11 2 3 IPPERWASH PUBLIC INQUIRY 4 5 6 7 ******************** 8 9 10 BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE SIDNEY LINDEN, 11 COMMISSIONER 12 13 14 15 16 Held at: Forest Community Centre 17 Kimball Hall 18 Forest, Ontario 19 20 21 ******************** 22 23 24 June 9th, 2006 25
21 Appearances 2 Derry Millar ) Commission Counsel 3 Susan Vella ) 4 Donald Worme, Q. C ) (np) 5 Katherine Hensel ) (np) 6 Megan Ferrier ) (np) 7 8 Murray Klippenstein ) (np) The Estate of Dudley 9 Vilko Zbogar ) (np) George and George 10 Andrew Orkin ) (np) Family Group 11 Basil Alexander ) 12 13 Peter Rosenthal ) Aazhoodena and George 14 Jackie Esmonde ) Family Group 15 Amanda Rogers ) (np) Student-at-law 16 17 Anthony Ross ) (np) Residents of 18 Cameron Neil ) (np) Aazhoodena (Army Camp) 19 Kevin Scullion ) 20 21 William Henderson ) (np) Kettle Point & Stony 22 Jonathon George ) (np) Point First Nation 23 Colleen Johnson ) (np) 24 25
31 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 Kim Twohig ) (np) Government of Ontario 3 Walter Myrka ) (np) 4 Susan Freeborn ) (np) 5 6 Sheri Hebdon ) Student-at-law 7 8 Janet Clermont ) Municipality of 9 David Nash ) (np) Lambton Shores 10 Nora Simpson ) (np) Student-at-law 11 12 Peter Downard ) (np) The Honourable Michael 13 Bill Hourigan ) (np) Harris 14 Jennifer McAleer ) 15 16 Ian Smith ) (np) Robert Runciman 17 Alice Mrozek ) (np) 18 19 Harvey T. Strosberg, Q.C.) (np) Charles Harnick 20 Jacqueline Horvat ) (np) 21 22 23 24 25
41 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 Douglas Sulman, Q.C. ) Marcel Beaubien 3 Mary Jane Moynahan) (np) 4 Dave Jacklin ) (np) 5 Trevor Hinnegan ) (np) 6 7 Mark Sandler ) (np) Ontario Provincial 8 Andrea Tuck-Jackson ) Ontario Provincial Police 9 Leslie Kaufman ) (np) 10 11 Ian Roland ) Ontario Provincial 12 Karen Jones ) Police Association & 13 Debra Newell ) (np) K. Deane 14 Ian McGilp ) (np) 15 Annie Leeks ) (np) 16 Jennifer Gleitman ) (np) 17 Robyn Trask ) (np) 18 Caroline Swerdlyk ) 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
51 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 Julian Falconer ) (np) Aboriginal Legal 3 Brian Eyolfson ) (np) Services of Toronto 4 Kimberly Murray ) (np) 5 Julian Roy ) 6 Clem Nabigon ) (np) 7 Linda Chen ) (np) 8 Chris Darnay ) (np) 9 Sunil Mathai ) (np) 10 Adriel Weaver ) (np) Student-at-Law 11 12 Al J.C. O'Marra ) (np) Office of the Chief 13 Robert Ash, Q.C. ) (np) Coroner 14 William Horton ) (np) Chiefs of Ontario 15 Matthew Horner ) (np) 16 Kathleen Lickers ) (np) 17 18 Mark Fredrick ) (np) Christopher Hodgson 19 Craig Mills ) (np) 20 Megan Mackey ) (np) 21 Peter Lauwers ) (np) 22 Erin Tully ) (np) 23 Michelle Fernando ) (np) 24 Maanit Zemel ) (np) 25 Patrick Greco ) (np)
61 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 3 David Roebuck ) (np) Debbie Hutton 4 Anna Perschy ) (np) 5 Melissa Panjer ) 6 Adam Goodman ) (np) 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
71 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 PAGE NO. 3 List of Exhibits 8 4 5 TREVOR EDWARD RICHARDSON, Resumed 6 Continued Cross-Examination by Mr. Peter Rosenthal 9 7 Cross-Examination by Mr. Kevin Scullion 47 8 Cross-Examination by Mr. Julian Roy 61 9 Cross-Examination by Ms. Karen Jones 87 10 11 WAYNE PAUL WAWRYK, Sworn 12 (Voir Dire Commenced) 13 Examination-In-Chief by Ms. Susan Vella 109 14 (Voir Dire Concluded) 15 Examination-In-Chief by Ms. Susan Vella 117 16 Cross-Examination by Mr. Peter Rosenthal 206 17 Cross-Examination by Mr. Kevin Scullion 219 18 Cross-Examination by Mr. Julian Roy 227 19 Cross-Examination by Mr. Ian Roland 238 20 Cross-Examination by Ms. Andrea Tuck-Jackson 245 21 22 Certificate of Transcript 255 23 24 25
81 EXHIBITS 2 No. Description Page 3 P-1682 Curriculum Vitae of Mr. Wayne Paul 4 Wawryk. 110 5 P-1683 Hard copy of Power Point presentation, 6 "Police Intelligence for Public Order 7 Operations in 1995", slides of Wayne 8 Wawryk. 118 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
91 --- Upon commencing at 9:02 a.m. 2 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 4 now in session, the Honourable Mr. Justice Linden 5 presiding. Please be seated. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: good 7 morning, everyone. 8 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Good morning, Mr. 9 Commissioner. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 11 morning, Mr. Rosenthal. Carry on. 12 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 13 14 TREVOR EDWARD RICHARDSON, Resumes 15 16 CONTINUED CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 17 Q: Good morning, Officer. 18 A: Good morning, sir, how are you? 19 Q: Not bad considering the 20 possibilities, anyway. Now, from the time I finished 21 questioning you late afternoon, late yesterday afternoon, 22 and the present moment did you discuss any of your 23 evidence that you gave yesterday with anyone? 24 A: No, sir. 25 Q: Not with anyone at all?
101 A: No, went home. 2 Q: Thank you. Now, we were at -- at the 3 hospital on September 6th, 1995, when we broke off 4 yesterday. 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And you told us about the three (3) 7 people being arrested on your instructions at that time? 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 Q: Now, just to clarify one (1) aspect 10 of it, I gather your evidence is you would not have 11 arrested them if you didn't know more than what Mark 12 Wright had told you was sufficient for arrest, right? 13 You would have disobeyed that order of Mark Wright's? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: Now, you told us when Ms. Vella was 16 examining you I believe, that the car that those three 17 persons had arrived in at the hospital was seized, right? 18 A: Yes, it was. 19 Q: And it was searched for weapons the 20 next day, right? 21 A: Yes, it was. 22 Q: And there were no weapons found in 23 that car, right? 24 A: No, sir. 25 Q: I -- I'm correct there were no
111 weapons? 2 A: That's correct. 3 Q: Yes. 4 A: Yeah. 5 Q: Sometimes when you say "no" to 6 something like that -- 7 A: Oh, -- 8 Q: -- it's an odd -- 9 A: I apologize. 10 Q: -- odd thing that happens. But, yes, 11 there were no weapons found. And so then throughout the 12 investigation of those three (3) people there were no 13 weapons found connected with any of those three (3) 14 people, correct? 15 A: That's correct. 16 Q: So you then came to learn, sometime 17 shortly afterward, that these were three (3) totally 18 innocent people? 19 A: Well, as I -- in-chief I said that I 20 left at 2:00 in the morning or shortly after that, I 21 didn't come back until 2:00 in the afternoon. 22 Q: Yes. 23 A: And when I came back I was told that 24 they were released. 25 Q: That they were released?
121 A: Yes. 2 Q: And -- but, then you were involved in 3 subsequent investigation of this entire incident right? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And certainly by now you know that 6 these were three (3) totally innocent people who were 7 just driving their relative to hospital trying to receive 8 aid for him, right? 9 A: Yes, sir. 10 Q: And there was -- you observed 11 somebody that drive to the hospital, was a rather heroic 12 attempt to get there with this flat tire sparking and so 13 on, right? 14 A: It was sparking, that's for sure, 15 yes. 16 Q: And there was obviously a very 17 difficult enterprise for those three (3) people trying to 18 get their loved one to the hospital? 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: Are you aware of any apology to those 21 people by the OPP? 22 A: I'm not sure, sir. I don't know -- 23 Q: Well -- 24 A: -- I don't know if Superintendent -- 25 Superintendent Coles or Superintendent Parkin or anybody
131 approached them or not, I don't know. 2 Q: And you're not aware of any 3 compensation that the OPP might have offered them -- 4 A: I'm not aware of that, no sir. 5 Q: It wouldn't be within your authority 6 to do either of those things I gather, right? 7 A: No, sir. 8 Q: But, if someone were to recommend an 9 apology and/or compensation, would you think that would 10 be an appropriate recommendation, sir? 11 A: Apology for sure. Compensation, that 12 would up to the Courts, I guess. 13 Q: Well, the Courts -- 14 A: Or up to the lawyers to be -- 15 Q: You can volunteer compensation as 16 well, right? 17 A: Well, I can't. 18 Q: No. But, you wouldn't be opposed to 19 a recommendation that some compensation be offered to 20 those people for that experience, right? 21 A: If that's what everybody thinks 22 should happen, yes sir. 23 Q: Now, you were under the 24 misapprehension as it turned out at the beginning that 25 Dudley George had driven the car that was involved in the
141 incident? 2 A: Yes, we were initially. Yes. 3 Q: Yes. And then -- but, at some point 4 or early on you got information that Detective Sergeant, 5 I believe he was, Deane had shot someone right? 6 A: Yeah, we knew that at that night. 7 Q: You knew that that night? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: But, you didn't realize it was Dudley 10 George? 11 A: That's correct. 12 Q: But, then it soon became apparent 13 that the only person who'd been shot that night was 14 Dudley George, right? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: So putting the fact that Ken Deane 17 had shot someone and the fact that Dudley George was the 18 only one who was shot, you would have known soon 19 thereafter that Ken Deane was the one who had shot Dudley 20 George? 21 A: Well, see what happened was is that, 22 when the car came out at the officers, several shots were 23 fired at the driver -- 24 Q: Yes. 25 A: -- and I guess, using a bad word we
151 assumed that Dudley was the one in the car, because with 2 the number of bullets at the car, the assumption was that 3 maybe he was the driver? 4 Q: Yes. No, I appreciate that at the 5 beginning, yes -- 6 A: And Dudley shot by Tex Deane; Tex saw 7 him being pulled into the Park and I guess they just 8 didn't realize that the was the one that was standing and 9 not driving. For -- it had to be a couple of day before 10 we realized that. 11 Q: Before you made that connection, 12 correct? 13 A: Before pretty well anybody made that 14 connection. 15 Q: But then Tex as you call him -- 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: -- had informed people that night 18 that he had shot someone who was standing somewhere, 19 right? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: And he saw that his shot did have 22 some effect on that person, did connect with that person, 23 right? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: So --
161 A: But, he could have been in the Camp 2 or in the Park with just a shoulder wound. 3 Q: The person who was shot, I see. 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: Okay, I understand your reasoning 6 now. You're thinking maybe that person -- 7 A: Well, we didn't know he was fatally 8 shot certainly at that time, and that's why we didn't 9 realize he wasn't the car driver. 10 Q: Yes. You didn't know that he was 11 fatally shot and you also thought that perhaps that 12 person that Ken Deane had shot had not seek -- sought 13 medical attention so you weren't aware of who that person 14 was; is that -- 15 A: That's correct. 16 Q: Okay. I understand now. Thank you. 17 Now you conducted, as you told, us a parallel 18 investigation concerning the killing of Dudley George, 19 right? 20 A: With SIU, yes. 21 Q: Parallel to the SIU investigation? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: And at first you did some interviews 24 with respect to that and then you took on a formal role 25 with respect to that parallel investigation?
171 A: Yes, sir. 2 Q: Now, I gather there was no OPP 3 investigation of the beating of Cecil Bernard George? 4 A: SIU said they -- they were going to 5 do that. 6 Q: Well, SIU was investigating the 7 killing of Dudley George as well? 8 A: As well, yes. 9 Q: But there was a parallel 10 investigation by the OPP of the killing of Dudley George, 11 but not of the beating of Cecil Bernard George, right? 12 A: Well, not probably directly but 13 certainly we gave SIU a statement of every officer that 14 was down there. They got copies -- 15 Q: I see. 16 A: -- of everybody that was down there, 17 their position, what they were doing. And certainly that 18 would help their investigation because they didn't have 19 to interview them. 20 Q: You give them some information but 21 you didn't conduct a parallel investigation? 22 A: I -- I say indirectly we did but -- 23 Q: I see. Okay. 24 A: Yeah. 25 Q: Well, did you determine some of the
181 officers who had been beating Cecil Bernard George that 2 night, sir? 3 A: No, sir. 4 Q: Did you interview officers and ask 5 them what -- where they were with respect to that 6 beating? 7 A: Yes, sir. 8 Q: You did? 9 A: Yes, sir. 10 Q: How many -- did you interview all the 11 officers in the Crowd Management Unit? 12 A: Every officer that was down there, 13 yes, sir. 14 Q: And you -- you asked them where they 15 were when Cecil Bernard George was lying on the ground 16 getting beaten? 17 A: Yes, sir. And we gave all the 18 statements to SIU. 19 Q: I see. And -- 20 A: They would be the lead agency on the 21 investigation. 22 Q: Did any of the officers acknowledge 23 hitting Cecil Bernard George with a baton? 24 A: I can't recall. But I believe one 25 (1) or two (2) of them said they hit him, yes.
191 Q: And did any acknowledge kicking Cecil 2 Bernard George? 3 A: I can't recall that. 4 Q: I see. 5 A: I'd have to look at the statements. 6 Q: Now, you also, as you told us, worked 7 with Norm Peel, the lawyer representing Ken Deane, in 8 assisting him with his defence of Ken Deane, right? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: Now, you told us that you were, on 11 January 16, 1997, assigned to do that work? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And who gave you that assignment? 14 A: I believe it was the Western Region 15 Command Staff with permission from Peel -- Mr. Peel and 16 from Ian Scott the Crown Attorney. 17 Q: So the Western Region Command Staff, 18 would that have been Superintendent Parkin then? 19 A: Him or his designate. I'm not sure 20 at that time. 21 Q: So it would have been either Parkin 22 or Parkin's designate? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: I notice you don't appear to have any 25 notes about that, right?
201 A: About the OPP giving us permission? 2 Q: Yes. 3 A: No. But I think in there, a day or 4 two (2) later I have Superintendent Parkin asking where 5 we're staying and to give the bills to him and all that 6 stuff. I believe I have that in my notes. 7 Q: I see. Is that in your notes -- 8 A: I believe so, yes. 9 Q: I'm sorry, could you point me to 10 where you're thinking of, sir? A day or two (2) after 11 January 16, 1997? 12 A: Yes. 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 Q: I didn't notice -- 17 MS. KAREN JONES: If it -- if it helps, 18 Mr. Commissioner, it's at page 146 of this officer's 19 notes. 20 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 22 Ms. Jones. Thank you. 146. 23 24 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 25 Q: Well, at page 146; that's on 6
211 February, 1997 -- 2 A: Yes, sir. 3 Q: -- is that correct? 4 A: Yes, sir. 5 Q: That's what you're thinking of? 6 A: Yes, sir. 7 Q: Yes, but that's several weeks after 8 you began to work, right? 9 A: Two (2) weeks maybe, yes. 10 Q: Yes. And, in fact, what you wrote 11 there is that Superintendent Parkin was questioning what 12 Dew -- Dew and you were doing for Norm Peel? 13 A: Yes, and we he was getting some cost 14 centre for our rooms and stuff, yes, sir. 15 Q: Yes. He also was questioning what 16 you were doing, right? 17 A: He wanted to know exactly what we 18 were doing for him, yes. 19 Q: But there's no notation -- 20 A: But he knew that -- 21 Q: -- in your notebook -- 22 A: He knew -- 23 Q: -- unless I missed it that he was, 24 before then, aware of what you were doing and or, even 25 stronger as you seemed to suggest, that he had assigned
221 you to do it? 2 He didn't assign you to do it, did he? 3 A: Yes, sir. You think I'm -- well, I'm 4 not out there being a rogue officer just doing this for-- 5 Q: No, no. Well, I -- I -- so 6 Superintendent Parkin assigned you to this work? 7 A: Or his designate. The OPP knew that 8 we were doing it, how's that? 9 Q: I see. Okay. I just would have 10 thought that that would have been important to right in 11 your notes, would it not, sir? Certainly Norman Peel 12 didn't have authority to assign you to do any work, 13 right? 14 A: No. Absolutely. And I wouldn't have 15 gone there if I didn't have permission from the OPP. 16 Q: Not only permission but instruction 17 from the OPP, correct? 18 A: Well, certainly permission. 19 Q: Yes. And you were doing this work as 20 part of your paid duties as an OPP officer? 21 A: Absolutely. 22 Q: Now, if you turn back to page 144 of 23 your notes... 24 A: Yes, sir? 25 Q: Sorry. If I could begin at page 143
231 there's an entry 7 November '96 at 8:30: 2 "Enroute to Orillia with Detective 3 Constable Dew and Sergeant Deane." 4 Right? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And then 12:45: 7 "Met with Darrell Hawk, Forensic ID 8 Orillia. Viewed re-enactment." 9 And there were some discrepancies. Now, 10 that was a re-enactment of the shooting of Dudley George 11 was it, sir? 12 A: Yes, and the bus and the car coming 13 out, yes. 14 Q: And the bus and the car. So -- and 15 Officer Deane was present at that re-enactment? 16 A: Yes, he was. 17 Q: And you -- you write there, there 18 were some discrepancies? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: Between what and what? 21 A: Between what the re-enactment, the -- 22 Mr. Hawk had done on the computer -- 23 Q: Yes? 24 A: -- and what Officer Deane believed 25 happened.
241 Q: I see. And how were those 2 discrepancies resolved? 3 A: Well, he showed us the video of it or 4 the computer imaging of it and Tex Deane wrote down what 5 he thought should be changed -- 6 Q: I see. 7 A: -- and they were changing? 8 Q: Then they changed? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: I see. And the next entry, more or 11 less, is at 16 January '97 on page 144. Sorry, Mr. 12 Commissioner, I should have indicated that we're looking 13 at his notes which are Exhibit P-1677 to the proceedings. 14 Now, at page 144, thereof: 15 "16 January spoke with Norm Peel. 16 Meeting arranged for 23 January." 17 So that's when you began to begin the 18 formal contact with Mr. Peel with respect to assisting 19 him in the defence, correct? 20 A: Yes, sir. 21 Q: And then the next entry is on 23 22 January? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And it says that you met with Norm 25 Peel then Ken Deane and Detective Constable Dew?
251 A: Yes. 2 Q: And it says, "briefly explained to 3 us." 4 I gather it was Mr. Peel who was doing the 5 explaining; is that correct? 6 A: Yes, he was. 7 Q: That: 8 "There was a pre-trial hearing and it 9 was agreed that Peel would re-interview 10 and prepare police officers as 11 witnesses while Scott would do the same 12 for the Natives." 13 Now, I gather that it was anticipated then 14 that the police officers would all be defence witnesses, 15 right? 16 A: No, I believe they'd be witnesses for 17 either side. 18 Q: For either side? 19 A: Yeah. 20 Q: But Peel would do the interviewing 21 even for prosecution witnesses? 22 A: Absolutely. 23 Q: That was your understanding? 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: I see. And then it says further down
261 on page 145, perhaps a third of the way down: 2 "Permission was granted for Peel to use 3 Dew and myself for the preparation." 4 Now, that was -- are you referring there 5 to the permission by Parkin or permission by whom? 6 A: By the OPP. 7 Q: By the OPP. So Parkin or some other 8 -- or someone in his office? 9 A: Yeah. 10 Q: And Mr. Peel informed you of that 11 according to this note; is that correct? 12 A: Yeah. He -- he also got permission 13 to use us. We got permission from the OPP and he also 14 got permission to use us as well. 15 Q: Well, is it possible since you don't 16 have a note of anything coming from Superintendent Parkin 17 or his office with respect to that that you got the word 18 of the permission from Mr. Peel? 19 A: No. 20 Q: That's the way this appears to read, 21 would you agree, sir? It's -- 22 A: It appears to read that but that's 23 not correct. He got permission to use us. 24 Q: But is -- is it possible -- 25 A: And -- and we got permission to help
271 Mr. Peel. 2 Q: Yes, but is it possible that you 3 learned about that permission through Mr. Peel? 4 A: No. 5 Q: That -- that is the way it seems to 6 read but that's incorrect then? 7 A: Well, I wouldn't have called him back 8 on the 16th of January if I didn't already have 9 permission. 10 Q: I see. Okay. 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 Q: So that was on February -- on January 15 16 you initiated contact with Mr. Peel with respect to 16 this arrangement. You met with him on the 23rd, and then 17 if you turn to page 146, we looked at it a few moments 18 ago, that's where it says: 19 "On 6 February that Superintendent 20 Parkin questioned what Dew and I were 21 doing for Norm Peel." 22 Now -- 23 A: He wanted to know what our duties 24 were. What -- what duties were we doing. 25 Q: He wanted to know exactly what you
281 had done or what you intended to do is that -- 2 A: Yeah. 3 Q: But, then that was February 6 '97. 4 And then if you look at page 148 an entry for 7 February 5 '97, the next day, 9:00 in the morning, you receive a 6 call from Superintendent Parkin -- Parkin and: 7 "Our assistance to Peel is being 8 terminated by Commissioner." 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: So whatever you told him in response 11 to his inquiries the day before, led apparently to a 12 termination of your continuing that work, correct? 13 A: I don't know. 14 Q: Well, in any event -- the work -- you 15 were notified at 9:00 in the morning on February 7 -- 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: -- to terminate that work? 18 A: Yes, is being terminated, yes. 19 Q: Sorry? 20 A: Is being terminated, yes. 21 Q: Yes. By the Commissioner himself? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: Is what you're instructed? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And Peel advised, I gather that means
291 that you advised Peel and he told you that he will call 2 Superintendent Parkin and then get back to you, right? 3 A: Yeah. 4 Q: So I gather when you advised Peel he 5 didn't like that fact and wanted to try to reverse that 6 decision, is that it? 7 A: Yes sir. 8 Q: And he told you he'll let you know 9 what happens? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: But, in fact, that decision was never 12 reversed, right? 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: And in fact you have it two (2) days 15 later on the same page: 16 "10:00 on February 9, Superintendent 17 Parkin confirms that Dew and I cannot 18 assist with Deane's defence." 19 Right? 20 A: Right. 21 Q: But, then on 13 February right 22 underneath that at 12:00: 23 "Meeting held with Peel, Dew and self. 24 Discussed who is retired and capable of 25 assisting and all agree Jack Clarke."
301 So I gather you were -- in light of the 2 fact that you were not allowed to continue, were 3 discussing with Mr. Peel who else could do the work that 4 you had been doing? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Is that correct? 7 A: That's correct. 8 Q: And it was thought that a retired 9 officer might be an appropriate person to do that work, 10 right? 11 A: Yes sir. 12 Q: And you sugg -- all agreed Jack 13 Clarke was an appropriate such person? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: But, then if we turn to page 152 of 16 the notes, the entry for 31 March '97 at 17:30 reads: 17 "Assist in setting up files et cetera 18 re. trial of Deane." 19 Is that correct? 20 A: That's correct. 21 Q: And that was assisting Mr. Peel was 22 it not? 23 A: It was. Getting all the files set up 24 for him, yes. 25 Q: Yes. Now did Superintendent Parkin
311 authorize you doing that, sir? 2 A: The OPP did, yes. 3 Q: The OPP did? 4 A: Yes sir. 5 Q: Well, we had just read an entry that 6 you work assisting Peele was terminated -- 7 A: Hmm hmm. 8 Q: -- and you agreed that that order was 9 never reversed, but who -- who allowed you to do this 10 then? 11 A: I believe it was Inspector Goodall. 12 Q: But, Inspector Goodall didn't have 13 the authority to countermand Superintendent Parkin did 14 he? 15 A: Well, I'm certainly sure that he got 16 permission to do that. He was working out of Orillia at 17 the time. 18 Q: So now you were assisting again, 19 right? 20 A: Just carrying the files down, that's 21 all. We didn't interview anybody, like to assist Mr. 22 Peel we -- 23 Q: Well -- 24 A: -- we just carried all the files down 25 and get him set up, that's all.
321 Q: Setting them up? 2 A: Cause I did the file coordinating so 3 I knew where they all were. 4 Q: Yes. And then you attended the Deane 5 trial for many days, right? 6 A: Yes sir. 7 Q: That was part of your paid duties? 8 A: Yes sir. 9 Q: And in the course of that trial you 10 consulted with Mr. Peel from time to time to assist him 11 in understanding the files and so on? 12 A: Yes sir. 13 Q: And that was assisting Mr. Peel in 14 the defence of Ken Deane, was it not? 15 A: Yes, sir. 16 Q: And Superintendent Parkin, did he 17 authorize that, sir? 18 A: He would have known about it, 19 absolutely. 20 Q: He would have known about it? 21 A: Absolutely. 22 Q: I see. And then continuing in the 23 notes... 24 25 (BRIEF PAUSE)
331 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 2 Rosenthal, are you going to be much longer in this area, 3 because you're way past your estimated hour. I just want 4 to know how much longer you're going to be? 5 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: In this area not 6 very much more then a couple of other small items, sir. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 8 Mr. Rosenthal. 9 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Sorry, did you wish 10 to have a break or something, sir? Getting close -- 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, no. No, 12 I'm fine. Just -- 13 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes, sir. 14 15 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 16 Q: At page 154 you have an entry for 13 17 May '97? 18 A: Yes, I do. 19 Q: At 15:15: 20 "Norm Peel advised of notes and photos 21 in archives in Ottawa." 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: That was assisting with the defence, 24 was it not? 25 A: No, it was not.
341 Q: Oh, I see. 2 A: He, as I explained yesterday, I was 3 asked that question already, Mr. Peel was a designated 4 member of the Department of National Defence -- 5 Q: Yes. 6 A: -- and when we originally got the 7 operational notes from the DND for court they were all 8 blacked out. And he, through his contacts, he found that 9 the notes and photographs from the Camp Ipperwash were in 10 the archives in Ottawa which gave us -- 11 Q: No, I appreciate all that, sir, but-- 12 A: Okay. 13 Q: -- you wrote you advised Norm Peel of 14 notes and photos in archives in Ottawa; that was with the 15 intent of assisting him in defending Ken Deane"? 16 A: No, he advised us where they were. 17 Q: Oh, I'm sorry, Norm Peel advised -- 18 he advised you. Okay, sorry, I misunderstood. Sorry. 19 A: Okay. 20 Q: But then if we turn to 15 May, on 21 page 155, there's an entry at 9:05: 22 "You met with Goodall, Dew and Ron 23 Piers." 24 That Ron Piers, I guess is his name; is 25 that correct?
351 A: Yes, it is. 2 Q: And he was an investigator assisting 3 Norm Peel? 4 A: I think so. Yes. 5 Q: Yes. 6 A: He was a retired -- 7 Q: A retired, I believe, Deputy 8 Commissioner -- 9 A: Deputy -- Deputy Commissioner -- 10 Q: -- of the OPP? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: -- who was assist -- also assisting 13 Norm Peel with his defence of Ken Deane, correct? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: And then there you have an entry: 16 "Bottom line is to disclose, is that we 17 can tell Peel anything we want but we 18 cannot give hard copies of statements, 19 records, et cetera. They however, can 20 obtain them through subpoenas, et 21 cetera. Piers given the names of MP's 22 interviewed and brief idea of what they 23 can say. Given copy of [something 24 redacted] statement and copies of 25 DND..."
