expressed to you the view at eight 8 o'clock at night: "we should go get those fucking guys", 9 is the officer who gave you the information that there 10 were people in the Sandy Parking Lot with baseball bats, 11 right? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: He said it was his observation. 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: Now, sir, when you have an officer 16 like Officer Wright reporting information to you, and 17 it's apparent as to what his view is, that he wants to go 18 and get them, do you take that into account when you're 19 evaluating the information from him, sir? 20 A: I'm not sure I understand your 21 question. 22 Q: I'm suggesting to you, sir, that if 23 someone reports to you: gee it's a terrible situation, 24 there's eight (8) to ten (10) guys in the parking lot 25 with baseball bats, you, knowing the person, would

52

1 evaluate that information based partially on what you 2 knew about the person. 3 And I'm suggesting to you, to give you the 4 fullest suggestion, if you knew that the person reporting 5 to you was a calm officer, who would liked to check 6 things out, and wasn't explosive, but quite the contrary, 7 you'd think that's very serious information. 8 But if you knew that the person reporting 9 to you was somebody who was very anxious to get into a 10 tangle with these people, then you might think, well, you 11 know, maybe he's exaggerating a bit; now isn't that fair, 12 sir? 13 A: No. 14 Q: I see. And it's -- it's not 15 appropriate to make that kind of analysis when you're 16 getting information in a situation like this, sir? 17 A: In all the time I've worked with Mark 18 Wright I've never known him to exaggerate. 19 Q: I see. 20 A: He's a criminal investigator. He 21 understands the Criminal Code far better than I do, and I 22 would expect him as a -- as my two (2) eyes see, to be 23 very frank and honest and open with me if he has an 24 opinion. 25 So, the fact that he gave of the opinion,

53

1 I really don't have -- whether I act on it or not is -- 2 is my issue. I want him to be as open and as honest with 3 me as -- as he feels he can be. 4 Q: Yes. You would want him to be as 5 open as he can be, but I'm suggesting to you, sir, that 6 any seasoned officer evaluating the situation, takes into 7 account the source of the information as well as the 8 content of the information; Is that not fair? 9 A: And that's fair, and that's exactly 10 what I'm saying. Is I -- I certainly have no qualms with 11 information that Mark Wright provides to me. 12 Q: Now I'm suggesting to you, sir, if 13 somebody has told you a little bit earlier that evening, 14 I said to you, don't you say we go and get those fucking 15 guys, and then he is the main source of information that 16 there's a more dangerous situation than you might have 17 thought, you would be wise to give a little pause before 18 you act on that information; is that not fair, sir? 19 A: If Mark Wright provided me 20 information, I would believe it to be accurate. 21 Q: Yes, sir. Thank you. Now, with your 22 indulgence. 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25

54

1 Sorry Mr. Commissioner. Now, sir, there 2 is something that's become known at these proceedings as 3 the picnic table incident, at which there's been evidence 4 that at least one of your officers pushed a picnic table 5 with his cruiser evidently in an attempt to push it from 6 the Sandy Parking Lot in the direction of the Park. 7 You -- you were familiar with that 8 incident, sir? 9 A: Yes. Yes. 10 Q: And was it your understanding that at 11 least one officer had done what I just described; used 12 his police cruiser to try to push a picnic table towards 13 the Park? 14 A: I had no idea that occurred. 15 Q: Well did you learn that eventually? 16 A: Only in -- in preparing for this 17 process. 18 Q: You didn't learn it until preparing 19 for this Inquiry, sir? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: I see. Did you learn that an officer 22 had used pepper spray on that occasion, prior to this 23 Inquiry, sir? 24 A: Yeah. I believe I knew there was 25 pepper spray used.

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1 Q: Yes. 2 A: But I wasn't aware there was a picnic 3 table pushed. 4 Q: I see. Well, hypothetically, would 5 you agree that unless the -- there was some extraordinary 6 circumstance that's hard to imagine, it would be 7 inappropriate for an officer to try to push a picnic 8 table with a cruiser in circumstances such as in the 9 Sandy Parking Lot? 10 A: I wasn't there, I don't know what the 11 facts were around it, sir, so I'm at a loss to really 12 even comment on it. 13 Q: Well perhaps I'll state a 14 hypothetical for you, sir. Suppose that the officer was 15 one of some officers that observed the picnic table in 16 the Sandy Parking Lot had the notion that the officers 17 did not want the picnic table in the Sandy Parking Lot, 18 would it be -- based on that, would it be appropriate for 19 him to push a picnic table -- when there are other 20 persons around. 21 And I'll add some additions to the 22 hypothetical in a moment, but when there are at least 23 some other persons around, would it be appropriate for 24 him to push that picnic table with his cruiser in effort 25 to get it towards the Park?

56

1 A: Without knowing the exact 2 circumstances, sir, I'm not going to speculate on what 3 they may or may not have been dealing with. 4 I mean, it's -- in isolation I -- I'm just 5 not prepared to -- to -- to go there. 6 Q: Can you imagine circumstances that 7 would justify that, sir? 8 A: Not off the top of my head. 9 Q: No. And would you agree that if 10 persons were sitting on the picnic table that was being 11 pushed by a police cruiser, that would be an apparently 12 very dangerous operation, would you agree? 13 A: It would be unusual. 14 Q: And dangerous, would you agree? 15 A: Potentially. 16 Q: And would you agree that if you were 17 investigating such an incident, you would require of the 18 officer a very good reason for doing that, before you 19 would conclude that the officer had acted 20 inappropriately; is that fair? 21 A: Of course. 22 Q: And did you make an investigation of 23 that incident, sir? 24 A: No, sir. 25 Q: Did anybody in the OPP make an

57

1 investigation of that incident in the ten (10) years from 2 then to now as far you are aware, sir? 3 A: Not that I'm aware of. 4 Q: Now, Inspector, the pepper spray that 5 was used, you did become aware of that at the time, more 6 or less, did you sir? 7 A: Yeah, there was some entry in the log 8 when I came back in the next morning that someone did 9 pepper spray. 10 Q: Yes, and it is required now and it 11 was required then that anyone who uses pepper spray file 12 a use of force report; is that correct, sir? 13 A: Yeah, it's required, yes. 14 Q: Sorry? 15 A: It is required, yes. 16 Q: And it was required in September 17 1995, is -- 18 A: Oh, yes -- 19 Q: -- that correct? 20 A: Sure. 21 Q: And was there a use of force report 22 filled out with respect to the use of pepper spray on 23 that occasion, sir? 24 A: I couldn't tell you for sure if there 25 was or not.

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1 Q: I see. And would you agree that one 2 (1) of the many responsibilities of an incident commander 3 is that he or she ensure that appropriate reports are 4 filled out after an incident which he is in command of? 5 A: I wouldn't have -- I would not have 6 asked for a follow-up on the -- on a pepper spray 7 incident. It would be filed with the officer's 8 supervisors and it would be processed that way. I 9 normally wouldn't see it. 10 Q: And it's not your responsibility to 11 ensure that the use of force report was filed? 12 A: Well, there would be one (1) filed. 13 The supervisor who would be working on that shift would 14 ensure it was done. 15 Q: But would it be your responsibility, 16 also, to ensure that it was done? 17 A: No, it would be the supervisor who 18 was working on that shift who is responsible to make sure 19 it's done. 20 Q: I see and you have no responsibility 21 to check after that? 22 A: No, it goes -- it gets filed in the 23 normal course and is -- is processed through the normal 24 channels. 25

59

1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: Now, sir, we've had some evidence 4 about and you, I believe, spoke with me about also the 5 use of a St. John's ambulance vehicle as a communications 6 centre in the Ministry of Natural Resources parking lot? 7 A: Right. 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 Q: And there is a man named Peter 12 Harding with whom you arranged the use of that vehicle, 13 is that correct? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: We had some evidence from him and 16 there are some statements from him. I'm going to, if I 17 may, ask you if you agree with a certain description that 18 he made of an interchange with you in his anticipated 19 evidence statement that's in Volume II of the inquiry 20 documents, Inquiry Document Number 1002290. 21 I'm just going to be asking you... 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 Q: Sorry, with your indulgence, sir, Mr.

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1 Commissioner. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 Q: Okay, yeah. Sorry, Mr. Commissioner. 6 I -- I thought that the photocopy had a page that's 7 missing from it, but perhaps, with your indulgence I 8 could call on your -- on him to put it on the screen, if 9 I may. 10 So, I'm talking about Inquiry Document 11 1002290... 12 13 (BRIEF PAUSE) 14 15 Q: Thank you. My Friend offers me a 16 hard copy, for which I'm very grateful. 17 I should like, if I may first, to read a - 18 - a portion of page 3 and ask you, sir, if you would 19 agree with this description. It's right in the middle of 20 page 3 and, perhaps, if it could be bigger? Yeah. Yes, 21 exactly there. Thank you very much. 22 What I should ask you if you agree with, 23 sir, is the words attributed to Harding there: 24 "Inspector Carson asked me if I would 25 keep this visit completely within our

61

1 own -- ourselves as they were expecting 2 an operation at Ipperwash. They didn't 3 know when or where or if it would 4 materialize, but they were planning it 5 in case something did happen." 6 So, is that fair, sir? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And then, if we could turn to page 9, 9 please? 10 11 (BRIEF PAUSE) 12 13 Q: Is that -- that's page 8, the next 14 page, please. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm not sure 16 what the status of this document is in this, is it an 17 exhibit or is it a piece of a transcript? 18 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I believe it is and 19 I'm happy to make it so, if -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, I 21 don't know. I'm not asking you to. 22 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Well, if -- if -- 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I just don't 24 know what the status of it is. 25 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes.

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1 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Is it a 2 transcript of something? 3 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Oh, I'm sorry, sir, 4 it's -- yes, it's the SIU interview -- 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, we're 6 not -- 7 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- of Peter Harding 8 and it's entitled, "Anticipated Evidence of Peter 9 Harding." I -- I don't think I'll necessarily -- 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 11 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- make it an 12 exhibit depending upon the answers, but... 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 14 15 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 16 Q: Sir, if you could move it down a tiny 17 bit so we could see the question, just -- no -- just -- 18 just before where you were. Thank you. Thank you very 19 much. 20 Now, this is, as I've just explained, 21 Deputy Commissioner, to the Commissioner and I'm sorry I 22 should have explained it to you as well, it's from his 23 SIU statement -- Peter Harding's SIU statement. 24 So, he was asked by Officer Kennedy: 25 "Was there some instruction to you to

63

1 keep this request confidential?" 2 To which he answered: 3 "Yes. And he explained at that time it 4 was, like a two-fold, the reason why we 5 had to keep the request confidential 6 and one (1) was they weren't sure that 7 there was going to be anything -- 8 anything happen at all was one (1) 9 thing. And the other situation was, if 10 something did happen or if they did not 11 want to pre -- you know -- second- 12 guessing from anyone or any agency. 13 So, they -- they -- people, they wanted 14 to involve -- they wanted then indicate 15 to them directly themselves. So, in 16 the applying stages, they -- they 17 weren't sure what was going to happen, 18 so they wanted it kept fairly quietly." 19 And that's a little difficult to read and 20 absorb, sir, but I think the meaning is clear. 21 And would you agree that Mr. Harding was 22 accurately reporting your request about keeping it 23 confidential? 24 A: Yeah. We were in the planning stages 25 and I was discussing the various equipment he might be

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1 able to help us with and I asked that he keep it to 2 himself. 3 Q: Yeah. And also, he indicates that: 4 "If something did happen, they did not 5 want to -- you know -- second-guessing 6 from anyone or any agency." 7 A: Yeah. I'm not sure what he's 8 referring to there. 9 Q: But -- well, he -- he's purportedly 10 reporting what you told him with respect to 11 confidentiality. 12 A: Yeah. 13 Q: So, would you dispute this or no? 14 A: I -- I don't know what -- what -- 15 what he means by that. 16 Q: By second-guessing from anyone or any 17 agency? 18 A: Yeah. I mean, it's -- it's no big -- 19 big deal to borrow his equipment, which is what were 20 doing. So, I'm not sure what -- what -- what he took 21 from a discussion that has to do with second-guessing 22 from some other agency 23 Q: I see. 24 A: So I'm not sure what that reference 25 is about.

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1 Q: I see, okay, thank you. I'm prepared 2 to move on. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, okay-- 4 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: We can make this an 5 exhibit -- 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- no, just 7 move on. 8 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- if you think 9 it's appropriate. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think this 11 is as good a place as any to take a break, Mr. Rosenthal. 12 I just want to you ask you where we left. 13 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Thank you, Mr. 14 Commissioner. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You 16 indicated -- when we left, you indicated that you might 17 have as much as two (2) hours and -- 18 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- we've 20 been just a little over an hour. I'm just wondering if 21 you're nearing the end of your cross-examination. 22 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I -- I hope that 23 another hour or so will do it, sir. We're moving along 24 much more -- 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We'll take a

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1 break now -- 2 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- quickly than -- 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- and I'm 4 hoping that you will be able to finish at the time you 5 estimated. 6 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I hope so, sir. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 8 so we'll take a break now. 9 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 10 for fifteen (15) minutes. 11 12 --- Upon recessing at 11:38 a.m. 13 --- Upon resuming at 11:55 a.m. 14 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We've lost 16 George. Please be seated, let's carry on. We thought he 17 was in here. We thought he was in here. 18 Can we carry on without him? Can we carry 19 on without him? 20 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Yes. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Okay, let's 22 go. Yes, Mr. Rosenthal, let's carry on. 23 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 24 25 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL:

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1 Q: Now, sir, just before the break we 2 looked at an inscription by Mr. Harding of some of the 3 interchange between you and him in respect to the use of 4 this vehicle, right? 5 A: Correct. 6 Q: And you indicated, as I understood 7 you, that you basically agreed with it. You weren't sure 8 what he meant by a phrase "second guessing by someone 9 else"; is that fair? 10 A: Fair enough. 11 Q: So now, we've had some evidence at 12 this Inquiry that afterward, after the shooting of Dudley 13 George and so on, when some of the First Nations people 14 saw an ambulance in or what seemed to be an ambulance, 15 marked as an ambulance in the MNR parking lot, and 16 realised that it had been used by the police for non- 17 medical purposes. 18 And when that was coupled with the fact 19 that Dudley George was not taken to hospital by 20 ambulance, but in a private car, there was some concern 21 among the First Nations people about the use of that 22 vehicle in that way, as opposed to for medical services, 23 and, in fact, there was some damage to the vehicle that 24 resulted from that concern. 25 You -- you're familiar with that, right?

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1 A: Yes. 2 Q: Now, sir, wouldn't you have 3 anticipated such a reaction if First Nations people or 4 anyone being policed found out that a vehicle was being 5 used for policing purposes, but was marked as an 6 ambulance, wouldn't they be -- wouldn't you expect people 7 to be concerned about that, sir? 8 A: I can't imagine why. 9 Q: You can't imagine why? 10 A: No. 11 Q: I see. Well, I'll try to assist your 12 imagination in that respect, sir, then, in the present 13 context. 14 Here is a situation where, from the Stoney 15 Point people's point of view, the OPP had marched on 16 them, unjustifiably and had attacked them in the fact, 17 and had killed one (1) of them and then had run away and 18 not provided any medical assistance to the person that 19 they mortally wounded, and had, among other things, used 20 as part of this operation, a vehicle -- 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. Millar, 22 do you want to interrupt or do you want to wait until he 23 finishes the description? 24 MR. DERRY MILLAR: I think it's unfair to 25 say to this witness that the OPP did not provide any

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1 medical assistance to the -- to the person who ran away. 2 The evidence is that the -- that -- that 3 we've heard is that Mr. Dudley George was carried back 4 into the Park. We've heard evidence that there was a -- 5 at least one (1) call that was interrupted from -- to 6 911. But I don't think it's fair to -- it's -- to say to 7 the Witness that the OPP -- implying that the OPP was 8 asked for assistance and didn't give assistance to Mr. 9 Dudley George. 10 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: With respect, Mr. 11 Commissioner, I don't think that's a proper objection to 12 the question as I framed it. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well -- 14 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I -- 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- if you're 16 going to go over, you're going to have to be very precise 17 about what evidence you're putting, and I know you're 18 trying and -- 19 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- Sir, and with 20 respect, I believe I was and I believe that Mr. Millar's 21 response is to something that I did not say, namely, I 22 had indicated I was in the process of putting to this 23 Witness what would have appeared to be the situation to 24 at least some of the First Nations people. 25 And I was doing that to assist his

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1 imagination -- 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well -- 3 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- when he said he 4 could not imagine why they would be upset in the 5 circumstances. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Those people 7 gave evidence. 8 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: And that was the 9 context, Sir. I wasn't purporting to -- to indicate, in 10 fact, whether or not ambulance assistance had been sought 11 or not, I just indicated that the perception was that, 12 here you had a situation where the officer has mortally 13 wounded one (1) of the Stoney Point people, and then fled 14 without offering any medical assistance to that person, 15 and I believe that is an accurate description of the 16 perception of at least some of the people. 17 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Well, but we should -- 18 we've heard all of the people -- 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yeah. 20 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- who are in the 21 occupiers, who -- who were in the Sandy Parking Lot, or 22 virtually all of them, and I don't -- can't recall any of 23 them saying anything about the OPP having not offered any 24 assistance. 25 What the occupiers said -- and if Mr. --

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1 My Friend wanted to deal with this when -- when the 2 occupiers were here, he might have asked that question, 3 and I don't recall that question about the perception 4 that the OPP didn't help being asked. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yeah. 6 MR. DERRY MILLAR: And so, when he says, 7 I'm trying to ask you a hypothetical that it's a 8 perception of people, well, we've heard from virtually 9 all of the people who were there that we can call, and 10 none of them said that. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 12 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: With respect, Mr. 13 Commissioner, I believe that I did ask that, and I -- 14 perhaps -- perhaps I could go on to other -- other parts 15 of my question and I could have the lunch break. I did 16 ask that of David George. I don't understand, frankly, 17 the interruption by Mr. Millar -- 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well -- 19 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- in the first 20 place and I -- I don't see that it's properly placed -- 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, I -- 22 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- even now and I - 23 - I believe that there is that evidence, and perhaps I 24 could look for it over the lunch break, sir? 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Ask a

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1 question, Mr. Rosenthal. 2 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Well, thank you. 3 4 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 5 Q: Sir, I was trying to deal with your 6 response that you could not imagine why any of the First 7 Nations people -- I forget exactly how I phrased it, but 8 -- might have taken the view that they were angered by 9 the fact that a vehicle labelled as an emergency services 10 vehicle, a medical vehicle, an ambulance vehicle, had 11 been in the circumstances used, in fact, to assist the 12 OPP in what they might have regarded as an assault upon 13 them, okay? That's where -- where I was at ten (10) 14 minutes ago and I'm trying to get back there; okay, sir? 15 Now, and I was suggesting to you some of 16 the factors that might have been in the perception of 17 such people to -- and I would like to try to reconstruct 18 that, and then I'll ask you at the end, can you now, 19 perhaps, understand why some people might have felt angry 20 enough to do damage to that vehicle; okay, that's where 21 I'm going; okay? 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We have the 23 evidence of those people, I mean, on this point. 24 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes, sir, we do. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: So, are you

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1 going to put that evidence to the Witness, or are you 2 going to try to summarize a number of witnesses? 3 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I was -- I was 4 trying to summarize an attitude, sir, to -- 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, it 6 better be accurate because there were a number of 7 witnesses, and each testified to some extent -- not all, 8 but many have testified about this. 9 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Many of the 11 First Nations witnesses. 12 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: And I -- and I 13 believe that I was giving an accurate overview of the 14 essence of that -- of that testimony, and I don't believe 15 that Mr. Millar objected to that on that basis. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We'll see. 17 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: He indicated -- he 18 indicated that there's a question as to whether or not 19 the -- the -- the OPP maybe did or did not offer 20 ambulance service, and I wasn't dealing with that aspect 21 at all in my submission. 22 I was dealing with what the perceptions 23 were, and I believe that the evidence does show, and 24 perhaps Mr. Millar would be kind enough to check my 25 cross-examination of Mr. David George while I'm speaking

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1 here, and I believe you'll find, sir, that Mr. David 2 George did, more or less explicitly, say that he was 3 concerned about the police running away and so on. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: There was 5 some concern. 6 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: But, in any event, 7 I may -- I may misremember that, but I believe I'm giving 8 an accurate rough indication of some of the feeling 9 there. 10 And I want to prove to this witness -- 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Carry on. 12 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- to see if he 13 could then understand it. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: All right. 15 As long as it's accurate. 16 17 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL. 18 Q: Now, sir, sorry I have to start again 19 because I have to put it in the context. Now, sir, I'm 20 suggesting to you that it appears one can argue and 21 perhaps different counsel will argue later in 22 submissions. 23 But it appears that there's some evidence 24 at this Inquiry suggesting that at least some of the 25 Stoney Point people perceived what happened as including

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1 the following elements, that they were attacked on that 2 night by OPP officers and including one of their own 3 being killed. 4 And also they perceived that when they saw 5 the vehicle marked St. John's Ambulance in the MNR 6 parking lot the next day, they perceived and from looking 7 at that vehicle, perceived that that vehicle had been 8 somehow assisting the police in making what they might 9 have considered that unwarranted attack. 10 And they also felt that at least some 11 felt, that appropriate medical assistance had not been 12 rendered to Dudley George. 13 Now if one had those perceptions, could 14 you understand, sir, why someone might feel angry that a 15 vehicle marked the St. John's Ambulance had been used 16 apparently to help the police in their tactical 17 operations rather than for medical purposes? 18 A: The St. John's communication trailer 19 is about a thirty (30) odd foot van type trailer with 20 several radios in it, some are fire department radios, 21 some are county city radios from the City of London and 22 it is simply that, it's simply a trailer and a truck. 23 There was one (1) van there that was an 24 ambulance. Given your hypothetical example and concern 25 about lack of or perceived as you indicated, lack of

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1 assistance -- medical assistance, perhaps one could draw 2 that in regards to the St. John van. 3 It might be hard pressed to understand how 4 a thirty (30) foot trailer equipped with communication 5 radios falls into that category. 6 Q: But that trailer was marked St. 7 John's Ambulance, is that correct, sir? 8 A: Yes, absolutely. 9 Q: And why did you not at least cover up 10 those markings when you were using it for a different 11 purpose than medical purposes, sir? 12 A: We had made no attempt whatsoever to 13 hide what we're using it for. There -- there was no 14 secrecy around that whatsoever. It was in plain public 15 view. 16 Q: Yes. 17 A: It was simply -- it was simply 18 shelter for the officers. 19 Q: Yes, sir. But to a naive person or 20 perhaps even to the sophisticated person, seeing the 21 outside of that vehicle marked St. John's Ambulance, that 22 person would -- might conclude that it's being used for 23 some medical purpose; is that fair? 24 A: They -- they show up at all kinds of 25 events. We use their equipment as St. John's Ambulance

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1 that has lighting -- lighting vehicles and they're 2 canteens, I mean St. John's does all kinds of things. 3 Not -- not just provide first aid. 4 Q: Now, sir, it would have been possible 5 for you to cover up the words St. John's Ambulance on 6 that trailer with OPP decals, would it not? 7 A: I'm not sure how much -- how that -- 8 well, I'm not sure what the markings are on a trailer 9 specifically but there was St. John's Ambulance on -- on 10 the truck or the trailer. I'm not sure exactly what the 11 -- the markings are specific. Could it have been done? 12 Of course it could have been done. 13 Q: It could have been covered with 14 decals, right? 15 A: Sure. 16 Q: Indicating OPP, right? 17 A: Could have. 18 Q: So that it would be unashameably 19 known to anyone who passed by as an OPP vehicle as 20 opposed to a St. John's Ambulance vehicle for the purpose 21 of that evening, right? 22 A: Well with the number of OPP cars 23 around there, it would be pretty hard pressed to not know 24 there was OPP involved there. 25 Q: But someone walking by that parking

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1 lot, sir, would have assumed that there was a medical 2 vehicle in that parking lot, is that correct? 3 A: They could assume that if they saw 4 the van. 5 Q: Yeah. 6 A: But the trailer certainly is not a 7 medical vehicle, it's a trailer. It's a thirty (30) foot 8 trailer. 9 Q: It says OPP -- it says St. John's 10 Ambulance on it, doesn't it, sir? 11 A: Yes. Yes it does. 12 Q: Now, sir, you had talked about the 13 possibility of using military vehicles in this operation. 14 Do you recall that discussion -- 15 A: Yes. Right. 16 Q: -- over several days -- 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: -- and several people -- several 19 people? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: And with respect to military 22 vehicles, you recognized the importance of covering up 23 any military insignia with OPP decals so it wouldn't be 24 misinterpreted; isn't that fair? 25 A: Yes.

