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1 2 3 IPPERWASH PUBLIC INQUIRY 4 5 6 7 ******************** 8 9 10 BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE SIDNEY LINDEN, 11 COMMISSIONER 12 13 14 15 16 Held at: Forest Community Centre 17 Kimball Hall 18 Forest, Ontario 19 20 21 ******************** 22 23 24 June 13th, 2006 25

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1 Appearances 2 Derry Millar ) Commission Counsel 3 Susan Vella ) (np) 4 Donald Worme, Q. C ) 5 Katherine Hensel ) (np) 6 Megan Ferrier ) 7 8 Murray Klippenstein ) (np) The Estate of Dudley 9 Vilko Zbogar ) (np) George and George 10 Andrew Orkin ) (np) Family Group 11 Basil Alexander ) 12 13 Peter Rosenthal ) Aazhoodena and George 14 Jackie Esmonde ) Family Group 15 Amanda Rogers ) (np) Student-at-law 16 17 Anthony Ross ) Residents of 18 Cameron Neil ) (np) Aazhoodena (Army Camp) 19 Kevin Scullion ) 20 21 William Henderson ) (np) Kettle Point & Stony 22 Jonathon George ) Point First Nation 23 Colleen Johnson ) (np) 24 25

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1 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 Kim Twohig ) (np) Government of Ontario 3 Walter Myrka ) (np) 4 Susan Freeborn ) 5 Sheri Hebdon ) (np) Student-at-law 6 7 Janet Clermont ) Municipality of 8 David Nash ) (np) Lambton Shores 9 Nora Simpson ) (np) Student-at-law 10 11 Peter Downard ) (np) The Honourable Michael 12 Bill Hourigan ) (np) Harris 13 Jennifer McAleer ) 14 15 Ian Smith ) (np) Robert Runciman 16 Alice Mrozek ) (np) 17 18 Harvey T. Strosberg, Q.C.) (np) Charles Harnick 19 Jacqueline Horvat ) (np) 20 21 22 23 24 25

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1 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 Douglas Sulman, Q.C. ) Marcel Beaubien 3 Mary Jane Moynahan) (np) 4 Dave Jacklin ) (np) 5 Trevor Hinnegan ) (np) 6 7 Mark Sandler ) (np) Ontario Provincial 8 Andrea Tuck-Jackson ) Ontario Provincial Police 9 Leslie Kaufman ) (np) 10 11 Ian Roland ) (np) Ontario Provincial 12 Karen Jones ) Police Association & 13 Debra Newell ) (np) K. Deane 14 Ian McGilp ) (np) 15 Annie Leeks ) (np) 16 Jennifer Gleitman ) 17 Robyn Trask ) 18 Caroline Swerdlyk ) (np) 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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1 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 Julian Falconer ) Aboriginal Legal 3 Brian Eyolfson ) (np) Services of Toronto 4 Kimberly Murray ) (np) 5 Julian Roy ) (np) 6 Clem Nabigon ) (np) 7 Linda Chen ) (np) 8 Chris Darnay ) (np) 9 Sunil Mathai ) (np) 10 Adriel Weaver ) (np) Student-at-Law 11 12 Al J.C. O'Marra ) (np) Office of the Chief 13 Robert Ash, Q.C. ) (np) Coroner 14 William Horton ) (np) Chiefs of Ontario 15 Matthew Horner ) (np) 16 Kathleen Lickers ) (np) 17 18 Mark Fredrick ) (np) Christopher Hodgson 19 Craig Mills ) (np) 20 Megan Mackey ) (np) 21 Peter Lauwers ) (np) 22 Erin Tully ) (np) 23 Michelle Fernando ) 24 Maanit Zemel ) (np) 25 Patrick Greco ) (np)

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1 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 3 David Roebuck ) (np) Debbie Hutton 4 Anna Perschy ) (np) 5 Melissa Panjer ) 6 Adam Goodman ) (np) 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 PAGE NO. 3 List of Exhibits 8 4 Opening Comments 9 5 6 BRADLEY GORDON SELTZER, Sworn 7 Examination-In-Chief by Mr. Donald Worme 10 8 Cross-Examination by Ms. Andrea Tuck-Jackson 179 9 Cross-Examination by Ms. Jennifer McAleer 180 10 Cross-Examination by Ms. Melissa Panjer 183 11 Cross-Examination by Mr. Basil Alexander 184 12 Cross-Examination by Ms. Jackie Esmonde 218 13 Cross-Examination by Mr. Kevin Scullion 260 14 Cross-Examination by Mr. Julian Falconer 292 15 Cross-Examination by Ms. Karen Jones 360 16 17 18 Certificate of Transcript 370 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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1 EXHIBITS 2 No. Description Page 3 P-1701 Document Number 2005553. Resume of 4 Brad Seltzer. 11 5 P-1702 Handwritten notebook entries of S/Sgt 6 Brad Seltzer, June 08 to 16,1994, 7 February 26,1995, May 18,1995. 36 8 P-1703 Document Number 2005596. Handwritten 9 notebook entries of S/Sgt Brad Seltzer, 10 August 30 to 31, 1995. 68 11 P-1704 Document Number 2003866. Handwritten 12 notebook entries of S/Sgt Brad Seltzer, 13 September 01 to October 31, 1995. 74 14 P-1705 Document Number 2003866. Will Say of 15 S/Sgt Brad Seltzer, March 19, 2004. 169 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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1 --- Upon commencing at 9:02 a.m. 2 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 4 now in session, the Honourable Mr. Justice Linden 5 presiding. Please be seated. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 7 morning, everybody. 8 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Good morning, 9 Commissioner. Before we begin with the next witness, Nye 10 Thomas has asked that I make a short announcement. 11 And that's -- as everyone knows Nye is our 12 Director of Policy and Research and he asked me to advise 13 the parties with Part 2 standing that a discussion paper 14 on police/government relations has been prepared by the 15 Commission's Policy staff. 16 The paper has been distributed to parties 17 with Part 2 standing, so My Friends here should have it, 18 and will be posted on the Inquiry website. It's the 19 first of three (3) short discussion papers on major 20 policy areas being considered in Part 2 of the Inquiry. 21 The purpose of this paper and the two (2) 22 others still being prepared is to convey issues and 23 related questions being considered in Part 2 and to 24 encourage parties to consider them in their written and 25 oral submissions.

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1 So I simply wanted to make that 2 announcement. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 4 very much, Mr. Millar. 5 MR. DERRY MILLAR: And Mr. Worme will be 6 dealing with our next witness. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 8 morning, Mr. Worme. 9 MR. DONALD WORME: Good morning, 10 Commissioner. 11 Commissioner, we call as the next witness, 12 Bradley Seltzer. 13 14 BRADLEY GORDON SELTZER, Sworn 15 16 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR. DONALD WORME: 17 Q: Mr. Seltzer, I understand that you 18 retired from the Ontario Provincial Police in January of 19 2005? 20 A: That's correct, sir. 21 Q: Accordingly, I will, with your 22 permission, refer to you as Mr. Seltzer? 23 A: Thank you. 24 Q: Yes. Firstly, sir, if I can ask you 25 to turn to the book of documents in front of you. In

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1 that brief at Tab Number 1 you will find a document which 2 is -- which bears Inquiry Document Number 2005553. It 3 has the name, "Brad Seltzer" across the top. 4 That is your resume? 5 A: That is. 6 Q: All right. Perhaps, I can ask that 7 that be marked as the first exhibit this morning, please? 8 THE REGISTRAR: P-1701, Your Honour. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 10 11 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1701: Document Number 2005553. 12 Resume of Brad Seltzer. 13 14 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 15 Q: And, sir, I see that at the outset of 16 this that you are currently a Professor teaching law and 17 security administration in the Police Foundations Program 18 at Conestoga College Institute of Technology and Advanced 19 Learning. 20 Do I have that right? 21 A: It's Conestoga College and that's 22 correct, yes. 23 Q: Conestoga, thank you. 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And that's located in Kitchener,

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1 Waterloo? 2 A: In Kitchener, yes. 3 Q: You have, as I've indicated, been 4 retired since 2005 January, however prior to that it's 5 been some thirty (30) years as a Member of the Ontario 6 Provincial Police? 7 A: That's correct. 8 Q: Prior to joining the Police service, 9 I understand that you had been a architectural draftsman, 10 that is an architect, I take it? 11 A: As a draftsman I work for architects 12 as a technologist. 13 Q: And I understand that you had spent 14 some three (3) years working as a draftsman for the City 15 of Windsor, do I have that right? 16 A: In the City of Windsor. There was 17 different architects within the City of Windsor that I 18 work for in private practice. 19 Q: Thank you. Simultaneously, with that 20 job you had also been involved with the Canadian Reserve, 21 that is the Military Reserve? 22 A: Yes, that is correct. 23 Q: And how would I properly state that? 24 I'm not sure that I stated that right. 25 A: It is the Canadian Armed Forces

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1 Reserve, often referred to as Militia and -- 2 Q: Right. You were a commissioned rank 3 with the Essex Kent Scottish Regiment? 4 A: That's correct, sir. 5 Q: And during that period -- I 6 understand that you served there from 1968 until 1974? 7 A: That's right. 8 Q: And as part of that Army Reserve you 9 did some training and accordingly would be familiar with 10 the Canadian Forces Base Ipperwash? 11 A: I was. 12 Q: At some point in time, obviously you 13 changed professions and I wonder if you might just tell 14 us a bit about that? 15 A: The change that I made to policing 16 was certainly made with forethought and intention. I was 17 involved as you say, with the architects and I was an 18 architectural draftsman and I wanted a different career. 19 And I recognized policing to be many of 20 the things that I enjoyed about the -- the Military that 21 I had known -- the military life that I had known; the 22 respect for structure and rank structure in the -- and 23 wearing of -- proper wearing of uniform and 24 accountability and the various things that military 25 structure provided in policing, and the ability to help

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1 people. 2 Q: Indeed, in that sense, you followed 3 the -- that proud tradition in the footsteps of your 4 father? 5 A: Thank you for noting that. That's 6 very true. My father was a officer with the Ontario 7 Provincial Police, as well. 8 Q: Sir, you joined the Ontario 9 Provincial Police in 1974? 10 A: That's correct. 11 Q: Your initial posting was to the 12 Ridgemont Detachment? 13 A: Ridgetown Detachment. 14 Q: Ridgetown? 15 A: That's right. 16 Q: And where is that located? 17 A: Ridgetown is a smaller community 18 southeast of Chatham towards -- towards Lake Erie. It 19 was -- 20 Q: I take it -- I'm sorry -- 21 A: -- I was going to say it was -- it's 22 -- it was a municipal detachment at Ridgetown, policing 23 the municipality and the surrounding county. 24 Q: And that would have been through the 25 Ontario Provincial Police as part of a contract with the

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1 community? 2 A: That's correct. 3 Q: That community being on the shores of 4 Lake Erie, I take it that there would be a marine 5 component to that? 6 A: There was. There was a vessel that 7 was at Ridgetown Detachment and during the summer months 8 it was deployed to a summer posting or a summer 9 detachment that we had located within Rondeau Provincial 10 Park. 11 Q: And I see from your extensive resume 12 that you would have had some training in that respect, as 13 well, that is to say in marine policing? 14 A: The Ontario Provincial Police has its 15 own marine training course and I attended that course in 16 preparation for my policing duties at the Provincial 17 Park. 18 Q: All right. And I note, as well sir, 19 that in -- from 1989 to 2002 you had, as part of your 20 operational roles been a crisis negotiator. I'm looking 21 under the third -- the third heading, Interpersonal 22 Skills, and just below that the heading, Operational 23 Roles; do you see the fourth bullet? 24 A: Yes, from '89 to 2002. 25 Q: And I note if you turn to the second

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1 page of your resume, sir under communication skills, 2 under the listening aspect of it, you again have crisis 3 negotiator, hostage and/or barricaded persons 4 occurrences. 5 And I take it that that is part of the 6 communications skills that you would have not only 7 trained for, but developed as part of your ongoing 8 duties? 9 A: That's correct, sir. 10 Q: I just note, as a matter of interest, 11 the next bullet under that, the Operations Manager, 12 Chatham-Kent Detachment: 13 "Exhibited strong interpersonal skills 14 during a time of Detachment devolution 15 and intense change." 16 I take it that that was the change that 17 the Ontario Provincial Police underwent in 1994? We've 18 heard something about that year in this Inquiry. 19 A: Yes, sir, that's true. 20 Q: And lastly, sir, if I can ask you 21 just to refer to the final page on your resume under, 22 Community Policing, under the second bullet there, 23 Operations Manager. Again, Chatham-Kent: 24 "Discussions with the Chief, 25 Moraviantown Reserve to assess the

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1 status and future direction of First 2 Nations policing on the Reserve. 3 Attended monthly meetings of the 4 Chatham-Kent Police Service Board." 5 I wonder if you would just tell us a bit 6 about that? 7 A: Well, as the operations manager at 8 Chatham it was my responsibility to liaise with those 9 persons that would be taking service from the Ontario 10 Provincial Police and there was a strong alliance that we 11 had with the policing service at Moraviantown Reserve. 12 And it was important that the -- certainly that the OPP 13 was aware as to the feelings of the -- the Elders and the 14 Band Council at Moraviantown as to how their policing 15 function was happening. 16 They had their own police service but it 17 was administered through the Ontario Provincial Police 18 out of -- out of Chatham. So, as a need was there and 19 certainly in -- in my role it was important that I met 20 with, it was Chief Joe Snake (phonetic) that -- that I 21 would meet with, and we had good talks about -- about the 22 policing and certainly other things as well in our 23 meetings. 24 At the same time, although Chatham-Kent 25 Police Service was policing much of the area I tended to

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1 see the responsibility that was the Ontario Provincial 2 Police in the Chatham-Kent area. We were responsible for 3 401 Highway and although it's a transient population on 4 401 Highway, I often thought of 401 as being a community, 5 the community that we policed. 6 So we had a community within the community 7 of Chatham-Kent. So it was important that I maintain 8 liaison with the Chief of Police and the Police Services 9 Board at Chatham. 10 Q: I see. There were -- or perhaps I -- 11 I should put it this way, are there other First Nations 12 communities in that area that you might have had some 13 contact with? 14 A: Through my -- through my roles as -- 15 as a trainer and as a negotiator and, to a lesser degree, 16 when I was at Chatham-Kent Detachment, there was 17 involvement that I had with persons at Walpole -- at 18 Walpole Island and here at Kettle Point. 19 Q: If I can ask you to turn to the 20 appendix of your resume, I will -- I just have a couple 21 of questions remaining, sir. 22 Firstly, under Police Courses and 23 Qualifications, in 1974 the OPP orientation course; I 24 take it that would be part of your initial training at 25 the police college in Aylmer?

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1 A: Actually it was the -- the OPP 2 Training Centre itself. At the time the OPP Academy, as 3 we now refer to it, was a -- referred to as a training 4 and development centre and it was in -- on Sheppard 5 Street in downtown Toronto. 6 And so in '74 I reported there and it was 7 a three (3) week orientation course for new officers to 8 become accustomed to some of the ways of the OPP prior to 9 being trained in policing matters at the Ontario Police 10 College which was later. 11 Q: Thank you for that, sir. In 1989 you 12 have indicated a negotiator course, Hostage and 13 Barricaded Persons, at the Canadian Police College? 14 A: That's correct. 15 Q: And could you tell us a bit about 16 that as to the length of time that that particular course 17 would entail? 18 A: The negotiator course is for hostage 19 and barricaded persons. It's a course that is provided 20 by the RCMP at the Canadian Police College in Ottawa. It 21 is a nationally recognized course. It serves the needs 22 of all police agencies in Canada and I believe it's 23 recognized worldwide given that I can speak with 24 experience that on the course that I was on there was two 25 (2) officers there that were from Sweden.

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1 And it was a one (1) week course and the 2 instructors took us through academics and scenario-based 3 learning in dealing with barricaded and hostage persons. 4 Q: And just on the next page, sir, under 5 1990, Facilitator Team Training Critical Incident Stress 6 Debriefing; I take it that might be in connection with 7 the program that you've just spoken to us about, the 8 Hostage and Barricaded Persons, or did that have a more 9 broad application? 10 A: It had a different application and I 11 can speak to it. At the time the Ontario Provincial 12 Police, in what was then Number 1 District -- which I'm 13 sure it's understood it's the area surrounding Chatham. 14 Chatham was the District Headquarters so we policed the 15 areas of -- of Essex-Kent, and Lambton Counties. 16 And it was the thoughts of the chaplain of 17 the -- of the day at the Public General Hospital in 18 Sarnia that he wanted to initiate a response team to 19 critical incidents given that emergency workers were 20 suffering some stress as a result of being involved in 21 these critical incidents. 22 And it was a fire that took place in the 23 City of Sarnia at the time and just following that fire 24 there was -- there were some emergency response personnel 25 that were deeply hurt by children that had burned to

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1 death in that fire. 2 As a result of the efforts of the chaplain 3 he wanted to bring together various emergency workers. 4 And of course the Ontario Provincial Police, having 5 policed some of the area of Lambton County we were asked 6 to provide membership as well as Sarnia Police as well as 7 emergency responders from -- from fire and from hospital 8 services -- ambulance and hospital services. 9 So it was primarily a Lambton County 10 response of -- of officers. And there was myself, 11 because I was the training coordinator at the time at 12 Chatham District Headquarters for the Ontario Provincial 13 Police, I was involved. And there was quite a number of 14 us that were trained by Dr. Jeffrey Mitchell in Sarnia, 15 Dr. Jeffrey Mitchell being a world-renowned trainer in 16 critical incident stress. 17 Q: And that critical stress incident 18 debriefing is now a standard operating procedure? Is 19 that -- do I put that fairly? 20 A: I would -- I would suggest that it 21 is. It certainly -- I -- I know it to be within the OPP 22 and I think most emergency response organizations now 23 recognize it as being a necessary part of their -- of 24 their duties. 25 Q: Sir, you mention that you were in

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1 charge of training with the Chatham in-service training. 2 You commenced that role in 1981? 3 A: 1981 I started in training as a part- 4 time instructor. So I still maintained many of my 5 policing responsibilities from the detachment at 6 Ridgetown. At the same time I was as I say a part-time 7 instructor used by the training unit from our 8 headquarters in Chatham to assist with various training 9 programs. 10 Q: You continued in the training role 11 until 1996? 12 A: 1996, that's correct, yes. 13 Q: As part of that training did you have 14 yourself any training in -- in cross-cultural matters 15 particularly with respect to First Nations or perhaps 16 multi-cultural training? 17 A: As the formal training there was 18 little. I do recall, and I can go back to I -- I think 19 1974 when I came on the job, recognizing that there was a 20 library publication; and in fact I taught the contents of 21 that publication when it was delivered to -- as a -- as a 22 trainer in the early '80's. 23 And the publication was referred to as 24 multi-culturalism and the basics of the -- the 25 publication which was, as I say a training session and

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1 then the actual document became a library document in our 2 detachments. And it primarily dealt with the need to be 3 culturally sensitive to -- to persons of -- of all 4 cultural backgrounds. 5 Q: And I -- can I take from that that it 6 was not First Nations specific? 7 A: No, you're right, it was not First 8 Nations specific. 9 Q: And you understand that today at 10 least that there are First Nations specific training? 11 A: I -- I understand that, yeah. 12 Q: All right. I -- I understand that 13 you didn't have any specific training in that respect? 14 A: I did not. 15 Q: All right. 16 A: Yeah. 17 Q: In 1984 you were promoted to Corporal 18 and became Shift -- Shift Supervisor at the Chatham 19 Detachment? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: All right. And became the Chatham 22 District Negotiating Team Leader; do I have that right? 23 A: I did become eventually the Team 24 Leader and -- and I'm not sure where you see a date on 25 that. I don't recall the date exactly.

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1 Q: I don't have a date on that, sir. 2 A: Okay. 3 Q: I was hopeful you might help me with 4 that. 5 A: I -- I would say it was in the early 6 '90's some time that I -- I did progress to become the 7 Team Leader for the negotiating team out of Chatham. 8 Q: Sir, what -- what type of incidents 9 might negotiators be -- be asked to deal with, at least 10 at that point in time? 11 A: Crisis negotiators have a -- have a 12 very specific role. And crisis negotiators respond only 13 to what we term to be a critical incident and for the 14 most part it's recognized to be a threat to life 15 incident. 16 Q: Okay. Can I suggest perhaps a -- a 17 situation where people -- persons might be barricaded -- 18 A: Exactly. 19 Q: -- making demands? 20 A: More often than not. Barricaded 21 persons with firearms that refuse to give themselves up 22 to local police at the scene. 23 Q: Hostage taking incidents? 24 A: Hostage takings is one of the 25 circumstances that happens, as well.

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1 Q: All right. Had you been involved as 2 part of your role as the Chatham District negotiating 3 team, particularly team leader, in either of those types 4 of incidences? 5 A: Yes, sir I was. As a negotiator I 6 was involved in many. And when I became the team leader, 7 it was my feeling that I wanted to respond to all of the 8 calls that we had as a team. So more -- more often that 9 not, I would be responding to -- even though not as a 10 negotiator, I'd be responding as the team leader to the 11 calls that we would have for the area from Chatham 12 headquarters. 13 Q: I mentioned sir, and you agreed that 14 you retired in January '05 and you are now a Professor at 15 -- in the Police Foundations Program at the college -- 16 again the name I'm sure to get wrong. 17 A: Conestoga College in Kitchener. 18 Q: In 1994, sir you were involved in 19 training in this region and in particular, with Detective 20 Sergeant Mark Wright. Do you have a recollection on 21 that; it was with respect to the West Ipperwash 22 circumstances? 23 A: I do. Mark Wright was the Detective 24 Sergeant for the Lambton County area. And approached me 25 about assisting him to put together a training package

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1 that was deemed to be required and ask for by the 2 Detachment Commanders in Lambton county. 3 The situations that were arising in the 4 West Ipperwash beach area were of concern to the 5 Detachment Commanders, such that they raised it with Mark 6 to try and establish a training program that would be of 7 benefit to all of the officers and he asked me to help 8 him put that together. 9 The objective was to provide training so 10 that the officers would have a better understanding 11 towards a more consistent and fair approach to each of 12 these occurrences as they arose. 13 Q: And do you understand the type of 14 occurrences that this training program was put together 15 in order to respond to? 16 A: Do I personally understand them? 17 Q: Well, I'm sorry, I worded that 18 poorly. Perhaps, do you have any recollection of the 19 types of occurrences that would have been occurring? 20 A: Yes, thank you for clarifying that. 21 The occurrences were actual occurrences that had occurred 22 and were occurring, and of course that was the concern; 23 would officers respond fairly and consistently to the 24 occurrences that seem to be, you know, coming up time and 25 time again.

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1 So the -- we put together the training 2 program so that it would be a cooperative learning 3 program. And by that I mean the officers would have a 4 chance to analyse the situations for themselves and come 5 up with their own responses in groups. 6 Now, we would have anticipated responses 7 ahead of time and hopefully those would marry up with our 8 thinking. Certainly, we were open to suggestion if they 9 thought that they had a different idea. 10 But, the overview of the program was that 11 the situations were actual situations that had occurred. 12 We went to persons that had worked in the area and got 13 from them their knowledge of these various occurrences 14 that were happening. So they were actual occurrences 15 that the officers would deal with and come up with 16 suggestions as to how they should be dealt with in a fair 17 and consistent way. 18 Q: I'll ask you to turn to the document 19 at Tab 2 in the brief of documents in front of you sir. 20 It's been marked as Exhibit P-1093. And you'll see the 21 cover page bears a signature that -- perhaps that might 22 be your signature? 23 A: That's my signature, yes. 24 Q: And if you flip to the next page of 25 this. It's -- the title at the top of that is Lambton

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1 County Detachment officers. And as I understand it there 2 was mandatory training of all officers within the county 3 to attend this training? 4 A: It was mandatory, yes. 5 Q: You'll see the subject line, it says: 6 "The policy regarding the handling of 7 occurrences on CFB Ipperwash." 8 So I take it from that, sir that not only 9 was this training package in relation to the occurrences 10 that you've described on West Ipperwash -- or pardon me 11 on Ipperwash, in the Ipperwash area, but also on CFB 12 Ipperwash? 13 A: I don't recall the -- I don't recall 14 the actual occurrences that we used as having any 15 occurrences on the Base itself. There was one (1) 16 occurrence as I recall that had dealings with Matheson 17 Drive and it's perhaps for that reason that it was 18 inclusive. 19 Q: I see. If I can ask you just to turn 20 to the top of the -- of the next page on that document, 21 sir. It's a half page of written material and it -- it 22 has the -- the name "W.A. Lacroix, Staff Sergeant Lambton 23 Commander" at about the middle of the page; are you with 24 me on that? 25 A: Yes.

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1 Q: You see right at the top of the page 2 it reads: 3 "It is imperative that the Ontario 4 Provincial Police be seen at all times 5 as neutral in this ongoing land 6 dispute. Accordingly, it should not be 7 the practice of officers to take coffee 8 breaks and other extended visits at the 9 Military Base. In the event of a major 10 occurrence, such as the attempted 11 murder of the military helicopter crew 12 last summer, the ability of 13 investigators to work effectively is 14 dependent upon all parties recognizing 15 the Ontario Provincial Police as a 16 neutral law enforcement agency." 17 A: I read that, yes. 18 Q: And does that assist you at all, sir, 19 in your recollection of whether or not this training 20 package was aimed at any occurrences at the -- the Army 21 Base? 22 A: The strongest recollection that I 23 have is -- is the -- the actual occurrences themselves 24 I'm -- I'm not familiar with one having been on the Base. 25 Q: All right, thank you for that. If

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1 you can turn to the next page. It is the document that 2 bears the date May 30th, 1994. Again, it's addressed to 3 all detachment personnel: 4 "re. general policing at Ipperwash." 5 And if you just look briefly at that -- at 6 that document and the subsequent pages I take it this is 7 more of what you're referring to and what you recall? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: And specifically it deals with 10 incidents or perhaps occurrences that might -- that might 11 be occurring at the Ipperwash beach area between First 12 Nations people and what has been called cottagers. 13 A: That's right. 14 Q: All right. It goes on to set out, if 15 you look at the -- the end of the fourth bullet on page 16 2: 17 "That's what we can't do." 18 And I'm -- and I quote: 19 "That's what we can't do. Now, here's 20 what you can do when called to an 21 occurrence in this area." 22 A: Yes, I see it. 23 Q: And, again, the -- the general tenor 24 of this I'm going to suggest is it was meant to ensure 25 that the Ontario Provincial Police be seen, as I've

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1 quoted earlier, in respect to the CFB Ipperwash, be seen 2 as a neutral body that is able to enforce the law in a 3 manner that protects the public peace? 4 A: That's right. I think the -- as I 5 said before, the -- the objective being a fair and 6 consistent approach by all officers who would be 7 responding. 8 Q: I'll ask you just to flip a couple of 9 pages over. There is a further document dated May 31st 10 of '94 addressed to all members Lambton County: 11 "Subject: Operations planning regarding 12 West Ipperwash beach area." 13 And the only reason I draw your attention 14 to this is that it has in the third paragraph the 15 highlighted sentence: 16 "Mandatory training will take place..." 17 And it sets out some dates for that? 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: The balance of the document, sir, it 20 creates -- there's a number of charts. It sets out 21 various offences, some sections, facts that have to be 22 proven and it goes on to deal with different scenarios 23 and exercises, in fact. 24 And I take it that that is part of the 25 training that you would have been involved in, not only

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1 creating but also delivering to the various members of 2 the Lambton Police Service? 3 A: That's correct, sir. Every member of 4 the OPP in this area, along with there was members there 5 from Ministry of Natural Resources enforcement personnel 6 and administration personnel from Ipperwash and Pinery 7 Park. There was officers there from First Nations 8 policing at Kettle Point. 9 And, again, as I say, the objective was 10 that through discussion with each other that we would 11 ensure that every member required to attend any of these 12 occurrences would be approaching the matter informed, 13 able to do their job in a fair and consistent way. 14 Q: And you'll see in the last few pages 15 of that document, sir, there are -- it is a -- a log, 16 essentially, of the various officers that would have 17 attended and their badge numbers and the dates of 18 training that they would have been involved in? 19 A: That's right. That -- that's 20 consistent with training within the OPP as it -- members 21 attend and their attendance is kept and -- and maintained 22 that they were there. 23 Q: Would you be able to offer us an 24 opinion, sir, as to the effectiveness of this training? 25 Did you get any feedback, perhaps I -- I might put it

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1 that way? 2 A: I -- I don't recall specific feedback 3 other than from the officers themselves when they were 4 taking the training and there was some degree of relief, 5 I recall, from the officers saying that they felt more 6 comfortable now. Because not only would they have the 7 opportunity to be informed by way of this training 8 package but they had the opportunity to talk with each 9 other in cooperative learning groups to -- to go with 10 ideas and try to understand the -- the occurrences, how 11 they were occurring, why they were occurring, and come 12 with, as I say, with a consistent approach to it. 13 And certainly it would be helpful that 14 there were persons in the groups from Natural Resources 15 or persons in the group from Kettle Point policing that 16 if our anticipated responses were somewhat askew the 17 opportunity was there for us to correct and adjust and -- 18 and come up with -- with what the -- the users I suppose 19 of this information would feel more comfortable with. 20 Q: Would you say that the sense of 21 comfort that you've indicated the officers felt or at 22 least you perceived was also due in part to their ability 23 to deal with some of the criticisms that they might have 24 been facing on the ground by those to whom services are 25 delivered?

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1 A: Correct. The occurrences themselves, 2 there was a -- there was a colour of right situation 3 where First Nations on their way between Kettle Point and 4 the -- the beach -- there was a colour of right issue as 5 to whether they had the right to move through -- through 6 those areas. 7 The cottagers of course would become upset 8 because they didn't know whether the colour of right was 9 there or not and therefore they were upset with people 10 walking past 11 There were cottagers that were drinking on 12 the beach given that it was land pertinent to their 13 property. Now, First Nations people on the beach 14 drinking, it wasn't land pertinent to their property. So 15 the fairness of the approach was very important to us. 16 There was issues of vending concessions 17 set up so was it fair for one (1) and not the other? So 18 it was through matters such as this for us to actually 19 vet these situations out in groups. 20 The anticipated responses were vetted by 21 the Crown Attorney for Lambton ahead of time so that we 22 knew that the anticipated responses at least would comply 23 with something that he would accept should it come to -- 24 to his court or to the court. And -- and again, as I 25 say, the officers having a chance to discuss it and come

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1 up with their own solutions. 2 I think there was a higher degree of 3 comfort level so that at two o'clock in the morning any 4 officer would be able to respond with the same feeling 5 that the officer did the night before or the day before. 6 Q: Thank you, sir. May I ask you to 7 turn to the document at Tab 3. These are copies of your 8 notes. They are redacted copies. You'll see at the 9 first page there's the number "61" at the bottom of the 10 page, Wednesday, 08 June, '94? 11 A: That's correct, yes. 12 Q: All right. And if you go on to the 13 next page the entry at 10:00 hours perhaps you'll help me 14 with -- with that -- with that entry? 15 A: May I refer to my original notes just 16 to clarify the -- this point? 17 Q: Perhaps if you can take a look at 18 those and I'll just ask you a question relative to your 19 original notes? 20 A: These are my original notes, yes. 21 Q: And does it correspond to the copy 22 that we are looking at at Tab 4 of the book of -- the 23 brief of documents? 24 A: Yes, I recognize them to be the same. 25 Q: Okay. Perhaps, Commissioner, I'll

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1 ask that that be made the next exhibit? 2 THE REGISTRAR: P-1702. 3 4 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1702: Handwritten notebook entries 5 of S/Sgt Brad Seltzer, June 6 08 to 16,1994, February 7 26,1995, May 18,1995. 8 9 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 10 Q: The entry then at -- is that 10:00 11 hours? 12 A: 10:00 hours, yes. And -- and my -- 13 my writing I'm reading to say: 14 "Training prep with Detective Sergeant 15 Mark Wright re. Ipperwash." 16 Q: And similarly under the entry of 17 Thursday, 09 January -- pardon me, June '94, there's an 18 entry at 08:30 hours? 19 A: "Preparations for Lambton County 20 Ipperwash training." 21 Q: Further at the bottom of the page 22 Friday, 10 June '94, there are entries there relative to 23 the training at -- again at 10 -- pardon me at... 24 A: That entry starts at 6:50, so it'd be 25 ten (10) to 7:00 in the morning. And in addition to

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1 other administration duties I also note that I made 2 preparations just dash Ipperwash. 3 Q: And if you turn to the next page, 4 sir, page 63, Monday, 13 June, '94, the entry at 09:00 5 hours? 6 A: "Operations planning, prepare 7 teaching points and hand out for 8 Ipperwash training." 9 Q: And I'm going to suggest to you, sir 10 that on the balance of the notations in here, I'll flip 11 you through here fairly quickly, at page 64, Tuesday, 14 12 June, '94 the entry at 07:45 hours, it would appear that 13 at least from 08:00 to 16:00, present Ipperwash operation 14 plan? 15 A: That's correct. 16 Q: That would be the plan that I've just 17 taken you through -- 18 A: That's right -- 19 Q: -- and you've confirmed for us. At 20 10:30 hours? 21 A: "Present Ipperwash operations plan to 22 Lambton Members with Detective Sergeant 23 Wright and Staff Sergeant Lacroix." 24 Q: And on Wednesday the -- 15 June, '94, 25 page 65 of those notes, the last entry at 08:00?

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1 A: At 08:00: 2 "Reported for duty, travel to Sombra 3 08:00 to 16:00 present operations 4 Ipperwash operations plan." 5 And I show 09:00 arrive Sombra, set up and 6 at 10:00 present operations plan. 7 Q: Again that's consistent with what 8 you've told us, it would be consistent with the log 9 report that I just asked you to take a look at? 10 A: That's right. That training package 11 was presented in several locations for the convenience of 12 the officer's attendance, some of them were off duty, of 13 course, and were travelling from home. 14 So the -- that training package was 15 delivered at several locations, detachment locations and 16 other where -- this room was actually used for one (1) 17 training session throughout Lambton County. 18 Q: Thank you sir. At page 80 of that, I 19 take it to be the same notebook and you'll confirm for me 20 if it is or not. There's an entry -- we don't have a 21 date on the redacted copy although there is a date penned 22 in at the top, it says February 26th, of 1995. 23 A: That's a different notebook. 24 25 (BRIEF PAUSE)

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1 A: On page 80 -- 2 Q: The entry at 23:00 is what I'm 3 interested sir -- 4 A: Correct and my notebook shows the 5 date was Sunday the 26th of February, '95. 6 Q: Right. Can you read that entry at 7 23:00? 8 A: At 23:00: 9 "Recalled by Inspector Linton, 10 negotiators required at Forest for 11 03:00 reference or re. apprehension of 12 parolee Darrell Lee George." 13 Q: Now, we heard something about that 14 incident, sir, and we understand that that was a 15 barricade type situation? 16 A: That was, yes. 17 Q: Perhaps you might just go ahead and 18 take a look at the following page, the entry at -- maybe 19 I'll just ask you to read a bit of that for us, if you 20 would. Perhaps down to 02:35. 21 A: And you want me to begin at the top 22 of the page? 23 Q: If you would, please. 24 A: At 23:20: 25 "I called Paul Wardle there was no

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1 answer." 2 Paul was a negotiator. 3 "At 23:25 I called Bob Bembridge. At 4 23:50 at DHQ --" 5 Which was reference to a district 6 headquarters. 7 "Equipment ready. At 00:30 hours 8 travel accompanied by Sergeant 9 Bembridge. Re-fueled en route and at 10 2:10 arrive Forest Detachment briefing 11 notes that followed Darrell Lee George 12 date of birth 21 of January '58 and 13 notes reference to him." 14 Shall I read? 15 Q: That's fine. We don't necessarily 16 need to have those notes, but this was the individual 17 that was involved, as we come to understand in a 18 barricade situation at the Kettle Point First Nation? 19 A: That's correct. 20 Q: All right. At the top of the 21 following page at page 82, that entry and if I may 22 venture to read that: 23 "Darrell called Wally Kaczanowski" 24 That's correct, is it? 25 A: That's correct.

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1 Q: And we understand Walter Kaczanowski 2 was a Kettle Point police service officer? 3 A: That's correct. That's correct. 4 "Darrell called Wally Kaczanowski that 5 he knew of his being turned in by his 6 girlfriend and that he wouldn't be 7 going easily. Briefing Officer was 8 Sergeant Mark Wright, he advises that 9 surveillance all day reveals Darrell to 10 be home. There is no car. His 11 girlfriend's car removed by KP Police 12 [meaning Kettle Point Police] and 13 reported in possession of a knife 14 always. John Peltier, FNC [meaning 15 First Nations Constable] was talking to 16 Darrell earlier this week. Darrell 17 bragged that he could acquire an AK-47 18 firearm. 02:45 John was talking to him 19 earlier tonight [meaning John Peltier] 20 talking to him earlier tonight. No 21 warrants for assault or possession. 22 03:30 telephone --" 23 Q: That -- that number is redacted as 24 you can see on the photocopy that we have? 25 A: That's right.

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1 Q: The entry at 03:40 hours, "Inspector 2 Linton's briefing" what does that -- 3 A: Inspector -- 4 Q: What does that indicate? There are 5 three (3) points there. 6 Q: "Inspector Linton's briefing"; those 7 three (3) points, to me, are -- are telling me that we 8 would -- we would handle the matter and that is that, 1) 9 there would be a lock out. And by lock out I mean 10 telephone lock out. In a negotiation process it's a very 11 controlled process whereby the telephone at the location 12 of the subject is locked out. 13 And by locked out I mean the only person 14 that the individual would be able to talk to would be the 15 negotiators. Through the assistance of technical people 16 from the OPP and their connections with Bell Security 17 it's capable to lock out a telephone at a subject's 18 location whereby they can talk to no one else other than 19 the negotiators. When they pick up their telephone it 20 rings in the negotiation room. So that's what I mean by 21 lock out. 22 The second point "evacuate by phone from 23 the Command Post". If there was people in the area -- if 24 there was people in the area that needed to be evacuated 25 for their safety that they would be evacuated by phone

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1 from the Command Post. 2 Meaning the personnel in the Command Post 3 would be calling and -- and advising them that in 4 interest of their safety perhaps they should move or move 5 to another area of the house; just try to get from them 6 in a sense as to how -- how their safety could be best 7 assured. 8 Q: Assuming they had a phone? 9 A: Assuming that they had a phone -- 10 Q: And there might be other ways to 11 communicate with them if they didn't have a phone, 12 perhaps personal attendance? 13 A: It's not unusual that a tactical team 14 in the perimeter would -- would look after the evacuation 15 of personnel within the perimeter. 16 Q: And the third point, sir? 17 A: And the third point is that TRU calls 18 Darrell. Inspector Linton's briefing to us is that he 19 was going to have a tactical response unit member make 20 the phone call to Darrell. 21 Q: The next notation says: 22 "Negotiators will be..." 23 Is that "from school" or "in school"? 24 A: "Will be from school" 25 We used as a Command Post a school at that

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1 time on the Kettle Point area. One (1) of the 2 significant points when it comes to negotiations, is that 3 the negotiators are not at the scene where the subject 4 is, of course. 5 The whole thing with negotiators is 6 negotiators are working from the Command Post so it's 7 very important the selection of the Command Post. We 8 rely on the local officers that are there in the first 9 instance to select a Command Post while the other 10 resources are enroute to get there so that immediately on 11 arrival a Command Post is selected. 12 Q: I see. 13 A: The Command Post should be within -- 14 within a kilometre of where the subject is. The Command 15 Post is in a safe area, a suitable area for such things 16 as parking and comfort, given the fact that sometimes 17 these scenarios go for a long time. So we need to have 18 washroom facilities and -- that would be why a school 19 would be selected. 20 Q: Thank you for that. If you look at 21 the entry at 04:00 hours? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: The last part of that entry would 24 say: 25 "Lock out of Darrell's phone."

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1 So I take it that the lock out procedure 2 you've described for us had occurred in that instance? 3 A: Had not -- it had not occurred. 4 Q: It has not occurred? 5 A: Had not occurred. 6 Q: I see. 7 A: What I'm reading here from my notes 8 is that not wanting to chance daylight, so it was getting 9 -- it's four o'clock in the morning, and not wanting to 10 chance daylight which would certainly bring a better 11 observation of the officers that were going to be present 12 in the perimeter that the Inspector Linton chose not to - 13 - to go -- not await lock out of Darrell's phone. 14 Q: And you see the entry at 04:20: 15 "Situation equipment up in school." 16 I take it that logistically you would have 17 gone ahead and carried out those duties setting up the 18 negotiator's room, if I can put it that way? 19 Q: We went ahead and did that, set up 20 the equipment in the -- in the school. 21 Q: And is your next entry a notation 22 that the difficulties with -- with some of the equipment 23 of the day? 24 A: That's right. The negoti -- all the 25 -- and again, that's the reason why negotiations are done

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1 from the Command Post, it's a controlled environment and 2 all the communications that negotiators make with 3 barricaded persons are all recorded, and they're recorded 4 on what we knew at the time to be, was referred to as a 5 Marantz Recorder. 6 My notes say that difficulties with the 7 Marantz, as the unit, will not record and play back. So 8 with those difficulties I move on then to say that at 9 5:50, using a smaller hand-held recorder from the 10 Incident Commander's kit, that we went ahead and set up 11 the tape -- recording tape from using it. 12 Q: And that's called improvisation, I 13 take it? 14 A: That's what it's called. 15 Q: All right. That matter was 16 ultimately resolved, was it not, without -- without 17 further incident? 18 And I see that at the end of the page at 19 page 84, that there is a debriefing and there's a 20 recommendation, the very final entry there? The last two 21 (2) entries, and let me just ask you to take a look at 22 those: 23 "Next First Nations occurrence is a 24 removal before our perimeters fall." 25 Perhaps you can read that for me?