361 And then one (1) word I can't read -- 2 well, "logs" I guess; is that correct? 3 A: "logs", yes, yeah. 4 Q: Did I read that correctly then, sir? 5 A: Yes, sir, you did. 6 Q: And that was assisting in the defence 7 of Ken Deane, was it not, sir? 8 A: And that's with permission of 9 Detective Inspector Goodall. 10 Q: I see. 11 A: So. 12 Q: Okay. And then similarly on 10 June 13 '97, at page 156 there's an entry: 14 "Also myself and Dew assigned to 15 coordinate re-interview of OPP by Ron 16 Piers." 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: Who gave you that assignment, sir? 19 A: Inspector Goodall. 20 Q: Thank you. And then subsequently you 21 did a number of interviews with military personnel, 22 right? 23 A: Yes, we did. 24 Q: And that was with the goal of 25 assisting the defence of Ken Deane as well, right?
371 A: No, sir, that was not. 2 Q: I see. And what goal was that with-- 3 A: To determine the truth of the whole 4 thing. 5 Q: Determine the truth? 6 A: They were not -- they -- we didn't 7 know who they were until after the trial when they 8 actually called and found out why we hadn't come and 9 interviewed them prior and so we -- because the logs were 10 all blacked out that we got. So they called and we -- we 11 started interviewing them. 12 Q: And then later on, as we know from 13 Tab 11, you signed an affidavit with respect to the 14 appeal of Ken Deane; is that correct? 15 A: I signed an affidavit of what I knew 16 about the case, yes. 17 Q: Yes. For the purposes of assisting 18 the appeal of Ken Deane? 19 A: Well, for whatever purpose they 20 wanted to use it for, I guess. 21 Q: Well, you understood it was to help 22 with the appeal didn't you, sir? 23 A: Oh, yeah, but -- 24 Q: That -- 25 A: -- if Ian Scott had asked for it I
381 would have given it to him too. 2 Q: Yes, but -- 3 A: Either one. 4 Q: -- when you did that was that part of 5 your assigned duties as well? 6 A: Absolutely. 7 Q: Thank you. Now, in answer to a 8 question of Ms. Vella you responded with respect to the 9 Whitehead and Dyke matter that you were not interviewed 10 by the Professional Standards Committee, that the way you 11 answered suggested to me that you were interviewed by 12 someone else perhaps; is that correct? 13 A: No, I wasn't. 14 Q: You weren't interviewed by anyone? 15 A: No. 16 Q: Including the investigator who did 17 the report for the OPP, he didn't interview you? 18 A: No, we -- 19 Q: Okay. 20 A: -- we disclosed the -- the tape when 21 we -- when we heard it and that's all we know. 22 Q: Now, you told us that in your view 23 the OPP should not have given up the crime scene? 24 A: Exactly. 25 Q: And if I understand your concern as -
391 - that late in September 6 the OPP withdrew from that 2 scene and it was -- investigators were not on the crime 3 scene or the many crime scenes perhaps for at least 4 several days and evidence can get lost and contaminated 5 in that period, correct? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: That's your concern? 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 Q: Now, did you acquire any 10 understanding as to why the OPP left that night? 11 A: I -- I had an understanding it was 12 for safety. 13 Q: But purportedly they had gone down 14 the road for safety, right? 15 A: For public safety, yes. 16 Q: Yes. 17 A: Yeah. 18 Q: And did you achieve any understanding 19 as to why it had been deemed important for public safety 20 to march down the road earlier that night, but at about 21 midnight or whatever it was not deemed important to be 22 there and they marched away? 23 A: Not my decision, sir, that was -- 24 Q: No, I appreciate it wasn't your 25 decision.
401 A: No. 2 Q: Did you achieve any understanding of 3 the elements that might have gone into those decisions? 4 A: No, sir. 5 Q: Thank you. Now, finally you told Ms. 6 Tuck-Jackson, counsel for the OPP, when she was examining 7 you yesterday that you would be concerned if a member of 8 the government appeared to be directing police on 9 operational matters? 10 A: Yes, sir. 11 Q: But then -- I don't understand then 12 why you didn't do something when you were advised as we - 13 - as we saw that the OPP had been told by the Government 14 to do whatever was necessary to keep the people out of 15 the Park? 16 Didn't you consider that to be a detailed 17 direction to the OPP? 18 A: No, sir, I -- I took it as the 19 Government of Ontario being a victim like with the MNR, 20 that if the Park's taken over then the -- the MNR who run 21 the Park, and I presumed owned it or had title to it 22 would be a victim of -- of the occupation. 23 Q: Yes. But if the Government -- 24 someone from the Government had advised the OPP do 25 whatever is necessary to --
411 A: Well, they aren't going to -- I -- I 2 took it that they weren't going to relinquish it like the 3 DND did. 4 Q: I'm sorry? 5 A: I took it that they weren't just 6 going to hand it to the occupiers. 7 Q: Yes, I'm not concerned -- 8 A: Okay. 9 Q: -- with that aspect, sir. I'm 10 concerned with what -- 11 MS. KAREN JONES: Well, sorry. Mr. 12 Commissioner. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You has to 14 give him a chance to answer the question. 15 MS. KAREN JONES: Surely this Witness 16 gets to answer the question -- 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 18 MS. KAREN JONES: -- without being 19 interrupted. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 21 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I'm happy to let 22 him answer, Mr. Commissioner, I'm trying to save time. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No. 24 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Please go on, sir. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You ask him
421 a question -- 2 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I -- I -- that's 3 not what I was going for but I will wait and ask you what 4 I want afterwards, sir. I don't mean to interrupt you. 5 THE WITNESS: That's -- 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: What was the 7 question that you had asked that he was in the middle of 8 answering now? 9 10 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 11 Q: The question that I'm concerned with, 12 sir, and -- and I -- I don't want to inhibit your answer 13 but I would like my question answered in addition to 14 anything else you would like to say. 15 And the question I'm concerned with is, 16 you've told us that you'd be concerned members of the 17 government were directing police on operational matters? 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: And I'm suggesting to you that a 20 statement from the government, your -- your notes don't 21 record who from the government but it says, "the 22 government," right? 23 A: Hmm hmm. 24 Q: Advised OPP to use whatever means are 25 necessary to prevent the takeover of the Park, or words
431 to that effect. 2 I'm suggesting to you that it does appear 3 to be a direction to the police on operational matters. 4 And does it -- does that appear to be the kind of 5 direction that you might be concerned about, sir? 6 A: No, I'm not concerned with it as I 7 was trying to answer to you. 8 I took it that the MNR, being part of the 9 Government, owned the Park and that they were not going 10 to relinquish the Park in the same manner that the 11 Department of National Defence relinquished the Camp. 12 When the First Nations people took over the camp, that 13 basically the DND says, Don't worry about it, we don't 14 need a hand, we're fine. 15 Q: Yes sir, I appreciate that. 16 A: And so I took it that if the 17 occupiers took over the Park that the MNR were going to 18 fight them taking over the Park, in that Court 19 injunctions and we'd keep the peace, and if there's 20 criminal activity charges would be laid, traffic 21 infractions, whatever. 22 Q: But you agreed -- 23 A: And that's what I took it as and it 24 would be no concern of mine. 25 Q: But, you agreed with me yesterday,
441 sir that what you wrote indicated that what you had 2 understood was that there were directives from someone in 3 the Government or somehow in the Government, separately 4 to the OPP and to MNR and to the effect of using whatever 5 means necessary to prevent the takeover of the Park? 6 A: I never said there was a directive 7 out. I had no idea about -- I'm just quoting what Mark 8 Wright told me. 9 Q: Oh, of course -- 10 A: Okay. So I'll -- so I can only tell 11 you what I believed he was telling me when I wrote that 12 down. 13 Q: Yes, but, what you understood from 14 Mark Wright was that that had been information that 15 flowed from the Government. You didn't specify in what 16 form -- 17 A: I don't know -- 18 Q: -- perhaps didn't know in what form. 19 But, there had been information that flowed from the 20 Government to both MNR and the OPP, that whatever means 21 necessary should be used to prevent the takeover of the 22 Park. All right, did I say it correctly this time? 23 A: Sure. 24 Q: Okay. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think
451 you've asked this question -- 2 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Now, that was your 3 understanding -- 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 5 Rosenthal, I think you asked this question yesterday, 6 this very question didn't you? 7 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes, to clarify 8 that. No, that's right. 9 10 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 11 Q: But then -- so then given that 12 understanding, sir were you not concerned that 13 information from the Government to the OPP, to use 14 whatever means necessary to prevent takeover of the Park, 15 would be a direction from the Government to the Police on 16 operational matters. 17 A: No sir. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just before 19 you answer -- you've already answered. 20 MS. JENNIFER MCALEER: I would just 21 prefer that we use the wording that's actually in the 22 note, which is "to do what is necessary." 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 24 MS. JENNIFER MCALEER: Mr. Rosenthal 25 keeps saying, "to use whatever means is necessary" and I
461 don't believe that was the Witness' evidence -- 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 3 Ms. McAleer. 4 MS. JENNIFER MCALEER: -- and it's not 5 reflected in the notes. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 7 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: No, no -- thank 8 you. No, I -- 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Do you want 10 to use the precise -- 11 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I do appreciate 12 that clarification. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: He already 14 answered the question in any event but if you want to -- 15 16 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 17 Q: What you wrote exactly is: 18 "To do what is necessary to prevent 19 Park from being taken over, sir." 20 I'm sorry -- 21 A: Yeah -- 22 Q: -- I slightly misquoted that. So -- 23 A: I have no concerns. 24 Q: And that did not constitute the kind 25 of Government direction that you'd be concerned with?
471 A: I don't think it was a Government 2 direction at me, that's for sure. 3 Q: Okay. Well I won't continue, Mr. 4 Commissioner. Thank you, Officer. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 6 Mr. Rosenthal. 7 Mr. Scullion, you're back and you're back 8 on time. Do you have any cross-examination? 9 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: I have returned Mr. 10 Commissioner. After some late night reading, I noticed 11 that Mr. Rosenthal had covered most of the issues, but I 12 also saw a couple of issues I wanted to follow up on. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 14 Carry on Mr. Scullion. 15 16 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. KEVIN SCULLION: 17 Q: Good morning. 18 A: Good morning, sir. 19 Q: Is it Detective, Constable still -- I 20 wasn't sure -- 21 A: Sergeant. 22 Q: Sergeant. 23 A: Retired, Mr. Richardson, whatever. 24 Q: I'll leave it with Sergeant 25 Richardson.
481 A: Thank you. 2 Q: My name is Kevin Scullion, I'm one of 3 counsel for the Residents of Aazhoodena. You may have 4 known them at the time as the Stoney Point Group? 5 A: Yes sir. 6 Q: I take it, just following up on Mr. 7 Rosenthal's last series of questions that you viewed this 8 situation as a basic land claim and that the MNR were 9 going to dispute that land claim as against the Stoney 10 Pointers? 11 A: Yes, sir. 12 Q: All right. And I noticed that that 13 was, in essence, the explanation that you gave to the 14 local resident when you met them on September the 5th, 15 that it was simply a land claim and it be resolved in 16 Court? 17 A: Yes, sir. 18 Q: All right. I also read with 19 interest, your responses to Ms. Panjer's questions 20 yesterday, just in relation to it -- the OPP being a 21 neutral entity. And I take it that was your view, as 22 well, at the time that the OPP were a neutral entity 23 there to keep the peace and make sure everybody was 24 behaving themselves? 25 A: Yes, sir. And any violations would
491 be investigated and charges laid if necessary, yeah. 2 Q: No, fair enough, with respect to 3 keeping the peace and making sure everybody was behaving 4 themselves. 5 A: Yes, sir. 6 Q: My question to you is: Did you find 7 it a little bit odd that given that you were a neutral 8 entity and given that it was a land claim, you were still 9 being directed as the Head of the Investigation Unit, to 10 prepare arrest warrants for the physical presence in the 11 Park? 12 Did you have any trouble with those two 13 (2) concepts? 14 A: The arrest -- the arrest packages -- 15 MR. KAREN JONES: Sorry, Mr. 16 Commissioner, there is no evidence that he was being 17 directed to prepare arrest warrants for people who were 18 in the Park. 19 He is -- he gave evidence he was preparing 20 arrest warrants for those persons who had committed acts 21 of violence against the police. People who had smashed 22 into cruisers -- 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Or other 24 criminal acts. 25 MS. KAREN JONES: -- or broke windows or
501 done that kind of thing. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. I 3 think to be precise -- 4 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: Or -- or other 5 criminal acts. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Other 7 criminal acts. 8 9 CONTINUED BY MR. KEVIN SCULLION: 10 Q: Right. And part of which was the 11 entry into the Park. You were looking into that? 12 A: Section 72? 13 Q: Right. 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: And you were preparing arrest 16 packages in that regarding as -- 17 A: Well, we -- initially we were trying 18 to get some clarification whether that section applied. 19 Q: Right. And -- 20 A: And after several days, yes, it did 21 apply and when we identified the -- the occupiers of the 22 Park I laid an information and warrants were issued. 23 Q: Right. Okay. 24 A: But not executed on the Park. 25 Q: No, I appreciate that --
511 A: Okay. Yeah. 2 Q: -- but you were preparing -- 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: -- that Information in order -- in 5 relation to the people that were, in fact, occupying the 6 Park? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: All right. And you were asked by Ms. 9 Vella in-chief about the concept of colour of right; do 10 you remember that line of questioning? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And your answer was that in your view 13 the MNR, in fact, had the colour of right with respect to 14 the Park? 15 A: To my knowledge, yes, everything that 16 I was told that they had the colour of right for the 17 Park. Yes. 18 Q: I agree. But I -- appreciate it and 19 I am looking for your view at the time. 20 A: Yeah. 21 Q: And that view was based on presumably 22 information that was provided by either Inspector Carson 23 or others that they'd already researched the concept of 24 ownership of the Park and it was being viewed as an 25 illegal occupation of the Park?
521 A: Correct. 2 Q: All right. Can I take it from that 3 the concept of colour of right, if it was acknowledged by 4 the OPP with respect to the people in the Park, it wasn't 5 given much credence? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: All right. Now, if I can turn you to 8 your notes, and I just want to make sure I'm on the right 9 tabs. 10 I guess Tab 3 of your binder and it's P- 11 1671. At the top -- 12 A: Correction, what page? 13 Q: At the top of the page is sixteen 14 (16), circle sixteen (16)? 15 A: Yes, sir. 16 Q: You've got a 23:10 timeframe with 17 Constable Speck advising of various things. And I'm 18 interested in (b), the reference to Children's Aid 19 Society? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: You see that reference? 22 A: Yes, I do. 23 Q: What was your impression or 24 understanding of why the Children's Aid Society was being 25 involved at this stage?
531 A: Well, they weren't being involved in 2 this stage, it was a preventative measure. If people are 3 arrested, if the father and the mother are arrested and 4 there's a five (5) year old child running around with 5 nobody looking after the child then it's our duty to put 6 that child into protection. 7 So the Children's Aid said they would do 8 that for us. 9 Q: Okay. So it was a follow-up kind of 10 view that you're taking if we arrested the parents we 11 needed to see what would be done with the children? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: And in your note it says: 14 "They would like us to announce to..." 15 If I'm reading it correctly: 16 "...Natives of this fact."? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: Do -- do you know if that ever 19 occurred? 20 A: I -- I don't know. I did not do it. 21 Q: And it wasn't up to you to advise the 22 Natives, as you have in here -- 23 A: That was correct. 24 Q: -- the CAS would be -- potentially 25 becoming involved?
541 A: That's correct. 2 Q: All right. You also were directed by 3 Ms. Vella with respect to various recommendations that 4 you had following-up this event; one of which was of 5 particular interest to me which was the availability of 6 officers' notes and reports following the incident of 7 someone such as yourself who's investigating the 8 occurrence; do you remember discussing that? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: Now, in terms of a recommendation, it 11 sounded more to me that that was a recommendation that 12 everybody do what they're supposed to do which is keep 13 proper notes and prepare proper reports as soon as 14 possible? 15 A: To be fair though, sir, that was not 16 a recommendation, that was a part of the debriefing on 17 the 21st of February. 18 Q: Right, and it was -- 19 A: That was just -- it was a follow-up 20 to make sure that it doesn't happen again, type of thing, 21 with the OPP. 22 Q: No, I appreciate that -- 23 A: Okay. 24 Q: -- as opposed to recommendations 25 coming through the Inquiry system --
551 A: Yeah, I -- yeah, it wasn't -- 2 Q: -- here. I -- I appreciate that. 3 A: Okay. 4 Q: But I'm just looking into that 5 comment by you was more of everybody needs to follow what 6 procedures are already in place which is take proper 7 notes, make proper reports as soon as possible and make 8 them available as quickly as possible? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: Right. And that's, I presume, 11 something that as the investigator dealing with this 12 matter that wasn't, in fact, what happened for you? 13 A: Well, the officers that were involved 14 in the major incidents, they provided notes and 15 statements right away. 16 What I was trying to explain was that some 17 of the officers that were on checkpoints that weren't 18 involved in anything, they still had to provide notes and 19 statements of what they did and -- and where they were 20 and all that stuff. 21 And we had a lot of officers coming in and 22 out of that area over the month. And someone would be on 23 a checkpoint just for a day or two (2), then they'd be 24 gone back to North Bay or whatever and we ended up, you 25 know, having to call and say, Hey, we need your notes and
561 a -- and a brief statement. 2 So it was -- none of the -- none of the 3 major players did that in the incident, it was just the 4 minor things. But we still have to collect them, right? 5 Everybody that's there has to give notes and a statement. 6 Q: Okay. And I'm just trying to -- 7 A: Yeah. 8 Q: -- put it in context. You're saying 9 that -- you used the term 'major players' but -- 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: -- presumably that's everybody who 12 was n the sandy parking lot that night -- 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: -- provided you, as the investigator, 15 with their notes and reports -- 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: -- quickly? 18 A: Yes, they did. 19 Q: And your reference to weeks and 20 months is just with respect to -- 21 A: Fringe players if you want to -- 22 Q: Fringe -- 23 A: Fringe officers that had no criminal 24 activity happen with them or anything like that, but 25 still we have to have their notes and -- and statements.
571 And a lot of times they forget or they get assigned to 2 another place and they forget that they have to do that. 3 Q: Right. And the reason I presume for 4 doing something like that is because taking notes at the 5 time or very close after the time is the best 6 recollection of what occurred? 7 A: Well, I don't mean their no -- I mean 8 providing us a copy of their notes. For disclosure we 9 have to have notes and statements from everybody involved 10 for -- 11 Q: Right. 12 A: -- disclosure. 13 Q: Right. I'm -- 14 A: Right. 15 Q: I'm just taking it a step further in 16 terms of -- 17 A: Okay. No, the -- I'm sure the 18 notebooks are up-to-date and -- and were done at the 19 time. 20 Q: Right. 21 A: I'm just saying that we didn't get a 22 copy of them or their statement -- 23 Q: Right. 24 A: -- for the brief. 25 Q: At the time you were an officer for a
581 number of years? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: And I'm looking to your view that 4 putting all the notes, putting all the observations down 5 in the police notes is the best way to keep track of what 6 occurred. And to do it -- 7 A: Absolutely. 8 Q: -- and to do it quickly is obviously 9 far better than waiting a number of months in which point 10 it could be influenced by other factors? 11 A: Absolutely. 12 Q: All right. If I can just turn you to 13 page 17 of your notes. Again it's, just for the record, 14 P-1671. At the time 02:10 you have a reference to 15 floodlights being shone on the members on occasion. 16 Do you see that? 17 A: Yes, I do. 18 Q: And then at 07:00 there's a 19 discussion with Mark Dew and again there's a notation: 20 "It's very quiet except for some 21 floodlights being shone on our members 22 on occasion." 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: I take it that it was your view at 25 that time that the floodlights being shone on the members
591 in the evening, in the late hours, was more of a nuisance 2 than anything else? 3 A: Well, as a criminal investigator 4 shining a light on somebody is not a criminal offence. 5 Not taking away the fear or the nervousness that the 6 officers would have having a floodlights shone on them, 7 not knowing if there's a rifle on them as well. 8 So I'm not taking away that they were 9 nervous or scared or whatever that having the floodlights 10 shone on them -- 11 Q: Hmm hmm. 12 A: -- but as a criminal act or criminal 13 investigation there's no offence for that. 14 Q: Right. And in terms of your criminal 15 investigation you didn't go any further than simply 16 making a note that there were floodlights? 17 A: That's -- that's correct. 18 Q: Okay, and one (1) last point. In 19 your evidence in chief you referred to outsiders or those 20 that were not regular people on the Base, that were 21 outside the Stoney Point Group as you referred to it, 22 were of concern to you at the time? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: I take it, notwithstanding the view 25 that you'd look into outsiders, you were aware of the
601 fact that many, many people from outside of the area 2 would oftentimes visit Stoney Point area -- 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: -- during the summer. 5 A: I assumed that would happen, yes. 6 Q: Okay. Not only in summer -- 7 A: I wouldn't know that personally but-- 8 Q: You weren't advised at any point that 9 in fact there were people coming and going to this Base? 10 A: I had no knowledge of the Ipperwash 11 incident until September 4th, so. 12 Q: That may be the easier answer to my 13 question. Thank you. 14 A: Okay. 15 Q: Those are all my questions, Mr. 16 Commissioner. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 18 Mr. Scullion. 19 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: Thank you, 20 Detective. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. Millar, 22 I understand Mr. George does not have any examination? 23 MR. DERRY MILLAR: That's correct. He 24 advised me this morning and asked me to advise you. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you
611 very much. 2 Mr. Roy...? 3 MR. JULIAN ROY: Good morning, sir. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: How are you 5 this morning? 6 MR. JULIAN ROY: Very good. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Your 8 original estimate is still reasonably accurate? 9 MR. JULIAN ROY: It's -- I expect I'll be 10 less time that I said I would be. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 12 very much.. 13 MR. JULIAN ROY: I think I said thirty 14 (30) to forty-five (45) minutes. I'll be on the low end 15 of that if not less. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 17 Mr. Roy. 18 19 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 20 Q: All right. Good morning, Mr. 21 Richardson. 22 A: Morning, sir. 23 Q: I'm going to refer to you as Mr. 24 Richardson deliberately because I don't want to demote 25 you from retired back to Sergeant.
621 A: Doesn't matter I liked it both. 2 Q: All right. I want to follow-up very 3 briefly on what Mr. Scullion was asking you about, you 4 contacting the CAS on September 5th or noting that there 5 was going to be contact with the CAS in regard to your 6 responsibilities? 7 A: Okay. 8 Q: Do you recall being asked about that 9 just a second ago? 10 A: I do. 11 Q: Okay. You were -- in terms of what 12 your responsibilities were, following your conversation 13 with Mark Wright on August 31st that everyone's been 14 asking you about -- 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: -- a big part of your job was to 17 prepare, sort of, the logistics surrounding how arrests 18 were going to be conducted; is that right? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: Okay. Now, normally when you arrest 21 adult people where there's children involved, you don't 22 always call the CAS, do you? 23 A: Pretty well CAS or another family 24 member. 25 Q: Yes, but --
631 A: If there's one and we... 2 Q: You anticipated my next question, 3 which is what you would often do in a situation where 4 you're arresting a parent is you might look in the 5 vicinity to see if there's a responsible adult connected 6 to the arrestee or the child, that might be able to take 7 custody of the child and look after them, right? 8 A: Absolutely. 9 Q: Okay. Now, in terms of the people 10 who were -- you understood to be occupying the Park, you 11 understood many of them to be related people; is that 12 right? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: Members of the same community, right? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: All right. So your first step, 17 presumably would have been to leave any children of 18 people who were arrested with other people who were part 19 of the occupation; is that right? 20 A: Well, that would be certainly the 21 option. Contacting the Children's Aid; it was just a 22 preventative thing in case we couldn't find anybody. 23 Q: And in the scenario where you 24 couldn't find anybody would be the type of scenario where 25 everybody was going to be -- all the adult people in the
641 vicinity were going to be arrested; is that right? 2 A: Or an isolated area where a couple of 3 people or three people got arrested and there was a child 4 there and nobody else around. 5 Q: All right. But, it would also -- 6 A: But, we'd still ask the question. 7 Q: Yes? 8 A: Have you got a brother, sister, 9 whatever. 10 Q: Yes. And -- but, it would also 11 encompass the situation where all the adults who were 12 part of the occupation would be arrested, the CAS would 13 have to be called; is that right? 14 A: Or all the family members of the 15 child, certainly. 16 Q: All right. Now, moving on to page 19 17 of your notes at Tab 3, which are 1671. 18 A: Yes sir. 19 Q: The briefing of 9:25. I -- you've 20 been asked at length about this and I don't want to go 21 over the same ground, but I have a couple of more 22 questions about it. 23 A: Certainly. 24 Q: You were asked yesterday by Ms. Tuck- 25 Jackson about the notation. If you look under where it
651 says, "Inspector Carson advises"? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: There's sort of two (2) parts, two 4 (2) lists that come out of this briefing in your notes, 5 right? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: There's an (a) through (d), correct? 8 A: That's my briefing, yes. 9 Q: Yes. And then there's (a) through 10 (d), is what you're briefing the rest of the meeting on; 11 is that right? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: Okay. And then Inspector Carson sort 14 of wraps up the meeting after, right? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And quite properly you note what 17 Inspector is telling the whole meeting, right? 18 A: Highlights, yeah. 19 Q: Okay. Now, you have the various 20 points numbered, am I right in saying that generally 21 speaking this is the order in which Inspector Carson was 22 imparting this information, right? 23 A: I wouldn't say it was exact order; I 24 couldn't say that. I'm just -- I'm writing it down as 25 he's talking and I might miss one and come back to it,
661 you know what I mean. 2 Q: But, you did your best as you were 3 doing it to note what Inspector Carson was saying in 4 order; is that right? 5 A: Yes, sir. 6 Q: So likely the point, number 6: 7 "If no one on Park we will try to gain 8 control of it." 9 Likely Inspector Carson said that after 10 the discussion about Member of Parliament and PM to be 11 notified? 12 A: I would say, yes. 13 Q: Okay. Now, Ms. Tuck-Jackson asked 14 you some questions about that notation. It's a -- and I 15 -- it's a very brief -- I have it here but I'm just going 16 to read from yesterday and it's a very short question and 17 answer. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 19 20 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 21 Q: It's at -- for Counsel's reference, 22 it's from yesterday's transcript, page 267 and onto 268. 23 And Ms. Tuck-Jackson asks you as follows: 24 "Q: All right. You told us in respect 25 of item 6 at page 19..."
671 And if I can stop there, you can tell that 2 that's the same thing that I'm asking you about. 3 A: Yes, sir. 4 Q: "...that part of what was conveyed 5 during the briefing was that if no one 6 in the Park we will try and gain 7 control of it. 8 And I think you added this morning that 9 conversely, if there was someone in the 10 Park then you weren't going to be going 11 into it? 12 A: That's correct. 13 Q: All right. Fair to say that also 14 having regard to the piece of 15 information that you had during the 16 briefing that MNR was in the process of 17 seeking an injunction, it was your 18 understanding that in the absence of an 19 injunction the police would not be 20 going into the Park? 21 A: That was my understanding. 22 Q: All right. And, indeed, at no 23 point during the 5th, as the day went 24 on, was there any intention of actually 25 going into the Park?