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1 Q: So how could you recognize the 2 importance of that with respect to military vehicles, 3 sir, and not recognize the importance of that with 4 respect to an ambulance vehicle? 5 A: Well, the issue there was totally 6 different. 7 Q: Yes. 8 A: The issue with the military vehicles 9 has everything to do with the dispute that the occupiers 10 have with the military base, and it is no way, shape, or 11 form related to our relationship with St. John's 12 Ambulance, or anyone else's, as far as that goes. 13 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Your indulgence, 14 Mr. Commissioner. 15 16 (BRIEF PAUSE) 17 18 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Just for the 19 record, Mr. Commissioner, My Friend Ms. Esmonde has found 20 that part of the testimony of David George on the matter 21 that I indicated before, and this is one of several 22 witnesses who talked about it, but Mr. David George 23 testified on October 21, 2004, and he said in part, 24 beginning on the bottom of -- oh, and Mr. Millar has 25 found it as well.

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1 I'll have to put my glasses on to see if 2 we're on the same page. 3 MR. DERRY MILLAR: We're on the same 4 page, it's page 83, starting at line -- may -- page 82, 5 line 20 down to page 83, line 12, Mr. Rosenthal asked him 6 about going to the MNR parking lot the next day 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 11 Q: And -- yes, and perhaps I should read 12 those lines, beginning at line 20 on page 82, of October 13 21, 2004. 14 "Yeah, you told us that the next day 15 you went to the MNR parking lot with 16 the -- with the St. John's Ambulance 17 vehicles? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: And then you beat the van? 20 A: Yeah, I gave it a couple kicks. 21 Q: Why did you do that? 22 A: I was just venting my frustration 23 and anger. 24 Q: What -- what -- was it the fact 25 that it was labelled St John's

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1 Ambulance? Did that have any 2 particular effect on you? 3 A: Well, yeah, because St. John's 4 Ambulance, they wouldn't help -- come 5 to help Dudley or anybody else that 6 night. It was their goddam ambulance, 7 they wouldn't let us use it, and it 8 wasn't -- that one that was there 9 wasn't even an ambulance. There was no 10 life saving equipment in it." 11 So that's -- that's one excerpt that's 12 related to that, Mr. Commissioner. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 18 Q: Now, sir, in the course of these 19 events of September 4, 5, 6, 1995, you asked that one of 20 the communications lines be unrecorded, or de-recorded, 21 or whatever the proper terminology is, right? 22 A: Right. 23 Q: And the explanation that you gave us, 24 in part, on June 20th when you testified, well you were 25 asked the following question at the bottom of page 215:

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1 "Q: You -- a part of your answer, sir, 2 was that you wanted to have persons 3 speaking to you, to not have to be 4 concerned about the possibility of 5 being recorded, is that correct? 6 "A: Right. 7 Q: And concerned, therefore, that 8 other people would know exactly what 9 they said as a result of the recording, 10 right?" 11 There must be a typo there, but: 12 "A: No, so that they would speak 13 freely and not be concerned what they 14 may want to say to me in order to be, 15 for lack of a better term, more 16 concerned about grammar, and 17 correctness, and language, as opposed 18 to being frank and honest with me. 19 Q: Grammar? You think that was the 20 concern; grammar, sir? Or was it not 21 including the contents, sir? 22 And you answered: 23 "Quite frank -- quite frankly, they are 24 recorded, so you have the actual 25 transcripts."

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1 I'm going to be picking up in several 2 respects from there. 3 You gave an order to someone at some point 4 to de-record one line, is that correct, sir? 5 A: Yes, I did. 6 Q: And that person evidently failed to 7 obey that order? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: And did you later find out who that 10 person was and... 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And was that person disciplined for 13 failing to obey that order, sir? 14 A: No. 15 Q: I see. Now, if we could turn to Tab 16 62 of the logger tapes Exhibit P-444(B). 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 Q: This is a call on September 7, 1995 21 in the hours between you and Superintendent Parkin. 22 So, at this point, you thought that the 23 lines had been de-recorded, is that correct? 24 A: I believe so, yes. 25 Q: And -- and you thought this line, in

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1 particular, had been de-recorded? 2 A: I believe so. There were several -- 3 there was a stack of lines, just so you understand, and 4 so whether the line that would normally -- or was 5 expected not be recorded was being used or not or whether 6 I selected that specific line to make that call, I 7 couldn't tell you. 8 Q: So, for example, on page 382 of this 9 transcript, the second entry attributed to you: 10 "Carson: Oh, fuck, they're all over 11 the place. 12 Yeah. There's a TV truck there at the 13 checkpoint when I come out." 14 Is that the kind of bad grammar you were 15 concerned about having recorded, sir? 16 A: Well, it's not exactly something you 17 like in public. 18 Q: Yes. So, you didn't like bad grammar 19 like that being recorded; that's your evidence as the 20 reason for de-recording a line? 21 A: Well, of course, you don't what that 22 kind of information. 23 Q: Now, if we could turn, then please, 24 to the other volume of logger tapes, Tab 26 thereof. So, 25 this is Exhibit 444(A)...

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1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: And this is timed as being September 4 6th, 1995 at 9:45 in the morning, is that correct, sir? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And if we turn to page 217 of that 7 transcript -- 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: What tab is 9 this transcript at? 10 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Tab 6 -- 26, sir. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 26. 12 13 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 14 Q: And page 217 thereof. You're -- 15 you're talking to a person who's identified as female and 16 you are Carson. About five (5) lines down it says: 17 "Female: Don't worry. We're not 18 being recorded or anything, I mean, you 19 can trust me." 20 And then: 21 "Carson: Well -- well, until about 22 ten (10) minutes ago, my lines were 23 being recorded." 24 So, first I want to stop there and can we 25 take from this, sir, then given the time of this call

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1 being 9:45 in the morning on September 6th, that it -- it 2 was your understanding that the lines -- at least one (1) 3 of your lines or some of your lines stopped being 4 recorded at approximately five (5) minutes after 9:00 or 5 a little bit after 9:00 on September 6th, 1995? 6 A: Fair enough. 7 Q: That -- that's what we take from 8 that? 9 A: Right, right. 10 Q: So at some point -- at some point in 11 the course of these several days, you found out that all 12 the lines were being recorded except for your cell phone 13 line, is that correct? 14 A: No. The -- there's -- there's a 15 discussion in here where Superintendent Parkin and I had 16 a discussion and I informed him that all the lines were - 17 - were being recorded and he suggested we probably should 18 have at least one (1) line not recorded. 19 As a result of that, I gave a direction to 20 have one (1) line not recorded. At this point I thought 21 that had been done -- 22 Q: Yes. 23 A: -- in fact, it appears it never was 24 done. 25 Q: Yes. And at this point you thought

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1 that had been done some ten (10) minutes prior to this 2 phone call? 3 A: Right. 4 Q: Now which line was that, sir, that 5 you thought had been de-recorded? How can we identify 6 that line if you're looking at these transcripts and want 7 to figure out which calls were made on that line? 8 A: I have no idea how you do that. I 9 don't know what the technology is that does that. 10 Q: There's now way of -- how did you 11 give an instruction to an officer to de-record this line? 12 Did you -- what line did you say should be de-recorded? 13 A: Well, I would have told them whatever 14 -- the phone has a stack of phone numbers. So one of the 15 phone numbers would have been assigned to be de-recorded. 16 It would be unrecorded. 17 Q: And you don't recall at this time 18 which phone number? 19 A: I have no idea today. 20 Q: Okay. Okay in any event so you 21 answer on page 217 of this transcript: 22 "Well, well until about ten (10) 23 minutes ago my lines were being 24 recorded." 25 And a female answers:

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1 " Get out of here, really?" 2 And you say: 3 "I just had one line de-recorded." 4 And she says: 5 "Holy cow." 6 And you say: 7 "Because anything in the -- in the 8 command post goes through the logger." 9 She says: 10 "Oh, dear." 11 And you say: 12 "So that all the communications here is 13 recorded for posterity." 14 She says -- I don't know what the EWE is 15 supposed to transcribe there but she says some reaction 16 to that and then you say: 17 "But I have one line de-programmed so I 18 could talk freely." 19 And she says: 20 "Oh good." 21 Now, sir, I suggest to you that this 22 interchange suggests a much more serious concern about 23 the recording of lines than grammar and expression like 24 that suggests that there is a serious concern about not 25 having the content recorded for posterity.

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1 What's your reaction to that, sir? 2 A: I don't have any reaction to it. 3 It's simply as I've stated time and time again, you can 4 see from the secretary's reaction how unusual it is to be 5 recorded. So I simply explained the process to her. 6 It's what they would expect. 7 Q: Sorry? 8 A: It's what they would expect that the 9 lines not be recorded. There was obviously surprise in 10 that the lines had been recorded. 11 Q: She thought it was a very serious 12 business apparently? 13 A: Well, she was surprised. Because 14 it's not -- that's not something that is -- 15 Q: I see. 16 A: -- customarily done as I tried to 17 explain. 18 Q: And then if we could turn then please 19 to the next tab, Tab 27 of Exhibit 444-A where you're 20 speaking to Superintendent Parkin. Look at page 220 of 21 that transcript please. 22 The second quotation attributed to you: 23 "Carson: And that was all set up and 24 the tables are set up kind of in a semi 25 circle like -- kind of like a barricade

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1 protecting them from the roadway. When 2 the cruiser came around the corner, two 3 (2) guys were running. All you could 4 see was dust headed for the Park. So 5 they disappeared right quickly. 6 And -- oh, by the way, this line I call 7 you on now has been changed. It's no 8 longer recorded." 9 And Parkin says: 10 "Oh." 11 And you're recorded as laughing and Parkin 12 says: 13 "Okay." 14 And you say: 15 "So we don't have to worry about that." 16 And Parkin says: 17 "Yeah." 18 Is that a more or less accurate 19 transcription of that interchange, sir? 20 A: I suppose it must be. 21 Q: Again, sir, I would suggest to you 22 it's suggests a more serious concern about recording that 23 matters of grammar and expression; do you agree? 24 A: What it indicates is Parkin raised 25 this issue with me the day before and when he called I

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1 inform him that it had been done, plain and simple. 2 Q: But wouldn't you agree, sir, that one 3 reason you didn't want the calls recorded was to preclude 4 people second guessing your decisions? 5 A: As I indicated before, when I was 6 speaking to Superintendent Parkin earlier, he suggested 7 one of the lines be not recorded or have some lines 8 available that they could call me on direct. I simply 9 carried that out. 10 Initially, it was all set up with all the 11 lines recorded. Our practise, as I've explained time and 12 again, is we do not record those types of lines. We have 13 -- we didn't do it then and we don't do it today. 14 Nothing has changed. 15 Q: So you don't record those types of 16 lines? 17 A: No. It -- as I explained before, 18 those lines are recorded because it's part of a 19 communications centre and it's for incoming traffic 20 around a communications centre. 21 Q: Yes. And none of the lines that were 22 being used September 4, 5, 6 were such lines that are 23 normally recorded, right? 24 A: I'm sorry, I mis... 25 Q: You -- you indicated which lines are

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1 normally recorded. 2 A: Right. 3 Q: And none of the lines being used 4 September 4, 5, 6 were such lines, right? 5 A: They weren't being used for that 6 purpose. 7 Q: They weren't being used for that 8 purpose -- 9 A: Right. 10 Q: -- so they shouldn't have been 11 recorded, right? 12 A: Right, right. 13 Q: So, why did you order that only one 14 (1) be de-recorded sir, why not all of them if that's the 15 explanation? 16 A: I -- I could have. I could have 17 easily done that. 18 Q: Well, sir, I would put it to you, if 19 the explanation that you told us was true, if it was the 20 truth that the reason that you did it was because it's 21 just not normally done, you would have given an order to 22 de-record all the lines, not just one (1) of them, isn't 23 that fair, sir? 24 A: Well, that's one (1) conclusion you 25 can draw, but that certainly wasn't the case.

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1 Q: And in fact, sir, isn't one (1) of 2 the reasons that you didn't want the -- that you wanted 3 unrecorded lines, or at least one (1) of them, so that 4 you could have discussions that would not subsequently be 5 reviewed, is that not fair, sir? 6 A: Any decisions we have -- that's why 7 we have a scribe. We -- we do keep track of our 8 decisions and our phone calls to the best of our ability. 9 The -- 10 Q: Now, sir, I would put it to you that 11 you testified under oath in these proceedings on May 17th 12 and on page 187 of May 17th's transcript. I'll read the 13 entire answer to you. 14 You were asked by Mr. Millar: 15 "What was your understanding of why 16 Superintendent Parkin wanted an 17 unrecorded telephone line? 18 A: Well, first of all, I think it's 19 important that to recognize it he would 20 be very surprised that a line was being 21 recorded. This particular 22 conversation, as all my conversations 23 were, were administrative in nature as 24 opposed to someone calling and 25 reporting an occurrence. So, he would

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1 not have ever experienced a recorded 2 line in any of our normal business. 3 So, if a call is to be taped, it was 4 out of the ordinary and certainly not 5 expected by him or any other callers 6 who would be calling in." 7 I interrupt at that point to say, sir, 8 that seems to be consistent with what you told me a few 9 minutes ago, right? 10 A: Sure. 11 Q: But then, I continue with your answer 12 on May 17: 13 "And, I suspect that at some point in 14 time, we may require some very frank 15 and open discussion -- dialogue -- 16 maybe differences of opinion that maybe 17 he wouldn't want everyone to 18 necessarily have, be able to hear that 19 as tapes are reviewed." 20 So, is that not at least part of the 21 reason, sir? 22 A: Sure. 23 Q: And, sir, would you not agree in 24 retrospect, now, given the fact that you had only one (1) 25 of the many lines de-recorded or that you tried to have

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1 only one (1) of the many de-recorded that the explanation 2 about normally done with respect to administration is 3 just not consistent with the evidence, isn't that fair? 4 A: I explained what our policy is and 5 our policy was, is and it continues to be and I've 6 explained a number of reasons why it was done the way it 7 was done and that's -- that's just the simple fact of it. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yeah. Okay. 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Mr. Commissioner, 13 as Counsel is familiar with from various emails that have 14 gone back and forth in the last several days -- 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, yes. 16 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- there was a 17 document entitled, "Standard Operating Procedures of the 18 Special Investigations Unit," that was in operation in 19 September of 1995 and that I had requested several weeks 20 ago, but it was only made available several days ago by 21 Mr. Millar by email and I should like to ask this Witness 22 a question or two (2) about that. 23 Mr. Millar sent all parties a copy of that 24 document as an attachment to an email and I have a couple 25 of hard copies including one for the Witness if I...

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1 MR. DERRY MILLAR: I gave the Witness 2 one. 3 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Oh. As often, Mr. 4 Millar has anticipated me and he has given the Witness a 5 copy, he indicates, and I presume his Counsel also has a 6 copy? 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Carry on. 8 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: So I have an 9 embarrassment of refusals, I have several more copies if 10 anybody -- anybody would like one. 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 15 Q: Now this is a document entitled 16 "Police Services Act, Special Investigations Unit, 17 Standard Operating Procedures." 18 Now, sir, were you familiar with this 19 document in 1995? 20 A: I can't say I was familiar with this 21 exact document but I'm familiar with the content of it. 22 Q: Yes, you knew that there was a 23 document that described some of the procedures concerning 24 the interaction between the Special Investigations Unit 25 and police forces in Ontario?

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1 A: Oh, for sure. 2 Q: Is that correct? 3 A: Yes. Yes. 4 Q: And you knew the Special 5 Investigations Unit had been established in 1990? Is 6 that roughly consistent with your memory, sir? 7 A: Sure. 8 Q: And it was an organization that was 9 established to investigate situations where there was 10 serious injury or death and that might have been caused 11 by a police officer, correct? 12 A: Yeah. Police involved, yes. 13 Q: And their special mission was to 14 investigate and determine whether or not in their view 15 criminal charges should be laid as a result of that 16 serious injury or death? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: And this document Standard Operating 19 Procedures, it was your understanding that there was such 20 a document that described some of the interaction between 21 the police forces and the SIU as it was called, correct? 22 A: Sure. 23 Q: Now I'm going to ask you just about 24 one little part of this. If you look at paragraph 3: 25 "All deaths that may result directly

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1 from the action of one or more police 2 officers, deaths that occur in the 3 course of making an arrest. Deaths 4 that occur in the course of pursuit and 5 deaths that occur while the deceased is 6 in police custody or at a hospital 7 following apprehension or custody by 8 police shall be reported immediately to 9 the SIU." 10 That's the phrase I'm concerned with, sir. 11 "Shall be reported immediately to the 12 SIU." 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: And then paragraph 4 says: 15 "All serious injuries resulting from 16 any of the circumstances described 17 above shall be similar reported." 18 So you knew at the time did you not, sir, 19 that in the case of a death or a serious injury caused by 20 a police officer direct resulting from the action of one 21 or more police officers, it was the responsibility of 22 that Force to immediately report that to the SIU, 23 correct? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: Now at the time you first heard that

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1 Mr. Dudley George had been shot, you didn't know his name 2 I don't believe. 3 A: Correct. 4 Q: And you also didn't know the extent 5 of his injuries? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: But you knew that they were serious 8 injuries? 9 A: Right. 10 Q: And so you certainly knew at that 11 instant that this was a case that came under the SIU 12 purview, is that fair? 13 A: Well I was going to for sure, yes. 14 Q: Yes. And therefore that it was 15 required that it be reported immediately to the SIU, 16 correct? 17 A: Sure. 18 Q: Now I want to ask you this, sir. 19 We've seen evidence that there was a notification of the 20 SIU and then an SIU officer was phoning back trying to 21 speak to you and left a message. 22 And then you responded to that message and 23 called him back and told him what had happened, correct? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: Your interpretation at the time, sir,

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1 of your responsibility of reported immediately here, did 2 that include once an SIU officer had phoned back and 3 given you a phone number at which he could be called, did 4 that include your feeling that you had a responsibility 5 to respond as quickly as you could to that call for 6 information? 7 A: No. That's not the reporting 8 immediately -- there's -- 9 Q: I see. 10 A: -- there's a protocol we have with 11 the Special Investigations Unit. What happens is the 12 region will -- the regional duty officer will notify our 13 criminal investigation branch at General headquarters and 14 CIB will make the call to the Special Investigations 15 Unit. 16 And based on that call, they will decide 17 whether or not they're going to invoke the mandate. 18 Q: Yes. But then I'm asking you, does 19 the immediate requirement there, does that apply to a 20 situation such as happened here where the SIU phones 21 back, leaves a message they want information from you. 22 Does that word, "immediate" still apply, that you have to 23 immediately get back in touch with them, in your view? 24 A: No. 25 Q: I see. And so, there was no

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1 particular requirement of urgency in your responding that 2 -- to that note, is that your view? 3 A: I -- I would -- I certainly would 4 respond to it, but that -- when you're talking about the 5 notification process, that certainly is not a part of the 6 notification process. 7 Q: I see. And it was your understanding 8 that before you did reply to that request from the SIU 9 officer for you to phone him back, the SIU would have 10 known very little, if anything, about what had happened, 11 is that fair? 12 A: They would have had -- I don't know 13 what information was given to them. I know -- 14 Q: Yes. 15 A: -- I spoke to Superintendent Parkin 16 shortly after midnight, and he indicated he was going to 17 make the notifications. 18 Q: Yes, but you understood, did you not, 19 that what they were going to be telling the SIU, in 20 effect, was we have an SIU situation here, the person who 21 knows about it is John Carson, call him and he'll tell 22 you the details, right? 23 A: Well, they -- they phoned back for 24 more information, sure. 25 Q: But you understood that they would be

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1 notified roughly to the effect that I indicated, correct? 2 A: Sure. 3 Q: And they wouldn't want to -- 4 Superintendent Parkin, it would be very unlikely that he 5 would start volunteering his understanding as to what had 6 happened. Given that he was so far away from the facts, 7 he'd want you to speak to it, isn't that fair? 8 A: He -- he would -- well, normally what 9 happens is, that he -- he would let the assigning officer 10 from Criminal Investigations know who the supervisor on 11 scene would be -- 12 Q: Yes. 13 A: -- regardless of the kind of event. 14 Q: Yes. And the SIU would be told 15 there's an SIU incident -- 16 A: Sure. 17 Q: -- in our opinion -- 18 A: Yeah. 19 Q: -- and the person who can tell you 20 about this incident is John Carson. 21 A: Right. 22 Q: Please phone him at this number, and 23 he will give you the details, right? 24 A: Sure. 25 Q: But it was your view that it was

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1 appropriate for you to first finalize the press release 2 before you responded to that phone call in the 3 circumstances, right? 4 A: I -- I had a number of things 5 happening at that point in time. 6 Q: Including finalizing the press 7 releases we've seen, right? 8 A: Yes. Oh, yes. 9 Q: And in your view, even in retrospect, 10 you behaved appropriately by doing that before responding 11 to the SIU phone call, sir? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: Thank you. Evidently there was a man 14 named Jim Moses? 15 A: Who? 16 Q: Jim Moses; are you familiar with that 17 name, sir? 18 A: Doesn't ring a bell. 19 Q: Okay. Who was, I'm told, some kind 20 of underground person investigating the Stoney Point 21 people at some point, is that false information or...? 22 A: I don't know what you're talking 23 about. 24 Q: Okay. Thank you. 25 Now, sir, within the OPP, were you ever

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1 disciplined or criticized for your handling of this 2 incident? 3 A: No, sir. 4 Q: The Commissioner of the OPP is 5 appointed directly by the Provincial Cabinet, is that not 6 correct? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And so, in other words, the 9 Commissioner of the OPP is appointed by the ministers of 10 the government of the day when the appointment is made, 11 right? 12 A: That's fair. 13 Q: The Deputy Commissioners, such as 14 yourself, I understand there are four (4) such? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And you are appointed by the 17 Commissioner, is that correct? 18 A: Well, technically, by government. It 19 has to go through a -- a process in government for 20 approval. 21 Q: I see. So it has to -- 22 A: The selection process is within the 23 OPP's parameters, and it is a recommendation made. 24 Q: I see. So, there's a recommend -- 25 and is that also then to the cabinet?

