11 2 3 IPPERWASH PUBLIC INQUIRY 4 5 6 7 ******************** 8 9 10 BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE SIDNEY LINDEN, 11 COMMISSIONER 12 13 14 15 16 Held at: Forest Community Centre 17 Kimball Hall 18 Forest, Ontario 19 20 21 ******************** 22 23 24 February 8th, 2006 25
21 Appearances 2 Derry Millar ) Commission Counsel 3 Susan Vella ) (np) 4 Donald Worme, Q. C ) 5 Katherine Hensel ) 6 Megan Ferrier ) (np) 7 Murray Klippenstein ) (np) The Estate of Dudley 8 Vilko Zbogar ) (np) George and George 9 Andrew Orkin ) (np) Family Group 10 Basil Alexander ) 11 12 Peter Rosenthal ) Aazhoodena and George 13 Jackie Esmonde ) (np) Family Group 14 15 Anthony Ross ) (np) Residents of 16 Cameron Neil ) Aazhoodena (Army Camp) 17 Kevin Scullion ) 18 William Henderson ) Kettle Point & Stony 19 Jonathon George ) (np) Point First Nation 20 Colleen Johnson ) (np) 21 Kim Twohig ) Government of Ontario 22 Walter Myrka ) (np) 23 Susan Freeborn ) (np) 24 Michelle Pong ) (np) 25 Lynette D'Souza ) (np)
31 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 Janet Clermont ) Municipality of 3 David Nash ) (np) Lambton Shores 4 Nora Simpson ) (np) Student-at-law 5 6 Peter Downard ) The Honourable Michael 7 Bill Hourigan ) (np) Harris 8 Jennifer McAleer ) 9 10 Ian Smith ) (np) Robert Runciman 11 Alice Mrozek ) (np) 12 13 Harvey T. Strosberg, Q.C.) (np) Charles Harnick 14 Jacqueline Horvat ) (np) 15 16 Douglas Sulman, Q.C. ) Marcel Beaubien 17 Mary Jane Moynahan ) (np) 18 Dave Jacklin ) (np) 19 Trevor Hinnegan ) (np) 20 21 Mark Sandler ) Ontario Provincial 22 Andrea Tuck-Jackson ) Ontario Provincial Police 23 Leslie Kaufman ) (np) 24 25
41 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 Ian Roland ) Ontario Provincial 3 Karen Jones ) (np) Police Association & 4 Debra Newell ) (np) K. Deane 5 Ian McGilp ) (np) 6 Annie Leeks ) (np) 7 Jennifer Gleitman ) (np) 8 Robyn Trask ) 9 Caroline Swerdlyk ) (np) 10 11 Julian Falconer ) Aboriginal Legal 12 Brian Eyolfson ) (np) Services of Toronto 13 Kimberly Murray ) (np) 14 Julian Roy ) (np) 15 Clem Nabigon ) (np) 16 Linda Chen ) (np) 17 Chris Darnay ) 18 Adriel Weaver ) (np) Student-at-Law 19 20 Al J.C. O'Marra ) (np) Office of the Chief 21 Robert Ash, Q.C. ) (np) Coroner 22 23 William Horton ) (np) Chiefs of Ontario 24 Matthew Horner ) (np) 25 Kathleen Lickers ) (np)
51 2 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 3 Mark Fredrick ) (np) Christopher Hodgson 4 Craig Mills ) (np) 5 Megan Mackey ) (np) 6 Peter Lauwers ) (np) 7 Erin Tully ) (np) 8 Michelle Fernando ) (np) 9 Maanit Zemel ) 10 11 David Roebuck ) (np) Debbie Hutton 12 Anna Perschy ) 13 Melissa Panjer ) 14 Adam Goodman ) (np) 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
61 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 PAGE NO. 3 List of Exhibits 7 4 5 Anthony Gilbert Parkin, Resumed 6 Cross-Examination by Mr. Peter Downard 8 7 Cross-Examination by Ms. Anna Perschy 44 8 Cross-Examination by Mr. Julian Falconer 63 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Certificate of Transcript 320 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
71 EXHIBITS 2 No. Description Page 3 P-1068 Document Number 1005870. The James 4 Stewart Report, July 11/'96. 232 5 P-1069 Document Number 1000477. Handwritten 6 notes of Detective Constable Mark 7 Dew, Pages 32 to 34, September 06/'95 295 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
81 --- Upon commencing at 9:00 a.m. 2 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 4 now in session, the Honourable Mr. Justice Linden 5 presiding. Please be seated. 6 MR. DONALD WORME: Good morning, 7 Commissioner. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good morning 9 everybody. 10 I was going to ask Ms. Twohig if she had 11 any questions. No? 12 MS. KIM TWOHIG: No, thank you. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 14 Then you're up, Mr. Downard. 15 MR. PETER DOWNARD: Good morning, 16 Commissioner. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 18 morning. 19 MR. PETER DOWNARD: My apologies for not 20 being here at the very end yesterday. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No problem. 22 MR. PETER DOWNARD: Thank you, Mr. 23 Sulman, for playing through. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Ms. McAleer 25 estimated that your examination might be approximately an