681 A: Not on my part anyway." 2 You see that? 3 A: Yeah. 4 Q: Do you recall giving that evidence 5 yesterday? 6 A: Yes. Yes, sir. 7 Q: All right. Now, your answer about 8 what was meant by this point 6, was that on your part, 9 anyway, you had no intention of going into the Park on 10 September 5th, fair? 11 A: That's correct. 12 Q: All right. But you can't speak for 13 others, correct? 14 A: I can't. 15 Q: And in terms of what point 6 reflects 16 on page 19 of your notes, what you're reflecting there is 17 -- is something that John Carson is saying, right? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: If you could turn to page 23 of your 20 notes, please. And page 24 is the morning of September 21 6th in 1995 where -- 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Are you on 23 your way up here? No? Sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt 24 you. It's sometimes hard to know if -- 25 MR. JULIAN ROY: I tend to provoke
691 objections -- 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Sorry. 3 MR. JULIAN ROY: -- so I'm not surprised 4 that you assumed that. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, you 6 haven't done that yet. 7 MR. JULIAN ROY: I've only just started 8 though, Mr. Commissioner. 9 10 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 11 Q: On page 24 it reflects the morning of 12 September 6th, 1995? 13 A: Yes, it does. 14 Q: And -- and it's your involvement in 15 the so-called picnic table incident -- 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: -- that we've heard a lot about prior 18 to you getting here. And as I understand your notes, you 19 were actually attending on scene with Mark Wright; is 20 that right? 21 A: Yes, at 7:30. We left to go down to 22 the -- to the Army Camp Road and East Parkway Drive, yes. 23 Q: And what I'm not clear about from 24 your notes is whether or not you and Mark Wright remained 25 on scene when the picnic table actually -- incident
701 actually unfolded? 2 A: We drove by -- 3 Q: Yeah. 4 A: -- and, of course, I made a poor 5 estimate, I guess, but I said there's around twelve (12) 6 picnic tables. I guess, actually there's twenty (20), 7 whatever. 8 We drove by, made our observations. We 9 then went down to the -- what we call the TOC site -- 10 Q: Yeah. 11 A: -- which is the parking lot just down 12 the road on East Parkway Drive and that's where the ERT 13 guys assembled. 14 Q: Yes? 15 A: And then they went down to get the 16 picnic tables and we observed. 17 Q: And you could observe that from the 18 TOC site? 19 A: No. We -- we went down towards them. 20 Q: All right. So you -- you also 21 attended on scene while the -- 22 A: Back a little ways. Yeah, we stayed 23 in our car and they did the picnic table thing. 24 Q: Okay. Now, after the -- if you look 25 on the next page, page 25?
711 A: Yes. 2 Q: At 8:49 you have the notes where you 3 reflect ERT enroute to scene -- 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: -- and the first -- and then 6 following that, the first and second loads of tables 7 being removed? 8 A: Yeah. 9 Q: And it says "no arrest"? 10 A: "No arrests", yeah. 11 Q: "Dudley George ID'd"; do you see 12 that? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And how did you get that information 15 that Dudley George was ID'd? 16 A: I believe it was Constable Speck but 17 I'm not 100 percent sure. Somebody knew Dudley -- 18 Q: Okay. 19 A: -- and said, that was him. When we 20 went there at 7:30/7:40 there was two (2) males. When 21 the ERT guys came down and started to go down the road to 22 go get the picnic tables there was only one (1) male and 23 somebody ID'd him as Dudley George. 24 Q: All right. And somebody ID'd him to 25 you immediately after the incident as reflected in your
721 notes, right? 2 A: Yes, sir. 3 Q: And Mark Wright and you were in -- in 4 the vehicle together when that happened; is that right? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Okay. If you could go to page 30 7 please, in your notes? 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 Q: And it's your entry at 20:00 hours? 10 A: Yes, sir. 11 Q: For the rest of us I guess eight 12 o'clock? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And you have a notation of an update 15 from Detective Constable Dew: 16 "Advised re. eight (8) to ten (10) 17 Natives"? 18 A: No. 19 Q: I beg your pardon? 20 A: I -- I advised him. 21 Q: I see. So you're advising -- 22 A: Advised Constable Dew. 23 Q: I see. 24 A: He had just -- as -- as I can recall, 25 he worked the night shift --
731 Q: Yes. 2 A: -- and he's back on duty now, around 3 eight o'clock. 4 Q: Okay. So you're giving him a mini- 5 briefing, sort of, about what's happening because he's 6 about to take over, right? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: All right. And -- or he's about to 9 go on shift and we later hear evidence that he's sent 10 down to speak to Constable Poole about a statement that's 11 going to be taken later on, and you're aware of that, 12 right? 13 A: Well, I believe the statement was 14 already taken but I wanted Mark Dew to go down and just 15 to make sure that, you know, the damage, and if they 16 could ID the -- ident guy -- identify the -- the accused 17 and all that stuff, yes. 18 Q: Okay. And then -- so then there's 19 the reference to Constable Poole taking a statement and 20 then there's the -- at the bottom of that entry at two 21 thousand (2000) it says: 22 "Discussion..." 23 Or sorry, 20:00 hours: 24 "Discussion held re-taking property 25 again by ERT, et cetera."
741 Do you see that? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: I take it that that discussion would 4 have happened some time between 20:00 hours and 20:10; is 5 that right? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: Yeah, because the very next entry 8 reflects the time 20:10, right? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: So that discussion would have 11 happened in the ten (10) minutes between 20:00 hours and 12 20:10, correct? 13 A: Yes, just between Mark Dew and 14 myself. 15 Q: All right. Well, I'm going to ask 16 you about that because -- 17 A: Okay. 18 Q: -- when you were asked -- answering 19 Mr. Rosenthal's questions about this parallel 20 investigation and your involvement in the defence team's 21 preparation for Ken Deane's trial -- 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: -- what came across to me loud and 24 clear is that you're the kind of officer that tries to 25 stay within your assignment and your bailiwick; is that
751 correct? 2 A: Yes, sir. 3 Q: And Mark Dew is the same kind of 4 officer, right? 5 A: Absolutely. 6 Q: Okay. Now, talking about -- or 7 decisions regarding going back and taking the Park or 8 taking the property again that's well outside of your 9 bailiwick; is it not? 10 A: I think you're misunderstood of what 11 I meant by "the property". I meant by the -- there was 12 allegedly some picnic tables back down at the sandy 13 parking lot and we discussed about the ERT guys going 14 back and having to take some more picnic tables. That 15 wasn't taking the Park back. 16 Q: I see. All right. You told Mr. 17 Rosenthal yesterday that "the property" referred to the 18 Park? 19 A: No, I did not. 20 Q: All right. If you could go back to 21 your notes... 22 A: I wouldn't say that, sir. Because it 23 says, "by the ERT, et cetera," again means in the morning 24 they took picnic tables and now they may have to take 25 some more picnic tables.
761 Q: All right. If you go to page 3 of 2 your notes? 3 A: Page 3? 4 Q: Yes. 5 A: Yes? 6 Q: If you look at the first point under 7 Prior Court Order -- Prior to Court Order? 8 A: Yes? 9 Q: "TTPA Section 9: Arrest without 10 warrant if already on property." 11 What does "property" refer to there in 12 your notes? 13 A: That would be the land. 14 Q: Okay. The Park, right? 15 A: Yeah. Well, you can't trespass on a 16 picnic table. 17 Q: Yeah. 18 A: Yeah. 19 Q: If you go to page 13 of your notes? 20 A: Yes, sir? 21 Q: There's an entry at 20:30 -- 21:30? 22 A: 21:30, yes, sir? 23 Q: "Met with Inspector Carson and 24 Detective Sergeant Wright." 25 A: Yes.
771 Q: Do you see that? 2 A: Yeah. 3 Q: And if you look further down it says: 4 "Constable Speck and MNR, Les 5 Kobayashi..." 6 Do you see that? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: "...are at the Park now but unknown 9 if they have told the Indian leaders they 10 must leave the property." 11 Do you see that? 12 A: Yes. Yeah. 13 Q: What does "property" refer to there? 14 A: The Park. 15 Q: I'm going to suggest to you 16 consistent with your evidence that you gave to Mr. 17 Rosenthal yesterday that "property" at 20:00 hours is the 18 Park. 19 MS. KAREN JONES: Mr. -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just -- 21 MS. KAREN JONES: -- Commissioner, this 22 is completely unfair. This evidence gave Witness -- this 23 Witness gave evidence yesterday to Mr. Rosenthal and it's 24 page 337 of his transcript clear as a bell. 25 "Discussion held re--"
781 "taking property again by ERT." 2 By ERT, et cetera. 3 Yeah. 4 So did you mean by that mean -- in 5 other words ERT re-taking the sandy 6 parking lot? 7 Well, if they had picnic tables or 8 something out there again like they 9 did -- 10 I -- 11 -- earlier in the morning. 12 I see, but so: 13 'discussion held re-taking property 14 again by ERT, et cetera.' 15 Is that at eight o'clock (sic)? 16 With Mark Dew. 17 Yes." 18 So -- and they talk about just the two (2) 19 of them. 20 "And you discussed the possibility that 21 ERT might have to that evening re-take 22 picnic tables like they had earlier 23 that day? 24 Yes, sir." 25 And it goes on like that.
791 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 2 MS. KAREN JONES: There was never a 3 single time yesterday in response to Mr. Rosenthal where 4 this Witness said anything but that, and to put to him 5 today incorrect information is really inappropriate. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 7 Ms. Jones. 8 MR. JULIAN ROY: I'm just going to keep 9 moving. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, all 11 right. I do remember that exchange and he was referring 12 at that point to the property -- 13 MR. JULIAN ROY: Well, he was talking to 14 the sandy parking lot and -- 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, carry 16 on now. But I'm glad that Ms. Jones has clarified the 17 record by putting that statement out. However -- 18 MR. JULIAN ROY: Okay. I'm going to 19 suggest... 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 24 Q: I'm going to suggest that your use of 25 the term 'property' at 20:00 hours on page 30 of your
801 notes relates to the Park -- 2 A: That's incorrect. 3 Q: -- consistent with how you've used it 4 previously in your notes. 5 A: No, sir. Because the ERT, it says 6 here: 7 "Discussion held re-taking property 8 again by ERT." 9 ERT has never taken the Park, so they 10 can't take it again. So it would be the picnic tables I 11 was referring to -- 12 Q: All right. 13 A: -- off the sandy lot, because that's 14 what we're discussing. We're talking about the Natives 15 being back at the Army Camp Road, East Parkway Drive, 16 damage to vehicle and ERT may have to take some property 17 out of there again, like the picnic tables. 18 Q: So you're -- this discussion was 19 about picnic tables being in the Park at 8:00 p.m. on the 20 evening of September 6th, 1995? 21 A: Being in the sandy parking lot. 22 Being in the sandy parking lot, yes sir. 23 Q: Okay. All right. So getting back to 24 a couple of questions ago, it wouldn't have been part of 25 your bailiwick to be ordering Bert down to the sandy
811 parking lot, in respect to picnic tables or anything 2 else, would it? 3 A: No, sir. 4 Q: Okay. And you've agreed with me that 5 in terms of how you conducted yourself as an officer and 6 Constable Dew conducts himself as an officer you like to 7 remain within what your bailiwick is in your assignment; 8 is that correct? 9 A: Absolutely, sir. 10 Q: Now, at -- if you can go to Tab 6, 11 and page 73 of the scribe notes. 12 13 (BRIEF PAUSE) 14 15 Q: At 20:02 if you can see, there's a 16 meeting between Dale Linton, Mark Wright, Rob Graham and 17 Stan Korosec. 18 A: Yes -- 19 Q: Do you See that? 20 A: Yes, sir. 21 Q: You're not reflected to be at that 22 meeting at that point; do you see that? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And Mark Wright makes a report about: 25 "Natives off Park area with baseball
821 bats. 2 CONSTABLE ZACHER: A personal vehicle 3 being damaged." 4 Do you see that? 5 A: Yes sir, I do. 6 Q: And Dale Linton: 7 "Let's take over B Team with helmets 8 and K-9." 9 Do you see that? 10 A: Yes sir. 11 Q: And then it appears in the scribe 12 notes that you join that meeting: 13 "Trevor Richardson arrived in meeting 14 reporting Bryan Byatt reports lots of 15 activity in kiosk area. They took the 16 gas to fill the bus. Mark Wright 17 briefing Inspector Carson on telephone. 18 DALE LINTON: Let's wait and see what 19 provincial -- what Provincial Constable 20 Poole's statement reveals." 21 Do you see that? 22 A: Yes. That's not me saying -- I just 23 said the first part, right? I -- right. 24 Q: So it appears that you arrived in 25 this meeting that commences at 20:02?
831 A: I arrived sometime after that yeah, 2 between 20:02 and 20:08, I guess. 3 Q: Yes, because the next scribe note is 4 20:08; do you see that? 5 A: Yeah. 6 Q: And you're -- the discussion that you 7 have reflected in your notes on page 30, if you flip back 8 there about taking back the property -- 9 A: Yes? 10 Q: -- I'm going to suggest to you that 11 that discussion likely happened in this period of time 12 after you arrive in this meeting, given the nature of the 13 subject matter that's being reflected in your notes? 14 A: The discussion with Mark Dew happened 15 after this meeting? 16 Q: No, I'm going to suggest to you -- 17 A: Oh -- 18 Q: -- that the discussion about taking 19 back the property -- 20 A: Yes? 21 Q: -- likely happened at the point that 22 you enter the meeting, that's reflected in the scribe 23 notes? 24 A: I would say no, because Mark Dew 25 wasn't at that meeting.
841 Q: Yes. 2 A: So Mark Dew and I would talk first 3 and then maybe that's why I attended the meeting after. 4 Q: Okay. But, your notes on page 30 5 don't reflect you attending this meeting, right? 6 A: No. 7 Q: Okay. So from your notes we can't 8 tell when during that period of time, 20:00 hours and 9 20:10 you may have left and joined another meeting; is 10 that right? 11 A: That's correct. 12 Q: Now, would Dale Linton, Mark Wright, 13 Rob Graham and Stan Korosec, would it have been within 14 their bailiwick to discuss where the ERT team was going 15 to go? 16 A: Yes. Well Dale Linton was the 17 Commander at the time, Incident Commander. 18 Q: Right. 19 A: Mark Wright would be his second. Rob 20 Graham and Stan Korosec were the team leaders or the ERT 21 Team. 22 Q: So it would be your expectation that 23 in terms of discussing where an ERT was going to go to 24 re-take some property that you -- 25 A: It would be then, not me.
851 Q: Okay. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 Q: Now, at 20 -- or at page 31 of your 6 notes -- 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: -- the reference at 20:30 to teams 9 being prepared; do you see that? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: Do you recall what -- what your 12 observations were in terms of teams being prepared at 13 20:30? 14 A: I believe the ERT teams were called 15 in and they were coming into the Command Centre area -- 16 Q: Yes. 17 A: -- and getting their equipment on. 18 Q: Okay, we -- 19 A: That's the way I took it. I don't 20 know if I can recall exactly what they were doing but. 21 Q: When you say, "getting their 22 equipment on", you mean the CMU equipment; is that right? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And you -- your recollection was that 25 that was happening at 20:30; is that right?
861 A: Approximately, yeah. 2 Q: All right. Thank you very much, Mr. 3 Commissioner. Those are my questions. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 5 Mr. Roy. 6 Ms. Jones, do you have some questions? 7 MS. KAREN JONES: Mr. Commissioner, I do 8 have some questions, and I'm wondering if we could take 9 our morning break. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: How long do 11 you think you might be? 12 MS. KAREN JONES: I think I might be 13 about thirty (30) minutes. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Then we'll 15 take our break now. 16 MS. KAREN JONES: Thank you very much, 17 Mr. Commissioner. 18 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 19 for fifteen (15) minutes. 20 21 --- Upon recessing at 10:10 a.m. 22 --- Upon resuming at 10:26 a.m. 23 24 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 25 resumed. Please be seated.
871 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 2 MS. KAREN JONES: Thank you. 3 4 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. KAREN JONES: 5 Q: Sir, I just wanted to make sure that 6 what you were saying regarding your notes on August the 7 30th, 1995 about the information you obtained from Mark 8 Wright were -- are clear. 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: I understand from what you were 11 saying in your cross-examinations this morning from 12 others that if the MNR or the Government had indicated to 13 the OPP that it did not intend to maintain or contest 14 ownership of the Park that the OPP would not have been 15 involved in any way? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: Simi -- and the analogy that you gave 18 was when the DND property was first occupied and then 19 ultimately the Military left, the OPP was not involved? 20 A: That's correct. 21 Q: And that's because, from what you 22 understood, the DND did not contest the ownership of the 23 Base? 24 A: Yes. No complaints came in, that's 25 correct.
881 Q: Right. And in this case there was 2 information that it would be contested? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: And until that matter was resolved in 5 the courts the OPP may be involved in terms of 6 maintaining and keeping the law? 7 A: That's correct. 8 Q: Okay. I have some questions to ask 9 you about charges in the context of Project Maple in 10 Ipperwash. 11 You had told us, I believe, that prior to 12 September the 4th you and Randy Parent put together a 13 list of potentially applicable charges? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: And that you put them together based 16 on your understanding and discussions with both the Crown 17 Law Office and the local Crown? 18 A: The legal branch up in -- in Orillia, 19 yes. 20 Q: Right. And at the time you put that 21 list of potentially applicable charges together you did 22 not know what was going to be happening -- happening at 23 Ipperwash so it was contingency planning? 24 A: That's correct. I mean, the 25 occupiers may not even have taken over the Park at that
891 time. 2 Q: That's right. And would you agree 3 that in terms of Ipperwash either the Incident Commander 4 or one (1) of the senior officers would have had to have 5 instructed you as to -- as to whether or not to lay 6 charges against any of the occupiers; that's not 7 something you would or could have done on your own 8 accord? 9 A: That's correct. 10 Q: Okay. 11 A: We'd be getting some guidance from 12 them, that's for sure. 13 Q: That's right. And at no time prior 14 to the obtaining of an injunction, with respect to the 15 Park, were any charges laid with respect to trespass? 16 A: That's correct. 17 Q: Conversely, even if you got 18 instructions from the Incident Commander or from a 19 superior officer to arrest someone you would have to have 20 -- be satisfied that there were grounds for the arrest? 21 A: That's correct. 22 Q: And so you told us on the night of 23 September 6th you were instructed by Mark Wright that 24 people exiting the Park or Base could be arrested for 25 attempted murder?
901 A: Correct. 2 Q: And I take it that's a general 3 direction from him? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And based on that general direction 6 you would have to make your own assessment as to whether, 7 based on individual circumstances, there would be the 8 grounds for the arrest of an individual person? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: And so when Mr. Rosenthal suggested 11 to you that you were disobeying orders from Mark Wright 12 if you hadn't arrested people, in fact that's not the 13 case is it? 14 A: That's not the case, that's correct. 15 16 (BRIEF PAUSE) 17 18 Q: You were further asked some questions 19 about your notes from September the 5th and you had set 20 out in those notes information that you got at a briefing 21 in --from John Carson. And one (1) of the notes related 22 to if there's no one in the Park, regaining control. 23 Do you recall those questions? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And I wanted to give you an
911 opportunity, you've told us that those notes were just 2 bullet points that you took at the time, of looking at 3 the scribe notes to see if they assist you in the context 4 of which those words were said. 5 A: Okay. 6 Q: And so if you turn to your scribe 7 notes in your book and specifically page 25? 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: What's the 9 tab number please, Ms. Jones? 10 MS. KAREN JONES: Mr. Commissioner, the 11 tab number is Tab Number 6. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 6, right. 13 MS. KAREN JONES: Yeah. 14 15 CONTINUED BY MS. KAREN JONES: 16 Q: And if you want, start at page 24 17 because you'll see that that sets it out that there's a 18 meeting at 09:25 hours on September the 5th? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And there are a number of points that 21 are covered off at that meeting and you'll see on page 22 25, the third paragraph from the bottom it says: 23 "JOHN CARSON: Gather information on 24 what's going on in the Park, whether we 25 can get people in there. We want them
921 to get ERT members in the Park and keep 2 them there." 3 And we've heard evidence that there was a 4 discussion at that point in time about checking to see 5 what the situation was in the Park -- 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: -- and some discussion about options 8 about what might happen. 9 And would it be usual or unusual in the 10 context of a meeting to discuss possible options? 11 A: Oh, absolutely. 12 Q: And at the end of that meeting was 13 there any decision made that any police would go into the 14 Park? 15 A: I don't think anybody was going to go 16 in the Park to my knowledge. 17 Q: All right. You gave some evidence 18 yesterday and today and that, for the most part, fell out 19 of questions from the 1996 Incident Review, that you had 20 concerns that officers at the checkpoints were not doing 21 all they could to obtain information about the vehicles 22 and people who were going in and out of the Base and the 23 Park after September the 6th, 1995? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: And similarly you -- you've expressed
931 concern here that the crime scene, that is the area 2 around the sandy parking lot, had been given up so that 3 no investigation could be done for -- until many days 4 later? 5 A: That's correct. 6 Q: And we've heard evidence from John 7 Carson and Chris Coles and others that the situation at 8 Ipperwash post-September the 6th was extremely volatile 9 and dangerous -- 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: -- for a significant period of time? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: That -- do you agree with that? 14 A: I do. 15 Q: And we've also heard evidence that a 16 number of decisions were taken by senior staff to limit 17 the actions of officers at checkpoints and to pull them 18 back from the immediate area of the Park and the Base in 19 an attempt to try and diffuse the situation? 20 A: Some of -- 21 Q: And -- 22 A: -- those decisions I wouldn't be 23 privy to. 24 Q: You wouldn't have been privy to. And 25 I take it that you would agree from a criminal
941 investigator's perspective some of those decisions 2 severely compromised your ability to -- ability to 3 investigate criminal activity and the events that 4 occurred on September the 6th? 5 A: That's correct. 6 Q: And on the other hand, there may well 7 have been other considerations that senior staff had to 8 take into account? 9 A: Oh, I'm sure there was. 10 Q: Yeah. Okay. I then wanted to ask 11 you some questions about post-September the 6th and at, 12 or prior to Ken Deane's trial, because you've been asked 13 a number of questions about your involvement and the 14 propriety of that involvement. 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And I wondered if you could turn to 17 your notes there at your Tab 12, it's Exhibit P-1677. 18 And I take it that during the period 1996/1997 and to 19 some extent into 1998, you still would have been in 20 charge of the investigations regarding Ipperwash, and you 21 were also the file coordinator? 22 A: That's correct. 23 Q: Is that right? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And perhaps you can give us a little
951 bit of assistance in terms of a file coordinator and 2 senior investigator. Has it been your experience that 3 you have been involved in assisting defendants or 4 defendant's counsel? 5 A: Yes, I have. 6 Q: On other trials? 7 A: Absolutely. 8 Q: Is that something that would be 9 arranged between, for example, a defence counsel and the 10 OPP and the Crown? 11 A: No, on -- on a lot of occasions a 12 defence lawyer would approach the Crown and say, Geez, I 13 got information that this witness may provide evidence 14 for me or you, or whatever, could the Officers go out and 15 check it, and the Crown would say, Yes. You know, if I'm 16 in charge of the case would you mind going and 17 interviewing this person, see what he has to say. Done 18 that several times. 19 Q: Okay. 20 A: Helped a lawyer out on a major fraud 21 because the Crown said that he couldn't quite grasp this 22 fraud that we had laid the charges for. So actually, we 23 sat down for pretty close to two weeks with the defence 24 counsel and went through the whole case. 25 And as a result of that, it ended up being
961 a quicker trial than it would have normally have been. 2 So it saved a lot of time and money for everybody. 3 And I recall another homicide one where a 4 defence lawyer came up and said I got some information on 5 some witnesses you may want to talk to, and we went out 6 and interviewed. And it helps both sides, actually, so. 7 Q: Sure. And that's because your role, 8 as an Officer involved in a trial, is to provide 9 assistance. And it doesn't matter, in particular, if 10 it's to the Crown or to the defence? 11 A: That's correct, exactly. 12 Q: And so when you got the call from 13 Norm Peel, and turning to your notes on page 144, January 14 the 16th, 1997, I take it that it -- and then you spoke 15 to him on January 23rd, 1997, I take it it wouldn't have 16 been any great surprise that there had been an agreement 17 between the Crown and Norm Peel, that both the SIU and 18 the OPP would be involved and continue to be involved in 19 this matter? 20 A: That's correct. 21 Q: And that there would be specific 22 roles assigned to the OPP and specific roles assigned to 23 the SIU? 24 A: Yeah. And permission from the OPP to 25 do that.
971 Q: That's right. And were any of the 2 tasks or the functions that the Crown and the defence 3 lawyer in this case determined that the OPP ought to do? 4 And I think you'll see that they're set out at pages 144 5 and 145 of your notes. 6 Were any of them unusual or outside the 7 course of what you would normally do in any event? 8 A: No. 9 Q: And just to be clear some of those 10 duties would involve, for example, interviewing 11 witnesses? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And there was an agreement, I take 14 it, that any interviews that were completed would be 15 shared as between the defence and the Crown? 16 A: Yes, as I remember, if we interviewed 17 a police witness and if his statement and what he told us 18 when we were reviewing with him, if anything changed, 19 that we would take it down in writing and give a copy of 20 any changes to the SIU or Ian Scott. 21 Q: Sure. 22 A: And I understood it was the same way 23 when he interviewed the First Nations people. That if 24 there was any changes in the statements that he would 25 take them down in writing and give a copy to Norm Peel.
981 Q: And that, again, would be consistent 2 with the role that you had provided in other trials? 3 A: I think it was just comfortable for 4 everybody, that the Police liked talking -- you know, 5 were more comfortable talking to us and vice versa. 6 Q: Yeah. And so in terms of the 7 termination of the agreement -- 8 A: Yes -- 9 Q: -- that you and Mark Dew would 10 assist, did that come as a surprise? 11 A: Initially I think it did -- 12 Q: Yeah. 13 A: -- because I -- we just weren't sure 14 why. And then later on we were advised that it just -- 15 that it would be more advantageous to have somebody go in 16 there that was a retired officer and -- and do the job. 17 Q: And I take it that that would be in 18 part because in terms of appearances it would -- there 19 could be no issue raised about, for example, the OPP 20 assisting? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: And even though that is something 23 that happens on a usual and normal basis in other cases? 24 A: Well, this certainly would be time- 25 consuming as well, so.
991 Q: Sure, because there was some 2 particular sensitivity -- 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: -- around this matter? 5 A: Correct. 6 Q: And you were asked some questions 7 then about why in your notes there's some information 8 that indicates that you had further contact with Norm 9 Peel. And you were taken, for example, to an entry where 10 you assisted with files? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And I take it at this time, prior to 13 Ken Deane's trial, you were still the file coordinator 14 for the OPP? 15 A: Well, I knew all about the files. 16 Yes. 17 Q: Sure. 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: And I take it one of the portions of 20 your job would be to provide that information to counsel? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: And that you would, as a matter of 23 course, if you were requested, assist counsel in 24 organizing and sorting the files and getting them set up 25 in court?