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1 A: No, not to cabinet, it's to -- oh, I 2 forget the terminology. It's a -- it's a leadership 3 group made up of deputy ministers. 4 Q: Deputy ministers; I see. But is it 5 fair to say that the appointment of a Deputy Commissioner 6 must be consistent, at least, with the views of the 7 Commissioner? 8 In other words, the Commissioner would 9 have to approve any such appointment, formally or 10 informally? 11 A: Well, I would suspect if -- if there 12 was diverse -- a problem with the selection. 13 Q: But the answer to my question is, 14 yes, is that not true? 15 A: Sure. Essentially. 16 Q: Yes. 17 A: Sure, of course. 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 Q: Now, sir, what happened on that 22 evening of September 6, we can now say it certainly was 23 that Dudley George was killed by your officers, right; 24 that Cecil Bernard George was badly beaten by your 25 officers, although there may be debate about the extent

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1 to which that may be justified. 2 Marcia Simon, Melva George were 3 apprehended as indicated, Pierre George and Carolyn 4 George were arrested at the hospital after their drive 5 with their brother, and your justification has been the 6 fears that First Nations people might have attacked some 7 innocent cottagers. 8 In fact, none of those fears came to pass, 9 isn't that not fair? 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: Stoney Point people made no such 12 attack before, during, or after your attack on them, 13 isn't that fair? 14 A: Well, I -- first of all, I do take 15 exception to the word "attack". 16 First of all, the crowd management team 17 were in the parking lot, and the occupiers came out and 18 the altercation occurred as a result of them coming out 19 of the Park, and Cecil Bernard George, with the steel 20 iron, causing a riot shield to be shattered. 21 So, there -- I -- I take exception to your 22 term "attack". 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I don't want 24 to repeat all the evidence again. 25 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: No, I --

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1 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I don't want 2 to go all over -- 3 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- don't -- 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- it again. 5 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: No, I'm not going 6 to try to justify -- 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, I didn't 8 think -- 9 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- that -- 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- you were 11 going to. 12 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- at this point, 13 sir. 14 15 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 16 Q: I'm just simply going to suggest to 17 you, sir, that looking back now on all the evidence that 18 you're aware of, looking back on the pressures that you 19 were under, including the knowledge that the Premier was 20 watching you, as communicated to you by Mr. Beaubien, and 21 your phone calls with Inspector Fox, knowing that you 22 were being watched in that sense, together with the 23 pressure from below, from people like Mark Wright, who 24 wanted to go get them, and the pressure not to be a 25 waffler like Inspector Linton, I'm suggesting to you,

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1 sir, that in retrospect, and I appreciate that it's 2 easier than foresight, but in retrospect, those pressures 3 must have influenced you to some extent in your allowing 4 those officers to go down the road at eleven o'clock at 5 night on September 6th, 1995. 6 A: I disagree. 7 Q: Thank you, Deputy Commissioner and 8 Commissioner. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 10 very much, Mr. Rosenthal, thank you. It's now 20 to 1:00 11 and I think Mr. Horton is next. 12 Would you like to start right now or 13 should we take a lunch -- 14 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: I am in your hands, 15 Commissioner, whatever you prefer. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I've 17 forgotten how long your estimate was, and how it might be 18 adjusted as a result of what's happened between the time 19 you first made it and now, if anything. 20 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: I said half a day to 21 a day and I'm hoping it'll be more like a half a day, 22 but... 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: So there's a 24 good chance that we'll finish here -- 25 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: Right, I do need --

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1 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- promptly? 2 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: -- to bring books up 3 and so on, so. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: So, I think 5 this would be a good time to take a break and we'll start 6 your cross-examination right after lunch. Thank you, Mr. 7 Horton. 8 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry stands 9 adjourned until 2:00 p.m. 10 11 --- Upon recessing at 12:43 p.m. 12 --- Upon resuming at 2:05 p.m. 13 14 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 15 resumed. Please be seated. 16 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Commissioner, before 17 we go on, there was a doc -- the last document referred 18 to by Mr. Rosenthal, the Police Services Act, Special 19 Investigations Unit, Standard Operating Procedures, that 20 Mr. Rosenthal had intended to have marked as an exhibit 21 and overlooked it. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Fine. 23 MR. DERRY MILLAR: So perhaps it could be 24 marked as the next exhibit. 25 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P-478.

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1 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: P-478. 2 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Thank you. 3 4 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-478: Police Services Act, - Special 5 Investigations Unit - Standard 6 Operating Procedures. Pages 165 - 168, 7 April 14/92. 8 9 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Thank you. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 11 Yes, Mr. Horton? 12 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: Thank you, Mr. 13 Commissioner. Good afternoon, Deputy. 14 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon. 15 16 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. WILLIAM HORTON: 17 Q: I have to confess the one thing I 18 have in common with Mr. Rosenthal is an inability to 19 remember ranks. So please forgive me if I do get ranks 20 wrong, I don't mean any disrespect by it, it's -- just 21 doesn't come -- come naturally. But I will do my best. 22 I have a little crib sheet here to help me if I get 23 things wrong, sir. 24 And Commissioner, it's -- I'm going to do 25 my best to minimize duplication, but I will have to go

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1 over some of the same grounds. When I do that, my 2 objective is really just to get a brief consolidation of 3 the -- what I understand to be the witness' evidence on a 4 particular point just for clarification. 5 It's not my intention to necessarily go 6 into every point I raise in depth. I just want you and 7 the Deputy Commissioner to be aware of that. 8 Now, Deputy Commissioner, I want to start 9 just with understanding one rather fundamental point. 10 And that is, as I understand your evidence, you take 11 personal responsibility for the decision to send the 12 Crowd Management and the Tactical and Rescue Unit to the 13 Park on the night of September the 6th, is that correct? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: And when I say "personal 16 responsibility," I mean just for clarification, that it 17 was you, and you alone who made that decision? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: And I understand from your evidence 20 that you had actually never been in an incident before 21 where you had deployed a Crowd Management Unit; is that 22 correct? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: And I also understand that before you 25 made that decision, you did not consult any superior

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1 officer? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: You had spoken to Chief 4 Superintendent Coles and Superintendent Parkin earlier 5 that afternoon, but I gather you had not spoken to them 6 between that time, and the time you made the decision to 7 deploy the CMU, is that correct? 8 A: Right. 9 Q: And so I assume that whatever 10 discussion you had with Parkin and Coles, you were 11 confident that your decision to send in the CMU, was a 12 decision they would support? 13 A: That's fair. 14 Q: But it was your decision alone? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: Correct? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: Now, I may come back to this later, 19 but just for now, I am not aware of any record of any 20 conversation, by that I mean a written record or a taped 21 record of any exchange, or conversation that you had with 22 Parkin or Coles, really after -- we'll put it this way, 23 between the call that you had with Parkin in the morning 24 of the -- of September the 6th, where you said it was the 25 -- the line was not recorded, you remember that?

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1 A: Right. 2 Q: And the time that you spoke to Parkin 3 after the shooting had occurred. I'm not aware of any 4 written record, or taped record of an exchange between 5 you and those two (2) individuals; am I right about that? 6 A: I believe that's accurate. 7 Q: And I also then understand, Deputy 8 Carson, that you take personal responsibility for the 9 timing of the decision to send in the CMU and the TRU, is 10 that correct? 11 A: Yeah, that's fair. 12 Q: And in that respect, just to break 13 that down a little bit, you take personal responsibility 14 for the decision to send them in at night, correct? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And to send them in before the 17 injunction had been obtained, correct? 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: And before you received any 20 additional information about the incident involving the 21 car? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: And I gather, then, that it was you 24 who weighed all the factors that applied at that time, 25 and it was your conscious decision then, that the

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1 occupiers should be physically engaged in the Sandy 2 Parking Lot on the evening of September 6th, correct? 3 A: Correct. 4 Q: And in making that conscious decision 5 to confront the occupiers in the Sandy Parking Lot, at 6 that time, I understand that there was a conscious 7 decision made not to use any lights, to -- to light up 8 the -- the activity that was going to take place, is that 9 correct? 10 A: I don't know where you would get that 11 inference, because I don't recall any discussion about 12 lights, 'cause we -- quite frankly, we don't have a 13 lighting capability that would support that kind of an 14 operation. 15 Q: Well, we may look it up if it's 16 important. Right now it's not terribly important, but 17 there was a reference, for example, to a vehicle coming 18 up behind the -- behind the CMU at one point, and the 19 comment was made that with -- they wouldn't have their 20 lights on because they didn't -- you didn't want to light 21 up the -- 22 A: Oh, that's fair -- 23 Q: Is that fair? 24 A: Sure, sure. 25 Q: Correct?

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1 A: Correct, sure. 2 Q: So -- so clearly there was a 3 conscious decision to have the CMU go down the road in 4 darkness and not be lit up? 5 A: Oh, correct. Sure, as far as going 6 down the road's concerned, sure. I thought you were 7 referring to try to light up the parking lot itself. 8 Q: Well, I don't -- I don't know what 9 options, frankly, you would have had for that Deputy 10 Carson, but clearly it was a conscious choice to go down 11 in darkness. 12 A: We -- we didn't have any equipment to 13 provide us any other option. 14 Q: And do I take from that, that even 15 the decision not to have the vehicle use its lights in 16 order to light up the Crowd Management Unit, that you 17 made a conscious decision that there should be an element 18 of surprise in terms of your arrival at the Sandy Parking 19 Lot? 20 A: Well, certainly the -- the idea of 21 not having a vehicle behind with lights, is -- is 22 obviously not to display where the officers are, and -- 23 and that type of thing, and it also has a drastic effect 24 on your sight, your physical sight. 25 Once lights are shined in your eyes, it

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1 takes a while for your light -- I'm sorry, it takes a 2 while for your eyes to become accustomed to the darkness 3 again, so I mean, there's an issue there where you're 4 working with lights in darkness. 5 Q: Okay. And is that an issue that you 6 consciously addressed at the time? 7 A: No. We didn't really get into that 8 kind of a discussion. We were certainly aware the 9 occupiers had floodlights and were using them in the 10 general area. They had been lighting up some of the 11 checkpoints -- 12 Q: Right. 13 A: -- the night before. 14 Q: Okay. I'd like to come back to my 15 question, which was about the element of surprise. 16 A: Right. 17 Q: I do understand, correct me if I'm 18 wrong, that it was not your desire to announce your 19 presence any sooner than you had to on arrival at the 20 sandy parking lot, is that fair? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: All right. So, you -- you did want 23 there to be some element of immediacy and surprise to 24 your arrival at the Sandy Parking Lot? 25 A: That's fair.

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1 Q: And again, I don't want to go deeply 2 into it, but it was your personal decision that -- well, 3 you take personal responsibility for the fact that you 4 did not try to obtain any more information about the car 5 incident? 6 A: Right. 7 Q: And I mean, clearly if you had wished 8 to obtain more information before making a decision, you 9 could have done that? 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: Now, there's also some reference in 12 your evidence to your thinking that there was a fire at 13 some point in the Sandy Parking Lot? 14 Q: Right. 15 Q: And perhaps, you're even thinking 16 that there were vehicles in the Sandy Parking Lot -- 17 A: Right. 18 Q: -- at the time of this incident. And 19 I -- I believe the evidence will show that you were 20 mistaken with respect to those points, and I don't want 21 to go to that right now, but is there -- assuming that 22 you were mistaken about that, is -- is there any 23 explanation you can provide as to why you were mistaken 24 about those things? 25 A: I really don't have an explanation on

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1 that because quite frankly I -- with such -- with such a 2 period of time I'm not -- I can't say with any certainty 3 of -- of how I got what information at what time. 4 Q: so, as of today, you can't point to 5 anyone else having given you the wrong information on 6 that? 7 A: That's fair. 8 Q: All right. Now, Deputy Carson, I 9 expect that the evidence will show that Dudley George was 10 not carrying a gun at the time he was shot, and there may 11 be argument about that and so on, but I'm just telling 12 you what I expect the evidence will show. 13 Let me stop there for a moment. In terms 14 of any of the occupiers having guns, and using guns in 15 this incident, I take it you're not aware of any forensic 16 evidence that confirms the use of guns in that incident 17 by the occupiers, is that correct? 18 A: That's correct. 19 Q: And the -- the Commissioner may have 20 to consider many different possibilities, Deputy Carson, 21 on the evidence, and of course, this evidence relates to 22 matters that you did not observe personally, I understand 23 that, but -- and it may be that I'll make arguments to 24 the contrary as well, but one (1) possibility that the 25 Commissioner will have to consider is that someone

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1 mistakenly thought that Dudley was carrying a stick 2 rather -- mistakenly thought he was carrying a gun when 3 he was carrying a stick, all right? I'm just mentioning 4 that to you. 5 A: Hmm hmm. 6 Q: Now, to come to something that you 7 did know about, Deputy Commissioner, you knew in advance 8 of making the decision to have the CMU go down the road, 9 that people in the area were carrying sticks, correct? 10 A: Oh, yes. 11 Q: And you knew in advance of the CMU 12 confronting the occupiers, that in the conditions that 13 existed that evening, it was possible for one (1) of your 14 men to mistake someone who was carrying a stick for 15 carrying a gun, correct? 16 A: I'm not sure I understand your 17 question. 18 Q: I'm referring, Deputy Carson, to the 19 incident that occurred while your men were walking down 20 the road. 21 A: Right. 22 Q: And one of the men identified 23 somebody who they thought had a gun. 24 A: Right. 25 Q: And we all listened to the tape, and

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1 I think it's several -- I'll be editorial for a moment 2 say 'heart stopping moments' between the time that your 3 men think there's someone carrying a gun, to the point 4 where they identify that he's carrying a stick. 5 A: Right. 6 Q: Do you remember that evidence? 7 A: Yeah. Oh, of course, yes. 8 Q: Okay. So I'm suggesting to you, that 9 you knew in advance of your men confronting the occupiers 10 in the parking lot, that it was quite possible in the 11 conditions that existed that evening, for your men to 12 mistake someone who was carrying a stick for carrying a 13 gun, correct? 14 A: Well, it's a fact that one of the 15 officers identified somebody they thought may have had a 16 firearm and -- and in fact it was a stick. So I mean, I 17 was well aware that that had occurred, yes. 18 Q: And given that it had occurred, you 19 were well aware of the fact that it could occur? 20 A: Sure. That -- that's why we had 21 observers in -- in place. 22 Q: Well, to give you accurate 23 information? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: Here was a case where you knew, not

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1 with benefit of hindsight, in advance, that it was 2 possible for one of your men to make that kind of 3 mistake, correct? 4 A: Well, I'm not sure it was a mistake. 5 They stopped the CMU until they could verify what they 6 could -- what they weren't sure what they were seeing. 7 Q: Inspector Carson, it took several 8 seconds for them having identified a man as carrying a 9 gun to determine that he was carrying a stick. 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: Okay. Right. The initial 12 identification was wrong, correct? 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: Therefore. And in the -- in a 15 confrontation that could occur in the Sandy Parking Lot, 16 you did not expect that your men would have the luxury of 17 several seconds to make a determination as to whether 18 someone was carrying a stick or a gun, correct? 19 A: Fair enough. 20 Q: Okay. So you knew, in advance, that 21 there was a risk that your men could misidentify somebody 22 as carrying a stick rather than carrying a gun in that 23 situation? 24 A: That's fair. 25 Q: And you knew that in advance of

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1 sending them down the road? 2 A: I knew that while they were going 3 down the road, yes. 4 Q: Right. And you could have stopped 5 the march at that time; that was in your power to do? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: And you made the personal decision at 8 that point that they would continue marching on down the 9 road to a parking lot which you expected to have -- in 10 which you expected to find people with sticks? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: Now, Inspector Carson, you had no 13 plan to communicate anything to the occupiers on the 14 evening of September the 6th, fair? 15 A: That's fair. 16 Q: And there was no briefing given to 17 your men as to any verbal communication that they should 18 address to the occupiers, correct? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: Nor were they provided with any means 21 to communicate? 22 A: Right. 23 Q: And again, that's something that you 24 would take personal responsibility for. If you had a 25 different set of directions that you wanted to give the

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1 men, you could have given them those directions, correct? 2 A: Fair enough. 3 Q: The mission that your men -- was 4 given, was to physically confront the occupiers and drive 5 them back into the Park, is that right? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: And in terms of arrest, the idea was 8 that they would be arrested for resisting the efforts of 9 your men to send them into the Park, is that fair? 10 A: Sure. 11 Q: So in other words, the offences that 12 you expected your men to arrest the occupiers for, had 13 not yet occurred when you sent your men down the road; is 14 that correct? 15 A: Part of it was the fact that they 16 were out on the parking lot and on the roadway with 17 sticks, I think I spoke to that before about, you know, 18 possession of a weapon dangerous; it certainly was 19 discussed. 20 Q: But, certainly you understood that 21 the occupiers had the option of going into the Park? 22 A: Yes, and in -- in fact that -- that 23 would be the -- what you would normally expect to happen 24 with a crowd management situation, is once the formation 25 shows up, normally the group retreats and that resolves

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1 the issue. 2 And that is the psychological approach to 3 using them. 4 Q: Right, but my point being that any 5 arrests that would take place, would take place in the 6 Sandy Parking Lot, correct? 7 A: Oh, yes. 8 Q: On that basis? 9 A: Right. 10 Q: And so, therefore, any arrests that 11 would take place in the Sandy Parking Lot would take 12 place because people were not going back into the Park? 13 A: There was that potential, yes. 14 Q: Isn't that correct? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: But isn't that really what -- what 17 you expected would happen in terms of arrests? 18 A: Well, we expected that they would 19 move back into the Park just upon the -- the sheer 20 presence of the team is what we expected. 21 Q: Your -- your men equipped in the CMU 22 equipment, which I have in a bag here -- 23 A: Okay. 24 Q: -- I'll resist pulling it out as long 25 I can, were not equipped to go running around in the Park

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1 chasing people between trees and the dark wearing that 2 equipment, I assume; is that right? 3 A: That's fair. 4 Q: Okay. You don't have to agree with 5 me on that. I have no idea what I'm talking about, so 6 you're free to disagree with me at any time. 7 But it just struck me that that equipment 8 is -- is not what people would wear if they're effecting 9 arrests in a Park, at night. 10 A: But they weren't going into the Park. 11 Q: No. And Inspector Carson -- I'm 12 sorry, Deputy -- Deputy Commissioner Carson, in terms of 13 the actual decisions that your men would make when 14 they're in the situation, I understand you cannot micro 15 manage that; is that correct? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: But you would expect them to keep 18 their mission objectives in mind? 19 A: Of course, yes. 20 Q: And you would expect them to keep in 21 mind any briefing that you gave them? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: And your briefing... 24 25 (BRIEF PAUSE)

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1 2 Q: Mr. Millar is giving me some advice 3 on political correctness, and I'm -- I'm admonished, and 4 accuracy as well. 5 6 CONTINUED BY MR. WILLIAM HORTON: 7 Q: I gather there was a -- a female 8 officer within the CMU unit, is that correct? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: Okay, my apologies, I -- that had 11 escaped my attention. 12 And you gave your directions by briefing 13 your management team? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: And you expected that any briefing 16 you give your management team would be passed on to your 17 men? 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: And -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You did it 21 again, Mr. Horton. 22 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: Yes. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 24 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: That's right. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: So I think

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1 if you're going to be politically correct, maybe you 2 should find another term. 3 4 CONTINUED BY MR. WILLIAM HORTON: 5 Q: To your officers. Too many months of 6 thinking one way, I'm sorry. 7 And you had made a personal decision to 8 tell your management team about the political pressure 9 that was taking place, correct? 10 A: I shared some information with them 11 around political commentary. 12 Q: And I'm not going to go back into 13 that. That's all been fully covered, but that was a 14 decision that you made to share that information with 15 your management team? 16 A: Yes, but in regards to the Crowd 17 Management Team, just so that you are clear, Staff 18 Sergeant Lacroix is the Unit Commander -- 19 Q: Right. 20 A: -- of the Crowd Management Team. He 21 was not part of all the discussions in the command 22 trailer at Forest, because he was the Detachment 23 Commander -- 24 Q: Right. 25 A: -- at Petrolia. And he had had some

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1 discussion with MPP Marcel Beaubien, but he was not at 2 the Forest Command Post on any regular basis, just so 3 that's clear. 4 Q: You would expect him to be briefed by 5 acting Staff Sergeant Wright -- 6 A: Well, I -- I would have briefed -- 7 Q: -- would you not? 8 A: -- Staff Sergeant Lacroix personally. 9 Q: Sorry? 10 A: I briefed Sergeant -- Staff Sergeant 11 Lacroix personally. 12 Q: All right. And as you pointed out, 13 Deputy Commissioner Carson, you had put Staff Sergeant 14 Lacroix directly in contact with Marcel Beaubien? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: So all the discussions that you had 17 had with Marcel Beaubien could easily have been 18 replicated in direct discussions with Marcel Beaubien and 19 Staff Sergeant Lacroix? 20 A: Sure. 21 Q: Correct? 22 A: Sure. 23 Q: And again, you take personal 24 responsibility for having briefed your men along those 25 lines?