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1 A: I'm sorry, I'm not -- 2 Q: The bottom of page 84. 3 A: 84? Oh. 4 Q: And I -- and I take it from the top 5 of the page, do you see the entry at -- at the top of the 6 page, 08:15 hours? I take it by that point the matter 7 has been resolved? There's a debriefing with Inspector 8 Linton. In the middle of the page it said: 9 "TRU initiated call. Went okay. Could 10 have gone bad." 11 There's some discussion there about the 12 potential that there might have been a further hostage 13 taking which would have become a serious problem? 14 There's some discussion about ensuring that the perimeter 15 is maintained in future instances? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: And lastly, a recommendation for 18 First Nations negotiators for incidents. I wonder if you 19 just might, as I've reviewed those matters very briefly 20 and obviously too quickly, might you just be able to 21 comment on that for us? 22 A: The -- the full debriefing that I 23 had? Is that what you're asking? 24 Q: Just the general -- general sense of 25 what it was came out of that debriefing, what was learned

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1 as a -- as a consequence of that debriefing? What's 2 talked about when it says: 3 "Things went okay but could have gone 4 bad?" 5 A: You know I -- I talk about some 6 things in my notes here to deal with logistical matters 7 such as telephone lines. We weren't able to lock out 8 properly and we had the wrong key to the incident -- or 9 to the Command Post, these sort of things, multiple 10 phones. So it may be difficult to lock those out. 11 We didn't have Technical Support Branch's 12 help for that. My thoughts -- we were thinking that it's 13 pretty difficult to do some of the logistical things that 14 we would like to do when we don't have the technical help 15 to do it. 16 So they just -- these were logistical 17 things to work through. 18 And I'm suggesting here that TRU initiated 19 the call. It went okay that time but it could have gone 20 bad. I'm just saying that it may not be a good -- a good 21 idea next time, that the negotiators are there to do the 22 negotiation. 23 It became daylight on us and we had people 24 moving around; that was problematic. And I'm asking the 25 question here:

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1 "Where do we fit into First Nations 2 policing? If Miles had become a 3 hostage at 07:30 this morning we could 4 have a serious problem." 5 Q: And "Miles" was the -- 6 A: And "Miles" was Miles Bressette? 7 Q: Sorry. 8 A: Miles Bressette was a First Nations 9 constable as well at Kettle Point. And as I recall this 10 incident, it was a matter that while the TRU Team was 11 maintaining a tactical perimeter for the safety of -- of 12 everyone, including Darrell and persons that would be 13 inside the perimeter, that the First Nations policing 14 Constable Miles Bressette went to Darrell at 7:30 and -- 15 and went right to his home and -- and took him into his 16 custody; custody or at least care, but he -- he knew him, 17 certainly. 18 And I'm asking the question here, for 19 debriefing reasons, where do we fit now with First 20 Nations policing, given that that was allowed to happen? 21 It went okay, but when you approach a barricaded person 22 as a police officer, if that barricaded person now takes 23 you as a hostage, or takes a police officer as a hostage, 24 the -- the ante for demand has just gone up considerably. 25

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1 So it could have gone bad. It could have, 2 in fact, endangered the lives of the barricaded person, 3 the police officer himself, or the police officers that 4 were on the perimeter, or persons within the perimeter. 5 So I'm just asking that question, let's 6 maybe sort this out as to where does -- where does our 7 Incident Command and our tactical people come in when it 8 comes to First Nations policing. 9 If it was allowed to somehow happen that 10 an officer could penetrate that perimeter and go to a 11 barricaded person's house, the situation could have gone 12 very badly. 13 Q: Perhaps sir, with that is a segue if 14 I may, I would ask you a bit about overall crisis 15 negotiation if I may. 16 A: Certainly. 17 Q: You've already told us something 18 about the training and qualifications that go into that. 19 You've indicated that there is a crisis negotiation 20 course that you yourself have taken? 21 A: That's right. 22 Q: And you had been, as I understand it, 23 the negotiator or team leader in approximately some 24 twenty (20) critical incidents; is that fair? 25 A: I think in my overall time as a

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1 negotiator, which is about thirteen (13) years, I 2 attended to as many as forty (40) calls. And I guess in 3 order for me to explain the impact of those forty (40) 4 calls it would be proper for me to explain at this point 5 in time what negotiators do. 6 Q: Would you please? 7 A: For thirteen (13) years I was a 8 negotiator and the forty (40) calls would result in 9 perhaps being called out three (3) or four (4) times a 10 year. So it doesn't happen all that often, thankfully. 11 But when it does it's a very controlled 12 environment. Crisis negotiators only respond when 13 directed to do so by an incident commander. And the 14 criteria that is set out for an Incident Commander to 15 call in a crisis negotiating team, is that there has to 16 be a threat to life to start with. 17 So that threat to life is the initiating 18 cause that would cause officers at the scene to want an 19 Incident Commander and the Incident Commander to respond 20 with what we refer to as an integrated response. 21 And with integrated response we have a 22 tactical team, we have negotiators, K-9 handlers are 23 involved, so it's a many faceted type of response. 24 That threat to life is now accompanied by 25 the individual himself refusing to give himself up or

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1 herself up to the local police. So it's a high risk 2 situation to start with, barricaded person or a hostage 3 situation. There's a threat to life and that person is 4 refusing to give himself up to the local police. 5 Q: Mr. Seltzer, just so I'm clear this 6 is the way the situation existed in 1995? 7 A: That's correct. 8 Q: And has it changed to date, to your 9 knowledge? 10 A: To my knowledge it has not changed. 11 Q: Thank you. Continue if you would. 12 A: It's the very premise and the reason 13 why crisis negotiation is used. The crisis negotiators 14 respond as a three (3) person team. 15 Q: And the composition of that team? 16 A: The composition of that team is a 17 team leader, a primary negotiator and a secondary. The 18 team leader's responsibility is to be the liaison between 19 the actual negotiating team and the Incident Commander. 20 Because a negotiating team -- when they're 21 set up with their equipment all conversations are being 22 recorded and they are locked away in a private room. 23 They must have a private area. 24 In any command post that I ever attended, 25 the first thing that you look for when you come into a

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1 building was where could the negotiators go? Where's the 2 private area the private room they can be set aside in? 3 Q: Relative to the situation you've 4 described at Kettle Point just moments ago -- 5 A: Yes -- 6 Q: -- the room where the negotiators 7 would be locked away, as I understood, was to be at the 8 school? 9 A: It was a the school and it was in an 10 area -- a room in the school, away from and private to 11 the rest of the command post, but certainly within a few 12 steps of the Incident Commander. 13 So the Team Leader's responsibility then 14 is to respond to the team the negotiating team by staying 15 in close liaison with the Incident Commander. 16 The primary negotiator is the actual 17 negotiator that does the talking. And with that he has a 18 headset with a microphone equipped to it and he's 19 listening to the conversations. And I've already 20 discussed the fact about how the phones are locked out. 21 As soon as he picks up the phone it dials 22 in to the subject and vice versa. So he's there. It's 23 an immediate contact with the individual. 24 The secondary negotiator, his role or her 25 role, is to provide a listening source so that -- the

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1 headset for the secondary negotiator is a -- is a 2 listening headset only, there's no mic. And that 3 listening -- so we've got two (2) people now listening to 4 the conversation, they're listening to the subject. 5 The second negotiator, his or her role is 6 to provide a well of information to the primary 7 negotiator. They're sitting side by side. But the 8 secondary negotiator, listening to the conversation, will 9 pick up on things. 10 It's very difficult as a primary 11 negotiator to listen intently to the degree that's 12 required and be formulating in your mind as to where 13 you're going to go with the conversation. So you really 14 depend on the secondary negotiator to be -- to be picking 15 up on just little tidbits of information that come out of 16 that conversation. 17 And actually, he just writes them down on 18 little sticky yellow tabs and creates for the -- for the 19 primary a whole well of information. So that at any 20 given time, if the conversation was to go a certain way, 21 the primary then has that information in front of him and 22 you just pick one of the tabs up. 23 We'll talk about anything from -- from 24 hobbies to past experiences, to family relationships and 25 whatever -- wherever the subject wants to go.

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1 So it's a three-person team. It's 2 sometimes not always understood that negotiators do not 3 respond alone; it's a three-person team, a very 4 choreographed response. 5 Q: And the objectives or the goals? 6 A: The objective is to develop trust 7 with the subject that's being spoken to, and that trust 8 takes, you know, hours to create and -- and develop. And 9 the objective is that the subject feels a trust now in 10 the negotiator and in the policing in general, that they 11 can see options. 12 Many times people barricade themselves 13 because they don't see any other option. They're afraid 14 and that trust develops over time so that they know that 15 there is a safe way to bring themselves into the care of 16 the police. 17 Q: You've already told us of the 18 instances where crisis negotiators might be deployed, and 19 that is where there is a threat to life. Are there any 20 other conditions precedent for deploying crisis 21 negotiators? 22 A: As I say, the -- the crisis 23 negotiators are -- are -- are deployed where there is a 24 threat to life and that can be either a barricaded person 25 or a hostage situation. But again, we're talking about a

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1 threat to life. 2 Short of that, no, there isn't. The 3 crisis negotiation team respond to the needs of the 4 Incident Commander and really become another resource for 5 the Incident Commander. 6 There's been times when, as part of the 7 crisis negotiation team, I've been in, you know, in the 8 Command Post, the crisis negotiator was never used. And 9 the reason why they weren't used is because the Incident 10 Commander would choose to go with a tactical option 11 depending on the dynamics of the situation and go a 12 different route, and the negotiators would not be used. 13 Q: Whose call is that? 14 A: That's the Incident Commander's call. 15 The Incident Commander's call to -- to -- 16 Q: The team leader, I take it, would 17 report as part of the chain of command directly to the 18 Incident Commander? 19 A: That's correct. That's correct. So 20 the team leader becomes a conduit between the Incident 21 Commander and the negotiators. He'll take the thoughts 22 and the direction that the Incident Commander has, take 23 it to the negotiators as to which way to steer the 24 negotiations. 25 The team leader, because of his experience

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1 and background, would also advise the Incident Commander 2 on issues dealing with communication and dealing with the 3 negotiations. So it becomes a -- a think tank with the 4 Incident Commander; the tactical commander is there, the 5 negotiation commander is there, and so it becomes a -- a 6 think tank of ideas when you're dealing to these 7 responses. 8 But the end decision is that of the 9 Incident Commander. 10 Q: You've indicated again in -- in 11 referring to the Kettle Point incident you've described 12 for us that there was a situation created as a result of 13 Officer Bressette attending on his own? 14 A: That's right. 15 Q: Might there be instances where that 16 might be part of the plan where an individual might be 17 used as, perhaps, an intermediary? 18 A: As a -- as another negotiate -- I'm 19 not -- I'm not following you, can you -- 20 Q: Well, an intermediary or a person who 21 could, perhaps, engage initial dialogue or some -- 22 something like that? 23 A: That would be the decision of the 24 Incident Commander. One of the things that is, sort of, 25 the umbrella statement when it comes to negotiations, is

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1 that you never say never. It's always a possibility. 2 But certainly to go to that option is not 3 one that I would recommend as a team leader to the 4 Incident Commander. The final decision is his, of 5 course, or hers, but it's not something that I would 6 recommend. 7 When you go to another person other than 8 negotiators, you give up a lot. When you got the scene 9 of where the subject is, you give up certainly the -- the 10 ability to record the conversation. If it goes bad and - 11 - and there's harm done, you have no record as to what 12 happened, there's no log kept of it. 13 The second thing you do is you now subject 14 individuals to a tactical perimeter that's being 15 maintained by tactical officers. 16 Tactical officers, when they maintain a 17 perimeter, that's a very controlled perimeter, they own 18 that perimeter. They know exactly where each other are. 19 They know exactly what each other's job is, what their 20 role is. They know where each other are looking. The 21 sounds that would come out of that perimeter are their's 22 to make, they know that. 23 Inside the perimeter, between they and the 24 subject, is a frozen ground, it's -- it's a frozen area. 25 They know exactly what's in there. So now, as I'm

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1 saying, if you -- if you were to take a third person and 2 introduce them into that area, it becomes very unsafe for 3 the tactical officers themselves and certainly for that 4 person that you're bringing into that area. So it's just 5 not a recommended procedure. 6 Q: Firstly, can I take from that that 7 you have to have a secure perimeter in order to engage or 8 employ -- 9 A: Certainly. 10 Q: -- or deploy a crisis negotiator? 11 A: Certainly. The Incident Commander 12 will not initiate the phone call to the subject until he 13 or she knows that that perimeter is controlled; it's -- 14 it's controlled and can be maintained by the tactical 15 officers and there's a reason for that. 16 If a phone call was to be placed to a 17 subject without that perimeter being controlled by 18 tactical officers, and that subject was in anger or in 19 fear or for whatever reason was to flee, now you have a 20 despondent individual who has threatened life and is now 21 mobile, so that person is not allowed to leave that 22 premises by way of that tactical team controlling that 23 perimeter. 24 If he does leave, or she does leave the 25 premises, then they come into the hands of the -- of the

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1 tactical officers. 2 The tactical officers have to maintain 3 that perimeter for that reason, for the safety as well, 4 the -- the safety of individuals. Other individuals 5 can't penetrate that perimeter because it's not safe for 6 them to do so, and we can't allow individuals to flee 7 from that frozen area, again for the safety of -- of 8 persons that are outside the perimeter. 9 Q: And I take it, for those reasons, one 10 (1) on one (1) or face to face communication is -- is not 11 something that's likely to be employed? 12 A: That was a good choice of words, not 13 likely to be employed. I would never say never -- 14 Q: I understand you -- 15 A: -- I would never say never, but it's 16 not likely to be employed. The face to face is a -- is a 17 dangerous option; you've now introduced the lack of -- of 18 recording equipment, you've introduced somebody to -- to 19 a tactical perimeter that is not trained to be in that 20 perimeter. 21 You've introduced someone face to face 22 with a person that has threatened life, and now you've 23 got somebody, a negotiator that's face to face and in a 24 threatening -- in a threatened environment. 25 The presence of that person so close to

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1 the individual could also cause that individual to become 2 agitated, and now you've just increased the -- the danger 3 for everybody involved rather than decreased it. So it's 4 just not a -- it's not a procedure that would be 5 recommended. 6 Q: Thank you for that, sir. I've 7 suggested to you there might be incidents where a lock 8 down of the telephone service might not be possible, for 9 example, where there's no phone. 10 I hear there's -- there's one (1) ringing 11 right here. 12 But, nonetheless, there might be other 13 things that would be employed, a loud hailer, for 14 example. 15 A: There is -- 16 Q: In order -- yeah. 17 A: There is a loud hailer that goes with 18 the negotiator's kit, and at least it did in the time 19 period that I was involved. And the purpose of that 20 would be a -- a last and final effort, if needed. 21 I recall -- if I can just tell you how 22 that was once used, I recall at one (1) point in time we 23 did have a telephone lockout. The individual was not 24 responding and -- and significant time went by, the 25 individual was not responding, and the team leader for

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1 negotiators went to the perimeter. And this all had to 2 be choreographed, as you can appreciate, to bring the 3 team leader to the perimeter where tactical people were. 4 Given that, the team leader went forward 5 with a -- with a loud hailer and was requesting by way of 6 loud hailer for the individual to pick up the telephone 7 and talk to the negotiators, and that eventually 8 happened. So it was a tool just to say pick up your 9 phone, talk to the negotiators and -- and that was the 10 best way to communicate. But with the loud hailer, again 11 you've lost the ability to -- to record the conversation. 12 And a loud hailer can be -- is very 13 intrusive. The whole objective of negotiation is to slow 14 things down, bring things under control, de-escalate 15 emotions, set things into a choreographed response so 16 that it works towards a safe solution. 17 And as soon as you introduce a loud 18 hailer, now you've increased the anxieties by increasing 19 that loud hailer in a blast of information that -- I mean 20 the person may not want to hear it, they may want that 21 peace and quiet. 22 And I've had situations before where you 23 just sit patiently in waiting, and it might be an hour, 24 hour and half before they even respond. They needed that 25 time to themself just to calm their own nerves.

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1 And now you've just introduced a loud 2 hailer that would -- you know has the tendency to set 3 them off. 4 Remember why you're there. You're there 5 because they have threatened death or grievous bodily 6 harm to themselves or somebody else. If they're starting 7 to calm down, do you want to agitate them and bring them 8 back up again to where that life threatening response is 9 there? It just goes contrary to the whole reason why 10 you're trying to negotiate with them, the loud hailer. 11 Q: Notwithstanding, there are certain 12 instances where that might nonetheless be -- 13 A: I saw it used once. 14 Q: Thank you. I've asked you to look at 15 the recommendation that you've noted at page 84 of your 16 notebook, we've marked that as Exhibit P-10 -- 1702 17 rather. 18 And the recommendation there was for First 19 Nations negotiators for incidents, I take it in the 20 future. 21 A: That's correct. 22 Q: I've asked you, as well, about the use 23 of third parties or intermediaries to assist, perhaps, 24 either in negotiations. Do I take it from your 25 recommendation here that there might be some departure

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1 from the general use or the general theory, and you're 2 going to correct me if I'm wrong here, sir -- 3 A: Okay. 4 Q: -- against using third party 5 intermediaries in instances involving First Nations 6 people? 7 A: Let me answer the second question 8 first, and I'll answer it by saying, I wouldn't 9 necessarily limit that to First Nations people. I'm 10 saying that -- but to introduce a third party into the 11 negotiations, again, I've seen it done. 12 It's not something that's recommended for 13 the reason that -- recognize why you're there, you've got 14 a person that is threatening death. To introduce a third 15 person into the negotiation process, it's taken a long 16 time to develop trust and understanding of that subject 17 you're talking to and you still don't know all the 18 reasons, you don't know as to why they're agitated in the 19 first place. 20 Now you introduce a third person because 21 others think it's a wise idea, and that person you 22 introduce is the person they were upset with in the first 23 place. So now you've just aided their agitation rather 24 than try to bring it down. So it's not recommended. 25 What my note refers to here is I'm making

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1 a recommendation to our debriefing which is, you know, 2 for future consideration, how do we do better next time? 3 "The recommendation for First Nations 4 negotiators for incidents like this." 5 And what I'm saying is, rather than have 6 our First Nations Constable go to the door, and I've 7 already explained as to the reasons why that was 8 dangerous -- 9 Q: Yes -- 10 A: -- what if we had the First Nations 11 Constable on the phone as the negotiator? Train them 12 into the negotiation process, that whatever was 13 accomplished at the door, perhaps could be accomplished 14 from the Command Post by way of telephone. 15 A much safer approach and perhaps a 16 trusted individual. 17 Q: I see. Thank you. 18 A: That was food for thought. 19 Q: You'll recall our earlier 20 conversation about the importance of understanding other 21 cultures that was in the context of our discussion about 22 multiculturalism and how that was brought into the 23 training package of OPP Members? 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: It would also be important, I would

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1 suggest, that if one were familiar, for example, with 2 First Nations culture, perhaps that there was a degree of 3 perhaps respect for elders, for example, might that -- 4 might they be used in certain instances? 5 And again, understanding that you say, 6 Never say never? 7 A: Never say never. Now, would they be 8 used as negotiators? Again, that would be the call of 9 the Incident Commander. But there's certainly nothing 10 wrong with, in the Command Post First Nations elders; 11 their -- you know, the respect that they carry and their 12 understanding of issues and the respect that the subject 13 may have or would have for the elder to be there as 14 advisor. 15 And there would be nothing wrong for the 16 negotiator to actually tell the person that, You're 17 talking to me, I'm the negotiator, that we're -- that, 18 you know, in so many words, however, Here in the room 19 with me is the Elder of your community -- 20 Q: I see. 21 A: -- who is recommending that I tell 22 you this or who recommends that we discuss that. So 23 there's nothing wrong with -- with that person being an 24 advisor to the negotiator team. But again, with the 25 Incident Commander's direction; the Incident Commander

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1 would make the decision on that. 2 Q: And it's part of that building of a 3 rapport and building of trust -- 4 A: Certainly. 5 Q: -- that you've indicated is important 6 as part of the overall -- 7 A: Certainly. 8 Q: -- negotiation process? 9 A: That's right. And the person -- you 10 want to bring about a level of safety and security for 11 that person to feel. And -- and certainly knowing that 12 an Elder was there and -- and helping the negotiators to 13 arrive at that feeling of safety and security for the 14 subject. 15 Q: Thank you for that, sir. I 16 understand, sir, in August of 1995, as part of your 17 duties as a training sergeant in charge of training for 18 the No. One District, that you were at a meeting on the 19 30th of August with Inspector Carson and he gave you 20 certain information. 21 And in that regard, sir, I'd ask you to 22 turn to the book of documents at Tab 5, it's Inquiry 23 Document 2005596. It's a photocopy of your notebook, I'm 24 presuming, commencing at page 78. The top of the 25 document reads:

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1 "Wednesday, 30th of August, '95." 2 Do you see that? 3 A: Yes, I have the document in front of 4 me. 5 Q: And you're looking at your actual 6 notebook? 7 A: In my actual notes here. 8 Q: And that corresponds to the photocopy 9 that -- 10 A: They do. 11 Q: -- you have just beside you. 12 A: Yes, they do. 13 MR. DONALD WORME: May that be made the 14 next exhibit please, Commissioner? 15 THE REGISTRAR: P-1703, Your Honour. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 1703. 17 18 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1703: Document Number 2005596. 19 Handwritten notebook entries 20 of S/Sgt Brad Seltzer, August 21 30 to 31, 1995. 22 23 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 24 Q: And, sir, you see the entry at 08:00 25 hours?

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1 A: Yes, sir. 2 Q: Perhaps you can just read that and 3 then -- and then tell us what it says at 14:30 and what 4 does that entail? What did you do as a result of this? 5 A: At 08:00 hours I met with Inspector 6 Carson at the headquarters in London and he and I 7 together went to a -- a -- a conference, a one (1) day 8 training conference at the Ontario Police College at 9 Aylmer. 10 It was at 14:30 of that day, 2:30 in the 11 afternoon, that I was debriefed by Inspector Carson and I 12 was asked to prepare a schedule for negotiator teams in 13 the event of Ipperwash takeover by Natives from the 14 Canadian Forces Base. 15 Q: Were you given any further 16 information as to how -- how this information came about, 17 that is the potential of takeover? 18 A: I -- I recall, independently, it's 19 not in my notes, I recall Inspector Carson advising me 20 that -- that there was a possibility that on the evening 21 of the Labour Day weekend, of the Monday evening when the 22 Park finished it's activities for the -- for the holiday 23 weekend, that there was some expectation that perhaps 24 occupiers would -- would go into Ipperwash Provincial 25 Park.

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1 And it was for that reason that the police 2 would have to respond. And given that he is Incident 3 Commander he wanted me to logistically set up teams of 4 negotiators that would be available would they be 5 required. 6 Q: Did he say how he came into that 7 information or, indeed, is it your place, one (1), to 8 ask, or secondly, do you need to know that? 9 A: I don't recall him telling me the 10 background behind it. 11 Q: If I can ask you to turn over to the 12 next page, sir, Thursday, 31st of August, '95. The entry 13 at the middle of the page, 08:00 hours, following your 14 report for duty at Chatham District Headquarters? 15 A: Yes. And from eight o'clock that day 16 until 16:00 hours, four o'clock in the afternoon, I had 17 set aside a negotiator workshop. One of the things that 18 -- as team leader my responsibility was to ensure that 19 the negotiators had frequent workshops. These were 20 workshops that were attended by the negotiators for that 21 area. 22 And I'm thinking that at that time there 23 was probably in the neighbourhood of eight (8) to ten 24 (10) officers that were negotiators for that area. And 25 we would have these workshops for -- the negotiators have

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1 to work very closely together when they're at a call, and 2 sometimes new negotiators came into the program and they 3 don't know the other negotiators well. 4 So the -- the workshops were to make sure 5 the introductions were there, that the officers felt 6 comfortable with each other as to who they were. And I 7 mean two o'clock in the morning at a dynamic event is not 8 a good time to -- to establish a relationship so the -- 9 that was an important time, not only for the officers but 10 for them to understand the equipment. 11 I think I suggested earlier that the 12 officers didn't get to respond as often as would be 13 required to have a working familiarity with that Marantz 14 recording equipment. So by having scenarios, I think we 15 tried for a couple of times in the -- in the year to 16 bring the officers together to work on a workshop whereby 17 there would be the opportunity to -- to work with the 18 equipment, get to know each other and practice a few 19 scenarios to hone their skills. 20 It just so happened that that next day was 21 a planned and scheduled negotiator workshop that I had 22 scheduled for them to attend. 23 Q: So an objective of that is -- is team 24 building and -- 25 A: Team building, yeah.

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1 Q: -- as well as -- as you say, honing 2 skills. 3 The entry at 16:00 hours? 4 A: "Discussed response plan with 5 negotiators." 6 So at the end of the day, after the -- the 7 routines of that -- of that training session, or if you 8 want to call it that, that that day's workshop were 9 finished, I discussed with the negotiators the necessity 10 for them to perhaps be called in future days, and the -- 11 the plan that I had in mind, given the direction I had 12 received from Inspector Carson. 13 Q: So you set up a schedule pursuant to 14 those instructions of negotiators to be on call? 15 A: I think I was starting to work on the 16 schedule. I think from them, that day, I was able to 17 determine who would be available. And I mean if the 18 officers were off for the long weekend they may have 19 plans and not be available, so I was trying to determine 20 from them, give them an understanding as to how we'd be 21 utilized or at least be on call to be -- to be required, 22 and getting feedback from them as to their availability. 23 And then from there I set up the teams. 24 Q: And that's part of your logistical 25 planning, part of giving them the head's up as well as

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1 what might be expected? 2 A: That was the task that was assigned 3 to me back on the -- the day before by Inspector Carson, 4 was to start putting logistics together to -- to set the 5 teams so that they were familiar with the fact that they 6 may be called. 7 Q: Thank you, sir. Commissioner, I note 8 we've been going for a little over an hour and perhaps 9 this might be an appropriate place, a natural break to 10 take our morning... 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 12 We'll take our morning break now. 13 MR. DONALD WORME: Thank you, sir. 14 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 15 for fifteen (15) minutes. 16 17 --- Upon recessing at 10:18 a.m. 18 --- Upon resuming at 10:34 a.m. 19 20 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 21 resumed. Please be seated. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25

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1 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 2 Q: May I ask you, Mr. Seltzer, to turn 3 to the document at Tab 6 of the brief of documents in 4 front of you, it's Inquiry Document 2003866. It appears 5 to be a copy of your notebooks commencing Friday, 01 6 September, '95? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: Okay. I see you were looking at your 9 actual notebook in front of you? 10 A: Again I am, yes. 11 Q: And again, I will ask you whether 12 that corresponds to the copy that we have at that Inquiry 13 document number and at that tab? 14 A: They're accurate, yes. 15 Q: I'll ask that that be made the next 16 exhibit, please, Commissioner? 17 THE REGISTRAR: P-1704, Your Honour. 18 19 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1704: Document Number 2003866. 20 Handwritten notebook entries 21 of S/Sgt Brad Seltzer, 22 September 01 to October 31, 23 1995. 24 25 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME:

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1 Q: The entry at 07:20 hours, Mr. 2 Seltzer, it would appear that you had an operational 3 briefing at 08:00 to 16:00 hours? 4 A: That's correct. 5 Q: And where was that and what was that 6 in connection with? 7 A: The operational briefing on the 1st 8 of September was at -- I've quoted in my notes here as 9 No. 2 DHQ, which would mean No. 2 District Headquarters 10 which is in London. And that operational briefing is in 11 reference to the -- the occurrence that Inspector Carson 12 told me about on the Wednesday prior. 13 Q: As part of that, I understand that 14 you had come then into possession of a document entitled, 15 Project Maple? 16 A: At that point in time I don't believe 17 I had the Project Maple document; I don't think it had 18 been created yet. I think by name -- the operation had a 19 name and we were putting the document together. 20 Q: I see. So this meeting was an effort 21 to continue the dialogue amongst the various, how shall I 22 call it, individuals that would be responsible for the 23 creation of the plan? 24 A: That's right. I think the reference 25 we made to Unit Leaders, so there would be myself as the

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1 negotiating team leader, there was representation there 2 from people that were going to be looking after 3 logistics, others would be looking after tactics. 4 And so each person would have, you know, a 5 responsibility, a unit type responsibility, were there 6 for direction from the Inspector. 7 Q: The entry at 11:45 hours: 8 "Spoke with..." 9 Perhaps you can read that for us? 10 A: Yeah, I spoke with Al Robertson at 11 No. 6 DHQ, which was at Mount Forest, it was No. 6. He - 12 - Al was the negotiating team leader for another 13 negotiating team at the headquarters of what I refer 14 there as No. 6 District, which was at Mount Forest. 15 Q: And at 12:20? 16 A: And at 12:20 I spoke with Lorne Smith 17 outlining -- 18 Q: Who is Lorne Smith, I'm sorry to 19 interrupt you. 20 A: Lorne Smith -- it was suggested by 21 the Inspector that I go talk to Lorne Smith and Lorne was 22 known to me. Lorne Smith is a now retired member and was 23 then a retired member of the Ontario Provincial Police 24 from Forest Detachment. 25 Lorne's -- one (1) of Lorne's

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1 responsibilities, when he was at the Detachment in 2 Forest, was the Liaison Officer to First Nations policing 3 at Kettle Point. It was known by Inspector Carson who 4 had been the Detachment Commander at Forest. 5 It was known that Lorne was well respected 6 in the community at Kettle Point, had some knowledge 7 certainly of the -- I would say the dynamics of the 8 Kettle Point people and who was who and this sort of 9 thing. 10 So it was important, from a negotiating 11 point of view, that I learned that information. And it 12 was Inspector Carson that suggested I get a hold of Lorne 13 and see if he would be working with -- you know, agree to 14 work with us in an advisory capacity. 15 Q: And you did so contact him? 16 A: And I did so contact him then at 17 12:20. 18 Q: And he agreed to work with you? 19 A: That's right. He was in full 20 agreement to work with us. 21 Q: You see the entry on the following 22 page, page 81 at 13:00 hours, there's an entry with 23 respect to George Speck? 24 A: Yes. 25 "George Speck advises that the key

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1 persons to be negotiated with were Glen 2 George and Les Jewel." 3 And it goes on to note that Lorne Smith 4 wanted to advise the Kettle Point elders that he knew, 5 and I discouraged him from request -- I discouraged him 6 that request in confidentiality. 7 There was a lot of -- there was a lot of 8 confidentiality still in the development of this plan, 9 that we were trying to develop our resources. And at 10 this point in time there was a lot of areas that were not 11 well firm in our mind as to how we were going to put the 12 thing -- the plan together. 13 And it was for that reason that everyone 14 should be somewhat confidential in the information we 15 were discussing. 16 Q: At the bottom of page 81, sir, is a 17 continuation of the logistical planning that you were 18 involved in, I take it? 19 A: Yes, my note here at 16:30 is from 20 home, meaning that I was back home by that point in the 21 day. And at this point in time I was calling other 22 persons that were going to be involved in negotiations. 23 Q: And those persons are indicated at 24 the top of page 82, are they, including Marg Eve? 25 A: Yes, Marg Eve, Paul Wardle, who I

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1 mentioned earlier was a negotiator, Bob Martin was a 2 negotiator out of London headquarters. And I'm saying 3 here that I was unable to reach two (2) persons by the 4 name of Dowell, Biskup, who were negotiators as well, 5 they were not home. 6 And I had spoken to Karen Moffat before I 7 left London Headquarters, my notes show at 14:30 hours 8 that day. 9 So what I'm doing by way of these phone 10 calls and my notes would suggest it, is that I was making 11 sure that I made personal contact with all of the persons 12 that may be called upon as negotiators, to ensure that 13 they were clear and able to respond. 14 Q: Okay. I'm going to ask you to keep 15 your finger on that particular page of your notebook and 16 then turn to the document that you will find at Tab 7 of 17 the brief of documents in front of you. 18 It is the minutes of that meeting of 19 September 1st, 1995. It is Inquiry Exhibit P-421. And 20 you've had an opportunity to see that document before, 21 sir? 22 And you'll see that there is various names 23 as present at that meeting? 24 A: Yes, I believe I've seen the document 25 before.

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1 Q: And you'll see that your name is -- 2 is indicated there, third? 3 A: Yes, that's my name. 4 Q: Right. You note the objective: 5 "To contain and negotiate a peaceful 6 resolution?" 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: You're familiar that that was, in 9 fact, the stated objective at the meeting? 10 A: Very well stated. 11 Q: And if I can ask you to turn into 12 that document. And unfortunately the pages are not 13 numbered, but if you go in three (3) pages it reads at 14 the top: 15 "Responsibilities ongoing. This could 16 be a major drain of our resources." 17 Are you with me there? 18 A: Yes, I've got the page. 19 Q: And if you go down to the bottom of 20 that page: 21 "Negotiator." 22 You see where it says that? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: "Responsible for talking to people 25 down there to get off their property." I take it that

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1 that is referring to the unit of which you would be -- 2 and bear some responsibility? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: And if you go in two (2) pages 5 further, at the top of the page it reads: 6 "List of requirements requested to 7 submit to administration." 8 A: I have the page, yes. 9 Q: The first -- the first full paragraph 10 following that, your name? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: Okay. It reads: 13 "All set. Concern for room at Forest 14 Detachment for negotiators only." 15 Again, this is part of the configuration 16 that you've described for us earlier? 17 A: Yes. As I understand these notes, 18 the way they're made up is, is Inspector Carson would go 19 around the room to see if the individual team leaders had 20 -- had their individual responsibilities set up. This is 21 the responses that we would provide. And then providing 22 that, you know, the persons are set to go. 23 And I have some concerns that the -- as I 24 suggested earlier in my evidence, that there's a private 25 room going to be set aside for the negotiations.

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1 Q: And that you have dedicated telephone 2 lines? 3 A: Dedicated lines. 4 Q: That you have headsets as you've 5 described the primary and secondary negotiators would be 6 equipped with? 7 A: All the equipment that they would 8 need. 9 Q: Right. 10 A: Can I take you back one (1) moment? 11 Q: Certainly. 12 A: Do you mind? If you go back to the 13 page that you had me looking at from negotiator, and you 14 pointed out the small paragraph there, the statement that 15 says: 16 "Responsible for talking to the people 17 down there to get off their land." 18 Q: Yes. 19 A: I think, if you would allow me to, it 20 would be appropriate for me to point out that -- 21 Q: Yeah, would you please -- 22 A: -- while it -- while it's stressing 23 here -- while it's pointing out the term "negotiator" 24 there, that may be just a friendly term to indicate 25 individuals that are responsible.

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1 That is not a negotiation by the way that 2 I've explained it to you; that would not be the function 3 of the negotiator. These are not the crisis negotiators 4 that would do this. However, by the way this message -- 5 or that this note is made, there was some direction that 6 came from Inspector Carson to say that as -- as a 7 negotiating team leader there, or other negotiators in my 8 place, that they may be called upon to provide 9 communication. 10 They may be called upon to make a point of 11 contact and communicate a message, his message, and 12 deliver it. But it's not, and I wouldn't want that 13 confusion to exist, that it's not a negotiation that -- 14 by -- by the process that I've talked about so far. 15 Q: I appreciate that clarification, sir. 16 And can we take from that that there is meant to be some 17 flexibility in so far as that role? 18 A: As far as the negotiator? 19 Q: Yes. 20 A: Flexibility in a sense that -- that 21 as police officers present in the Command Post, the 22 Incident Commander may direct other responsibilities of 23 those officers. 24 And certainly being communicators outside 25 the role of crisis negotiators, as communicators those

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1 individuals may be called upon to communicate the message 2 of the Incident Commander. 3 Q: Thank you. You've told us that you 4 contacted Lorne Smith because of some of the background 5 information that he would be able to provide in order to 6 assist the overall plan? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: I take it you didn't know the history 9 of the area, and I think you may have mentioned that 10 earlier, but for your earlier attendances at CFB 11 Ipperwash? 12 A: I -- I was familiar with -- with the 13 base -- the Army Base, given my time in the Army Reserve 14 and the -- the lay of the land, if you want to call it 15 that. I understood the base and its properties and where 16 the ranges were and where the training area was and such 17 things as that. 18 Q: You were familiar, for example, that 19 there was a grave site that was located -- 20 A: Yes, there is. 21 Q: -- within there that belonged to the 22 Stoney Point people -- 23 A: I was very familiar with that. As a 24 military personnel we were always cautioned to treat the 25 area with respect.

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1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: Just -- just a moments indulgence, 4 please. 5 6 (BRIEF PAUSE) 7 8 A: So I was explaining my familiarity. 9 Q: Yes, thank you for that. 10 A: So I was familiar with the -- with 11 the Base layout, physically. As far as to the people 12 that were in the area, as a result of my role as a 13 training officer and providing training to our OPP 14 members in this area, which often was firearms training 15 on the Base itself using their ranges, I did have 16 familiarity with some of the -- the people of the area, 17 namely Ron George and -- and Vince George and -- and 18 Luke, because they were officers in this area and I 19 trained with them and got to know them personally. 20 As to the -- as to the Kettle Point people 21 themselves, I had not nearly the -- the history, the 22 knowledge, and certainly the trust that -- that would 23 have been given to -- to Lorne. 24 Q: And what about the people that have 25 come to be described here as Stoney Pointers, were you

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1 familiar with them? 2 A: I was not familiar with them, no. 3 Q: Is that the kind of information that 4 a negotiator, as -- as you've described it for us, would 5 need to know or should know? 6 A: As crisis negotiators? 7 Q: Yes. 8 A: Any knowledge that the negotiator has 9 is certainly going to be, you know, valuable for the 10 negotiator if he had knowledge of the people. But I 11 think you have to appreciate the complexity of -- of 12 society and that negotiators can be called upon at any 13 time to deal with distraught persons from any walk of 14 life. 15 So I'm talking, you know, whether it's 16 gender, cultural background, religious affiliation, 17 social strata, there -- there's so many variables that it 18 would be very difficult to have a negotiator fully 19 trained in -- in all aspects that would be helpful, and 20 I'm talking about cultural aspects and -- and all the 21 other diversities. 22 So therefore, anything that the negotiator 23 would have, or negotiators would have, would be helpful. 24 But do the essentially need that training or that 25 background? I would say, no. And if I could just

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1 explain. 2 When the negotiators are called upon it 3 takes some time, but the important thing is that there is 4 a level of trust that's established between the 5 negotiators, the team, and primary negotiator 6 particularly, that level of trust is established with the 7 subject. And that level of trust is established over 8 time on a telephone by the negotiator becoming a 9 significant other to that individual. 10 And the negotiator will ask questions. In 11 fact, my own personal experience is to have been to calls 12 and I didn't want to know anything. There would be some 13 information that would be available to the criminal 14 investigators, perhaps, that they needed to know about 15 the subject. 16 And I would stay away from that, I didn't 17 want to know. I didn't want to see a picture, name, age; 18 some criminal background perhaps, if it was -- if it was 19 necessary, if -- if the individual had some, but that's 20 about all. 21 I didn't want to know family involvement 22 because I want those questions to be questions that I 23 would ask the subject, so that that level of trust 24 becomes established by you telling me. How do I learn 25 about your background? You tell me your background.

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1 I'll ask the questions. Tell me. 2 It develops a trust, it develops a rapport 3 that is so important. It helps me then to understand 4 where the -- the subject is coming from, the problems 5 that he's experiencing, why -- what places him in the 6 position that he's in. And it helps me to understand 7 that in a way that he or she wants to explain it to me. 8 Above all else, the negotiator must not 9 lie. And by that I say, if I was to ask a subject, What 10 about your sister, and that subject responds by saying, 11 You know about my sister, I have to be able to say, No, I 12 don't, tell me about it, that relationship. 13 If I say, No, I don't, and I really do, 14 then that can come back and -- and destroy any rapport 15 you've built. So I don't want to know that information 16 going in. Any information about the subject that -- from 17 a negotiating point of view, to be learned, the subject 18 should tell the negotiator so that that level of trust 19 and rapport is established. 20 Q: And I thank you for that 21 clarification. I was attempting to, I guess, wrap my 22 mind around the -- on the one hand bringing someone in 23 who is knowledgeable about the community and what you've 24 described to us as locking away the negotiators. So that 25 helps me.