1001 A: That's right. And -- and on the 2 other side of that, if Mr. Scott needed something from 3 Mr. Peel's file -- 4 Q: Right. 5 A: -- original statement or whatever, I 6 knew where they were, yes. 7 Q: That's right. And so I take it, 8 then, that even though that, again, would be something 9 that would be normal and usual in your role to provide at 10 any trial -- 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: -- you took an additional step here 13 of checking with Bob Goodall? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: And again, just to make sure that 16 everybody would be comfortable -- 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: -- with that, given the particular 19 sensitivities of this case? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: You were asked some questions by Ms. 22 Vella and by Mr. Alexander about interviews and further 23 investigation that was conducted after Ken Deane's trial? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And I wanted to follow up on that
1011 briefly. You have in your notes, and it's at page 147 of 2 your notes, and this is February 6th, 1997? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: That you get some information from 5 Detective Constable Darryl Whitehead? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: Advising you that someone wanted to 8 speak with the police? 9 A: Yes, correct. 10 Q: That's right. And as a result of 11 that call, did you go out and you and Constable Dew 12 interview the person who wanted to speak to the police? 13 A: Yes, we did. 14 Q: And that person, I take it, from your 15 15-20 notes told you that he took guns to Ipperwash 16 before and after Dudley was shot, and he gave you an 17 explanation about why he was requesting an opportunity to 18 give that information to the police? 19 A: That's correct. 20 Q: Is that correct? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: Similarly, if you turn to page 151 of 23 your notes on March 13th, 1997? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: At 08:30 hours you record receiving a
1021 call from an officer who tells you that he has the name 2 of a person who saw a stockpile of weapons at Camp 3 Ipperwash in September of 1995? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And you, as a result of that 6 information, contacted the person? 7 A: Yes, we did. 8 Q: And during the course of that did he 9 volunteer information to you? 10 A: Yes, he did. 11 Q: Had you sought out either the 12 information from the person that gave you information 13 about gun running or about the person who saw weapons 14 stockpiled? 15 A: No. 16 Q: They contacted the police? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: And requested an opportunity to give 19 you that information? 20 A: Yeah. Correct. 21 Q: And similarly, you've said today that 22 you received information from the DND and personnel 23 asking why they hadn't been interviewed? 24 A: That's right. 25 Q: And as a result of that request, you
1031 and Mark Dew then went out and interviewed a number of 2 DND personnel? 3 A: Yes, we did. 4 Q: And can you tell us how you went 5 about doing that? How did you identify people to 6 interview? 7 A: We would go to the -- the Base, the 8 DND base, and we'd ask to talk to the Military Police. 9 And we went there and we said that -- explained to them 10 what had happened and what was going on, and we asked if 11 anybody wanted to talk to us, if anybody had been up at 12 Ipperwash during the occupation and whatever. 13 Q: Okay. 14 A: And they would come in; some guys 15 were off duty and some were on duty and they would come 16 in and give us a statement. 17 Q: And again, I take it that the people 18 you interviewed were people that requested or wanted to 19 talk to you? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: You didn't search them out and try 22 and find information that way? 23 A: No. 24 Q: And if you look at your notes at page 25 164 --
1041 A: Yes. 2 Q: -- does that set out the general 3 gist, and it goes from page 164(a) to page 164(k)? 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 A: What was the question, sorry? 8 Q: The question was: Does that set out 9 the general gist of what those DND personnel told you? 10 A: Yes, there were a little synopsis -- 11 Q: Right. 12 A: -- of -- 13 Q: And out of those and when you 14 interviewed the people, I take it they gave you a full 15 statement? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: And I take it that some of the DND 18 witnesses, and I take it from reviewing that material, 19 indicated to you that they had heard gunfire in the -- on 20 the Base between the years 1993 and 1995? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: Including automatic gunfire? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: Similarly, some of the witnesses that 25 you spoke to hadn't heard or seen any observations about
1051 guns in the hands of the occupiers at all? 2 A: That's correct. Had no -- no 3 incidents up there at all while they were on their tour 4 of duty. 5 Q: Sure. And you have some notes, for 6 example... 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 Q: And I am looking at page 164(f) -- 11 oh, sorry, 'g', at the top where you indicate that you 12 were told that a person heard gunfire all the time and 13 had rifles pointed at the observation post on several 14 occasions? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: Right. Is it fair to say, and I'm 17 not going to take you through all of these notes, that 18 you were not seeking out people who could only tell you 19 information that would assist in terms of saying, yes, 20 there guns in the Base or, no, there weren't guns in the 21 Base? 22 A: That -- 23 Q: You were simply collecting 24 information that people gave you? 25 A: That's correct.
1061 Q: And -- 2 A: Because the next one down there says, 3 Never heard or saw a firearm, so. 4 Q: That's right. 5 A: Yeah. 6 Q: And so again that would be consistent 7 with your role as an investigator, to find out all the 8 information that you could? 9 A: Find out the truth about everything, 10 that's -- 11 Q: That's right. And -- 12 A: To the best of our ability, yes. 13 Q: Yes. And once that information is 14 gathered to the extent that it could potentially impact 15 on an ongoing trial or outstanding charges, I take it 16 that either the Crown, or a defence lawyer that was 17 involved in those matters, could get access to that 18 information? 19 A: That's correct. 20 Q: Because that would be part of the 21 OPP's disclosure obligations? 22 A: Yes, it would be. I'd be making 23 copies of them and sending them to the Crown and -- 24 Q: Sure. 25 A: -- it would be up to him to
1071 distribute to defence people? 2 Q: Sure. 3 A: Part of the disclosure. 4 Q: You were asked some questions about 5 recommendations or your concern that, after Ipperwash, 6 sometimes copies of notes or statements were not handed 7 in in a timely manner. And I believe that it was 8 suggested to you that in fact the notes weren't made in a 9 timely manner, they were made a significant period of 10 time after the events. 11 Do you have any recollection of an 12 incident or a single incident where notes were not made 13 contemporaneously or as soon as possible after an 14 incident? 15 A: No, I have no recollection of anybody 16 not making notes at the time. What I was suggesting is 17 that we didn't get copies of their notes. 18 Q: That's right. 19 A: And their statement on time, that's 20 all. 21 22 (BRIEF PAUSE) 23 24 Q: And those are my questions for you. 25 Thank you.
1081 A: Thank you. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 3 very much, Ms. Jones. 4 Ms. Vella, do you have any re-examination? 5 MS. SUSAN VELLA: I have no re- 6 examination. But I'd like to thank Detective Sergeant 7 Richardson for coming in and giving his evidence to us. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 9 very much for coming and giving us your evidence. Thank 10 you. 11 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You are 13 finished now. 14 15 (WITNESS STANDS DOWN) 16 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And we'll 18 take a short break, five minutes. 19 MS. SUSAN VELLA: A very short recess, 20 just so that we can set up for the next witness, please. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 22 We'll take a very short break. 23 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess. 24 25 --- Upon recessing at 10:51 A.M.
1091 --- Upon resuming at 11:00 A.M. 2 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 4 resumed, please be seated. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 6 morning, sir. 7 MR. WAYNE WAWRYK: Good morning, sir. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Ms. 9 Vella...? 10 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Good morning. The 11 Commission calls as its next witness, Wayne Wawryk. 12 13 WAYNE PAUL WAWRYK, Sworn 14 15 (VOIR DIRE COMMENCED) 16 17 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 18 Q: Mr. Wawryk, I understand that you are 19 a retired Assistant Commissioner of the Royal Canadian 20 Mounted Police? 21 A: Yes, that's correct. 22 Q: And if you would kindly look in your 23 binder, Counsel Commission brief, Tab 1, is that a copy 24 of your curriculum vitae? 25 A: Yes, it is.
1101 Q: And does it accurately reflect your 2 career and history? 3 A: Yes, mostly pertaining to operational 4 matters, yes. 5 Q: Thank you very much. 6 MS. SUSAN VELLA: I'd like that to be 7 make the next exhibit, please? 8 THE REGISTRAR: P-1682 Your Honour. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: P-1682. 10 11 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1682: Curriculum Vitae of Mr. Wayne 12 Paul Wawryk. 13 14 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 15 Q: I understand that you commenced your 16 career with the RCMP in 1965? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: I understand that between 1998 and 19 2001 you were the Assistant Commissioner with 20 responsibility for international liaison and protective 21 operations? 22 A: Yes. That's one of the four (4) 23 operational directorates of the RCMP, so I was in charge 24 of that, yes. 25 Q: And your duties, with respect to that
1111 directorate, included head of Interpol for Canada, 2 responsibility for protective policing in Canada, RCMP 3 International Liaison Program overseas, Canadian Police 4 in peacekeeping, Prime Minister's protective detail; is 5 that right? 6 A: That's correct. And what remained of 7 the small airport policing program at that time. 8 Q: All right. Thank you. From 1995 to 9 1998 you were a Chief Superintendent and Director of 10 Criminal Intelligence Directorate? 11 A: That's correct. 12 Q: Those duties included, national and 13 international program responsibility for Canada? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: Organized crime? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: Counter terrorism? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: National security? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: Senior RCMP Member of the 22 Intelligence Advisory Committee, Privy Counsel Office? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And a senior RCMP Member to the Lion 25 Group as part of the G-8 effort to counter organized
1121 crime and terrorism? 2 A: That's correct. 3 Q: From 1993 to 1995 you were 4 Superintendent Officer Commanding, Fredericton 5 subdivision? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: I understand that that included 8 operational policing in the Eastern third of New 9 Brunswick, and Detachment policing in locations from 10 Plaster Rock to the Bay of Fundy? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And as Superintendent and Officer 13 Commanding for this subdivision, did you have 14 opportunities to work with First Nations communities? 15 A: Yes, I did. 16 Q: From 1990 to '93 you were an 17 Inspector, Officer in charge for the Winnipeg 18 International Airport Detachment? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And you had duties relating to 21 security for the Winnipeg International Airport, and 22 responsibilities for enhanced security during the Gulf 23 War? 24 A: That's correct. 25 Q: From 1990 to 1997 you were also the
1131 Canadian Police Officer to His Royal Highness the Duke of 2 York? 3 A: Yes, I was. 4 Q: From 1988 to 1990 you were an 5 Inspector RCMP Liaison Officer to the Department of 6 Foreign Affairs and International Trade? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And 1985 to 1988, Inspector Travel 9 Officers, including duties, personal security to the 10 Prime Minister of Canada for travel within Canada and 11 international travel? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: I also understand that you have been 14 involved in many, many operations over the course of your 15 career, but they would include, among the many, 2000 -- 16 sorry, 1993 you were the on scene Commander to resolve 17 First Nation unrest at Kingsclear in New Brunswick during 18 the road blockage of the TransCanada Highway? 19 A: Yes, that was over the Easter 20 weekend. 21 Q: Okay. 1996, Senior Canadian Police 22 Officer to lend on scene support during a hostage taking 23 in Lima, Peru? 24 A: That's correct. 25 Q: And at which all Canadian personnel
1141 were released? 2 A: Yes, they were. 3 Q: 1999 you had visits to Haiti, Bosnia 4 and the Western Sahara in support of peacekeeping 5 operations? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: 1999 you assisted the Canadian 8 Embassy on a Canadian held hostage in Ecuador? 9 A: That's correct. 10 Q: And in 2000 you took action with 11 respect to the assault on the Prime Minister in Prince 12 Edward Island? 13 A: Yes, much to my embarrassment, I did. 14 Yes. 15 Q: As you were responsible for his 16 security? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: 2000, provided security for the 19 Federal elections? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: And in 2001 you provided security for 22 the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: I understand that you have received 25 several awards and they include the Royal Canadian Humane
1151 Association in recognition of the preservation of life in 2 1967? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: The Queen's Silver Jubilee Medal in 5 1977? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: The RCMP Long Service Medal in 1985? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: International Association of Law 10 Enforcement Analysts Leadership in the Field of Criminal 11 Analysis in 1997? 12 A: That's correct. 13 Q: And the RCMP Long Service Medal gold 14 clasp in 2000? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: I understand that over the course of 17 your policing career you have been responsible for 18 hundreds of security operations in Ottawa, involving 19 embassy demonstrations and visits of Heads of State in 20 government, many of which had a public order component? 21 A: Yes, that's true. 22 Q: You have had substantial experience 23 as part of command and control operations in the field, 24 in Command Centres and overall control of major events 25 and public order issues?
1161 A: Yes. 2 Q: On November 21, 1981, as an example, 3 you were liaison to the Canadian Labour Congress at its 4 Command Centre in the Chateau Laurier during what was 5 believed at the time to be the largest demonstration in 6 Canadian history? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And that involved a march of 9 approximately a hundred -- a hundred thousand (100,000) 10 persons on Parliament Hill? 11 A: Yes, it did. 12 Q: I understand that you have attended 13 several courses on the gathering and use of intelligence 14 and senior management activities, including Commissioned 15 Officer courses in 1987, Situational Leadership in '87, 16 Negotiator Hostage Barricaded Persons 1985, VIP Security 17 course 1983, surveillance training 1974, and the like? 18 A: Yes. And I was trained as an armed 19 ship boarding commander while I was stationed in New 20 Brunswick. 21 Q: And that was in 1993? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: Did your duties bring you into 24 contact with political staff at the Federal Government 25 level from time to time?
1171 A: Yes. 2 Q: Did you deal also with central 3 agencies of the Federal Government, particularly the 4 Privy Council, on operational and intelligence matters? 5 A: Yes, I did. 6 Q: Commissioner, I would like to tender 7 Mr. Wawryk as an expert in police intelligence standards, 8 processes and practices. 9 10 (VOIR DIRE CONCLUDED) 11 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Does anybody 13 have any objection or comment? 14 I think his credentials are satisfactory 15 to have him characterized as an expert. Thank you. 16 17 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 18 Q: Thank you very much. Now, Mr. 19 Wawryk, I understand that you have prepared a PowerPoint 20 presentation in order to assist with your testimony this 21 morning? 22 A: That's correct. 23 Q: And I understand that you've added 24 one (1) slide at the end since I distributed copies to 25 Counsel this morning?
1181 A: Yes. 2 Q: And we will distribute a copy 3 subsequently. But for the time being I would like to 4 make the hardcopy of the PowerPoint presentation 5 entitled, "Police Intelligence for Public Order 6 Operations in 1995," as the next exhibit. 7 THE REGISTRAR: P-1683, Your Honour. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 1683. 9 10 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1683: Hard copy of Power Point 11 presentation, "Police 12 Intelligence for Public Order 13 Operations in 1995", slides 14 of Wayne Wawryk. 15 16 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thank you. 17 18 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 19 Q: Now, Mr. Wawryk, I'm going to give 20 one (1) of my uncharacteristically general questions, but 21 nonetheless, here's -- here's my question for you and I'd 22 ask you to proceed thereafter. 23 Would you advise the Commission with 24 respect to the basic concepts, processes, and practices, 25 including best practices employed by Canadian policing
1191 bodies in 1995, including the Ontario Provincial Police 2 relating to the intelligence component of public order 3 police operations? 4 A: Well, to a certain extent the 5 presentation will explain this, but I would say in 1995, 6 if you counted the decade, it was in the middle of the 7 decade and the RCMP itself was in the throes of improving 8 training for what we called major events or major crime. 9 And that was brought about by Commissioner 10 Murray's concern over many of the things you've mentioned 11 in my CV I was personally involved in. 12 But then there were thing domestically in 13 Canada that were cropping up, such as Oka, such as 14 Gustafsen Lake, and many of our major VIP operations 15 which were becoming more and more complicated to police 16 because of changes in the way people would conduct 17 themselves in protesting some of these gatherings. 18 So it was an area of transition, of 19 development, and looking for better answers. Other 20 people in the world were doing the same thing at the same 21 time. 22 And if I could just frame the decade, in 23 1990 -- 1989, when the Berlin Wall came down, that 24 unleashed, unbeknownst to us, a considerable number of 25 people with far-ranging skills and access to huge amounts
1201 of money, and they were known as transnational organized 2 crime. And they had a -- a fairly significant -- a very 3 significant effect upon Canada. 4 We were aware of this, we were working on 5 it, but it was a challenge and it was very consumptive of 6 police criminal intelligence resources. 7 At the same time, around the middle of the 8 decade, we started to see demonstrations that were far 9 beyond the pale to what we had seen before. In previous 10 years perhaps we could have gone down, as I did myself 11 for many years, talked to the organizers, bring the Fire 12 Department, bring the city police, the Ottawa City 13 Police, and actually come to a deal as to how you were 14 going to get twenty thousand (20,000) people onto 15 Parliament Hill, what you're going to do while you were 16 there, how can we help you? 17 And our -- my biggest concern for them was 18 that if they could regard the police as sort of a picket 19 fence, and they could operate inside the fence, then we 20 would be happy and I think they would be happy. 21 And the locus of all of this for Canada 22 was the steps of Parliament Hill. When the Government 23 tried to create a speaker's box on Sparks Street Mall, 24 nobody went there. So some days on the Hill we would 25 have -- it was like the deck of an aircraft carrier, we'd
1211 have somebody on deck and two (2) waiting over to come 2 on. 3 And generally these things were negotiated 4 and done in a very calm fashion and people often had 5 their own security. But in -- in mid -- in the mid '90's 6 people started to change the way they operated, the way 7 they wanted to conduct their protest, and it was 8 remarkably different so we had to -- we realized we 9 weren't ready for it. 10 Q: All right. 11 A: So police intelligence inside the 12 component of public order operations, was something that 13 we were obviously working on because we were under 14 pressure to -- to make it better. 15 Q: All right. Thank you. And perhaps 16 you can proceed with your presentation and commence with 17 the discussion, at least at your testimony, concerning 18 the visions of intelligence. 19 A: Okay. I can't see what slide is up 20 there. 21 Q: Yeah. No, the slides will go up here 22 I -- 23 A: Oh, there we go. 24 Q: -- understand that you have your own 25 copy --
1221 A: Right, and I'm -- I'm using this for 2 my notes. 3 Q: I think it's fine if you look at your 4 computer for your presentation. 5 A: All right. Could we go to the second 6 slide? 7 Q: Certainly. 8 A: I'd just like to begin this 9 presentation with some visions of intelligence and there 10 is more than one (1) vision of intelligence. I'd like to 11 begin with perhaps a more intuitive vision. 12 Seemingly it's less complex. But to my 13 way of thinking, it's more like people think. And 14 basically, it's used widely in business and systems 15 theory. And it -- I think you'll see things in these 16 visions that you can relate to. 17 The next slide, please. And we'll then -- 18 we will then look at a version more popular in military 19 circles. And the reason I've placed this in here is it 20 has more to do with speed and agility. 21 And we'll then combine the two (2) conver 22 -- the two (2) visions for a look before we move into the 23 police model, which is what I would call a traditional 24 model, used by most intelligence services whether they're 25 secret intelligence services or police forces or to a
1231 lesser extent military intelligence. 2 Because military intelligence is very much 3 dealing with systems of their own design. 4 The next slide please. I found this -- in 5 doing some research it's from a poem written in 1934 by 6 T.S. Eliot which is called "The Rock": 7 "Where's the life we have lost in 8 living? 9 Where's the wisdom we have lost in 10 knowledge? 11 And where is the knowledge we have lost 12 in information?" 13 And that struck me like a bolt of 14 lightening considering what I've been doing all my life. 15 It was an absolutely stunning three (3) phrases. 16 And I think we can all relate to the 17 sentiments in this quote and if anything it might apply 18 more now in terms of the pace of our lives than it did in 19 an era of no computers. 20 Eliot, I think was referring to the 21 development of the automobile and roads were being built 22 and things were too fast and too complicated. So, inside 23 his poem he had these three (3) consecutive phrases. 24 And then if I could have the next slide, 25 please. We move to some work by Professor Russell Ackoff
1241 the Wharton School of Business. 2 He is now 87 years old and he's still 3 going strong, but he first proposed this vision in 1988. 4 And it was to me -- it has some basic elements of how 5 human beings model things internally. 6 It was found to be very useful in 7 understanding flows, database applications and some 8 business organizations, such as Walmart and FedEx have 9 taken these principles to high levels by using computers. 10 And there's really a -- no decision point 11 shown in this model, but it could come after achievement 12 of the knowledge phase. And your understanding will be 13 refreshed by more data and continual connectedness. And 14 then data is perishable and you need a constant 15 refreshing of accurate data to remain connected to the -- 16 to the situation you're dealing with. 17 And wisdom is a great attribute, but it 18 can be altered by new circumstances and the changes they 19 bring. So I think all of us have some wisdom, some -- 20 that we've acquired over our lifetimes and perhaps we are 21 surprised from time to time at a new circumstance that 22 would change our view of something. 23 Isolation will deprive you of the ability 24 to connect and your wisdom may be less useful in these 25 circumstances. Your wisdom may be less than -- or excuse
1251 me, all police officers who serve a long time in one (1) 2 location acquire a form of wisdom about policing at that 3 spot but rarely can any one of them give you detail on 4 all very recent cottage break and enters or the B&E's for 5 the last two (2) years. 6 Only when the data is subjected to forms 7 of analysis can a pattern emerge that might lead to the 8 solution of thirty (30) crimes and I've seen this happen. 9 Not because the Corporal or the Sergeant told somebody to 10 do it but because a young Constable decided to take the 11 laptop and put them all in there and slice and dice them 12 and sort them and ended up solving all of them. 13 Another classic example from my time in 14 New Brunswick, I had a serious crimes investigator, a 15 female Corporal from the General Investigation Section, 16 who was assigned to go to St. Andrews, New Brunswick 17 because someone was an arsonist. 18 When she arrived the NCO in charge, 19 recently in charge, opened all the files and she went 20 back ten (10) years and by the time she was finished he 21 had the time of day, the suspect, the day of the week. 22 But we didn't have enough money so we got 23 portable radios and this person lived at home with his 24 mother and he didn't have a car so we just stood like 25 sign posts in the dark and let him move between them.
1261 And at the end of the evening he was caught lighting a 2 fire under a trailer with two (2) elderly vacationers 3 inside and he was arrested and charged and prosecuted. 4 But if you were to ask the Corporal in 5 charge of that detachment to do the same thing as the GIS 6 Corporal did perhaps he might not have had the skills 7 that she had. 8 So there's some examples of you're sitting 9 on top of something that maybe you didn't know was there. 10 And looking at this diagram, data moves 11 through it and becomes move valuable because you're 12 understandings increasing of relations, your 13 understanding may be increasing with patterns, and 14 finally you will have some principles that evolve from 15 what you have gone through by being connected to other 16 people and other things and by being connected to data 17 moving you towards understanding. 18 So this is a very popular thing and if you 19 look it up on the internet you'll find all kinds of 20 papers on it. 21 The next slide please. This is less 22 popular on the internet. This is known as the O-O-D-A 23 Loop or the Boyd Cycle. By OODA, I mean Observe, Orient, 24 Decide and Act. The Colonel Boyd was an F-86 pilot in 25 Korea and he found he could survive for two (2) things;
1271 he had a 360 degree view in his canopy and he had 2 extendable dive brakes. But he was up against a faster 3 aeroplane. Using those two (2) things and a number of 4 other tactical manoeuvres he was able to survive and win 5 engagements. This is a purely military example. 6 So after he had returned and towards the 7 end of his time in the military he drew up this theory 8 known as the OODA Loop. It's time critical. It's 9 competitive. Its intent is to survive and thrive on 10 chaos. 11 You seek to be faster and more accurate 12 while denying the same goals to an opponent. And without 13 support, in his case, the support all came from himself, 14 without support you will be outrun, which can be a 15 disaster in military terms. 16 Now, billions are being spent to automate, 17 speed up and drive decision making down to the frontline 18 of various military organizations yet when you move from 19 a set piece engagements into random asymmetric conflict, 20 systems can still fail to perform. 21 And I think we're all aware of these from 22 examples overseas. In these cases at times only us human 23 -- a human source can help you, can save you. You can 24 have an objective view such as a camera view or you can 25 have subjective views such as info -- information gained
1281 from a human source. 2 In police work, and that is why I've -- 3 I've put this up here, in police work options are sought 4 to use as little force as possible contrasting that with 5 this vision here. And for the police options may allow 6 them to slow down if they're lucky and seek a peaceful 7 means. 8 And this is the hardest thing to do in 9 public order because there will be times when you are not 10 allowed to slow down because the people who are out there 11 are not going to let you. And finding a measured 12 approach to suit the event is a high goal. It was a high 13 goal in 1995 and it's a high goal now. 14 The measured approach is where you -- you 15 may have a lot of assets but you're going to use them in 16 a measured fashion, quietly and as carefully as possible 17 and with as little force as possible. That doesn't mean 18 you're going to use no force but that's your intent, but 19 it's very difficult to accomplish sometimes. 20 And when the police have a hockey riot 21 they're criticized for being not ready. And when I have 22 my little pie incident I wasn't ready. I was the 23 Director in Ottawa but when I did a very careful look at 24 that I could see the flaws and a young man used 25 innovation to defeat the police.
1291 And when the police use force -- so 2 they're criticized in the hockey riot for not being ready 3 and not controlling people, now let's go to Gate 6 at 4 APEC. I think we're all familiar with the APEC event and 5 the Commission of Inquiry that followed. 6 At Gate 6 at APEC they were criticized for 7 using excessive force. In this case a better plan would 8 have held the gate with minimal force and they should 9 have had possession of the gate as it was important to 10 their plan. The words in their plan and in -- when 11 you're protecting a VIP you definitely want to know 12 you're going to be able to leave the area. So they 13 should have taken possession of the gate an hour earlier 14 and there would have been no issue. 15 And the formation they sent down to take 16 the gate was actually too small. They should have sent a 17 tactical troop in full gear and the weight of that troop 18 would have moved people off the road without any pepper 19 spray and the gate would have been secured in less than 20 five (5) minutes. And they had that at their -- their 21 disposal but things happened. And they were reviewed 22 quite carefully by the Commission of Inquiry. 23 Could I have the next slide, please. Now 24 we're -- I'm trying to confuse you on purpose here by 25 combining these two (2) previous visions, but it's -- you
1301 can see how they combine. And you orient to find 2 context, differences, relationships, looking for 3 distinctions, and this is the management of complexity 4 and overload, keeping in mind what is important. 5 What is your primary objective? Read 6 every word of your stated goal. What can Intelligence do 7 to help you achieve the words of that goal? 8 And decide is selecting among options and 9 requires intelligence support, without which options may 10 not come up very well. And you act to effect a change 11 from an existing condition to a condition that you'd 12 consider desirable and not acting is always amongst the 13 options. 14 So in the Federal Government in Ottawa 15 it's always the first option, let's not do anything. And 16 then the rest of them follow. 17 So could I have the next slide, please? 18 Q: Maybe I could ask -- 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: -- who -- who determines, in your 21 experience, how intelligence can assist the plan's stated 22 -- written stated goal? 23 A: In the mid '90's it was usually the 24 Incident Commander and the person above that person who 25 would set up the operational plan and the components of
1311 that plan. 2 The program officer while -- at this time 3 I was the Director of Criminal Intelligence. If they 4 were having a demonstration in BC I wouldn't necessarily 5 call a Commanding Officer and say, make sure you put a 6 good intelligence component in there. We were very 7 trusting and we felt that it would be done. 8 My previous experience before 1995 was in 9 Manitoba and New Brunswick. The Chief Superintendent in 10 Manitoba would not let a public order event take place 11 without the Division Intelligence Officer being 12 responsible for the processing of information in that 13 event; it wasn't allowed. 14 And if anybody tried to do otherwise they 15 would be talked to. 16 Q: And you're speaking to your 17 experience obviously in -- as an RCMP Officer -- 18 A: Yes, yes. 19 Q: -- do you have any knowledge about 20 what -- what the standard would have been or at least 21 the practice for the OPP during that same time period? 22 A: I would assume the OPP being a 23 Provincial Police Force with a fairly -- what I would 24 call at that period of time, similar intelligence 25 structure, that the Incident Commander and the level
1321 above him, perhaps would be designing that plan, and that 2 the -- shall I call it the intelligence program, the 3 Director if there was one in the OPP at the time, might 4 not have had a say or perhaps a role in how intelligence 5 was put into that plan. 6 And that to me, is a fruitful avenue for 7 research and it's also something that we should be 8 striving towards. And very much so at the Canadian 9 Police College; I've been away from policing for almost 10 five (5) years, I would hope they are getting to that. 11 And I'll -- talk to you on this a little 12 later on when I talk about certain incidents. 13 Q: Thank you. 14 A: Next slide. And we're now moving 15 into the police model and we might as well start with a 16 definition that many of you -- many of you may have heard 17 over -- over the course of your time. 18 "Information is unprocessed data of 19 every description which may be used in 20 the production of intelligence." 21 And I've put a bullet in there: 22 "Sometimes this is referred to as raw 23 data". 24 So next slide please. 25 "Intelligence. Intelligence is the end
1331 product of information that has been 2 subject to the intelligence process." 3 We're starting to get a little complicated 4 here. 5 And the process is this wonderful thing we 6 have in front of us; planning, direction, collection, 7 collation, evaluation, analysis, reporting, dissemination 8 and re-evaluation. 9 A lot of people, the first time you show 10 them that they -- they get a little tense because it 11 looks pretty complicated. 12 And if I could go to the next slide. 13 Another definition and I really felt this was important 14 for you to hear, another view from the Australian Custom 15 Service in 2000. 16 "Intelligence can be defined as a value 17 added product derived from the 18 collection and processing of all 19 relevant information relating to client 20 needs, which is immediately or 21 potentially significant to client 22 decision making." 23 So the goal in public order operations 24 should be to give Commanders a high appreciation of 25 intelligence as their tool, to make demands to ask
1341 questions and to look for answers. 2 Of course, you have to give them the 3 support to do so. And the Command -- the client is the 4 Incident Commander in public order police operations. 5 You can have thirty/forty (30/40) 6 intelligence people working, there's only one (1) client; 7 it's the Incident Commander. There is no other. 8 The Commander does not do the work. Some 9 people used to come to my office all the time and they'd 10 tell me I had to write a report and I'd tell them, I'm an 11 Assistant Commissioner, I don't do any work, you're going 12 to write the report. 13 It's a way -- a little joke but, you know, 14 the Commander has a lot to do in a public order 15 operation. He does not do the intelligence work. He's 16 the recipient -- he or she is the recipient of the work 17 and the commander must be supported in a very disciplined 18 manner. And in my way of thinking, this is something 19 that needed a lot of work in 1995. Next slide, please. 20 Strategic Intelligence Report. And this 21 is my own words here on this slide. All that has 22 happened, what does it mean? What can be done in the 23 future? What needs to be further explored? 24 What is significant? What relationships 25 can be found? What intelligence can be built upon the
1351 new data? And what can you do to improve on this 2 opportunity? 3 In 1995 this was not uniformly applied, 4 especially in public order operations. I used to have a 5 very fine Senior NCO who went through five (5) Directors 6 of Criminal Intelligence, and he used to carry a kid's 7 puzzle to meetings of senior officers. 8 And he'd flip the puzzle pieces over on 9 their blank side and hand them to ten (10) senior 10 officers and ask them what they had. And they replied, 11 We don't know. 12 And then he said, Well, you have a few 13 minutes to tell me what you have. And they start 14 flipping them over and putting them together, all these 15 Assistant Commissioners with gold braid on and 16 everything, and then they'd yell out, We have Big Bird. 17 And they'd be so happy. 18 But -- and then the Sergeant Johnson would 19 use that as an illustration. Everybody may have 20 something, but until you start working together in a 21 strategic fashion you will not know what you have. So 22 this was a way he would illustrate that everybody might 23 have a piece of a problem, in amongst a lot of police 24 officers. 25 And in my opinion, singular events can
1361 have a strategic component, as well as the more immediate 2 unfolding tactical issues. This is because they may 3 impact a whole region, a whole city, a whole country and 4 all of its people, and that is strategic in nature. Next 5 slide, please. 6 I think tactical intelligence is primarily 7 the support given to investigative or operational 8 mandate. 9 Is that where I am or have I missed -- 10 Q: Strategic Intelligence Reporting 11 would be the next slide. 12 A: Oh, I've missed one. Okay. Thank 13 you. I think I was pretty well finished that one and 14 we'll move on to the next. Okay. 15 And it's primarily the support given to 16 the investigative or operational mandate that leads to 17 better prioritization and the best use of resources in 18 operation. And it may also allow for the -- one choice 19 over another. The next slide, please. 20 Now, tactical intelligence is dependent on 21 the reliability of sources. Of course, in an unfolding 22 operation it's speed and time sensitive, and it's better 23 if you have vision. And here I've put the word "sight" 24 in brackets. You can actually see, combined with good 25 information gathering and processing abilities.