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1 A: Correct. 2 Q: Now, Deputy Commissioner Carson, I 3 want to talk about the bus a little bit, and I think 4 you'll agree with me that the bus, the school bus, was a 5 major -- made a major contribution to the events of the 6 evening of September the 6th; can we agree on that? 7 A: Oh, yes. Sure. 8 Q: And I'm not aware in any of the 9 briefing records that I've seen that you did anything to 10 prepare your men for the possibility that the bus might 11 be deployed against them in the Sandy Parking Lot, am I 12 correct in that? 13 A: Yes, you are correct. 14 Q: Right. There was no -- no -- no 15 briefing given to your men on that subject? 16 A: No. 17 Q: All right. Now, you knew that the 18 bus had been used in the drill hall incident? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And you, yourself, described in your 21 evidence, the bus, as being something you regarded as 22 being a "weapon of choice" by the occupiers? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: Is that right? 25 A: Yes.

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1 Q: And the record at the time indicates 2 that before you sent your men down the road -- your 3 officers down the road -- you identified the bus as being 4 very much of concern? 5 A: Correct. 6 Q: You gave the bus, and the movements 7 of the bus, as one (1) of the reasons that you sent your 8 officers down the road, is that correct? 9 A: That's fair. It -- it was one (1) of 10 the -- 11 Q: Right. 12 A: -- topics of discussion, yes. 13 Q: Right. And I'm going to suggest to 14 you, Deputy Commissioner Carson, that you fully expected 15 that in any confrontation that took place between your 16 officers and the occupiers, that the bus would be 17 deployed, isn't that correct? 18 A: No, it's not correct. 19 Q: Are you saying that knowing that the 20 bus had been used in that way before, having identified 21 the bus as a source of concern, having identified the bus 22 as a weapon of choice, having identified the movements of 23 the bus as a reason for your sending your officers down 24 the road, it came as a total surprise to you that the bus 25 was deployed against your officers?

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1 A: Well, that's the facts. 2 Q: Did you -- did you actually give any 3 thought, Deputy Commissioner, as to what might actually 4 happen, what the scenarios might be, if you sent your 5 officers down the road on September the 6th; did you -- 6 did you give any thought to what the scenarios might be? 7 A: Sure. 8 Q: And in the thought that you gave to 9 those scenarios, it never occurred to you that the very 10 thing that you were concerned about, mainly the bus 11 coming out into the Sandy Parking Lot, might actually 12 occur? 13 A: I didn't believe they would try and 14 run down the officers with the bus. I -- I -- that -- 15 that did not cross my mind that there would be an attempt 16 to do that. 17 Q: Inspector -- Deputy Commissioner 18 Carson, just in fairness to you, I do want you to know 19 that we will be suggesting to the Commissioner that you 20 had to have anticipated that the bus could be used, or 21 might be used in that way before you sent your officers 22 down the road, and you disagree with that? 23 A: Absolutely. 24 Q: Now, in the event that a vehicle is 25 used to run at officers, what is the -- what is the

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1 standard operating procedure for dealing with that 2 situation? 3 A: There is no such standing operating 4 procedure. 5 Q: Let me ask you this question -- 6 again, I'll -- I'll leave the CMU equipment in the bag, 7 but you will agree with me that wearing the helmet, and 8 carrying the shield, and wearing all the equipment that's 9 required for your CMU unit, is not the ideal way to be 10 dressed if someone is going to drive a bus at you. 11 Would -- would you agree with me on that? 12 A: I don't think there is any dress 13 that's ideal for that situation. 14 Q: Right. Certainly that doesn't make 15 you anymore nimble? 16 A: Absolutely not. 17 Q: No. And in that situation, if the 18 bus were to be deployed, if you had anticipated that the 19 bus was going to be deployed in some way, did you have 20 any way of dealing with that situation other than -- 21 other than through the TRU? 22 A: I don't know what it would be. 23 Q: That would have to be the only way of 24 dealing with it, correct? 25 A: Well it -- it's certainly a totally

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1 unexpected type of behaviour that you just -- you just 2 don't have equipment to stop that kind of a vehicle. 3 Q: And I suggest to you, Deputy Carson, 4 without being too roundabout about it, is that in that 5 situation, you would anticipate that your TRU officers 6 would shoot at the driver, isn't that correct? 7 A: Well, first of all, we didn't 8 anticipate the bus running down the drive -- or running 9 down the officers. And second of all, any officer who 10 discharges his firearm has to make that decision 11 themselves, and only they can make that decision based on 12 the circumstances that they face. 13 I mean I can't second guess the threat 14 that they feel is present. 15 Q: Inspector Carson, I suggest to you 16 that you were able to, and did anticipate more than you 17 claim in your evidence just now, that you knew when you 18 sent your men down, that there was a real risk that the 19 bus was going to be deployed, and that the response to 20 that would be one of your officers shooting at the 21 driver; I'm suggesting that to you. 22 A: I disagree. 23 Q: And incidentally, in the event that 24 one of your officers decides to fire at the driver of a 25 vehicle, the same answers you gave to Mr. Rosenthal

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1 before would apply, I take it, and is that they would aim 2 at the largest body mass as much as they could. 3 A: Of course. 4 Q: Well, the use of the bus incidently, 5 Deputy Commissioner Carson, I know you weren't there, but 6 is it your understanding that it came out after the 7 confrontation between Cecil Bernard George and your 8 officers? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: And again, it'll be in the evidence 11 from others, but certainly there was at least one 12 explanation given at the time, or shortly thereafter, 13 that the bus really came out to rescue Cecil Bernard 14 George. 15 Are you -- are you aware that that was one 16 interpretation of events at the time? 17 A: I understand that now, yes. 18 Q: All right. And in fact you spent a 19 good deal of the day on September the 5th and September 20 the 6th as I recall, trying to locate a light armoured 21 vehicle for use by your men for just sort of purpose, is 22 that correct? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: Your officers? 25 A: Right.

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1 Q: So you were able to anticipate the 2 remote possibility that a light armoured vehicle would be 3 required to rescue one of your officers who might be 4 under fire, but with all the information and concern you 5 had about the bus, you were not able to anticipate that 6 the occupiers would use the bus for the same purpose; is 7 that correct? 8 A: That's exactly correct. 9 Q: Now, I want to turn briefly to the 10 basis for the decision to send your forces down the road 11 and I appreciate this has been covered ad nauseam, but I 12 do want to make sure I understand something about each of 13 the key elements. 14 I understood you to say that one (1) of 15 the risks that you had in mind when you decided to send 16 your forces down the road, was the possible invasion of 17 the cottages by the occupiers; is that correct? 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: And is it also correct that earlier 20 that same afternoon, Mark Wright, to your knowledge, had 21 met with some irate cottagers. He told them to calm down 22 and go home, and he reported that to you, correct? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And it's clear, is it not, that Mark 25 Wright would not have advised the cottagers to do that,

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1 and you would not have advised the cottagers -- you would 2 not have agreed with that, if you thought the cottagers 3 were going to be invaded in their cottages that night, 4 correct? 5 A: I'm sorry, I'm -- I'm not sure I 6 understand. 7 Q: All right, let's put it this way, 8 let's cut to the chase. 9 As of the time that you spoke to Mark 10 Wright at eight o'clock on the evening of September 6th, 11 approximately -- 12 A: Right. 13 Q: I think I have your evidence correct 14 that you did not anticipate any invasion of the cottages 15 that night? 16 A: No. 17 Q: All right. And I'm suggesting to you 18 that once you made the decision to send in the CMU, and 19 you decided to get a message to the cottagers, ultimately 20 it was a message about staying put in their cottages, 21 correct? 22 A: Basically, yes. 23 Q: All right, and that was to protect 24 the cottagers from the results of your decision to go 25 down the road and confront the occupiers, isn't that

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1 right? 2 A: Are you talking about Mark Wright's 3 meeting? 4 Q: Well, I was initially -- I was trying 5 to cut through that and not go back to the Mark Wright 6 meeting. The Mark -- when Mark Wright met with the 7 cottagers -- 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: All right. He told them to calm down 10 and go home. 11 A: Right. 12 Q: He reported that to you. 13 A: Right. 14 Q: You didn't disagree with the advice 15 he'd given the cottagers? 16 A: No, of course not. 17 Q: Right. And the reason that Mark 18 Wright told them to go home and calm down, and the reason 19 you didn't disagree with that, was because you weren't 20 expecting any invasion of the cottages that night? 21 A: Right, we didn't want a confrontation 22 between the cottagers and the occupiers. 23 Q: I'm coming to that in a minute. But, 24 in -- I'm just talking about the invasion of the cottages 25 right now.

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1 A: Right. 2 Q: I need to break this -- 3 A: It was -- it was a -- a -- how would 4 I term it; a threat that had been there for some period 5 of time. 6 Q: Yeah. All I'm trying to get at now, 7 Mr. -- Deputy Commissioner Carson is, in terms of that 8 threat, as of eight o'clock when you spoke to Mark 9 Wright, you did not have any thought in mind that the 10 cottages were going to be invaded that evening. 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: All right. And later on that 13 evening, when you decided to get a message to the 14 cottagers, to ultimately the men -- you talked about 15 different options, but ultimately the message was to stay 16 put, stay in their cottages, right? 17 A: Right. 18 Q: And the -- the purpose of that was to 19 make sure they -- as you've testified, didn't stumble 20 onto the operation. 21 A: Oh, sure, yes. 22 Q: Right. 23 A: I just didn't understand your 24 question -- 25 Q: Right.

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1 A: -- earlier, I'm sorry. 2 Q: So the purpose of that advice to the 3 cottagers was to protect the cottagers against the 4 consequences of your decision to send the CMU to confront 5 the occupiers? 6 A: That's fair, we didn't want them to - 7 - to come out and be caught in the middle of it. 8 Q: Right. They wouldn't be at that risk 9 if you didn't decide to go down the road. 10 A: Fair enough. 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 Q: And again, just to -- I -- hopefully 15 a quick point, but we've heard a lot of evidence, Deputy 16 Carson, about guns in the Park, and guns in the camp, and 17 guns and -- gunfire the night before, and all that sort 18 of stuff and I just -- again, I just want to be clear, 19 that as of the time that you were actually sending your 20 officers down the road, you did not have any concerns 21 about being confronted by gunfire; as late as that point 22 in time, correct? 23 A: I didn't believe we'd be fired upon. 24 Q: Right, you had just -- whatever 25 evidence there was, you -- that did not translate, in

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1 your mind, to your men being fired on when they arrived - 2 - or your -- your officers being fired on when they 3 arrived at the Sandy Parking Lot? 4 A: I -- I didn't -- I didn't believe 5 that would occur, no. 6 Q: No. And just again to quickly cover 7 another point, you mentioned as one (1) of the many 8 reasons in your mind, fires that had been set by the 9 occupiers, correct? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: And I believe the evidence will show, 12 and I can -- I can take you to some references in the 13 scribe notes, but I'll try to avoid that, that the -- 14 there was no fire in the Sandy Parking Lot that night, 15 and there was nothing in the Sandy Parking Lot to set on 16 fire that night. 17 Do -- do you accept that that's the case 18 or do you -- 19 A: No, that's fair. 20 Q: All right. Okay. And another reason 21 that you mention for sending your officers down the road 22 on the evening of September the 6th was something to do 23 with the kiosk blinds, you mentioned that at one (1) 24 point? 25 A: Right.

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1 Q: All right. And I just -- I just want 2 to be clear that actually, by the time your officers were 3 walking down the road, you had dismissed the kiosk as a 4 risk to any operations in the Sandy Parking Lot? 5 A: Correct. My concern was the line of 6 sight from the kiosk -- 7 Q: Yeah. 8 A: -- to the Sandy Parking Lot. 9 Q: So, before the decision was actually 10 implemented, you had satisfied yourself on that? 11 A: Right. 12 Q: And again, the kiosk was only an 13 issue if you did send your officers down the road to 14 confront the occupiers in the Sandy Parking Lot, correct? 15 A: Right. 16 Q: You -- you weren't expecting someone 17 sitting in the kiosk to shoot at the cottages? 18 A: No. 19 Q: And another point that you mentioned 20 as a reason for -- in your mind, for sending people down 21 the road, was the movement of vehicles within the Park, 22 correct? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And you really had no idea why that 25 was going on?

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1 A: No, I didn't. 2 Q: And you never made any investigations 3 or inquiries with respect to why that was happening? 4 A: Inquiries? 5 Q: Yes. 6 A: Well, we had -- during the day we had 7 a helicopter up trying to monitor what activity was 8 happening there. We sent people down there to attempt to 9 stimulate some discussion, but did -- did we have the 10 ability to ask questions, and discuss it, that didn't 11 occur. 12 Q: Stay with me on this -- 13 A: Okay. 14 Q: -- Deputy Commissioner. As of eight 15 o'clock on the evening of September the 6th, you were 16 formulating in your mind the reasons why you might send 17 the CMU in. 18 A: Right. 19 Q: And one (1) of the concerns you've 20 said you had was that there are vehicles moving around in 21 the -- in the Park? 22 A: And into the parking lot. 23 Q: And you -- you stated that that was 24 your understanding? 25 A: Right.

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1 Q: Okay. And all I'm trying to 2 determine is that at that point you didn't make any 3 further inquiries as to why this is happening; Why are 4 they moving those vehicles around, right? 5 A: Fair enough. 6 Q: Okay. And as far as moving them into 7 the Sandy Parking Lot, the Sandy Parking Lot is a parking 8 lot, I gather, is that right? 9 A: Right. Right. 10 Q: It is -- it is used to park vehicles? 11 A: Yeah. 12 Q: All right. And then another reason 13 that you gave was that you were concerned that the 14 cottagers were going to attack the occupiers, is that 15 right? 16 A: Well, that was certainly a concern, 17 yes. 18 Q: And I -- just to quickly summarize 19 the -- the facts in play on that, Mark Wright had told 20 the cottagers to calm down and -- and go back to the 21 cottages, and they did that? 22 A: Right. 23 Q: Is that correct? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And you had no further information

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1 that the cottagers were going to confront the occupiers 2 that night? 3 A: Correct. 4 Q: Okay. And if you did have that 5 concern you could have evacuated the cottages? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: And in fact, you -- at one (1) point 8 you discussed that -- 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: -- with Mark Wright and Inspector 11 Linton, correct? 12 A: Correct, correct. 13 Q: And it was -- I might come back to 14 this, but I suggest to you that it was actually Mark 15 Wright who opposed any solution through the evacuation of 16 cottages. 17 A: I can't recall that particular point 18 one way or the other. 19 Q: Right. We might -- we might come 20 back to that. Now, I want to then come down to the issue 21 of the baseball bats in the Sandy Parking Lot. 22 A: Right. 23 Q: And you indicated that the fact that 24 there were occupiers in the Sandy Parking Lot with 25 baseball bats was one of the reasons you decided to send

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1 the Crowd Management Unit and the TRU down to confront 2 the occupiers, correct? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Now, what exactly did you think the 5 occupiers were going to do with the baseball bats? 6 A: Well the information was, when Mark 7 Wright had -- had stopped at that corner, that there was 8 several there with baseball bats, and that -- and the 9 exchange that took place, they made it clear it was in 10 his best interest that he -- that he moves on right 11 shortly. 12 And it appeared that if he didn't comply 13 with that, that the baseball bats may be something to be 14 considered. 15 Q: Well, I want to just -- just take all 16 that as read. I want to be more specific about what you 17 thought the threat was beyond the point of Mark Wright's 18 encounter with these individuals with the baseball bats. 19 So let's -- let's just take it one at a time. 20 Did -- did you think that the occupiers 21 were going to potentially attach the checkpoints using 22 these baseball bats? 23 A: I didn't know if they were or if they 24 weren't. 25 Q: Did -- did you think that was likely?

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1 That -- that a group of men with baseball -- or well I 2 think maybe they were all men with baseball bats, I don't 3 know. 4 But, that -- that they would march on the 5 checkpoints with bats knowing that there's armed officers 6 at the checkpoints? 7 A: No. I -- I didn't believe that was 8 going to happen. 9 Q: Okay. You -- you didn't think they 10 were going to attack the -- the TOC centre if they could 11 get past the checkpoints with -- with their baseball 12 bats, did you? 13 A: No. 14 Q: Did -- did you think they were going 15 to use the baseball bats to invade the cottages; to break 16 down the cottage doors, is that what you thought? 17 A: It was a possibility. 18 Q: And is -- is that really what you 19 thought was going to happen; that they were going to walk 20 down the road past the checkpoints, past the TOC centre, 21 and just -- and just break down some cottage doors? 22 A: Well there was numerous cottages 23 between the checkpoint and the Park. 24 Q: Well, in fact -- in fact, Inspector 25 Carson, sorry, Deputy Commissioner Carson, you knew that

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1 the bats were clearly defensive in nature, did you not? 2 A: How -- how could I possibly know 3 that? 4 Q: Well because that is the most 5 reasonable interpretation of events I suggest to you, 6 Deputy Commissioner Carson, was that they -- they had -- 7 they could not conceivably use the bats in some offensive 8 manner without being fired on by the police. 9 Clearly they would know that, would they 10 not; isn't that a rational conclusion? 11 A: Well they used like objects against 12 the officers on the evening of Monday, September the 4th, 13 and used rocks on the cruisers whey they responded 14 through the night on the night of the 5th. 15 You know, so there was clearly behaviour 16 that was aggressive in nature. 17 Q: I -- I'm talking about invading the 18 cottages with baseball bats, Deputy Commissioner Carson. 19 You did not seriously believe that there was a threat; 20 that these individuals were going to -- were going to do 21 that, correct? 22 A: I disagree. 23 Q: You disagree? And I'm suggesting to 24 you that in all the other situations of confrontation 25 with the police, that it was initiated by an approach by

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1 the police to the occupiers; isn't that correct? 2 A: I -- I would argue that. I -- I 3 don't agree. 4 Q: Oh Okay. Well we'll let the evidence 5 stand for itself. Let me take you to something 6 contemporaneous, Deputy Commissioner Carson. I'll take 7 you to Exhibit 444(b), Tab 51. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: What tab, 9 Mr. Horton, are you looking -- 10 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: Tab 51. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 51. 12 13 (BRIEF PAUSE) 14 15 CONTINUED BY MR. WILLIAM HORTON: 16 Q: This is a telephone conversation that 17 you had with Inspector Linton at about 8:15 say, on 18 September the 6th, 8:15 p.m.? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: Okay. And this is actually the first 21 conversation that you had with Inspector Linton after you 22 spoke to Mark Wright? 23 A: I believe so, yes. 24 Q: Mark Wright had given you the first, 25 very brief information that you'd had about people in the

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1 Sandy Parking Lot with baseball bats? 2 A: Right. 3 Q: Right. And now you're talking to 4 Inspector Linton, and just go to the top of page 325 5 where Inspector Linton says to you, quote: 6 "Yeah, and so we just got a statement 7 now. She says they were hassling her. 8 Mark Wright came through and they told 9 him they didn't know he was a cop, or 10 else get the hell out of there, and now 11 they've got the school bus down in that 12 corner, and they're bringing a dump 13 truck in. They're in the kiosk with 14 the windows down, so..." 15 And these are the words I want you to 16 focus on: 17 "They're waiting for us to do 18 something." 19 And then he goes on to say: 20 "So I just called the TRU team in, and 21 we're probably --[I'm skipping a few 22 words] 23 We're probably going to go down and 24 arrest that group of eight (8) or so 25 people blocking the roadway, and

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1 there's no doubt that, you know, 2 they're waiting for something." 3 And then he goes on. Did you see that 4 statement by Inspector Linton? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Okay. And you understood that that 7 was his assessment of the situation at the time? 8 A: Sure. 9 Q: Okay. And if you go to Tab 52, this 10 is another conversation that you had with him a couple of 11 minutes later. I think there was a problem on the line. 12 Page 332, second quote from Linton, he says: 13 "My concern is that you have the school 14 bus moving down there, you've got the 15 dump truck moving down there, you've 16 got people in the kiosk pulling the 17 blinds all down and I think that, you 18 know, the threat of maybe sniper fire, 19 or like they're doing something inside, 20 getting ready for us." 21 Do you see that statement? 22 A: Yes. Right. 23 Q: And you see that assessment? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And I suggest to you that it was

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1 Inspector Linton's assessment that the people who were in 2 the Sandy Parking Lot were anticipating a -- a conflict 3 with you, with the OPP; isn't that correct? 4 A: It's possible, yes. 5 Q: Well that was -- that was his 6 assessment at the time, correct? 7 A: Right. 8 Q: And -- but they were in the parking 9 lot waiting and expecting you to come down the road; that 10 -- that's what his assessment was, right? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And that was a reasonable assessment, 13 was is not, Inspector Carson? As opposed to some 14 scenario where they're massing the troops to go and 15 invade the cottages with baseball bats; isn't -- isn't 16 that a more reasonable interpretation of events? 17 A: Sure, it's -- it's a possible set up; 18 there's no problem -- no doubt about that. 19 Q: So did it occur -- did it -- did you 20 ask yourself the question, what -- what is it that they 21 needed to have baseball bats for? 22 Did you -- did you ask yourself the 23 question, perhaps it's a rational explanation, as to why 24 these people in the Sandy Parking Lot have baseball bats? 25 A: I can't tell you if I asked myself

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1 that question. 2 Q: Okay. Well, it -- it didn't -- 3 didn't occur to you, then, that maybe they were expecting 4 to be attacked by people with clubs or bats; did that 5 thought cross your mind? 6 A: I couldn't tell you if it did or it 7 didn't. 8 Q: Well, it seems to have occurred to 9 Inspector Linton that that's what they were doing, that 10 they were anticipating some sort of a movement by the 11 OPP, right? 12 A: That appears what he's referring to, 13 yes. 14 Q: And in fact, as events unfolded, you 15 did send people down the road to confront the occupiers 16 with clubs, correct? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: Except that you also had people with 19 guns hiding in the bushes, is that right? 20 A: Correct. 21 22 (BRIEF PAUSE) 23 24 Q: Are you aware of anything in the 25 record, the actual -- you know, the scribe notes or

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1 handwritten, typed, and perhaps, Mr. Sandler can help us 2 with this, that actually records an anticipation that the 3 occupiers were going to invade the cottages that night. 4 Are you aware of that having made its way into the record 5 at the time? 6 A: No. It was just -- there's just the 7 odd reference about the cottages being right there. 8 Q: Yeah. Yeah. 9 A: But there's -- there's numerous 10 examples where, "the -- the cottages are going to be 11 next," has been a topic of discussion over the last 12 several weeks. 13 Q: Oh, I -- I understand that, Inspector 14 Carson, I'm trying to focus on a decision that was made 15 at a particular point in time, you'll appreciate that. 16 I don't want to go to the audiotape right 17 now unless I -- I need to, Inspector Carson, but, one (1) 18 point in the evening of September the 6th you suggested 19 to Linton, or instructed Linton to call the person at the 20 last cottage right next to the Sandy Parking Lot? 21 A: Right. 22 Q: And to tell them, give them some 23 information, and to tell them to stay away from the Park 24 side, correct? 25 A: Right.