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1 I understand, sir, that on the -- 2 September the 2nd and the 3rd, that you were off duty and 3 your notes would indicate that you were off. However, 4 you went about other tasks to ensure that logistically 5 you were prepared to go in? 6 A: I have some expenses noted in my 7 notebook that were required for the equipment that were 8 going to be needed. 9 Q: And your notebook at page 82, sir, at 10 approximately the middle of that, just following your 11 rest days, Monday 4th of September, 1995 it indicates 12 that this is a statutory Labour Day. 13 And at 19:40 hours perhaps you can just go 14 ahead and tell us what happens? 15 A: At 19:40 I called Marg Eve. Marg 16 Eve, apart from me mentioned earlier that she was a 17 negotiator, she was also a Sergeant, and as a Sergeant 18 she was a supervisor in our Communications Centre. 19 And I called Marg and she advises that the 20 -- the official call, and I noted that as the official 21 call, meaning the actual activation deployment, had not 22 yet been received, but that Stan Korosec had advised that 23 Natives had cut the fences at Ipperwash Provincial Park 24 and are driving in with cars. 25 My curiosity as to what was happening

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1 caused me to make that call. So it was a casual call to 2 Marg to say, Do we have any knowledge as to what's 3 happening? 4 At 20:00 hours I recalled Marg again to 5 ask her, and she advises now that Inspector Carson and 6 Detective Sergeant Wright had been activated, but there 7 are no others needed to be called yet. 8 At -- I'm turning the page now, to the top 9 of page 83, and at 20:20 hours I spoke with Staff 10 Sergeant, or then Staff Sergeant Bill Dennis at his home, 11 we happened to live in the same neighbourhood, and I know 12 that he was in charge of logistics and he advised that he 13 was not en route to the Forest area. 14 And at 21:11 is when I officially got the 15 call from Marg Eve, that as the team leader for crisis 16 negotiators, that -- on the authority of Detective Staff 17 Sergeant Mark Wright, I was to make my way to Forest 18 Detachment. 19 Q: When you say, official call, just so 20 I'm clear, does that mean that the crisis negotiators 21 were activated, or simply you were to attend and be on 22 standby? 23 A: No, that was for me alone to respond. 24 And to go down about four (4) lines under that note, I 25 made note at 22:00 that Inspector Carson -- Sergeant Eve

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1 confirms with Inspector Carson that I alone am needed, 2 not the teams. So I clarified that point before I left 3 Chatham to head for Forest. 4 Q: You attend down and you do attend to 5 the Forest Detachment I note, at 23:40 hours? 6 A: At 23:40 hours I arrive at Forest 7 Detachment, yes. 8 Q: And it's at that point in time that 9 you receive a copy of what's been described as Project 10 Maple? 11 A: That's correct. 12 Q: If you look at the document at Tab 8, 13 sir, it's been marked as Exhibit P-424. You would be 14 familiar with that? 15 A: Yes, sir. 16 Q: And if you go into the page that's 17 marked -- hand marked page 5 at the top of that, pardon 18 me, page 10. And I apologize for the copy of that, you 19 can barely see the page 10. 20 The response plan under negotiations. 21 Your name is there -- 22 A: That's correct. 23 Q: -- with Smith as the advisor. And 24 that would be Lorne Smith -- 25 A: That's correct.

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1 Q: -- that you described for us. And 2 that diagram, does that indicate the negotiations team as 3 you would have structured it? 4 A: As a result of the planning that had 5 been accomplished both at our workshop on the Thursday 6 prior and the meeting with Inspector Carson on the 7 Friday, this is the negotiation response plan that I put 8 together. 9 It shows, as I say -- as you indicate, 10 myself with Lorne Smith advising, and Karen Moffat as a 11 second to me, so that in my absence she would be able to 12 take charge of that situation. 13 I note under that that John Fuller would 14 be part of our plan from technical support branch, for 15 the reasons that I indicated when it comes to locking out 16 lines and the technical assistance we would require. 17 I then show three (3) teams, one (1) team 18 composed of -- did you want me to -- 19 Q: Yes, please. 20 A: One (1) team composed of Marg Eve as 21 the team leader, with Bob Martin and Paul Wardell as the 22 negotiators. And you can see how I've indicated there 23 that Martin would start off as the primary negotiator, 24 being Mark was the number one (1) and Wardell is number 25 two (2).

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1 Sometimes that was based on background and 2 experience, sometimes it was based on knowledge of the 3 area, these -- that would be how they would be set up. 4 Team Two -- Team Two was led by Dave 5 Dowell. And on that team would be Karen Moffat, or in her 6 place would be Pat Dale. And the second on that team 7 would be Bob Biskup. 8 Team Three (3) was Bob Bembridge, he was a 9 Sergeant and a negotiator. He was a team leader and 10 Debra Mineau from Essex Detachment and -- oh I see there 11 I've used Pat Dale a second time then on Team Three (3). 12 Sometimes it was a matter of juggling 13 people's availabilities as to how they would fit in. And 14 then I have as back up the teams that -- that Al 15 Robertson had -- and I had talked about on Friday when I 16 called him at Mount Forest. He had his team as well that 17 could respond. 18 Q: Just lastly, with respect to this 19 document, if you go to the fourth page in, it's marked 20 number 3 at the top. It talks about community liaison 21 and the community exchange -- pardon me, communication 22 exchange with the effected community being a vital 23 component of this? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: Do you have a sense, when you saw

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1 this, that you would be involved in that -- with that 2 function; that is community liaison in any -- any 3 fashion? 4 A: I don't recall at this time whether I 5 knew then that that page was referring to me. I don't 6 recall. 7 Q: All right. If I can ask you to turn 8 back to your notebooks, the notes that are marked Exhibit 9 P-1704, and at your page 83. 10 You then receive information from 11 Inspector Carson; that is you are briefed as part of the 12 operational group and certain information is imparted to 13 you about the persons that had occupied the buildings in 14 the Park, and that negotiators were not expected to be 15 required for at least twenty-four (24) hours. 16 Now, is that -- is that typical? 17 A: Well, I wouldn't say it's typical, 18 given that this was not a typical occurrence, this was a 19 pretty significant occurrence. And I think he was 20 reading the situation to tell me that in this particular 21 case he wouldn't be requiring the actual crisis 22 negotiators for at least twenty-four (24) hours. 23 So -- meaning that he didn't see any need 24 to have them close at hand for the next twenty-four (24) 25 hours or so.

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1 Q: Do you know what the reasons behind 2 that were? Or is that the type of information that you 3 would be informed, you would be provided? 4 A: I don't have any notes as to why he 5 was suggesting that, no. And I -- I'm looking at my 6 notes thinking it doesn't come as a surprise to me that 7 he would say that, but I don't recall the reasons why -- 8 why he told me that. 9 Q: Ultimately, you became familiar that 10 there were efforts underway in order to try to get 11 somebody inside the Park to talk? 12 A: There was, earlier in that evening, 13 some -- some attempt, as I recall. 14 Q: Can I ask you to turn to -- keeping, 15 again, a finger on your page of your notebook, and if you 16 turn to the documents at Tab 6, these are the scribe 17 notes that have been marked as Exhibit P-426. 18 And these are the notes, particularly from 19 -- notes from 4th of September 1995, and you'll see at 20 the very first page, Tab 10 -- 21 A: Tab 10 I'm at? 22 Q: Yes. 23 A: Okay, sorry. 24 Q: And you'll see your name appears at 25 the -- in the third column second from the top?

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1 A: Correct. I see that, yes. 2 Q: And if you turn over to the second 3 page at 21:09 hours, that perhaps you might have been 4 called by Don Fraser? Again, I appreciate these are not 5 your notes. 6 A: If I'm putting the time together 7 properly, 21:09 Don Fraser to call Brad Seltzer, and my 8 notes reveal 21:11 I was called. So in a matter of two 9 (2) minutes then for Don to call the Comm Centre and the 10 Comm Centre to call me. 11 Q: And if you turn over to the next 12 page, it's marked page 8 at the top, at 23:14 hours; you 13 see the very last entry on that? 14 "Brad Seltzer should be here soon and 15 maybe can assist." 16 I take it that ultimately you did arrive 17 there as you've indicated? 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: And when you flip over to page 9 at 20 23:43 hours, that you do, in fact, arrive, and you're 21 given the project book, it says. 22 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And it goes on to read: 25 "John Carson advised Brad Seltzer of

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1 notice being served and general 2 incidents to-date." 3 So you would have had that information at 4 that point? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And that coincides with your 7 notebook? 8 A: My notebook shows that there was not 9 a lot of information but some details that the Inspector 10 passed on to me. 11 Q: And if you go down to the -- on that 12 same page 9 at 23:46 hours? See where it reads: 13 "John Carson to Brad Seltzer: Twenty- 14 five (25) to forty (40) people in the 15 Park?" 16 A: Yes, I see that. 17 Q: And that essentially corresponds with 18 the notes that you have? 19 A: Essentially, yes. 20 Q: That you're to get a room and be 21 ready for tomorrow? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: And then he goes on: 24 "John Carson to Brad Seltzer: I don't 25 see any negotiators with Marg Eve and

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1 Paul Wardle yet." 2 A: Yet, right. 3 Q: And just lastly on that page: 4 "Brad Seltzer to John Carson: I've got 5 Wardle and Eve ready for tomorrow. 6 Dave Dowell to stand by." 7 Again that corresponds with -- the -- the 8 notes and the logistical planning that you've described 9 for us? 10 A: It's the logistical planning that I'm 11 informing him as to what I know and he's telling me what 12 he knows relative to negotiations or the negotiators. 13 Q: And if you flip over two (2) pages to 14 page -- it reads "13" at the top at 01:04 hours: 15 "John Carson to Brad Seltzer: When 16 Stan Korosec returns we will debrief, 17 then if all is okay we will go get 18 rest." 19 Again consistent with your notebook and 20 with the information and advice that you would have 21 received on that occasion? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: At page -- 24 A: I must say I think the -- the 25 importance of that note as I read it, the scribe note

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1 there at 23:54, Do we have key people is that you -- you 2 have to have -- the negotiations that I've indicated -- 3 Q: Were you looking at page 10 just for 4 the record? 5 A: Just for the record on page 10, yes. 6 Q: Yes. 7 A: I'm saying do we have individuals? 8 You can't negotiate with -- with -- in the way that I've 9 describe negotiations -- 10 Q: And you're informing the Incident 11 Commander and the balance of the team that you now have 12 the resources in place? 13 A: I had the resources but do -- do we 14 know any of the people that we were going to be dealing 15 with in -- in any kind of communication at all? 16 Q: Sir, if you -- if you turn over to 17 page 15 we are now at -- into September the 5th of 1995 18 and the entry at 01:52 hours it has you leaving to return 19 at -- at seven o'clock or 07:00 hours the following 20 morning? 21 A: That's correct. 22 Q: And in fact if we go back to your 23 notes at Tab 6 Exhibit P-1704 at page, I think it's 84, 24 am I right? 25

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1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: Pardon me. 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 A: I believe I have the right spot, page 8 84 on that date. 9 Q: At 07:00 hours you do report back for 10 duty so that coincides with the notes we've just looked 11 at? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: You proceed then to set up the 14 negotiation room. You test equipment to make sure 15 everything's in working order? 16 A: That's correct. 17 Q: And again that's part of your -- your 18 regular function in order to get prepared given some of 19 the -- 20 A: A state of readiness, yes. 21 Q: -- equipment problems that you've 22 described for us earlier? 23 A: That's correct. 24 Q: And you see the entry at 09:20 hours? 25 You attend at a Unit Leader's briefing?

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1 A: That's correct, I see it. 2 Q: And you're there as the unit leader 3 for the negotiators obviously? 4 A: That's right. 5 Q: The goal is again set out to contain 6 and negotiate a peaceful resolution? 7 A: That's right. 8 Q: And you get additional information 9 and -- and what I'm interested in then is the comment 10 that you'll find on the following page at page 85, the 11 entry at 10:30 hours: 12 "Called Lorne. He is..." 13 And perhaps I'll get you to read that? 14 A: I'm looking at my original notes 15 which are consistent with the -- with the -- 16 Q: Yes -- 17 A: -- copies, just a little better to 18 read and at 10:30 I'm saying that I called Lorne. 19 "He is content at arm's length but 20 agrees that Vince George could 21 negotiate." 22 Q: And what -- what is that about? What 23 -- what's the reference to Vince George and what -- what 24 would his role be again in the context of the crisis 25 negotiation teams you described for us earlier?

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1 A: I think we have to be cautious when 2 we talk about negotiations, in that I find in hindsight 3 looking back at some of the wordings of both my notes and 4 of the scribe notes and of the plan, that term 5 negotiations is used too often and out of context. 6 But, for lack of a better term, it's used. 7 So there's different definitions I suppose of negotiation 8 that would be applied situationally to when the term is 9 used. 10 So when I say, negotiators, being used or 11 negotiations it doesn't -- it doesn't necessarily 12 coincide with the definition or the use or the strict 13 role that I commented earlier as to how crisis 14 negotiations are handled. 15 So when I say here, negotiations, Vince 16 George could negotiate. Vince George was not a trained 17 negotiator and therefore would not be ever placed in a 18 negotiation role and certainly the negotiators were there 19 for a very specific role, given the criteria that I set 20 out before. 21 That wasn't any criteria that we had. So 22 I used the term negotiate there and if I could I would 23 change that term for us to speak of, to say communicate. 24 That Vince George could communicate. 25 That Lorne knowing the people better than

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1 I would say, that he felt safe in I asking Vince George 2 if he could be a point of contact for us. If he could 3 open a door, if he could try to communicate. 4 Q: Thank you. I'm interested in your -- 5 in your notation that just follows that at 11:00 hours, 6 perhaps you can read that for us and tell us what that 7 means? 8 A: My notation at 11:00 hours says: 9 "Intel [meaning intelligence] three (3) 10 males, two (2) females, two (2) kids." 11 And I don't recall why I wrote that in 12 there. It would be subject of the discussion that we had 13 with the Inspector in the -- I can't comment, I don't 14 remember -- I don't recall why I wrote it. 15 Q: All right. At 12:10 you then travel 16 with Detective Sergeant Mark Wright and Park 17 Superintendent Les Kobayashi to the west boundary of the 18 Park? 19 A: That's correct. 20 Q: Am I reading that properly? 21 A: You're reading that correctly, yes. 22 Q: And at 12:30 I take it that that is 23 some attempt to make contact with the people in the Park? 24 A: That's right. There were vehicles 25 being driven around within the Park and Mark and Les were

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1 at the fence trying to make contact with those persons. 2 Q: All right. You were in attendance, 3 as well? 4 A: I was in attendance as well. I say 5 they were trying to make contact, in that they were at 6 the fence, I stood back. I wasn't at the fence with 7 them. 8 But I mean certainly, hardly more than the 9 distance between you and I, you know, 20 - 25 feet sort 10 of thing, away from them. 11 Q: Were they successful in making 12 contact? 13 A: No. 14 Q: See the entry at the bottom of that 15 page, "waited for" is that group? 16 A: "Waited for approximately 45 minutes 17 watching the vehicles and the persons 18 around the concession." 19 Q: And if we just go over to the 20 following page at 13:30 hours. 21 A: At 13:30 hours I attended the main 22 gate of the old Canadian Forces Base Ipperwash. And Mark 23 spoke with Bert Manning. I didn't know Bert Manning. 24 And I draw to your attention that his name is in 25 quotation marks in my book, which indicates to me that

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1 somebody told me, maybe it was he -- I don't know, but 2 somebody told me his name and I didn't know the 3 gentleman. 4 Q: All right. Were you able to overhear 5 that conversation as between Marg Eve -- 6 A: I was -- 7 Q: -- and Bert Manning? 8 A: I was there, yes. 9 Q: Mark Wright, pardon me. And it would 10 appear that certain information was imparted? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: To the effect, at least, for the 13 first few entries that there was nobody to speak to, is 14 that fair? 15 A: Yes, that's a correct statement, yes. 16 Q: And the entry at number 5, at the 17 bottom portion of page 86 of your notebook, sir, what 18 does that read? 19 A: "Natives are upset by roadblocks. 20 Not necessary and if we choose to play 21 that way somebody will get hurt." 22 Q: Okay. And do you know what, if 23 anything, happened to that -- that piece of information 24 or indeed any of this information, was that reported up 25 the chain of command?

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1 A: At 14:00 hours my note says that we 2 returned to -- or I returned to Forest Detachment and 3 briefed Inspector Carson. And as would be my usual 4 custom information that I knew about the role or task 5 that he'd given me I would report back to him about that; 6 what had just occurred and the information I'd learnt 7 from it. 8 Q: Your role in attending with Mark 9 Wright and Les Kobayashi what -- what was that? 10 A: My recollection is that my role would 11 be to be present as we establish a contact; that 12 hopefully persons would talk to us and those persons 13 would become then known to me and -- and by doing that we 14 would establish a communication contact. 15 Other than that, I don't recall being 16 assigned a role. I was told to accompany the two (2) of 17 them and -- and as I recall being there I'm recalling 18 that I was interested in knowing who they would end up 19 talking to. 20 Q: All right. I take it that you 21 weren't there in the context of a crisis negotiator? 22 Again, as you -- 23 A: Certainly not. 24 Q: -- described it. 25 A: Certainly not and -- and, again, as I

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1 say, the -- the term "negotiator" for as often it 2 appears, I would suggest is used far to often. It's 3 certainly not the role that the crisis negotiating teams 4 were set up for. They were set up for in the event of a 5 barricaded person, a hostage situation, or a life 6 threatening situation of a barricaded person, you know, 7 within the whole -- the entire occurrence. 8 And that person, again, would be refusing 9 to give themself up to -- to the police. As I say, it's 10 a very distinct role that they would have and my function 11 at this point would have nothing to do with crisis 12 negotiation. My function at this point would be to learn 13 who our point of contact was. 14 Q: Were you -- were you aware, for 15 example, that there was also a need to determine someone 16 upon whom an injunction might be served? 17 Did you have any role in that or any 18 understanding that that was part of -- at least -- 19 A: I don't recall if I had an 20 understanding of that. Certainly not my function or my 21 role and I don't recall whether I had any knowledge, if 22 at all. 23 Q: I had skipped over the -- on the 24 previous page, your page 85 of your notebook, Mr. 25 Seltzer, the entry of 12:30 hours.

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1 It would appear that, again, that that was 2 some attempt for contact? 3 A: These are the notes that I made 4 relative to the -- to the efforts that Mark and Les were 5 making to make contact with persons that were inside the 6 fenced area. 7 "Mark attempted contact with a male 8 native driving a flaming auto who spun 9 up to a finned [I call it a finned] 10 bomb that said "OPP" on -- "Who" on it. 11 All vehicles sped away after their 12 conversation." 13 And by "their conversation" I mean the two 14 (2) vehicles, I remember sat nose to tail, so to speak, 15 so that the persons could talk to each other and they 16 sped away without any contact with Mark or Les at all. 17 Q: Can I ask you to turn please to the 18 document at Tab 12. It's been marked as Exhibit P-913. 19 It is a -- from Wednesday, September the 6th. And 20 although it's cut off it's obviously 1995 and the 21 headline, which is also partly cut off "three natives at 22 Park C-H..." and it's cut of at that point. 23 There's a photograph there, unfortunately 24 of rather poor quality. And you'll note the caption at 25 the bottom of that photograph indicates that that is you;

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1 at least in the background? 2 A: That's right. 3 Q: Have you seen that photograph before? 4 A: I've seen this photograph before. 5 That is a photograph -- actually it marries up with the 6 next page, I believe, to make the photograph complete. 7 Q: Right. 8 A: And it shows Mark and Les at the 9 fence and -- and I'm standing back, as I suggested to 10 you. The photograph doesn't really show the depth that - 11 - you know that would be in reality. "Depth" meaning 12 that I'm not standing forward of them but standing back. 13 Q: You're in full uniform? 14 A: I'm in full uniform, correct. 15 Q: Why is that? If that is Mark Wright 16 he doesn't appear to be in uniform -- 17 A: Mark is not in uniform. 18 Q: -- am I correct on that? 19 A: Mark is not in uniform; that's 20 correct. 21 Q: Why would you be in uniform as the 22 negotiator and he would not be? 23 A: Mark is a criminal investigator and 24 in his role in criminal investigation was not a uniformed 25 member. For my role and function I was a uniform member

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1 in my -- my everyday duties. 2 For this function or this -- this role in 3 this occurrence, although I was a crisis negotiator, and 4 I think we've established or pointed out that the role of 5 crisis negotiators weren't being anticipated, certainly. 6 And I think it -- as a crisis negotiator, 7 that is not different than other crisis' that I responded 8 to as a negotiator, and that is to respond in uniform. 9 Even though as a crisis negotiator you're 10 at an occurrence, first and foremost you are a police 11 officer and must be able to be identified as a police 12 officer. If the dynamics of the situation were to change 13 and the Incident Commander, for whatever reason, chose 14 not to do -- to use negotiators in the crisis role that 15 I'm talking about, and yet the dynamics required him to 16 deploy police officers, those police officers have to be 17 visibly identifiable as police officers. 18 So my response to my duties were in 19 uniform. 20 Q: Thank you. Turning back to your 21 notes again, you've indicated the entry at 13:30 hours, 22 this conversation with Bert Manning, you were in -- in 23 the company of Mark Wright when this conversation went 24 on. 25 A: That's correct.

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1 Q: And you would have been familiar at 2 that point that the message was given that MNR was 3 seeking an injunction and that they, that is the people 4 in occupation, would have a right to be represented at a 5 hearing of that injunction, yes? 6 A: Yes. I have Mark's -- or I have a 7 comment in my notes as to Mark -- would it be of help for 8 me to read my notes of that conversation? 9 Q: Please do. 10 A: Okay. So again, I'm going back to 11 13:30 where we attend at the main gate with -- with Mark 12 and spoke to Bert Manning, who I believe was Bert 13 Manning. And these are just notes that I would have made 14 immediately thereafter so they're not verbatim but they 15 are notes of the conversation. And I'm suggesting that 16 Bert Manning advises: 17 "1. Elders are not present for us to 18 talk. 19 2. Does not know who will talk. 20 3. Is satisfied to have their Stoney 21 Point back. 22 4. It was advised by Mark Wright that 23 Natives are trespassing pursuant to the 24 Trespass to Property Act [Or in my 25 notes I have TPA] that the land is

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1 rightfully owned by MNR. MNR are 2 seeking a court injunction and may have 3 right to be represented. 4 5. Natives are upset by roadblock, not 5 necessary, and if we choose to play 6 that way, somebody will get hurt." 7 And then I go on again to say: 8 "14:00 to return to Forest and brief 9 the Inspector." 10 Q: And there is a corresponding note, 11 and you don't necessarily need to turn there, but at Tab 12 10, which is Exhibit P-426, the typed scribe notes, 13 there's an entry at 14:08 hours where you were -- Carson 14 was discussing a visit to the Park with yourself, 15 Sergeant Seltzer. 16 "Seltzer advises that he concurs with 17 Detective Sergeant Wright, observations 18 that the First Nations people are very 19 disorganized and nervous." 20 I take it that was an assessment that you 21 would have made? 22 A: That that was an assessment? 23 Q: Yeah. And again, I appreciate that 24 that is not your notes, but it would appear that that 25 assessment, if I could put it that way, is attributed to

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1 you, nonetheless. 2 A: The scribe note is indicating that 3 Mark made the comment. 4 Q: Oh, pardon me. All right. 5 A: And in -- in the scribe note is 6 indicating that I concur with Mark's co -- Mark's 7 observations. 8 Q: Thank you. 9 A: So in answer to your question, yes. 10 Q: And he would of -- you would concur 11 with the balance of that which indicates that nothing 12 should be done until more is known about what's going on. 13 A: That was my comment. And I believe 14 it comes from my training and background. And again, if 15 I can bring the crisis negotiation hat into the picture, 16 I'm saying that the whole intent would be to slow things 17 down. 18 Slow things down, find out who's there, 19 find out what the problems are, find out, you know, 20 information before we do any -- any action at all. 21 Q: Thank you. Your notes at page 87, 22 it's P-1704, do you see the entry at 18:00 hours? It's 23 in the middle of that page. 24 A: Yes. Yes. 25 Q: Pardon me, I should -- I should go to

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1 the entry at -- that ends just on -- on the page previous 2 at page 86: 3 "Marg --" 4 The entry at 15:40 hours. 5 A: At 15:40 hours: 6 "Marg Eve was instructed to attend 7 Forest for 07:00 hours tomorrow. Since 8 14:00 I have arranged for her shift to 9 be covered through Staff Sergeant Sharp 10 for tonight." 11 She had a -- an evening shift for the Comm 12 Centre where she had responsibilities and I had arranged 13 through her supervisor to have her cleared of her -- of 14 her responsibilities and to attend the next morning to 15 Forest. 16 Q: And at page 87, the entry at 16:40, 17 you then meet again with Inspector Carson? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: And the information that's indicated 20 on there, the -- the warrants on file, that would be 21 information, I take it, provided to you? 22 A: They would be -- they would be notes 23 that I made at the time of the briefing, and for whatever 24 reason they may have value to me, I noted them. Although 25 they didn't have any value to me. In -- in my function,

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1 my role, the warrants were a matter being handled by -- 2 by the Crime Leader. 3 Q: And the note that just follows that: 4 "MNR..." 5 A: "Are moving on injunction." 6 Q: Okay. 7 A: Again, they'd be notes that would 8 come out of the briefing; someone else would make them 9 and I would copy them down for what value they may be to 10 me at a later time. And then I go on with negotiation. 11 Q: Yes. 12 A: That I'm still trying to raise Vince 13 George and Marg will be here for 08:00 hours, meaning the 14 next morning. 15 Q: All right. So clearly part of your 16 task was to contact Vince George and -- and his value, as 17 I understand it -- we've had the benefit, incidently, of 18 Vince George's testimony -- 19 A: Okay. 20 Q: -- here, that he would act as a 21 person to -- to at least initiate dialogue; would that -- 22 would that be fair? 23 A: I -- I think it's fair, in all the 24 things that we've talked about, about my sense that we 25 shouldn't do anything 'til we know what we're dealing

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1 with. How are we going to know what we're dealing with 2 if nobody will talk to us? 3 So given that my attendance with Mark and 4 Les Kobayashi met without -- with any result, we were 5 moving to another stage now of having Marg, a female 6 officer, attend, and Vince, a First Nations person, an 7 officer, and see if that would open any doors for us or 8 any point of contact. 9 Q: Up to this point, sir, you've 10 described the -- the attempts to make contact with people 11 inside the Park, approaching the fence line, that is Mr. 12 Kobayashi and Detective Sergeant Wright. 13 Do you know whether or not there were any 14 attempts to contact those people inside the Park by 15 telephone? 16 A: I can't speak to that. I don't know. 17 Q: Would -- would that have been your 18 call? 19 A: That wouldn't have been my call, no. 20 Q: All right. If you look at the scribe 21 notes at Tab 10, that's Exhibit P-426, and at page 42 in 22 particular, the entry at 17:07 hours. It is the second 23 paragraph. 24 Pardon me, on the page previous it reads 25 16:07 hours, and we move to page --

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1 A: Correct. 2 Q: -- 42. Do you see the -- the first 3 full paragraph: 4 "Sergeant Seltzer..." 5 A: I see that, yes. 6 Q: "...advises that there will be no 7 negotiators overnight. Constable 8 Dowell can be here in two (2) hours if 9 he's required. Sergeant Eve will be 10 here at 08:00 hours 06 September, '95. 11 Constable Vince George has been 12 contacted." 13 And I pause here. I take it you would 14 have made contact with him by then? 15 A: That's correct. 16 Q: And I continue with the quote: 17 "He is going to think about our 18 request." 19 And the request was that he act in some 20 role, and again as a facilitator to dialogue. I'm going 21 to use that as opposed to negotiator. 22 A: That's a good term, I guess, 23 facilitating dialogue for us. 24 Q: Thank you. 25 A: We'll open a door, make a contact.

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1 Q: "Make it clear to him that he is not 2 being pressured to be a negotiator." 3 And I take it that that word there, 4 "negotiator" is one (1) of those unfortunate uses. 5 A: Thank you. I think it is an 6 unfortunate use, yes. Again, if we can change that we 7 would say that he is not being pressured to be a 8 facilitator, a -- a person of contact. 9 Q: Okay. 10 A: We didn't want Vince to feel that he 11 was -- in -- in policing it's easy to understand a very 12 structured environment, and when a -- an officer in 13 charge tells you to do something, sometimes it's 14 necessary that you just do it; you don't ask questions, 15 it's just -- it has to get done. 16 And it was -- it was very important here 17 to be sensitive to Vince's situation and let him know 18 that this is no pressure on him to become involved, that 19 it would be helpful if -- if he would do so. 20 Q: Okay. I -- I take it you came to 21 understand, ultimately, that Vince George was quite happy 22 to play a role in -- in achieving the objective -- 23 A: Yes, he was. 24 Q: -- that is the overall objective of 25 negotiating a peaceful resolution.

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1 A: That's correct. 2 Q: When you note that you advise that 3 there would be not negotiators overnight, you certainly 4 weren't indicating there would be no negotiations, I take 5 it? 6 A: No. What I was indicating was to the 7 Incident Commander, to help him to -- or make him to be 8 aware of the fact that the room would not be occupied 9 with negotiators. 10 So given the need, if -- if the situation 11 was to occur and the criteria fit, and thereby 12 negotiators would need to be called in, just for him to 13 know that they aren't going to be on the Command Post 14 site, that it would be two (2) hours before we could get 15 Dave Dowell as another negotiator there. And I was close 16 at hand, so at least we would have two (2) negotiators, 17 you know, within two (2) hours, if the need required. 18 Q: And back to your notes at P-1704, 19 page 87, the entry at 18:00 hours, it seems to indicate 20 that at that point in time you did manage to get a hold 21 of Vince George; you requested that he attend the 22 following morning? 23 A: That's correct. If I -- did you want 24 me to carry on? 25 Q: Please.

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1 A: Yeah. That he -- he had a fatal 2 report due. So he was a -- as an officer on the road, he 3 had an investigation involving a fatal accident. So I'm 4 saying that he had a fatal report due tonight, but will 5 leave early if -- if I can see his relief NCO. 6 So by that he was asking if I could give 7 his Detachment a call, talk to his -- his NCO here or his 8 supervisor and see that he be cleared as soon as possible 9 in the morning to attend to our needs. 10 Q: Aside from seeking your assistance in 11 getting you to clear him from his own Detachment, I 12 understand he was at the Petrolia Detachment? 13 A: Vince? He was either -- I think he 14 was Sombra Detachment. 15 Q: Pardon me. 16 A: In Lambton County, yeah. 17 Q: I stand corrected. 18 A: Yeah. 19 Q: Did it seem to you that -- I know you 20 came to understand, ultimately, that he was interested in 21 doing whatever he could. What was your assessment at 22 this point in time, if -- if any? 23 A: Can I go ahead an read -- 24 Q: Please. 25 A: -- the note that I have here because

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1 I think it's pertinent to -- to your question. And I'm 2 saying that in addition to Vince requesting that I talk 3 to his NCO to relieve him, I'm also noting in my notes 4 that: 5 "Vince will also check with him before 6 midnight." 7 To ensure that he has that time. 8 "Vince will determine from his family 9 as to whether anyone will talk to him 10 and if he wants to act for or with us 11 as a negotiator." 12 Again, the improper use of the term 13 "negotiator." 14 "He has to work here after all is 15 done." 16 And so he was relaying to me and I clearly 17 understood his position, given his and his family's 18 cultural ties and his need to be sensitive to he and his 19 family's position. He's recognizing the fact that he'll 20 check with his family to see is his need going to be help 21 -- is his presence going to be helpful to us? 22 Is he going to be able to have somebody 23 use him as a point of contact for us? Would there be 24 people that would talk to him? And secondly, he's going 25 to determine if in fact he wants to.

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1 And -- and again, it goes back to the 2 earlier note that was indicating that there was no 3 pressure on him to do so. We wanted to ensure that he 4 felt that. 5 Q: The last entry on that page at 18:15. 6 A: At 18:15: 7 "I discussed with Inspector Carson..." 8 So I go over the page to page 88: 9 "...the negotiator office will shut 10 down for tonight." 11 Q: All right. 12 A: And again, just making sure he was 13 clear that there was nobody in there. 14 Q: And before you go off duty at 19:30, 15 what -- what's the balance of -- 16 A: At 19:05: 17 "I called Lorne Smith. There was no 18 answer there so I left a simple message 19 on his machine." 20 And by that I mean as to what had 21 happened, that Marg was on her way in the morning and 22 that Vince was going to check with his family to see if - 23 - if he should be involved with this. That Shawn Johnson 24 will release Vince. 25 I guess Shawn Johnson, now that I read

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1 this note, was the supervisor, so Vince would be relieved 2 as early as possible tonight. And at 19:30 I was off 3 duty. 4 Q: And I note that you come back on duty 5 at 07:00 hours on Wednesday 06 September of '96. 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: And Marg Eve attends. You provide 8 her a briefing, I take from that. 9 A: That's correct. 10 Q: And at 09:00 hours, Vince George 11 attends. 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: I'll ask you to look at scribe notes 14 at pages 54 and 55, that is Exhibit P-426 at Tab 10. 15 There's an entry at 0:47 hours. It starts on the page 16 earlier, page 54. They have you arriving at 8:47, that 17 is 08:47 hours, and Inspector Carson is asking you: 18 "Wants to know what Constable George 19 has decided to do." 20 I take it that that coincides with your 21 entry that Constable Vince George then arrives -- 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: -- and you -- or someone has a 24 discussion with him about his -- whether or not he feels 25 comfortable to negotiate or not. Again, I understand the

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1 use of that word. 2 And then you make a comment: 3 "Brad Seltzer feels negotiations will 4 just be dialogue." 5 I take it -- 6 A: That's right. 7 Q: -- that that is more consistent with 8 the role that Vince George was to play as you've -- 9 A: That's right. 10 Q: -- you've described for us. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Mr. 12 Falconer...? 13 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I'm sorry, Mr. 14 Commissioner, I'm just going to ask My Friend Mr. Worme, 15 if it's possible, in terms of a process, we had an 16 explanation by the Witness earlier about how negotiation 17 -- the word "negotiation" may have been spread in 18 different places, different ways. 19 But now we're getting to the point where 20 it's now unclear how the word is meant. And I'm just 21 asking My Friend, gently, if he could not lead the 22 witness on it, because "negotiate" might mean the formal 23 negotiate, we don't know. And I'm just asking, for 24 example, this last passage, we should be hearing from the 25 Witness in how a negotiation --

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1 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 2 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- if it's all 3 right. 4 MR. DONALD WORME: I'll take that 5 direction from My Friend and I appreciate that. 6 7 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 8 Q: You did get from Constable George his 9 view on that? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: And did he have an appreciation of 12 the role that he would -- would play? Could you tell us 13 about that? 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 Q: It might help to simply go ahead and 18 read the balance of that scribe note and tell us if 19 that -- 20 A: I would have to read the scribe -- my 21 notes don't show what the scribe notes do, for whatever 22 reason. 23 Q: Right. 24 A: I was there. 25 Q: Tell me if --

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1 A: But I can explain it. 2 Q: -- reading those scribe notes, does 3 that refresh your memory as to the discussion and the 4 understandings that you and perhaps others had? 5 A: Yes. And as -- as you directed I'll 6 -- I'll read the -- the scribes notes then. 7 Q: Please. 8 A: So the Inspector's asking me to 9 discuss with Constable George if he feels comfortable or 10 not to negotiate. 11 And by "negotiate" here I don't mean 12 crisis negotiator. I -- "negotiate" meaning communicate. 13 "Brad Seltzer feels negotiations will 14 just be dialogue." 15 So I'm correcting the use of that word, I 16 suppose, without meaning to correct it, but just to 17 explain it. 18 "We have to have someone that they will 19 talk to. John Carson, from Constable 20 George's point of view, have him as an 21 introduction person. Have him..." 22 Meaning Vince George. 23 "... take them in and have Marg do the 24 talking. Constable George provides a 25 bit of safety to us. Suggest to

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1 Constable George that he go in and 2 facilitate the dialogue. Not to be 3 seen as a dialogue person, just to help 4 us get in there. Sergeant Seltzer 5 agrees with the idea. Sergeant Seltzer 6 feels that the -- that the First 7 Nations have some acceptance of the 8 female. John Carson, do we have 9 anybody else in our negotiation team 10 that is more appropriate? John Carson 11 advises Brad Seltzer that we should 12 have Lorne Smith talk to Bob George." 13 So, from what I just read, I'm recognizing 14 that Vince George is agreeing that perhaps he can 15 facilitate in arranging for Marg Eve to talk to someone 16 within the Park, so that he would be a contact person. 17 Q: And the comment that it suggested you 18 agreed with, that he not be seen just as a dialogue 19 person but something more. What was it that you were 20 agreeing with on that? If, in fact, that is properly 21 attributed to you. 22 A: What I -- what I'm agreeing to is 23 that -- that Constable George go in, not to be seen as a 24 dialogue person, just to help us get in. So that the 25 dialogue person would be Marg. Marg Eve would do the --

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1 the discussion. And again I believe in reading this, if 2 my memory serves me correctly, that we were very 3 sensitive to -- to Vince's position; just introduce us 4 and we'll take it from there. 5 Q: And you continue with an assessment 6 that the First Nations have some acceptance of the 7 female? It seems to me that that was your feeling? 8 A: That was my feeling, yes. 9 Q: Okay. Do you -- do you want to tell 10 us anything about that? 11 A: I don't know how much I knew of it at 12 that point in time other than perhaps I'm making the 13 suggestion so I'm recognizing from -- from perhaps Lorne 14 that -- 15 Q: All right. 16 A: -- that there may be some ability 17 that Marg would have that maybe a male person talking to 18 them would not. We didn't know. We -- we were trying 19 hard to find the right person that could open the door 20 and start some dialogue so we were trying options. 21 The -- the -- having attended the Park 22 there was no communication with Les, Mark, and -- and -- 23 or myself and so the next option was to have Vince try to 24 open the door so that Marg could attempt. 25 Q: And just lastly with respect to that

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1 passage where John Carson is asking, Do we have anybody 2 else in our negotiation team that is more appropriate, is 3 that an expression of concern or do you recall that he 4 might have been concerned about the appropriateness of 5 the people that you have as -- as part of your resource? 6 A: I don't think it was a concern in the 7 sense that the resources are lacking, I think it was a 8 concern to say have we -- have we done our best to, you 9 know, select the best option that we have at this point? 10 Have we done all we can? Is there -- is there anybody 11 else that would be more appropriate? 12 Q: All right. You see then the entry at 13 08:59 hours where you're instructed -- how it reads: 14 "John Carson instructs Brad Seltzer of 15 having Lorne Smith go and visit with 16 Bob George and some of the elders, give 17 him a sense that we want to do this 18 peacefully; make them aware that we got 19 ambushed last night." 20 What can you tell us about that, sir? 21 A: The plan was for -- for Lorne and I 22 to visit the community of Kettle Point and Lorne being 23 the respected person that he was in that community and 24 the direction from the Inspector was to go see Bob 25 George, for one, and I'm just inquiring should I go with

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1 -- with Lorne? Is it something that he should do alone? 2 Where should we be on that? 3 And his direction to me is that I should 4 go with -- with Lorne. 5 Q: Okay. The next entry on page 56 at 6 09:03 hours that I want to ask you to address. See: 7 "John Carson wants them to know that we 8 are there, keep pressing them. Keep 9 some dialogue going. Sergeant Seltzer 10 asks if it is time to introduce Marg 11 Eve. John Carson advises yes, take her 12 in and keep her in there. 13 SERGEANT SELTZER: Any support to 14 thinking that Marg Eve is the one we 15 want them to talk to. Let them know 16 that she is a negotiator." 17 And perhaps you can just tell us about 18 that? 19 A: I think the Inspector's concern was 20 that we not leave the area without -- without a point of 21 contact. 22 So what he's suggesting by that is to keep 23 -- keep pressing and -- and keep dialogue going as to -- 24 as to maintain a vigilance of trying and so he's -- and 25 I'm asking him here is it time to get Marg down to -- to,

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1 you know, to the fence? Is it time to get Marg down to 2 the Park? 3 And he's advising me that yes, take Marg 4 down there and I'm asking is there any support to 5 thinking that Marg is the one that we want them to talk 6 to? And he's saying certainly and it doesn't hurt to let 7 them know that Marg is a negotiator. 8 And by that -- if I can clarify that term 9 is to know that -- that Marg has had training as a 10 negotiator, has had training as a communicator and would 11 be -- you know exhibit the -- the qualities that -- it 12 goes back to that point of trust that I talked of before 13 that -- that Marg would be able to do that, that she's -- 14 she is a negotiator and -- and can talk? 15 Q: In fact the instruction is more than 16 simply go to the fence isn't it? If you continue on that 17 passage it says: 18 "JOHN CARSON: We should cross the 19 fence. If we go in there they will 20 come up and talk to us. We have lots 21 of video there and lots of officers. 22 If you go in, someone has to go in and 23 tell you to go out." 24 Do you recall that as being part of the 25 instructions?

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1 A: Until I read it here, no, I didn't. 2 I -- I don't recall that as being a specific instruction. 3 Q: And carrying on with that same 4 passage: 5 "Sergeant Seltzer agrees that there is 6 enough support there." 7 That seems to be out on its own, and it 8 continues: 9 "John Carson stresses to Brad Seltzer 10 that he wants Vince George to be the 11 introduction guy. Have a lot of 12 respect for his read of the people. 13 SERGEANT SELTZER: Some cultural 14 things he will be able to help us with. 15 SERGEANT SELTZER: Keep Lorne Smith at 16 arm's length. No problem with him 17 going to the Reserve. John Carson 18 wants to get a sense of how the other 19 people are feeling. Sergeant Seltzer 20 has Lorne Smith to set something up and 21 Sergeant Seltzer to attend with him." 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 A: That would be consistent with my

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1 understanding of -- of the direction we were going at 2 that point in time. 3 Q: In addition to the consideration of 4 using Constable George -- Constable Vince George in the 5 fashion as you've described as he's described here as the 6 introduction guy, was there any consideration given to 7 using Staff Sergeant Bouwman to establish dialogue given 8 that he was the one that we've come to understand was 9 dealing with the Stoney Point group over the past 10 approximately one year? 11 A: I don't recall any consideration of 12 that. 13 Q: And I'm just going to ask you about 14 the -- the last -- second last sentence in the entry I've 15 just read you at 09:03 hours. 16 "No problem with him going to the 17 Reserve." 18 And I take it that that is Lorne Smith. 19 "John Carson --" 20 But you'll correct if I'm wrong on that. 21 A: Hmm hmm. 22 Q: "John Carson wants to get a sense of 23 how the other people are feeling." 24 And I wonder if you could tell us who -- 25 who as you understood it, was the 'other people'?