1371 In 1995 all of these factors were not 2 uniformly available in all parts of the country. And in 3 the RCMP we -- we had to compensate by creating, 4 sometimes, for technical equipment, rapid deployment 5 packs which would be held in Ottawa to be sent to some 6 place where they might be needed. 7 And tactical intelligence is constantly 8 changing. In a large, let's take the Republican National 9 Convention a few years ago in New York City. A block of 10 an intersection may last ten (10) minutes and then the 11 swarm of people moves on. And the NYPD have to decide 12 whether they're going to put up with that, let it happen, 13 change it, alter it arrest everybody. But they have to 14 make a decision. 15 But they know the whole route of the 16 march, they know where it began, they know the demeanour 17 of the people that are involved, and they will make a 18 decision. 19 And a commander being able to see, answers 20 a lot of questions in public order. And when I was a 21 young person in Ottawa, I returned from Kingston 22 Detachment and I was involved in many Control Centre 23 operations at the RCMP Operational Control Centre. 24 And first we had fixed cameras; we had a 25 number of cameras on Parliament Hill, which we still have
1381 today, and they were fixed. They could tilt, pan, and 2 they were all-weather. 3 And then a lot of money was spent and we 4 started to have mobile cameras that could transmit video 5 back to the same control centre we were in. Things got a 6 lot calmer on the panel. When you were moving a 7 dignitary into the Government House, now you had some 8 mobile video. 9 And then we acquired the Westcam video and 10 we got live video transmission from the air, and that 11 flattened it out even more for the Commander. The 12 Commander is the consumer of all of this. A whole lot of 13 questions were no longer asked, they were there on 14 screen. 15 But when Princess Diana made her first 16 visit to Ottawa and she had to go to the Chateau for 17 lunch, the Commander could see a crowd of two thousand 18 (2,000) people blocking the door. He didn't know what 19 the demeanour of the people were so he sent in a soft hat 20 response team of about twenty (20) officers. 21 They ascertained and radioed back to the 22 commander that these were people who were interested in 23 seeing her arrive. He blocked off the street north and 24 south and asked the -- the soft hat officer to just move 25 the people back out into Wellington Street so that the
1391 motorcade could go on. 2 It solved his problem in less than two (2) 3 minutes; an example of vision, being able to see. When 4 you can't see, you have to take alternate means, and if 5 they aren't fast enough or accurate enough, things are 6 going to get rough. 7 And another example, at Kingsclear in 1993 8 I had to dismantle the blockage of the Trans Canada 9 Highway. I had two (2) helicopters. I had one (1) for 10 reconnaissance and another one (1) with a Westcam in 11 stationary orbit overtop of me. And the first thing that 12 was shown to the -- His Honour at the trials was -- was 13 the video from the Westcam, which helped the Crown and 14 Defence and the judge in their consideration of the 15 charges at hand. 16 Q: I wonder if you can just help us with 17 -- or help me with a couple of -- better understanding of 18 the concept of strategic versus tactical intelligence. 19 First of all, strategic intelligence, was 20 -- in 1995 was that a relevant component in the 21 intelligence process on an incident-specific basis, as 22 opposed to an issue-specific basis? 23 Q: Well, for us it was -- pretty well on 24 all of the major tasks we were assigned, we were assigned 25 VIP protection. But I'll give you an example.
1401 In Manitoba in '92 the Rousseau River Band 2 decided they were going to take over the Trans Canada 3 Highway at the North Dakota border, and we knew they were 4 going to do it, and they knew that we knew that they were 5 -- we were going to do it. And intelligence practices 6 were in place but they weren't strategic, they were 7 tactical. 8 They were going to do it for a specific 9 reason, which escapes me right now, they went ahead and 10 did it. We had all of our police assets present. The 11 media were there filming everything. It lasted from 12 maybe one o'clock to 2:15, at which time the Chief 13 decided he was leaving the highway and going back to -- 14 to the reserve. 15 We knew things. We were talking to them 16 but we were in a tactical mode. There wasn't a great 17 strategic story to tell about this particular blockage of 18 the Trans Canada Highway. It was over Native issues but 19 they were point, sharp, specific. I even forget what 20 they were at the time. 21 At Kingsclear, the Government of the day 22 in New Brunswick decided that they were going to tax; 23 anybody who went onto a Reserve and bought something was 24 going to have to pay taxes remitted to the Province. 25 And then the Government of the day went on
1411 Easter vacation. And we were left with people who were 2 not pleased with this new advocated tax law, and 3 therefore they took measures; took over the Trans Canada 4 Highway. 5 We had very little warning. There wasn't 6 a great deal of history to the event, it had happened in 7 the week and a half previous. Strategically, though, 8 it's our knowledge of the community, our knowledge of the 9 people; they were blocking the Trans Canada, but we 10 could still go visit the Chief. 11 We could still drive onto the Reserve. 12 But we had buffered it out; five (5) minutes after they 13 blocked it, I instructed that the highway be closed on 14 both ends, all traffic re-routed and only emergency 15 vehicles, residents and people who lived nearby could go 16 in. 17 And I did that for my own purpose, was to 18 avoid conflict. And I made sure that our people were out 19 of sight, completely out of sight. 20 So does that -- I don't know where I am, I 21 think I've wandered off, I'm not organized. 22 Q: Well that's -- that's fine. The 23 examples are illustrative and we do appreciate them. But 24 you were just explaining -- at least explaining the -- 25 whether or not you would have a place for strategic
1421 intelligence as opposed to tactical intelligence in the 2 '95 operation. 3 And I think you've given us an example of 4 tactical. 5 A: But -- 6 Q: I guess one (1) of the questions I 7 have is: Within the context of a specific policing 8 operation, if an intelligence analyst is reviewing past 9 incidents by the same people in question, to spot 10 patterns, for example, with respect to how they do 11 things, what -- how they use vehicles, perhaps, in order 12 to predict what might happen tomorrow, would that be 13 under a strategic or a tactical intelligence rubric with 14 respect to an ongoing incident? 15 A: Well, I equate this to, how much do 16 you have, how long have you had it? How much data do you 17 have? How long have you had it? And what period of time 18 are you dealing with? And is there some issue that is -- 19 even to the normal detachment person working on the 20 detachment, that has some history, that has some emotion 21 attached to it, that has some drive behind it? 22 I'll go to Burnt Church, New Brunswick. 23 That started to become a strategic issue because the 24 Department of Fisheries and Oceans is going to do one (1) 25 thing, the fishers over here are going to one (1) thing,
1431 and the Native fishers over here are going to do one (1) 2 thing. 3 And so from year to year, the Force had to 4 say, Okay, we've got a -- we've got a history here and 5 we'd better work it up and -- so that we know what we're 6 going to do, what kind of a plan we're going to have. 7 And most of all -- most of all, maybe who 8 can we talk to to help ourselves out? Because it could 9 get incredibly complicated, another enforcement body, as 10 I've mentioned. 11 So if something seems to have a history 12 attached to it, wouldn't you want to do it? And I think 13 I mention that a little later on here, but. 14 Q: All right. Fair enough. I think 15 we're on slide 15 then. 16 A: Yes. So if I could go to the next 17 slide. This is me talking here, it's not out of a book, 18 and I think it might be just what we were talking about. 19 Everything counts; all of the public who 20 are nearby, the geography, the turf, the terrain, the 21 weather, the light, the darkness. What do you know and 22 what do they know? I'm sorry to use the word, they, but 23 police often think that they -- nobody is watching them, 24 and I beg to differ on that. 25 Are there supporters? Are there people
1441 against? And what about culture and emotions? These are 2 all things that count strategically, and eventually are 3 very much so going to count tactically. 4 And it's apparent that the police are 5 being studied by people involved in public order events, 6 as I've mentioned. 7 And in some cases the police can 8 conveniently hide things and move as quietly as possible, 9 as I mentioned earlier. And it's much easier in Ottawa 10 or New York to hide things than it is in the rural part 11 of Canada. It's pretty hard to hide an elephant in a 12 rural area if it's, you know, very difficult. 13 And culture, I'll use APEC again as an 14 illustration. Some people, Canadian and international 15 people who were in Vancouver, wanted two (2) things. 16 They wanted to be seen and heard by the dignitaries that 17 were visiting APEC. 18 And some people did not want to see them 19 or hear them as it made them uncomfortable. I'm not 20 going to go into detail but as you can imagine some of 21 the world leaders do not have a comfort level with 22 demonstrations. 23 Some of our officials do not have a 24 comfort level when the world leaders don't have a comfort 25 level. So they start to wonder what could be done to
1451 give them a comfort level so... 2 And the RCMP, at the end of the day, as I 3 mentioned earlier, had to answer for actions taken and 4 it's a matter of public record. And people tried to 5 influence the police to conform to one (1) view or 6 another and the police had to deal with it and findings 7 were made. So that's my illustration of culture. It may 8 not be the best one (1) but I'm not familiar with all 9 cultures. 10 And having moved around the world as a 11 travel officer with the Prime Minister I've seen things 12 that I couldn't even comprehend but I had to accept them 13 at the time. We were being protected by other people but 14 it was quite interesting. The next slide please. 15 And this is from Stacey L. Skuhr 2003. A 16 PowerPoint on analysis. And this is the full bore 17 reality view of any situation and I can see everybody 18 straining to comprehend this slide. I don't blame you. 19 And that's why this slide is here. 20 And I know analysts who can take all of 21 these variables, they can place them into a flowing 22 document that makes it all understandable. They can do 23 it over one (1) month, one (1) year, ten (10) years. 24 They can do it for a province, a city, a country or they 25 can give you a report with a worldwide view.
1461 They can track money, phone calls, video, 2 audio, sources, time analysis, relationship analysis. I 3 once had the crew in Toronto describe to me the Russian 4 organized crime situation in Toronto and it took them 5 three (3) hours and they papered four (4) walls of the 6 room with charts. 7 And I -- I wouldn't want to explain it at 8 the end. 9 So, as an aside some police cases are 10 getting so complicated these days it takes -- it takes 11 the practitioner to explain them but they are getting 12 frightfully complicated because of the mass of data 13 that's come in and subjected to this application. 14 So, if you have a critical mass of data 15 why do you not process it? And in some respects if you 16 don't process it now when are you going to process it/ 17 And in this Commission of Inquiry, this 18 room and how long you've been at it and you are, in 19 effect, investigating something and the rules and 20 procedures that you have to go through to keep track of 21 yourselves, all of you, defence, Commission Counsel, the 22 tracking of exhibits, the transcripts that are available, 23 is -- is another illustration. 24 You could be a bunch of criminal 25 investigators and you're a Commission of Inquiry. But
1471 the fact is, you're trying to get to - to the truth. So 2 that might be a small illustration of how complex it is. 3 I -- I don't know if you feel this has been complex. I 4 think you've been at it for a while and I'll leave it to 5 you to decide whether it's been complex or not. It might 6 have been. I think it probably has. 7 And, but the one (1) thing I can say, this 8 event, you know, at the top of the pyramid we see 9 "event". Many things have happened to everyone. 10 Everyone feels they know most of it. 11 And if you're going to be precise there's 12 no such thing as most of it. It's all of it. If you 13 haven't got a grip on all of it you might miss something. 14 And an event affects everyone. 15 In London this week a report was released 16 about the security services and the subway bombings and 17 found the security services had a lot of trouble as soon 18 as people went underground the radios didn't work very 19 well. 20 Another finding is that they completely 21 forgot about all the people that were hurt and just 22 wandered away. And the work is going to be done to fix 23 that. 24 So you have to ask yourself questions. 25 How long have you had this data? Is there any more and
1481 what have you done with all of it? Could I have the next 2 slide please. 3 And this, again, is just a list of the 4 intelligence cycle. Sometimes it's called the legacy or 5 a waterfall system and prioritization is necessary when 6 the police do not have enough resources. 7 And in this country in 1995 police 8 resources were in a free fall federally, provincially. 9 Cuts were being made. Huge cuts were being made and 10 choices had to be made even with significant organized 11 crime groups. 12 But public order events, you don't have a 13 choice because your public is out there. There's a whole 14 bunch of people are there. You may have a dignitary 15 present. You have this. You have that. People may be 16 disagreeing with other -- one another, therefore, there's 17 no priority in public order events. 18 Are you just not going to go to this event 19 at the Legislature? Are you going to stay away? No, 20 you're going to go. You're going to deal with it and 21 you're going to have to deal with it. 22 So it rises up when people discuss 23 priorities. The public order events automatically have a 24 high priority. 25 And I'd just like, looking at this cycle,
1491 there's always a dynamic tension between operators and 2 analysts. And that's a good reason in the RCMP, I think 3 at CID Headquarters we might have had thirty/thirty-five 4 (30/35) analysts, hardly any of them were police 5 officers. They were the strategic analysts of the RCMP. 6 In the divisions we might have had a 7 hundred and twenty (120) more across the country and we 8 tried very much to make 50 percent of those sworn police 9 officers and 50 percent civilian persons so that we could 10 get a good healthy mix in the analytical community. 11 And, in my opinion, there's also a dynamic 12 tension between intelligence professionals and others in 13 policing and that was prominent in 1995. 14 And it's a very hard thing to change in a 15 police force. But there is one (1) simple truth; all 16 police officers should be part of intelligence awareness 17 and practices. 18 Q: Why is that? 19 A: Otherwise you're going to lose 20 things. You're going to lose information and you're 21 going to -- you're going to end up with inconsistencies 22 in diffusion of information. 23 And in 1999 in the RCMP, it wasn't until 24 1999 that Commissioner Murray had a meeting which I'll 25 refer to later on to try and make that happen.
1501 Q: Maybe you can just spend a few 2 moments explaining to us what each stage of the 3 intelligence cycle comprises of and why it's important in 4 the order that it is? 5 A: Well, I think if we just take, let's 6 say, an operation has just concluded then we'd be down at 7 number seven (7) in the intelligence program, re- 8 evaluating, and then sending it back up for planning and 9 direction. 10 And if you want to know how it works in 11 this country every August the CISC, the Canadian 12 organization for Police Officers, has a meeting in August 13 and they try and decide priorities. 14 So let's take that as the planning and 15 direction part of the cycle. They meet somewhere in 16 Canada and they have two (2) versions of a report. One 17 (1) is public, they're going to put it on the Internet. 18 And the other is private and it has all the chapter and 19 verse in it. 20 And the collected chiefs, all of them, the 21 Commissioner of the OPP, the Chief of Metro and the 22 Commissioner of the RCMP. The RCMP is part of this 23 organization, Criminal Intelligence Service Canada. 24 They would then give a general direction 25 of three (3) or four (4) items, which would be taken home
1511 by all of the responsible officers, and that would be the 2 general theme for the year on intelligence practices. 3 From there, the RCMP and all of these 4 other Police Forces would look to their regional and 5 local priorities, and under that umbrella they would 6 sometimes put together what is called, 'collection 7 plans.' 8 And then they would be assigned to 9 intelligence investigator's, JFO's, or maybe even a drug 10 squad in some cases. Material would start to be 11 gathered, off the collection plans and correlated into 12 computer systems. It would be, of course, evaluated. 13 And then the analysts, all of those 14 previous stages having taken place, would start writing 15 the report that I've just referred to perhaps again, for 16 the next August. 17 And that would be -- they would have full 18 access to all of the data that's been gathered by the 19 collectors. 20 And they would employ techniques that 21 they've learned in school, first of all through 22 University training, and then in courses taught by the 23 RCMP and CISC. 24 And when they finally finished a report in 25 CID, they would have to board the report; the analyst
1521 would have to go into a room with all the other analysts 2 and defend the report. And this is a strategic model. 3 And then once that had been done, the 4 report was put into final and disseminated, and we would 5 be asking for feedback from everyone who received it. 6 So there's an example of the cycle. 7 Q: And in practice, you know, on a 8 smaller, more modest scale than you've been addressing, 9 on a particular incident, if the Incident Commander is 10 faced with rapidly unfolding events with the possibility 11 of serious police action being taken, is there a 12 shortened version of the intelligence cycle that would be 13 acceptable for standard practice in 1995? 14 A: There's not a shortened version, but 15 all of this can be done mentally, it doesn't have to be 16 written down. 17 And you have to remember you're operating 18 on a timeline. What was important two (2) years ago is 19 still fundamental to the file, but you're now in a 20 timeline, it's tonight, it's 5:00 or 6:00 and things -- 21 perhaps things are starting to happen. You have to start 22 disciplining yourself and winnowing down to this 23 timeline, the now. 24 And when you're in the now, you have to 25 start looking at everything that's coming forward just in
1531 the now. And how does -- you can pause for thought and 2 think back to how it relates to previous events of 3 previous days, but you have to have -- hopefully you've 4 got all the things I mentioned previously though. 5 Do you have people to work on this? Do 6 you have vision? Yes or no? Do you have something 7 that's going to do this for you? And if you don't, it 8 could be very, very difficult in the now, with 9 acceleration happening minute by minute, to come to two 10 (2) things. 11 First of all, what are my choices and what 12 am I going to do with -- what choice can I make amongst 13 those choices? Especially when it comes to something 14 like the use of force. 15 So you have to shorten it down, and 16 hopefully I'm speaking in a world, a very optimistic 17 world where you would have all the good things. But if 18 you don't have all the good things, you're already headed 19 into chaos, straight in, and you may not recover. 20 Q: I'm wondering, is this an appropriate 21 time, in terms of your presentation, to have the lunch 22 break? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: All right. Commissioner...? 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Fine, we'll
1541 take a lunch break now. 2 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thank you. 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry stands 4 adjourned until 1:00 p.m. 5 6 --- Upon recessing at 12:03 p.m. 7 --- Upon resuming at 1:06 p.m. 8 9 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 10 resumed, please be seated. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 12 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Good afternoon. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 14 afternoon. 15 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Perhaps we could have 16 the PowerPoint back on the screen? There you go. 17 18 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 19 Q: And this was the -- just before the 20 break you had -- you had testified about the different 21 visions underlying concepts or theories of -- of 22 intelligence, you'd given us many illustrative examples 23 on the world stage and the Canadian stage about that. 24 And we were now getting into I think the 25 more nut and bolts, if you will, of the intelligence
1551 process and how that may have application to public order 2 events like the one which is at focus in this Inquiry. 3 And you had just left off explaining or at 4 least listing the components of the intelligence cycle, 5 so perhaps we can -- you can pick up there. And I don't 6 know if you want this; this is the -- the slide you had 7 or we can go to the next one? 8 A: Perhaps we can go to the next one. 9 Q: Thank you. 10 A: And this is just a depiction of the - 11 - that narrative in a circle, so I won't dwell on it. I 12 suppose this is a very popular way of depicting this in 13 many -- many publications. Could I have the next slide, 14 please? 15 The plans for a tactical operation, the 16 history and reasons behind the cause for the operation 17 are always somewhat unique or completely unique so that 18 they may have similarities but -- but they also have 19 their own root causes that must be paid attention to. 20 So in many respects, custom made plans are 21 required and should derive from a strategic view of what 22 has happened up 'til now, and potentially what could 23 happen. 24 Q: And what does that involve? 25 Essentially, the first part of that, deriving from a
1561 strategic view of what has happened up to now with 2 respect to a particular ongoing incident? 3 A: What I'm saying here is that if you 4 have a history it would be a great idea to have that in a 5 condition. By "condition," I mean you have processed all 6 of the information so that you don't have to go backwards 7 and do that, you are now -- you have it up to this point 8 in time and now you can move forward into something 9 that's more focussed and tactical, something more 10 immediate. 11 Q: And perhaps more time impacted? 12 A: Yes, much more time impacted. And 13 resources, and let's just say -- I should have the word 14 there, 'intelligence resources'. We all know that 15 operations have many types of resources. They should be 16 scaled up in favour of more rather than less, at the 17 outset. 18 A small example of this is when I was at 19 the Winnipeg Airport during the first Gulf War; we had a 20 -- a plan on the shelf for an emergency. It was a 21 generic emergency. And that plan had a certain number of 22 people in it; it doubled our complement. So the Chief 23 Superintendent gave me the people, we scaled up, we had 24 an intelligence operation underway, he gave more 25 intelligence resources.
1571 But as it became apparent that the threat, 2 in that respect, was in the Gulf, and not manifesting 3 itself at that time in Canada, the plan was scaled down 4 'til I was back to a normal complement at the airport. 5 Q: So in other words, you don't wait to 6 scale up your resources while something is -- is in -- 7 until something is a reality, if you will, you look at 8 the -- the size of the risk, the -- the severity of the 9 risk and you scale up accordingly, before the event 10 happens? 11 A: If you are in a position to do so, 12 that is what you do. 13 Q: Okay. 14 A: And in -- in some other examples, 15 I'll go back to Kingsclear, there wasn't much time to 16 scale up. 17 And I'll just mention here another point. 18 In a provincial police force, scaling up can take days, 19 three (3) or four (4) days, because you have to have all 20 of the resources brought from distant points and 21 assembled. 22 And in Ottawa, scaling up can take an 23 hour. In Tokyo it can take thirty (30) minutes, because 24 in Tokyo what -- what's known as a CMU, there's probably 25 twenty (20) of them on duty every day. They all have
1581 their own bus and they all can be ordered up to do -- 2 solve various problems for Police Commanders. They're 3 fully trained and they're ready to go. But that's a city 4 of 25 million people. 5 Q: Okay. 6 A: So a Provincial police force, whether 7 it's the RCMP policing Manitoba or Saskatchewan, the OPP 8 or the SQ, they have to assemble the resources. 9 Go down to Toronto; less time to assemble 10 resources, you're in the City of Toronto. 11 And since 1995, what was not common in 12 1995, was the sharing and cross training of public order 13 resources. And that is now done Canada wide. And just 14 worthy of note, Canada has half the ratio of police to 15 population of Europe. 16 So for example, at the Kananaskis Summit, 17 public order and a major event, I'm fully confident we 18 had the OPP there and some people from the Metropolitan 19 Toronto Police as well as other police forces. 20 Q: And when you said the, "public order 21 resources," are you talking about policing, different 22 policing organizations? 23 A: I'm mostly talking about the 24 resources such as CMU's and other formations that might 25 be required by the Chief of the Calgary Police or the
1591 RCMP -- 2 Q: Thank you. 3 A: -- in that example. In some places, 4 plans are SOP, Standard Operating Procedures. But, you 5 know, it's -- plans can be scaled up and written on the 6 spot, but if you have some kind of warning, it's better 7 to do this earlier rather than the later. 8 Could we go to the next slide, please? 9 And I guess we're -- here we are. How 10 much warning? All police -- community based policing was 11 very well developed all across Canada in 1995, so 12 Detachment Commanders are expected to have a strategic 13 overview of their area. 14 And -- and they're expected to keep this 15 in good condition. What are the issues in your town or 16 village? Are there labour issues? Are there other 17 issues that could impact the community? 18 So in some cases, if you have no warning, 19 you still fall back on your knowledge of your community, 20 that you've obtained through hard work with -- with the 21 people of the community. 22 And as I say, some with a historical 23 buildup, in that case, if you -- let's take Burnt Church 24 with the fishing, you know next year that something might 25 happen.