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1 Q: Now, you were not concerned about the 2 occupiers throwing a bat into the cottage from the Park 3 side, were you? 4 A: No. 5 Q: No. Okay. So, I'm suggesting to you 6 that the reason that the cottager is told to stay away 7 from the Park side is because there's a risk of gunfire, 8 correct? 9 A: Sure. There's always that risk, 10 yeah. 11 Q: And at that point in time, you're not 12 expecting the occupiers to have guns, but -- but 13 certainly your officers do, isn't that right? 14 A: No, that's not accurate. 15 Q: And I'm -- I'm suggesting to you, 16 Inspector Carson, that you knew there was at least one 17 (1) scenario, namely the bus coming out of that Park, and 18 possibly other scenarios where your officers may have to 19 discharge their weapons, and what you were trying to do 20 was ensure that the cottager was not hurt by fire from 21 your officers, isn't that correct? 22 A: I totally disagree. 23 Q: And Inspector Carson -- Deputy 24 Commissioner Carson, you had a concern of communicating 25 to any individual who might be in that cottage, an

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1 innocent person who might be hurt in the event of 2 gunfire. 3 What concern did you have for any innocent 4 person who might be in the Park and subject to gunfire; 5 did -- did that thought cross your mind? 6 A: We're always concerned for safety at 7 any time, it's -- that's a given. 8 Q: You took special measures to contact 9 a cottager in the vicinity, and you've already told us 10 you had no thought -- no thought -- about communicating 11 in any way with the people in the Sandy Parking Lot or 12 the Park before the -- before the confrontation, correct? 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: A confrontation that you initiated 15 when you sent your men down the -- your officers down the 16 road, correct? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: And you had no assurance that the 19 women and children that you knew were playing in that 20 Park earlier in the day had been completely removed from 21 the Park, did you? 22 A: We didn't know exactly who had left 23 the Park or not. 24 Q: No. And even in terms of the, let's 25 say, the men, having excluded women and children, you had

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1 no idea that there might not be young men in that group, 2 who were simply there following the example of their 3 elders; you had no information about that, did you? 4 A: Not specifically, no. 5 Q: And those young men would be at risk 6 as a result of your decision to send the CMU and TRU down 7 the road in the same way, more so, than the cottager in 8 the last cottage, isn't that right? 9 A: That's fair. 10 Q: And it is the case that you took no 11 precaution to warn or protect any such person who might 12 be among the occupiers or in the Park, correct? 13 A: There was no steps taken to notify 14 them. 15 Q: Right. Now, I want to just go to the 16 last point in terms of your thinking, your decision 17 making process, when you decided to send your officers 18 down the road, and that's the Gerald George incident, the 19 -- the car incident? 20 A: Oh, yes, yes, I'm sorry. 21 Q: And we've already amply gone into the 22 fact that the information you had was wrong, and you 23 don't dispute that, that it was wrong in many significant 24 respects? 25 A: That's fair.

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1 Q: All right. And you have already said 2 that -- you -- you confirm that you made no effort to 3 verify any of the information before making the decision 4 to send your officers down the road, or implementing that 5 decision, right? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: Now, Mr. Rosenthal has gone into this 8 in some -- at some length, and so I only want to 9 highlight one feature of it, and that is Mark Wright. 10 And Deputy Commissioner Carson, we have a 11 number of pieces of information that the Commissioner is 12 going to have to deal with. I don't want to spend too 13 much time on it unless someone thinks I should, but we 14 have the -- we -- we have a comment that was to made to 15 somebody else, not to you, about -- by Mark Wright about 16 going to war, going into battle. 17 And that was read to you by somebody, and 18 I realise you -- it was not said to you. 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: What was said to you was, don't you 21 say we go get those fucking guys, right? 22 A: Right. 23 Q: And there's also a tape that we can 24 play -- can we have that set up? 25

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1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: And this is the one about Mark 4 Wright's intervention with respect to evacuation of the 5 cottages. 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE) 8 9 MR. DERRY MILLAR: The -- this transcript 10 is Inquiry document 2000606 and it's also May 19th, page 11 153 and 154. 12 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: And I think just to 13 set this up, maybe before Mr. Millar plays this -- 14 THE WITNESS: Is it -- it is in the 15 documents? 16 17 CONTINUED BY MR. WILLIAM HORTON: 18 Q: No, it's not. It's not. 19 A: Oh. 20 Q: And you have -- but it has been 21 played to you in chief -- 22 A: Oh, okay. 23 Q: The reason I'm going back into that 24 is because we have a different understanding of what 25 happened on the tape than what you may have said in-chief

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1 and that may just be because -- I'm not blaming you for 2 that, just to be clear. 3 These are things you sometimes have to 4 listen to a few times, but I -- I do want to go back 5 because it's -- it's quite important on the Mark Wright 6 issue and I'm going to suggest to you that a certain 7 phrase is -- is said by Mark Wright, not by Linton. You 8 can listen for it. 9 There's no surprises here. The phrase is 10 "absolutely not" -- "absolutely not" and I want you to 11 listen for that on this tape. And this is a -- actually 12 background -- a background conversation while Sergeant 13 Korosec is trying to get a line through to -- 14 MR. DERRY MILLAR: He's trying to call 15 Skinner. 16 17 CONTINUED BY MR. WILLIAM HORTON. 18 Q: -- Skinner. He's trying to call 19 Skinner to stop TRU from coming down until you've made 20 your mind up. And we'll -- we'll play the tape. 21 22 (BRIEF PAUSE) 23 24 (AUDIOTAPE PLAYED TRANSCRIPT TO FOLLOW) 25

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1 (Our objective before this buildup ... now we have this 2 shit ....) 3 4 ... Make an arrest). 5 6 (What happens if we just draw back? and evacuate some 7 houses.? 8 9 (Absolutely not.) 10 11 (We can do that too. What basically what we∆ve done...) 12 13 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: Can you -- can you 14 just play the last few seconds again? 15 16 (AUDIOTAPE PLAYED TRANSCRIPT TO FOLLOW) 17 18 (Our objective before this buildup ... now we have this 19 shit ....) 20 21 ... Make an arrest). 22 23 (What happens if we just draw back? and evacuate some 24 houses.? 25

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1 (Absolutely not.) 2 3 (We can do that too. What basically what we∆ve done...) 4 5 CONTINUED BY MR. WILLIAM HORTON: 6 Q: There are three (3) voices in the 7 background. I think you've identified yourself as saying 8 "what happened if we draw back?" 9 A: I'm not in that conversation. 10 Q: You don't identify yourself as being 11 in that conversation? 12 A: No. 13 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Yeah, that's a 14 conversation, we went through this in-chief, and you 15 identified your -- I know it's a long time ago, but on 16 May 19th, yourself and Inspector Linton as part of that 17 conversation. 18 THE WITNESS: Okay. 19 MR. DERRY MILLAR: And I asked you the 20 same question that My Friend asked. 21 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: Well, I know that. 22 And I -- I fully understand that. I'm going to suggest a 23 different answer is why I went -- went here. The words 24 are -- sorry? 25

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1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: Yeah let me -- 4 actually before you do that, let me suggest to the 5 witness what it is I -- I -- that we are looking for. 6 7 CONTINUED BY MR. WILLIAM HORTON: 8 Q: We have a phrase "absolutely not" and 9 then we have another phrase that says "we could do that 10 too", all right? And I believe that in-chief you've 11 identified both phrases as being Inspector Linton's, 12 which I suggest to you makes no sense because "absolutely 13 not" and "we can do that too" are two (2) diametrically 14 opposed ideas in response to the suggestion that we 15 evacuate the cottages, okay? 16 So what I'm suggesting to you is that 17 "absolutely not" is Mark Wright, and "we can do that too" 18 is Inspector Linton. That's -- you can listen to that, 19 if you can -- if you can pick that out fine and if you 20 can't we'll move on. 21 22 (AUDIOTAPE PLAYED TRANSCRIPT TO FOLLOW) 23 24 (Our objective before this buildup ... now we have this 25 shit ....)

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1 ... Make an arrest). 2 3 (What happens if we just draw back? and evacuate some 4 houses.? 5 6 (Absolutely not.) 7 8 (We can do that too. What basically what we∆ve done...) 9 10 CONTINUED BY MR. WILLIAM HORTON: 11 Q: So, did you hear that that time? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: First of all there's -- there's a 14 phrase -- 15 16 (AUDIOTAPE PLAYED TRANSCRIPT TO FOLLOW) 17 18 (Our objective before this buildup ... now we have this 19 shit ....) 20 21 ... Make an arrest). 22 23 (What happens if we just draw back? and evacuate some 24 houses.? 25

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1 (Absolutely not.) 2 3 (We can do that too. What basically what we∆ve done...) 4 5 CONTINUED BY MR. WILLIAM HORTON: 6 Q: First of all there's someone saying 7 "what happens if we draw back and evacuate the cottages?" 8 A: I think that's myself. 9 Q: And you can just barely hear the 10 "absolutely not"? 11 A: Right. 12 Q: And then you can hear what I think is 13 clearly Inspector Linton saying, "we could do that too". 14 A: That -- that's fair. 15 Q: Okay. The "absolutely not" is not 16 Inspector Linton which is what you testified to in-chief, 17 I suggest to you. 18 A: I'm -- I'm confused now. In -- In- 19 chief, I indicated it was Linton? 20 Q: Okay. It's not clear. I'm -- let me 21 -- let's forget about what you said in-chief because I'm 22 not trying to -- it's -- it's a difficult tape, Deputy 23 Commissioner Carson. 24 A: Yeah. It is, it's hard to -- 25 Q: But what I'm suggesting to you is

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1 that it's -- it's Mark Wright who says "absolutely not" 2 to the suggestion to that we draw back -- to your 3 suggestion that we draw back, and it's Inspector Linton 4 who says, "we could do that, too". 5 Do you -- do you take that from the tape 6 or not? 7 A: I -- I can't be sure, quite frankly-- 8 Q: All right. 9 A: -- because I just -- it just isn't -- 10 isn't clear enough to -- to really -- 11 Q: Okay. 12 A: -- draw that conclusion. I'm sorry. 13 Q: Okay. Let's -- let's -- let's leave 14 that and move on. What -- 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Do you want 16 to just wait a minute, Mr. Horton? 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 CONTINUED BY MR. WILLIAM HORTON: 21 Q: Well, in any event, what -- what 22 little we may have accomplished, Deputy Commissioner 23 Carson, on that, I don't know whether to take credit or 24 blame, is that you're not clear in any event about 25 whether the, "absolutely not" is the same -- is Inspector

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1 Linton, is that fair? 2 A: That's fair. 3 Q: Okay. 4 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Before My Friend moves 5 on, in 2000/6/04 of the transcript it's -- this portion 6 is pages 6 and 7, I believe. 7 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 2000/6/06. 8 MR. DERRY MILLAR: 6/06, it's pages 6 and 9 7. 10 11 CONTINUED BY MR. WILLIAM HORTON: 12 Q: Now, I -- I want to come back, 13 Inspector Carson, to the now well worn quote: "Don't you 14 say we go get those fucking guys." And I just want to 15 look at a different aspect of that, if I may, and it's 16 this. 17 It's, I think, fairly well established and 18 common ground that when Acting Staff Sergeant Wright was 19 talking to you, he felt that Inspector Linton was 20 waffling and not making a decision as quickly as he would 21 like; do you accept that as being common ground? 22 A: Fair enough. 23 Q: Okay. And the -- part of the phrase 24 I want to pick up on, and it -- it'll come through in the 25 audio if you want to listen to the audio, is "don't you

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1 say -- don't you say, we go get those fucking guys?" 2 And I'm suggesting to you that Mark 3 Wright, when he was talking to you, seemed to be of a 4 view that you would -- you would be in favour of a 5 confrontation with the occupiers whether or not Inspector 6 Linton was, and I -- I'm not asking you to say what was 7 in Mark Wright's mind, obviously, but what I am asking 8 you is, isn't it fair to say that Mark Wright had a 9 reasonable expectation that you were someone who would 10 support going down the road to confront the occupiers 11 that night? 12 A: I -- I wouldn't necessarily agree 13 with that. I think what he is saying is, don't you think 14 we should go and do that? I mean, he's asking for my 15 opinion and -- and concurrence that that's what we should 16 do. 17 Q: Right. And he -- he seemed to think 18 that you might be more in favour of doing that than 19 Linton, is that -- is that fair? 20 A: I -- quite frankly, I don't know. I 21 mean, you're asking me to give an opinion on what he's 22 thinking. 23 Q: Right. The end result of it is that 24 you did agree that the CMU should be deployed that night. 25 A: Yeah, eventually I did.

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1 Q: Right. Well, fairly shortly 2 thereafter. 3 A: Well he -- I came back to the Command 4 Post -- 5 Q: Right. 6 A: -- and I had a discussion with Dale 7 Linton. 8 Q: And the -- and the decision was made 9 pretty well right after you came to the Command Post? 10 A: A few minutes after, yes. 11 Q: And certainly you didn't -- you 12 didn't waffle, and you didn't suggest that you should 13 wait until you get any more information, correct? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: And from the time that you returned 16 to the Command Post, you never questioned the need to 17 send the Crowd Management Unit in to confront the 18 occupiers, is that fair? 19 A: I'm sorry? 20 Q: From the time that you returned to 21 the Command Post -- 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: -- and you had that discussion with 24 Linton, you made the decision you never -- you never 25 looked back. You never reconsidered that decision. You

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1 just went forward with it for the balance of the -- 2 A: I wouldn't agree with that. 3 Q: Was there any point at which you 4 changed your mind or put everything on -- on hold? 5 A: Well, the team was moved up to the -- 6 to the MNR parking lot and the observers were put in to 7 observe the activity that was going on. 8 Q: Right. 9 A: I mean if there was no activity in 10 the parking lot there -- there would have been no 11 deployment of an ERT team or of a crowd management team. 12 Q: Well, and I don't want to go into 13 because you've already covered -- there's nothing you 14 want to add about what activity it was that caused you 15 concern. I -- 16 A: Right. 17 Q: -- I assume you've said all that -- 18 all that you have to say on that? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: Is that fair? 21 A: Right. Right. 22 Q: All right. But there wasn't any 23 point at which you made a different decision you just -- 24 A: Oh, no. 25 Q: -- you just carried on with it?

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1 A: Correct. 2 Q: You just went into implementation 3 mode basically, did you not? 4 A: Well, but you're continually 5 assessing. 6 Q: All right. And -- and with only the 7 information that you've already told us about -- you've 8 told us about the information that you said you were 9 receiving -- 10 A: Right. 11 Q: -- I take out the word "only" because 12 I don't want to get into an argument about "only." 13 You've told us the information you had and there wasn't 14 anything that caused you to reassess from the time that 15 you made that decision? 16 A: Fair. 17 Q: So that all the -- all the factors 18 that we talked about that went into that decision were 19 the factors, there wasn't anything new that was added. 20 A: Oh, fair enough. 21 Q: Is that correct? 22 A: Fair enough, yes. 23 Q: And with respect to deploying TRU and 24 I try to do this without going back to the transcript 25 just for efficiency, you'll recall the transcript where

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1 you're talking to Linton, I think it's about quarter past 2 8:00 or so and you say, "Don't do that". 3 A: Right. 4 Q: And I want to be clear about this, 5 that you're not questioning, at that point, confronting 6 the occupiers, you're questioning the tactical issue of 7 how to use TRU. Is that -- is that correct? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: And so it was not a question that -- 10 that you didn't want TRU to be deployed, you preferred 11 the ERT team to be the one that went in and confronted 12 the occupiers and made the arrests. Is that right? 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: And you -- you preferred that the TRU 15 unit be used covertly rather than overtly? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: And meaning that the occupiers would 18 not be aware that they were deployed? 19 A: Sure. 20 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: Is that a convenient 21 time for a break, Commissioner? 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Certainly, 23 Mr. Horton. It's twenty after 3:00, we'll take a break 24 now. 25 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess

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1 for fifteen (15) minutes. 2 3 --- Upon recessing at 3:20 p.m. 4 --- Upon resuming at 3:40 p.m. 5 6 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 7 resumed. Please be seated. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Mr. 9 Horton. 10 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: Thank you, 11 Commissioner. 12 13 CONTINUED BY MR. WILLIAM HORTON. 14 Q: Deputy Commissioner, the use of force 15 that you decided upon on the event of September the 6th, 16 I think it's fair to say and you'll agree with me was -- 17 was contrary to what you had set out to accomplish when 18 this incident began; is that fair? 19 20 (BRIEF PAUSE) 21 22 A: I'm not sure I understand the context 23 of -- like the ideal situation is you don't have to use 24 any force. 25 Q: Yeah, well, to make it simple, let's

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1 just go to Project Maple, Exhibit 424. 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: And I read from the very first page: 4 "Objective: To contain and negotiate a 5 peaceful resolution." 6 And peaceful means without the use of 7 force? 8 A: That would be the preference, yes. 9 Q: No, that was your objective? 10 A: Sure. 11 Q: And once you decided to use force, it 12 was contrary to what your objective had been; is that 13 right? 14 A: Well -- well, yes and no. It just 15 isn't that simple. If the occupiers in the parking lot 16 simply went back into the Park and stayed there, there 17 would be no reason to apply any force whatsoever. 18 So, it would have still met the criteria. 19 Q: You don't interpret sending -- how 20 many men, how many officers, thirty-two (32) plus 21 officers -- 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: Down the middle of the road, plus six 24 (6) tactical and rescue unit members hidden in the 25 bushes, you don't interpret that as a use of force?