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1 A: The 'other people' meaning the people 2 of Kettle Point. Again knowing Lorne's background, his 3 affiliation with the community, their knowledge of him 4 and respect for -- for him it was the Inspector's 5 direction to me to pass it onto Lorne that what we want 6 to know is where's -- where's the community at on this? 7 Q: All right. 8 A: And again, can anybody direct us to a 9 point of contact? Can we find somebody to talk to? 10 Q: We've talked about or -- or we've 11 reviewed the instruction that you had received from 12 Inspector Carson to attend, to make some contact with 13 Robert -- Knobby George -- also known as Knobby George. 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: And you understood that he was a 16 relative of the OPP officers Luke and Vince George? 17 A: I knew that, yes. 18 Q: Did you -- did you make that contact? 19 A: We made that contact later in the 20 day, yes. 21 Q: All right. And in addition to the 22 instruction to contact Bob George or Knobby George, you 23 were also asked to contact Earl Bressette. 24 A: Earl Bressette, correct. 25 Q: And Earl Bressette was important in

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1 what way? 2 A: Earl Bressette was an Elder in the 3 community known to -- to Lorne and Lorne took me to 4 Earl's home. 5 Q: And you see your entry at 09:20 hours 6 on your notes at page 88 at the bottom page? 7 A: Page 88, yes. 8 Q: All right. "09:20 hours meeting with 9 Inspector Carson." 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: This is information that you would 12 have been providing I take it that you did talk -- or 13 that you're getting instructions rather to talk to Vince? 14 A: Yes. At 9:10 the meeting with 15 Inspector Carson and those were the things that I note 16 that he -- he instructed me. 17 Q: To see if he would facilitate Natives 18 talking with Marg Eve? 19 A: That's correct. 20 Q: The next bullet. You talked with 21 Lorne Smith to -- sorry, I'm having some trouble with 22 reading that. 23 A: The next bullet there at the bottom 24 of page 88 I'm saying: 25 "Talk with Lorne Smith to determine if

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1 he "will contact Robert Knobby George, 2 Luke and Vince's dad." 3 Q: All right. 4 A: "Where is the community on this?" I 5 go on to say: 6 "Talk to Earl Bressette, Duff's 7 dad." 8 And in quotation, I'm quoting the 9 Inspector to say: 10 "We do not want confrontation. We want 11 to settle this with genuine concern for 12 the community." 13 At 9:20: 14 "I spoke with Marg and Vince. They 15 agree with the plan." 16 Meaning that Vince will facilitate 17 discussion with Marg and -- and -- and the occupiers. 18 "Vince will attend Grand Bend this 19 morning to talk with a contact person." 20 Q: And we know from his testimony that 21 he had a confidential source? 22 A: Sure. 23 Q: And I take it that that's what that's 24 in relation to or do you know? 25 A: I -- I have no knowledge of that. I

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1 -- a "contact person" and that person was for Vince to 2 know and I didn't know who it was. 3 Q: And I see at 9:40 hours that you get 4 some agreement is that -- is that -- am I reading that 5 properly? 6 A: At 9:40 Lorne Smith agrees to attend 7 Kettle Point with me. 8 Q: And you do, in fact, do so. At 10:20 9 you -- 10 A: And at 10:20 -- 11 Q: -- attend on -- 12 A: We visited with Earl Bressette at 13 Kettle Point. 14 Q: I wonder if you could just read down 15 into that entry that I -- again, I apologize I haven't 16 been able to decipher some of that? 17 A: I think it's important for me to 18 point out that these notes that I make after visiting 19 Earl are not notes that I made in Earl's home at the time 20 that he was speaking. 21 Q: You wouldn't be taking notes as he's 22 talking? 23 A: It was made very clear to me by Lorne 24 on our arrival. It was very clear to me that my role was 25 to be listening and that there was a great deal of

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1 respect to be paid to the gentleman and that I was to 2 listen and if at all earn the right to speak. 3 I listening very intently all the time 4 that I was there and I made notes as soon as possible 5 thereafter. In fact, I remember stopping on the side of 6 the road coming back to the Command Post to make these 7 notes knowing that I would have to pass information on to 8 the Inspector. 9 So the notes are not made at the time. 10 This is information that Earl Bressette told me -- or at 11 least told us in general conversation in his home. 12 "Three hundred (300) people at the 13 base." 14 And these are just bullet points that I 15 note. 16 "Most not Stoney Point but others who 17 have no real claim. Elder women 18 originate power to the Chief. Others 19 are held above him." 20 That came from Lorne. So I say, these -- 21 these are not necessarily notes that -- that Earl would 22 have said. They're notes that I acquired -- made based 23 on the information I acquired in that meeting. Either 24 something that Lorne had said, Earl had said or I -- 25 perhaps I noted. I think there's a note here that I made

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1 myself. 2 "Heavy machine guns. Cars hidden in 3 the bush. Great respect for proper 4 papers. Make sure that whatever we do 5 is with government authority and papers 6 are unquestionable. Later events will 7 challenge those arrangements. Any land 8 offered in lieu of the Provincial Park 9 must be recognized on paper. It may 10 work but land promised in lieu of the 11 Canadian Forces Base has not been 12 delivered. What you say you must be 13 prepared to live with tomorrow. New 14 members of Saugeen here. Young woman 15 in van makes frequent trips to the 16 Canadian Forces Base [I have CFB 17 noted]. Husband works at the store as 18 butcher. Trust the OPP, always has. 19 Does not know anyone who agrees with 20 what is happening. No burial grounds 21 known. Daisy's father was there at the 22 time the land sale to Wilson Realtor 23 from Sarnia in the '30's." 24 I say '30'ish. 25 "Lakefront land Kettle Point to Point

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1 Franks was sold in 1929. Why would 2 Stoney Point natives sell burial 3 grounds? Canadian Forces Base not 4 taken by DND until early '40's." 5 I capitalized the words "do not forget". 6 The quotation I have is that: 7 "Most of the blame for the whole 8 problem lies with the Federal 9 Government who handled the DND takeover 10 improperly. If they had made up proper 11 papers and removed the squatters in the 12 first place this would not occur. 13 After two (2) years of nuisance DND 14 actually helps with the land claim. 15 Therefore the Provincial Park squatting 16 have no right but will not talk to 17 anyone who does not have the right to 18 grant them something. Authority is 19 very high to them. Earl recognized -- 20 Earl recognized my rank many times. 21 Nuisance until we give in. Think of 22 Monday night. You guys can play tough 23 but we'll hang in the until you upper 24 bureaucrats give in." 25 That was my note based on the comment that

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1 -- that Earl said, Nuisance until we give in and then I 2 made a note there -- it was my comment. 3 "They want to be listened to, not told, 4 the Bill Tye story." 5 I forget now what that was. 6 "There's a male American or Canadian is 7 there. He has killed two (2) persons. 8 They're -- he's back in or they're back 9 in and not visible." 10 So that was the -- the gist of the 11 conversation and -- and the relative information that I 12 attached to it in -- in visiting Earl's home. 13 Q: All right. And I note that at 12:45 14 you attempt to carry out the second aspect of the 15 instructions given to you by Inspector Carson, that is to 16 visit with Robert "Knobby" George? 17 A: That's correct. We attempted to 18 visit with Robert "Knobby" George. He was away and would 19 telephone Lorne on return. 20 Lorne and I went away, had some lunch and 21 -- and I went back to the Command Post and made some 22 notes there. 23 Q: And at 14:40 hours you meet with 24 Inspector Carson and provide him the details of this 25 meeting with Earl Bressette?

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1 A: That's correct. 2 Q: Okay. And that the suggestion is 3 made to you that part of the reason that you were there 4 was to gather intelligence and pass that along. What -- 5 what's your view on that? 6 A: No, no, I -- I don't recall being 7 told to gather intelligence in that sense. I think if I 8 recall the direction to me it was to accompany Lorne and 9 with Lorne determine where's the community at on this 10 occurrence? 11 The notes that I made were notes that I 12 believe were important given the discussion that we had 13 because many of the notes relate to -- to safety and 14 although my intention was not to gather intelligence I 15 think I would be in grave error at not reporting issues 16 that may mean safety issues later. 17 So it was conversations that I heard and - 18 - and more emotions and feelings that I had heard while I 19 was in Earl's home. 20 Q: Did you or did anybody else, to your 21 knowledge, have any role in terms of assessing this 22 information that was provided by Mr. Bressette; that is 23 to say the -- the veracity of it, the accuracy? 24 A: Before he gave it to me you mean or 25 afterwards?

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1 Q: No, after -- after -- 2 A: After? 3 Q: -- it was provided to you and 4 perhaps -- 5 A: After it was provided to me. 6 Q: -- after it was sent up the chain of 7 command? 8 A: I have no idea. Once I give it to 9 the Inspector I -- I have no idea as to what -- what 10 happened. 11 Q: All right. Again the entry at 14:40 12 at page 91 and -- and continuing on page 92 you'll help 13 me with it if you would -- 14 A: Sure. 15 Q: -- because I have some difficult 16 reading that. 17 A: "At 14:40 I met with Inspector 18 Carson. The details of the firearms, 19 trust, promise, and a person perhaps 20 having killed two (2). Meeting with 21 two (2) -- or meeting with the group 22 and told them of the reluctance to talk 23 to us but lack of the support to the 24 Provincial Park actions and no truth 25 known to burial ground."

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1 So that's kind of an overview of what I 2 told the Inspector based on my discussions with -- 3 Q: All right. 4 A: -- or my presence with -- with Lorne 5 at -- at Earl's home. 6 Q: And we see the -- I'm sorry? 7 A: Did you want me to carry on? 8 Q: Yes, please. 9 A: At 15:00 I -- with Lorne Smith I 10 attended then at Bob George's residence and again I made 11 notes afterwards as to the conversation that occurred 12 there. 13 Q: And the reasons for that? 14 A: For the notes that I made? 15 Q: Yeah. 16 A: Hmm hmm. 17 Q: And take -- making the notes 18 afterward as opposed to at -- at that moment? 19 A: Well, at the moment it -- it -- I -- 20 I didn't want to be disrespectful and to be there in 21 officious capacity and making notes of our conversation, 22 one (1) it -- it would just be disrespectful and that's 23 not why I was there so I made the notes as soon as I 24 could afterwards remembering the details as best I 25 remembered and -- and again would pass them onto the

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1 Inspector because I would be negligent if I didn't. 2 Q: All right. 3 A: So with Lorne Smith I attended Bob 4 George's residence and he tells or at least our 5 conversation was about the following items: 6 "This history of the appropriation of 7 DND in '42. Stoney Point persons moved 8 to Kettle Point Land. Indian Affairs 9 will not recognize Stoney Point persons 10 as a reserve in itself and now Stoney 11 Point are simply saying, we are here to 12 stay. 13 Recognize us as people having had our 14 land taken regardless of whether we are 15 a Band or not." 16 A couple of comments there. 17 "T.B lies, J.C. lies. 18 Does not accept the George boys our 19 leaders. Manning rebels are. Joined 20 by Spike." 21 Meaning Ron George, who I knew by nickname 22 as Spike, and I'm meaning that at that point, Ron came 23 and sat at the table as well. 24 And with Ron we talk about the world 25 takeover by other powers, Japanese believed by one leader

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1 and his -- has them all fired up. It was a world 2 politics type discussion. 3 "Spike and Bob think perhaps Judas or 4 Glenn might talk if no arrest was 5 made." 6 Q: You're at the top of page 93 now. 7 A: I'm at the top of page 93, yes. 8 Q: All right. 9 A: And to repeat that statement: 10 "Spike and Bob think perhaps Judas or 11 Glenn might talk if no arrest is made 12 because all agree. 13 Lorne, myself, Bob and Spike that 14 safety will start only when we can open 15 communication. 16 Spike and I talked about a window of 17 opportunity that's lost for apology 18 between Glenn and Vince. Maybe we 19 should open a window of opportunity 20 here." 21 Q: What -- what did that mean if you 22 could comment on that if -- if you have a recollection? 23 A: I don't recall. I don't have a 24 recollection of it. 25 Q: Thank you. Continue then.

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1 A: "I expressed my opinion that land 2 issue is to be resolved at higher 3 level. Not physical confrontation in 4 Bosanquet Township. 5 Bob spoke that we could all go home and 6 the matter could be settled by one 7 person." 8 And in quotation marks I have: 9 "in authority." 10 "I expressed public opinion that we had 11 to protect public safety that was 12 perceived to be in jeopardy. We 13 discussed public opinions altered by 14 the media that can only get worse over 15 time." 16 Q: Do you have a comment on that, just 17 before you go on, as to what that conversation was about? 18 A: Other than my note, I have no 19 recollection. 20 Q: Thank you. 21 A: "Kevin Thomas observed that K.P, 22 known to be going to Ipperwash." 23 It means nothing to me. 24 "Guns are unknown although auto gunfire 25 has been heard. Unknown who is there

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1 although most believed local not Kettle 2 Point but Stoney Point persons. 3 No known burial ground at property but 4 one (1) person thought to be buried 5 there. Of value is that Stoney Point 6 is a flint field. 7 Stoney Point young and impatient 8 radicals see Provincial Park takeover 9 as the same as two (2) years the slow 10 occupation of DND property. 11 It doesn't matter who owns it now, it 12 was Stoney Point people owned." 13 I think at -- at that point I was 14 explaining how DND was owned Federally and the Provincial 15 Park was Provincial and Bob's responding to say, it 16 doesn't matter who owns it, that's it's Stoney Point 17 people owned. 18 "Bob agrees that the land was bought 19 from Stoney Point persons in segments. 20 Of major importance to this day, is 21 what I appreciate in Native culture." 22 These are notes that I made afterwards, do 23 you want me to continue with them? 24 Q: You're at the top of page 95? 25 A: I am.

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1 Q: Right. 2 A: I'll continue? 3 Q: Please. 4 A: "I am the only other police officer 5 that Lorne Smith, a respected person of 6 Kettle Point has ever taken to Earl 7 Bressette's home. 8 Females are respected when they are 9 mothers of chiefs due to genetic power. 10 Earl's wife Daisy, for example, looked 11 away while talking to us. 12 Indian custom is to never be lied to. 13 You must never make a flippant remark. 14 They will hold you to it. Never lie. 15 For example, I was asked if I would 16 meet with Judas if no arrest would 17 result. And I said that I could not 18 guarantee the actions I would be forced 19 to take and therefore could not promise 20 and betray their trust, becoming a 21 liar. 22 At 18:30 I took Lorne home and at 20:00 23 I was off duty. Before going off at 24 20:00 I briefed Inspector Carson." 25 Q: And I take it you would have did your

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1 notes at -- before going off duty as well? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: I -- I note that we're coming up very 4 closely to the end of the 6th of September '95 and I see 5 that there's just a couple of pages left to go and I 6 wonder, Commissioner, I -- I also not the hour. Might I 7 continue? 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Sure. By 9 all means if you find a point that you think is good to 10 break, we'll break, but if you can finish. But if you 11 can finish -- 12 MR. DONALD WORME: Thank you. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: If you can 14 finish than just carry on. 15 MR. DONALD WORME: Thank you, sir. 16 17 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 18 Q: At page 96, Mr. Seltzer, you'll see 19 the entry at 21:50 hours. It would appear that you then 20 again meet with Lorne Smith? 21 A: 21:50 hours I was met by Lorne Smith 22 who advises that he received a message from -- my 23 independent recollection was that I was having dinner 24 that evening and I remember Lorne coming to the 25 restaurant to meet me.

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1 And he was advising me that from Bob 2 George, and Bob's telephone number is noted, that: 3 "Judas will check with his people to 4 see if he can meet with me in the 5 morning. Conditional, one (1), no 6 arrest, two (2), subsequent to meeting 7 no charges will come up before our next 8 negotiation possible. But the burial 9 site is at the maintenance shed if he 10 could show us." 11 At 22:15 I called Bob George. I'm meeting 12 Bob George to get the message in that I'll check on the 13 possibilities. 14 Q: And the possibility being the 15 conditions that were apparently transmitted through Mr. 16 George? 17 A: Exactly. My request is for him 18 and/or Spike to accompany me, not Lorne -- respecting 19 Lorne's position in this. Further they want the same 20 negotiator to follow through to the end. And in brackets 21 I say "no lying". 22 23:30 I called -- I have noted "JC" and to 23 me that means Inspector Carson: 24 "His cell phone since 22:50." 25 So, almost an hour there. It's busy and I

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1 left a message for: 2 "JC answering on his pager." 3 And at 03:30 I was recalled by motel staff 4 to return to the Command Post. 5 Q: All right. Well, let's maybe stop 6 there. At 03:30 we're obviously talking now about the 7 early morning hours of September 7th, -- 8 A: Okay. 9 Q: -- of '95? 10 A: That's correct. 11 Q: And at that -- up to that point in 12 time had you been aware that there had been this 13 confrontation by CMU and others at the -- what we've 14 called the sandy parking lot at Ipperwash Park? 15 A: I was not aware of it no. 16 Q: The events that bring us all here, in 17 fact, had occurred by that moment? 18 A: At 23:30 the last mention I made, 19 yes, I suppose they had. Yes. I wasn't aware of it. 20 Q: The message that you were going to 21 leave or that you did leave for Inspector Carson; what 22 was that in relation to? 23 A: Well, I don't have notes that 24 indicate that. But it -- 25 Q: You have --

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1 A: -- would be in relation to the 2 conversation that I'd had with Bob George that -- the 3 conditions of us meeting. That Judas was perhaps going 4 to meet with us if those conditions could be met the 5 following morning. 6 Q: And you would have to seek the 7 authority of the Incident Commander in order to provide 8 those; is that -- 9 A: Oh, for sure. 10 Q: -- is that putting it right? 11 A: That's right. 12 MR. DONALD WORME: I think this would be 13 a good time, Commissioner. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We'll take 15 the lunch break now. 16 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry stands 17 adjourned until 1:00 p.m. 18 19 --- Upon recessing at 12:04 p.m. 20 --- Upon resuming at 1:05 p.m. 21 22 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 23 resumed, please be seated. 24 MR. DONALD WORME: Our Witness is here, 25 Commissioner, and he'll be up shortly.

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1 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I see him. 2 He's... 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 7 afternoon. 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 12 Q: Good afternoon, Mr. Seltzer. 13 A: Good afternoon. 14 Q: Exhibit P-1704, of course, is your 15 notes that we've been referring to that we have at Tab 6 16 of the brief of documents in front of you. 17 At your page 97 -- you may certainly refer 18 to your actual handwritten notes if you wish, sir. 19 A: Yes, I have them. 20 Q: The entry at 03:30 hours -- perhaps 21 you can just read from that and tell us what happened at 22 that point? 23 A: At 03:30 hours I was recalled by 24 motel staff to return to the Command Staff and the date 25 that we're talking now is the -- the 7th of September.

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1 Q: At 04:00 hours you do arrive at the 2 Forest Detachment and that's where the Command Centre we 3 understand was located? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: And further at 04:00 hours you have a 6 further entry there? 7 A: I -- I just have entries that there 8 was administration duties. As I recall there was a lot 9 of things happening there so I put in my first half hour 10 there, so to speak, looking after whatever needed to be 11 looked after. 12 Q: I take by that point in time you 13 would have been apprised of the events as they had 14 unfolded at approximately 11:00 -- 23:00 hours on the 6th 15 of September, 1995? 16 A: I don't know as to the detail but I 17 can't imagine being there and someone not telling me what 18 had happened. 19 Q: And certainly at 04:30 hours you make 20 a note in your notebook of a briefing by Inspector Carson 21 and it seems to me that you then go ahead and set out the 22 information that he had provided you and I can tell you, 23 Mr. Seltzer, that Inspector Carson has been here and he 24 has testified as to the information that was imparted. 25 A: Thank you.

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1 Q: And that is your notes of that 2 information as described to you I take it? 3 A: That's correct. 4 Q: I note that at 07:30 -- pardon me. 5 Just as we look at your notes, perhaps I could ask you to 6 turn to page 98, that is the following page. 7 A: Yes, sir. 8 Q: I'm going to ask you specifically 9 about the notes that appear on the sidebar of the 10 notebook. Firstly, at the top of page 98, is that -- 11 does that say "weapons?[question mark]" and correct me if 12 I'm wrong. 13 A: "Weapons -- weapons? [question mark], 14 rocks, et cetera, 2x4." 15 Q: And then if we go down to the bottom 16 of the page there is -- does that say 'loss of --' 17 A: "Loss of concentration." 18 Q: Now what does that refer to? 19 A: The briefing notes that were provided 20 to me at 04:30 by Inspector Carson, I did not make note 21 of at the time. It was some time later that morning and 22 just to go ahead in -- in my notes and I'm going to look 23 at the pages to suggest that it was somewhere in the 24 neighbourhood of around 8:30, I believe. 25 Yes, 8:30 in the morning that I did my

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1 notes. So we're talking about a four (4) hour 2 difference. I recall at the time in my mind's eye, I can 3 remember me sitting in the parking lot at the motel. I 4 went there for the solitude that it would provide me. 5 I was sitting in a cruiser. I was writing 6 these notes to the best of my ability in remembering the 7 facts as they unfolded from Inspector Carson. 8 With a little bit of sleep and the day 9 unfolding and I'm writing my notes and I -- I remember 10 making that note in the margin because I remember 11 striking those words out and thinking I don't know why I 12 wrote them in there. 13 And -- and I put loss of concentration in 14 -- in the margin just to remind me that for some reason I 15 put them in, took them out and I -- I wanted to account 16 as to why I did that. 17 Q: So the loss of concentration there is 18 your own concentration I take it. 19 A: It's my own loss of concentration as 20 to why I did that. 21 Q: All right. I see that the next page 22 that we have is page 99 and there is a diagram there that 23 would appear to be consistent with the diagram that we 24 had earlier reviewed from the Project Maple document. 25 A: Those are administration notes that I

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1 kept for myself. I'm not sure whether I made them up as 2 administration notes at the time that I was creating my 3 portion of the Project Maple plan. Excuse me. 4 Or whether I made them up afterwards. But 5 essentially what they are and what they were intended to 6 be, was administration notes that would be available to 7 me given that this was in my pocket. The Project Maple 8 plan was not. 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 Q: The next page, sir, page 100. 13 A: Again, those are administration notes 14 that date back to the -- March of that year just in 15 reference to unclaimed overtime that -- it was just 16 logistical notes that I kept for myself. 17 Q: And the following page -- the 18 following page that is on the -- on the brief of 19 documents that we have, there's a page number 1 at the 20 bottom of that. 21 A: Yes. And that moves onto my next 22 notebook. 23 Q: And that's what I was going to ask 24 you. So the -- you commence a new notebook at that 25 point.

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1 A: I commence a new notebook, yes. 2 Q: I should also indicate, Commissioner, 3 that there is a series of phone numbers and other 4 personal information and I would ask Mr. Registrar to 5 ensure that that information is properly redacted. 6 Can we taken then, Mr. Seltzer, that the 7 following page which is your page 2 at the bottom and it 8 starts at the top "Briefing concluded" that is the 9 conclusion of the briefing that you had from Inspector 10 Carson upon your arrival at approximately 04:30. Am I -- 11 have I got that right? 12 A: That's correct. 13 Q: You have an entry at -- it says 05 is 14 that 3-0? 15 A: My entry is -- is your 05:30 correct. 16 Q: Right. And it would appear that you 17 are making a -- a notation of instructions. A notation 18 of instructions that you received from Inspector Carson? 19 A: At 05:30 I note that: 20 "As requested by Inspector Carson I set 21 out to re-establish talks with Bob 22 George. I called Lorne Smith, picked 23 him up and met him in my motel room." 24 Q: There is a notation that commences in 25 the middle of your page 2 and I wonder if you could just

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1 help me in deciphering that entry? 2 A: Would you like me to start at 05:50 3 which was my -- 4 Q: If you would, please? 5 A: I finished off last by saying that at 6 05:30 I met Lorne in -- in my motel room. My next entry 7 is at 05:50 and I'm saying that: 8 "Lorne and I both frustrated as 9 negotiators..." 10 I'm sorry, I'll start again. 11 "Lorne and I both frustrated as 12 negotiations appeared probable as of 13 23:00 last night." 14 And, again, I would use the term 15 "negotiations" meaning facilitated discussion. Some type 16 of discussion or contact. Not negotiations in the sense 17 of crisis negotiations that I explained earlier. 18 "Full briefing of details to Lorne as I 19 know them." 20 Which mean I explained to Lorne. 21 "While talking earlier with Inspector 22 Carson I told John how pleased Lorne 23 and I were that it appeared that today 24 we would get inside to talk. Lorne and 25 I discussed the entire incident impact.

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1 The security for the MPP, tighter 2 perimeter, bigger perimeter, safety of 3 perimeter members as natives from 4 elsewhere will now come to Ipperwash in 5 support. Some of whom may seek revenge 6 out of anger and frustration. The 7 Provincial Park will never be a 8 provincial park again. Surrounded by 9 reserves on both sides and if the MNR 10 decide to give it back to Stoney Point 11 natives then they have achieved their 12 goal that they said they would on 13 Monday night; that is stay until your 14 bosses would give in and let them have 15 it." 16 Q: Can I just -- 17 A: Meaning the Park. 18 Q: Can I just interrupt you there, 19 briefly, sir? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: Those comments that you've just 22 referred to, is that an assessment that you arrived at or 23 is this information that -- 24 A: That's information that I learned and 25 I -- I don't recall where I learned it from. But it was

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1 information that was commonly understood to me at the 2 time that it was a statement that was made to an OPP 3 officer on Monday night is that you will come here with 4 your equipment, you know, words to that effect, you'll 5 come with your equipment and in time your bosses will 6 give in and you'll go away. 7 So: 8 "From the native side it will be 9 perceived that they used vehicles to 10 flee the armed advance of police 11 assault troops and were innocently 12 fired upon. Regardless we have to go 13 through Bob to negotiate." 14 And, again, facilitate discussion. At 15 07:30 -- and these notes were just notes of the 16 conversation between Lorne and I up to that time. 17 "At 07:30 called Bob George advising my 18 pager for when it is time to talk. Bob 19 says they will want answers for 20 mistakes made. Not only are KP and 21 SP..." 22 Meaning Kettle Point and Stoney Point. 23 "... people massing but so are Walpole 24 and others. But we need to talk. Bob 25 and I agree that we can -- we begin but

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1 some cooling off time is required." 2 At eight o'clock Lorne and I have 3 breakfast and I'm saying that: 4 "Lorne and I can meet with Bob at a 5 time selected. Bob had called Lorne 6 around midnight complaining of a set 7 up. With ambulances at the ready in 8 Ravenswood, we assaulted the Park. Bob 9 spoke to me on the phone at 07:30 about 10 why would we assault with women and 11 children present in their camps. Lorne 12 and I agree that the issue here would 13 be the general safety of everyone 14 concerned if natives mass to the area." 15 And in brackets I have "(funeral)". 16 "And how or with whom -- how/with whom 17 can Bob help us to negotiate the long 18 road back." 19 And, again, I'm talking about discussing - 20 - or at least facilitating discussion. Again, an 21 overused -- use of the term 'negotiate'. 22 "We agree that perhaps Marg should be a 23 female negotiator with -- with me 24 should they choose to have female 25 negotiators. What about Karen Moffat.

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1 Notes for next briefing, are my events 2 accurate? Can I release all details? 3 What are the feelings about using Marg 4 or Karen to assist given they may want 5 to maintain the same negotiator." 6 Q: And let me just -- let me just ask 7 you to explain that if you would, please. What do you 8 mean are your notes accurate? 9 A: I think again recognizing the time 10 period without sleep, recognizing my own frailty and the 11 loss of concentration, recognizing what I've said so far, 12 there's a lot of detail there and I wanted to ensure that 13 what I've noted and where my thinking was at was entirely 14 accurate. 15 Q: And the release of the details? Who 16 would that be released to in your estimation? 17 A: I don't know who I meant by that. 18 Q: Your next notation at 08:30 it's -- I 19 take it that's when the notes were actually made? 20 A: That's right. I'm saying at 8:30 21 Lorne home, notes and when I'm doing the notes I'm saying 22 that: 23 "Lorne and I had discussed that all 24 districts, intelligence, and liaison 25 officers should be checking movement of

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1 natives and reply with feelings from 2 native people. What are we dealing 3 with [was the question that I...]?" 4 Q: You had -- you had a number of 5 discussions throughout the balance of that day, over the 6 course of that day. Could you inform us as -- again 7 briefly as to what that consisted of? 8 A: 10:45 I had a call from Vince George 9 as to what was happening and it was a matter of an 10 exchange of information between he and I as to, you know, 11 I -- I would share with him as to where we were at as a 12 policing organization and in the Command Post and he 13 would share with me as to where the community was at, 14 where his family was at and we were just trying to get a 15 handle from each other as to what the circumstances were, 16 what were we dealing with? 17 Q: At 11:15 there was a new Incident 18 Commander? 19 A: That's correct. 20 Q: And that would be Inspector Gordon? 21 A: Inspector Jim Gordon, that's correct. 22 And there's information here about a new Technical 23 Support Branch person, a Mark Dubois, whose name means 24 nothing to me now. I -- I don't recall Mark. Bryan 25 Byatt (phonetic) is watching video in the maintenance

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1 shop where audiovisual is running. There's a phone 2 number here that I have for the warehouse and the phone 3 number there is being taped. 4 This is just information that's coming to 5 me I believe from Inspector Gordon's briefing. Inspector 6 Gordon wants telephone contact by negotiators to the 7 warehouse. 8 Q: Your entry at -- on page 7 at 17:00 9 hours you speak with Inspector Carson? 10 A: "Liaison with Inspector Carson. We 11 discussed the need to stay focussed on 12 our objective. Contain --" 13 Q: You note that there's -- and I'm 14 sorry to interrupt, sir. 15 A: That's okay. 16 Q: You note there is now a -- a 17 secondary or sub-objective? 18 A: There's also a secondary and sub- 19 objective and that must be to keep ourselves safe until 20 tempers cool; maintain our strength. Also: 21 "Inspector Carson should inspire 22 subunits to recall and be mindful of 23 our objectives, keep faith in 24 leadership and their ability to stay 25 focussed. He's taking a rest and not

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1 leaving. 2 As to negotiations Inspector Carson has 3 authorized my judgment until his 4 return." 5 Q: All right. Do we take from that that 6 you continued in the role that you were filling up to 7 that point? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: And that role, was that as crisis 10 negotiator? Was that as liaison? As -- how would you 11 describe it? 12 A: I think my role at that point would 13 be to be responsible for crisis negotiation should the 14 criteria present itself that the need was there. As to 15 any liaison the unfortunate thing is that had fallen to 16 the side I'm afraid and I think I recognized that. 17 Q: You continued to maintain a schedule 18 for the negotiators that were to be at the disposal of 19 Inspector Gordon now for the next -- for the next period 20 of time? 21 A: Correct. If you recall from my 22 comment earlier when Inspector Gordon took over at 11:15 23 he asked me then that he wanted telephone contact to the 24 -- by negotiators to the warehouse. 25 Throughout the day, that was being set up.

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1 And at 18:15 and upon my return after speaking with 2 Inspector Carson, excuse me, my notes suggest that 3 Sergeant Eve is set up for negotiations with their teams 4 of Sergeant Pat Dale and Constable Warden. Or -- I'm 5 sorry, Wardle. 6 The second team of Constable Dowell, 7 Sergeant Moffat and Sergeant Biskup is to start at 07:00 8 hours. So over the night until seven o'clock tomorrow 9 morning, Marg Eve's team was there in the event that they 10 were to be put into and did deployment immediately. 11 And then there was another team on at 7:00 12 in the morning. 13 Q: And I note, sir, that you continued 14 in that capacity, pardon me, from September the 6th until 15 Tuesday, September the 19th when you were relieved of 16 your duty by Inspector Carson. 17 And I take that actually from a document 18 you will find at Tab 21 which is Inquiry Document 19 2003866, it's titled 'Staff Sergeant Brad Seltzer', it's 20 the Will State that you had prepared and it appears to be 21 dated March 19th, 2004. 22 A: Correct. That -- that's a document 23 that I prepared as to my involvement. 24 Q: Perhaps I can have that marked as the 25 next exhibit please.

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1 THE REGISTRAR: P-1705, Your Honour. 2 3 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1705: Document Number 2003866. 4 Will Say of S/Sgt Brad 5 Seltzer, March 19, 2004. 6 7 THE WITNESS: Having read it I can note a 8 typo that's in it. And that's the very last line on page 9 1 where I say: 10 "At 03:30 hours on Thursday, September 11 the 6th --" 12 And that date should read September 7th. 13 And then it goes on in three (3) later to say at 07:30 14 hours Thursday, September the 6th, and again that 15 correction -- should be corrected to September 7th. 16 "I talked with Bob George by 17 telephone." 18 19 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 20 Q: Thank you. And just going back to 21 your -- your notebook entries at page 9 that speaks to 22 your involvement on the 8th of September 1995. 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And correspondingly at Tab 10 the 25 scribe notes marked as Exhibit 426 at page 123 thereof.

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1 The entry at 20:00 hours reads: 2 "Brad Seltzer reports a phone is 3 available in the Army Camp. We're 4 aware they're using Jerry Thompson, 5 let's leave that option until urgent or 6 Chief Coles tell us different." 7 I take it by that point, that Chief 8 Superintendent Coles had assumed a larger role. 9 A: That's correct. I -- I didn't see 10 where you were just reading from, I'm sorry. 11 Q: I'm sorry. Page 123, 20:00 hours. 12 A: Okay. Yes, they are the scribe notes 13 in my -- I see them now with accuracy, yes. 14 Q: The entry at page 142 of the same 15 scribe notes, there's an entry at 11:56 hours. I take it 16 that this is now September the 8th of '95? Do you see in 17 the second paragraph, there's an entry there that starts 18 "Brad Seltzer negotiation team set up." 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And it goes on the middle of that 21 entry: 22 "Brad Seltzer suggests that maybe the 23 training van should be emptied of their 24 ammunition. Jim Gordon advises them to 25 be emptied."

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1 A: We had vans there that were being 2 operated by the logistics people that we had. And the 3 purpose that they used the vans was for taking food to 4 the checkpoints around the perimeter. 5 And given the circumstances, they were 6 training vans and had been used for firearms training. 7 And if you can appreciate there was -- there was bins and 8 different types of ammunition that would be somewhat -- 9 somewhat cumbersome to empty out and secure properly and 10 whatnot prior to being sent to Ipperwash. 11 So their involvement given that they were 12 just a transport van up until this point in time, the 13 ammunition was not a significant issue. 14 But at this point in time it was -- it was 15 just a chance that shouldn't be taken. Any ammunition 16 that was not being closely guarded should be disposed of 17 and the van should be emptied and the Inspector agreed 18 with me. 19 Q: And so prior to the -- I'm sorry, 20 excuse me. Prior to the -- you're being relieved of 21 duty, I think and you've agreed with me, on the 19th 22 September did you have any other major involvement in so 23 far as this incident that you can tell us about? 24 A: No, I think your suggestion, sir, is 25 accurate that at that point in time contact and

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1 discussions were being held at a higher level. I think 2 my role continued through until -- in the Command Post 3 and there was just -- there was varying degrees to which 4 the negotiators were called to be there. 5 Sometimes the full team was there and 6 other times just the team leaders were there. So -- and 7 I was there until I believe the following Tuesday and I 8 was relieved for a few days. I went back to Chatham, did 9 my work there. 10 And then I ended up coming back to 11 Ipperwash -- or to the Forest Detachment, the Command 12 Post, for a couple of days and then I would go back to 13 Chatham. So in the big -- in the bigger picture I wasn't 14 totally relieved until the date that you mentioned, then 15 I was done, but my -- my role was fairly insignificant. 16 Q: And you've described that role as -- 17 as it was throughout the period that you were involved in 18 the matter. Are we to take from that that you were never 19 actually engaged as -- or were you ever actually engaged 20 as -- as a crisis negotiator? 21 A: Crisis negotiators were never 22 engaged. The criteria for crisis negotiation in the way 23 that I've advised you today as to how crisis negotiators 24 work, the criteria for their activation by the Incident 25 Commander never -- never presented itself. And we --

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1 Q: Sir, is there anything else that you 2 believe to be important that I haven't asked you about 3 that you think we should know about? 4 A: The significance, perhaps, of -- of 5 the repeated attempts to -- to make contact that, you 6 know, through myself and -- and through Marg and through 7 Vince and the people that I've commented on through the 8 Elders at Kettle Point, for a couple of days we tried 9 very hard to make the contact, keeping in mind that we 10 believed we had time to make those contacts. 11 As was -- as -- I mean, an involvement of 12 that size our intent was to slow everything down. There 13 was no hurry. We understood that the Ministry was taking 14 -- going after an injunction. And we believed that we 15 had time to establish a contact; to work with that 16 person; to establish some dialogue; try to understand the 17 situation and -- and develop a rapport. 18 And within -- looking back at it now, very 19 few hours, two (2) days, that was gone. We just didn't 20 have time to do the job that we wanted to do in the -- in 21 the fashion that we wanted to. 22 Q: Do you have anything to offer, Mr. 23 Seltzer, to the Commissioner, by way of comment, 24 observation, or recommendation that might assist the 25 Commissioner in arriving at his mandate?

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1 A: If you would allow me to, I have 2 written something. Thank you. And I'll read that now. 3 First off, thank you for the opportunity 4 to speak and express my personal sentiments regarding 5 Ipperwash. As a retired member of the Ontario Provincial 6 Police I was and always will be proud of my career and my 7 service record. 8 Ipperwash was, without a doubt, the most 9 significant experience of my life and my career. It had 10 a profound impact on me and still burdens me almost 11 eleven (11) years later. My wife, my children, and all 12 who know me know that to be true. 13 Like others, I attended the Ipperwash 14 occurrence because I was assigned to the task. I 15 attended with the goal of doing my job to the best of my 16 ability and towards the mutual goal of peaceful 17 resolution. But that was not to be. 18 When I was briefed by Inspector Carson at 19 4:00 a.m. on September 7th as to what had happened 20 overnight I was shocked. The tide had turned so quickly 21 and I experienced a heartfelt disappointment that the 22 goal we had as a group would not be achieved. It was a 23 tragedy beyond expectation. Control was fragile if not 24 lost. Emotions were high and I was deeply concerned for 25 the future of the next few hours or days.

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1 I had never experienced a situation of 2 this magnitude but was comforted by the thought that 3 somehow the collective professional skill of so many 4 would bring this again under control. 5 Later that day Inspector Carson and I 6 talked again. Where were we? What do we need to do? A 7 citizen had died, police personnel had experienced a 8 life-threatening environment, SIU was or would be on 9 scene interviewing some. A psychologist and trauma 10 counsellors were interviewing others. Morale was 11 shattered by the events and our hope of a communication 12 contact was gone and we had been so close. 13 I thought of the first question that Bob 14 George had asked me the day before, Do you have any 15 power? No? Then they won't talk to you. 16 I said, John, we are out of our league. 17 This isn't something we can fix. His response was slow 18 and deliberate. I believe it bothered him as it did me. 19 Emotionally he said, We have to handle it; there's nobody 20 else coming. 21 All at the same time I felt anger, denial, 22 frustration and despair and that's the unresolved emotion 23 that I'm still left with today every time I hear the 24 word, "Ipperwash." 25 Resolution is found at a table in the

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1 spirit of inclusion, not with a couple of people yelling 2 at each other over a fence. The police can deal with 3 public safety and security but the police were left to 4 handle a situation that we had no power to resolve. 5 The resolution of these matters lies 6 within our governments, the foundations of power that 7 society leans on when social structures become 8 ineffective and as we know this isn't just an occurrence 9 for today or even tomorrow. 10 This is a moment in time in Canadian 11 history and as the old adage says, unless we change our 12 direction we are likely to end up where we are headed. 13 Thank you very much. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 15 MR. DONALD WORME: Thank you, sir. 16 Perhaps we can ask the -- My Friends who intends to ask 17 questions of Mr. Seltzer? 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Are you 19 going to make a note? 20 MR. DONALD WORME: I have a -- 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I -- 22 MR. DONALD WORME: I'll make a note of 23 it, Commissioner. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I just want 25 to make sure that I have the order.

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1 MR. DONALD WORME: Ontario Provincial 2 Police. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Is it the 4 OPP first? 5 MR. DONALD WORME: Yes. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Ms. 7 Tuck-Jackson...? 8 MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: Two (2) 9 minutes. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And what 11 order are we going to go in? 12 MR. DONALD WORME: I believe -- 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Ms. McAleer? 14 MS. JENNIFER MCALEER: Yes. 15 MR. DONALD WORME: I believe Ms. McAleer 16 is next. 17 MS. JENNIFER MCALEER: Less than five (5) 18 minutes. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And then Ms. 20 Panjer? 21 MS. MELISSA PANJER: Two (2) minutes. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And then Mr. 23 Alexander? 24 MR. BASIL ALEXANDER: Twenty (20) to 25 forty (40) minutes.