1601 You're in contact with the Fisheries and 2 Oceans, and you're in contact with everybody in the 3 community. You might want to start to plan in January if 4 it's going to be unfolding, perhaps, when the season 5 opens, say -- say it's in March or whatever month it is; 6 why wait? 7 And you would have the complete co- 8 operation of your division headquarters, and they would 9 have the co-operation of -- look for resources from other 10 places to help you with that. 11 So if you have a historical build-up, in 12 the United Kingdom these are called 'tension indicators' 13 and -- 14 Q: And so if you have a long standing 15 political dispute which flares up from time to time, 16 would that be an tension indicator? 17 A: Yes, absolutely. 18 Q: And when you have flaring up from 19 time to time, so you have a number of tension indicators, 20 is that a suggestion to the Incident Commander that 21 perhaps they ought to be ramping up an intelligence 22 process? Or -- or just maintaining status quo? 23 A: You should be ramping up a plan that 24 includes an intelligence process with the co-operation of 25 his superiors. And I think you have to keep going back
1611 to the program. Is there a program in this police force, 2 An intelligence program where people with certain 3 expertise are, And can they be asked to help? 4 And if you are dealing in the First 5 Nations context, do you have a First Nations program in 6 your police force, where they have subject matter experts 7 and people who can help you further and make suggestions 8 to you; things that you don't know about. People that 9 might be available with certain expertise that you don't 10 know about. 11 Q: And just so that I'm clear, this 12 whole process of these tension indicators and ramping up 13 intelligence by having an operational plan sooner than 14 later, was that something that was in common policing 15 practice here in 1995? 16 A: In some places, yes. In other 17 places, no. And I go back to Manitoba where we had an 18 officer who occupied himself with these issues and he 19 would be calling people in. Where are you? Do you have 20 a plan? I want to see the plan. I want to review the 21 plan. And he'd have the division intelligence office 22 with him so. 23 Q: All right. 24 A: And I -- I guess a couple of 25 examples, some -- some incidents are precipitated by
1621 actions with unintended consequences. OKA is one of 2 them, where a municipal official decided perhaps a golf 3 course should be somehow in a certain place, and other 4 people did not agree. 5 Well, he just all of a sudden announced 6 this and things got -- got very involved quickly. 7 And again, the tax model in New Brunswick 8 where a tax thing was put out, and all of a sudden a 9 problem that was not there is there. 10 Sometimes the police can precipitate these 11 things, but I'll -- I'd say that's on rare occasions. 12 Clumsy policing or something like that. 13 Q: And it sounds like you're -- you're 14 really saying that there are certain factors that an 15 incident commander has to be cognisant of from day one 16 (1), and re-evaluating and anticipating, I guess, what 17 the reaction to his actions may be. What's the 18 motivation behind the -- 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: -- activity in place -- 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: -- because the same act can have 23 different interpretations? 24 A: Yes. I'll give you one (1) more 25 example. Gustafsen Lake started off with a ranch, and
1631 one (1) person was involved in the -- in the protest, 2 shall we call it. And the Force didn't react fast 3 enough, and the one (1) person started to talk to forest 4 rangers and other people, and he started to be 5 aggressive. 6 And then one (1) person changed to five 7 (5) persons, changed to ten (10) persons, and we -- all 8 of a sudden we had an event that we probably could have 9 handled in the first instance had we had a bit of a 10 tactical assessment of where could this one (1) person be 11 going. 12 And instead, we waited until we had a 13 situation, in a very rugged piece of terrain, where it 14 was apparent guns were going to be out at the outset. 15 But it did start with one (1) person. 16 Q: Okay. 17 A: Could I have the next slide? I'm 18 going to move into this area of reliability. 19 Reliability, the source of the information. The caution 20 is that sources can be difficult to assess. And 21 information, you're going to be gathering information; 22 nothing escapes, but not all of it will be used. 23 And just to illustrate this, I once had a 24 source in the drug squad days who would give me a pound 25 in the East End, while he was trafficking three hundred
1641 (300) pounds in the West End. 2 And I learned my lesson from other sources 3 who told me I was being fooled, and that I had to learn a 4 little more about source handling. What motivates a 5 source? Human source handling is a skill and we had to 6 radically alter our human source handling course for 7 criminal intelligence officers along about 1995, 1996 8 because we felt that it needed a lot of work. 9 So these courses were developed -- we also 10 radically altered our criminal intelligence officers 11 course around that time. 12 Q: Are you saying '85 to '96? 13 A: '95, '96, yeah. 14 Q: '95 to '96. Thank you. And -- and 15 what -- 16 A: We made the -- we made the 17 intelligence officer's course more project oriented. We 18 made them, in a two (2) or three (3) week period at -- we 19 worked them all day but then at night they had to work on 20 a plan and they had to present the plan at the end. And 21 they had to account for themselves, how they were going 22 to execute the intelligence cycle from planning and the 23 collection plan right through to the end on a, say, a 24 criminal organization. 25 Some of the plans were so impressive that
1651 they were taken straight away and put into use. So it is 2 useful to -- to put intelligence officers -- I think it's 3 useful to revise the course and put them through more. 4 And, you know, nothing escapes -- in 5 Seattle in 1999 the police did not see the dots being 6 connected. They were heavily criticized and there was 7 about $5 million damage. 8 Some people think intelligence is 9 excessively collected. If you're a citizen of London 10 today and you walk about in a normal business life you'll 11 be photographed three hundred (300) times a day, so. But 12 the citizens of London, through all they've been through, 13 don't seem to be objecting too much. 14 So there's examples of extremes. And 15 that's why police intelligence is supposed to be 16 confidential because it hasn't been proven yet. 17 Could we go to the next slide? 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 A: Okay. And just continuing the 22 training and -- and identification of problems, 23 Commissioner Murray took it upon himself in 1999, at the 24 end of this decade, after all that we had been through, 25 to command all senior officers of the Force, Deputy
1661 Commissioners right down to probably down to the Chief 2 Superintendent level. 3 Command performance, they had to attend a 4 two (2) day seminar. And Commissioner Murray went with 5 the seminar right across Canada until it was finished, 6 and he -- he gave them information from people who could 7 deliver the information to them, and then he outlined his 8 expectations on their use of intelligence. And from that 9 point on they were expected to be able to prove how they 10 were using intelligence. And every senior officer had to 11 attend. 12 And that was very useful. I had to 13 attend, I was the ex-Director CID but I still had to 14 attend. It was mandatory. 15 So the reliability scale is heavily source 16 oriented, as mentioned earlier, and reliable as a 17 combination of proven accuracy of information, and proven 18 dependability of a person. And every effort must be made 19 to validate information before grading it reliable. 20 And I'll mention later on who uses these 21 scales; not everybody uses them. 22 Believed reliable applies that the 23 qualifying conditions of reliability are not yet met but 24 the -- and we can see the rest. Next slide, please? 25 Unknown reliability applies if there is
1671 insufficient experience with the source of the 2 information. And doubtful reliability applies if there 3 is doubt about the source of the information. 4 Q: Can I just -- I just think it's 5 important for us to understand these concepts. I think 6 the -- the full definitions are important. You said the 7 -- at least according to the -- the slide: 8 "Believed reliable applies if the 9 qualifying conditions of reliability 10 are not met, but the existing knowledge 11 of the source is favourable and it is 12 believed he or she will eventually 13 prove reliable." 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: And what -- what do you base that on? 16 A: What you would base it on is very 17 often when you have a new source or a source, you have 18 believed reliable information. You go find some other 19 sources and other ways of corroborating that and testing 20 it. Then perhaps the source, in all honesty, can't give 21 you anymore than they have, so you test the believed 22 reliable information by using other techniques and 23 methods. 24 Q: All right. And there's unknown 25 reliability and doubtful reliability. Can you tell me
1681 what's the significance of the different rankings of 2 reliability in terms of playing into the Incident 3 Commander's game plan? 4 A: Well, the significance is the -- the 5 Incident Commander, this is very useful to them because 6 if -- if they have a -- let's say they have a visual 7 observation linked with something that has been obtained 8 from a wiretap, and the wiretap said something was going 9 to happen at two o'clock and the visual observation is 10 not consistent with the wiretap. Something else is 11 happening at two o'clock. 12 So then a human source might be employed 13 to try and straighten out the -- the difference between 14 the two (2). 15 Q: But in terms of affecting or in terms 16 of underpinning a course of police action, does it make 17 any difference if the information that the Incident 18 Commander is relying upon is doubtful reliability or 19 unknown reliability or believed reliable or reliable? 20 A: Well, I -- doubtful reliability would 21 really be something if you were considering your options. 22 You would go to the -- the information of a higher 23 quality on the shelf -- 24 Q: Okay. 25 A: -- when you're trying to -- if you
1691 had them on shelves, you'd go to the higher quality 2 information. Because if it's doubtful reliability, you 3 would assign people, you'd give them an order; you're not 4 satisfied with this, they would say, Well boss, we can't 5 get anymore; go out and try and get some more. 6 Q: And under what circumstances would 7 you employ a use of force option to resolve a situation 8 based on information of unknown reliability? 9 A: Well, that would be pretty -- pretty 10 risky in some respects. You're combining, what do you 11 have, what do you know, and what can you see. If you 12 can't see anything and you're stuck with information of 13 unknown reliability -- first of all, do you know it's 14 unknown reliability? And I'll refer to that in another 15 slide. 16 Q: Okay. 17 A: But it's -- it's something that would 18 be of great consequences if you were going to base your 19 whole use of force on something that was very tenuous. 20 Q: And the intellectual cycle that 21 you've described in this now reliability scale, were 22 these new concepts in 1995 in -- in intelligence policing 23 circles in Canada? 24 A: No. No, they were -- 25 Q: Were they fairly well established?
1701 A: Yes. Yes. Could we go to the next 2 slide? 3 Okay. Information for court purposes must 4 include a 'C' in the assessment. Believed reliable can 5 be used for court purposes. Of course by this time you 6 either have an exhibit seized or available to be seized 7 and a witness who can testify or both. 8 And you're -- you're now in a position of 9 having evidence, gathering evidence and a criminal 10 investigation may be underway. 11 And when intelligence units are formed up 12 into JFO's, they will often run cases to prosecution. 13 So, some criminal investigators though -- and this is a 14 major difference, including some of the best serious 15 crime investigators in this country may make little use 16 of this system. 17 Because they're working on a principle of 18 evidence, I think many of you have heard of Tip Files in 19 serious crime units where everything is kept in a file 20 until it's proven or not proven. And if it's proven, 21 it's moved into the evidence chain and to them a 22 reliability scale, of course in their line of work a 23 homicide investigation is to -- is court or no court 24 period. 25 So in their line of work they would not --
1711 they don't have a whole lot of nebulous information, they 2 don't have a whole lot of ambiguity. Their job is to get 3 rid of ambiguity. 4 An intelligence officers job is to sort of 5 be involved in the ambiguity over a long -- number of 6 years and maybe never reach a prosecution. And that's 7 why these scales are very important. 8 And then when you take the continuum of 9 time, what was unreliable here after a period of time and 10 a number of other inputs from various sources, might be - 11 - end up as believed reliable, court. 12 So you leave it in the system but you 13 don't make it your primary decision making tool at that 14 time. Maybe at a later time it will be. 15 Q: And whose job ought it be to 16 determine the level of reliability of any particular 17 piece of intelligence in the -- in a police operation? 18 A: In a tactical operation it should be 19 the officer who obtained the information. But if you 20 have a -- if you -- you should be questioning -- I think 21 it's the next -- I think we could go to the next slide. 22 You could be questioning that officer with 23 the simple questions, Where's this from, where did you 24 get it, how did you get it, who did you get it from, 25 and --
1721 Q: What do you know about that person? 2 A: What do you know about them? I'm not 3 -- can you go out and get more? Is there anybody else in 4 this room who can go -- has somebody else who can go out 5 and get more? 6 It's very important to, especially for the 7 Incident Commander who is going to make a decision 8 potentially on the use of force or something else very 9 significant, they should have a level of satisfaction and 10 comfort with the -- and that's why I say people have to 11 be very demanding as Incident Commanders and the higher a 12 level of understanding they have -- a good police officer 13 can bring -- bringing you bad information. It's as 14 simple as that, and not know it. 15 But maybe -- and he's not doing it through 16 some act of intention, but he may be -- that's all he 17 has. He has no way of -- he or she has no way of 18 confirming it but as a team what can you to do confirm 19 it? And questions have to be asked. 20 Could I have the next slide. And here we 21 go. I guess you were ahead of me, of course. How do we 22 interpret what you see? How do you combine one (1) piece 23 of information with another? Do you realize if it's 24 flawed? How do you arrive at a whole picture and what 25 can you do to get better information?
1731 And when I'm asking these rhetorical 2 questions, I guess I'm asking them of the Incident 3 Commander. And he has a team and they are supposed to 4 obtain this for him. 5 Q: So these are questions he should -- 6 or he or she, the Incident Commander, should be asking of 7 the people who are bringing the information -- 8 A: Hmm hmm. 9 Q: -- to them? 10 A: Hmm hmm. Next slide please. And, 11 again, tactical operation for larger scale public order 12 can be very fast and the police have less control. I'll 13 cover this in a slide in a few minutes. It can be very 14 much medieval in appearance and some of the physical 15 movements may have significance and some may not. 16 Your vision is paramount and vision is 17 expensive in police forces. I haven't mentioned -- 18 Q: And when you're talking about -- 19 A: -- that yet, but it is. 20 Q: Well, when you're talking about 21 "vision" do you mean direct sight? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: Why. 24 A: What -- what can you see? 25 Q: Why?
1741 A: Because if you can't see how can you 2 put anything into context. You may have a report that 3 Constable X saw something. But if -- if you had the 4 wherewithal to look at the vulner -- vulnerable points of 5 your territory where you -- where this operation is going 6 to take place and put in transmission that you can 7 actually see that, when Constable X reports it, you can 8 put it into your own context because you're looking at 9 it. 10 Q: And so when you talk about aids to 11 vision are you -- you're talking about, it sounds like, 12 video camera equipment -- 13 A: Hmm hmm. 14 Q: -- so, things like that and are you 15 also talking about undercover teams? 16 A: Yes. Any -- any way of getting a 17 reliable vision or a -- a verbal feed of a reliable 18 vision is, if you -- if you're minus cameras and you send 19 out an -- an observer team and they are reporting back, 20 chapter and verse, that's better than having nothing, of 21 course. Yes. 22 And, again, reiterating there must be 23 enough people to process the information. And in '95 24 across this country sometimes you didn't have enough 25 people. You just didn't.
1751 Q: Due to? 2 A: Due to budget restraints or no -- no 3 warning or various problems. Or you had people and maybe 4 you have to ramp them up and that becomes a problem 5 because you're working from behind, so. 6 Q: And -- 7 A: I'll give you an example. Quebec 8 City, You've got fifty thousand (50,000) people, among 9 them are two hundred (200) anarchists. So forty-nine 10 thousand, eight hundred (49,800) care about something and 11 are going to be peaceful. And the anarchists care less 12 and are prone to violence and public order is going to 13 come at a high cost. And it costs a lot of money. And 14 the two hundred (200) people hid amongst the other people 15 and when they stepped forward they did violence and then 16 they retreated back into the crowd. 17 We -- we just could not keep up with who 18 the two hundred (200) people were. So what did we do? 19 We used huge amounts of force. We used tactical troops. 20 We used rubber bullets. We used tear gas and we kept a 21 perimeter secure. We had the perimeter. We declared the 22 perimeter. The Prime Minister declared the site. We 23 declared the perimeter and then we had to hold it and we 24 had a -- we had a difficult time. 25 Q: Are you saying that if there's not
1761 sufficient resources for whatever reason devoted to a 2 public order event that that may put -- that may mean 3 that to maintain public order it's going to require use 4 of force on a scale that otherwise would not be 5 necessary? 6 A: It might. If -- if you -- if you are 7 under-resourced, I'll take you back to Gate 6. 8 You're -- you have a credible police 9 resource but it's not that big and it's arrived late you 10 have to put a bunch of people off a roadway so a 11 motorcade can go through. You try to put them off the 12 roadway, a few of them are resisting, you're having a bit 13 of a rough time so out comes the pepper spray and the 14 pepper spray is used. 15 The people are put where you want them and 16 minutes later the motorcade can pass but -- so there you 17 have a small use -- a smaller group using force but they 18 don't have the weight of say a tac -- when a tactical 19 troop swings into move these people over, it would just 20 be a gradual push. There would be no blows. 21 There would be -- the people would move 22 because of the weight of the formation they would -- they 23 would move and you wouldn't have to use a chemical agent. 24 So what I'm saying is that sometimes if 25 you don't have enough resources you may have to elevate
1771 your level on the continuum of forced used in a -- I 2 think some of you may have seen that continuum of force 3 for use of police officers and so that might be the case. 4 Q: Okay. 5 A: That's a pretty esoteric example but 6 it could be a factor. 7 Okay. I -- next slide, please? 8 I'm moving into something, this is 9 straight from me. It's a one (1) -- what I call a one 10 (1) person concept. 11 In an ideal world one (1) person should be 12 able to take all of the processed intelligence to the 13 Commander and that one (1) person should have control of 14 every investigator in the place and around the place. 15 And the Commander will listen to the one 16 (1) person and the one (1) person can take resource 17 people with him, the criminal person or the intelligence 18 person or the CMU person or whatever for -- for more 19 detail but the Commander will in turn task the one (1) 20 person to obtain better answers if he or she is not 21 satisfied. 22 Q: And what's the purpose of having just 23 one (1) person in charge of essentially coordinating all 24 those efforts and feeding back to the Incident Commander? 25 A: Because they are feeding into the one
1781 (1) person. There's no ambiguity of who's in charge at 2 all and so it's, you know, it -- it's the -- it's much 3 easier for the Commander to dialogue. 4 Q: Is it also a bit of a safety valve 5 with respect to preserving the -- the integrity of 6 information? 7 A: Yes. Yes. And without this -- you 8 know I don't want to drift too far into command and 9 control but I'll drift -- 10 Q: Right. No, I understand. 11 A: -- into it a bit. Without this 12 contribution to command and control commanders will go to 13 their comfort level and inevitably this will lead to the 14 many persons impacting the Commander. Maybe you want to 15 call it the many persons concept with all manner of raw 16 data. 17 And this diffusion of the intelligence 18 process does not bode well for the Commander and his or 19 her ability to make decisions. 20 Q: Just tell me what you mean by, 21 "diffusion". 22 A: Well, if you have a culture where 23 everything is being fed to the Commander without the 24 proper attention to analysis, filtering, detail, then the 25 Commander will be listening to many people at once.
1791 It'll be more chaotic, more confusing. 2 The one (1) person is going to be 3 accountable and you know they're going to be trained. 4 They have to be trained and they're not a very nice 5 person; they're the one (1) person. So they're pretty 6 fearful people. And the -- the reason for that is, is 7 they have to be accountable or they will be tasked and 8 re-tasked. 9 And in my opinion, 1995 all -- here -- 10 here's a very important point. This diffusion can, as I 11 mentioned earlier, can be a prelude to chaos but all 12 commanders should be trained for intelligence and anybody 13 who you're going to put in this position of the one (1) 14 person should be trained for intelligence. 15 And in 1995 only a few were across this 16 whole country. That includes the RCMP, all the 17 Provincial police forces. They weren't all trained for 18 intelligence. And maybe we should use a new word. Let's 19 call it, throw out intelligence and you could call it 20 'training for processing information'. 21 Whatever, whatever word you want to use. 22 But -- so -- so the capacity to process equals training, 23 resources, tasking and vision. It also means having your 24 house in order to all that has gone on before. 25 I'll give you one (1) quick example. The
1801 -- the night -- New Year's Eve of the year 2000 is known 2 as Y2K. And at the RCMP National Operation Centre in 3 Ottawa, we were all told to come in and work all night 4 with Commissioner Murray because we had to be ready for 5 anything. 6 Commissioner Murray was there, we were 7 around a table, two (2) stories up in -- in the National 8 Operations Centre. And down on the ground floor were two 9 (2) floor screens were thirty-five (35) analysts. CSIS 10 is down there, the military's down there, RCMP, they're 11 all working on the computers. 12 They have intelligence feeds coming in 13 from wherever they want, they can call them up and 14 Commissioner Murray is waiting for something to happen. 15 Happily we had a very uneventful night. 16 But only one (1) person gave information to Commissioner 17 Murray and that was Richard Proulx, my successor, the 18 Director of Criminal Intelligence. 19 He would deliver information to 20 Commissioner Murray and all of us and I was there in case 21 something needed to be protected, period. I wasn't 22 delivering information. 23 And at a given moment during the evening, 24 Assistant Commissioner Proulx took the Commissioner down 25 to meet the people in the room who were working all
1811 night. He didn't ask all of us to go down there. 2 We were left upstairs. And that's how 3 strict it gets. And it didn't matter where the 4 information came from, Proulx was ready to handle it, 5 deliver it and vouch for it and go back and get more if 6 necessary. That's a small example. 7 Now training on the next slide, I -- this 8 is a very interesting point. Training in 1995, the 9 Incident Commander's course to tell you the truth was 10 called 'The Hostage Barricaded Persons Course' in those 11 days. 12 So you imply from that that you're being 13 trained as an Incident Commander to deal with a very 14 discreet contained incident, hostage barricade. But it 15 was sort of built for contained incidents. 16 And a classic example is a TRU team with a 17 leader and what they have, they call it the standing on 18 the IA, they have the Immediate Action plan. And it's 19 followed throughout the incident by a never ending 20 updated series of options as the operation unfolds. 21 So for the Commander, the TRU team leader 22 is his intelligence person. He has contained the 23 incident to the four (4) points of the compass. He has 24 an observer group around that incident and at given times 25 the -- the TRU team leader will come to the Incident
1821 Commander and say Your options have changed in the last 2 forty-five (45) minutes, here are your new options. 3 Of course going on with this it's not just 4 a TRU Op, there'll be a negotiation going on. There 5 would also be people from the Detachment working 6 intelligence around the incident. And the incident will 7 be contained. 8 Members of the community might be aware 9 what's going on. Maybe the roads are blocked off. But 10 somebody has to explain that to them and the Incident 11 Commander will use Detachment resources and Division 12 resources to do that. 13 So in a classic -- this is the type of 14 training -- it's called 'The Hostage Barricaded' and a 15 lot of times it was dealing with one (1) individual 16 period. On rare occasions it might have been more than 17 one (1) hostage or more than one (1) person barricaded. 18 And -- and what Commissioner Murray 19 realized in '95/'96 is that we were getting things that 20 were much more complicated than that. And we hadn't 21 really gotten ourselves to address these issues of -- as 22 I've described in the beginning of my testimony. 23 Public order issues were no longer just a 24 hostage barricaded person. You have to discriminate 25 between them. Some of them have different qualities than
1831 others. And some of them are much more complicated than 2 dealing with one (1) person, although that is very 3 complicated also. 4 Q: And was your police organization -- 5 was the RCMP more or less representative of the other 6 police organizations in terms of their capability to deal 7 with these new emerging situations, beyond the hostage 8 barricade situation? 9 A: I -- I think all the police forces in 10 the country were struggling with it, it was becoming: 11 Who do you get? Were do you go? Who do you get when you 12 have to send somebody into Equador in twenty-four (24) 13 hours to help the Canadian Ambassador deal with 14 kidnapping of Canadians. 15 Where are you going to find this person? 16 What type of background do they have and how are they 17 going to ameliorate the situation? 18 They're out there, but you have to have 19 thoughts about how you're going to deal with these issues 20 in the future. 21 And public order, I'll say one (1) thing, 22 you know, most of my experience is in VIP and I have 23 dealt with hostage barricade situations, but, you know, 24 when you name a city and you're going to hold -- hold a 25 summit, the public order comes to you.
1841 They don't care about your city. They 2 don't care about its people. What they do care about is 3 protesting. So they are coming to the event, and they 4 are not mad at the city they are mad at the visitor. 5 And under Section 2 of the Criminal Code, 6 we have to maintain the safety of the visitor; 7 internationally protected person. So that's a different 8 quality; people involved in that protest are thinking 9 about different things than a person who is dealing with 10 an issue surrounding his family, for example, or 11 something more personal and emotional. 12 Q: And I think, you know, this is an 13 important insight. You're saying that when there's a 14 significant protest it's about an issue or an event, it's 15 not about the other people there, necessarily, or the 16 city in question. It's not about hatred towards that, 17 it's about upset or -- or frustration with a particular 18 issue. 19 A: Yes. So there is differences in -- 20 in -- maybe not visually to you watching these things on 21 TV, but behind the scenes. The emotions at Burnt Church, 22 people are talking about their livelihood; will they have 23 any income or not? 24 And it's a totally different thing than 25 people arriving to engage in an anti-globalization event,
1851 for example. They have serious issues too, but of a 2 different dimension in their own minds. 3 And on a personal level, it's very 4 important to them but it's not affecting their -- their 5 own family right away, so. And in this respect, you 6 know, modern public order is loosely contained, and 7 persons in a demonstration will have their own tactics 8 and they're not necessarily going to tell you what you -- 9 they are going to do. 10 And there's a term known as, 'diversity of 11 tactics,' where people aren't even going to tell each 12 other but they're all going to go together in the general 13 theme of protesting a certain individual. And they're 14 networked and they have silence as a security device. 15 And for this ten (10) minutes somebody may 16 be leading, and the next ten (10) minutes somebody else 17 will be leading. Maybe the puppet show is going to lead 18 off in this ten (10) minutes and maybe you're going to 19 rip up and intersection in the next ten (10) minutes. So 20 -- and all of these people have studied the police to the 21 N'th degree. 22 So the police in the '90's had to start 23 catching up with this. Could we have the next slide? 24 Okay, good. 25 As we've mentioned earlier, some incidents
1861 were under resourced. And let's bring it down to the 2 intelligence discussion again. They may have been well 3 resourced physically, with checkpoint people and all 4 these other resources that you need, but perhaps they 5 were under resourced in the intelligence equation. 6 And that relates to some of our previous 7 discussions on the concern with which senior management 8 views these things. What training has senior management 9 had to make them concerned? None? Or some? And that's 10 important. So that relates to the whole police force. 11 That's a force-wide issue. 12 And I mention the one (1) person concept 13 was not well used in '95 and I also mentioned that 14 training was beginning to change, but intelligence was 15 not where it should have been in this change, and it was 16 happening very rapidly. 17 And debriefings of individual police 18 officers were starting to serve as problems with 19 intelligence when it failed. And many operations had to 20 be scaled up in mid operation. 21 Q: So in other words, a little bit too 22 late? 23 A: Hmm hmm. But you take that one in 24 Quebec City, you had huge resources, and the truth of the 25 matter is it was -- I knew it was going to be a tough
1871 operation in that we were -- we were behind the barricade 2 and they were coming to us, and you could say that we 3 achieved our objective, but at what cost, is the point? 4 Q: And when you say, "command and 5 control," what are you specifically referring to in -- in 6 1995? 7 A: In 1995 I'm referring to the 8 structure within a police force, radiating completely up 9 to its headquarters. And if you see a structure where 10 its headquarters is not involved, that might be 11 problematic. But who -- who is going to be the Incident 12 Commander, what resources will they have? The -- the 13 Incident Commander is, in effect, almost the on scene 14 commander, I suppose you could agree. And then what 15 level above them will there be and how does that level 16 deal with the entity's headquarters, wherever that is? 17 And what reporting relationship and the frequency of 18 reporting to that headquarters? 19 And then there's the -- there's the 20 programs in that headquarters that can help the Incident 21 Commander and his superior, or her superior, programs 22 such as technical support, communications, and all of the 23 other important issues. And what role are they playing 24 to help? And what person, what entity is making sure 25 that they deliver what they're -- what the -- what that
1881 poor Incident Commander might need? 2 Q: And -- and how does this impact on 3 how -- what information gets reported, if you will, to 4 outside agencies, like the media or government or 5 politicians? How does that play into it? 6 A: Are you talking about how the 7 Incident Commander is going to deal with the media and 8 politicians? 9 Q: Yes. 10 A: I see. Well, nearly all of these 11 things in '95 would have had a media liaison person 12 there, and you would be giving press releases when 13 required. 14 Now, dealing with the political entity, it 15 depends -- I can only -- well I can go back to my -- I'll 16 deal with -- could I deal with Quebec City again? I'm at 17 RCMP headquarters prior to the event. 18 We've taken people from the Solicitor 19 General's Department on an RCMP aircraft to Quebec City 20 and shown them our complete plan. We've taken the Privy 21 Council Office to Quebec City and shown -- walked around 22 the perimeter and shown them our plan. 23 But they aren't allowed to tell us to 24 change our plan, but we've shown them what we've got. 25 They know they've got an event with world leaders
1891 inbound. They know that this is the place, and then they 2 know that we have structured this situation with this 3 fence, and they know, in general, how we're going to 4 operate. 5 Now, let's move to the days leading up. 6 We have intelligence reports on what is going to happen 7 to us. We know what is going to happen to us. An 8 undercover operation has just been concluded; somebody's 9 been arrested with explosives. That goes up in a 10 briefing note. 11 Now, we go over to the PCO and to the 12 Minister's Office. I go with the Deputy Commissioner and 13 we are going to brief them on what -- the nature of our 14 operation and its general plan, the -- the options that 15 we see that we might use, and stand by for reports on any 16 injuries or any damage. 17 And in the days of the operation we go 18 over and we report -- regrettably we have to report that 19 we have used force, that we have discharged 'X' rounds of 20 rubber bullets, tear gas, et cetera, and that the 21 hospital has so many people that have been injured, and 22 that there are so many people that have been sent to the 23 Detention Centre. 24 And that is the reporting and that is how 25 it was handled on that occasion.