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1 A: It's a use of force, yes. 2 Q: And isn't -- isn't a use of force 3 regardless of whether or not you get what you want out of 4 it? 5 A: Fair enough. 6 Q: And if you do get what you want out 7 of it, you got what you want because you used force, 8 right? 9 A: Fair enough. 10 Q: You would -- you weren't under the 11 impression that you were initiating a negotiation on the 12 evening of September the 6th? 13 A: No. 14 Q: So you were using force to achieve 15 your objective rather than negotiations? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: Correct? It was contrary to your 18 objectives? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: And, in fact, your objective was out 21 the window once you -- once you marched down that road, 22 wasn't it? 23 A: No, I wouldn't say that. We -- we 24 were going for an injunction the next morning. We were 25 optimistic that the injunction may provide us some

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1 assistance into next steps. And we had worked in the 2 community with a couple of officers trying to establish 3 some communication networks and, quite frankly, well, it 4 still had the potential to stay on track. 5 Q: You keep saying you were going for an 6 injunction. That's not correct, is it? I mean, the OPP 7 was never going for an injunction -- 8 A: Well, that's maybe the wrong 9 terminology, but I'm sure you understand. The Ministry 10 of Natural Resources was going to make an application and 11 there would be a hearing the next morning. 12 Q: Right. It was not within your 13 control whether the Ministry of Natural Resources went 14 for an injunction, didn't go for an injunction. 15 A: Not at all. 16 Q: Not within your control whether they 17 went the following morning or a week later? 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: Okay. In terms of what you could 20 control, you weren't expecting to go back to having a 21 peaceful negotiation with these occupiers once you sent 22 forces like that the road in the middle of the night and 23 pushed them back into the Park, were you? 24 A: Absolutely. 25 Q: And I suggest to you --

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1 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Excuse me, I 2 don't mean to interrupt you. The answer is not clear to 3 me; absolutely yes or absolutely no? 4 THE WITNESS: Yes, I thought we could 5 meet our objective after that. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I just 7 wasn't sure. 8 9 CONTINUED BY MR. WILLIAM HORTON: 10 Q: Hmm hmm, you -- okay. Now, I suggest 11 to you, Inspector Carson, that the use of force in that 12 situation was totally contrary to OPP policy. You 13 disagree with that? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: And you've -- you've already been 16 referred to -- it's Exhibit P-472, and that's a policy 17 statement by Commissioner O'Grady. 18 Are you familiar with that? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And I'd just like to have you turn -- 21 turn to that, please. If it's available to you -- 22 A: Where do I find it, sir? 23 MR. DERRY MILLAR: We're helping you. 24 THE WITNESS: All right. 25

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1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 CONTINUED BY MR. WILLIAM HORTON: 4 Q: And you've already told us that you - 5 - you had not familiarized yourself with this policy 6 before you took the steps you did on September the 6th? 7 A: That's correct. 8 Q: As the Deputy Commissioner, do you 9 supervise incident commanders now? Is that within your 10 bailiwick? 11 A: They're within my area of command. 12 Q: It is within your area? 13 A: Correct. Emergency Response, Field 14 and Traffic Services. 15 Q: Do you expect your incident 16 commanders to familiarize themselves with important OPP 17 policies that are relevant to the project that they're 18 involved in? 19 A: Sure. 20 Q: And, in fact, wouldn't you say that 21 that's essential in terms of making sure that people do 22 comply with overall policies of your force? 23 A: Sure. 24 Q: And this incident had not taken you 25 by surprise, you had several days to prepare for it in

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1 advance; correct? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: And, you had more than enough time to 4 familiarize yourself with any applicable policies; is 5 that correct? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: All right. This would be an 8 applicable policy; correct? 9 A: Sure. 10 Q: And, you did not familiarize yourself 11 with it; correct? 12 A: I didn't see it, no. 13 Q: No. Okay. Now, I just want to go to 14 what it says. 15 "When dealing with anti-social or 16 alleged criminal behaviour involving 17 protesters,..." 18 And you agree with me that that policy 19 covers both anti-social and alleged criminal behaviour, 20 correct? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: The fact that there may be criminal 23 behaviour does not suspend the application of this policy 24 in and of itself; correct? 25 A: I'm sorry?

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1 Q: This policy can apply even if there 2 is criminal behaviour? 3 A: It could, but -- 4 Q: It could. 5 A: It could. 6 Q: It could. The fact that there's 7 criminal behaviour doesn't immediately mean this policy 8 no longer applies, right? 9 A: Fair enough. 10 Q: Okay. 11 "Involving protestors, hostage-takers, 12 and armed persons." 13 Do you see that? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: Again, the fact that persons are 16 armed doesn't immediately mean this policy doesn't apply? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: Even though they are armed and even 19 though they may be engaged in criminal behaviour, this 20 policy could still apply? 21 A: Sure. 22 Q: Should be considered? 23 A: Sure. 24 Q: And then, it says: 25 "The initial response of the OPP has

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1 traditionally been one (1) of 2 negotiation in an effort to avoid the 3 use of physical force if at all 4 possible." 5 Do you see that? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: Okay. And then, it says: 8 "The only exception to this approach 9 has been in situations where death or 10 serious injury was immediately probable 11 if force was not used to control 12 events. Do you see that? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And you have already agreed with me 15 that sending the forces down to meet the occupiers was a 16 use of force, correct? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: And you already indicated in many 19 different ways that that use of force carried the risk of 20 injury and -- and possibly death once that decision was 21 made, correct? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: And that's the reason why the OPP has 24 a policy that says the only exception is in situations 25 where death or serious injury was immediately probable if

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1 force was not used; correct? 2 A: Right. 3 Q: Now, regardless of whether you read 4 this policy, were you aware that that was the policy? 5 A: The context of it, yes. 6 Q: You knew that it was important that 7 the kind of force that you deployed on that evening not 8 be deployed unless there was something like what's 9 described in the policy as death or serious injury being 10 immediately probable if force is not used? 11 Would you agree with that? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And have you told us now, I don't 14 want to go over it all again -- have you told us now all 15 the information that you considered that might relate to 16 whether you thought death or serious injury was 17 immediately probable? 18 Have you told us everything you can think 19 of that relates to that issue? 20 A: I believe so. 21 Q: And I suggest to you, Deputy Carson, 22 that the risk of death or injury was increased by your 23 decision to send the CMU down the road? It was not 24 necessary for you to send the CMU down the road to avoid 25 risk of death or injury. Do you agree with that?

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1 A: No. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 Q: I want to turn briefly to another 6 subject. Just to be very clear about this, Deputy 7 Carson, we've touched on a little bit a few minutes ago. 8 There are a number of points when you've 9 given evidence and you've been asked about political 10 pressure. Your answers have encompassed something to do 11 with the injunction in a -- in a very general way. 12 And I just want to ask some questions that 13 make -- make this very clear. You've already agreed with 14 me earlier today that the OPP did not play a role in 15 initiating any injunction proceedings. 16 Your only role was to give evidence if and 17 when the MNR brought those proceedings; right? 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: And neither you nor the OPP had 20 anything to do, any influence on what the government was 21 going to do in terms of bringing an injunction, not 22 bringing an injunction, bringing it ex parte, not 23 bringing it ex parte. 24 That was for the government and its 25 lawyers to decide; correct?

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1 A: That's right. 2 Q: You didn't even have any knowledge 3 about those issues to offer an opinion for the most part; 4 correct? 5 A: That's fair. 6 Q: All right. And you did not interpret 7 political pressure as, in any way, relating to the 8 injunction, is that correct? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: Okay. And just to be clear about 11 this, it really wasn't possible, because the government 12 didn't need to pressure anybody about the injunction 13 proceedings. The government just had to make its own 14 decision about what it wanted to do, right? 15 A: That's fair, sure. 16 Q: Okay. So there was no point in the 17 government putting any pressure on the OPP that related 18 to the injunction and anything that was related to you 19 with respect to -- that may be characterized as political 20 pressure, was related to something other than the 21 injunction, correct? 22 A: That's fair. 23 Q: Okay. So if Mike -- if -- if 24 Inspector Fox was telling you about Mike Harris thinking 25 that the OPP had made mistakes, that wasn't mistakes

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1 about the injunction? 2 You didn't interpret it as being anything 3 to do with the injunction, right? 4 A: No, that's fair. 5 Q: Okay. And if Inspector Fox described 6 the government attitudes as being redneck attitudes or 7 high testosterone or any of that, you didn't take it to 8 mean that you were supposed to do something different 9 with respect to the injunction? 10 A: Fair enough. 11 Q: Correct. And if you interpreted the 12 government's position or Mike Harris' position as wanting 13 you to kick ass, which you did, correct? 14 A: Hmm hmm. Correct. 15 Q: Okay. You didn't interpret that as 16 meaning to kick ass by doing something in relation to the 17 injunction proceedings, right. 18 A: Correct 19 Q: Okay. 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 Q: And, in fact, we can go back to the 24 O'Grady statement if you like, but perhaps I can just do 25 it a simpler way, the OPP's preference was to have the

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1 injunction in place before any force was used. That was 2 the point, wasn't it? 3 A: Sure. 4 Q: Okay. And that's -- that's 5 referenced in the -- what I'll call the O'Grady policy, 6 that the -- once the injunction is in place, the OPP has 7 no choice but to use force; right? 8 A: Not necessarily. I mean, there's a 9 number -- depending on what the injunction would state, 10 there might be a number of options that could come to 11 bear that may not require the use of force. 12 Q: Okay, understood. Let me rephrase 13 the question. Once the injunction is in place, if force 14 is required via injunction, the Court Order justifies the 15 use of force? 16 A: Oh, fair enough, sure. 17 Q: Right? 18 A: Sure. 19 Q: You don't have to worry about whether 20 is justified in that situation? 21 A: It may be necessary. 22 Q: Right. So, the sooner the injunction 23 is in place, the sooner force could be used if you needed 24 to? 25 Isn't that fair?

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1 A: It's possible. 2 Q: Yeah. And isn't that one (1) of the 3 reasons why it was important to pursue the injunction, 4 because once you had the Court Order, there was the 5 possibility then of using force that was justified by the 6 Court Order itself. 7 A: It was also the -- anticipated that 8 once the Court Order was delivered, that it would 9 stimulate the negotiations that would provide us an 10 opportunity to deal with this without having to use 11 force. 12 Q: Right. And that's because it has 13 that stimulative effect because everybody knows that 14 force could be used justifiably in enforcing a Court 15 Order. 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: Isn't that right? So it all comes 18 down ultimately to the -- the injunction creating the 19 possibility that force could be used if necessary; isn't 20 that right? 21 A: That's fair. 22 Q: And I want to be also clear about 23 something that's been touched on, but I want to just add 24 a couple of points, and that is: the injunction 25 proceeding that you were hearing about from various

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1 people, never came up in relation to the Sandy Parking 2 Lot, right? 3 A: Correct. 4 Q: You did not discuss the Sandy Parking 5 Lot, and Mr. Rosenthal covered this this morning, with 6 anyone from the County of Lambton in terms of delivering 7 a trespass notice? 8 A: Right. 9 Q: And there had been activity in the 10 Sandy Parking Lot, you say that it concerned you over the 11 course of a couple of days. 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: Okay. And yet at no time did you try 14 to find out who owned the Sandy Parking Lot, go through 15 the same process that you did with the Park, right? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: Okay. And nor did you seek to pursue 18 any kind of injunction proceeding, or have an owner 19 pursue any kind of injunction proceeding with respect to 20 the Sandy Parking Lot? 21 A: Right. 22 Q: And in fact, the Trespass Notice that 23 was served on the occupiers, required them to leave the 24 Park, right? 25 A: Yes.

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1 Q: And the injunction that was applied 2 for required the occupiers not to be in the Park, right? 3 A: Correct. 4 Q: So if the occupiers, in compliance 5 with the Trespass Notice or the Injunction Order, had 6 left the Park and gone into the Sandy Parking Lot, they 7 would not be in violation of either the Trespass Notice 8 or the Injunction Order, right? 9 A: Fair enough. 10 Q: And in fact the whole issue of 11 trespassing, the occupiers trespassing in the Park, that 12 was the sole message that you really had to deliver to 13 the occupiers of the Park; isn't that correct? 14 The -- the only thing you really had in 15 mind to say to the occupiers of the Park was: you're 16 trespassing, you need to leave the Park. 17 A: Oh, yes, yes. 18 Q: Correct? 19 A: Sure. 20 Q: At -- at anytime that's -- that's the 21 only evidence I can find in the record is that that's the 22 message you, the OPP, wanted to convey to the occupiers? 23 A: Sure. 24 Q: And you had no trouble actually 25 conveying that message. You believed that that message

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1 was gotten through, and was understood, right? 2 A: The message? 3 Q: The message that they were 4 trespassing, and they should leave the Park? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Didn't you believe that that message 7 had gotten through? 8 A: I believe so. 9 Q: Okay. That was the -- you had a 10 message, you wanted to get that message through to the 11 occupiers, and you succeeded in getting the message you 12 wanted to to the occupiers, correct? 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: Okay. And I'm suggesting to you that 15 if you had a different message that you wanted to convey 16 to them, you could have just the same way conveyed that 17 message to them too; if there was a different message, 18 correct? 19 A: I'm -- I'm not sure what your point 20 is there. 21 Q: Well, Commissioner, let's go to this 22 issue of trespassing. Deputy Commissioner I should say. 23 Your role in this incident really went beyond waiting for 24 the injunction to decide whether or not the occupiers 25 were trespassing.

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1 Because you've stated many times that you 2 yourself believed them to be trespassing, isn't that 3 correct? 4 A: Sure. 5 Q: That was your perception of the 6 situation, correct? 7 A: Yes, with the information I had at 8 that time, that's -- 9 Q: Right. 10 A: -- the conclusion I came to, yes. 11 Q: And so, that's the message you wanted 12 to get to them, is they're trespassing and you wanted 13 them to get out of the Park, right? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: Now, what I'm suggesting to you is, 16 if you had a different message, and I'm not suggesting 17 you did. I don't -- I'm suggesting you didn't have any 18 other message. 19 If you had a different message, you could 20 have gotten that through to them, too, isn't that right; 21 isn't that fair? 22 A: Well, if I had another message I 23 would have tried, yes. 24 Q: Right. But you didn't have another 25 message, isn't that fair?

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1 A: Fair enough. 2 Q: Okay. And all I'm -- all I'm trying 3 to establish is that there -- there's been all sorts of 4 evidence about a lack of ability to communicate, and I'm 5 not suggesting that it was easy, but we certainly know 6 that there was a meeting or a discussion with Mr. Bert 7 Manning on the evening, I think it's of September the 8 4th, and he said to come back the following day; do you 9 remember that evidence? 10 A: Sure. 11 Q: And so, virtually, there was an 12 appointment that was made to see Bert Manning, is that 13 fair? 14 A: That's fair. 15 Q: And Mark Wright went out to see Bert 16 Manning, and actually met with him on the occasion that 17 was set aside for them to meet, is that right? 18 A: Well, he found him up at the Military 19 Base, but -- 20 Q: Yeah. 21 A: -- yeah. 22 Q: All right. He -- he found him, and 23 then they met. It was actually about two o'clock on the 24 afternoon; I think it was 2:30 -- 25 A: Something like that.

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1 Q: -- on the afternoon of September the 2 5th. 3 A: Something like that. 4 Q: Okay. And Mr. Manning had said that 5 he would meet on the afternoon of September the 5th at 6 about 2:00, is that correct? 7 A: I believe it was noon, but... 8 Q: Okay. And Mark Wright went up there 9 and met with him? 10 A: Yes, he did. 11 Q: He had a conversation with him? 12 A: Hmm hmm. 13 Q: And he delivered the only message 14 that you had in mind to deliver, which is: you're 15 trespassing, you should get out of the Park? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: And if there was any other message to 18 be conveyed, it could have been conveyed at the same 19 time, right? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: Okay. And in fact, as I understand 22 the record, and I'll try to save time and not go to the 23 documents, but they had a conversation about some other 24 things that Bert Manning wanted to raise. 25 A: Right.

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1 Q: They had a conversation about the 2 roadblocks and whether the roadblocks were really needed, 3 et cetera, right? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: And there was a fairly full 6 conversation there. 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: Now, if you had had a -- any 9 intention whatsoever, of telling the occupiers that we're 10 going for an injunction, until we get the injunction, we 11 just want you to stay in the Park, not go outside the 12 boundaries of the Park, now, that's going to be trouble, 13 okay? 14 If -- if you had that in mind, that would 15 have been -- I suggest to you, you would have had that as 16 part of your communication strategy, right? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: You would have told Mark Wright, when 19 you go to see Bert Manning at the -- this afternoon, tell 20 him this important information, right? You could have 21 done that, isn't that right? 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Mr. 23 Sandler? 24 MR. MARK SANDLER: I just wanted to point 25 out that there actually is evidence bearing upon the MNR

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1 injunction, and it being communicated by Mark Wright on 2 that occasion. So, I don't want the Witness to be misled 3 about that inadvertently. I'm sorry. 4 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: What -- what was it 5 you wanted to tell the Witness, Mr. Sandler, is that... 6 MR. MARK SANDLER: You just suggested to 7 him that if you wanted to communicate a message about the 8 MNR injunction, well there is evidence that that was 9 communicated, and there's evidence -- 10 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: No, no. 11 MR. MARK SANDLER: -- in the scribe notes 12 about it. 13 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: No, no, I'm sorry, 14 that is not -- that's not -- that's not what I was 15 talking about. That's not what I'm talking about. 16 MR. MARK SANDLER: I think it was. 17 18 CONTINUED BY MR. WILLIAM HORTON: 19 Q: That's not what I was talking about 20 at all, but -- but if you'd like to give the Witness any 21 other pointers, I'm -- I'm happy to defer. 22 I'm talking about a message, specifically 23 a message, that says: stay in the Park until we get the 24 injunction, because we're going to have to use force if 25 you go outside the Park.

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1 If you had that sort of a message, you 2 could have conveyed that to Bert Manning at that time, 3 isn't that correct? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And in fact, the message was exactly 6 the opposite: You're trespassing, you need to get out 7 of the Park, right? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: I won't take you to the Trespass 10 Notice that was intended to be given to him, but that's 11 what the Trespass Notice said, right? 12 A: Sure. 13 Q: And that was the message that was 14 given verbally by the OPP. 15 A: Right. 16 Q: Not by the MNR, by the OPP. 17 A: By -- Mr. Kobayashi was there, he is 18 MNR, Yes. 19 Q: Okay, but with -- with Mark Wright 20 present, in support. 21 A: Hmm hmm. 22 Q: And Mark Wright's report to you is, 23 we got that message across, right? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: And no surprise to you, then, that

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1 the -- that's what the occupiers understood that that was 2 the message, was that you wanted them out of the Park? 3 A: The fact that they were trespassing, 4 sure. 5 Q: Right. So any suggestion that what 6 you really meant to do was to tell them through other 7 means that they'd be fine if they stayed in the Park 8 until the injunction was granted, that's just fantasy, 9 isn't it, Inspector Carson? 10 A: I don't know why you would say that. 11 Q: I say that because all your actions 12 were exactly to the contrary, and if you had any 13 intention whatsoever of communicating that to the 14 occupiers, you had every opportunity to do so. 15 A: Well, first of all, I -- I think our 16 actions in regards to the picnic tables on the -- on the 17 parking lot on the -- the morning of the 6th, made it 18 clear there were issues in regards -- the officers had 19 never gone into the Provincial Park. 20 There was no effort on our officers to -- 21 I think the physical message is -- was very clear. When 22 Mark Wright and Sergeant Eve went up to the -- to try and 23 have some discussion, that's where they were, was at the 24 fence. 25 They tried to stimulate some discussion.

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1 Yes, there was some discussions with -- with Bert 2 Manning, and what was discussed was discussed. 3 There was no message that, you know, stay 4 in the Park and -- and hang tight. There was no one who 5 would identify themself as a leader. 6 There was, you know, Mark Wright did his 7 best in the discussion he had. So, quite frankly, the 8 depth of the discussion Mark had with Bert Manning, I 9 guess he's going to have to explain exactly the context 10 of that, because I wasn't there. 11 Q: I'm not asking you to defend what 12 Mark Wright did. I'm asking you you're -- you're -- 13 you're asking the Commissioner to believe that you 14 actually had a plan to communicate to the occupiers that 15 they should stay out of the Sandy Parking Lot? 16 This is what you're asking the 17 Commissioner to believe, is that right; That that was 18 your intention was to communicate to them that they 19 should stay out of the Sandy Parking Lot? 20 A: Well -- 21 Q: Isn't that what you're telling the 22 Commissioner? 23 A: We -- we didn't communicate that 24 message. 25 Q: No, I mean that's -- I quite agree.

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1 But your -- you've suggested repeatedly, Deputy 2 Commissioner Carson, that you could -- you attempted to 3 communicate that message physically. 4 You said so a few minutes ago, you're 5 saying, physically by dealing with the picnic tables, 6 physically by doing all these different things, that all 7 should be interpreted as an effort to communicate to them 8 that they should stay out of the Sandy Parking Lot, is 9 that right? 10 Is that what you -- let's --- let's be 11 clear about this. Is that what you're saying, is that by 12 those physical actions, you were trying to communicate 13 that message to the occupiers, is that what you're 14 saying? 15 A: Yes, that the issue with the picnic 16 tables lined up along the roadway was -- wouldn't be 17 allowed to occur. 18 Q: Yeah, no, no, but I -- I'm asking 19 you, just so that we're really clear about this, okay, it 20 has come up repeatedly, in a lot of different contexts, 21 that there was this line in the sand, the line at the 22 picnic -- at the fence. 23 Your Counsel has cross-examined in 24 numerous First Nations witnesses, as if, and I'll put it 25 in the vernacular, by coming across that fence they were

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1 asking for it, all right? 2 And I am asking you to be very clear. Are 3 you saying that you intended to communicate a message to 4 the occupiers that they should stay on the other side of 5 the Park fence, otherwise force would be used against 6 them? 7 I just want to know your intention. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just before 9 you answer the question -- 10 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: What did you intend 11 when you gave that message? 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Are you 13 finished asking the question? Just before you do, just 14 before you answer it... 15 MR. MARK SANDLER: I'm going to deal with 16 the evidence on this point in re-examination, so I won't 17 -- so I won't concern Mr. Horton about alerting the 18 witness about what the actual evidence is on this point. 19 But to suggest that either Ms. Tuck- 20 Jackson or I have made that suggestion to any First 21 Nations witness that they're asking for it by stepping 22 out of the Park is unfair, and it's inflammatory, and 23 really doesn't contribute to this Inquiry. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No. It 25 shouldn't -- no one used that kind of language that's for

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1 sure. Yes, Mr. Henderson...? 2 MR. WILLIAM HENDERSON: Well I -- I've 3 heard My Friend's submission on that. I clearly recall 4 amongst one of the many exchanges to which Mr. Horton has 5 averted, Mr. Sandler once went to the -- to the extent of 6 suggesting that the Park was a sanctuary if the occupiers 7 would stay behind the fence. 8 That was a message entirely consistent 9 with that -- that Mr. Horton has summarized. It happened 10 on several occasions. I happened to have taken objection 11 to that particular word on that particular occasion. 12 It's in the transcript, and I suggest Mr. Horton be 13 permitted to move on. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, if you 15 used that word, if that word is in the transcript, it 16 wouldn't have been objected to I presume. But anyway, 17 you've made -- I think you've made your point in the 18 question. 19 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: Commissioner, I'm -- 20 I'm going after a very -- I want to deconstruct this, and 21 it's really important to -- to deconstruct this because 22 things are being, as Mr. Downard said at one point, 23 slurred together so that things that were done physically 24 are now being elevated to the level of -- of having been 25 a warning.