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1 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And then Ms. 2 Esmonde? 3 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: Thirty (30) to 4 forty-five (45) minutes. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And, Mr. 6 Scullion? 7 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: Twenty (20) to 8 thirty (30) minutes. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And, Mr. 10 George? 11 MR. JONATHAN GEORGE: Maybe five (5) 12 minutes. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And, Mr. 14 Falconer? 15 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: One (1) hour. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: How much is 17 the total time? 18 MR. DONALD WORME: Something just over 19 two (2) hours, Commissioner. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Including 21 Mr. Falconer's hour? 22 MR. DONALD WORME: Pardon me, at -- at 23 the outside -- at the outside one (1)... 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm sorry, 25 including Mr. Falconer's hour what's the total time?

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1 MR. DONALD WORME: Including Mr. 2 Falconer's hour something just over three (3), I'm sorry, 3 at the outside. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Let's get 5 started and see. We should finish today. 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE) 8 9 MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: Good afternoon, 10 Mr. Commissioner. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 12 afternoon. 13 14 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: 15 Q: Good afternoon, Mr. Seltzer. 16 A: Hello. 17 Q: Sir, my name is Andrea Tuck-Jackson, 18 I'm going to ask you some questions on behalf of the OPP. 19 As you may know, sir, Commissioner Linden, 20 has addressed the issue as to what extent, if any, 21 political interference played a role as to operational 22 decisions that were made in relation to the events of 23 September 4th and September the 6th. 24 And you've told us, sir, of the time that 25 you spent at the Command Post by the side of John Carson

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1 and indeed during the course of briefings that were 2 conducted by John Carson. 3 And I want to ask you, sir, was there 4 anything that John Carson said in your presence or was 5 there anything that he did in your presence, that 6 suggested to you that political views were in any way 7 interfering with his operational decisions? 8 A: No. 9 Q: Thank you, sir. Those are my 10 questions. 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. JENNIFER MCALEER: 15 Q: Good afternoon. My name is Jennifer 16 McAleer and I'm one of the lawyers who's acting for the 17 former Premier Mike Harris. I just have a couple of 18 questions for you. 19 You told us about the efforts that Mark 20 Wright and Les Kobayashi engaged in on September 5th and 21 you were with them. You indicated in your notes that 22 that was the west side of the property. 23 Was that down in the area of the sandy 24 parking lot, do you recall? 25 A: Yes.

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1 Q: And when you were there, you -- you 2 described their efforts as being unsuccessful. Could you 3 perhaps tell us a little bit more about what it is that 4 Mark Wright and Mr. Kobayashi were doing to try and 5 attempt to communicate with people in the Provincial 6 Park? 7 A: No. I -- I don't recall what they 8 were doing. I know they were -- they were at the fence. 9 My recollection doesn't help me to help you as to what 10 they were doing. I don't know. 11 Q: Do your recall if there were people 12 within the Provincial Park who were within view? Could 13 you see some of the occupiers from where you were 14 standing? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: Okay. And did you see if Mark Wright 17 or Mr. Kobayashi tried to call out to any of those 18 occupiers? 19 A: I don't recall. 20 Q: And do you recall if there was any 21 response from any of those occupiers to Detective 22 Sergeant Mark Wright or Les Kobayashi? 23 A: There was no response. 24 Q: Now you also talked about an incident 25 where somebody came up in a car. Do you recall

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1 overhearing any dialogue between the occupant of that car 2 and Mr. -- and Detective Sergeant Mark Wright? 3 A: No. 4 Q: Do you recall any of the occupants in 5 the car swearing at Mark Wright? 6 A: No, I don't recall. 7 Q: And do you recall Mark Wright 8 indicating to you that he wanted to find Glenn George 9 because he had had a prior incident where he had gotten 10 to know Glenn George a little bit? 11 A: I don't recall that. 12 13 Q: Okay. Now with respect to the 14 discussion that then happened with Mr. Bert Manning, you 15 testified that Mark Wright had informed Mr. Manning that 16 the MNR was seeking an injunction and that the Stoney 17 Pointers had a right to be represented. 18 Do you recall what if any, response Mr. 19 Manning made with respect to the information about the 20 injunction? 21 A: I don't recall any response, no. 22 Q: Thank you, those are my questions. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 24 Ms. Panjer...? 25

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1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. MELISSA PANJER: 4 Q: Good afternoon. My name is Melissa 5 Panjer and I'm one of the lawyers who represents Deb 6 Hutton who was an Executive Assistant to the former 7 Premier. 8 A: Okay. 9 Q: And the Commission has heard evidence 10 that Deputy Commissioner Carson -- from Deputy 11 Commissioner Carson that the OPP was trying to open 12 discussions with the occupiers so that everyone could 13 work through the issue peacefully and so that everyone 14 knew what the other side was doing. 15 But he said it was not the role of the OPP 16 to enter into discussions to negotiate a potential land 17 claim. I take it that you would agree that -- with that, 18 that the OPP negotiates with the occupiers to maintain 19 the peace but leave substantive negotiations about a land 20 claim to the Government? 21 A: That's correct. My understanding is 22 that we had no intention, no dealings with the land 23 claim. 24 Q: Okay. Thank you. 25 A: As part of our negotiation.

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1 Q: Those are my questions. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 3 Ms. Panjer. 4 Mr. Alexander...? 5 6 (BRIEF PAUSE) 7 8 MR. BASIL ALEXANDER: Good afternoon, 9 Mr. Commissioner. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 11 afternoon. 12 13 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. BASIL ALEXANDER: 14 Q: Good afternoon, Mr. Seltzer. 15 A: Good afternoon. 16 Q: My name is Basil Alexander and I'm 17 one (1) of the lawyers for the Estate of Dudley George 18 and several members of the George family, including Sam 19 George who's sitting here beside me. And I have a number 20 of questions to ask you this afternoon. 21 To start off with, as I understand your 22 evidence you've been very emphatic that the crisis 23 negotiation team and structure that you're part of, for 24 lack of a better term, was never activated during the 25 entire course of Project Maple, correct?

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1 A: Yes. 2 Q: Okay. And I want to understand a 3 little bit more about the criteria and what you -- what 4 falls under the negotiation role of things. 5 Now, as I understand your evidence in- 6 chief, the major role of the crisis negotiation team is 7 particularly to develop trust, which takes hours, so that 8 way the person on the other side can develop trust in 9 police and the negotiation process itself so they can see 10 options, and as a result it's a safe way to bring them 11 into the care of police. 12 Does that sound a fair summary of what you 13 said in-chief earlier this morning? 14 A: Yes, sir. 15 Q: And the other thing you emphasized 16 was that one of the key elements of this is to basically 17 bring things down in terms of emotions, slow things down 18 and try to bring it all down to a choreographed solution; 19 does that sound familiar, sir? 20 A: I could agree with that. 21 Q: I'm going to suggest that two (2) of 22 the key elements in order for this process to work is, 23 number one (1), there has to be communication and trust 24 on both sides, correct? 25 A: Yes, sir.

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1 Q: And it would require one (1) person 2 who's -- who is communicating, at least from the police 3 perspective in terms of -- 4 A: I'm sorry, I didn't catch the last 5 part. 6 Q: There would be -- it was a badly 7 worded question. I'll try it again. There would be a 8 primary -- you used the term 'primary negotiator' when 9 you're explaining the -- how the teams work. 10 So the way I understood that is that would 11 be the key person from the police side who would be 12 speaking on the telephone or being the main contact 13 person? 14 A: That is correct. 15 Q: Okay. And you've also said that 16 sometimes the best case scenario is to give everybody a 17 lot of space and a little bit of time, and give people 18 time, and that's the best thing to do rather than try to 19 push anything at a particular point; does that sound 20 familiar? 21 A: There's -- there's time for that, 22 yes. Yeah. 23 Q: Okay. Now, you've already said that 24 Project Maple was not a typical operation in terms of how 25 things were organized, correct?

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1 It was not a typical incident? 2 A: I think I would agree with that in 3 part. I think it certainly was not a typical occurrence. 4 I'm not sure I said it wasn't typically organized. I'm 5 not sure the two (2) were the same statement. 6 Q: The reason why I'm asking is there 7 seems to be a lot of planning that went into Project 8 Maple. And this is a copy -- 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: -- of the document that's in your 11 binder and this was handed to you -- 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: -- even on the evening of September 14 the 4th, if I understand your evidence correctly? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: And when I look at the negotiations, 17 which was page 10 at your Tab 8, Exhibit P-424 -- 18 A: What was the tab, I'm sorry? 19 Q: Tab 8 in your binder. Sorry. 20 A: 8? Yeah. 21 22 (BRIEF PAUSE) 23 24 Q: And it's page 10, the handwritten 25 page 10 is what I have noted down.

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1 A: Yes, I have it. 2 Q: It doesn't seem to make any 3 distinctions about crisis negotiations or any other form 4 of negotiations, it just says response plan negotiations, 5 correct? 6 A: As to the printed words that are 7 there I understand your point. 8 Q: And this was -- this, as far as we 9 know, was the document prepared to deal in preparation 10 for Ipperwash, correct? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And then I think about -- then I -- 13 the other question I have for you is in terms of the 14 actions that you took while you were at Ipperwash in the 15 detachment and at the Command Post area. 16 Now, as I understand it, you set up an 17 interview room specifically for the negotiators, correct? 18 A: That's true. 19 Q: It had -- it had its own telephone 20 line, correct? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: And essentially you were in a state 23 of readiness at that point? 24 A: As far as the equipment? 25 Q: Yes.

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1 A: Yes. 2 Q: And you had all of your negotiation 3 equipment that would normally be available at a crisis 4 negotiation situation? 5 A: I believe so. 6 Q: And when we look at page 35 of the 7 scribe notes, which is at your Tab 10, sir, Inquiry 8 Document Number 1002419 Exhibit P-426... 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 Q: Sorry, it's page 36. Mr. Worme took 13 you to this at 14:08 hours, where Sergeant Carson -- 14 where sorry, then Inspector Carson was talking to you, 15 and you made the point of what you were trying to do was 16 things needed to be slowed down at that point, correct? 17 A: Yes, sir. 18 Q: And then if I take you to page 56, 19 which this is the point of whether or not it's time to 20 introduce Marg Eve at 09:03 on September -- the morning 21 of September the 6th, it says: 22 "SERGEANT SELTZER: Any support to 23 thinking that Marge -- Marg Eve is the 24 one we want them to talk to? Let them 25 know that she is a negotiator."

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1 Do you see that, sir? 2 A: Yes, I see it. 3 Q: It seems, from reading this, that 4 you've taken a number of steps and you're taking steps in 5 terms of dealing with the occupiers that are very similar 6 to the steps that you would take in what would occur in a 7 formal crisis negotiation situation? 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 A: That may be true, I don't know. I -- 12 I just did what I do. I don't know. 13 Q: I'm not arguing that, and I'm 14 suggesting that what you're doing is you're exercising 15 negotiation skills and you're exercising your training in 16 all of this, and even though this may not have been a 17 formal crisis negotiation scenario, you were using those 18 kinds of skills and scenarios in terms how do you deal 19 with the situation? 20 A: I was dealing with people. 21 Q: And what was also in terms of dealing 22 with the occupiers and how to move this forward from the 23 police perspective? 24 A: Hmm hmm. 25 Q: Correct?

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1 A: Okay. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 Q: Now one (1) other role that you've 6 talked about is that the negotiators, when they weren't 7 going to be used, could be called upon to communicate the 8 Incident Commander's message. Do you recall that? 9 A: I don't -- I don't recall in what 10 context I said that. What you're telling me doesn't 11 surprise me. I mean I hear what you're saying. 12 Q: I believe that was in the context of 13 speaking to people at the Park, if I recall correctly. 14 A: Okay. 15 Q: My question for you, sir, is: Given 16 that these people may be playing a negotiation role, 17 isn't that a potential conflict of interest in terms of 18 anything that they may -- in terms of the role the 19 negotiator may have to play down the road? 20 A: I guess if I was to answer your 21 question in -- in -- in recalling the events as they 22 unfolded for us, to separate the tasks or the roles that 23 -- that I can speak to, the roles that I was involved in, 24 we had crisis negotiators that were set up as for the -- 25 for the schematic that you saw, the diagram that you saw,

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1 to put them into teams so that they had a heads up, that 2 their supervisors had a heads up, that if it was needed, 3 they could be pressed into service without delay. 4 The need did not arise. Given that, and 5 understanding who they were as individuals, there were 6 certain individuals that we were trying to involve to 7 enable the contact to happen, the discussion to happen. 8 We were trying -- let me rephrase that. I 9 was recognized that my tasks and the people that I was 10 involved with, was repeatedly -- repeated attempts to 11 make contact. 12 Q: I don't think you've answered my 13 question, sir. And I'll try to be clearer. 14 A: Okay. 15 Q: From the perspective of the 16 occupiers, do you not see it as a concern that if you're 17 sending somebody who's a potential negotiator to go into 18 -- to then have them first go and introduce the Incident 19 -- the messages from the Incident Commander to those 20 people, do you not see that as a potential conflict of 21 interest and concern down the road? 22 A: No, sir, I don't see that. 23 Q: Now I just want to be clear about 24 what negotiators were on the ground on the evening of the 25 5th and on the days of the 5th and the 6th.

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1 So as I understand it, you and Marg Eve 2 were there, correct? 3 A: I'm trying to remember as to when 4 Marg was called in. I don't think Marg arrived until the 5 morning of the 6th. 6 Q: Okay. 7 A: If -- if I recall my -- my notes. 8 Q: And you were there from the 9 beginning? 10 A: And I was there from the beginning. 11 Q: Can you assist us with whether or not 12 anybody else was there? 13 A: There was no one else there. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 Q: And in terms of how things were 18 looking on the evening of the 5th, things were seeming 19 all right to the point that the nearest negotiator was 20 two (2) hours away and nobody was on site, correct? 21 A: That's right. 22 Q: And now I'm not clear about the day 23 of the 6th because I -- in terms of reading your notes, 24 I'm not exactly clear as to at what point did you leave 25 the Detachment in order to go and do other things?

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1 So I was wondering if you could assist 2 with me with approximately what time that was? 3 A: Sure. 4 Q: For the reference of My Friends, this 5 will be at Tab 6, Exhibit P-1704, Inquiry Document Number 6 2003866. 7 A: I'm looking at my notes relative to 8 Wednesday the 6th of September, and I have myself leaving 9 the Detachment on or about the time of 09:40. 10 So I had time in the morning to brief Marg 11 Eve and Vince George as to what their role was given the 12 instructions that I receive from Inspector Carson, and 13 left them to that role as I went and made contact with 14 Lorne Smith and we went to -- to Kettle Point itself to 15 talk to the -- to the Elders there. 16 Q: And then you were out and about for 17 the rest of the day, I guess? 18 A: That's correct, yes. 19 Q: And would you have been accessible 20 via a pager or via a cell phone? 21 A: I don't recall if I had a pager or a 22 cell phone. I don't recall at that time. 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25

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1 A: The schematic that I've drawn, that 2 shows the various names that we saw earlier, doesn't show 3 any cell phone numbers or pager numbers on it. And I'm 4 not sure if technology had been sufficient at that point 5 in time to provide us all with that type of 6 communication. I'm... 7 Q: Well, I assume -- would you have been 8 checking in; or no? 9 A: Maybe. Not likely. 10 Q: Not likely. 11 A: No. 12 Q: So the earliest indication that you 13 received anything had happened would have been when you 14 got the call at the hotel that -- early that morning? On 15 the morning of the 7th it would have been. 16 A: I went back to the Command Post that 17 evening before -- before going off duty and that was at 18 18:30. I went back and briefed the Inspector at that 19 point in time. 20 Q: So after that briefing you received 21 no indication that anything was going on? 22 A: Nothing that -- 23 Q: As far as you knew. 24 A: Certainly not to the events that -- 25 that did occur. I knew nothing of them.

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1 Q: Okay. Now, one other thing you 2 talked about in terms of the role of how the negotiation 3 teams work, is that there's a leader who's a conduit to 4 the Incident Commander, correct? 5 A: That's correct. 6 Q: And as I understand your evidence, 7 that provides a way to be able to -- for you to be able 8 to -- to be able to take information from the Incident 9 Commander to the negotiator, correct? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: Particularly with respects to giving 12 the negotiator information on ways on how things are 13 going and how to steer the negotiation? 14 A: To some degree. And I say that with 15 some degree of caution in that that's one of the roles 16 that the team leader has, given the expected experience 17 that the team leader has. 18 And not all information that is shared 19 with the team leader via the Incident Commander would 20 necessarily be given by the team leader to the 21 negotiators themselves. So the team leader can know, but 22 not necessarily shared with the negotiators. And that's 23 a judgment call the team leader will make. 24 Q: But it's something that you need to 25 be aware of in order so that way you understand what the

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1 Incident Commander is up to and what's the information 2 that's coming, correct? 3 A: I believe that's -- that's a true 4 statement given that there's leadership levels within the 5 Command Post, the Incident Commander, of course, being 6 overall in charge. But there are tactical commanders, 7 there's the negotiator commander, and as a team those 8 persons will discuss and -- and -- and brainstorm some of 9 the options. 10 And as I say, again, not all of those -- 11 that information would be fed back to the negotiator 12 necessarily. 13 Q: I'm going to be referring to -- 14 referring the Witness to a number of pages in the scribe 15 notes and some of them are pages that aren't in the -- in 16 your binder, sir. So I'm going to request that Exhibit 17 P-426 and P-427 be provided to him. I think it would be 18 easier than flipping back and forth and trying to find 19 pages. 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 Q: And as a result, sir, one (1) of the 24 things you would do is you would sit up on unit 25 commanders meetings in order to find out what information

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1 was going on, correct? 2 A: That's correct. 3 Q: Okay. If I can take you to page 84 4 of your notes. 5 A: 84 of the scribe notes I was just 6 given? 7 Q: Of your notes? 8 A: Of my notes? 9 Q: So Tab 6, Inquiry Document Number 10 2003866, Exhibit P-1704. Do you have it, sir? Or you 11 can refer to your own notebook, whichever is more 12 convenient for yourself. 13 A: I have both. 14 Q: Okay. I'm looking at the time entry 15 for 09:20. 16 A: Yes, sir. 17 Q: There's a mention of a unit commander 18 meeting? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: Okay. If I can take you to page 25 21 of the typewritten scribe notes. This will be Exhibit P- 22 426, Inquiry Document Number 1002419. 23 A: I'm sorry, is that the notes I was 24 just provided with? 25 Q: Yes.

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1 A: And the page number again, I'm sorry? 2 Q: 25. 3 A: Thank you. 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 Q: And, sir, if you look at the page 8 before, page 24, you'll see that it refers to a meeting 9 at 09:25. 10 A: Yes, sir? 11 Q: And you're listed in the people who 12 attended. 13 A: And I'm listed there, yes. 14 Q: If I take you to the next page, sir, 15 the first paragraph starts with: 16 "John Carson." 17 Do you see that? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: The second sentence: 20 "Advised that Staff Sergeant Lacroix 21 has been in contact with Marcel 22 Beaubien, local Member of Parliament. 23 He is updating the Premier on the 24 situation." 25 Do you see that, sir?

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1 A: Yes, sir. 2 Q: Do you recall that statement being 3 made in the meeting? 4 A: I don't recall the statement being 5 made. 6 Q: But you were present at the meeting? 7 A: I was present, yes. 8 Q: You don't take issue with the 9 statement? 10 A: No. 11 Q: You would have likely heard the 12 statement? 13 A: If it was said there and I was there, 14 then I probably heard it. 15 Q: And this information would have been 16 provided to you so that way you were -- this information 17 would have been added to the information that you were 18 now aware of with respect to the operation, correct? 19 A: I would expect so. 20 Q: Okay. If I can take you to page 86 21 of your notes, please? 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 A: I have it.

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1 Q: And you'll note at 14:00: 2 "Return to Forest Detachment. Brief 3 Inspector Carson?" 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: Okay. If I can take you to page 35 6 of the typewritten scribe notes, please? 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 A: I have them. 11 Q: At 13:54 hours we've got the 12 observations that are provided by Detective Sergeant 13 Wright, and it indicates he arrived back from the Park, 14 correct? 15 A: Yes, sir. 16 Q: And if I flip to the next page, on 17 page 36 at 14:08? 18 A: At what time? 19 Q: 14:08 on page 36, Inquiry Document -- 20 A: Yes, sir? 21 Q: -- P-426. It says that he concur -- 22 that you concur with Detective Sergeant Wright's 23 observations. And I'm just trying to understand, sir, 24 were you present when the observations were made? 25 Did the two (2) of you come back at the

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1 same time? 2 A: I would say we came back at the same 3 time because we went in the same vehicle, as I recall. 4 As to whether I was present when they were made, I don't 5 recall. 6 Q: Given the way that this is worded, it 7 seems to indicate that you were present when he made 8 those observations. 9 A: At -- at 14:08? 10 Q: Yes. 11 A: If I wasn't present, in order for me 12 to concur with him someone would have had to have fed 13 back to me what Mark had said or I -- or I wouldn't have 14 concurred or not. 15 Q: Hmm hmm. And I'm just looking at -- 16 A: So. 17 Q: -- I'm just looking at the times of 18 the scribe notes. It doesn't seem that that's reasonable 19 given what's happening there. At least that's my 20 interpretation of what I see there. You can have a look 21 and -- 22 A: I'm trying to be as fair as I can 23 with you, sir, by suggesting that I don't recall whether 24 Mark and I stood together and briefed the Inspector, or 25 whether I was ten (10) feet away from him doing something

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1 else while he briefed the Inspector. 2 And then upon hearing from the Inspector, 3 what Marks's comments were, I concurred -- I don't 4 recall. Like I don't recall whether I actually heard him 5 say it, or whether it was fed back to me to agree with or 6 disagree. 7 Q: But you're agreeing it's possible 8 that you would -- 9 A: It's possible. 10 Q: -- heard it? If I can take you to 11 page 432 of the handwritten scribe notes. I believe it's 12 in the same binder on the second tab, sir. That's 13 Inquiry Document Number 1000152, Exhibit P-427. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 A: And I'm looking at page 432? 18 Q: Yes. 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And these are the handwritten scribe 21 notes. And you'll see that it correlates -- there's a 22 154 at the top of the page. 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And you'll see it correlates with the 25 typed scribe notes.

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1 A: Oh, I see. 2 Q: In terms of the information that's 3 being -- that's being talked about? 4 A: I recognize the words as being the 5 same. 6 Q: And the one I'm taking to you is one 7 that does not appear in the typed scribe notes. It's at 8 the bottom: 9 "Helicopter here shortly." 10 This is John Carson speaking, "J.C." 11 A: Okay. 12 Q: "No bigger things are going to come. 13 Make plans from there. Inter-ministry 14 has to make up mind." 15 And then if you continue onto the next 16 page, it's the continuation as it continues. 17 A: Okay. 18 Q: Do you remember that statement being 19 made, sir? 20 A: No. 21 Q: Now given that you've said it's 22 possible that you were -- that you heard the statement, 23 if you did hear it -- if you were present in the room you 24 would have likely heard the statement? 25 A: This one your lastly referring to?

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1 Q: Yes. 2 A: Not necessarily, no. If I can 3 describe for you the Command Post, there's a hub of 4 activity happening there. There's a lot of people, 5 sometimes it has to be controlled by the Incident 6 Commander to tell people to get out because there's 7 people that -- that want to come in. 8 So it's -- it's something that has to be 9 policed almost, as to amount of that are in there and why 10 they have reason to be in there. 11 There's telephones that are ringing, 12 there's, you know, the usual administration that is 13 happening with a lot of people there. I agreed with you, 14 sir, that I concurred with Mark's comments, either, one 15 (1), because I stood there and heard them, or because 16 they were fed back to me and that's the reason I 17 concurred. 18 As to whether or not I heard these 19 comments made by -- by J.C., I don't recall hearing those 20 comments. I wasn't there close enough to hear him. 21 Q: But it's possible you heard them? 22 A: They're new to me now -- 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Everything 24 is possible, Mr. Alexander. He said he doesn't recall. 25 MR. BASIL ALEXANDER: I'm moving on after

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1 that. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 CONTINUED BY MR. BASIL ALEXANDER: 7 Q: If I can take you to page 87 of your 8 notes, please. 9 A: Yes, sir. 10 Q: Again it's Tab 6, Inquiry Document 11 Number 2003866, Exhibit P-1704. 12 A: Yes, sir. 13 Q: At 16:40. 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: You have a meeting with Inspector 16 Carson. 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: If I can take you to page 40 of the 19 typed scribe notes, Inquiry Document Number 1002419, 20 Exhibit P-416. 21 A: Yes, sir. 22 Q: You can actually go to page 39. 23 A: I'm on page 39. 24 Q: You'll see at the bottom there's a 25 notation 16:45.

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1 A: Yes. 2 Q: And then there appears to be minutes 3 starting with Detective Sergeant Richardson. 4 A: Okay. 5 Q: And it continues onto page 40. 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: At the bottom of page 40 it says: 8 "John Carson advised that the next 9 meeting to be held at 18:15 hours 10 before a new crowd comes in." 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And you'll see your name at the top 13 of page 40: 14 "Sergeant Seltzer advises that Sergeant 15 Eve is attending tomorrow." 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: So this appears to be the same 18 meeting that's referred to in your notes, correct? 19 A: The 16:40 notes that I have, yes. 20 Q: Okay. If I take you to the bottom of 21 page 40? 22 A: The bottom of page...? 23 Q: 40. Typed scribe notes? 24 A: Forty (40), yes, sir. 25 Q: Okay.

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1 "Inspector Carson updated Chief Coles 2 that Marcel Beaubien has contacted the 3 Premier. There's to be a press release 4 by the Solicitor General stating that 5 this is not an Indian issue, it is an 6 MNR and a Provincial issue." 7 Do you see that, sir? 8 A: Yes, I see it. 9 Q: Do you recall that statement being 10 made in the meeting? 11 A: I don't recall the statement being 12 made, no. 13 Q: But you were present in the meeting? 14 A: I think that's been established. 15 Yes, I was there. 16 Q: And you would have likely -- so you 17 would have likely heard this statement? 18 A: I -- yes. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm not sure 20 how helpful that is. I'm just not sure how helpful. If 21 he doesn't recall it, he doesn't recall it and you can 22 make that argument. He acknowledges that he was at the 23 meeting, it seems. 24 MR. BASIL ALEXANDER: Okay. 25

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1 CONTINUED BY MR. BASIL ALEXANDER: 2 Q: And this would have been added to the 3 information that you would have been aware of with 4 respect to the operation? 5 A: Okay. 6 Q: If you can go back to page 87 of your 7 notes? 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 Q: You see at the bottom -- this is, 10 again, Inquiry Document Number 2003866, Exhibit P-1704. 11 You'll see at the bottom of page 87, 18:15: 12 "Discussed with Inspector Carson..." 13 A: On my notes? Yes. 14 Q: Your notes. And if I can take you to 15 page 42 of the typewritten scribe notes? 16 A: Yes, sir. 17 Q: You'll see the page before that it 18 goes 17:27 hours and then it drops to 16:07 hours? 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: And you've heard that that's a typo 21 and that actually should be 18:07 hours. So it's 22 actually 6:07. 23 A: Okay. 24 Q: And if you want to turn the page, it 25 appears that from that entry on 41 through to 43 it

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1 appears to be minutes of a meeting? 2 A: Yes, sir. 3 Q: And you'll see on the top of page 42: 4 "Sergeant Seltzer advised..." 5 A: Yes, sir. 6 Q: So it would appear that you were at 7 this meeting? 8 A: It appears that I was at the meeting? 9 Q: Yes. 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: If I can take you to page 450 in the 12 handwritten scribe notes, it's Exhibit P-427, Inquiry 13 Document Number 1000152? 14 A: I have it. 15 Q: The pages before and after this 16 appear to be a handwritten version of the typed scribe 17 notes that I've just shown you before. Do you want to 18 check them or will you take my word for that, sir? 19 A: Okay. 20 Q: I'll assume you'll take my word for 21 it? 22 A: That is? 23 Q: That these are -- these are the 24 handwritten versions of the typed scribe notes I've just 25 shown you?

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1 A: Okay, I'll take your word for that. 2 Q: If you could look at the middle of 3 page 40 -- 450, sorry? 4 A: 415? 5 Q: 450. It says "J.C." 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: "Heat from political side. Made 8 strong comments in the House." 9 And I'll tell you, sir, that's not in the 10 typed scribe notes, it's in the handwritten version. 11 A: And that's on page 4-5-0? 12 Q: 450. 13 A: Okay. I've got it now. I was on 4- 14 1-5, sorry. 15 Q: So again, the -- 16 A: I'm reading what you said, yes. 17 Q: You see that, sir? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Do you remember that statement being 20 made? 21 A: No. 22 Q: Okay. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Do you have 24 much more? You indicated you'd be about forty (40) 25 minutes and you're just up at that level now. You said--

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1 MR. BASIL ALEXANDER: I'm nearly done. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- twenty 3 (20) to forty (40). That's fine. 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 CONTINUED BY MR. BASIL ALEXANDER: 8 Q: What I'm handing up, sir, is a copy 9 of Exhibit P-1088, Inquiry Document 1007879, which is a 10 page of Ed Vervoort's notes who we understand was also at 11 the meeting? 12 A: Okay, sir. 13 Q: If you'd like you can skim this but 14 it -- it is the same meeting. 15 A: Okay. 16 Q: And at the bottom of the page, right 17 before September 6 -- sorry, it should be two-thirds of 18 the way down the page. 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: "Lots of political pressure. Strong 21 in-house comments by Premier/Sol Gen." 22 A: Okay. 23 Q: Did either of those two (2) 24 statements I've taken you to assist you with recalling 25 whether or not either statement was made in the meeting?

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1 A: I cannot account to the accuracy of 2 the statement. I don't remember hearing them. 3 Q: But you probably heard it in the 4 meeting? 5 MS. KAREN JONES: Mr. -- Mr. 6 Commissioner, I think this Witness has already said he 7 doesn't recall hearing that and -- 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, he's 9 trying -- 10 MS. KAREN JONES: -- in terms of spending 11 -- hearing the comments, and in terms of is it possible-- 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well -- 13 MS. KAREN JONES: -- I'm not sure if that 14 helps you, Mr. Commissioner. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: The possible 16 is -- 17 MS. KAREN JONES: Now spent some 18 significant amount of time going over things this Witness 19 doesn't recall, is it possible? 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: The possible 21 aspect doesn't help me but he's asking him if this helps 22 refresh his memory. 23 MS. KAREN JONES: And he says he doesn't 24 recall. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: If he

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1 doesn't recall, if that's his answer, that's his answer. 2 If you're trying to refresh his memory, it doesn't seem 3 to be working, move on. 4 MR. BASIL ALEXANDER: I'll take that 5 direction and move on, Mr. Commissioner. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 CONTINUED BY MR. BASIL ALEXANDER: 11 Q: One (1) last one, sir. 12 A: Yes, sir. 13 Q: Can you turn to page 91 in your 14 notes, Tab 6, Inquiry Document 2003866 Exhibit P-1704? 15 A: I have both. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 Q: And you've got: 20 "14:15, Report to Command Post. Return 21 to Command Post [my apologies]. Notes 22 14:40 met with Inspector Carson." 23 Do you -- do you see that, sir? 24 A: I have it, yes. 25 Q: If I can take you to pages 62 and 63

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1 of the typewritten scribe notes, Exhibit P-426, 1002419? 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 A: Yes, sir, I have it, page 63. 6 Q: And you'll see at page 62: 7 "14:27 briefing." 8 This is on September the 6th. 9 A: 14:27 briefing on page 62, yes. 10 Q: Do you see that, sir? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And then at page 63 you have Sergeant 13 Seltzer there? 14 A: Yes, sir. 15 Q: So it appears that you were at this 16 meeting? 17 A: Yes, sir. 18 Q: If I take you to the bottom of page 19 62 where it says: 20 "Mark Wright." 21 A: Yes, sir? 22 Q: "MARK WRIGHT: There will be a lag 23 time." 24 A: Is that a lag time or leg time? 25 Q: Yes, I should -- I should be clear.

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1 It says: 2 "leg time." 3 It says: 4 "MARK WRIGHT: There will be a leg 5 time." 6 We have -- in the evidence here we've 7 heard that that's been corrected to lag time. 8 A: Thank you. 9 Q: Moving down to the third sentence 10 that starts right at the end of the page: 11 "Concerns raised that the longer it 12 goes, more may be around." 13 Do you see that, sir? 14 A: I -- I read it, yes. 15 Q: Do you recall that statement being 16 made at the meeting? 17 A: No. 18 Q: Okay. Given that response, Mr. 19 Commissioner, I'll stop that line of questioning. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 21 MR. BASIL ALEXANDER: I have one brief 22 area to -- 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: One more 24 area? 25 MR. BASIL ALEXANDER: Yes.

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1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 CONTINUED BY MR. BASIL ALEXANDER: 4 Q: Now the final -- I have just a couple 5 of quick questions about this. As you indicated that you 6 spent some time at CFB Ipperwash, and that you paid the 7 utmost respect with respect to the burial ground that was 8 located on the Army Base, correct? 9 A: I recall it being brought to our 10 attention that we should pay respects to the burial 11 ground, yes. 12 Q: Okay. 13 A: That's what I said. 14 Q: But you have no idea of what may have 15 actually happened at the site of the burial ground, 16 correct? 17 A: No, I don't know. 18 Q: Or the conditions of the headstones 19 or the ground or the actual site? 20 A: No. 21 Q: Okay. Those are my questions, Mr. 22 Commissioner. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 24 very much. 25 MR. BASIL ALEXANDER: Thank you, Mr.

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1 Seltzer. 2 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 4 Mr. Alexander. 5 I'd like to take an afternoon break now. 6 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 7 for fifteen (15) minutes. 8 9 --- Upon recessing at 2:24 p.m. 10 --- Upon resuming at 2:42 p.m. 11 12 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 13 resumed, please be seated. 14 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: Good afternoon, Mr. 15 Commissioner. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 17 afternoon. 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: 22 Q: Good afternoon, Mr. Seltzer. 23 A: Good afternoon. 24 Q: My name is Jackie Esmonde and I'm 25 going to be asking you some questions on behalf of the

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1 Aazhoodena and George Family Group, which includes some 2 of the Stoney Point people. 3 A: Okay. 4 Q: And just to be clear, I'm going to 5 use the term 'crisis negotiator' if I'm ever -- if I'm 6 referring to the kind of formal negotiations that you've 7 described to us earlier. 8 A: Okay. Thank you. 9 Q: Now in advance of September 4th, 10 1995, through your involvement in the planning of Project 11 Maple and the eventual creation of the Project Maple 12 document that you've seen, it was your understanding, was 13 it, that you were being tasked with preparing for a 14 traditional crisis negotiator role? 15 A: That's correct. 16 Q: And that by definition that would be 17 a reactive process? 18 A: Yes. To a set criteria, yes. 19 Q: Right. In the sense that the 20 occupation would have had to have started and a situation 21 would arise that involved a risk to life such as a 22 hostage or a barricade situation. 23 A: Exactly right. Yes. 24 Q: And you have no training, I take it, 25 with respect to crisis negotiating in an occupation

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1 situation such as you were faced with? 2 A: That's right, I have no training. 3 Q: Right. And their -- as far as you're 4 aware, there are no protocols or policies that had been 5 created or adapted for that kind of situation? 6 A: At that time -- 7 Q: At that time. 8 A: -- I was not aware of any. 9 Q: Okay. And there are some now? 10 A: I don't know that. 11 Q: You don't know, okay. So the plan 12 that became Project Maple, as far as you knew, it didn't 13 in -- involve the attempt to open any dialogue to try to 14 prevent an occupation of the Park? 15 A: Could you ask me that again, please? 16 I missed a word, I think. 17 Q: Certainly. There were no plans, that 18 you were aware of, as part of Project Maple, to try to 19 initiate a dialogue in advance of any occupation taking 20 place? 21 A: I can't speak to that. No -- in 22 answer to your question, I wasn't aware of it. 23 Q: You weren't aware. And would that be 24 one of the reasons why you told Lorne Smith not to 25 contact any Elders in advance?

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1 A: I don't draw that correlation. My 2 statement that I suggested to Lorne not to contact 3 anybody was just the instructions that we received from 4 the Incident Commander that other than people that were 5 going to be deployed and their immediate supervisors were 6 the only one that, at that part of the planning, should 7 be involved in an awareness of what was going to happen. 8 Q: You were taken earlier today to the 9 minutes from the September 1st, planning meeting? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: And you commented for us on a 12 notation about negotiators being responsible for talking 13 to the people down there to get off their property; do 14 you remember that? 15 A: I remember that -- 16 Q: I can -- 17 A: -- phraseology. Yeah. 18 Q: Okay. And you explained to us that 19 wasn't your role, as you understood it, as a crisis 20 negotiator? 21 A: That's right. 22 Q: And was anybody identified to fulfil 23 that role that you can recall in the course of that 24 meeting or any other planning meetings in advance of 25 September 4th?

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1 A: I don't recall if anybody was 2 designated as -- as that role. I don't recall that. 3 Q: You were familiar with the project 4 mission to negotiate a peaceful resolution? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Would you say that the use of the 7 term "negotiate" in that phrase, that was the looser 8 meaning of the term "negotiate"? 9 A: That's one of the areas where I'm 10 saying it's used, I wouldn't say improperly, but it needs 11 clarification because there's different -- I would say 12 there's contextual definition to the word "negotiate". 13 Q: Okay. Can you -- can you tell us 14 what was your understanding of the use of the term 15 "negotiate" in the -- in that context? 16 A: In that context, dialogue, 17 discussion, work towards. 18 Q: And from what you've told us 19 throughout the day would it be fair to summarize your 20 role, September 4 through 6, as trying to assist in the 21 opening of a dialogue with the people in the Park? 22 A: That's a fair statement. Yes. 23 Q: And you were working -- fair to say, 24 you were working on the assumption that the Provincial 25 Park was, without a doubt, the property of the Provincial

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1 Government? 2 A: I think that's an accurate statement. 3 Yes. 4 Q: And what was -- can you help us with 5 what was -- what was to be the subject of this dialogue 6 then? 7 A: I think we needed something to go on 8 towards any kind of peaceful resolution. And I suppose 9 the subject matter of any kind of dialogue would relate 10 to help us to understand what the situation is and what 11 you'd like it to become. 12 And how can we help? What can we do? 13 Q: Were you aware September 4th through 14 September 6th of a position being put forward by 15 officials and/or politicians in the Provincial Government 16 that there would be no negotiation? 17 A: We're talking about a different 18 negotiation I guess? 19 Q: Yes. 20 A: Regardless, I wasn't aware. 21 Q: Okay. Now, a common theme that 22 appeared to me to arise from your discussions with Earl 23 Bressette and Bob George was, would it be fair to say, 24 they both indicated to you that they thought the people 25 in the Park would want to talk with somebody with

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1 authority? 2 A: That was a very strong impression I 3 had by the end of the day as a result of talking to both 4 of them, yes. 5 Q: Right. And you told us about Bob 6 George saying to you, do you have any power? And when 7 you said, no, he said, they won't want to talk to you? 8 A: That's right. 9 Q: And you understood that to mean that 10 they were telling you, that is Earl Bressette and Bob 11 George, were telling you that they felt the people in the 12 Park would want to talk with somebody who had the 13 authority and power to deal with their claim to the land? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: And that would obviously not be 16 someone in the OPP? 17 A: That's correct. 18 Q: And Les Kobayashi had some 19 involvement in these attempts to open dialogue? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: He was there the time that you went-- 22 A: The time that I was there, yes. 23 Q: You were there. But would it -- did 24 you understand his role to be as a representative of MNR, 25 the Ministry of Natural Resources?