91 hour. Is that still a reasonable estimate? 2 MR. PETER DOWNARD: Well I'm hoping to 3 shorten it. I'm going to be a little while but I'm 4 hoping to shorten it. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: But not more 6 than an hour, is that what you're saying? 7 MR. PETER DOWNARD: No, no. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 9 10 ANTHONY GILBERT PARKIN, Resumed 11 12 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. PETER DOWNARD: 13 Q: Good morning, sir. My name is Peter 14 Downard and I appear for the former Ontario Premier Mike 15 Harris in this matter. 16 A: Good morning, sir. 17 Q: Now, as I was watching your -- your 18 evidence yesterday afternoon on the webcast, at the end 19 of the day you told Ms. Twohig, for the Government of 20 Ontario, that it was the OPP's position in the Ipperwash 21 matter in early September of 1995 that the OPP would like 22 to have an injunction. 23 A: That's correct, sir. 24 Q: And as I understand it, it was always 25 the OPP's intention that it would take no steps to remove
101 the occupiers from Ipperwash Park without a court 2 injunction first having been granted. 3 Is that your understanding as well, sir? 4 A: Yes, sir. 5 Q: Now, if I could refer you to one of 6 the conversations that we've gone through, this is the 7 September 5th conversation with Inspector Linton at 8 21:53. And I'm going to refer you to page 5 of the 9 transcript if you have that. 10 Do you have that transcript? It's at -- I 11 believe it's at Tab -- it's at Tab 3 -- Tab 4 of the 12 Commission's brief. I just have a separate copy, so. 13 A: September 5th, 21:53 hours? 14 Q: Yes. Yes, sir. And in particular 15 I'd like to refer you to a passage that begins on page 5. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think that 17 document has an exhibit number now, 1057 if I'm not 18 mistaken? 19 MR. PETER DOWNARD: Exhibit P-1057. Yes, 20 that is the note I have. Yes, Thank you. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Page 5? 22 23 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER DOWNARD: 24 Q: Now, at page 5 towards the bottom, 25 the transcripts states or records Inspector Linton saying
111 to you, quote: 2 "No, but I guess if, you know, we'll 3 have to talk at considerable length if, 4 you know, when that injunction comes in 5 how we're going to go about moving in 6 there and --" 7 And then the transcript denotes that -- 8 that you've interrupted and it -- it states that you 9 said: 10 "Well, oh, you're definitely right 11 there. We're going to have to take a 12 look at that." 13 And then you go on -- go on over the next 14 page and you say: 15 "Well, that's right and we've got, you 16 know, we're kind of looking at two (2) 17 options. I mean you've got a -- 18 because of the thing that's going on 19 out west and the length of time that's 20 dragging on that, you know, they may 21 have some security that we wouldn't go 22 in." 23 And Inspector Linton says, "Yeah". 24 And you continue: 25 "So therefore we may still have an
121 element of surprise that we could use 2 if we [inaudible passage] the dynamic 3 thing. And then the other is to kind 4 of go up to the front door at, you 5 know, eleven o'clock or something and 6 say, Hey, this is the injunction and 7 you're out of here and try to do it 8 peacefully." 9 And Inspector Linton says, Yeah. And you 10 say: 11 "And so those are the decisions we're 12 going to have to make." 13 Now, going back to the beginning of that 14 passage and where Inspector Linton says that, You're 15 going to have to talk at considerable length when that 16 injunction comes in assuming it came in and you agree 17 saying he's definitely right, did you have an expectation 18 at that time as to who was going to be involved in those 19 discussions? 20 A: Well, I would think, given the -- the 21 fact that once if and when we did get an injunction, 22 clearly I would have been involved, Chief Superintendent 23 Coles may have become involved along with John, and that 24 would be because we would have time to sit and think 25 about processes and planning.