1901 Q: And why is it that it was you in 2 particular and -- and the Deputy Commissioner who was 3 charged with this aspect of the communication plan? 4 A: Well in the hierarchy of the Force 5 and the Federal Government, the Deputy is the highest 6 ranking operational officer beneath the Commissioner. 7 And I am the person, the program officer, who's charged 8 with the overall planning for the execution of the 9 security at the summit. 10 So that is what -- that's why we went 11 over. And we were dealing with the Prime Minister's S&I 12 clerk at the time. 13 Q: And did any of the -- did you permit 14 any government politicians or bureaucrats into the 15 Command Post, the Centre? 16 A: No. 17 Q: Or to talk directly to the Incident 18 Commander? 19 A: No. 20 Q: Why not? 21 A: Because I've never heard of that, 22 even all the times I operated in Ottawa, the only time a 23 -- we had a permanent Command Centre, and the only times 24 these people might visit would be to see if it had been 25 refitted or to make a social call and inspect in an --
1911 when an operation wasn't underway. 2 They had their own Command Centres by the 3 way. And so with this multiplicity of Command Centres, 4 when I was younger, on the morning the Turkish Embassy 5 was assaulted, my sole job was to go to the scribe notes, 6 vet them, clean them up and call the Sol Gen every 7 fifteen (15) minutes and report to a person similar to 8 myself. 9 And we found that there were no more calls 10 from that office. They were satisfied that from what 11 they could see on TV and verbal I was giving to them, 12 that they were being kept up to date in a satisfactory 13 manner. 14 Q: Okay. 15 A: But it's -- there is also something 16 that must be kept in mind. If you go to a modern Command 17 Centre, we call it the 'glass booth' where the Commander 18 might be, but there's also other rooms available. 19 Should somebody of a technical expertise 20 be required, then you would put them in that room, away 21 from the Commander, and have subordinate with them. And 22 that's what -- that's what I call a technical advisory 23 group. 24 If you have to have one, you assemble it, 25 you put them in an -- off in a room over there, they
1921 never see the Command Centre. They never see the 2 Commander. 3 And one time I was -- to give you another 4 example, I -- I was given an exercise to assault a 5 nuclear power station with police resources in an 6 exercise. 7 And we did that and then we had a mock 8 hostage taking, but inside that, I, as the Incident 9 Commander, had to assemble a group of scientists from the 10 power facility to understand what I could do and not do 11 inside that area with all the dangerous equipment. 12 Q: And -- and what is the rationale 13 behind this concept of isolating the Incident Commander? 14 A: Now -- the rationale is that there is 15 enough happening to this person, this human being, that 16 you don't want any extraneous information impacting them 17 that doesn't have to do with the task at hand, period. 18 And for example, in -- in New Brunswick, 19 when I went out to the Aboriginal roadblock, I didn't 20 have to worry about food, housing, anything. It was all 21 being done for me. I had three (3) staff sergeants and 22 all of the admin support in the building to help me. 23 All I had to do was deal with the 24 situation at hand, period. 25 Q: Okay. Okay.
1931 A: I guess I have one more. And this is 2 me again. Is there a criteria? And in England there's a 3 criteria because Her Majesty's Inspector of the 4 Constabulary has an inspection plan for all the police 5 forces on intelligence. So they're inspected on a 6 regular basis. 7 But as a general way, three (3) key 8 points: Where did your plan start? Where did you plan 9 end up? And if your information processing was changed 10 midway, is that -- that is where you should have been, or 11 you could put it as a question; is that where you should 12 have been? 13 Q: You mean at that point or earlier in 14 -- in the process? 15 A: Earlier. 16 Q: At the outset. 17 A: Hmm hmm, yeah. 18 Q: And this sounds like it -- it's a 19 re-evaluation criteria, is it? 20 A: Yes, it is. And all debriefings are 21 very, very useful, things can be learned from them, but 22 often they're left on shelves when they should be acted 23 upon. I'll give you an example. 24 When I arrived in Criminal Intelligence 25 Directorate, there had been an audit of the whole
1941 operation; just when I arrived. And I welcomed it. 2 Most people would be terrified, but I welcomed it because 3 it gave me a chance to go through all the things that had 4 to be done to improve while I was there. 5 And it was a road map for improvement. 6 Q: Hmm hmm. 7 A: So these things should be debriefed 8 and the debriefings should be acted -- the Force should 9 be studying it too. And there's a lot of work that needs 10 to be done. And it -- this is -- the greater majority of 11 incidents in this country were -- were hostage barricade 12 incidents. They weren't public order. 13 But these things rise and fall in cycles. 14 And in -- in the year 2001 there -- public order 15 demonstrations went down to zero because people were so 16 occupied with the horrible consequences of 9/11 that they 17 didn't go back to demonstrating for quite a while. But 18 they're back -- they're back now. 19 Q: And the process of this formal 20 debriefing or re-evaluation, was that something that was 21 commonly in place in Canada in 1995? 22 A: Yes. Yes, it was. 23 Q: Okay. Next slide? 24 A: Yes, I suppose we could go down to 25 the --
1951 Q: That one -- 2 A: -- the time one? Yeah, the next one. 3 And this is just -- just a challenge of time in analysis, 4 and I'm not going to spend a long time on it. But on a 5 continuum of time, and it goes back to much of what we 6 discussed in -- in earlier thoughts, different sources do 7 not report simultaneously on an event; that's the nature 8 of life. 9 Data from different sources may be near 10 real time or take years to arrive. And the hypothesis of 11 today may be thrown out by new data arriving next week. 12 So data must be visualized over time, as patterns which 13 change in times and updates occur. I think that's very 14 important. 15 What was valid -- incredibly valid and may 16 have been the central theme two (2) years ago, may have 17 changed. Who is the central focus of where you could go 18 may have changed. 19 Instead of talking to two (2) groups, 20 maybe you're going to go between two (2) groups. I don't 21 know. 22 Q: And I -- I -- 23 A: And who can go between them? 24 Q: Right. Who -- can you just explain 25 the line -- the timeline you have there and --
1961 A: Well, it's -- 2 Q: -- what that means? 3 A: Yeah. Collector one (1) observes 4 event planning and reports it. And then we move along 5 the collector one (1), two (2), three (3), I think -- 6 Q: Hmm hmm. 7 A: -- observe the event; collector one 8 (1) has reported, collector two (2) reports, collector 9 four (4). 10 So it's all happening all over the map and 11 it's not exactly -- this is probably more related to 12 crime than it is to public order. 13 Q: And I have a question that relates to 14 time, although maybe not to this particular slide, but it 15 is, what happens if you don't have time to properly 16 analyse a piece of information or to go through that 17 intelligence process? What do you do then? 18 A: Then you know you're in that position 19 and hopefully you have some other tactics, some other 20 alternatives that you could take under advisement, 21 including doing nothing, or doing something totally 22 different. 23 You know it -- we go back to perimeters. 24 I've always said, whoever holds the perimeter holds the 25 perimeter.
1971 Q: Hmm hmm. 2 A: And that -- that implies a lot. 3 Q: Well, and -- and -- 4 A: If you hold the perimeter, you're 5 defending the perimeter. If the police are holding the 6 perimeter, like in Quebec City, they're defending it from 7 people who can go 360 degrees around them. 8 Q: And -- 9 A: And so it -- it -- it implies 10 different resources, different expenses. It also implies 11 that you're holding something from the public, and you -- 12 you've declared that you're going to hold it from them. 13 The public don't like that very much, but they will 14 accept it in rare circumstances. 15 Q: And is one of the tactics that are to 16 be considered in the event that there isn't enough time 17 to properly assess a piece of information -- a critical 18 piece of information, to take other steps to slow down 19 what's going on, slow down the events, buy time? 20 A: That would be -- that would be a very 21 wise thing to try and do. Maybe it'll cost you 22 something. Maybe you would be humiliated a bit. 23 Q: And by "cost you something," you mean 24 cost you something in terms of giving up some -- some 25 territory or --
1981 A: Yeah. Maybe it will cost you some 2 turf. 3 Q: Hmm hmm. 4 A: Maybe you'll give up a lot of turf, 5 you know, sometimes you have to. 6 Q: In order to be able to know that 7 you've got the right information? 8 A: Hmm hmm. 9 Q: Okay. 10 A: Again, the New Brunswick example, I - 11 - I didn't want to have -- I didn't want anybody's turf. 12 I buffed it out by five (5) miles to the side. Nobody 13 could even see each other. Where's the conflict? 14 Where's the investigations? There aren't any. 15 But at the -- at the critical time, when 16 we went down face to face, line to line on the road, 17 there was open-handed use of force, not closed-handed. 18 And it was regrettable but it had to be done. And -- but 19 that was the only time we encountered face to face. 20 Okay. Do you want me to go through the 21 other two (2) very quickly or...? 22 A: Certainly. Yes, of course. 23 Q: The next one is -- these are the 24 types of non police intelligence, and I just put them in 25 there. We say non police but when the police have proper
1991 judicial authority they can use some of these techniques, 2 but only in a police style and -- for example, the use of 3 an aircraft or the use of Part 6 or the use of various 4 other techniques that are authorized under our system. 5 But -- and believe me, we use open source 6 intelligence. On the last two (2) summits I did, I 7 didn't take a traditional analyst, I found a young 8 person, security cleared, to go onto the blogosphere and 9 to give us an assessment of how young people were viewing 10 the Quebec City Summit. That proved very useful, and 11 without being intrusive they just trolled the internet 12 and picked up the open source of material, so. 13 And HUMINT is -- of course in police 14 circles that's called source. 15 And the last slide is, where was everybody 16 going at the end of the 1990's and where might they go? 17 And Dr. Jerry Ratcliffe is actually a former -- a 18 Metropolitan London Police Officer. He's a young 19 professor at Temple University and he has many 20 discussions and papers. But this is an example of 21 intelligence-driven crime reduction or intelligence-led 22 policing. 23 And what it means is that -- and I put 24 this in because it shows the role of the decision maker. 25 It's bottom up on intelligence, and members are still
2001 going to deliver all of it and then they're going to 2 analyse it. The analysts are going to analyse all of it, 3 they're going to take it up to the top and then it's 4 going to be top down on targeting. 5 You already got the agreement of the 6 members down there what the problems are, now you 7 prioritize the targets; some fall off the table. So it's 8 high impact on criminals, it's a heavy use of 9 surveillance in human sources, and to some extent this is 10 the way Criminal Intelligence Service Canada sets its 11 priorities every August, so. 12 But there are many models. And of the 13 basic model of how to do criminal intelligence is there, 14 but there are other emerging -- other -- other situations 15 of how to marry that up with community-based policing, et 16 cetera. So that's the last slide. 17 Q: Thank you. I have just a couple of - 18 - of follow-up questions to your presentation. 19 And you mentioned a few moments ago 20 something about open-ended force versus non open-ended 21 force? 22 A: Open-handed? 23 Q: Open-handed? 24 A: Versus the closed -- 25 Q: Sorry, I missed that. What -- what
2011 does that mean? 2 A: Open-handed is where -- okay, there - 3 - there is the peace camper on Parliament Hill, one (1) 4 person many years ago, and I was given the assignment to 5 go and remove them from the Hill. And I used two (2) 6 other officers, we picked up the legs and the arms and 7 carried him gently to the -- to the van, and the arrest 8 was performed and he was removed from the hill. Because 9 he had this tent in the middle of the... 10 Another example is that I used that exact 11 same technique at Kingsclear. I told my Members that 12 they were going to remain on the road, not go off the 13 road, not chase anybody, and that when a person was being 14 arrested, four (4) of them would do the arrest, no 15 swearing, absolutely none. 16 And they were to use one person per leg or 17 arm, and, if necessary, carry the people away as gently 18 as possible, because we were -- on the road there was 19 women, children, there was everybody there. 20 And so that is open handed. 21 Closed handed is starting to put an arm 22 lock on or using -- using course of force. 23 Q: Okay. Okay. 24 A: Or using a stick or baton or 25 something like that.
2021 Q: Okay. Another question I have is, it 2 goes back a bit to your -- your concept, I guess, of one 3 person. What if the Incident Commander is -- is the best 4 person to analyse and evaluate information because of his 5 or her historical involvement in an incident and their 6 knowledge of the people involved in the situation? Does 7 your theory still apply? 8 A: If they're going to be the Incident 9 Commander they shouldn't be doing what you just said; 10 they should be the Incident Commander and -- unless you 11 want to make them the one person and put another officer 12 in as the Incident Commander. 13 But they should have the skills to process 14 information, period. But -- so I don't agree with the 15 premise that that person should be the analyst, no. 16 Q: And is that -- so -- but is that -- 17 that doesn't -- wouldn't preclude, of course, the 18 Incident Commander in that scenario from bringing to bear 19 his or her own judgment or assessment of the finished 20 product? 21 A: Absolute -- that's what I'd like to 22 see, if they have such a wealth of knowledge that they 23 are tasking the one person out of that -- out of that 24 well, they're tasking them to -- to move onwards and 25 upwards with the accuracy of the information.
2031 Q: And what is likely to happen if you 2 have a long standing situation of collection of data, but 3 very little or no analysis -- ongoing analysis of that 4 data until immediately pre event? 5 A: What will happen is that if you need 6 a slice of that data; when you open the garage door and 7 you're looking for the lawnmower and you open my garage 8 door you can't even find it. 9 So in other words, you open the data door, 10 you're looking for a very fine slice, some particular 11 question, and it's all in banker's boxes or files or -- I 12 don't think so. 13 It's going to be very hard to get to it 14 quickly, it's going to be very hard to get the answer to 15 your particular question, you're going to slow yourself 16 down, and if you had it all charted you would be in a 17 much better condition. 18 Q: To make decisions -- 19 A: Why would you deprive yourself of an 20 advantage that you could have had? 21 Q: Thank you very much. Is there 22 anything else that you wish add to your presentation? 23 A: Not at this time. 24 Q: Thank you. Commissioner, that then 25 concludes the examination-in-chief of Mr. Wawryk.
2041 Perhaps we can canvass, see if anyone would like to have 2 an opportunity to cross-examine. 3 And I should indicate, do you have the -- 4 the order in front of you? 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I do. 6 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Okay. Mr. Rosenthal 7 perhaps first? 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think Mr. 9 Rosenthal. No, I'm going to ask you how long you might 10 be. 11 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes, I appreciate 12 that. I'm just surprised at the order that was decided, 13 but that's fine. It's not clear for this witness, I 14 guess, what the natural order would be. But in any 15 event, ten (10) minutes. 16 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Ten (10) minutes, thank 17 you. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Ten (10) 19 minutes. Mr. Scullion...? 20 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: I think ten (10) or 21 fifteen (15) minutes. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Ten (10) or 23 fifteen (15) minutes. 24 Mr. Roy...? 25 MR. JULIAN ROY: Five (5) minutes, I
2051 would guess. Five (5) to ten (10) minutes. 2 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Five (5) to ten (10) 3 minutes for Mr. Roy. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 5 Roland...? 6 MR. IAN ROLAND: Ten (10) to fifteen 7 (15) minutes. 8 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Ten (10) to fifteen 9 (15) minutes for Mr. Roland. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Ms. Tuck- 11 Jackson...? 12 MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: Ten (10) to 13 fifteen (15) minutes, if necessary. 14 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Ten (10) to fifteen 15 (15) minutes for Ms. Tuck-Jackson. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Let's take a 17 short break and we should be able to conclude the 18 examinations this afternoon. 19 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thank you. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 21 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess. 22 23 --- Upon recessing at 2:16 p.m. 24 --- Upon resuming at 2:30 p.m. 25
2061 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 2 resumed, please be seated. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 4 afternoon, Mr. Rosenthal. 5 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Afternoon, Mr. 6 Commissioner. 7 8 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 9 Q: And good afternoon, sir. 10 A: Good afternoon. 11 Q: My name is Peter Rosenthal, I'm 12 counsel for some of the Stoney Point people of the name 13 Aazhoodena and George Family Group. 14 A: Thank you. 15 Q: I want to ask you primarily about 16 what you call the reliability scale? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: And you showed us, on two (2) 19 different slides, and I believe Ms. Vella's going to put 20 one (1) of them up, four (4) different categories of 21 reliability scale. 22 Now, is this your categories, sir, or -- 23 A: No. These categories, to source 24 them, in 1991 the RCMP put out a very important report to 25 the whole Force on the intelligence program in general,
2071 and this is where I obtained these from. 2 Q: Including the definitions given for 3 each of the categories? 4 A: That is correct. 5 Q: Now, these definitions are meant to 6 guide police officers in using the categories, 7 presumably? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: But I wonder how much guidance can be 10 obtained the way they are phrased? I mean, let's look at 11 "reliable" "R". It says: 12 "It's a combination of proven accuracy 13 of information and proven dependability 14 of a person. Every effort must be made 15 to validate information before grading 16 it reliable." 17 A: Hmm hmm. 18 Q: Not a very useable criteria, it 19 doesn't seem to me. It means, if you tried hard then 20 it's -- then it's reliable? It's a -- it tells you some 21 of the ingredients, but wouldn't it be more reasonable to 22 define it for a police officer saying, reliable 23 information is information that you feel quite confident 24 is true? 25 A: I suppose it could have been made in
2081 simpler language, but it was written inside the Criminal 2 Intelligence Directorate. That's the language that used. 3 And as I mentioned earlier, these scales 4 are normally used by intelligence officers and less 5 normally -- 6 Q: Yes. 7 A: -- used by criminal investigators. 8 Q: But even by an intelligence officer, 9 by anybody, to say it's a combination of certain factors, 10 how does that help a person to understand what the result 11 of the combination has to be in order to qualify as 12 reliable? 13 A: Well, first the proven accuracy of 14 the information and the proven dependability of a 15 person or a source. 16 Q: Yes. 17 A: And those are the two (2) key 18 criteria. 19 Q: Yes, it's a combination of those 20 things, but must it be that the accuracy of the 21 information is proven and the person is dependent -- is 22 proven to be dependable; you must have both? 23 A: Not necessarily. 24 Q: No. 25 A: I suppose you could have one (1) --
2091 Q: Yes. 2 A: -- and then go to alternate sources 3 to look for confirmation or corroboration of that. 4 Q: But doesn't my question convince you, 5 sir -- 6 A: I agree with you it's not -- it's 7 not -- 8 Q: -- that is a very poor definition? 9 A: It's important, and I agree with you 10 it's complex, and I don't have any explanation as to why 11 it wasn't authored in a simpler way. 12 Q: Well, it's not -- I'm not complaining 13 about complexity, sir. 14 A: Okay. 15 Q: Sometimes things are complex in real 16 life and one must deal with complexity. I'm complaining 17 about the lack of specificity. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yeah, well-- 19 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I'm complaining 20 that this doesn't say what any definition is, it just 21 says what the ingredients are that you might consider. 22 THE WITNESS: Yes. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 24 Rosenthal, he didn't develop this -- 25 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: No, no. I
2101 appreciate that but I -- 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And I can 3 see that this isn't an exact science, I mean you have 4 some experience with an exact science. 5 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes, and I have 6 experience with -- 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: This is 8 clearly not an exact science. 9 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- with Social 10 Science too and I'm suggesting -- 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 12 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- that this does 13 not convey any significant information to an officer who 14 wants to use it, sir. 15 THE WITNESS: Well, I -- 16 17 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 18 Q: Do you agree with me? 19 A: Not totally, no. 20 Q: And then, similarly: 21 "Believed reliable [it says] applies if 22 the qualifying conditions of 23 reliability are not yet met, but the 24 existing knowledge of the source is 25 favourable and it is believed he/she
2111 will prove -- eventually prove 2 reliable." 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Now, you told us earlier in your 5 evidence, sir, that you can have a very excellent police 6 officer who might give poor information for some reason, 7 right? 8 A: Well -- 9 Q: Right? 10 A: -- here they're talking about the 11 source. 12 Q: Yes. 13 A: Hmm hmm. 14 Q: But here they seem to be suggest -- 15 A: So you have a police officer dealing 16 with a source who is believed reliable. 17 Q: Yes. 18 A: And we are looking upon him 19 favourably -- him or her favourably. 20 Q: Yes. 21 A: And it's believed she will eventually 22 prove reliable -- 23 Q: Right. 24 A: -- he or she. So -- 25 Q: But even -- even a very, very
2121 reliable source, sir, can make a mistake, right? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: So whether you believe information to 4 be reliable, has to depend on other things than just the 5 source, right? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: But this suggests it only depends on 8 the source, right? 9 A: It does. 10 Q: Now, similarly, if we could look at 11 the next slide, please? Sorry. 12 13 (BRIEF PAUSE) 14 15 Q: If you look at the reliability scale 16 the -- 17 A: Hmm hmm. 18 Q: -- third and fourth categories -- 19 would -- would you agree with me, by the way, that by 20 believed reliable you mean it's probably true? Is that a 21 fair summary? 22 A: I don't know if it would be ready for 23 court but in -- in the world of intelligence it -- it's 24 probably true -- 25 Q: That --
2131 A: -- but it might not be worthy of 2 going to court yet. 3 Q: Yes, well, we're not talking about 4 court in this scale, right? 5 A: Okay. 6 Q: So reliable means you're pretty sure 7 -- you're quite sure it's true? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: Believed reliable means probably 10 true, right? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And unknown reliability, the 13 definition you give here is: 14 "Applies if there's insufficient 15 experience with the source for 16 assessment or when information cannot 17 be verified." 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Well again, I would suggest to you, 20 sir, that that suggests some of the ingredients you might 21 consider in coming to the conclusion on reliability, but 22 it doesn't give a definition of it? 23 A: That's probably true. 24 Q: And what you mean by unknown 25 reliability is you're not sure, it's neutral?
2141 A: Yes, you're not sure -- 2 Q: You don't have a reason to believe 3 it's true or it's false, right? 4 A: -- and you may not have the ability 5 to verify it. 6 Q: And you may -- you may be able to 7 improve that -- 8 A: You can't -- maybe you can't reach 9 out. Maybe you're in a place where you can't go or 10 you're dealing with something that you have no other -- 11 no other credible source to verify it. 12 Q: Right. So at -- at the moment it's 13 neutral information. You can't say it's likely true or 14 likely false; you don't know enough about it, right? 15 A: No, you don't know enough about it. 16 Q: And then doubtful reliability, again 17 it says: 18 "Applies if there's doubt about the 19 source or the information." 20 Well, I would put it to you there could be 21 doubt about one (1) or the other but you could still be 22 quite confident in the information, right, depending? 23 A: You might be but perhaps you're 24 dealing with a source that has been proven to be, shall 25 we say, treacherous --
2151 Q: Right. 2 A: -- difficult to deal with. 3 Q: But can I translate doubtful 4 reliability to mean, in fact, likely false? 5 A: Yes. Subject to something else on 6 the timeline coming along out of left field that might 7 prove it to be of a higher but not lower category. 8 Q: Right. Now if you -- if information 9 has been passed to an Incident Commander, would you agree 10 that certainly doubtful reliable -- doubtfully reliable 11 information should not be passed onto the Commander, 12 right? 13 A: It depends. You could pass it on but 14 you must put it in a caveat that it's doubtful 15 reliability -- 16 Q: That -- 17 A: -- so that the Commander can know 18 what you have, know that it's doubtful, and just know in 19 -- in the whole parade of information coming in that 20 there are varying degrees of reliability on varying 21 pieces of information. 22 So sometimes it might be presented and 23 other times it might not. 24 Q: But if you think it's false, 25 especially in a complex situation, as you -- you know
2161 something about the situation -- 2 A: Then you could say we have a -- we 3 have this thing here that looks like a false reading -- 4 Q: Yes. 5 A: -- but we want you to know about it. 6 Q: Well why -- why would you want him to 7 know about it if it looks like a false reading, 8 especially if there's a lot of information to be sent to 9 the Incident Commander -- 10 A: Hmm hmm. 11 Q: -- which has higher reliability -- 12 A: It depends on your perspective as the 13 one person, or the briefer -- 14 Q: Yes. 15 A: -- whether you want them to know 16 about this particular piece of information, whether 17 you're worried about people conducting operations against 18 you to misinform you, and various other things like that. 19 Q: In any event, if you did pass onto 20 the Incident Commander, it would have to be with a very 21 strong warning that this is doubtful. 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: I see. 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And then finally, you mentioned, in
2171 talking about the Quebec City, some anarchist's. 2 A: Hmm hmm. 3 Q: Noam Chomsky is an anarchist. 4 A: Sure. 5 Q: Do you know his name? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: Very, very respected human being? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: What did you say about anarchist's 10 when you were describing them? 11 A: I said that they were in amongst the 12 crowd and they would come forward and do what they 13 wished. 14 Q: And be violent. 15 A: And then they -- 16 Q: You said they'd be violent. 17 A: Yes, I did. 18 Q: Well you agree that was perhaps an 19 overstatement? 20 A: No. 21 Q: No? I see. So Noam Chomsky, a 22 violent human being? 23 A: No. 24 Q: He's an anarchist. 25 A: Well --
2181 Q: Sorry? 2 A: But I don't know that he came forward 3 amongst those people. 4 Q: No. But you -- you used the word 5 anarchist and said they were violent. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I don't 7 think this is going to help me any more on that, Mr. 8 Rosenthal. 9 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Well, with respect, 10 Mr. Commissioner -- 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think -- 12 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- this relates to 13 a question about warriors, for example, too. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I don't 15 think -- 16 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: And characterizing 17 people by titles. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's too 19 much of a stretch for this question and this Witness. 20 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Okay, but I -- 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 22 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- if it's too much 23 of a stretch, I won't stretch that far. Thank you, Mr. 24 Commissioner. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you,
2191 Mr. Rosenthal. 2 Mr. Scullion...? 3 4 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. KEVIN SCULLION: 5 Q: Good afternoon, sir. 6 A: Good afternoon. 7 Q: My name is Kevin Scullion, I'm one of 8 the counsel for the Residents of Aazhoodena. 9 You mentioned this morning and a phrase 10 that I had to jot down, that you said that the first 11 option for the Federal Government was most likely, Let's 12 do nothing. 13 And I take it you're familiar with the 14 underlying principles for many of the occupations or 15 blockades that take place with the First Nations 16 communities. 17 A: Some of them, yes. 18 Q: Right. And that they are, most of 19 the time, I won't say every time, but I'll say the most 20 or the majority of times, are the expression of years and 21 years of frustration with the Federal Government doing 22 nothing about their concerns. 23 Do you agree with that? 24 A: Yes, I agree with that. 25 Q: All right. I take it from your
2201 evidence this morning regarding approaches and theories 2 to the intelligence system, that there was, back in 1995, 3 no one particular intelligence process for dealing with 4 an occupation or a potential occupation? 5 A: I would agree with that statement. 6 Q: You do agree with that? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: Okay. And that what you're trying to 9 do is to take these general concepts of intelligence, and 10 by analogy, extend them to a possible occupation. 11 A: Or a public order event, yes. 12 Q: Well, let's stick with the 13 occupation -- 14 A: Stick with the occupation? Yes. You 15 -- that's true. 16 Q: Okay. And these principles, I take 17 it you're suggesting back in 1995 it would have been 18 appropriate to have somebody who was managing the 19 intelligence process that could then report to the 20 Incident Commander, who would be separated, to an extent, 21 from that process? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: All right. 24 A: That would be very beneficial. 25 Q: All right. And I take it, then, that
2211 the person managing that intelligence process, some 2 training in the area of intelligence gathering, 3 intelligence analysis; that type of training, would be 4 very beneficial for that type of person in that role? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: All right. I take it it's probably 7 fairly straightforward that the person that's supposed to 8 be managing that intelligence process, it would be 9 preferable if they knew from the outset that that was 10 going to be their role in the operation? 11 A: Absolutely. 12 Q: I also take it you'd agree with me 13 that an analysis along with other, say, historical 14 analysis, but an analysis of contemporary or fairly 15 recent similar situations would be immensely helpful -- 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: -- in assessing such a situation? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Okay. And if, for example, we've 20 heard of a contemporaneous occupation of a provincial 21 park that was calm and peaceful in nature and started on 22 a Friday and finished on a Monday; something like that, 23 an analysis of something like that would have been very 24 helpful in an intelligence gathering process? 25 A: I agree it would give you something
2221 to compare it to to see the qualities of that event. 2 Q: So see what works, what doesn't work? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: All right. You also referred to the 5 use of force and having resources available but not 6 necessarily in plain view -- 7 A: That's right. 8 Q: -- so it could be accessed if 9 necessary -- 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: -- do you remember testifying to that 12 effect? And I take it that it would still be important, 13 even if these resources are not in view, that it's plain 14 and clear to those that are, I guess, the subject of the 15 intelligence, that the OPP is not only prepared but 16 prepared in a fairly short order to deal with anything 17 that might arise; and that would be of assistance? 18 A: I suppose that would be useful. 19 There's no use -- you should be transparent and you 20 should let people know you're purposeful -- it is a 21 purposeful police operation. It has wide-ranging 22 capabilities and that you'd like to resolve this 23 peacefully. 24 Q: Right. You have the resources -- 25 A: However, you have other resources
2231 available. 2 Q: You have the resources to deal with 3 it if it goes a certain way -- 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: -- but making that available or that 6 information available to, let's just say the other side 7 at the moment, would be of a -- of benefit for the -- 8 A: Yes, it would be a benefit. 9 Q: All right. Keeping it secret, 10 conversely, may be a disadvantage for the Incident 11 Commander because the other side has no idea, really, 12 what you're going to do? 13 A: That -- that could be -- yes, that 14 could be correct. 15 Q: Okay. You also indicated that things 16 changed somewhat in the mid 1990's following Oka and 17 through Gustafson Lake but we're aware here that 18 Gustafson Lake was right about the same time as 19 Ipperwash? 20 A: Yes, it was. 21 Q: But I take it from your evidence that 22 the approach changed from one (1) of straight 23 negotiations to a somewhat more aggressive approach from 24 the OPP's intelligence gathering end of things? 25 A: Well, could you rephrase that?