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1 A: That's what I knew him to be. I have 2 known Les for sometime prior to that and I knew him to be 3 the Park Superintendent. 4 Q: And that his role would be to advise 5 the people in the Park that they were trespassing? Did 6 you have that impression? 7 A: I don't know whether it was the 8 intentions -- I don't know what his intentions were at 9 the time that we went down, I just know that from my part 10 I understood the three (3) was to be there to try and 11 make contact with whoever would -- would talk to us. As 12 to what Les' intentions were, I don't know that. 13 Q: Okay. You didn't have the impression 14 though that he was somebody who had the authority to 15 speak with people in the Park about their land claim? 16 A: I -- I think I understand what you're 17 asking me and I would say that I -- I would agree that he 18 didn't have the authority to deal with the -- the land 19 claim; that's right. 20 Q: Now, through September 4th through 21 6th in your discussions with Inspector -- then Inspector 22 Carson -- 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: -- would it be fair to say you were 25 advising him based on your experience as a trained

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1 negotiator and communicator on who should be involved and 2 how -- how to go about opening a dialogue? 3 A: I -- I think I was making suggestion, 4 yes. 5 Q: Because you do have experience with 6 communication; that's part of your training as a 7 negotiator? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: And were you -- well, let me take you 10 to a -- a few points in the scribe notes then. 11 A: Okay. 12 Q: The scribe notes are at your Tab 10 13 and they've been marked as P-426, page 27 and 28? 14 A: Yes, I have it. 15 Q: Okay. And you'll see at the bottom 16 of page 27 the -- the last paragraph there: 17 "Brad Seltzer stated that the 18 negotiator should know what's going on 19 and that the negotiator shouldn't 20 change. It should be the same one all 21 along. John Carson advised that that 22 was a good point." 23 A: Can you help me to know what day that 24 was? 25 Q: This was September 5th in the course

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1 of a meeting. 2 A: Okay. 3 Q: Yeah. I should have told you that, 4 it's the -- the morning of September 5th at a meeting 5 that began at 9:25 hours -- 6 A: Okay. 7 Q: -- according to the scribe notes. 8 And I see you're cross-referencing with your handwritten 9 notes? 10 A: If you -- is it okay if I do that? 11 Q: No, that's -- if that's helpful. 12 A: September the 5th at 9:20. Oh, yes, 13 that meeting that we had with the Inspector, yeah. 14 Q: Okay. So I've taken you here to a -- 15 a notation in the scribe note where it appears that 16 you're providing some suggestions about -- the term 17 "negotiator" is used here -- 18 A: Hmm hmm. 19 Q: -- but you meant -- 20 A: Hmm hmm. 21 Q: -- did you mean in this circumstance 22 somebody to open dialogue? 23 A: I believe I did, yes. 24 Q: Okay. And you were suggesting that 25 this person to open dialogue should know what's going on

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1 and should be the same person all along? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: Okay. And you -- do you recall now 4 or does that sound like something you would have advised 5 John Carson? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: And in terms of some other 8 considerations that you may have raised with John Carson 9 or may not I -- I'd like to get your opinion on what you 10 thought would make a good person to open dialogue. 11 Now, ideally it would be somebody who 12 would be trusted by both sides, that being the OPP and 13 the people in the Park? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: And I -- I believe you may even raise 16 several times it appears in the scribe notes the 17 importance of having someone with some knowledge about 18 First Nations? Would you agree with me that that would 19 be an important character trait of somebody who would be 20 involved in opening a dialogue? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: Someone with experience in training 23 as a communicator? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: A person who would be respectful of

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1 the First Nations people in the Park? 2 A: For sure. 3 Q: Someone who shared your view that the 4 situation should be cooled down? 5 A: I -- I would think that that person 6 that would respect that type of environment would -- 7 would recognize that facilitating discussion is a lot 8 better under those circumstances than in an agitated 9 environment. 10 Q: Right. You wouldn't want somebody 11 who was anxious to take action against the people in the 12 Park, right? 13 A: Not as a facilitator of discussion, 14 that's right. 15 Q: You wouldn't want somebody for 16 example, who made comments such as "We're going to amass 17 a fucking army and do these fuckers big time." That's 18 obvious, right? You wouldn't want somebody who would 19 express comments of that nature to be involved in opening 20 dialogue? 21 A: That was some time to come up with a 22 proper answer to that and you're right on. That's right 23 on. 24 Q: Now but when you attended at the Park 25 on September 5th, you attended as you've told us already,

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1 with Mark Wright -- 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: -- and Les Kobayashi. So was there a 4 decision made some point prior to that that Mark Wright 5 would be the person to try to open dialogue? 6 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 A: I don't recall the amount of 11 discussion that happened before we went down. I know 12 that -- that Mark and Les were designated to go down and 13 -- and I was directed by the Inspector to accompany them 14 as -- 15 Q: Okay. 16 A: -- to what the selection criteria was 17 for that I don't know. 18 Q: Was it decided in advance that Mark 19 Wright would be the person to try and speak with the 20 people on the other side of the fence? 21 A: I don't recall other than -- other 22 than to suggest to you my position as was obvious -- not 23 obvious but as I pointed out in the picture and the 24 position that I know that I took. 25 Q: Hmm hmm.

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1 A: I was giving way to -- to others to 2 make contact. 3 Q: Right. So you can't help us at all 4 with how it -- 5 A: Was decided on? 6 Q: -- was decided or how that happened? 7 A: No. 8 Q: Was there a discussion before you 9 left the Command Post or in the car on the way down there 10 about what approach would be used to try to open a 11 dialogue? 12 A: I don't recall any discussion that 13 way. I just recognize now that I was somewhat cautious I 14 suppose and stayed back a few feet. 15 Q: Now the three (3) of you did not have 16 success in opening a dialogue while you were down in the 17 sandy parking lot area? 18 A: That's correct. 19 Q: You were successful though at -- when 20 you moved up the road and went to the -- the gate of the 21 former CFB Ipperwash? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: And were you introduced or -- or did 24 you hang back again when you were at the gate of the 25 former CFB Ipperwash?

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1 A: I recall standing closer to Mark at 2 the time of his discussion with the gentleman who either 3 then or later became known to me as Bert Manning. I 4 didn't know him. I didn't know Bert Manning. 5 Q: Okay. I'm sorry did -- do you -- if 6 you said that I missed it. 7 A: I did not know Bert Manning and was I 8 introduced? I'm -- I'm not sure that I did. 9 Q: Okay. 10 A: So either he identified himself or 11 Mark told me later who he was. But I remember standing 12 closer to Mark at that encounter than I did at the -- at 13 the parking lot. 14 Q: Would it be fair to say in terms of 15 your state of mind while you were with Mark Wright and 16 Les Kobayashi that you were -- you used the word 17 'cautious', that you -- you were concerned about your 18 safety? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And at Tab 12 of your book there's a 21 -- the picture you were taken to earlier, this is marked 22 as P-913, Inquiry Document 2001840. The picture of you 23 stand -- this is when you're down at the sandy parking 24 lot. 25 A: Hmm hmm.

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1 Q: Do you -- do you have your hand on 2 your sidearm there? 3 A: I -- I can't see that in the picture. 4 May be just a stance with my hands on my hips. 5 Q: Fair enough. Now you've told us -- 6 you've taken us through the notes of what you recorded 7 about what you overheard of the discussion between Bert 8 Manning and Mark Wright. 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: There is one other point that I 11 wanted to see if you can assist us with. I have a copy 12 of page 37 from the scribe notes which isn't in your 13 binder. 14 A: Okay. 15 Q: But there's one passage I'd like to 16 show you if I can. 17 A: Okay. 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 22 23 CONTINUED BY MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: 24 Q: This is from P-426, the typed scribe 25 notes. And you'll -- I think you'll see there I have

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1 marked a passage which is about the fourth paragraph 2 down? 3 A: Okay. Yes. 4 Q: It says: 5 "Detective Sergeant Wright restated 6 that he advised the First Nations 7 occupants that they were trespassing. 8 They know they are illegally in the 9 Park. They want the road blocks 10 removed. Advised that we will be back 11 tomorrow at noon. Elders were not 12 there. Had to go to CFB Ipperwash to 13 meet with Bert Manning." 14 A: Okay. 15 Q: Now, the part that I'm interested in 16 is "advised that we will be back tomorrow at noon". And 17 were you aware of any plans that were made for the OPP to 18 return the following day at noon to try to reinitiate 19 discussions? 20 A: That statement doesn't come as a 21 surprise to me now when I put it together with what my 22 notes would remind me, in that Marg and Vince went down 23 the next day around noon hour. 24 So whether it was all part of the plan. 25 At that time, if I heard that comment, it's not in my

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1 notes that I noted it. 2 Q: Okay. You didn't note it in your 3 notes? 4 A: That's right. 5 Q: You say you're putting together 6 information and surmising then that this comment must 7 have been made and that led to Marg Eve and Vince George 8 going the next day? But you don't have a specific memory 9 of knowing that -- 10 A: That's right. 11 Q: -- there were plans? 12 A: That's right. Yeah. 13 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: Okay. If I can just 14 have a moment? I want to check something -- 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 CONTINUED BY MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: 20 Q: So if it was -- if you had been told 21 that there were plans to reinitiate dialogue the next day 22 at noon that's something that you would normally have put 23 in your notes? 24 A: Given Mark's comment you mean? 25 Q: Right. If you knew about it?

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1 A: If I remembered it. Given my notes 2 were made at some time after the contact. 3 Q: Hmm hmm. 4 A: And I tried to make note of the 5 points that I remembered and, forgive me, but I didn't 6 remember that point at the time I made my notes. 7 Q: But that would be a very important 8 point, wouldn't it, if -- if there was these arrangements 9 made to try and reinitiate dialogue since that was your 10 goal over the period September 4th to 6th? 11 A: That's right. 12 Q: Right? 13 A: That's right. And I suppose, keeping 14 it in context, it would be significant if that was the 15 only contact we were going to make or, you know, 16 something of that nature. 17 I'm just saying that that was foremost in 18 our mind at that point -- at least it was in my mind at 19 that point, was that we should be trying to make contact 20 as best that we can. The fact that there was a promise 21 to meet again tomorrow, I saw as a matter of course. 22 I guess. I don't know. I can't recall. 23 My impression of that statement, I don t have -- 24 Q: Well, what I'm trying to understand 25 is if -- the fact that it's not in your notes and you

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1 didn't mention it earlier today in your testimony and 2 it's not in your Will Say either -- 3 A: Right. 4 Q: -- can we surmise from that that you 5 didn't know, in fact, that there were plans to meet the 6 next day? 7 A: I would prefer to think that the only 8 thing that can be drawn from that is that I didn't 9 recognize it at the time and make note of it. And now, 10 when I go back into my notes to -- to make -- to help my 11 recall, they're not there to help me in whether I 12 recognized it at the time or not, I can't recall. 13 Q: Fair enough. Now, in the -- in terms 14 of -- I'm speaking again of your contact both at the 15 Sandy Parking Lot and at the Gate at CFB Ipperwash on 16 September 5th, there was a lot of media around during 17 that period; right? 18 A: I recall a significant amount of 19 media at the Sandy Parking Lot. And whether they 20 followed us up to the gate, there was some but I don't 21 think there was many. For some reason my mind's telling 22 me that. 23 Q: Okay. Well, there was some media 24 then -- 25 A: Well, certainly there was media

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1 there. 2 Q: -- that involved -- were there people 3 filming? 4 A: I don't know what they were doing. 5 Q: Okay. Taking pictures? 6 A: I don't know what they were doing. 7 Q: Recording with an audio recorder? 8 A: I can't say. I don't know. 9 Q: Would you agree with me that it might 10 be difficult to establish trust in trying to open a 11 dialogue with the people on the other side of the fence 12 if there's some media around who are listening to the 13 conversation? 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 A: I'm not sure that I would agree with 18 it in its full statement. If I was -- are -- are you 19 asking my opinion at this point? 20 Q: Yes. 21 A: If my intention was to create 22 attention to what I was doing I might welcome the fact 23 that they were there. You know what I'm saying? So I -- 24 I can't say as that -- say that -- again my opinion, my 25 thoughts on that, I wouldn't -- just to your statement,

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1 I'm saying I wouldn't necessarily agree with your 2 statement given that if it was my intention to draw 3 attention to what I was doing I wouldn't necessarily say 4 that the media would stifle me. 5 Q: Was that your intention on the -- on 6 September 5th, to draw attention to what you were doing? 7 A: My personal attention? 8 Q: Yes. 9 A: No. 10 Q: And you'd agree with me -- 11 A: They were there before we got there. 12 Q: No, of course. I'm not suggesting 13 that you had the media there on purpose. 14 A: Okay. 15 Q: I'm -- I'm just trying to understand 16 what -- what role the media being there would have played 17 in this dynamic and you attempting to open dialogue with 18 the people. 19 A: Hmm hmm. Hmm hmm. 20 Q: And if you're trying to have a 21 confidential discussion in which you're building trust 22 between two (2) parties, then having the media there 23 listening to what's going on wouldn't help; would you 24 agree? 25 A: No, no. And I -- I think again if I

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1 can just build the context of that this was the -- to my 2 knowledge, certainly my involvement, this was the initial 3 contact we were trying to make, so as far as developing 4 trust and building trust that would be further down the 5 road. 6 That would be once I or whoever the 7 contact person was was introduced to another then we 8 would set up a formal meeting time, place, whatever and 9 start working on that -- that relationship then but in 10 the beginning we were just trying to say, Hey, is there 11 anybody out there that wants to talk to us? Like, come 12 over here. 13 So I -- I'm not so sure that that bond and 14 relationship that, you know, that you're talking about 15 was critical to our needs at that point in time. 16 Q: So you weren't trying to establish 17 trust with that meeting? 18 A: Well, I wouldn't go that far. I 19 think that's always a -- it's always a -- an objective. 20 Q: Of course. 21 A: But I -- I'm not so sure that to say 22 the relationship and bonding that happens in a -- in a 23 more intimate discussion was necessarily the objective as 24 we stood at a fence. 25 Q: And Mark Wright actually spoke with

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1 the reporters did he not? 2 A: I -- I don't -- 3 Q: At least once? 4 A: I can't help you with that; I don't 5 know. 6 Q: Can I -- let me see if I can refresh 7 your memory. If you go to Tab 12, this is again -- this 8 is a document we were just looking at; it's the newspaper 9 report from the Sarnia Observer from September 6th, 10 1995, -- 11 A: Okay. 12 Q: -- P-913 Inquiry Document 2001840. 13 And if you turn the page to the second page of the 14 article -- 15 A: Okay. 16 Q: -- the very last paragraph, quote: 17 "He wanted the roadblocks down" 18 End quote. 19 And "he" in this case refers to Bert 20 Manning. 21 A: Okay. 22 Q: "...Acting Staff Sergeant Wright said 23 after the conversation ended. We're 24 not prepared to negotiate anything, 25 just talk."

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1 A: Okay. 2 Q: Now, I understand this is a media 3 report so we can't assume that this is an accurate quote 4 but do you -- does this refresh your memory? Can you 5 recall now that Acting Detective Staff Sergeant Wright 6 made a statement to the media after concluding his 7 discussions with Bert Manning? 8 A: This paragraph that I'm reading tells 9 me that he did. Do I recall him doing it? No. 10 Q: What -- what about the content of 11 this quote: 12 "We're not prepared to negotiate 13 anything, just talk." 14 And is that consistent with the message 15 that you were receiving from Mark Wright? 16 A: The message that I was getting from 17 Mark Wright? 18 Q: That the OPP was not prepared to 19 negotiate anything, just talk? 20 A: I don't know the context that he's 21 making that statement. I -- I'm reading the paragraph 22 suggesting to you that he's making that statement in 23 response to Bert Manning's request to take down the 24 roadblocks and so what he's saying is that at this point 25 in time we just want to talk. We're not prepared to --

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1 to make changes in the way we presently sit with 2 containment. 3 Q: My question though in terms of your 4 interactions with Acting Detective Staff Sergeant Mark 5 Wright -- 6 A: Hmm hmm. 7 Q: -- would this kind of comment be 8 consistent at any point through -- in the period 9 September 4th through 6th with what he was conveying to 10 you? 11 A: No, not when you put it in that 12 context over time. I think, you know, there -- there 13 certainly was a time when we were prepared to talk and -- 14 and if you want to use the term, "negotiate," I -- I 15 think, not crisis negotiate but negotiate to talk, I 16 think there was a -- a time when we all recognized that 17 that was paramount in our mind. 18 We -- we've got to open dialogue and find 19 out how we can help. 20 Q: Okay. And -- and when did that 21 change? 22 A: Well, certainly subsequent to this 23 contact as we start getting into day 2 and we try with 24 Marg and with Vince to make contact. 25 The Incident Commander sends Lorne and I

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1 to Kettle Point to try and you know, make contact there 2 or find out from the Elders who we could make contact and 3 we were starting to facilitate that discussion as best we 4 can and -- and trying to find somebody that will talk to 5 us. 6 And as far as to negotiation, any -- 7 anything that would be a negotiated principle or a 8 negotiated point would have to come from the Incident 9 Commander. 10 Q: You told us earlier today that you 11 didn't think it was necessary -- necessarily for you to 12 have knowledge about the Stoney Pointers in advance of 13 engaging in a crisis negotiation. 14 A: In crisis negotiation, okay. 15 Q: Right. That -- that's a fair summary 16 of what you said earlier? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: But in your role -- in the role that 19 you actually played -- 20 A: Hmm hmm. 21 Q: -- in terms of trying to open a 22 dialogue between the OPP and the people in the Park, you 23 weren't seeking sources through Kettle Point at the 24 Kettle Point Reserve. 25 A: We were not, you're saying?

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1 Q: You were. 2 A: We were, yes. Yes. 3 Q: And were you -- were you aware that 4 there was this rift between people who identified 5 themselves as Stoney Pointers and people who did not? 6 A: Not until -- and my notes would 7 remind me, the discussions that we had with -- with 8 persons at Kettle Point with Earl and with Bob. 9 And I'm appreciating from their comments 10 to us at the time that -- I mean they -- they didn't even 11 know who is in at the Park in many cases. 12 Q: Were you aware that there was in fact 13 some hostility between people of the Kettle and Stony 14 Point Reserve and Stoney Point Group at -- 15 A: No, I would say no to that. 16 Q: You were not aware of that? 17 A: I don't think so. 18 Q: But you would agree with me that 19 would be important information in terms of assessing your 20 discussions with people at the Stony and Kettle Point 21 Reserve? 22 A: Certainly. And that's the importance 23 of our discussions was to find that information out. 24 Q: And in terms of finding somebody that 25 would have the trust of the people who were in the Park,

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1 it would be important for you to know that there was this 2 hostility that could make -- would might make it 3 unacceptable to the people in the Park to have somebody 4 from the Kettle Point -- the Stony and Kettle Point 5 Reserve trying to open a dialogue? 6 A: I don't think I knew that at the 7 time. I didn't know that at the time. 8 Q: Now you've told us about your 9 conversations with Bob George in which he raised the 10 possibility that Roderick George may be concerned about 11 being arrested and that that may be a barrier to opening 12 dialogue with that particular individual? 13 A: If I -- if I can just check, please. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 A: Because the name that you just gave 18 me is not consistent with the name that I remember. 19 Q: Oh, I'm sorry. He -- he -- you may 20 have known him as Judas George. 21 A: Judas is the name that I have. 22 Q: Then -- then his nickname is -- is 23 Judas George. 24 A: Okay. 25 Q: Okay. So --

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1 A: I -- I didn't know that. 2 Q: Pardon me? 3 A: I didn't know that it -- 4 Q: You learned it from Bob George. 5 Okay. You learned from Bob George though that a Judas 6 George -- 7 A: Judas, yes. 8 Q: -- may be an appropriate person to 9 dialogue with but that it was theorized that he may have 10 a concern about being arrested? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: Okay. And you're saying you didn't 13 know that Judas George and Roderick George were one and 14 the same? 15 A: There's something in my notes the 16 night that I arrived that the Inspector told me about. 17 Q: You were aware there was an arrest 18 warrant for a Roderick George? 19 A: For a Roderick George? It's in 20 reference to an arrest warrant for some reason that -- 21 that my independent recollection of talking to Bob it was 22 in reference to the arrest warrant that he's saying to me 23 that I might be able to meet with Judas if no arrest 24 would result. 25 Something in my independent recollection

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1 would remind me that that arrest is not a reference to 2 anything else other than an arrest warrant. 3 Q: Oh, I see. Okay. So that helps. So 4 in the course of your discussion Bob -- 5 A: It must have come up. 6 Q: It must have come up that there was, 7 in fact, a warrant for the arrest of Judas George? 8 A: I believe so. Yes. That's the way I 9 recall it. 10 Q: And you've told us that you reported 11 on your discussion -- 12 MS. KAREN JONES: Mr. Commissioner, just 13 to assist Mr. Seltzer, if -- if it would be helpful he 14 could be referred to his notes at page 83 where he -- and 15 those are his notes from September 4th, 1995, and he has 16 noted down and Mr. Worme didn't take him through this in 17 any kind of detail in examination-in-chief, but he can 18 look at the bottom of page 83 and the top of page 84 and 19 that might assist him in refreshing his memory. It might 20 be helpful. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 22 Ms. Jones. 23 24 CONTINUED BY MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: 25 Q: And the top of page 85 is a reference

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1 in your notes to there being an arrest warrant for 2 Roderick George? 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 Q: Do you have the reference that your 7 counsel brought you to? 8 A: I can look at my notes to what my 9 counsel was suggesting on page 83 of my notes. It's the 10 night that I arrived. Taking this information from my 11 notes when I arrived on September 4th and Inspector 12 Carson briefed me at 23:40 information in my notes would 13 reveal that: 14 "Presently MNR officials are serving 15 natives with written notice of 16 eviction. Judas George, Dudley George, 17 Stewart Bradley George..." 18 And then I have a note that says: 19 "warrants for one (1) and three (3)." 20 Q: I see. Okay. That -- that does 21 help. 22 A: So that would -- perhaps is why I'm 23 remembering that when talking to Bob maybe that's why it 24 occurs to me that they were talking about a warrant. 25 Q: Okay. Now, you've told us that you

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1 reported on your conversation with Bob George to Incident 2 Commander Carson? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: And you advised him of this issue 5 about there being an arrest warrant for the person Bob 6 George has identified as a possible opening into the 7 people in the Park? 8 A: Well, at 18:30 when I briefed the 9 Inspector I -- I would -- and my notes only say that I 10 briefed him and I would -- 11 Q: Yes. 12 A: -- expect that the full details of 13 the day is what I briefed him with. 14 Q: That would -- but that would be a 15 critical piece of the puzzle right, if you had this lead 16 on somebody who might be an opening for dialogue -- 17 A: That's right. 18 Q: -- in the Park but there was this 19 obstacle to opening that dialogue -- 20 A: Hmm hmm. 21 Q: -- that is the kind of thing that you 22 would want to pass on to him? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And what was Inspector Carson's 25 response to that piece of information?

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1 A: I -- I don't have that. I don't 2 recollect it and I don't have any note on it. I don't 3 know. 4 Q: So you can't assist us? As far as 5 you recall there was no discussion then about if there 6 would be some way to work around there being a warrant; 7 for example? 8 A: No. 9 Q: Okay. 10 A: I think I spoke of it earlier today 11 as well, that it was later that evening when I spoke 12 again with Bob and he told me the same information again. 13 Only now that we were getting closer, the meeting could 14 probably occur if those conditions could be met and I -- 15 and -- and my notes would remind me that when I paged the 16 Inspector I left that note on his pager again because, as 17 you say, I think that would be critical information to 18 his decisions. 19 Q: That's right. And, of course, you 20 don't know whether that message was picked up before the 21 unfortunate shooting occurred? 22 A: I don't know that. 23 Q: Okay. Just a few other areas. If 24 you could turn in the scribe notes at Tab 10, Exhibit P- 25 426. I'm interested in page 31 and 32.

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1 A: I have them. 2 Q: Okay. This is part of a briefing 3 meeting on September 5th apparently at 11:0 -- beginning 4 at 11:04. 5 And at the top of page 32 there's a 6 paragraph that begins with a report from you. I'm 7 interested in the -- the last sentence in that paragraph. 8 Are you with me at the top of page 32? 9 A: The top of page 32, yes. 10 Q: "Sergeant Korosec advises that the 11 emergency phone is still hooked up if 12 they want to make contact by 13 telephone." 14 Do you see that? 15 A: I see it. 16 Q: And is that with reference to an 17 emergency phone inside the Park? 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 A: I wish I could help you, I -- I don't 22 recall. I don't recall that statement. 23 Q: You don't recall this statement being 24 made? You don't recall any -- any follow-up arrangements 25 that were made to try to contact by telephone?

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1 A: No, I don't. 2 Q: Now finally, Mr. Seltzer, we've heard 3 some evidence here regarding the creation of some 4 memorabilia with respect to the incident at Ipperwash? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Some mugs and T-shirts. Now, did you 7 ever see a mug created with the crest, the OPP crest and 8 with an arrow through it and the words, "Team Ipperwash"? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: You did see that? Did you own such a 11 mug? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And where did you get this mug? 14 A: The night that I left the Park, I 15 believe it was the Tuesday night, I'm sorry I don't have 16 the date in front me, at any rate when my duties were 17 finished there -- 18 Q: Okay. 19 A: -- and I was leaving a colleague that 20 I worked with gave it to me. 21 Q: Who was that colleague? 22 A: Constable Paul Japp. 23 Q: Paul Japp? 24 A: Japp. 25 Q: And did -- was he -- did you

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1 understand him to be the -- the person who had created -- 2 A: No. 3 Q: -- these mugs? 4 A: No, I -- I don't believe he was the 5 creator but I don't believe it now and I didn't believe 6 then I don't believe. He was working logistics there. 7 Q: Hmm hmm. 8 A: He was the one that we talked of 9 earlier about the van, the ammo coming out of it because 10 he was delivering meals. That was his job was delivering 11 meals. I was leaving, he more or less said, Here and -- 12 and it seems to me that he -- he had a set that he gave 13 to me. 14 Q: Okay. Did you see other people -- 15 A: I say a set -- 16 Q: Okay. 17 A: -- explaining that there was a T- 18 shirt and a mug. 19 Q: Oh, it was a T-shirt and a mug? 20 A: That's why I -- that's why I say 21 that, yes. 22 Q: Okay. Can you describe the T-shirt 23 as well? 24 A: No, I can't. 25 Q: Did it have a -- an OPP crest with an

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1 arrow laying on the side beneath it? 2 A: I can't recall what it looked like. 3 Q: I'm wondering -- I'm going to ask if 4 we can get actually a -- I hadn't anticipated this area 5 or I would have given notice for these pictures but I'd 6 like to see if we could get up on the screen the -- a 7 photograph of the T-shirt with the -- first of all with 8 the feather? 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 Q: Thanks. Thank you very much. You'll 13 -- you'll see, Mr. Seltzer, on the screen there's a 14 photograph of P-958 which is a vers -- one (1) version of 15 a T-shirt that we're aware of that was created after the 16 -- the incident. 17 And did that assist you -- was that the 18 T-shirt that was given to you? What -- we'll -- I'll 19 show you the other one; there were two (2). 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 Q: That was P-1496? 24 MR. DERRY MILLAR: P-1494. 25 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: P-1494.

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1 2 CONTINUED BY MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: 3 Q: This is the second version of a T- 4 shirt that -- 5 A: I believe it was the first one. 6 Q: You believe it was the first one? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And do you still have that T-shirt? 9 A: I do not. 10 Q: And what happened to that T-shirt? 11 A: I destroyed it. 12 Q: When did you destroy it? 13 A: Shortly after I got home from 14 Ipperwash I destroyed it and the mug. 15 Q: And why did you do that? 16 A: Ipperwash has got very emotional 17 memories for me, and they are not pleasant memories, and 18 I do not need memorabilia to remind me of the time. I 19 destroyed them both. 20 Q: Were you aware that there was an 21 investigation launched by the OPP into the creation of 22 the mug and T-shirt? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And when did you become aware of 25 that?

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1 A: I -- when it was happening. I don't 2 know when that was. 3 Q: Was it before or after you destroyed 4 the mug and T-shirt? 5 A: After. 6 Q: It was after. 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: Were you ever interviewed as part of 9 that investigation? 10 A: No. 11 Q: Were you aware of any memo or callout 12 to OPP members to identify themselves if they had 13 possession of a mug or T-shirt? 14 A: I don't recall that. 15 Q: Have you seen a T-shirt with the 16 words, "I support Ken Deane?" 17 A: No. 18 Q: Have you seen a pin with the TRU 19 symbol and Ken Deane's badge number? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: Do you have such a pin? 22 A: I do not have one. 23 Q: Did you ever have such a pin? 24 A: I did. 25 Q: And when did you obtain that pin?

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1 A: Again, I don't know the time period, 2 but when the pins were for sale, by whoever was selling 3 them, and I'm not even sure who that was, I bought one. 4 Q: You purchased one. And did you 5 understand that you were purchasing one to assist in the 6 legal defence of Ken Deane? 7 A: I understand that I was assisting 8 with the financial assistance that was required for Ken 9 Deane to have an appeal. 10 Q: And I understand you -- you don't 11 have a strong memory about when this occurred, but was it 12 after the conviction? 13 A: Given that it was in -- in support of 14 his appeal, I would have to say yes. 15 Q: It was in support of his appeal? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: So it was before the appeal process 18 had been -- 19 A: I believe -- 20 Q: -- concluded? 21 A: Yes, yes. 22 Q: And did you ever wear this pin? 23 A: No. 24 Q: Have you seen other OPP officers 25 wearing the pin on their uniform?

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1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 A: I don't believe so. 4 Q: Are you aware of a memo from OPP 5 Command that OPP members were not to wear the pin on 6 their uniform? 7 A: I don't recall seeing a memo -- 8 Q: You never saw such a memo. 9 A: -- but that doesn't surprise me. 10 It's not authorized to be worn on the uniform. 11 Q: So you don't have the pin any longer? 12 A: I don't have it any longer. 13 Q: And when did you -- why do you no 14 longer have the pin? 15 A: I gave it away. 16 Q: You gave it away? And when did you 17 do that? 18 A: Not long after I purchased it. 19 Q: Who did you give it to? 20 A: My daughter. 21 Q: Is your daughter an OPP member? 22 A: No. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Okay. 24 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: Thank you very much, 25 Mr. Commissioner.

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1 Thank you, Mr. Seltzer. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 3 very much, Ms. Esmonde. Thank you. 4 Mr. Scullion...? 5 6 (BRIEF PAUSE) 7 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 9 afternoon, Mr. Scullion. 10 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: Good afternoon, Mr. 11 Commissioner. 12 13 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. KEVIN SCULLION: 14 Q: Good afternoon, Mr. Seltzer. 15 A: Good afternoon. 16 Q: My name is Kevin Scullion, I'm one of 17 the counsel representing the Residents of Aazhoodena. 18 You may know them better as the Stoney Point Group. 19 A: Thank you. 20 Q: Just following up the last line of 21 questioning in regards to the T-shirts and the mugs and 22 not being involved in the investigation. 23 I take it you weren't asked specifically 24 by anybody involved in the investigation whether or not 25 you had or had purchased or been given a mug or T-shirt?

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1 A: I don't recall ever being asked. 2 Q: All right. But I take it that if you 3 had been asked, you would have told them about having a 4 mug and a T-shirt? 5 A: Yes, sir. 6 Q: All right. You were asked a number 7 of questions earlier about the concept of negotiating to 8 a peaceful resolution; do you remember that line of 9 questioning in general? 10 A: Can you help me more? 11 Q: Just generally? 12 A: Generally? 13 Q: As an objective for Project Maple? 14 A: For Project Maple, yes, that was the 15 objective stated. 16 Q: You also talked about your knowledge 17 of both colour of right and your understanding that the 18 MNR had clear title to the Provincial Park lands; you 19 remember testifying to that effect? 20 A: I remember agreeing with the fact 21 that I was going on an understanding that the MNR had 22 clear title to the Park. 23 Q: Right. At the time? 24 A: Yes. Exactly. Yes. 25 Q: Do I take it then your view or your

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1 understanding of negotiating a peaceful resolution in 2 regards to Project Maple was the people that were 3 occupying the Park leaving the Park? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: All right. You, I understand, just 6 following up your earlier answer to my question, I take 7 it you're aware of various government reports that the 8 issue of the burial grounds had some merit and that that 9 came up fairly quickly after this incident of September 10 6th? 11 A: Was I aware of them? 12 Q: Were you aware of it? 13 A: Yes. Yes. 14 Q: All right. And do I take it then 15 that your view of the clear title to the parklands and 16 the issue of colour of right may have been affected if 17 you'd known about that additional material regarding 18 burial grounds? 19 A: Not sure I'd agree with that being a 20 true statement. I think I found that the -- I think I 21 found the climate of that very confusing at the time. 22 There was, on one (1) hand, believed that the Ministry of 23 Natural Resources had title to the Park. They owned it. 24 It was a Park. 25 There was information about the -- the

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1 burial site that I found very confusing. I didn't know 2 any more. 3 Q: Right. Well, there were claims that 4 there were burial grounds in that area? 5 A: Hmm hmm. 6 Q: Correct? 7 A: Hmm hmm. Yes. 8 Q: And you were aware of that at the 9 time? 10 A: There were claims, yes. 11 Q: Yeah. And you're aware that people 12 that were occupying the Park believed that they had the 13 right to be there in part because there were burial 14 grounds in the area? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And I -- I take it that for you, at 17 least from your perspective, the continued peaceful 18 occupation of the parklands wasn't of particular concern 19 as long as it remained peaceful? 20 A: The continued occupation wasn't a 21 concern as long as it remained peaceful; is that what 22 you're asking me? 23 Q: At the time? 24 A: At the time. 25 Q: And -- and I draw an analogy to your

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1 approach to the West Ipperwash lands where you recognized 2 the claim that was being made and the possible or at 3 least perceived colour of right argument? 4 A: Right. 5 Q: Right? And in the West Ipperwash end 6 of things -- your approach to West Ipperwash and the 7 training that you provided with respect to West Ipperwash 8 was, as long as it remained peaceful it was an issue that 9 would be resolved by the courts, correct? 10 A: As I recall that there -- there -- 11 there had already been issues regarding that before the 12 courts and the courts had made decisions on it. And so 13 it seemed that there was a little stronger position as to 14 colour of right. 15 Q: Your timing may be off in terms of 16 the court's determination. And just to help you out, Tab 17 1 -- sorry, Tab 2 of your notes you have training that's 18 occurring back in May of 1994? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And at page 4 of that tab there's a 21 memo dated May 30th, 1994? 22 A: Okay. 23 Q: Do you see -- have that before you? 24 A: "General Policing Ipperwash"? 25 Q: That's correct.

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1 A: Yes. 2 Q: At the bottom there's a note, 2, and 3 this memo's from then Detective Sergeant Mark Wright. 4 Number 2 says: 5 "The regional Crown and our Legal 6 Branch have explained that because of 7 the impending legal battle over final 8 ownership of the land, the Natives now 9 enjoy what is called colour of right." 10 Do you see that? 11 A: Yes, I see that. 12 Q: And I take it that the training that 13 you then provided to the officers was not only with 14 respect to the concept of colour of right, but also the 15 consistent enforcement of criminal law in respect of any 16 particular criminal activity that was in that area? 17 A: Consistent being the key word, yes. 18 Q: Right. Incidental to the colour of 19 right -- 20 A: Right. 21 Q: -- that they were enjoying at that 22 particular time? 23 A: I think I understand you, yes. 24 Q: Okay. And the charges that you're 25 illustrating or -- or instructing your officers with

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1 regards to, were outside of this particular colour of 2 right argument? 3 A: The colour of right argument meaning 4 only the trespass? 5 Q: That's right. 6 A: That's right, yes. 7 Q: And you were instructing your 8 officers that with respect to the trespass it wasn't a 9 charge that was going to be laid with respect to the West 10 Ipperwash lands? 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 Q: And if you're looking for assistance, 15 if you just go to the next page of that memo. 16 A: Yeah. 17 Q: Okay. And Detective Sergeant Wright. 18 Numbers 2 -- sorry 3 and 4 are part of the instructions 19 that you were providing to the officers at the time? 20 A: Okay, sir. 21 Q: Yeah. So I take it you agree that 22 those types of charges are not going to be laid against 23 anybody in the West Ipperwash area, your focus is on the 24 consistent application of the law with regards to other 25 charges?

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1 A: I think I am agreeing with you, yes. 2 Q: Okay. And in your approach to the 3 West Ipperwash situation, you're advocating, in your 4 training sessions with the officers, a measured approach, 5 a calm approach, and one which recognizes that it's going 6 to take a while to resolve the issues? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: Patience is key? 9 A: Patience is key, yes. 10 Q: Okay. Because you testified earlier 11 about not having First Nations training or other courses 12 that might help you in regards to potential occupation. 13 A: Hmm hmm. 14 Q: But I'll suggest to you that you were 15 fairly familiar with at least the issues of colour of 16 right and those issues surrounding the Ipperwash area 17 from these training sessions; is that fair? 18 A: I would have to speak to my 19 familiarity, because my part in -- in providing this 20 training was creating the vehicle for training as to how 21 we were going to do it. 22 As far as the -- the scenarios and as to 23 the enforcement action in those scenarios, that was left 24 to Detective Sergeant Mark Wright who was the, you know, 25 the -- the crime sergeant for this area and was familiar

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1 with how matters had been dealt with in the past, how the 2 courts in Lambton County had seen these matters. And so 3 his familiarity with that led to our anticipated 4 responses. 5 As a -- as a trainer my expertise was to 6 design how we were going to accomplish it in putting the 7 package together. And as I said before, our goal was to 8 have cooperative learning groups whereby they would learn 9 from each other based on discussion of the scenarios. 10 They're -- they were the officers that were here and 11 dealing with the situations. 12 Q: Understood. If you go three (3) 13 pages further in -- and for your assistance, Mr. 14 Commissioner, it's a memo dated May 31, 1994? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: There's a notation that says: 17 "Mandatory training will take place on 18 June 14th and 15th for all Lambton 19 County members. This training will 20 allow every officer to become familiar 21 with the intricacies of the problem as 22 well as what will be the Ontario 23 Provincial Police policy with respect 24 to the enforcement action in that 25 area."

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1 A: Okay. 2 Q: Do you see that? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: And that's a fair description of the 5 training that you were providing to the officers at the 6 time. 7 A: Okay. Yes. 8 Q: Correct? 9 A: Right. 10 Q: All right. On a related note, if you 11 go two (2) pages earlier in that tab, which is page -- oh 12 it has a page 3 at the top but it's a note 8 on that 13 page. 14 A: Okay. Yeah. 15 Q: It says that: 16 "The risk of sounding somewhat -- " 17 And this is Detective Sergeant Wright in 18 his memo. 19 "At the risk of sounding somewhat like 20 a cheerleader, I can assure you that 21 Staff Sergeant Lacroix, Superintendent 22 Randall and Chief Superintendent Coles 23 are aware of the difficult policing 24 situation we now find ourselves in." 25 Do you see that?

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1 A: I see that. 2 Q: Did you take comfort in the fact that 3 those three (3) individuals were aware of the 4 difficulties that you were facing with respect to West 5 Ipperwash? 6 A: I don't know if taking comfort was -- 7 was you know, accurate of my emotions. I don't -- I 8 think I was -- if I was aware of the memo at all, I think 9 I was somewhat -- recognizing that proceeding with our 10 training would be accurate given that the Command 11 structure for the -- for the district knew of the 12 policing scenarios and that we were attempting to address 13 them. 14 Q: Okay. I take it you don't recall 15 this particular memo -- 16 A: No. 17 Q: -- and that specific note in the 18 memo? 19 A: I'm sorry? 20 Q: You don't recall that specific note 21 in the memo? 22 A: No. 23 Q: But do I go further and take it if 24 you had been aware at the time, it would have been of 25 some importance to you to know that those three (3)

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1 individuals were aware of the situation? 2 A: We're looking at a Detachment 3 Commander, a Regional Commander and a Divisional 4 Commander and if they're aware of the situation that's 5 what that statement is saying, there would be there -- 6 there would be a satisfaction in knowing that the 7 situations were -- were known to them and their attempts 8 to address them were satisfactory. 9 Q: Okay. I listened this morning to 10 what you referred to as concerns and recommendations and 11 my reading from what you were saying was there's a 12 certain level of frustration from you as to how this 13 unfolded. This event unfolded. Is that fair? 14 A: Meaning the West Ipperwash Beach 15 event? 16 Q: No. I've skipped ahead to the -- 17 A: Oh, sorry. 18 Q: -- September 6th incident. 19 A: Okay, yeah. Yes. 20 Q: Is that fair? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: And can I ask you what are you 23 frustrated with? Where does your frustration begin and 24 end? 25 A: The lack of resolution.

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1 Q: Do you go further and blame either 2 the occupiers or the police or the community in general? 3 A: No. 4 Q: Or the -- simply the situation and 5 the unresolved nature of it? It's frustrating for you. 6 A: It's frustrating. 7 Q: Now you testified earlier about an 8 incident back in February of 1995 that we've referred to 9 in general as Darrell George incident. 10 A: Okay. 11 Q: Do you remember testifying about 12 that? 13 A: I remember that, yes. 14 Q: I take it that the Darrell George 15 incident was a classic example of your crisis negotiation 16 or at least an opportunity to employ the principles to a 17 crisis negotiation. 18 A: Yes. There was a lot of problems 19 that came out of that incident that I wouldn't say it was 20 classic but I'm saying -- I would agree with you that it 21 was an opportunity, it was a barricaded person that the 22 opportunity was there for us to do what -- what should be 23 done. 24 Q: All right. So it's a classic 25 opportunity but the end result was a little bit different

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1 than -- 2 A: Yeah. 3 Q: -- was expected. And I take it that 4 going through that -- that exercise, you had the 5 opportunity to recognize that dealing with First Nations 6 is somewhat different from dealing with other areas of 7 the population? 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 Q: It presents its own unique challenges 10 for the police? 11 A: Yes, sir. 12 Q: And something that the police should 13 be aware of going into a situation, correct? 14 A: Yes, sir. 15 Q: Okay. Do I also take it from your 16 evidence that with respect to this situation and the 17 resolution that was reached by Chief Miles Bressette at 18 the time, that you were concerned with his actions from 19 at least two (2) areas. 20 Firstly, his safety in reaching the inner 21 perimeter and approaching the house. 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: And secondly, putting the police in a 24 situation where there was potential that he could be 25 taken hostage?

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1 A: Yes. 2 Q: And that if he was taken hostage, if 3 he was close enough to the suspect in this case, if he 4 was taken hostage, that that could magnify the problem 5 that the police were then facing? 6 A: Certainly. 7 Q: Okay. And presumably part of that 8 debriefing that occurred afterwards at least reflected on 9 that potential? 10 A: My notes reflect that I have them in 11 there to have been discussed. And I would hope that we 12 did discuss them, yes. 13 Q: Okay. Now, if I can move ahead to 14 September 4, 6 timeframe. There's a notation in your 15 notes at Tab 5, the first page which -- it's P-1703, Mr. 16 Commissioner. And if my reading of your notes is 17 correct, in the time of 14:30 -- 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: -- about nine (9) or ten (10) lines 20 down in the course of your discussions with Inspector 21 Carson on the 30th of August, '95 there's a notation for 22 you that seems to say: 23 "No holds barred." 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: What does that relate to?