131 So when we're discussing this, really what 2 we're talking about is looking at options. 3 Q: And further on in this passage you 4 say at the top of page 6: 5 "We're kind of looking at two (2) 6 options." 7 And then you describe a -- a dynamic 8 surprise approach and also a -- a peaceful approach. Who 9 was the -- the "we" you referred to when you said, "We're 10 kind of looking at two (2) options"? 11 A: Well, I think what I'm probably 12 talking there is I'm just thinking out loud; collectively 13 "we", I'm not thinking of who specifically. Essentially 14 I'm saying that we're looking at two (2) options 15 potentially down the road. 16 Q: All right. But is -- is it fair to 17 say that when you say, "We're looking at options," you're 18 talking about people within the OPP? 19 A: Absolutely. 20 Q: And similarly when you say at the end 21 of this passage, "So those are the decisions we're going 22 to have to make," by referring to "we," you're referring 23 to people within the OPP? 24 A: OPP command. 25 Q: All right. So this passage is clear
141 on its face so that at the time of this conversation, 2 just before or around 10:00 p.m. of the night of 3 September 5th, it was your understanding that when and if 4 a court decided that an injunction should be granted, and 5 did grant it, police would have discussions of 6 considerable length at that point in time as to how they 7 were going to go about enforcing it, right? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: All right. And it's clear on the 10 record that no injunction was granted prior to the 11 morning of September the 7th, okay. 12 So, prior to the morning of September 7th, 13 didn't the police ever make a decision as to how the 14 injunction was going to be enforced? 15 A: No, sir. 16 Q: So it's fair to say that that was 17 always something that was left as a matter that would be 18 down the road? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: And did your -- did your 21 understanding that the means of enforcement of any 22 injunction would require considerable discussion with an 23 OPP command ever change? 24 A: No, sir. 25 Q: Now, as I understood your evidence
151 yesterday morning, your view was at the time, in early 2 September 1995, that as far as ending the occupation was 3 concerned, the OPP were prepared to take as much time as 4 that required, right? 5 A: Correct, sir. 6 Q: And did that ever change? 7 A: No, sir. 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 Q: And in particular, just to put a 12 point on it, at that time did you have any expectation or 13 intention that once the OPP had an injunction in hand, if 14 it did, the OPP would be looking to politicians to -- for 15 -- for guidance as to when and how to enforce that 16 injunction? 17 A: No, sir. 18 Q: And would that be so whether the 19 injunction was granted on an emergency ex parte basis or 20 at a later time; would that be the case in both 21 situations? 22 A: In both situations the same case. 23 Q: All right. Now, if I can refer you 24 back to page 4 of this transcript, you'll see there's a - 25 - the second line from the top of the page, Inspector
161 Linton says: 2 "And I guess if we -- there's supposed 3 to be an injunction tomorrow. 4 [and you say] Hmm hmm. 5 [and he says] As early as tomorrow. 6 [you say] As early as tomorrow? 7 [he says] Yeah. 8 [and then you say] Oh, that's a change, 9 because today when we were talking to 10 them, they were going for -- they 11 hadn't even -- [Inspector Linton says] 12 To look at a twenty-four (24) hour 13 injunction? 14 [And you say] Yeah, the emergency or 15 the standard, and they were looking at 16 the standard injunction which is two 17 (2) weeks, but that's good." 18 Now you may have been asked this and I may 19 have -- I may have just missed it, but when you say "we 20 were talking to them", who was "we" and who's "them"? 21 A: I believe I was asked on that and I 22 believe I thought it was, in all likelihood, Les 23 Kobayashi. 24 Q: Les Kobayashi or Peter Sturdy, MNR 25 people.