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1 Physical actions are being elevated to the 2 level of having been a warning to the occupiers that -- 3 that ultimately justifies the force that was used. 4 5 CONTINUED BY MR. WILLIAM HORTON. 6 Q: Now, I'm asking a very narrow 7 question. My narrow question is this: did you actually 8 intend -- did you at some point, formulate in your mind 9 the thought that we need to tell these occupiers that 10 they will be safe until the injunction is issued if they 11 still inside the Park, but force will be used against 12 them if they go into the Sandy Parking Lot. 13 Was there some point in time where you 14 decided that that was a message you wanted to convey to 15 the occupiers, or not? 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Stop there. 17 That's a question. 18 THE WITNESS: The message was clear that 19 we, as the OPP, were not going into the Park. We did not 20 communicate any message to them that if they came out of 21 the Park, anything in particular would happen. 22 23 CONTINUED BY MR. WILLIAM HORTON: 24 Q: I'm sorry, Deputy Commissioner, 25 that's not the question I asked. I'm not asking whether

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1 the message was clear, or whether the message was not 2 clear. And in any event perhaps others are a better 3 judge of whether the message was received. 4 All I want to know is whether it was your 5 intention to transmit that message; that's -- that's what 6 I'm asking. 7 A: I can't tell you if I had the intent 8 to do that or not. 9 Q: Okay. 10 A: I mean, I don't -- I don't recall 11 having that particular thought process. 12 Q: Right. Well that's helpful. That's 13 very helpful. So when we talk about trying to convey a 14 message to them along these lines, this is not something 15 you remember having intended to do, this is an 16 interpretation of the events that occurred, is that 17 correct? 18 A: That's fair. 19 Q: And Deputy Commissioner, I say this 20 with the greatest of respect, this is -- that answer is - 21 - is obvious isn't it? Because if you had formulated in 22 your mind a message that you wanted to send to the 23 occupiers, Mark Wright could have told Bert Manning that 24 when he met him to talk about the trespassing, isn't that 25 right; if that had been your intention, it would be part

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1 of the message, wouldn't it? 2 A: Quite frankly I -- you know, ten (10) 3 years ago I cannot tell you the context of all of our 4 discussions, what I assigned Mark Wright, or anybody else 5 to have in regards to a particular discussion, sir. 6 Q: Well, I can assure you, Deputy 7 Commissioner Carson, I'm not an authority on all these 8 documents, there are others here who know more about 9 them. 10 But I'm not aware of anything in the 11 record that suggests that somebody thought the occupiers 12 should be told at the time, stay inside the Park and 13 you'll be safe, if you come out into the Sandy Parking 14 Lot, force is going to be used against you. 15 I'm not aware of anything in the record 16 that suggests that that was a thought in anyone's mind at 17 the time; are -- are you aware of anything to the 18 contrary? A: No, no. 19 Q: At best, Deputy Commissioner Carson, 20 if that was a thought that was being communicated, it was 21 a thought that was being communicated through conflict, 22 through physical action, is that correct? 23 A: Fair enough. 24 Q: And I suggest to you that, in fact, 25 there was little or no thought given by you to any

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1 communication message, or strategy, or plan other than to 2 let the occupiers know that they were trespassing, and 3 that an injunction application would be brought, is that 4 fair? 5 A: No. 6 Q: Let me take you to Project Maple 7 again, Exhibit 424. 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 Q: And this was -- this represented your 12 plan for the incident? 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: And you knew at the time this plan 15 was put together that there was likely to be an 16 occupation of the Provincial Park? 17 A: Right. 18 Q: That was the whole purpose of 19 preparing the plan? 20 A: Sure. 21 Q: And your objective in putting the 22 plan together was to anticipate the contingencies? 23 A: Sure. 24 Q: To work through all the different 25 scenarios, is that correct?

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1 A: Correct. 2 Q: And if I look at this document I see, 3 for example, I look at communication, and I'm thinking to 4 myself, that may be a good place to find out what your 5 communication strategy was, and there are, in fact, 6 several pages. I think it goes on for -- I haven't 7 actually counted. I should have, but it looks like it's 8 ten (10) or twelve (12) pages, anyway. 9 And it's all about how you are going to 10 communicate with the other members of your team, isn't 11 that right? 12 A: Yeah, it's a technical communication 13 piece. 14 Q: Right. 15 A: Right. 16 Q: It's -- it's all about how you're 17 going to communicate within your side. 18 A: Right. It's -- it's -- it's the 19 technical part. 20 Q: Right. 21 A: Right. 22 Q: And it has to do with Mobile Command 23 Posts and all kinds of high-powered equipment that's 24 available for this purpose, is that correct? 25 A: Sure.

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1 Q: And -- and then, we've got other 2 sections that deal with other things, and then if I go to 3 "negotiations", I've got a single page, is that right? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: All it has is the names of some 6 officers that you think might be involved? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And in fact, I -- without reviewing 9 the whole thing you'd identified Sergeant Eve to be the 10 person who would have the contact? 11 A: She was one (1) of the team leaders. 12 Q: Right. And with an introduction from 13 others and all this sort of stuff, right? 14 A: Well, you're getting confused between 15 communication as far as negotiators, and communication 16 between the OPP generally and the occupiers -- 17 Q: Right. 18 A: -- generally. 19 Q: Right. 20 A: It's two (2) different -- two (2) 21 different things. 22 Q: Okay. Is there anywhere in this 23 document where I can find reference to the technical 24 aspects of how you're going to communicate with the 25 occupiers?

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1 A: No. 2 Q: So, is -- is there anywhere in this 3 document that I can find what your negotiation strategy 4 was going to be with the occupiers? 5 A: No. 6 Q: Is there anywhere in this document 7 where I can find what the key messages would be that you 8 would try to get through to the occupiers? 9 A: No. 10 Q: Is there anywhere in this document 11 that I can find what other resources -- human resources - 12 - outside the OPP you may be able to access in order to 13 communicate with the occupiers? 14 A: No. 15 Q: And in fact, every time that the 16 subject of communication comes up, your answer has 17 consistently been, we couldn't find anyone to talk to, is 18 that right? 19 A: Correct 20 Q: Okay. So, basically, after a couple 21 of hundred years of dealing with First Nations, your 22 communication strategy is take me to your leader, is that 23 -- that's what you're telling us? 24 A: We asked numerous people to speak to 25 us.

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1 Q: Right, and -- and unless the 2 occupiers were organized in a way that made it convenient 3 for you to talk to them, then they were entitled to no 4 consideration in terms of being communicated with by your 5 Force? 6 Is that -- is that what you're telling us? 7 A: That's not what I'm saying. 8 Q: And -- and you're saying that in the 9 absence of being told the name of a specific person that 10 you could talk to, you just throw up your hands. There's 11 no way of communicating with these people? Is that what 12 you're telling us? 13 A: Like I told you, we had two (2) 14 Members working in the community trying to get some 15 assistance from the community to establish some dialogue 16 with the occupiers. In the past, ever since 1993, there 17 had been the likes of Carl George or Glenn George who 18 would present themselves and they would speak on behalf 19 of the group, and that seemed to work just fine. 20 But, for whatever reason, this issue with 21 the Park, no one would come forward and the very brief 22 discussion that Mark Wright had with Bert Manning, is one 23 (1) of the few opportunities anyone would speak to us 24 whatsoever. 25 Q: Is the safety of a group of occupiers

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1 in terms of police action depend on them holding a vote 2 and electing someone to talk to you? 3 Is that -- is that a reasonable 4 interpretation of what you're saying? 5 A: That's not what I'm saying. 6 Q: No. You have an obligation, do you 7 not, to consider the safety of all the people who were 8 involved in the incident including not only the cottagers 9 but the -- but the occupiers and the people who were part 10 of that group -- 11 A: Sure. 12 Q: -- don't you? 13 A: Of course. 14 Q: And not to use excessive force; 15 right? 16 A: Correct 17 Q: And to -- and to attempt to 18 communicate reasonable requests to them before you use -- 19 before you use force? 20 A: We try to do that, yes. 21 Q: Right. And you're not suggesting 22 that all of that disappears unless the group can come up 23 with a -- a leader for you to talk to? 24 A: That's -- that's not what I said. 25 Q: Well, but isn't that the effect of

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1 what you're -- you're trying to suggest as being a reason 2 for you not communicating to the occupiers about the need 3 for them to stay in the Park? 4 A: Well, you -- you force me to ask a 5 question with a question or answer a question with a 6 question, because if no one comes up to speak to us 7 besides Bert Manning, then who do you suggest that they 8 should talk to? 9 Q: Well, you did speak to Bert Manning? 10 A: Right. And we had some discussion 11 with him. 12 Q: Yeah. You had -- you had very full 13 discussions with him, based on the plan that you had when 14 -- when you set your plan. 15 A: Right. 16 Q: The fact of the matter is your plan 17 didn't go beyond the trespassing message, that's the 18 problem, isn't it? 19 A: Well, I guess in your view. 20 Q: Well, I suggest to you, Commissioner, 21 it's a fail -- it's a failure on your part in terms of 22 the planning process and that -- that all you did was to 23 pay lip service to the idea of communication beyond 24 telling the occupiers they were trespassing; isn't that 25 right?

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1 A: I disagree. 2 Q: And, in fact, if you had had a 3 communications strategy, even a rudimentary 4 communications strategy where your men were told what the 5 key messages were, I suggest to you that opportunities 6 such as your officers took to yell inflammatory epithets 7 at the occupiers across the fence, may have been put to a 8 much better purpose; don't you agree? 9 A: Well, I take exception to the -- your 10 last comment, because I certainly don't know that to be a 11 fact. 12 Q: When you go into an incident, you 13 anticipate there's going to be contact of one (1) kind or 14 another between your officers and the occupiers? 15 Don't you expect that to happen, from time 16 to time? 17 A: It could happen. 18 Q: Well, don't you -- isn't -- isn't it 19 almost certain to happen, that there will be moments, 20 whether it's at a checkpoint or at a -- a -- something -- 21 an incident involving the picnic tables or whatever? 22 Isn't that -- isn't that a normal thing 23 that you might expect as an Incident Commander? 24 A: Sure. There's -- there's bound to be 25 interaction.

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1 Q: Right. And if you have a 2 communication plan that's passed down to your management 3 team, that's passed down by them down to the -- down to 4 the rank and file officers to say, Here's our 5 communication plan. 6 Here's what we intend to say to the 7 occupiers when we have an opportunity, it's more likely 8 that that would happen; isn't that right? 9 A: Fair enough. 10 Q: Don't you think that would be a 11 minimum requirement in terms of dealing with an incident 12 as an incident commander if you have some sort of plan 13 for how you're going to deal with the -- 14 A: Well, the -- the difficulty with 15 that -- 16 Q: -- occupiers? 17 A: -- I mean, it -- that all sounds well 18 and good, now you have to ensure that every officer -- 19 some sixty (60) some officers -- understand every aspect 20 of this whole incident. That's why Mark Wright and 21 Sergeant Seltzer and Sergeant Eve and Sergeant retired, 22 Lorne Smith were involved in this because they understood 23 the issue there. 24 A lot of the officers who were there would 25 not understand the intricate issues around all of this.

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1 Q: So, can you think if any reason why 2 Mark Wright would not have said anything more to Bert 3 Manning when he had the opportunity other than, You're 4 trespassing. You should get out of the Park? 5 A: Well, that's a question that Mark 6 Wright's going to have to answer. 7 Q: You -- you certainly don't have any 8 answer for that? 9 A: Of course not. 10 Q: Well, you say, Of course not, but -- 11 A: Well, I wasn't there. 12 Q: -- you're the incident commander. 13 You -- I'm questioning you as to what steps you took to 14 make sure that communication with the occupiers was a 15 part of your strategy and do I take it you told me 16 everything that you can about what steps you took? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: And I suggest to you that even at the 19 crucial moment, Inspector Carson -- Deputy Commissioner 20 Carson -- when this incident -- when -- when you made the 21 decision to send armed officers down the road, 22 communications was the last thing from your mind. 23 And you were relying in part -- you were 24 relying on conflict and you were relying on surprise and 25 you were relying on -- on intimidation; isn't that

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1 correct? 2 A: Well, that's -- that's the 3 psychological objective of using a crowd management team, 4 I guess. 5 Q: Okay. And we can -- we can 6 rationalize it any way we like, but that's the nature of 7 the decision that you took on that evening. 8 A: Fair enough. 9 Q: And you recognized that at the time 10 that you made that decision; correct? 11 A: Fair enough. 12 13 (BRIEF PAUSE) 14 15 Q: And throughout the time, the -- the 16 days that you did have before the shooting incident, you 17 certainly did spend a lot of time dealing with equipment 18 issues? 19 A: That was -- required some attention, 20 yes. 21 Q: But all of the equipment issues that 22 you dealt with were focussed on, essentially, officer 23 safety? 24 A: Sure. 25

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1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: But in a conflict between officers 4 and occupiers, it's -- there's also the potential, 5 clearly, for the occupiers themselves to be injured or 6 killed, right? 7 A: There's always that potential, yes. 8 Q: Right. And you knew that when you 9 made that decision. 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: Now, I'd like to take you back to 12 your evidence-in-chief where you talked about the moment 13 that you'd heard that and occupier had been shot. Do you 14 recall that evidence? 15 A: Yes. Yes. 16 Q: And you indicated that you made a 17 note in your notebook, you threw the notebook in the dash 18 and you knew that you had just lost control of the event. 19 Do you recall that evidence? 20 A: Yes. That's the terminology I used, 21 yes. 22 Q: Yeah. That's correct and it's 23 correct as well, you certainly had lost control of the 24 event; isn't that right? 25 A: Fair enough.

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1 Q: Well, that's your language. 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: And I'm quoting your evidence. 4 Again, I can take you to the transcript if you want me 5 to. You said, this was the moment in time when this 6 whole event changes and now, we had been the mediators 7 through all of this for more than two (2) years, now we 8 were going to be target. 9 Do you recall giving that evidence? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: And had you given any thought what 12 was the moment at which you lost control of that 13 situation? 14 When do you think you lost control of that 15 situation? 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 A: As far as I'm concerned, it's when 20 the bus and the car came out of the parking lot. 21 Q: And I've already asked you some 22 questions about that, so I won't go back to that. 23 In fact, Deputy Commissioner Carson, you 24 were aware even at the time that you were making the 25 decision to send the CMU in, that you were subject to

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1 criticism for not being in control of the situation at 2 that moment in time, isn't that correct? 3 A: I was subject to criticism? 4 Q: Yes, yes. 5 6 (BRIEF PAUSE) 7 8 A: Unless you're referring to the 9 political statements that we reviewed earlier, I don't 10 believe I was being criticized by anyone. 11 Q: All right. Well, let's take the 12 political statements. Certainly the political statements 13 would have led you to believe that people were 14 questioning you for having lost control of the situation; 15 fair? 16 A: Well, it was being questioned. I 17 wasn't -- I didn't -- I didn't feel I was being 18 questioned personally, quite frankly, but maybe Ontario 19 Provincial Police in a general way, I guess you might 20 interpret that. 21 Q: But regardless of whether you felt 22 you had control of the situation, you could only 23 interpret some of the comments that were being repeated 24 to you as being criticisms of you for not having 25 maintained control of the situation; isn't that right?

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1 A: Sure. 2 Q: That was the gist of the comments of 3 Premier Harris, was that mistakes were made, they should 4 have taken action right at the time; correct? 5 A: That's what he said. 6 Q: All right, and I'm -- I'm going to 7 suggest to you, Deputy Commissioner Carson, that frankly, 8 you were subject to criticism from other quarters for not 9 -- for not having controlled the situation better than 10 you did. 11 Is that not right? 12 A: Well, like, you know, I guess when 13 you look at all the circumstances, we were probably being 14 criticised from every which angle. 15 I mean, there was no one who was happy 16 about this, regardless whether you're talking the -- the 17 local community, the municipality, the First Nations 18 Band, I mean everyone had an opinion. And we're not 19 necessarily agreed that we were handling it they would 20 have each -- would prefer it to be handled. 21 Q: But you were -- you were subject to 22 criticism from your own superiors, I suggest, for not 23 having maintained containment of the situation from the 24 beginning. 25 A: I totally disagree with that.

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1 Q: Well, I -- I would like to replay a 2 tape of a conversation you had with Superintendent Parkin 3 and this is one of the first conversations that you had 4 with him in -- I think it's the morning of September 5. 5 A: Okay. 6 Q: And in this particular case, I want 7 to replay the tape, Commissioner, because it's not the 8 words on the page, it's the sense that one gets from the 9 conversation that I'm interested in having the witness 10 hear. 11 A: Is there a transcript to this? 12 Q: There is a transcript. It's at Tab 13 6, I believe, of 444(a). Is that right? 14 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Yes, it starts at page 15 22 or Tab 6. 16 17 CONTINUED BY MR. WILLIAM HORTON: 18 Q: And we're going to pick up the 19 conversation partway through. This is a conversation 20 where it -- it looks to be, Deputy Commissioner Carson, 21 the first conversation that you had with Superintendent 22 Parkin after the Park was occupied. 23 You can read this. Yeah, it's -- it's 24 September -- it's a conversation that takes place on 25 September the 5th at 9 -- approximately 9:43 in the

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1 morning. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Are you 3 going to play the whole tape or just a part? 4 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: No, no, just -- 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: What part of 6 it are we referring to? What page? 7 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: The part I believe 8 we're going to play is a part that starts on page 33. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Page 33. 10 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: Half way down with 11 the words "So how close is our inner perimeter?" 12 MR. DERRY MILLAR: These things aren't 13 divided up. 14 15 (AUDIOTAPE PLAYED) 16 17 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: Commissioner, it's 18 difficult to find the exact right spot. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 20 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: So we're playing it 21 through. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 23 24 (AUDIOTAPE PLAYED) 25

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1 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Where Mr. Horton 2 wanted to start is at 7:58 on this -- 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I have 4 that. 5 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Could you give the 6 page number of the transcript? 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's 33. 8 9 (AUDIOTAPE CONTINUED) (TRANSCRIPT FOLLOWS) 10 11 PARKIN: So how close is our inner perimeter? 12 CARSON: Not very, ah were probably half a 13 kilometre out. 14 PARKIN: So we don't have Matheson Drive. 15 CARSON: No there's ah trees across Matheson Drive. 16 Apparently and we got ah ah Jimmy DYKE and 17 Donny BELL up here and they're going down 18 there now to have a have a look see. Ah 19 we don't know you know it appears they may 20 even have for the most part went back into 21 the military base ah through the night. 22 We don't know to what degree and we're 23 asking for the helicopter as we speak to 24 come down so we can have a look from 25 above.

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1 PARKIN: So I guess what I'm hearing is we don't 2 have containment. 3 CARSON: Not well we don't know what we have like 4 we we don't have containment as as we 5 normally understand it, no. 6 PARKIN: So they can go in between the park and the 7 grounds without us being aware. 8 CARSON: That's right and what they've done is 9 they've locked Matheson Drive gate so you 10 can't get down it at this point and 11 they've also cut a whole in the fence so 12 they can drive right through the end of 13 the park, you know free wheel right out 14 there. 15 PARKIN: Ah do we have any Marine in the water? 16 CARSON: Ah that's being done as we speak. 17 PARKIN: Okay. And your next meeting is at ah 18 twelve (12) o'clock? 19 CARSON: Ah eleven (11). 20 PARKIN: Okay. 21 CARSON: Ah we're our guys are the crime guys are 22 getting ah our pursuant three warrants for 23 the incidence involving the cruiser and ah 24 the flare and that. We know we have 25 identified the people involved.

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1 PARKIN: Warrants being obtained. 2 CARSON: Now we're if if the 3 PARKIN: (U/i) charges Mischief. 4 CARSON: Ah there's ah yeah Mischief and then there 5 will be ah. 6 PARKIN: Assault Police. 7 CARSON: Ah yeah Assault Police and probably a 8 Possession of Weapon Dangerous or 9 something along that line. 10 PARKIN: And um subjects ah identified. 11 CARSON: Yep. 12 PARKIN: So we're getting warrants by name. 13 CARSON: Right. Hopefully you know ah and and we 14 will once we obtain the warrants we will 15 make a press release on that. 16 PARKIN: Uhum. 17 CARSON: And hopefully an opportunity will p9resent 18 itself that we can scoop those guys. We 19 don't know if we can or we can't MR. DAVID 20 BUTT: you know I think we have lots of 21 people here in daylight ah that we may be 22 able to ah get into the park while I we 23 know they've parked some junk CARSON: in 24 around the entrance to the you know the 25 normal driveway but we don't know to what

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1 degree. So if we can develop that 2 information and see then maybe we can put 3 the ERT right back inside the park if we 4 can get access. 5 PARKIN: Ah ah I'm only going to ask this question 6 because I'm sure that the Chief is 7 probably going to ask it. How did we ah 8 given the fact we have people there when 9 this all happened. How did we lose 10 containment? (U/i). 11 CARSON: Ah well it was a matter of safety. Like 12 somebody is going to get their head caved 13 in if we'd of stayed in there. 14 PARKIN: Okay. 15 CARSON: Cause they were really getting getting 16 irate with our guys and ah ah I would 17 suggest the damage to the cruiser was you 18 know indicative of what more we were going 19 to get into. 20 PARKIN: What was the damage to the cruiser done 21 by? 22 CARSON: Who. 23 PARKIN: What did they use to do the damage? 24 CARSON: Um. I (u/i). 25 PARKIN: Kept booting the doors.