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1 A: That relates to my ability to set up 2 the logistics of having negotiators at the ready. What 3 he was suggesting to me, or at least the way I've noted 4 them, is to say that I shouldn't receive any 5 interference; that there is no holds barred to the 6 arrangements that I want to make and that full support of 7 personnel resources as required. 8 Q: You're going to get whatever you need 9 to set up whatever you need? 10 A: He told me what needed to be done and 11 he's telling me, Do what you need to to get it done, 12 there should be nothing to hold you back. 13 Q: Okay. And do I take it from your 14 earlier evidence today that that was, in part, in 15 relation to setting up something that could deal with a 16 crisis situation, but that that never actually unfolded? 17 A: That's correct. 18 Q: All right. I take it then, as 19 September 4th rolled around, you became quickly aware 20 that it was a protest, a political protest through the 21 occupation of the Park? 22 A: I think that would be accurate, yes. 23 Q: Okay. Not only from what you saw but 24 your discussions later that you've alluded to with the 25 members of the Kettle Point Band that you visited?

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1 A: Yes. 2 Q: Okay. At the outset, were you aware 3 of a peaceful occupation of a Provincial Park that had 4 ended that afternoon of September 4th, with the Serpent 5 Mounds Provincial Park? 6 A: I have no recollection of it. 7 Q: Okay. And if you had had a 8 recollection of a peaceful protest of that nature taking 9 place, I trust it would be in your notes because you 10 would have followed it up? 11 A: I would like to think I would have, 12 yes. 13 Q: Right. It would have been important? 14 A: I would think it would be. What 15 happened? How did that happen? How -- how was it 16 handled? 17 Q: And what was done right? 18 A: That's right. 19 Q: Okay. So I take it because it's not 20 in there, it's not in your recollection, there was no 21 discussion of any kind regarding this other occupation 22 that occurred that weekend? 23 A: Well, I wouldn't go so far as to say 24 there was no discussion, but it wasn't with me. 25 Q: Well, I just want to know --

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1 A: Yeah. Yeah. Nothing with me. 2 Q: -- from your recollection. Are you 3 aware of any training course that took place shortly 4 before this potential occupation that would have 5 addressed the issues you were dealing with on the West 6 Ipperwash? 7 Are you aware of any training of any kind? 8 A: That would address West Ipperwash? 9 Q: The issues that you've addressed with 10 West Ipperwash -- 11 A: Oh, I see. Yeah. 12 Q: A similar type of training? 13 A: No. No, there was no training. 14 Q: All right. When you were looking at 15 resources and personnel and otherwise, did you consider 16 locking out the phones that you referred to earlier; that 17 particular approach? 18 A: No. 19 Q: Okay. Did you consider setting up a 20 field telephone that would be available for the non face- 21 to-face type of negotiation? 22 A: If I can answer that by explaining 23 that when a critical incident such as that would occur, 24 in other words, if the criteria was met for the actual 25 activation of crisis negotiators, those sort of needs are

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1 -- are answered for us or -- or brought -- we're provided 2 help by our technical support branch. And so the -- the 3 Incident Commander would have made arrangements with our 4 technical support branch to provide such things. 5 And -- and I know, for example, in the 6 absence of a telephone service in the area, that tactical 7 teams are able to deliver a telephone to -- to a 8 subject's residence, and you end up with a land line 9 telephone that way. 10 So there are contingencies that are 11 available through our Technical Support Branch at the 12 time and the -- the Incident Commander would be aware of 13 that. 14 Q: It was possible but you don't know if 15 it was looked into? 16 A: But I don't know what was done about 17 it, no. 18 Q: All right. And I need to retrace 19 your steps a little bit -- 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: -- but I take it that the first 22 opportunity, in order to speak with somebody, was when 23 you went out with Mr. Kobayashi and Inspector -- 24 A: Mark Wright. 25 Q: -- Mark Wright?

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1 A: That was my first opportunity, yes. 2 Q: That was your first opportunity -- 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: -- and your efforts were to flag 5 somebody down to speak with you at the fence? 6 A: Collectively, yes. 7 Q: Collectively? 8 A: Yeah. 9 Q: All right. And that was more of an 10 ad hoc approach because it seems diametrically opposed to 11 your approach in a crisis negotiation? And I say that 12 actually approaching people and trying to get into a face 13 to face dialogue? 14 A: Oh, for sure, that -- that's not -- 15 that's not an option that, you know, given the criteria 16 for -- for crisis negotiation, that wouldn't be -- that 17 would be away down on the list of recommendations in a -- 18 in a, you know, a negotiation that's true to form. 19 Q: Okay. 20 A: But in this particular case a -- a 21 contact for the purpose of dialogue or introduction, it 22 was different. 23 Q: Okay. Did it dawn on you, at that 24 particular point in time, that you were attending with 25 Mr. Kobayashi, who had attended in the wee hours of the

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1 morning the night before in order to serve trespass 2 notice on the people, and Mark Wright who was the head of 3 Criminal Investigations for the region, did it dawn on 4 you that maybe those two (2) weren't the best people to 5 be approaching those in the Park? 6 A: I don't think it -- it occurred to 7 me. That would be the Incident Commander's call as to 8 who was going down there. 9 Q: I raise it just because your approach 10 seems to change after that point in time in that you then 11 attend at the Kettle Point Reserve to talk with elders 12 and others that may be able to assist you in reaching 13 people in the Park. 14 A: Okay. 15 Q: You don't recall if that factored 16 into your decision making? 17 A: It didn't factor into my decision 18 making, it might have factored into the Incident 19 Commander's decision making. 20 Q: All right. 21 A: I think -- 22 Q: Well, we won't get into that. 23 A: Okay. 24 Q: Just what you know. 25 A: Yeah.

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1 Q: And I take it, from your discussions, 2 you mentioned Earl George and Bob George, who we also 3 know as Knobby, that you started to get a good 4 appreciation of the background factors at work in this 5 particular situation? 6 A: Somewhat, yes. 7 Q: I -- I mention that in terms of the 8 Kettle Point versus Stoney Point distinction. They made 9 you aware of different approaches? Or do you recall? 10 A: I don't -- I don't recall that. I -- 11 I remember them -- they were unsure as to who was there. 12 They were not always accepting who was there, but I don't 13 -- I don't think I appreciated it at the time, in fact I 14 -- I'm telling you I didn't appreciate at the time there 15 was any rift happening there. 16 Q: Okay. 17 A: I didn't know. 18 Q: Okay. That didn't come out in those 19 discussions? 20 A: I don't believe so. 21 Q: But do I take it you became aware or 22 you started to become aware that it was more than a 23 simple issue; there were a lot of issues at work? 24 A: I think that's fair. 25 Q: Okay. And I take it that when you

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1 heard back the night of September 6th, that you'd made 2 some progress and you'd established some contact with a 3 fellow that you referred to as Judas? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: That you were going somewhere and the 6 next day you might be able to talk with them; is that 7 fair? 8 A: I believed we were making progress. 9 Q: Okay. Because in part of your 10 recommendations or your comments along the way you said 11 you were so close. 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: I trust what you meant was you were 14 so close to establishing contact as opposed to finding a 15 peaceful resolution to the matter? 16 A: Oh, a peaceful resolution was way 17 down the road for us. In my mind, I believed that we had 18 time. The -- the injunction was being sought, I had no 19 idea how long an injunction would take, if it would 20 happen at all, I -- I didn't know, but I believed that we 21 had plenty of time and we were working towards it. 22 Q: Right. 23 A: We tried a contact, another, another 24 and I'm agreeing with you that I was elated to think we 25 were starting to make headway here.

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1 Q: Right. A small amount of headway 2 towards something that was going to take perhaps a long 3 time to resolve? 4 A: Sure. 5 Q: All right. And I take it from your 6 usual approach to the issues that that was something that 7 not only could you live with but you kind of expected it 8 was going to take a while to resolve? 9 A: Oh, for sure. 10 Q: Okay. Now with respect to your 11 discussions with Inspector Carson the morning of 12 September 7th, if I can turn you to your notes, it's at 13 Tab 6. 14 Sorry, Mr. Commissioner, if I can back up 15 just a little bit. 16 You, in your notes, had detailed, I think 17 there was three (3) pages of notes about your discussions 18 with Earl George and Bob George. 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And all of the issues that you talked 21 about with those two (2) individuals. Do you remember 22 going through that this morning? 23 A: Yes, sir. 24 Q: There was reference that you were 25 also referred to by Mr. Worme in your examination-in-

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1 chief to a notation in the scribe notes at Tab 10, page 2 63. 3 A: Yes, sir. 4 Q: You see the third paragraph there? 5 A: Yes, sir. 6 Q: I take it when you came back and 7 briefed the Command Post on your discussions, that you 8 gave a detailed briefing as to your discussions with Earl 9 George, which included all the issues that you talked 10 about -- 11 MR. DONALD WORME: Earl Bressette. 12 13 CONTINUED BY MR. KEVIN SCULLION: 14 Q: Sorry, Earl Bressette -- and it would 15 have included all of the issues that you talked with Earl 16 Bressette? 17 A: I would hope it was, yes. 18 Q: All right. You see the scribe notes 19 simply make reference to you saying: 20 "There's no support coming from the 21 Reserve." 22 There's a note that Trevor Richardson 23 advised, told by Elders there is no 24 burial on that part of the land." 25 And Mark Wright:

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1 "Have Sergeant Seltzer check with John 2 Carson that a statement can be made 3 regarding this." 4 I take it that doesn't reflect your full 5 briefing that came back to the Command Post. 6 A: See if I'm following the times 7 correctly, that scribe note is prior to 14:47 hours. And 8 my notes on that day have me still at Bob George's house 9 at 15:00. 10 Q: So not even back -- 11 A: So I'm not even back yet. So that 12 note -- 13 Q: So your notes have you still meeting 14 with Earl Bressette, which presumably that meeting's 15 taking a number of hours. 16 A: Okay. I met with Inspector Carson at 17 14:40, so that scribe note is in reference to what I told 18 Carson at 14:40. And at 15:00 I go back to -- to Bob -- 19 to Bob George's. 20 Q: For your follow-up meeting. 21 A: Okay. I -- I'm with you now, yes. 22 Q: All right. I have them separated 23 out. 24 A: Yeah. 25 Q: You go to Earl Bressette's, you come

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1 back, you brief the Command Post then you go back out 2 again. 3 A: Then I go back to Bob's house, yes, 4 at 15:00, yeah. 5 Q: Okay. 6 A: Yeah. But I would -- 7 Q: I take it then you would agree that 8 this particular note in the scribe notes, does not 9 reflect the full conversation or the briefing that you 10 brought back to the Command Post from your discussions 11 with Earl Bressette? 12 A: That statement does not reflect what 13 I have, that's right, yeah. 14 Q: Now if I can just -- my last issue, 15 Mr. Commissioner, turn you to your notes, I had them 16 earlier, of your discussion with Inspector Carson the 17 morning of the 7th. 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 Q: Which is at Tab 10. 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 Q: I've got a little bit too much paper

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1 at the moment. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 Q: Nobody is coming to my rescue. So I 6 have Tab 6, page 97, 98 and 99. Do you have those before 7 you? Tab 6? 8 A: Tab 6, page 97, 98, yes. I'm looking 9 at 4:30 in the morning as one of the notations. 10 Q: And your discussion with Inspector 11 Carson, is that over the phone or is that in person? 12 A: At 04:30? 13 Q: Yes? 14 A: That was in person. 15 Q: And when I take a look -- it's your 16 practice to put down in print, as best you can, your 17 recollection of what you're being told; is that fair? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Okay. When I look at your summary of 20 what you're being told, there's a reference at the middle 21 of page 98, across from your card. If my reading of your 22 notes is correct, it says: 23 "Gunfire was heard and police members 24 saw handgun and rifle on the bus, 25 [bracket] (or out a window?) [question

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1 mark, off bracket]." 2 A: Right. 3 Q: That's what you're being told by 4 Inspector Carson? 5 A: That's right. 6 Q: And that's accurate at the time? 7 That's what you were told by Inspector Carson? 8 A: I believe it was. Yes. 9 Q: Okay. And they you say: 10 "Police..." 11 And maybe you can help me with the next -- 12 A: "... fired back in defence." 13 Q: And that's when you lose your 14 concentration and cross out whatever the note is -- 15 A: The note is: 16 "As the vehicles withdrew." 17 Q: So your reference to loss of 18 concentration is simply more detail? 19 A: Are you saying you require more 20 detail of that? 21 Q: No, I'm just trying to put it in 22 context as to why you have to the left: 23 "Loss of..." 24 A: Because I struck -- I struck that 25 line out:

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1 "As the vehicles withdrew." 2 Q: Okay. 3 A: And I don't -- I didn't, at the time, 4 understand why I did that. So I put in the margin, I was 5 starting to lose it, with just time and the facts; just 6 loss of concentration. Something distracted me perhaps 7 at the time and I wasn't comfortable with the fact that 8 I'd written that statement in there and then struck it 9 out again. I -- I didn't know why I did that. 10 Q: All right. I take it if Inspector 11 Carson had told you that somebody in the car and somebody 12 at the bus had shot at police, you would have recalled 13 that and put it in your notes? 14 A: If he had said that in so many 15 words -- 16 Q: You would have put that in your 17 notes? 18 A: I would think so, yes. 19 Q: Right. And so I take it then that 20 the wording that you've used, where "gunfire is heard" 21 and reference to someone seeing a handgun or a rifle on 22 the bus, is the words that were used by Inspector Carson 23 in your discussion? 24 A: I would agree with you, otherwise I 25 would have no reason to put that in there.

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1 Q: Okay. And then on the page before, 2 which is page 97 of your notes, and at the 04:30 3 timeframe there's a reference -- perhaps you can just 4 read it for me, the first seven (7) lines of your note? 5 A: At 04:30: 6 "Briefed by Inspector Carson. 7 Expressed Babbitt's last evening." 8 Oh, briefed by Inspector Carson and there 9 was a -- a media release, I guess, the night before, or 10 sometime by -- by Sergeant Babbitt, so I'm just drawing a 11 line to -- from Babbitt to the media -- 12 Q: Okay. 13 A: -- release saying that there was some 14 consistency there. 15 Q: All right. 16 A: So I'll go on to say that: 17 "Last evening approximately 20:00 hours 18 a council member from Kettle Point was 19 en route along the curve area of Army 20 Camp Road at the beach access alongside 21 the Park boundary. His or her [I 22 didn't know] car was damaged by 23 militants and a complaint was lodged. 24 Concern for persons using the roadway 25 and living in the area resulted in

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1 crowd squad ERT members, suited for 2 safety, being sent to the area to 3 contain Natives inside the fence line, 4 not allowing them to spill into the 5 adjacent parking area and roadway." 6 Q: Okay. The area of concern for me is 7 that the wording, A council member for Kettle Point, was 8 used by Inspector Carson when describing to you the 9 incident that occurred here. 10 A: I believe so. 11 Q: Well, that's why you would have put 12 it in -- 13 A: That's right. That's why -- that's 14 why I put it in there, yes. 15 Q: Thank you, Mr. Seltzer. 16 Those are my questions, Mr. Commissioner.. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 18 very much. 19 Mr. George...? 20 MR. JONATHAN GEORGE: Commissioner, given 21 previous examinations I don't have any questions. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 23 very much, Mr. George. 24 Yes...? 25 MS. KAREN JONES: Mr. Commissioner, given

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1 that I understand we're going to be at least another 2 hour, I wonder if we could have a five (5) minute break? 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think 4 that's a good idea. 5 MS. KAREN JONES: Thank you very much. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We'll take a 7 short break now. 8 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 9 for five (5) minutes. 10 11 --- Upon recessing at 4:06 p.m. 12 --- Upon resuming at 4:15 p.m. 13 14 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 15 resumed. Please be seated. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 20 Q: Mr. Seltzer, my name is Julian 21 Falconer, I act for Aboriginal Legal Services of 22 Toronto. 23 A: Good afternoon, sir. 24 Q: Good afternoon. Mr. Seltzer, do you 25 have your written statement that you read to Mr. Worme at

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1 the end of your evidence? Do you have it there? 2 A: Oh, yes, my pre-prepared...? 3 Q: Yes. 4 A: Yes, sir. 5 Q: May I see that, please? If I could 6 get the assistance of Mr. Registrar? 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 Q: Thank you. I just need a brief 11 indulgence. It's short, Mr. Commissioner. 12 13 (BRIEF PAUSE) 14 15 Q: In your written statement you stated 16 first of all, among other things, quote: 17 "I experienced a heartfelt 18 disappointment that the goal we had as 19 a group would not be achieved. It was 20 a tragedy beyond expectation." 21 And I take it you're speaking personally 22 for yourself? 23 A: That's my thoughts, my feelings. 24 Q: All right. You go on to say in 25 respect of the service though:

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1 "A citizen had died. Police personnel 2 experienced -- had experienced a life 3 threatening environment. SIU was or 4 would be on scene interviewing some. A 5 psychologist and trauma counsellors 6 were interviewing others. 7 Morale was shattered by the events and 8 our hope of communication contact was 9 gone." 10 So when you spoke to morale, you were 11 speaking, I take it, to more than just yourself? You 12 were speaking about other officers? 13 A: Yes, sir. 14 Q: And I take it it's -- the view you 15 were seeking to express through this statement is that it 16 was your experience and -- and remains your view today, 17 that not only you but the officers you were involved 18 with, all found this to be a tragedy, as you put it, 19 beyond expectation, right? 20 That was what you meant to convey by this. 21 A: It was certainly my feelings as to 22 what was going on. 23 Q: Right. 24 A: Yeah. 25 Q: But I'm now speaking to you speaking

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1 on behalf of other officers, which is what you do in this 2 statement. You don't simply speak to what you felt. You 3 said that: 4 "Morale was shattered by the events." 5 A: That was my perception. 6 Q: Of other officers, yes? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And -- and you meant to convey that 9 other officers experienced this notion of heartfelt 10 disappointment and notion of tragedy, correct? 11 A: Okay. 12 Q: Is that right? 13 A: Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 14 Q: Okay. Thank you. If that could be 15 handed back to the Witness please. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 Q: Now I notice from your curriculum 20 vitae, and I apologize for not having an exhibit number. 21 Mr. Worme, no doubt, after talking to Mr. Millar will 22 help me. 23 But in respect of your curriculum vitae 24 that's at Tab 1, you have numerous teaching posts; is 25 that right?

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1 A: Yes, sir. 2 MR. DONALD WORME: P-1701. 3 Q: It's Exhibit P-1701. I'm grateful to 4 Mr. Worme for that. 5 6 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 7 Q: And it's fair to say that you have 8 really directed your career to a teaching role; is that 9 right? 10 A: For the most part, yes, sir. 11 Q: My information is that the pin that 12 you purchased, among others, that is, you, among others, 13 purchased, that that pin supporting Ken Deane was 14 distributed to recruits in the year 2000 at the Orillia 15 Academy. 16 Did you know that? 17 A: No, sir. 18 Q: May I ask you something? 19 Hypothetically, if that is indeed accurate, would you 20 agree with me that it's somewhat problematic to seek the 21 support or brand spanking new recruits in respect of a 22 police officer who's been convicted in the death of a 23 First Nations person who was found by the judge to be 24 unarmed, that it's somewhat problematic to -- to have the 25 recruits faced with that decision of purchasing a pin to

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1 defend the officer? 2 A: I don't know in what context the pin 3 was explained to them, sir. 4 Q: Fair enough. Let's deal with the 5 context that was explained to you. You -- you bought the 6 pin. 7 A: Yes, sir. 8 Q: Okay. What was the context that was 9 explained to you? 10 A: That there was an appeal process that 11 was requiring financial assistance; simple as that. 12 Q: Fair enough. Let's assume for a 13 moment that that same context was explained to the 14 recruits. Do you see a problem in distributing a pin of 15 that nature, in the circumstances as I indicated in my 16 previous question to you, of an officer who has been 17 convicted in respect of a death of a First Nations person 18 who was found to be unarmed? 19 Do you see a problem in distributing 20 something like that to recruits? 21 A: I'm looking at it from a contextual 22 point, that if it was explained it was a financial 23 assistance to the Member, everybody's entitled to an 24 appeal. And if the financial assistance was required to 25 help that appeal, then I -- I guess I don't see a problem

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1 with that. 2 Q: Fair enough. Does it enter your mind 3 in answering my question at all, about your experience 4 with brand spanking new graduates or recruits and how 5 impressionable they are? 6 Does that enter the equation when you 7 consider my question? 8 A: I was thinking about it for that 9 reason, yes. 10 Q: Does it enter your mind that people 11 in that position are anxious to please those far more 12 experienced in the roles they seek to attain? Does that 13 enter your mind? 14 A: Yes, sir. 15 Q: And yet, notwithstanding those 16 considerations, you think it would still be appropriate? 17 A: Again, as I say, depending on how 18 much was explained to them. I mean we're talking about 19 people that are in their mid 20's, old enough to 20 understand, if things are explained to them properly. 21 And I have no idea how it was explained to them, sir. 22 Q: Well, you -- you kind of shifted, 23 because in the hypothetical I asked you to assume the 24 same explanation to them as was provided to you; fair 25 enough?

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1 A: Okay. I hear you, yeah. 2 Q: Now you know what was explained to 3 them. You still maintain that was appropriate? 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 A: Probably not, given that there's not 8 enough explanation with it. 9 Q: Thank you. Now, you received the T- 10 shirt and the mug as memorabilia, and you were asked by 11 Ms. Esmonde what precisely caused you to destroy it, and 12 I think you said you, Didn't need memorabilia of a 13 tragedy like that; do you remember saying that? 14 A: Words to that effect. 15 Q: All right. Was there any pressure on 16 you to accept the T-shirt and the mug in the first place? 17 A: No. 18 Q: Would you agree with me that if you 19 were the person you've depicted in your statement, the 20 person who was suffering from the most tragic event that 21 you had experienced as a professional, you would have 22 been experiencing that tragedy as of September 7th, 1995 23 when you found out, yes? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And yet the person you depicted as

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1 experiencing this tragedy, chose to accept the 2 memorabilia that you then went and pointed out in cross- 3 examination you wouldn't keep; you wouldn't need 4 memorabilia like that. 5 Could you explain that please? 6 A: At the time it was given to me I 7 didn't even examine it. 8 Q: Sorry? 9 A: At the time that it was given to me I 10 did not even examine it. 11 Q: I see. 12 A: I was leaving the Command Post. I 13 was packed up to go home. I wanted to go home. Somebody 14 gave me something. I took it. I took it home. I looked 15 at it at home and destroyed it. 16 Q: And would you agree with me that the 17 implication, by your evidence previously, is you 18 destroyed it when you found out it had become a 19 controversial issue? 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, I don't 21 think that was his evidence, Mr. Falconer. 22 THE WITNESS: I didn't say that. 23 MS. KAREN JONES: That's not remotely 24 what he said, Mr. Commissioner. 25 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: All right. Let

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1 me -- 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, that's 3 fine, Ms. Jones. I don't think that's the way he put it. 4 5 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 6 Q: So that wasn't the case? 7 A: That's not the case. 8 Q: All right. How soon after you 9 received the memorabilia did you destroy it? 10 A: I can't tell you in days or weeks. 11 What I'm saying, very quickly upon returning home. 12 Q: All right. And would you agree with 13 me that when presented with the items, you knew you were 14 receiving a mug in reference to the incident? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: Would you agree with me that in 17 receiving the T-shirt, you knew you were receiving a T- 18 shirt in reference to the incident? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: Could -- I ask that Exhibit P, I 21 believe it's 1494, which is a picture of the anvil logo, 22 be placed on the screen? You didn't receive a copy of 23 this T-shirt, correct? 24 A: No, sir. I did not. 25 Q: All right. You'd agree with me that

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1 you're a police officer capable of recognizing the words 2 Project Maple '95? 3 A: I understand that, yes. 4 Q: Right? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And you recognize the TRU symbol? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And you recognize the symbol for the 9 Emergency Response Team, correct? 10 A: I recognize the initials, E-R-T. 11 ERT. 12 Q: Yes. 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And you recognize the broken arrow, 15 broken by the TRU symbol, yes? 16 A: I see that. Yes. I recognize it. 17 Q: Okay. Just looking at the logo, as a 18 police officer involved in the incident and as a person 19 using your commonsense, you'd agree with me that it 20 appears on the face of the logo that the TRU symbol is 21 being used to break an arrow over an ERT anvil, agreed? 22 A: That's what it appears, yes. 23 Q: If you had been presented that T- 24 shirt you would be offended at the time, if it had -- if 25 you'd been presented with it?

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1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 A: I don't know in the context that that 4 logo was made up. I -- 5 Q: Fair enough. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I take it 7 he's never seen it before? 8 THE WITNESS: I've never -- I'm not 9 familiar -- 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I take it 11 he's never seen it before? 12 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Fair enough. 13 14 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 15 Q: And I'm asking you questions based on 16 you seeing it now. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, I'm 18 taking it that he's looking at it for the first time. 19 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Fair enough. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: So I'll have 21 to take his answers in that context. 22 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: And I -- I thank 23 you for that. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 25

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1 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 2 Q: And, Officer, having said that, if it 3 was presented as a T-shirt just like the T-shirt you 4 received, memorabilia from the incident, following the 5 incident, right? That's the context, period. 6 A: Okay. 7 Q: I'm asking you if you had received 8 the T-shirt at the time you would have been offended by 9 it and not accepted it, correct? 10 A: I don't know whether I -- I wouldn't 11 have accepted it because of what it shows there or just 12 the fact that I don't want that kind of stuff. 13 Q: Well -- 14 A: I don't -- I don't want it. 15 Q: The reason I ask you that is that you 16 made a comment in your statement about the tragedy 17 experienced by your fellow officers -- a brief 18 indulgence. 19 20 (BRIEF PAUSE) 21 22 Q: You've made a comment about the 23 tragedy suffered by your fellow officers. You'd agree 24 with me that Sam George might be forgiven for not 25 thinking that the persons wearing or receiving the T-

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1 shirts showing TRU breaking an arrow over an ERT anvil, 2 Sam George might be forgiven for thinking that those 3 people who received that T-shirt didn't feel the tragedy 4 you felt? 5 You -- you'd agree with me that you'd 6 forgive Sam George for thinking that? 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 A: Given the full details of the event 11 as I know them I would agree. 12 Q: Now, again on this premise of the 13 tragedy being suffered by your fellow officers I'm having 14 Exhibit P-1351 placed in front of you. 15 Exhibit P-1361 is a taped conversation 16 dated September 7th, 1995, between Staff Sergeant at the 17 time, Wade Lacroix, and Sergeant Brian Deevy who was 18 taking over the TRU shift following the TRU shift of 19 September 6th, 1995, all right? Do you have it in front 20 of you? 21 A: I have it, yes. 22 Q: Now, I'm going to ask Mr. Registrar 23 to provide a copy to Mr. Commissioner though I know he's 24 more than knowledgeable as to the contents of P-1361. 25 I want to direct your attention -- now,

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1 you know that Wade Lacroix was a key figure in the 2 enforcement action against the occupiers on the night of 3 September 6th, 1995? He led the CMU team, you know that? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: All right. Now, I just want to share 6 some words that were recorded the following day, being 7 18:45 hours, less than twenty-four (24) hours after the 8 tragedy, all right? 9 And then I want to ask you if you 10 experienced that level of sincere concern when you talked 11 to your fellow officers. Page 7, of the Exhibit P-1361 12 if you could turn to it, please? 13 A: I have page 7. 14 Q: Thank you. Now, you'll take my word 15 for it because believe people will get up if I'm not 16 giving it to you straight, but halfway down: 17 "B.D.: No problem. How are you 18 doing?" 19 Do you see that halfway down, "how are you 20 doing?" 21 A: Yes, yes. 22 Q: And that's Brian Deevy. Then Wade 23 Lacroix: 24 "I'm doing all right. 25 BRIAN DEEVY: How'd it go? Everything

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1 okay? 2 WADE LACROIX: I think it went -- under 3 the circumstances, ah it couldn't -- it 4 could I mean -- 5 B.D.: Sounds like a -- 6 -- the political side. It couldn't 7 have been better. 8 BRIAN DEEVY: I think you're right. 9 WADE LACROIX: Hmm hmm. 10 BRIAN DEEVY: I think we're getting 11 beat up in the press Big Time. I think 12 we could have handled the press a 13 little better there, personally. 14 WADE LACROIX: I was out there man and 15 boys -- both down in TRU and the CMU, 16 like it was very professional. 17 BRIAN DEEVY: Yeah. 18 We took a barrage of rocks. We 19 repulsed a full attack about fifteen 20 (15) -- twenty (20) with clubs. A guy 21 broke my shield right in half with a 22 steel pole. I cold-cocked him. 23 BRIAN DEEVY: Good. 24 WADE LACROIX: You boys, we hammered - 25 - we hammered 'em, like we cut them

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1 down, like with the sticks. 2 BRIAN DEEVY: Good. 3 WADE LACROIX: And then I guess we 4 finally realized we got their leader. 5 They're a little choked then. 6 WADE LACROIX: I think they were 7 setting us up. 8 WADE LACROIX: They wanted it, they 9 wanted it. 10 BRIAN DEEVY: Sure, they did. This -- 11 them, I'm sure they're all wailing and 12 everything but this is the best thing 13 as far as they're concerned that could 14 ever happen. They've taken the 15 limelight away from 100 Mile House 16 squarely on Ipperwash. One (1) of the 17 guys was saying that his mother-in-law 18 in Florida, it's front page news in 19 Florida. It's big news everywhere. 20 It's what they want but -- 21 WADE LACROIX: One (1) of the TRU guys 22 stepped in and you know they were going 23 to mow us down and we had to take them 24 out. We took out Dudley George who's a 25 jerk."

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1 Is that the tragedy that you were talking 2 about officers experiencing? Is that the kind of 3 sentiment or -- or tragedy that you heard about at the 4 time and that you were trying to convey to the 5 Commissioner about your fellow officers -- 6 A: No, sir. 7 Q: -- that kind of sentiment? 8 A: No, sir. 9 Q: You'd agree with me that from Sam 10 George's perspective putting yourself in his shoes, he 11 should be offended by those kinds of words within 24 12 hours of the death of his brother? You'd agree with 13 that? 14 A: These words? 15 Q: Yes. 16 A: Yes, sir. 17 Q: And you'd also agree with me that you 18 didn't mean to include an officer who uttered those words 19 when you talked about experiencing the tragedy, correct? 20 A: I didn't know these words existed. 21 Q: And you didn't mean to include an 22 officer who uttered those words, correct? 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25

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1 A: Yes, sir. 2 Q: If Mr. Registrar could get P-1361 3 back from the Witness, that will mean my obligation to 4 the Registrar is completed on that exhibit, Mr. 5 Commissioner. 6 I received a number of exhibits this 7 afternoon and I'm particular paranoid. The Registrar 8 makes me quite fearful about keeping exhibits. 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 Q: Your notes to yourself in and around 13 the area of September 3rd, 4th and 5th of 1995, am I 14 right to some extent, they're a perfect example of an 15 officer making notes to himself about what he's learning 16 about a community? 17 I -- I'm talking about the things about 18 not lying, their regard for females -- 19 A: Oh, I -- 20 Q: -- that kind of things. I'm not -- I 21 could take it each line but I'm trying to -- 22 A: I understand. 23 Q: It's fair that you're sort of 24 reflecting what you're learning as you go in terms of the 25 community?

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1 A: I am and I'm making notes because I 2 don't know of what reference they'll ever be -- 3 Q: Fair enough. 4 A: -- to me. 5 Q: And you're trying to do your job in 6 the sense of you're -- you're gathering data and it's not 7 nice to call things data, but it's data. 8 You're gathering data because it might be 9 useful to you as a negotiator later on. 10 A: It would -- I'm gathering -- I'm 11 making note of the data because it helps me to understand 12 the -- the culture of things that we're talking about. 13 Q: Now -- 14 A: Things that I might otherwise forget 15 and would want to look back at it. 16 Q: And I want to emphasize that the last 17 thing I would be is critical of that, so we're clear. 18 A: Okay. 19 Q: All right. But I would concede I'll 20 probably be critical about other things. So -- but on 21 that issue the -- the fact that you are so careful to 22 note things down as you go, it's impressive in terms of 23 those aspects of the community. 24 And you obviously weren't going to note 25 everything you knew from years before, you were noting

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1 what you were learning in and around that time from 2 different people, right? 3 A: My notebook became almost like a 4 workbook. 5 Q: Fair enough. And so -- and thus to 6 some extent, Mr. Commissioner, gets sort of a -- an eye 7 and a window into your learning curve; is that fair? 8 A: I think it's a fair statement. 9 Q: All right. And -- and I want you to 10 understand something for example, me, I -- I'm on a huge 11 learning curve when it came to Aboriginal issues. I 12 didn't do that much work before Ipperwash, all right? So 13 I respect the learning curve, all right? 14 A: Okay. 15 Q: But I want to ask you this: You knew 16 as of September 1st, 1995 that there was going to be in 17 the minds of the Incident Commander an occupation? 18 You would have known that as of September 19 1, 1995, correct? And it's only a few days before but -- 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: -- that would have been the sort of a 22 key moment as reflected in Tab 7, Exhibit P-421, the 23 meeting of September 1, 1995 where you're formally 24 organized into different units to cope with an impending 25 occupation of Ipperwash Provincial Park, right?

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1 A: Yes, sir. 2 Q: And with that knowledge, can you tell 3 me, looking at your notebook or anything else, what unit 4 you had put together -- what unit you had put together as 5 of September 1, 1995 to be the negotiating team? 6 Because this speaks to a high level of 7 organization, and when I say "this" I'm talking about 8 Exhibit P-421 that each unit leader is to come back with 9 their plans during the course of the meeting and I was 10 just curious, it may be there or it may have happened 11 later and that's what I want to understand. 12 When do you devise your negotiation teams? 13 A: Later after the 1st. I -- I -- now 14 on the 31st, the day of the workshop, I heard from the 15 negotiators that I had contact with and there was some 16 phone calls that I made to others just to see what their 17 availability was going to be. 18 Q: Okay so that -- that's what I was 19 interested in, is later; it's post September 1, 1995? 20 A: That's right. 21 Q: Right. And then if we turn to Tab 8 22 which is Exhibit P-424, what we see is a reference to 23 your negotiator team, Sergeant Seltzer, at page 3 of the 24 -- of the plan, if I count the cover page, P-424. Page 3 25 you see on the chart just "negotiator team Sergeant

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1 Seltzer" with no detail, correct? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: But if you flip to page... 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 Q: If you flip to page, and I don't see 8 a page number on it, a document called, Response Plan -- 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: -- right in the middle. 11 Do you know where that is? Do you want to 12 flip through and find it? There's no page numbers on 13 this. 14 A: I have a page 10 on mine. 15 Q: All right. I don't have that 16 reflected on my copy so page 10 is "Response Plan?" 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: Now, "Response Plan" now has 19 individuals named, correct? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: And I notice that's -- you're 22 referring to Eve and so on. Can you assist me, when 23 would you have made that decision to have these 24 individuals as part of your team or teams? 25 A: After the 1st.

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1 Q: But before -- are you able to help me 2 with a range? 3 A: The time we had to respond, and I 4 don't recall exactly when that was, there was a time that 5 we had to respond with our plans so that the Project 6 Maple books were available. Certainly my copy was 7 available to me when I arrived at Forest Detachment the 8 night of the 4th. 9 So sometime between the 1st and the 4th it 10 was necessary for us to put our plan together and respond 11 to the Incident Commander or whoever his delegate was 12 that was receiving the information. 13 Q: All right. Now, under Team 1, Team 2 14 and Team 3, the leader of each team respectively is Eve, 15 then Dowell, then Bembridge, correct? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: But we hear a lot about Eve, but not 18 much about Dowell or Bembridge, in terms of your evidence 19 previously; is that fair? 20 A: That's right. 21 Q: And I take it, Sergeant Marg Eve, she 22 would have been sort of your first line primary 23 negotiator? 24 A: That's right. 25 Q: Right. And what was --

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1 A: Well, let me rephrase that for you. 2 She was -- the primary on her team was Martin, but Eve 3 was the team leader for that first group, that Team 1. 4 Q: And what was it about her that made 5 her the primary -- I apologize. 6 A: The team leader. 7 Q: What was it that made her the, sort 8 of, go to leader? I say that because if you look 9 relative, Dowell and Bembridge, they're not mentioned 10 much by you in your evidence; that's why I'm asking. 11 What was it about Margaret Eve that made her stand out, 12 in your mind? 13 I know one of the things, for example, you 14 mentioned, a female. Were Dowell or Bembridge females? 15 A: No. 16 Q: All right. But maybe you have other 17 things that -- that made Sergeant Eve a primary 18 candidate, not a primary negotiator? 19 A: I wish I could help you with my 20 thought process as I put the teams together. It may have 21 been based on availability, I'm not exactly sure. 22 Q: What -- 23 A: Certainly my reference to Eve is more 24 frequent given that she was on the first team. And when 25 we activated the team leaders to come in, Eve was the

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1 first one to come in, for several reasons. 2 One, because she was on the first team and 3 there was a time period, you know, following up on the 4 6th -- the 5th, when I was advised to have her there for 5 the 6th, because we were going to try again to make 6 contact and we wanted a female police officer to help us 7 with that. 8 Q: So as you sit here today, other than 9 knowing that she -- that she lands as Team 1, and 10 secondly that she's a female, you're not able to assist 11 us with what about Margaret Eve made her the appropriate 12 person to, sort of, be the -- the -- the leader? 13 A: Well I can certainly speak to her 14 ability; she was experienced, she was knowledgeable about 15 negotiation and I had worked with her many times. 16 Q: And is that the -- 17 A: So I knew -- 18 Q: -- same for Dowell and Bembridge? 19 A: And for Dowell and Bembridge as well. 20 So now it may have been a matter of availability -- 21 Q: Okay. 22 A: -- as to why Eve was on the first 23 team and not the second team. 24 Q: Of Eve, Dowell or Bembridge, the 25 three (3) leaders you have, did any of them, as you sit

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1 here today recalling, have any particular expertise in 2 issues Aboriginal in nature? 3 A: I don't know of any other than I know 4 that Margaret worked at Sombra Detachment and Sombra 5 Detachment responds to incidents and occurrences at 6 Walpole Island. So she's familiar with -- she would have 7 been familiar with policing First Nation communities. 8 Q: Did she work as a negotiator with 9 Walpole Island? 10 11 (BRIEF PAUSE) 12 13 A: My mind right now is racing to think 14 of what calls -- I -- I had a lot of experience working 15 with both Marg and Dave Dowell and I'm trying to answer 16 your question by running through my mind was I ever at 17 Walpole with Marg and I -- and I don't recall that. 18 Q: Nothing comes to mind? 19 A: Nothing comes to mind. 20 Q: And -- and this is only to ask you 21 for this reason. The very learning curve you were on on 22 those days might have been learning curves that also 23 Margaret Eve or Officer Dowell or Officer Bembridge would 24 also need to be on; is that fair? 25 A: I would think so.

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1 Q: All right. So no matter which of the 2 leaders we pick Brad Seltzer, Margaret Eve, Officer 3 Dowell, or Officer Bembridge each one (1) of you in your 4 mind would have been on a pretty steep learning curve 5 when it came to issues of First Nations concern, correct? 6 A: I would agree with you, sir, and 7 that's why some time today earlier we discussed -- there 8 was a -- a question that came out of one (1) of our 9 meetings to say do we have the appropriate people here? 10 Is there anybody else that we're missing? We were trying 11 to make sure that we had the right people doing the right 12 job. 13 Q: Now, is it possible looking at the 14 response plan under the name, first of all Martin, is 15 that a Chris Martin? 16 A: No, that's Bob Martin. 17 Q: Fair enough. And Warole? 18 A: Wardle. 19 Q: It's Wardle, eh, so the "O" should be 20 a "D"? 21 A: Right. The "O" should be a "D" and 22 that's why I can respond to you by saying that I didn't 23 do this document because I'm familiar with the spelling 24 of those names. 25 Q: Fair enough.

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1 A: Both he and Robertson are spelled 2 wrong. 3 Q: All right. Now, would you agree with 4 me that one (1) of the reasons you're quite careful about 5 distinguishing between what I'm going to describe as 6 crisis negotiation and this looser form of negotiation. 7 And one (1) of the reasons for 8 distinguishing between them is that it is absolutely 9 crucial for law enforcement in critical incidents to 10 understand their roles and what is expected of them; that 11 it's crucial. 12 Would you agree with that? 13 A: I would agree. 14 Q: And so for example the loose 15 negotiation that you speak of today, you draw quite a 16 sharp contrast between that. You call it facilitation. 17 You call it a number of -- dialogue. 18 A: Okay. 19 Q: That's one (1) kind of negotiation 20 according to you today and then there's this critical 21 incident negotiation and that's -- there's a world of 22 difference between the two (2), fair? 23 A: In terms of its structure, yes. 24 Q: Right. 25 A: Yeah.