171 A: MNR people, yes, sir. 2 Q: Yes, thank you. That refreshes my 3 recollection as well. And who was "we"? 4 A: Again, I would think I'm talking 5 about the collective "we", perhaps Inspector Carson, 6 myself. 7 Q: But are you talking here about a 8 conversation that you participated in or one that's been 9 -- that other people within the OPP were reporting to you 10 about? 11 A: Well if, in fact, my memory is 12 somewhat right and it was Les Kobayashi, it would have -- 13 it could have been myself -- 14 Q: I -- 15 A: -- talking to Les. 16 Q: Right. But you're saying it could 17 have been, so it -- but it might not have been; this 18 might have been something passed on to you? 19 A: It may have been. 20 Q: All right. And -- and you'll see, 21 then, in this passage you're -- you're being -- it starts 22 with the report that there could be an injunction as 23 early as tomorrow and it ends with you're saying: 24 "But that's good". 25 And when you said, "But that's good", what
181 did you intend to convey? 2 A: In all likelihood, I would be just 3 looking at the time factor. 4 Q: That you would be content with a -- 5 with the injunction being granted on a -- on a shorter 6 basis the next day? 7 A: Well, given that the Ministry of 8 Natural Resources was seeking the injunction, the impact 9 of that was just, for the OPP, would only be the fact 10 that we now had an injunction. 11 Q: Right. 12 A: After that whichever kind that was 13 served or ordered, we would then have to sit down and 14 take a look at that and then decide, okay, we now have an 15 injunction, what are we going to do with it. 16 Q: Okay. But I -- I -- what I took from 17 this conversation was that you did not have a great 18 concern at this point whether you got the injunction the 19 next day or whether you got it at a later time. 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: Now I want to refer you to another 22 transcript which is at Tab 7. It's formally marked 23 Exhibit P-469. It's at Tab 7 of the transcript brief and 24 it's a passage at page 50. 25 And at page 50 towards the top of the
191 page, you've been informed -- just by way of background, 2 you've been informed about the injunction being -- being 3 sought and that the Government was trying to get it in 4 court for the next morning. 5 And towards the top of page 50 you say -- 6 and have you got the transcript, sir? 7 A: Starting with, "Yeah the women and 8 kids are leaving"? 9 Q: Right. 10 A: Yes, sir. 11 Q: Okay. Thank you. And about an inch 12 down it -- it records you as saying: 13 "Well, that injunction surprises me 14 because the one -- the one that they 15 were going for and I guess John told 16 you what happened today about me going 17 up the MNR side about the possibility 18 of automatic weapons." 19 Then you discuss for a while how that's 20 gone up and then towards the next page there's been a 21 discussion about information about weapons going up the 22 MNR side and you say: 23 "And then it got -- the next thing it 24 was us sitting in the, uh, in the 25 Deputy Solicitor General's office.