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1 CARSON: No no they smashed the back window out of 2 it. 3 PARKIN: Uh huh. 4 CARSON: I'm not sure what what you know device 5 they used but somehow or another they 6 smashed (u/i) through a rock through it or 7 a baseball bat or something. But they 8 they were prepared to to take us on at 9 that point and we just didn't have the 10 numbers to do it. Because all we had was 11 the one (1) District ERT at that time with 12 ah, with ah eight (8) in one (1), you 13 know, ah ah. 14 PARKIN: How many how many people do we think we 15 are dealing with? 16 CARSON: Well there was up to forty (40) ah ah ah I 17 would suggest at the height of it there 18 for a while and the the women and the kids 19 are in there too of course. 20 PARKIN: Okay any anything else that you want to 21 give me while I've got you on the phone. 22 CARSON: Ah I think that's about it ah we're we're 23 going to try and ah go down and talk to 24 them (u/i) of course that's what we want 25 to do ah. The township is ah pursue in

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1 getting their legal house in order if a if 2 we can't get the roadway clear or have any 3 trouble with that they're going to get an 4 injunction for the roadway too. 5 PARKIN: Where are we talking? 6 CARSON: Matheson Drive. 7 PARKIN: Yeah. No I ah yeah sorry bad question. 8 Where where are we doing our negotiating 9 from? 10 CARSON: Well we don't know yet ah they said last 11 night that they were prepared to to talk 12 to us at noon and ah like you know we're 13 we're, will have to play that by ear as we 14 develop that. 15 PARKIN: Okay. Ah. 16 CARSON: Cause what what I would like to do like 17 like or or if we can achieve it is get ERT 18 inserted into the Park so at least we're 19 just in there and in their face even you 20 know, not not to physically scoop em and 21 drag them out but just just to be in there 22 and keep an eye on their activities. 23 PARKIN: But you can't your problem now as I 24 understand you is you can't drive onto 25 Matheson.

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1 CARSON: We can't that's right that's right. 2 PARKIN: You've got it blocked off and what are 3 they fell trees across the road. 4 CARSON: That's what it sounds like yeah. 5 PARKIN: So you need the helicopter? 6 CARSON: Yep. 7 PARKIN: And and are you looking after that? 8 CARSON: That's being addressed ah I just talked to 9 Mark here in a minute see how he made out. 10 PARKIN: Okay um are you getting calls from any ah 11 is anybody getting to you the park and 12 government officials. We've been talking 13 to BEAUBIEN this morning. 14 CARSON: Yeah he ah he called LACROIX. The 15 LACROIX's handled that ah so he's kind of 16 run ah interference for us that way. 17 PARKIN: Is somebody else bothering you or media 18 getting to your (u/i). 19 CARSON: Ah no Doug's doing an excellent job 20 handling that, ah Ken WILLIAMS the 21 Administrator from the Town of Bosanquet 22 ah was here. We talked to him. MNR has 23 been here ah doing you know anything we 24 want. If we want front end loaders or 25 chainsaws, whatever the township is ah

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1 more than happy to help us out. 2 PARKIN: Ah, is twenty-one (21) Highway still open? 3 CARSON: Oh yeah. 4 PARKIN: Okay. 5 CARSON: Yeah. 6 PARKIN: So basically then, I guess our containment 7 is Ipperwash and the Military Base. 8 That's the inner perimeter? 9 CARSON: Ah not the Military Base. Just just 10 access ah through down on ah Army Camp 11 Road (u/i). 12 PARKIN: And from the cottages eh? 13 CARSON: Yep, yep. I mean we have no way of really 14 containing the Military Base really. Not 15 not you know and be any effectiveness to 16 it whatsoever. 17 PARKIN: Okay. And you have enought ah resources 18 there now? 19 CARSON: I think so I think so I'm pretty 20 comfortable with that. 21 PARKIN: So what have you got you've got ah. 22 CARSON: T (u/i) six (6) and three (3) District ERT 23 are on the ground now and one (1) and two 24 (2) District are in bed. 25 PARKIN: Okay.

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1 CARSON: I've got use of ah St. John's Ambulance ah 2 ah Command Post vehicle that's being used 3 for like ah talk down near there. 4 PARKIN: So you've got the trailer ah right at 5 Forest Detachment? 6 CARSON: That's where I'm talking to you from yep. 7 PARKIN: Okay so the media aren't bothering you 8 there. 9 CARSON: No no not. 10 PARKIN: (u/i) they're using the Legion. 11 CARSON: Yep. 12 PARKIN: What em. Ah ah in you're your relief. 13 CARSON: Yes. 14 PARKIN: Ah. 15 CARSON: My relief. 16 PARKIN: Yeah. 17 CARSON: Okay I haven't address it. Ah what I did 18 ah is I worked off about ah ah one (1) 19 thirty (30) and then I went to bed and ah 20 and then I was back in here for seven (7). 21 PARKIN: Okay, so you're good for. 22 CARSON: Yep oh yeah yeah I'm okay today. 23 PARKIN: Um okay but what um and Dale will be 24 coming in. 25 CARSON: I haven't talk to Dale there's a note here

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1 to call. I guess he's ah waiting for my 2 ah call. 3 PARKIN: I guess you guys should come up with when 4 you're going to do the switch. 5 CARSON: Yep. Yep. 6 PARKIN: Okay. 7 CARSON: Yep. 8 PARKIN: All right so the bottom line is like I say 9 ah I won't we won't be bothering you. 10 CARSON: Yep. 11 PARKIN: You know. 12 CARSON: Yep. 13 PARKIN: We'll wait for your calls. 14 CARSON: Okay. 15 PARKIN: And um the only thing that might happen 16 either later today is that ah the Chief 17 and I may come. 18 CARSON: Yep, that's fine. 19 PARKIN: But that will only be to see you. 20 CARSON: Yep. 21 PARKIN: And ah to to show support and then leave. 22 CARSON: Yep. 23 PARKIN: Okay. 24 CARSON: You know I'd I'd welcome that. I don't 25 have any trouble with that.

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1 PARKIN: Okay. 2 CARSON: Yep. 3 PARKIN: But we'll let you know. 4 CARSON: Yep. 5 PARKIN: And if it doesn't happen today then it 6 might be tomorrow or whatever it just 7 depends on how things are going. 8 CARSON: Yep well I think ah were in reasonably 9 good shape ah ah you know I think the the 10 planning we did has paid off in the short 11 term ah, you know there's some organized 12 confusion but but I think for the most 13 part it's ah ah as well as we could 14 expect. 15 PARKIN: Yeah I'm just um I guess it's it's 16 unfortunate we couldn't maintain the park. 17 CARSON: Well huh. 18 PARKIN: But that's a decision that has to be made 19 by the people that ah we you say. I mean 20 if ah we're going to get beat up for (u/i) 21 that reason. 22 CARSON: Well that's right and we we could have 23 maintained the park if we had every you 24 know the numbers that people have here 25 now. At that time we probably could of

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1 maintained it but you know it would have 2 it would have meant somebody getting hurt 3 last night. 4 PARKIN: Ah they're going to say we got caught by 5 surprise. Is that accurate? 6 CARSON: Ahhh not. 7 PARKIN: They're going to say that well we knew 8 this this was going to happen. 9 CARSON: Well we anticipated it and we anticipated 10 that it would happen when we weren't there 11 at all is what we anticipated. So the 12 fact that we were there is is a bonus. 13 (Laughs) I guess from a public safety 14 point of view. We really expected it to 15 happen today after our presence had had 16 left, but they chose to do it when we were 17 still around so ah you know we had 18 anticipated em doing it, ah you know we 19 just didn't know when. 20 PARKIN: Okay, alright I let you go. 21 CARSON: Okay. 22 PARKIN: And ah we'll be talking to you at around 23 noon. 24 CARSON: Okay. 25 PARKIN: Alright.

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1 CARSON: Thank you. 2 PARKIN: Bye. 3 CARSON: Right bye. 4 5 End of conversation. 6 7 CONTINUED BY MR. WILLIAM HORTON: 8 Q: Deputy Commissioner Carson, when I 9 listen to that transcript, it's -- it's clear to me and 10 I'm asking you to tell me whether it's -- was clear to 11 you that the loss of containment of the Park was a major 12 concern of Superintendent Parkin in that conversation? 13 A: I would disagree with your 14 conclusion. 15 Q: The fact that you kept discussing a 16 number of different aspects of the thing and he keep -- 17 kept coming back to the issue of how disappointed he was 18 that containment had been lost, did not suggest to you 19 that that was a serious concern in his mind as to how 20 containment had been lost and how that was going to be 21 explained. 22 That didn't suggest that to you? 23 A: Not at all. 24 Q: And, the fact that he said, Well, I'm 25 going to ask you this because the chief is going to ask

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1 me this, how did we lose containment, that didn't suggest 2 to you that he was a bit surprised and disappointed to 3 hear that you'd lost containment? 4 A: I would suggest he would prefer we 5 could have done it differently, but it didn't work out 6 that way and he wanted the facts and that's his role to 7 ask those questions and I wouldn't be surprised for him 8 to ask that question. 9 Q: No, I'm -- I'm not questioning that 10 it's his role, Deputy Commissioner. When he says at one 11 (1) point in the conversation, You know, we might get 12 beat up over it, that didn't suggest to you that he was 13 concerned that the OPP might be criticized for having 14 lost containment when you had advance notice? 15 A: No. 16 Q: And when he talked about how we could 17 be criticized because we had advance notice, that didn't 18 suggest to you that he was implying that there would be 19 criticism of that? 20 A: No. I -- I certainly didn't take 21 that. 22 Q: And... 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25

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1 Q: Later on when you heard that Mike 2 Harris had been criticizing the OPP for not having -- for 3 having made mistakes right at the beginning. 4 You understood that to be a reference to 5 having lost containment, did you not? 6 A: Sure. At initial stages, yes. 7 Q: And that was really related to the 8 same kind of subject matter that you were discussing with 9 Superintendent Parkin in this telephone conversation, was 10 it not? Lost of containment. 11 A: Sure. Sure. 12 Q: How come you lost containment when 13 you had advance notice, right? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: That made you look as if you were 16 ineffective in doing your job. Isn't that right? 17 A: I totally disagree with you. 18 Q: And I -- I just note, Deputy 19 Commissioner Carson, that in this course of this phone 20 call, Superintendent Parkin learned that the line was 21 being taped? Do you -- do you recall that? 22 A: Could be. 23 Q: I think it was -- 24 A: I don't think we played that part. 25 This could be the tape that I told him.

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1 Q: Yeah. It's -- it's early on in the 2 conversation. 3 A: Oh, that's fair. 4 Q: And I suggest to you that as explicit 5 as Superintendent Parkin was in this -- in raising his 6 concerns that that was not the end of the conversation 7 about containment. 8 You had further conversations with 9 Superintendent Parkin about that subject, did you not? 10 A: About which subject? 11 Q: About the loss of containment. 12 A: No. 13 Q: I'm curious about the fact that we 14 don't have a -- a record of substantive discussions. I 15 know there's one (1) other tape I think on the following 16 morning of a conversation with Inspector Parkin but I 17 don't believe we have any other substantive record of 18 discussions between you and Parkin or Coles. 19 I would like to just be clear. Have you 20 told us at this point in the Inquiry everything you can 21 remember about the conversations that you did have with 22 Parkin and Coles regarding this incident before you sent 23 in the CMU? 24 A: Yes, I have. 25 Q: And as -- as I recall, correct me if

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1 I'm wrong and I won't go into it anymore deeply than 2 that. You actually don't have a very clear recollection 3 of what was discussed with Parkin and Coles when they 4 came to visit you on the 6th; is that correct? 5 A: No. I kept no record of it. 6 Q: Yeah. And -- and you have no 7 recollection of it? 8 A: No. It was ten (10) years ago. 9 Q: But I'm going to suggest, Deputy 10 Commissioner Carson, that you did talk to them about the 11 loss of containment and how that happened. And that was 12 one (1) of the things they were very curious to find out 13 about from you in that meeting. 14 A: I'm sure I would have explained the 15 circumstances up to that point and probably would have 16 had some discussion about it, sure. 17 Q: And I suggest to you that at that 18 meeting, there would have been some discussion about the 19 fact that an explanation was required because there was 20 criticism from political quarters for having lost control 21 of the situation? 22 A: No, there was not. I don't recall 23 any discussion of that nature whatsoever. 24 Q: But apart -- apart from saying that, 25 you really don't have two (2) hours worth of conversation

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1 that you can -- you can relay to us? 2 A: I would suggest to you, that 3 Superintendent Parkin and Chief Superintendent Coles 4 would be more than prepared to answer any questions in 5 regards to our discussions. 6 And at no time did I ever feel I was being 7 criticized in any way for the -- my involvement in this 8 incident. 9 Q: I suggest to you, Deputy 10 Commissioner, that with the loss of containment, with the 11 political criticism that you'd been hearing about, that 12 you were extremely concerned about the fact that you were 13 looking as weak and you were looking as if you had lost 14 control of this situation. Is that not correct? 15 A: It's absolutely not correct. 16 Q: And I suggest to you that your 17 judgment, whatever judgments you made regarding sending 18 in the CMU on the evening of September 6th can be better 19 understood with reference to your concerns about 20 criticism of your activities to that point, than by any 21 of the reasons that you've given the Commissioner to 22 date? 23 A: I disagree with you. 24 Q: And in the conversation that we've 25 just had -- in the conversation that we've just heard

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1 between yourself and Commissioner (sic) Parkin, there was 2 a reference to regular reporting with Parkin? 3 A: Sure, yes. 4 Q: And prior -- in the three (3) hours 5 that took place between your hearing about the incidents 6 in the parking lot and your deploying the CMU and the 7 TRU, you personally had no conversations with Inspector 8 Parkin? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: I suggest to you that that's because, 11 based on what had already taken place, you knew that 12 Inspector Parkin and -- sorry, Superintendent Parkin and 13 Chief Superintendent Coles were on side with taking 14 advantage of an opportunity that would make the OPP look 15 like they were in control of the situation. 16 A: That's absolutely false. 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 Q: Now, Commissioner, I -- 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'd like to 22 keep going until your done. 23 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: No, no, I was going 24 to suggest that. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. How

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1 much longer do you think you might be? 2 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: I think I can finish 3 in about twenty (20) minutes. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, I 5 think we should just keep -- 6 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: Yes. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- going 8 until you finish. 9 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: I just wanted 10 permission to do that. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Fine. 12 Unless -- 13 MR. MARK SANDLER: I have no objection -- 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Unless the 15 Deputy -- 16 MR. MARK SANDLER: -- to it, but I'd like 17 the Deputy Commissioner to be -- 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I'm 19 sorry, I should have asked. Unless the Deputy feels 20 otherwise, because you haven't been well. 21 Are you okay for another twenty (20) 22 minutes? 23 THE WITNESS: I'd like to -- 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You'd like 25 to finish, too? So let's carry on.

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1 2 CONTINUED BY MR. WILLIAM HORTON: 3 Q: Now, Deputy Commissioner Carson, I 4 want to just take a slightly different perspective on 5 some evidence you gave when questioned by Mr. Millar and 6 it was in relation to the cottagers and you were asked a 7 question and you gave this answer. 8 For those who are interested, I believe 9 it's on page 66 and 67 -- I think so, of the transcript 10 of May 30th. 11 You said: 12 "I don't think I could have imposed any 13 control on the group of people that 14 Mark Wright had met with. If the 15 cottages were broken into or damaged in 16 any way, our credibility would have 17 been lost and the cottagers would have 18 taken it into their own hands. 19 I think their confidence level was on 20 edge." 21 Do you recall saying words to that effect? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: Deputy Commissioner, the -- this 24 Commission of Inquiry has been trying to look at these 25 events in a historical context and I just want to

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1 encourage you to look at that those comments from a First 2 Nation perspective and see if you can assist me as to the 3 appropriateness of the -- of your thought process when -- 4 when you thought these thoughts. 5 I gather what you were saying in those 6 comments is that people who feel that the law is not 7 protecting their rights, lose confidence in the law and 8 law enforcement personnel. 9 Is that part of what you were trying to 10 say? 11 A: That's fair. 12 Q: And that when they lose confidence in 13 the law and in law enforcement personnel, they might 14 become difficult to control. 15 Is that a fair reading of your evidence? 16 A: That's fair. 17 Q: And in fact, if they don't feel that 18 the law and law enforcement personnel are protecting 19 their legitimate rights, they may take matters into their 20 own hands, right? 21 A: Correct 22 Q: And in this situation, can you see 23 how those words sound from a First Nations perspective 24 when -- particularly with reference to this parcel which 25 I understand you'd researched?

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1 We won't get into the technicalities, as 2 people could be right or wrong about that, but we clearly 3 -- and you knew, from your own research of this situation 4 -- people who, for many views, were of the view that the 5 law was not protecting their legitimate interests, 6 correct? 7 A: In regards to the land claims? 8 Q: In -- in regard to the Camp, in 9 regard to the land, in regard to how they were dealt with 10 on two thousand (2,000) acres of land, not just the 11 cottages that you were concerned about that night? 12 A: But the -- the dispute in regards to 13 the Military Base was certainly with the federal 14 authorities who had an agreement with them. I would 15 suggest it wasn't a point of law in regards to what the 16 police were doing or not doing in regards to the Military 17 Base. 18 Q: You -- you don't understand then, 19 Commissioner, and you're free to understand it or not or 20 -- or whatever, but I'd like to know whether or not you 21 have any perception of how these words might be taken to 22 apply to the First Nations situation? 23 A: I certainly understood their 24 frustrations. I've never made any qualms about the fact 25 that they were certainly frustrated over the issue of the

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1 Military Base, but from a policing point of view we also 2 have to be mindful of all the other issues in regards to 3 the rightful way of -- of land claims and those are the 4 kinds of discussions I had with the likes of Tom 5 Bressette and others in regards to whether there was or 6 was not any claim to the property and all of that issue. 7 Q: But you're no more an expert in land 8 claims than you are in injunctions, right? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: You're no more an expert in the -- 11 the possible grounds for setting aside a transfer from a 12 private citizen to the government based on a surrender; 13 that -- that's not part of your expertise, is it? 14 A: Not at all. 15 Q: And you are not an expert on which 16 group of First Nations might have the legal right to 17 assert a claim to one (1) parcel of land or another? 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: And all of those matters are as much 20 open to being determined by the courts and the legal 21 process as the rights of the cottagers, isn't that right? 22 A: That's fair. That's exactly what was 23 going on in West Ipperwash at that time. 24 Q: You weren't entitled to make a 25 determination that would put the rights of the cottagers

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1 ahead of the rights of the First Nations people in terms 2 of those kinds of issues, property claims, were you? 3 A: I -- I had no position on property 4 claims. 5 Q: And yet, I suggest to you that what 6 you were doing on the evening of September the 6th is you 7 were putting the concerns about the cottagers ahead of 8 the personal safety of the occupiers of the Park, isn't 9 that correct? 10 A: That's not my opinion. 11 Q: I'd also like to focus on some 12 comments that you made about the same point in the 13 transcript where you said now the focus would be -- 14 because of this altercation and the subsequent shooting 15 that this wasn't somebody else anymore, it -- this was 16 not about somebody else anymore, it was about the police. 17 And, is -- is that correct that that was 18 your first reaction when you heard that occupiers had 19 been shot in this incident that came about as a result of 20 your decisions, that the concern now was that this was 21 about the police? Is that right? 22 A: Well, it's in a broader context than 23 that, but this -- what I was trying to point out is that 24 the frustration that had been experienced in the past 25 with the Military Base and the land claim issue now was

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1 going to be focussed on the issues with the altercation 2 with the police where, in the past, the -- the dispute 3 had never been a native/police issue, but now the issues 4 obviously were going to be police and the First Nations 5 community. 6 Q: So, we have -- we have people shot, 7 ultimately fatally, and your first concern is for the 8 reputation of the OPP in this situation, is that right? 9 A: No. That's not fair. 10 Q: And, your -- your concern is now the 11 OPP is going to become a victim of -- of criticism 12 because of this incident, is that -- is that what I'm to 13 take from your words? 14 A: No. That's -- that's not what I'm 15 saying there at all. 16 Q: Isn't that exactly what you said, 17 this wasn't about somebody else anymore, it was about the 18 police? 19 A: The -- the whole situation was 20 changing; the -- the whole context of the situation has 21 changed. 22 Q: And I suggest to you, Deputy 23 Commissioner, that in fact, the words you gave in that 24 evidence perfectly sums up your attitude towards the 25 situation, which is that the -- the main challenge that

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1 that situation created for you, was to protect the 2 reputation and credibility of the OPP in reference to 3 theses events; isn't that -- isn't that correct? 4 A: I don't agree. 5 Q: And finally, Deputy Commissioner 6 Carson, I want to refer to a statement that you made in 7 your evidence. Again I can turn up the exact reference. 8 You're speaking about how you and your officers handled 9 this situation. 10 You stated; "Everybody did their best."' 11 Do you recall saying that? 12 A: I believe I did, yes. 13 Q: And do you honestly believe that to 14 be true, "Everybody did their best."? 15 A: To the best of my knowledge, 16 everybody was doing the best they could. 17 Q: So if similar circumstances were to 18 arise today, we can expect the same sorts of judgements 19 to be made by you and by officers of the OPP; is that 20 fair? 21 A: I would suggest not necessarily, no. 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 MR. WILLIAM HORTON: Thank you,

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1 Commissioner. Thank you, Deputy Commissioner. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 3 very much, Mr. Horton. 4 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Thank you. As I 5 understand that the line up tomorrow morning will be Mr. 6 Ross followed by Mr. Henderson and then Mr. Falconer. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And then Mr. 8 Sandler. 9 MR. DERRY MILLAR: And then Mr. Sandler 10 at the end, yes. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 12 We've had a long day and I hope you're feeling well 13 tomorrow. It's been a long day for you. Let's adjourn 14 now until tomorrow morning at nine o'clock. 15 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Thank you, sir. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 17 very much. 18 19 (WITNESS RETIRES) 20 21 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 22 adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday, June 28th at 9:00 a.m. 23 24 --- Upon adjourning at 5:08 P.M. 25

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1 2 Certified Correct, 3 4 5 6 7 8 _________________ 9 Carol Geehan, Ms. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25