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1 Q: And you -- and it is essential for an 2 officer discharging their duties that they know whether - 3 - which one is expected of them. 4 Would you agree? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Looking at the September 1st document 7 that's a reflection of the various exchanges between the 8 parties, that is the planning, I can't find any reference 9 to this distinction between this broad form of 10 negotiation, let's call it facilitation or the critical 11 incident negotiation, the more formal kind. 12 I don't see you referring to this 13 distinction or bringing the distinction to the Incident 14 Commander's attention -- 15 A: No. 16 Q: -- do you agree? 17 A: That's right. 18 Q: And then secondly looking at the 19 Project Maple document that is P-424 at Tab 8 again I see 20 no distinction between this broad form of negotiation or 21 dialogue and the formal critical incident negotiation; do 22 you agree? 23 A: That's right. 24 Q: And then looking at the scribe note 25 passages reproduced at Tab 10 and other scribe note

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1 passages but in particular the ones brought to your 2 attention by Mr. Worme where you're actually recorded as 3 saying different things to Incident Command September 4th 4 through September 6th, 1995, I cannot find one (1) 5 example of where you draw a distinction between this 6 broad form of negotiation and dialogue and critical 7 incident negotiation where you say to the Incident 8 Commander or bring to his attention the distinction. 9 Do you agree? 10 A: Verbally I did not make the 11 distinction. 12 Q: Thank you. 13 A: I can assure you that it wasn't 14 necessary. 15 Q: All right. I'm going to break that 16 down, just let me catch up to you. 17 A: Okay. 18 Q: Verbally you did not make the 19 distinction; that's what you said? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: And then you went on to say to me 22 just now but you can assure me that it was not necessary, 23 correct? 24 A: To make the distinction, yes. 25 Q: Fair enough. Now, I -- I take it

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1 what you're trying to tell me is that from the point of 2 view of the Incident Commander Carson you were very 3 comfortable that he understood the distinction? 4 A: Oh, yes. 5 Q: And that would be because you 6 discussed the distinction with him in the past? 7 A: Relative to this? 8 Q: Yes. 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: You did? When did you discuss the 11 distinction between this broad form of negotiation and 12 critical incident negotiation? 13 When would you have had that discussion 14 with him? 15 A: I think the -- the broader sense of 16 negotiation and as I say I think the -- the problem is 17 that we overuse that word. 18 Q: No, but I'm focussing on when you 19 brought the distinction -- 20 A: Okay. 21 Q: -- to his attention; that's what I'm 22 focussing on, please, sir? 23 A: In our first meeting -- 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just a 25 minute. Just a minute.

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1 Yes, Ms. Jones...? Do you just want to 2 make room for her, please. 3 MS. KAREN JONES: My point, Mr. 4 Commissioner, is this Witness ought to be able to answer 5 the question without being cut off. 6 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well, that's fair 7 enough. Sometimes a questioner as a courtesy more than 8 anything tries to bring the Witness back to make sure 9 we're talking about the same thing. That's all I'm 10 doing. I'm not trying to cut you off. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 12 13 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 14 Q: But I'm asking you to direct your 15 mind to when you would have brought it to his attention 16 if you could. And please continue. 17 A: The Incident Commander, Inspector 18 Carson, on the 30th of August when he and I attended the 19 Ontario Police College, told me then that my function was 20 to put together logistically teams of crisis negotiators. 21 He was a crisis negotiator. He was a team leader for 22 crisis negotiation. 23 He knew and I knew exactly what he was 24 talking about. In an earlier time I'm saying he was. So 25 he knew exactly and I knew exactly what he was talking

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1 about. 2 That should the criteria to activate a 3 crisis negotiation team come up within the Ipperwash 4 occurrence, it was my responsibility to ensure that the 5 teams were set up, free from other duties with their 6 supervisors, and able to respond. 7 So there was never any doubt from the word 8 'go' when the Incident Commander directed me to put the 9 teams together that we were talking about the crisis 10 negotiation teams as I defined them. 11 Q: Now -- 12 A: The other form of negotiation to use 13 your words 'loose negotiation' which I'm saying is more 14 of a -- of a dialogue, that sort of grew from my presence 15 in the Command Post starting on the 4th to the fact that 16 I was there and we were trying to establish contact. 17 Not -- not that I wasn't being used 18 otherwise, but I was directed by the Incident Commander 19 to attend with two (2) other officers and try to make 20 contact. From there it grew. 21 Q: So when you say it grew, I take it 22 your evidence is the distinction only became apparent 23 over the course of the incident from September 4th 24 through to September 7th, 1995? 25 A: It became apparent then although back

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1 on September the 1st when we were planning, there was not 2 a confusion to me, but I certainly understood that there 3 may be a liaison that I would have to make come my 4 attendance to the -- to the occurrence. 5 And that liaison would be the -- the 6 contact. To find out who's there. In other words we 7 wouldn't be activating crisis negotiators unless the 8 criteria fit. 9 However, and that's the reason why I was 10 to contact Lorne Smith as well, was to -- to have him 11 help us to try to establish a contact through the 12 community or somehow with the occupiers. 13 Q: Now the reason you told the 14 Commissioner just now that you took this comfort in John 15 Carson's knowledge, was in part to explain why you didn't 16 actually ever expressly discuss the distinction between 17 the broad form of negotiation and the formal one, 18 correct? 19 I mean I've asked you when did you discuss 20 the distinction and to be fair to me, you still have yet 21 to actually tell me that you did. 22 And so I'm just asking, is it fair to say 23 you worked on a series of assumptions and therefore never 24 discussed that distinction with John Carson, isn't that 25 true?

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1 A: I want to answer your question yes, 2 because it sounds logical to me. 3 Q: All right. Now the next issue that 4 I'm interested in is, is it fair to say that a critical 5 incident negotiator such as Marg Eve, her very essence, 6 her very credibility depends on the person she's 7 negotiating with perceiving her as neutral in a sense, is 8 that fair? 9 A: Would that be the same as receiving 10 somebody that they can trust? 11 Q: Yes. 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And part of -- part of the trust that 14 developed, you talked about it. I don't even want to 15 know too much about -- about this person from my people. 16 I don't want to lie to anybody and tell 17 them I know -- I don't know stuff about you, I want to 18 learn from them. I want to build a relationship. 19 It's about building bridges, correct? 20 A: In the conversation that you would 21 have as a crisis negotiator. 22 Q: Right. And that was what you 23 anticipated the team -- the leader Marg Eve, to be 24 involved in that's why you had her front and centre, 25 fair?

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1 A: I hope we're not getting confused 2 here as to when that was. 3 Q: No. That would have been in and 4 around September 4th through 6th, 1995 -- 5 A: Okay. 6 Q: -- is that not true? 7 A: The time period of the 4th through 8 the 6th when Marg was utilized as a contact person to 9 establish dialogue it was chosen -- she was chosen by the 10 Incident Commander to be there. 11 Q: But it was under your supervision? 12 That was your -- she was a part of your team? 13 A: Yeah. 14 Q: And you made her that front person 15 because of her skills and because she was, basically, the 16 first line? 17 A: Okay. Yeah, I hear you. 18 Q: All right. And you expected her to 19 be able to foster a certain element of trust over the 20 course of any crisis negotiations she had to engage in; 21 correct? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: All right. And you've written part 24 of your learning curve in terms of dealing with First 25 Nations persons, don't lie; right?

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1 A: Yes. 2 Q: You wrote that? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: And -- and you knew that even though 5 it's a standard of human dynamics that it's a bad thing 6 to lie, the point is, persons of First Nations background 7 particularly rely on a person for their word; right? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: And that deception is basically the 10 antithesis to trust for them, correct? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: All right. You also knew that it was 13 essential that the person you used on that front line for 14 negotiations have some arm's length relationship; that is 15 you don't want them as the tactical enforcement officer 16 at the same time they're building the bridges, do you? 17 A: No. They can't have a dual role. 18 No. 19 Q: Sorry. 20 A: They wouldn't have a dual role there; 21 you're right. 22 Q: No. Because you're critical incident 23 negotiator can't be the person marching on the officers - 24 - on the -- on the occupiers, right? That doesn't work? 25 A: Right.

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1 Q: Right. Could you look at Exhibit P- 2 131 and confirm for me that this is, indeed, a photo of 3 Marg Eve? 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 Q: Is that her? 8 A: No. 9 Q: It's not? 10 A: That is not Marg Eve. 11 Q: Could you assist me with who that is? 12 A: I don't know that woman. 13 Q: All right. But you can say 14 confidently it's not Marg Eve? And for the record the 15 photo P-131 that I'm showing you, and I've been advised 16 it is Marg Eve, so we'll -- we'll clarify it. 17 You're confident it's not? 18 A: I am confident that that is not Marg 19 Eve. 20 Q: Fair enough, sir. And I've -- I've 21 never -- obviously, I know she's deceased but I'd never 22 met her when she was alive so I defer to you on that, 23 sir. 24 For the record, we're all -- we're all 25 grateful to you --

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1 A: Thank you. 2 Q: -- for clarifying that. And you know 3 that in showing you Exhibit P-131, the concern I have is 4 that that person's wearing camouflage, makeup and bearing 5 a gun? 6 A: So I can understand your concern and 7 I've to tell you -- I'm telling you that that is not Marg 8 Eve. 9 Q: And you agree -- 10 A: Because I know Marg Eve. 11 Q: Right. And you'd agree with me that 12 the reason -- my reason for concern is legitimate. 13 A: I understand. 14 Q: Because you wouldn't want her 15 involved in any form of tactical operations on an 16 enforcement level if she's at the same time, a critical 17 incident negotiator; true? 18 A: That's correct. 19 Q: And that's because you can hardly 20 have credibility in a world where you're practising 21 enforcement or deception, correct? Right? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: Now, let me understand something. 24 When you determined your teams what information did you 25 have about Marg Eve's role prior to September 4th, 1995

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1 in relation to the Ipperwash incident? 2 Do you recall? 3 A: Would you ask me that question again? 4 Q: Sure. When you were formulating your 5 team, what information did you have with respect to Marg 6 Eve's role -- Sergeant Marg Eve's role in the Ipperwash 7 incident prior to September 4th, 1995? 8 A: I don't recall that. I don't recall 9 what I knew of her role. 10 Q: Could you look at your notes please 11 and tell me whether you can find anything that you did by 12 way of inquiries to find out what her role was? 13 Could you check your notes? 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You could 18 just ask the question, Mr. Falconer -- 19 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- and if he 21 wants to check his notes -- 22 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- Mr. 23 Commissioner, it's cross-examination. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just a 25 minute. Let me finish. Let me finish. You could just

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1 ask him -- 2 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: No, but I don't 3 want to flag this for the Witness. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: If he wants 5 to check his notes he'll check them. 6 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Fair enough. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You've asked 8 him to check his notes, so he is. 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 THE WITNESS: The -- the only note 13 that I have is -- is from home at 4:30 on the 1st. And I 14 call Marg at her house and talk to her about it. I don't 15 have any details as to what I said or she said. 16 17 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 18 Q: All right. I have provided you a 19 copy of Exhibit P-411 which is the incident log that was 20 managed by second in command at Ipperwash, Detective 21 Sergeant Mark Wright, that reflects the various 22 involvement of police officers over the course of the 23 incident. 24 For our purposes, the portions that I want 25 to bring to your attention and ask you about start at

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1 page 5. Exhibit P-411 has been stickied by me. The 2 stickies should be removed after my questioning of you. 3 I haven't marked it in any way; I'm assuring Mr. 4 Registrar. But it's not -- 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Is this in 6 our binder? 7 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- in your -- your 8 binder but I'd ask you to bear with me, Mr. Commissioner, 9 because -- 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 11 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- the references 12 are -- are simply to page numbers and they don't -- we 13 don't go very far. 14 15 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 16 Q: Could you look at page 5? Do you 17 have that, sir? 18 A: Yes, sir. 19 Q: Do you see a 1994 involvement of 20 Officer Eve in respect to the Army Base? Do you see the 21 -- if you go to the fourth column, you always see the 22 officers involved. 23 A: Oh, okay. 24 Q: Do you see that? 25 A: Yes, I see that --

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1 Q: Then you don't have to look at all 2 the -- the text, you just go to that. 3 A: Okay. 4 Q: You see Eve -- 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: -- page 5? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And that's her -- and you'll confirm 9 with me, of course, that she's making observations in 10 respect of matters related to enforcement at the Army 11 Base. Would you agree with that? 12 A: If we look on page 1 and see the 13 title of the column being the Source and the title of the 14 other column -- 15 Q: Hmm hmm. 16 A: -- being Summary, and I look on page 17 5 and relate the same information that Eve is the source, 18 and the summary is in the next block -- 19 Q: Okay. Could you read the summary 20 out? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: Could you read it out, please? 23 A: "Reports people on the beach have 24 stolen his wood and are burning it on 25 the beach. Believes suspects are

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1 Natives." 2 Q: All right. Just stopping. That 3 relates to Ipperwash West, but let's keep going. 4 A: Okay. 5 Q: Could you flip to the next sticky and 6 give the Commissioner a page number, please, that's page 7 5. 8 A: I'm on page 32. 9 Q: All right. Now, page 32, could you 10 look in the column that indicates the officers involved? 11 And do you see a column for July 31st, 1995 that 12 includes, quote: 13 "Eve, Dew, Martin, and Dunn." 14 A: I see it. 15 Q: "Daytime observed encampment on beach 16 approximately one (1) kilometre north 17 of Matheson Drive." 18 Do you see that? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: Now, I'm going to refer you to this 21 passage, then the passage directly below. Do you see 22 another reference July 31st, '95 at 00:30 hours on the 23 same page to "Eve, Dew, Martin, and Dunn?" 24 A: I see it. 25 Q: All right. And again, at a

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1 subsequent time on the same page? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: Now, if you flip to the next sticky, 4 you'll see again page 37, July 31st, 1995, 20:20 "Eve, 5 Dew, Martin, and Dunn," again? Do you see that? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: If you turn to page 38, you'll again 8 see, "Eve, Dew, Martin, and Dunn," on July 31st, 1995. 9 Do you see that? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: If you flip to page 40, August 1st, 12 1995, again you see an involvement of Sergeant Eve with 13 Dew, Martin, and Dunn in relation to Ipperwash Park. 14 Do you know what Sergeant Margaret Eve was 15 doing on July 31st and August 1st, 1995, without reading 16 the summary? Do you know? 17 A: Do I know what she was doing? 18 Q: Yeah. 19 A: I know that now. 20 Q: Then, did you know then? 21 A: But I did I know that then? I can't 22 recall. I don't -- I mean I don't recall. I know that 23 there was some involvement that she had as a camper in -- 24 in relation to observations, but I don't recall whether I 25 knew that at the time that -- that I was designated to

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1 set up the teams or not. I don't know. 2 Q: Isn't it fair to say that the role of 3 Sergeant Eve was as an undercover police officer designed 4 to deceive those around her that she was a camper? And 5 it was designed to collect intelligence about what the 6 First nations person were doing in Ipperwash Provincial 7 Park. 8 Wasn't that her role? 9 A: I guess I have a hard time speaking 10 to her role, other than to suggest to you that if we're 11 talking the same thing, yes, that she was -- she was at 12 the Park as a camper, with the intentions of gathering 13 information about Park activities. 14 Q: The activities of First Nations 15 persons in the Park, correct? 16 A: I believe so, yes. 17 Q: And the idea was to feed intelligence 18 to Incident Command about the expected occupation, 19 correct? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: And the point of being undercover, 22 you'll forgive me, I don't want to be facetious, but the 23 point of being undercover is it's a secret, right? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: You don't wear police emblazoned on

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1 you if you're working undercover. 2 A: I understand your point, yes. 3 Q: Yes. Your perpetrating a deception. 4 That's the point, right? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: You want the First Nations persons to 7 do things around these people, not knowing they're 8 police, right? 9 A: Okay. 10 Q: Is that not fair? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: Now, would you agree with me that 13 having a person be your go-to person as the crisis 14 negotiator, while at the same time, or within thirty (30) 15 days of being an undercover officer in with First Nations 16 persons and reporting them, is hardly an ideal situation 17 for a crisis negotiator to be. 18 It's hardly ideal, is it? 19 A: I understand your point and I would 20 say it's not ideal. 21 Q: And would you agree with me that 22 there's every chance, based on your evidence thus far, 23 that you didn't know that Sergeant Eve played this role? 24 A: I can only tell you that I don't 25 recall when I learned that.

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1 Q: But you'd agree with me that it would 2 be significant information for you to take into account 3 in assessing her appropriateness as a crisis negotiator? 4 A: I would think so. 5 Q: For example, if you look at the 6 incident log, among other things, you will see that she 7 actually observes and/or has contact with Dudley George 8 during the report she does on July 31st and August 1st. 9 Now that wouldn't be the ideal person to 10 then be negotiating, for example, with Dudley George, 11 would it? Do you want me to show you the page? 12 If you go to page 37, July 31st, 1995. 13 A: Okay. 14 Q: "Observed blue TransAm on Matheson 15 Drive, [et cetera]." 16 Reference to someone saying: 17 "Get off of my property." 18 Then Dudley and the camper are quoted as 19 an exchange. Do you see all that? 20 A: I see that, yeah. 21 Q: Right. You just -- you will agree 22 with me, that if you had known about this, you wouldn't 23 have made Marg Eve the front line critical negotiator, 24 right? 25 A: I want to answer that question very

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1 carefully, because there are times when in her -- if 2 we're talking about -- if we're talking about now, the 3 crisis negotiator in it's -- in it's formal sense, Marg 4 here is -- is shown as being a team leader. 5 And there are times when the team leader 6 knows information that he or she may not necessarily tell 7 the other negotiators. And you'll learn that information 8 from a variety of sources at the scene at the time from 9 the Incident Commander, and you're not -- as a team 10 leader, you're not always going to share that information 11 with the negotiators themselves. 12 But it's important that you have the 13 bigger picture. So I only answer it that way to say that 14 in a role of team leader of a crisis negotiation team, 15 that information not have -- may not have interfered with 16 her duties. But I don't know -- 17 Q: But -- 18 A: -- when I learned of that 19 information. 20 Q: We can't find a single discussion you 21 had where in which you reflect considering that, do -- 22 can we? 23 A: That's correct. 24 Q: And whereas we can find all of those 25 examples of you're quite thoughtful learning curves about

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1 what you were learning on First Nations issues about not 2 lying, right? 3 A: For sure. 4 Q: And importance of building trust? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: There is no visible way we can find 7 that you addressed your mind to the dual role of Marg 8 Eve, enforcement officer, and Marg Eve, critical 9 negotiator, correct? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: May we draw the inference from that 12 then, that in all likelihood, you didn't know about it at 13 the time you assigned her? 14 A: I would hope that's the only 15 inference. I -- I hope that's the only inference. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You're 17 approaching the end of your estimated time. I just want 18 you -- 19 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Thank you. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- to be 21 aware of it, that's all. 22 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Thank you. 23 24 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 25 Q: Now, what I draw so far from the

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1 evidence you've provided, is that you were making headway 2 on negotiations late the night of September 6th, 1995, 3 correct? 4 A: If we're -- again, we're talking 5 about negotiations. We were making headway when it comes 6 to making contact for the purpose of discussion, yes. 7 Q: Well, it's more than that. Judas 8 George was prepared to take you and show you the burial 9 grounds? 10 A: We were working, yes, that's right. 11 Q: Right. 12 A: Yeah. Yeah. 13 Q: You had built or were in the process 14 of building a bridge where he would trust you? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And you were going to give him 17 certain assurances about not using that -- that bridge to 18 get him arrested and put in jail, right? 19 A: I was -- 20 Q: I mean, you weren't promising it yet? 21 A: I was going to take that information 22 to the Incident Commander who would make that decision. 23 Q: Right. And that makes some sense, 24 right? That's the to and fro of negotiations. You know, 25 if I trust you are you going to take advantage of that

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1 trust and burn me? That kind of -- 2 A: Right. 3 Q: That's typical, isn't it? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: So you have -- were making headway on 6 the night of the 6th, right? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And now we've talked about broad 9 negotiations versus critical incident negotiation, but 10 the truth of the matter is, whatever you want to call it, 11 you were making headway, right? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: Now, Judas George had shown to you, 14 so far, that he was a person worth building that bridge 15 with, you were interested in pursuing. You didn't just 16 cast him off as useless as a representative or a person 17 that mattered, you saw him as worth -- a person worth 18 investing some time in, true? 19 A: From a personal perspective, yes. 20 Q: Right. And when you say, "from a 21 personal perspective," you're acting professionally as 22 someone in charge of negotiations for the entire 23 Ipperwash Park incident, so you saw him, from a 24 professional and personal point of view, as someone worth 25 investing time in, right?

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1 A: Yes. 2 Q: And so right at that moment something 3 was going wrong somewhere else that you didn't know 4 about, right? 5 A: Right. 6 Q: And I take it critical incident 7 negotiation is all about de-escalating; is it not? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: So, for example, if presented with a 10 scene or a situation that's escalating out of control, as 11 a person involved, in charge, indeed, of negotiations, 12 you would hope that you would be consulted with how to 13 de-escalate, agreed? 14 A: No, I'm not sure that I -- I would 15 agree with that. 16 Q: Fair enough. Let me take it to a 17 more specific point. Do you agree with me that depending 18 on the nature of the escalation, a critical incident 19 negotiator can be an important tool in affecting de- 20 escalation, depending on the nature of the escalation? 21 A: Depending on the nature, the Incident 22 Commander would hear from the negotiating team leader. 23 Q: About the ability to de-escalate? 24 A: Yes, yes. 25 Q: And that the reason the critical

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1 incident negotiator, or let's take out those terms, the 2 reason the negotiator leader, the one in charge of 3 negotiations is an important tool, is it represents an 4 alternative to the use of force, correct? 5 That's what de-escalation is about, it 6 represents an alternative to the use of force; isn't that 7 right? 8 A: I don't want to answer your question 9 to say blank -- blankedly, yes, because we're -- I'm 10 talking about qualifying that by saying, in an example of 11 the criteria that meets crisis negotiation -- 12 Q: Fair enough. But let's -- 13 A: -- an individual that's barricaded, 14 threat to life and refuses to comply. 15 Q: You didn't have anyone barricaded 16 when you talked to Judas George and said, That's 17 interesting, an idea of a burial ground, I might be 18 willing to come look. You didn't have anybody barricaded 19 when you had that chat with him. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Ms. 21 Jones...? 22 MS. KAREN JONES: Mr. Commissioner, 23 again, I think it is important that Mr. Falconer be fair 24 and accurate when he puts propositions to a witness. 25 This witness didn't speak with Judas

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1 George. He had a -- he had received information that 2 there was a possibility that Judas George might be 3 prepared to talk in the event he got an assurance -- 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 5 MS. KAREN JONES: -- that an arrest 6 warrant wouldn't be carried out. 7 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That's fine. 8 MS. KAREN JONES: This person -- 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank -- 10 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: No, no, that's 11 fine -- 12 MS. KAREN JONES: -- never spoke with him 13 and he's now proposed that -- 14 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- no need to go on 15 at length -- 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's all 17 right, she has to finish her objection and then that's 18 fine. 19 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: In your 20 communications -- 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You can 22 adjust your question to take that into account. 23 24 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 25 Q: In your communications with Judas

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1 George you didn't cease communications with him because 2 you didn't have a barricaded person? 3 A: I didn't start communications with 4 him. I never talked to him. 5 Q: Fair enough. Communications from 6 Judas George made their way to you, yes? 7 A: Through Bob George. 8 Q: Fair enough. 9 Q: And you didn't say I'm not going to 10 have any further communications with you, Judas George, 11 through Bob George or otherwise because I don't have a 12 barricaded person? 13 You didn't do that? 14 A: Certainly not. 15 Q: Pardon me? 16 A: Certainly not. 17 Q: No. You had developed your hopes 18 that night that this could lead to a bridge that you were 19 prepared to work on? 20 A: That's right. 21 Q: Right. And it didn't matter that you 22 weren't called, quote, "the critical incident negotiator" 23 in -- in having communications direct or indirect with 24 Judas George, you were going to try to build a bridge, 25 right?

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1 A: That's right. 2 Q: To de-escalate the occupation? 3 A: Yes. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Okay. 5 6 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 7 Q: Okay. Now, with that in mind you'd 8 agree with me that that process of building a bridge to 9 de-escalate was a possibility as a tool the night of 10 September 6th, 1995, at Ipperwash Provincial Park as 11 matters escalated. That was a possibility you could have 12 continued that process if you'd known about the 13 escalation? 14 You could have raised the issue 15 indirectly back to Judas George about the escalation, 16 correct? 17 A: Given the dynamics of how things 18 moved and how quickly they moved I'm not so sure. 19 Q: Well, that's fair that you're not 20 sure and -- and I'm not asking you to be certain. I'm 21 saying it's an option that could have been explored. I'm 22 not saying it could have worked, it could have been 23 explored? 24 You say it moved quickly but that -- you - 25 - you didn't know of anything at the time?

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1 A: I didn't know of anything, that's 2 right. 3 Q: Right. So you would expect in the 4 normal course to be consulted and/or have input about 5 whether it's viable for you to play a role, no? 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE) 8 9 A: I'm trying to answer your question as 10 fairly as I can. I don't want to answer a "what if" 11 question and -- and that's the way I'm perceiving it. 12 What if I had been there? What if I had known? And 13 giving that as it is I don't know what influence I would 14 have had over anything. 15 Q: Now, -- 16 A: I'm not talking about an individual 17 anymore, I'm talking about a situation that involves a 18 multitude of people that a de-escalation attempt by one 19 (1) individual is -- is not going to be meaningful so 20 we're talking about -- 21 Q: Its' not going to -- 22 A: -- two (2) different scenarios. 23 Q: You're saying a de-escalation effort 24 by a crisis negotiator, a person skilled in crisis 25 negotiation would necessarily not be meaningful?

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1 You can predict that with certainty? 2 A: No, I can't. 3 Q: All right. So what I'm saying to you 4 is you were never consulted, correct? 5 A: That's right. 6 Q: You were available. You -- if 7 Incident Commander Carson had wanted to talk to you about 8 de-escalating what was developing or what he thought was 9 developing in the sandy parking lot you would have been 10 willing to give input, yes? 11 A: If he thought I was going to be 12 useful to his needs he would have called I'm sure. 13 Q: I'm not asking what he would have 14 done, I'm only asking what you did and what you would 15 have done. 16 If he had consulted with you you would 17 have talked to him? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: All right. And you would have 20 directed you mind to whether there was a way to de- 21 escalate what was apparently escalating out there. There 22 might not be; there might be. 23 You would have directed your mind to 24 that? 25 A: I'm sure.

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1 Q: Right. 2 A: I'm sure I would have. 3 Q: And that's because you're skilled in 4 de-escalating, correct? That's what you do -- 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: -- for a living? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: But no one asked you to help that 9 night did they? 10 A: No. 11 Q: And it wasn't that no one asked you 12 to help because the crisis negotiators -- formally as 13 crisis negotiators weren't triggered, because you were 14 busy working on this case weren't you? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: Right. Did you ever learn why you 17 weren't asked for help? 18 A: No. 19 Q: No. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I ask you to 21 please conclude -- 22 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Yeah. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- it as 24 soon as you can now, Mr. Falconer. 25 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Certainly.

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1 2 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 3 Q: Now, you refer to that -- to -- to a 4 portion of I think it was Forest Detachment but I could 5 have gotten that from notes so I want to make sure this 6 is your evidence. 7 A portion of Forest Detachment, a room, 8 was set aside specifically for purposes of usage by 9 critical negotiators, correct? 10 A: That's correct. 11 Q: Do you remember sit. boards being up 12 in that room of any kind? 13 A: No. 14 Q: You know what I mean by situation 15 boards? 16 A: Would you explain a little? 17 Q: All right. Is it not the case that 18 different forms of board situation reports or boards are 19 put up by negotiators so that they can have a track of 20 for instance to hooks that might be important in 21 communications between a subject and the negotiator those 22 things happen, yes? 23 You're familiar with the term hooks? 24 A: Yes. Yes. Yeah. I understand what 25 you're asking.

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1 Q: That biographical data about a person 2 you're negotiating with or people you're negotiating with 3 can be -- 4 A: Sometimes, yes. 5 Q: Right. Do you recall whether those 6 form of sit. boards were up on the wall outlining who 7 these people were? 8 A: No. There was no -- 9 Q: There was nothing? 10 A: There was nothing of that nature, no. 11 Q: Now the last area I want to ask you 12 about it's really this -- this business of the phones. 13 You've answered Mr. Scullion that -- that at the certain 14 point in time, the phones became a non issue and that -- 15 but I just want to backup to September 1st, 1995. 16 As of September 1st, 1995 you'd agree with 17 me that you and your teams had access to Ipperwash 18 Provincial Park, yes? 19 There was nothing stopping you from going 20 into the Park? 21 A: I see. 22 Q: Am I right? 23 A: That's correct. 24 Q: Nor was there anything stopping 25 Technical Services Branch from going in the Park,

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1 correct? 2 A: Well let me -- let me qualify that by 3 saying that none of us would have moved without the 4 Incident Commander saying that it was okay. 5 Q: Yes, naturally. Subject to getting 6 direction -- 7 A: For all the reasons you stated 8 earlier there was things happening -- 9 Q: Not overriding authority, but subject 10 to that there was nothing stopping access to the Park, 11 correct? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: And the whole point of your being 14 brought in was that in the event negotiations became 15 important, it was for you to communicate with the 16 occupiers. 17 That was the whole point of you being 18 brought in as of September 1st, 1995, right? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: Now how did you envisage in your head 21 on September 2nd, 1995 having communications with those 22 occupiers in the Park once they controlled the Park? 23 How did you envisage in your head those 24 negotiations happening? 25 A: I'm not sure if I was told then or

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1 learned later but at some point in time I was aware of a 2 phone in the warehouse. 3 Q: Sorry? 4 A: I was aware of a phone in the 5 warehouse. 6 Q: In a warehouse? Where do I find that 7 in your notes? 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 A: I made reference to it later -- 12 Q: After the incident? 13 A: Oh yes. And I -- but I don't -- 14 Q: No, I'm talking about before. 15 A: -- know as to whether I knew about it 16 prior to is my point. But the reference I made to it is 17 afterwards. 18 Q: Well I'm talking about preparations 19 between the 1st and -- you -- you know that when you're - 20 - when you're at this meeting on September 1, 1995 -- 21 A: Right. 22 Q: -- the premise to the meeting is that 23 there is an expectation that the occupiers are coming in 24 over the course of the Labour Day weekend. 25 A: Right.

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1 Q: Several days down the road, right? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: Between the 4th and the 6th, 1995, 4 right? 5 A: Right. 6 Q: Which is exactly what they did, 7 correct? 8 A: Yeah. Right. 9 Q: Now backing up, I'm trying to 10 understand how you envisaged at that time, not down the 11 road when you're looking back -- 12 A: Okay. 13 Q: -- at the time, how did you envisage 14 your critical incident negotiators having communications 15 with those in the park? 16 A: I don't know that I did. 17 Q: All right. And you stand by your 18 evidence that you never see critical incident negotiators 19 that, well you say never use never and that's a very fair 20 point. 21 So backing up, it is not good practice and 22 generally not done to have a critical incident negotiator 23 be face to face, correct? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: So while on the one (1) hand it's not

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1 good practice and -- and generally not done to do face to 2 face, you're telling the Commissioner, that you had not 3 sorted out in your own mind how the negotiations were 4 going to happen in a non face to face fashion, is that 5 so? 6 A: Because usually I see -- in a 7 circumstance that fits the criteria for crisis 8 negotiators to be activated where they're going to be on 9 a -- on a phone system, somebody calls the police. Or 10 they call from somewhere so they've established the phone 11 themselves. 12 So wherever they're at is the phone that 13 we look -- link into. 14 Q: Sir, you're telling me that the only 15 communications you know of by phone or happens when the 16 person on the other side, the non police officer 17 initiates the call? 18 A: No -- 19 Q: All right. 20 A: -- I'm not saying that's the only 21 time. 22 Q: Right. And isn't it true that it is 23 indeed one (1) of the practices of many police services 24 to use portable phones -- 25 A: Yes.

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1 Q: -- to use wire phones; yes? 2 A: That's right. 3 Q: Brought in by tactical people? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: There's a term called "locking out a 6 phone"? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: That's to dedicate a line? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: Right. And all of those things are 11 communication initiatives initiated by the police? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And, in fact, it would have been open 14 to you between the 1st of September and that expected 15 Labour Day occupation to go in with technical services 16 and set up a central phone line capable of being 17 activated if necessary; correct? 18 A: I guess it would have been possible. 19 I'm not saying that it's something that I would concern 20 myself with. 21 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Fair enough. Those 22 are my questions. Thank you, sir. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 24 very much, Mr. Falconer. 25 Ms. Jones, do you have any examination?

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1 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: For the record, I'm 2 returning -- 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 4 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- Exhibit P-482 to 5 Mr. Registrar. And I believe the other exhibits, which 6 is 411 is in front of the Witness. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You've 8 discharged all your responsibilities. 9 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Thank you. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Ms. Jones, 11 how long do you think you might be? We're all getting a 12 little tired. It's not fair to have you start when we're 13 all tired but that's what we have to do. 14 MS. KAREN JONES: Well, life's not fair, 15 sometimes, Mr. Commissioner. I think I might be fifteen 16 (15) minutes. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 18 very much. 19 20 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. KAREN JONES: 21 Q: Mr. Seltzer, I wanted to follow up on 22 the last line of questions that Mr. Falconer asked you. 23 I wanted to make sure we understand what your evidence is 24 on certain points because it seemed to be a little 25 different than your evidence this morning so I want you

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1 to have a chance to be very clear. 2 A: Thank you. 3 Q: Mr. Falconer had suggested to you 4 that you were in charge of negotiations for the entire 5 Ipperwash operation, or words to that effect. 6 Were you in charge of negotiations for 7 the entire Ipperwash operation? 8 A: When the -- 9 Q: And by "negotiation" let me make it 10 clear I'm not saying critical incident or negotiations 11 but negotiations writ large? 12 A: That was one (1) of those questions 13 where you answer in a few seconds in jet lag you think, 14 did I answer that properly? I was a little bit concerned 15 about -- 16 Q: I appreciate that. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Ms. Jones, 18 you asked him to be given an opportunity to answer, 19 perhaps -- are you finished answering? No? 20 THE WITNESS: Sorry. 21 MS. KAREN JONES: No. He's just started. 22 THE WITNESS: I am concerned about my 23 answer on that statement that, no, I was not responsible 24 for the entire operation of Project Maple in terms of 25 discussion and liaison outside of critical incident.

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1 2 CONTINUED BY MS. KAREN JONES: 3 Q: Okay. Just moving back a little bit. 4 In terms -- you were asked some questions about Project 5 Maple and the plan that you put together and you've told 6 us that you were of the view that John Carson, I believe, 7 when you were speaking with John Carson about 8 negotiations, in terms of your portion of the Project 9 Maple plan, it was in relation to crisis negotiation and 10 not negotiation writ large -- 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: -- is that fair? And did you see or 13 hear anything over the course of the 4th, 5th or 6th that 14 led you to believe John Carson had any misunderstanding 15 or confusion about negotiation and Project Maple with 16 reference to you, meaning negotiation for the purpose of 17 crisis negotiation? 18 A: No. There was no misunderstanding. 19 Q: Okay. You were asked some questions 20 about your role in -- with respect to negotiations on the 21 evening of September 6th. 22 Were the discussions that you were having 23 with Mr. George during the course of the day and into the 24 evening of September the 6th discussions that you would 25 consider to be related to critical -- sorry, the kind of

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1 hostage or barricading negotiation that you had 2 particular expertise in? 3 A: No. 4 Q: You were asked some questions about 5 your skills in de-escalation are yours -- of an incident. 6 As of 1995 would you -- would you -- were 7 your skills in de-escalation of a situation in relation 8 to a situation where there was a barricaded or a hostage 9 person, or was it with respect to, for example, a crowd 10 of some forty (40) people? 11 A: My experience was in hostage 12 barricaded persons, so we're talking about the -- the 13 truest sense of the word, 'crisis negotiator.' 14 Q: That's right. 15 A: One (1) on one (1) environment. 16 Q: And I take it you would agree with me 17 that as a skilled crisis negotiator, you would be 18 accustomed to de-escalating situations with one (1) 19 individual and not many? 20 A: That's correct. 21 Q: Were you of the view that you had 22 skills in de-escalating or dealing with crowds? 23 A: Would you ask that question again, 24 please? 25 Q: Did you have skills and experience in

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1 de-escalating crowds? 2 A: No. 3 Q: Was it your view that if any 4 negotiations were to occur between the OPP and the 5 occupiers, that you would be involved in any 6 negotiations? And again, this is negotiation writ large, 7 not critical incident negotiation? 8 A: I need that question again, I'm 9 sorry. 10 Q: I'm sorry. Was it your understanding 11 at any point in time, when you were at Ipperwash in 1995, 12 that you would be involved in any negotiations that were 13 taking place writ large between the police and the 14 occupiers? 15 Or was it your understanding that you 16 would be involved in crisis negotiation only as a matter 17 of course if you're there, and other matters perhaps at 18 John Carson's behest? 19 A: If I'm answering your question 20 correctly, I would answer to say that I was designated 21 to be in charge of crisis negotiation in the event that 22 an occurrence would happen that would meet the criteria 23 of a crisis negotiation team. 24 As the events unfolded, I was designated 25 by the Incident Commander, by Inspector Carson, to make

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1 the contacts that we've been discussing -- 2 Q: Right. 3 A: -- this afternoon, to try and open a 4 point of dialogue to talk to anybody to -- to find out, 5 through the assistance of Lorne Smith in the community at 6 Kettle Point, who is it that we should talk to and -- and 7 carrying that further, now would I ever get involved in 8 any negotiation with that person eventually? That would 9 be the -- the call of the Incident Commander as to who 10 would do that. 11 My role was to try to initiate contact and 12 -- and we were working successfully, I believed, towards 13 that goal, and time was taken away from us. 14 Q: You were also asked some questions, I 15 believe, by Mr. Falconer about whether or not there was 16 or there should have been a phone line put into the Park 17 prior to September the 4th. And I wanted to ask you a 18 couple of questions about that. 19 A: Okay. 20 Q: As I understood your evidence from 21 this morning, as part of your plan, and with the 22 agreement of John Carson, you would have had access -- 23 access to assistance in services and support from the 24 Technical Support Branch? 25 A: That's correct.

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1 Q: Were you -- were you of the view that 2 if a situation occurred in which, for example, a phone 3 line was required to be put into a location, that that 4 could be done? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And is that the kind of a -- a -- the 7 arrangements that you would make at any crisis 8 negotiation, to have the resources available if need be? 9 A: It's a wonderful thing, at a crisis 10 negotiation situation, if you can end up with a Command 11 Post that has a telephone in it and will relate to a 12 subject area that has a telephone in it. 13 I've operated out of a phone box in a 14 ditch and had to do that because you've got to -- you've 15 got to go with what you've got. And the skills of 16 Technical Support Branch hook us up and it's not of my 17 concern as to how. 18 Q: Thank you. 19 20 (BRIEF PAUSE) 21 22 Q: You were asked some -- 23 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Mr. Commissioner, 24 this is not so much as an objection but a request of My 25 Friend that she consider clarification.

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1 Did she just elicit from the Witness that 2 he actually communicated with Technical Services Branch 3 or Carson about this being available, or that this was a 4 practice at large, borne of an expectation or assumption. 5 I'm just -- to be fair to the evidence, 6 it's unclear to me -- 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's not 8 unclear to me, Mr. Falconer. 9 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: All right. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: So I don't 11 know if it's necessary. I mean that's not an objection 12 and it's not unclear to me so let's just carry on. 13 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well, if it's not 14 unclear to you, Mr. Commissioner -- 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, it 16 isn't. It's not unclear to me. 17 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Fair enough. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Carry on. 19 Do you want to clarify it for Mr. Falconer? I thought it 20 was fairly clear -- 21 MS. KAREN JONES: I thought this Witness' 22 evidence was clear as a bell, Mr. Commissioner. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- I don't 24 want it to be -- yes, I think it's okay. 25 MS. KAREN JONES: And so I was quite

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1 relieved to hear you had the same thing, I was a little 2 concerned. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Carry on. 4 5 CONTINUED BY MS. KAREN JONES: 6 Q: You were asked some questions about 7 Marg Eve earlier on, about whether or not, as a crisis 8 negotiator team leader, she might be -- this is my 9 language, not the language that was put to you -- tainted 10 by being a person who was trying to open communications 11 with the occupiers during the course of the 6th of 12 September. 13 And do I understand that during the 4th, 14 5th and 6th, from what you've said, it was a priority of 15 the OPP to try and see if you could find someone who 16 would talk to you, an occupier who would talk to you? 17 A: That was a priority. 18 Q: And is it fair to say that during 19 that period of time a variety of people were used in an 20 attempt to try and establish contact with the occupiers? 21 A: That's correct. 22 Q: And is it also fair to say that if 23 there had been a problem because of Marg Eve's 24 involvement in Ipperwash, prior to September the 4th of 25 1995, that got in the way of her acting with your group,

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1 that that would have been something that could have been 2 addressed? 3 A: That would be something that would be 4 dealt with by the Incident Commander. 5 Q: Sure. And I take it, from your 6 understanding, John Carson would have been aware of Marg 7 Eve being on the crisis negotiator team? 8 A: Oh, for sure. 9 Q: And he never expressed any concerns 10 about that? 11 A: About Marg, no. 12 Q: No. Those are my questions, thank 13 you very much. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 15 Mr. Worme, do you have any questions? 16 MR. DONALD WORME: I do not, 17 Commissioner. I simply want to rise and thank Mr. 18 Seltzer for his attendance here and providing us his 19 testimony. Thank you, sir. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 21 very much for giving us your evidence, Mr. Seltzer. 22 Thank you. You're finished now. 23 24 (WITNESS STANDS DOWN) 25

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1 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And so are 2 we. I think our day comes to a conclusion and we'll 3 reconvene tomorrow morning at nine o'clock. Thank you 4 very much. 5 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 6 adjourned until tomorrow, Wednesday, June 14th at 9:00 7 a.m. 8 9 --- Upon adjourning at 5:36 p.m. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Certified Correct, 17 18 19 20 21 _____________________ 22 Carol Geehan 23 24 25