2241 Q: I'm just trying to put in context 2 your suggestion, I guess, that things changed in the mid 3 '90's as a result of what had occurred in various 4 occupation situations? 5 A: But in -- in a -- in a world where 6 you are going to negotiate as a foundation of your plan 7 the changes in the world wouldn't alter that. If that 8 was your philosophy to preferable negotiate then you 9 should try and execute on that philosophy. 10 Q: When you say that things changed in 11 the mid '90's are you saying that it moved aware from the 12 desire to negotiate then? 13 A: Most public order events there's no 14 negotiation at all. 15 Q: I appreciate that. But public order 16 events, let's say, it's a broad spectrum? 17 A: Yes, it is. 18 Q: Right. In an occupation situation 19 you have somebody who's occupying an area -- 20 A: Okay. 21 Q: -- and protesting some -- 22 A: Then there will be a negotiation. 23 Q: Right. There would be a negotiation? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: Right.
2251 A: Let's take, you've heard of all the 2 occupations of Minister's offices. Some of them are 3 short-lived. Some of them are multiple days. In general 4 all of them are negotiated to a conclusion. 5 So I agree with you on what you're saying. 6 Q: Okay. And I -- I take it that the 7 intelligence process would be very helpful in determining 8 the approach taken by the Incident Commander to those who 9 are protesting or that are occupying the area? 10 A: Absolutely. 11 Q: And in fact it could be helpful in 12 determining whether an in-your-face kind of approach to 13 the people or a sit back, relaxed and wait to see what 14 things happen, the difference between those it would be 15 helpful to have intelligence factor into that kind of 16 decisions? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: All right. 19 A: Or -- or are you going to look for 20 something more subtle or look for somebody else to talk 21 to, people that you feel might be receptive to their 22 approach? 23 Q: Right. 24 A: Maybe it's not even a police officer. 25 Q: Investigate all the options that may
2261 be available before turning to the use of force? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: All right. And in your experience 4 when you have somebody who makes it clear that it's going 5 to be a peaceful occupation unless somebody uses force 6 against those that are occupying the area is that 7 something that would be important for the Incident 8 Commander to be aware of before going into that type of 9 situation? 10 A: Yes, if they said it, it would be 11 important, yes. 12 Q: Right. And -- and that would be a 13 valuable role for intelligence in that kind of situation? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: Thank you. Those are all my 16 questions, Mr. Commissioner. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 18 Mr. Scullion. 19 Mr. Roy..? 20 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: Thank you. 21 22 (BRIEF PAUSE) 23 24 MR. JULIAN ROY: Good afternoon, Mr. 25 Commissioner.
2271 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 2 afternoon. 3 4 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 5 Q: Good afternoon, sir. 6 A: Good afternoon. 7 Q: Very, very briefly I just have a few 8 questions that follow-up by way of Ms. Vella's questions 9 of you this morning and this afternoon. 10 The -- one (1) of the things that came 11 through loud and clear in your evidence at least as I 12 heard it was that the client or the ultimate consumer in 13 the intelligence process is the Incident Commander; is 14 that right? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And it's the Incident Commander who 17 decides how this end product is going to be used in 18 determining how operations are conducted; is that right? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And it's the Incident Commander who 21 decides what of that intelligence information is going to 22 be imparted to his subordinates to assist them in 23 directing operations; is that right? 24 A: Yes, that would be known as the need 25 to know principle.
2281 Q: Yes. 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: Because the Incident Commander may 4 choose to keep certain information from his subordinates 5 for very good reasons, right? 6 A: On occasion, yes. 7 Q: Yes, but at the very least he'd want 8 to have -- he'd want to be on the same page in terms of 9 what information he has and the information that his 10 subordinates have, right? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: He'd have to know what information 13 they were operating under, right? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: Okay. And that's the Incident 16 Commander's responsibility to ensure that that's done; is 17 that correct? 18 A: The briefing of teams? Yes. 19 Q: All right. Now, you've told us about 20 the importance of having one (1) person as a clearing 21 house for information next to the Incident Commander. 22 I've heard your evidence about that but what I want to 23 raise with you is -- is -- is another issue which is -- 24 which is related to that. 25 You would agree with me that in a
2291 significant public order policing operation such as a 2 First Nations occupation or protest, you're going to have 3 many, many individual officers involved in the 4 intelligence cycle; is that not correct? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Okay. Because every officer who's 7 involved in the officer is -- is potentially a collector 8 of raw data which ultimately is submitted into the 9 intelligence cycle; is that right? 10 A: That is absolutely true. 11 Q: All right. And so what's going to 12 happen is that -- that you're going to have many, many 13 officers, many of whom who do not have an intelligence 14 background who are exposed to data at various stages of 15 its processing through the cycle; is that correct? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: And you used a literary reference in 18 your presentation. I'm -- I'm going to suggest another 19 one (1) to you which is the phrase, "a little knowledge 20 is a dangerous thing." 21 You'd agree with me that that is a concept 22 that might apply to the intelligence process in an 23 incident? 24 A: Are you're talking about rumour 25 control amongst the line officers?
2301 Q: I am. That's where I'm getting at. 2 A: Okay. 3 Q: You're anticipating where I'm going. 4 A: Yes, that's something that you have 5 to work on and the line officers have supervisors -- 6 Q: Yes. 7 A: -- and you have to work on that 8 carefully so that you are not generating rumours and you 9 are not propagating rumours. 10 Q: Okay. When you say, "you," are you 11 talking about the Incident Commander? 12 A: The whole police force. 13 Q: Okay. So you're talking at everybody 14 at every stage of this intelligence cycle, whether it's 15 your front line officers who may be involved in the 16 collection or the people who are explicitly involved in - 17 - in the intelligence analysis. 18 But also subordinate officers within the 19 Command team. Everybody has to be conscious of this -- 20 A: And that -- that is a function of 21 proper briefing. 22 Q: Okay. Well I -- I want to ask you to 23 elaborate if you can. If you could assist us with what 24 mechanisms or protocols would you impose to minimize the 25 risk of information, rumour control or information moving
2311 horizontally, as opposed to vertically -- 2 A: Well if you're briefing -- let's say 3 you're briefing checkpoint people and they're going to go 4 out there, you will have a strong supervisor of that 5 operation and I would recommend that you have that 6 supervisor or a delegate of his visiting the checkpoints 7 throughout the day and the night. 8 And if you're in a mode of radio silence, 9 they can be brought confidential information without it 10 going over the radio or a telephone. And the more often 11 you go out and encounter them, tell them what's happening 12 back at the Operation Centre that affects them, 13 expectations that the Operation Centre has of them, to 14 send information in, the less rumours you will have. 15 Q: All right. Now what you're 16 suggesting is that this issue about maintaining control 17 over rumours and controlling the flow of information, is 18 something that has to be constantly re-enforced through 19 the operation? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: Is that correct? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: You can't just say well I -- these 24 are experienced police officers, they should know better, 25 right?
2321 A: No, you can't. 2 Q: All right. And that comes -- that 3 emphasis of that issue comes from the top down, is that 4 correct? 5 A: Yes, it does. 6 Q: Right from the Incident Commander 7 down through the various leaders and through to the 8 frontline officers? 9 A: Yes. And you -- you service it. 10 It's like a machine, you have to -- you have to brief it 11 often, at least once per shift, you have to debrief them 12 when they're going off duty. 13 And when you debrief them, all their 14 frustrations will come forward. They'll ask for 15 improvements and you'll make the improvements and this is 16 the type of thing -- things that they don't like will be 17 discussed. 18 So it's -- when you come on shift, you're 19 briefed, when you go off shift, you're debriefed and the 20 debriefing information -- there might be something said 21 in the debriefing that's not on the log, that might be 22 very valuable to you. 23 But it takes strong people and they have 24 to be operating from a strong intelligence program in 25 order to give accurate -- a person on the line is happy
2331 to be on the line but they also would like to, not out of 2 idle curiosity, but they would like to know the big theme 3 of the operation. 4 And as the operation goes on, they want to 5 know the sub themes that are emerging. And it's -- it's 6 quite healthy to share it with them. 7 But if there's something that is -- you 8 would classify as need to know, a little more classified 9 in nature, you don't -- you don't share it with them. 10 And they won't get angry at you. 11 But -- and there are times when things 12 like that -- of that nature do come up. 13 Q: All right. 14 A: As long as they're being handled by 15 somebody else to a satisfactory conclusion, a person on a 16 checkpoint might not need to know about that at this 17 particular hour. 18 Q: And having a -- setting up a -- a 19 proper intelligence process ahead of time gives 20 individual officers confidence that information is 21 properly being considered and processed. 22 A: Yes. And it also gives them 23 confidence that somebody's paying attention to their 24 information. 25 Q: All right.
2341 A: And when -- when that type of thing 2 is the least leadership let the Constables know that 3 somebody is very interested in what they have to say and 4 what they have to report tonight, they've very attentive, 5 they're very happy to work and they're less prone to 6 rumours. 7 Q: Thank you. I want to move to another 8 area. And that's -- you eluded to some experience you 9 had in your work in other countries. And you told us 10 that you saw things in some of these other countries that 11 you didn't understand. 12 Is that right? Yes? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: Okay. And that's because the -- your 15 observations were in the context of a different cultural 16 reality, is that right? 17 A: That is right. 18 Q: And in dealing with First Nations 19 people, there can be a different cultural reality at 20 play. 21 Is that correct? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: And I want to ask you some questions 24 about the implications for that at the collection stage. 25 You've already told me about how every
2351 police officer potentially is involved in the collection 2 phase, right? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: And in a situation where those 5 officers, assuming that they're not First Nations 6 officers of course but in situations where frontline 7 officers are encountering a different cultural reality, 8 I'm going to suggest that there is a risk that things 9 they observe get misinterpreted? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: And then you can have another kind of 12 problem where the Officers -- front line Officers observe 13 things, but they don't notice them because they don't see 14 them as significant, right? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And in order to counteract that you 17 would agree with me that it's important to have very good 18 cross-cultural training for front line police officers, 19 correct? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: And that type of training ought to 22 address their role in information gathering and their 23 role in the intelligence process, correct? 24 A: If that was possible, it would be a 25 very good, a very good thing. But, very often when you
2361 have cross cultural training of -- it's divorced from 2 intelligence issues, by the very nature of the two (2) 3 types of training. 4 Q: Yes. 5 A: But, what you've suggested is a very 6 good suggestion. 7 Q: Yes, well you don't want to ghettoize 8 the issue of cross cultural training, it ought to be part 9 of every aspect of a police officer's training, is that 10 correct? 11 A: I agree. 12 Q: For it to be useful, right? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: Now, I'm also going to ask you about 15 the people higher up in the intelligence cycle, the 16 people who are doing the evaluation and the analysis. 17 You'd agree with me that it would be even 18 perhaps more important for them to have training in cross 19 cultural issues, correct? 20 A: Yes. For example in CID I had a 21 person who worked full time on aboriginal strategic 22 intelligence. They were not a First Nations person. 23 But, they occupied themselves with that, they did an 24 extensive amount of reading. 25 And under an ideal world they would
2371 perhaps be a First Nations person. And -- but this 2 person also had access to people within RCMP Headquarters 3 from Community contract and Aboriginal policing and could 4 refer to them as necessary. 5 But, in an ideal world you know, if you're 6 going to have a person specialize in that area, it would 7 be very nice if the person was from a First Nations 8 background and had the analytical training to function in 9 that regard. 10 Q: So you, in terms of any policing 11 organization it's expected to have to deal with First 12 Nations occupations or protests, you would agree with 13 that that organization should do its very best to recruit 14 and promote First Nations police officers, not only at 15 the front -- front line level, but also at the management 16 level and at the command level -- 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: -- in terms of incidents -- 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: I didn't expect that you would 21 disagree with that. But, those are my questions. Thank 22 you. very much. 23 A: Thank you. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 25 very much, Mr. Roy.
2381 Mr. Roland ...? 2 3 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 4 Q: Good afternoon Mr. Wawryk. My name is 5 Ian Roland for the Ontario Provincial Police Association. 6 I have a couple of questions for you to 7 understand better your evidence. 8 You said that all police officers should 9 be part of intelligence awareness and practice? 10 A: Yes I said that. 11 Q: Could you help us a bit in knowing 12 what that means? First let's deal with awareness. What 13 level of awareness should all police officers have with 14 respect to intelligence? 15 And I take it by intelligence you're 16 referring to information processing -- 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: -- you've otherwise described 19 intelligence as information processing? 20 A: Well, in general, they are the front 21 line of the police force, in this case the OPP. 22 Q: Right. 23 A: They know more about the communities 24 collectively than anyone. 25 Q: Yes.
2391 A: They work as individuals in the great 2 tradition of Canadian police officers -- 3 Q: Right -- 4 A: -- along with the discretion that 5 goes with that. They patrol alone in the car et cetera. 6 However, it has to be borne to them that they -- the 7 product of all their work is extremely valuable to the 8 OPP. 9 And this has to be done through sessions 10 where you would impart this to them. And their 11 contributions to their detachment and to the intelligence 12 program are considered valuable. 13 And that is a very tall order I must 14 admit. It's hard to do and it would take a considerable 15 amount of effort and time and leadership by senior 16 management. 17 Conversely, when they arrive on an 18 operation where they are now part of a group it must be 19 imparted to them, okay, you are all part of this op -- 20 one (1) of you is on ERT, you're on TRU, you're a 21 checkpoint Officer, et cetera, et cetera, Criminal 22 Investigator, Intelligence Officers. 23 We have an expectation of you during this 24 operation that you will be reporting inwards, that you 25 will be making every effort to place a reliability factor
2401 on what you're reporting inwards. Because we depend on 2 you the speed is going to accelerate and you are our eyes 3 and ears. So they have to be given a very focussed 4 briefing upon arrival in the Operations area. 5 So that's what I meant by that. 6 Q: All right. So, well it's interesting 7 because you've added a dimension that -- that's I think 8 of some use to understand the role of a front line police 9 officer. I gather you said that they should be aware 10 that they should be gathering information -- 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: -- as to collection information? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: But you've also indicated they should 15 be evaluating the information as well -- 16 A: When they're in -- 17 Q: -- reliable -- 18 A: When they're in the throes of an 19 operation such as a public order operation they may not 20 have been familiar with this type of thing but they would 21 have to be cautioned that we need to know what you're 22 feeling, hearing, seeing, obtaining from other people but 23 we also want you as a first course to give us some 24 indication of what you -- why you believe what you're 25 reporting in; the reliability of that information.
2411 Maybe it doesn't have be from that classic 2 scale that I put up there but it's very helpful. 3 And then your supervisor, if the Incident 4 Commander needs more qualification on that may come back 5 down to you and ask you what you saw, to give more detail 6 on what you saw, et cetera, et cetera. 7 Q: I see. And this is -- is this what 8 police officers are being trained today to do in 9 intelligence, that is front line police officers in the 10 context of intelligence being trained to not only collect 11 information but to evaluate it? 12 A: Intelligence officers are but front 13 line officers are not necessarily being given that 14 training. 15 Q: Yeah. I -- I haven't heard of that 16 for front line officers. When we talk about intelligence 17 officers we're talking about operators I think. You -- 18 you've divided intelligence officers into two (2) 19 categories as I hear you, operators and analysts? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: Is that -- 22 A: Operators, if we could just -- they 23 are the people who go out. They are the police officers 24 who go out in plain clothes and function in intelligence 25 roles.
2421 Q: Yes. 2 A: Analysts can be a police officer or a 3 civilian employee of the police force who is going to be 4 working as an analyst. 5 Q: But -- but the operator function is 6 distinct from the analyst function? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: Yes. 9 A: But many operators are cross-trained 10 in analysis or have a great deal of sophisticated 11 knowledge of analysis -- 12 Q: Fair enough. 13 A: -- as their careers go on. 14 Q: Fair enough. And -- but -- and so 15 what you're telling us is that -- is that intelligence 16 officers who are operating as operators do evaluation of 17 data or information as it's collected? 18 A: On a daily basis they do. 19 Q: But front line police officers are 20 not trained to do that kind of reliability evaluation, 21 are they? 22 A: But what I'm saying is when you bring 23 them out to an operation you're right they're not trained 24 but you may have to speak to them carefully and tell them 25 why you want them to do this for you on this occasion.
2431 Q: Hmm hmm. 2 A: Because this is a preliminary 3 sensitising them to the fact that questions may be asked 4 to verify things -- 5 Q: Hmm hmm. 6 A: -- because their information may be 7 extremely valuable if it's alive with other information 8 and both of them can be judged for reliability. 9 Q: But judging information for 10 reliability is a pretty sophisticated art isn't it? 11 A: Yes, it is. 12 Q: And in fact there's external 13 reliability; that is reliability from other sources apart 14 from the source of information? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And there's internal reliability? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: That is -- and I've witnessed this 19 myself where an intelligence officer will ask a person a 20 host of questions of which the intelligence knows the 21 answer but the - the person being interviewed doesn't 22 know the intelligence officer knows the answer and if the 23 person being interviewed gives the wrong answer that 24 tells the intelligence officer this person's not 25 reliable?
2441 A: Or they do not have the degree of 2 knowledge that they're pretending to have about the 3 subject at hand. 4 Q: Which makes them not reliable? 5 A: True. 6 Q: Right. And so that's in -- that's a 7 kind of internal process that intelligence officers are 8 trained to go through in dealing with sources? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: All police officers aren't trained to 11 do that at all are they? They haven't got that kind of 12 level of training in analysing reliability factors? 13 A: Some of them might have it 14 intuitively -- 15 Q: Hmm hmm. 16 A: -- but by and large most of them do 17 not have that kind of training. 18 Q: And you think this would be something 19 that would be useful for police officer training? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: Thank you. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 23 Mr. Roland. 24 Ms. Tuck-Jackson...? 25 MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: Good afternoon,
2451 Mr. Commissioner. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 3 afternoon. 4 5 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: 6 Q: And good afternoon, Mr. Wawryk. 7 A: Good afternoon. 8 Q: Sir, my name is Andrea Tuck-Jackson 9 and I'm going to ask you some questions on behalf of the 10 OPP. And I want to step quite a ways back to begin with. 11 Can you give us a lay person's and a 12 succinct definition of intelligence led policing? 13 A: Intelligence led policing? 14 Q: Yes. 15 A: Is where you are going to receive 16 information from all of your workers, your intelligence 17 workers in the police force, you're going to analyse it, 18 you are going to then take it to a decision maker at a 19 higher level who is going to make decisions on what jobs 20 you will pursue and what you won't pursue. 21 And then give direction back down to the 22 workers to put together collection plans, to go out and 23 interfere with and do damage to criminal organizations, 24 preferably by way of prosecution of course. 25 Q: Okay. Is it fair to say that today,
2461 the model that is followed by most police services across 2 the country is intelligence led policing? 3 Is that fair? 4 A: They are using the model at a high 5 level such as I mentioned, the Criminal Intelligence 6 Service Canada. 7 Q: Yes. 8 A: But then let's say the OPP may take 9 the four (4) or five (5) priorities delivered in August 10 but in some respects in a certain region of the Province, 11 that priority might not exist at all. 12 So they might allow the District Commander 13 to look at other things because it -- that priority 14 doesn't exist at all in that area. 15 So -- but then the OPP itself has to 16 remember they're policing the Province of Ontario and do 17 they have any other priorities unto themselves unique to 18 the Province of Ontario that they would like to declare 19 to their police officers besides the nationally oriented 20 ones. 21 So then the OPP would declare those and 22 perhaps dossiers would be created and JFO's and work 23 would be done according to, not only the national vision 24 that the OPP is a member of and subscribes to but then 25 the opinion of the Commissioner and senior officers of
2471 the OPP as to what that organization should be doing. 2 That might not be being done in Manitoba 3 or Saskatchewan because that is a different territory 4 with different issues. 5 Q: I understand. All right. As a model 6 or an analytical framework which governs policing 7 decisions, is it fair to say that police led -- excuse 8 me, intelligence led policing did not really come into 9 its own until the period following the tragic events of 10 9/11? 11 A: I would say you're -- you're right 12 because as I gave in my evidence, Commissioner Murray 13 didn't really emphasize this to his officers until 1999. 14 So it -- and even today, it's still be worked upon -- 15 Q: That also is -- 16 A: -- in various parts of the world. 17 Australia, New Zealand, England, Canada and the United 18 States. There's a very substantial document given out by 19 Homeland Security and it's on the Internet about how they 20 want everybody to go forward in intelligence. 21 Q: I understand. All right. Then given 22 that that par -- this particular type of framework that 23 you've described, intelligence led policing, didn't 24 really start to come into its own until the very late 25 '90's and into the early -- early 2000, in the years of
2481 2000. 2 What was the analytical framework that was 3 in place in 1995? If we could put a label on it, what 4 was it? 5 A: Are you talking my Force or RCMP or-- 6 Q: I'm sorry. That -- that's completely 7 fair for clarification. I'm talking about in general. 8 A: In general? The focus at a -- I'll 9 just take a divisional headquarter somewhere in 10 Saskatchewan. There would be a thing called the DCAS, 11 Divisional Crime Analysis Section. 12 And that is where the analysis would take 13 -- where the analysts were and where the analysis would 14 take place. For any given -- in other words you would 15 have to call up the services of an analyst and you'd have 16 to be able to justify, which is very bad, hopefully you'd 17 -- you'd have all kinds of analysts and you wouldn't have 18 to justify. 19 But you'd have to justify to the Chief 20 Superintendent why you need that analyst more than 21 somebody else. 22 Q: Would it be fair to say and again I'm 23 -- I'm -- in an effort to really try and over simplify 24 things. 25 A: Hmm hmm.
2491 Q: Is it fair to say that the model that 2 was in place in 1995 was more of a reactive model? 3 Whereas intelligence lead policing is 4 more of a proactive and predictive model towards -- 5 A: That's fair. 6 Q: All right. And therefore a reactive 7 model, I gather, in effect you're playing catch up when 8 you are requesting to the benefit of intelligence? 9 A: You are either just at the beginning 10 of an operation or part way into it where you realize 11 this would really help you. So yes you are playing in a 12 way catch up. 13 And the strategic abilities in -- for us 14 all of our strategic abilities were in Headquarters 15 Ottawa, but there were people out there trained in the 16 Provinces that could respond to a strategic request. 17 I believe in the OPP in 1995 this was just 18 coming into play. 19 Q: I understand. So then I gather it 20 wouldn't come as a surprise to you in 1995 in the context 21 of OPP policing, that there wouldn't be this long term 22 intelligence plan and program in place, prior to an event 23 occurring? 24 A: That's possible. 25 Q: Okay. Again --
2501 A: But, if you have a situation where it 2 would be amenable because you have a huge amount of data, 3 you would have to persuade the Senior Officers of the OPP 4 to grant you the analyst. 5 Q: And no doubt one (1) of the powers of 6 persuasion would have to be the availability of financial 7 resources and person power? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: And as you've already alluded to, 10 those were barriers in 1995? 11 A: Police budgets were in a free fall 12 right at that point. 13 Q: Thank you. One (1) other area, sir. 14 You spoke I'm going to suggest, almost wistfully, about 15 your experience earlier on in your policing career when 16 you were dealing with protestors. 17 And the police and the protestors had a 18 good working relationship, if I can put it that way, 19 where you could explain to them what your objectives were 20 and the protestors in turn, communicated to you what 21 their objectives were? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: All right. And fair to say that when 24 it would come to your attention that there was going to 25 be some type of an occupation or a protest of sorts,
2511 you'd speak with them and that communication was a form 2 of information gathering on the part of the Police that 3 would translate ultimately into intelligence gathering? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: All right. And I gather also that 6 once the protest is actually underway that information 7 gathering continues and you are dependent upon that 8 willingness of the protester to communicate to you, to 9 provide you with meaningful information that again 10 ultimately becomes valuable intelligence for you? 11 A: Yes, in Ottawa right now, there's a 12 major events liaison team. And they'd be walking along 13 with the protest. 14 Q: Okay. 15 A: Dialoguing as they go. As much as 16 they can. 17 Q: Of course, of course. So I gather, 18 sir, that you'd agree with me that the intelligence 19 generating process can be hampered and indeed hindered 20 when the group that the police is involved in or involved 21 with, does not communicate with the police? 22 A: Well that was the big problem at the 23 end of the 90's, is the leaderless, networked, 24 organization where the methods I described in my younger 25 days didn't -- no longer worked as well, but sometimes
2521 worked. 2 So in these leaderless organizations 3 someone may not want to talk to you, but equally off to 4 the side someone might. 5 So you have to look within what happened. 6 Was there any opportunity to talk about anything to 7 anybody on the boundaries or fringes of an operation, 8 either before, during -- mostly before or during, after 9 it doesn't count, does it? 10 But, did you give up any opportunities to 11 dialogue like you've just described? 12 Q: Right. 13 A: Did you let any go? 14 Q: Right. 15 A: So that's a -- I agree with you. Any 16 type of friendly contact between officers and people who 17 are of a mind to protest is beneficial in my opinion. 18 Q: Of course. And presumably the police 19 are limited as to how they can change or alter 20 unwillingness on the part of a protestor to communicate. 21 In other words, the police are limited in 22 what they can do -- 23 A: Absolutely. 24 Q: -- in order to encourage a protestor 25 to communicate with them?
2531 A: Yes, and sometimes the RCMP has been 2 heavily criticized when they get -- shall we say in their 3 eagerness to get information they might, say, go onto a 4 university campus and knock on somebody's door and ask 5 them to talk about the upcoming protest and it ends up in 6 the Globe and Mail. 7 So I agree that it -- it's very difficult 8 to -- and sometimes you have to forget about looking for 9 a leader because the -- you may not find a leader because 10 what you might be looking for is someone else to talk to 11 who can get you some idea of what's going to happen -- 12 Q: But again -- 13 A: -- who might not be qualifying 14 themselves as a leader at all. 15 Q: Of course but again that's also 16 premised whether it's a leader or not. The success of 17 that attempt is again premised on the notion that the 18 other person will communicate with the police. 19 A: That's right. 20 Q: Thank you very much for you time, 21 sir. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 23 Ms. Tuck-Jackson. 24 Ms. Vella, anything else? 25 MS. SUSAN VELLA: The only other order of
2541 the -- the day I think is to thank Mr. Wawryk very much 2 for coming today to provide your expert evidence. Thank 3 you. 4 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 6 very much, Mr. Wawryk. 7 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We really 9 appreciate it; it's been very helpful. Thank you. 10 11 (WITNESS STANDS DOWN) 12 13 MS. SUSAN VELLA: I'm afraid we don't 14 have another witness in the wing but we have had a very 15 long I think and productive week with -- 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think so. 17 MS. SUSAN VELLA: -- staying overtime 18 several times so... 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think we 20 accomplished everything that we set out to -- 21 MS. SUSAN VELLA: And more I might add. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- 23 accomplish and more at the beginning of the week. 24 MS. SUSAN VELLA: We're ahead of the 25 schedule.
2551 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: So even 2 though it's only 3:15 we're going to adjourn for the week 3 and we'll see everybody on Monday morning at nine 4 o'clock. 5 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Ten o'clock? 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: At ten 7 o'clock. That's right, I'm sorry, at ten o'clock on 8 Monday. Thank you. 9 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 10 adjourned until Monday, June the 12th, at 10:00 a.m. 11 12 --- Upon adjourning at 3:18 p.m. 13 14 15 16 Certified Correct 17 18 19 ___________________________ 20 Carol Geehan 21 22 23 24 25