201 Uh, so there was some concern that you 2 know maybe we weren't doing the right 3 thing." 4 Q: Now, where did you get that 5 information about the concern that you mentioned? 6 A: I could have gotten it from Chief 7 Coles or Inspector Fox. 8 Q: Do you recall who? 9 A: Not -- not directly. 10 Q: It wasn't based upon any conversation 11 that you participated with anyone who is in Government at 12 Queen's Park other than possibly Ron Fox, the seconded 13 officer? 14 A: Correct, sir. 15 Q: So this information is secondhand at 16 best, fair? 17 A: Yes, sir. 18 Q: And then towards the bottom of the 19 page there's been a reference to the Commissioner and you 20 say: 21 "And he had been talking to Runciman 22 and they were more than pleased with 23 what they, OPP, were doing so it was no 24 problem there." 25 Now, do you recall where you got this
211 information that the Commissioner had been talking to 2 Robert Runciman the Solicitor General of the day? 3 A: In all likelihood I would have been 4 paraphrasing something that Chief Superintendent Coles 5 had told me. 6 Q: So that's something that -- that in 7 all likelihood Coles would have informed you about a 8 conversation he had had with the Commissioner? 9 A: Correct, sir. 10 Q: Okay. So again, it's secondhand 11 information? 12 A: Yes, sir. 13 Q: Is it possible you got that 14 information from Ron Fox? 15 16 (BRIEF PAUSE) 17 18 A: I would say no. I indicate there 19 that we called the Commissioner tonight and that wasn't - 20 - I know that I didn't call the Commissioner. But I 21 believe Chief Superintendent Coles, part of his role of 22 course was to keep the Commissioner's office updated on 23 what was taking place. 24 Q: Okay. So looking at this document as 25 reconstructing the facts as best you can, that's the view
221 you come to that you probably got this from Coles? 2 A: Correct, sir. 3 Q: But what I take from your evidence is 4 that although obviously you're doing your -- your best to 5 reconstruct this in a sensible way is this is not 6 something you have a specific recollection on, fair? 7 A: Well, my recollection is from the 8 recordings. 9 Q: Right. Right. So you don't -- you 10 don't recall Chief Coles speaking to you about this? 11 A: I don't have separate recall of that. 12 Q: Thank you. And then it goes on. It 13 says: 14 "What happened though by that -- by 15 that information about the automatics 16 going up the MNR side, they went from 17 that regular type of injunction, uh, to 18 the emergency type which, you know, 19 which isn't really in our favour. 20 Now, when you -- you said that going to 21 the emergency type isn't really in our favour, was that 22 an opinion of your own that you were expressing or was 23 that something that someone else had suggested to you? 24 A: That would be my own thought. 25 Q: Okay. And you'll agree with me that
231 the night before you didn't have a concern as to whether 2 you might have an injunction in hand the next day, right? 3 You told me that earlier. 4 A: That's correct. 5 Q: So why -- why did -- did your 6 position permanently change on this or were you just at 7 this point having a different thought or how can you 8 explain that -- that difference? 9 A: I don't think I can explain it to any 10 satisfaction, it's just the comments I made at the time. 11 Q: That's -- that's the opinion you -- 12 you thought was appropriate to raise at this moment? 13 A: At that moment. 14 Q: Okay. 15 16 (BRIEF PAUSE) 17 18 Q: Okay. But not to belabour it, but in 19 any event as I take it from your earlier evidence what 20 your intention was, whether you had the injunction the 21 next day or not, was that the OPP command was going to be 22 making decisions as to how and when to enforce it and 23 they would take as long as they thought was appropriate, 24 right? 25 A: That's correct.
241 Q: And that would be a decision that the 2 OPP command would make with reference to concerns of 3 public safety, native people, non-native people; public 4 safety period, right? 5 A: Police also. 6 Q: Indeed. Indeed. All right. Now, 7 you were talking in your evidence -- I want to move to a 8 different topic now. You were talking in your evidence 9 about communications with Inspector Fox and his 10 particular role. 11 And as I recall your -- your evidence from 12 Monday, in fact, because -- because I have on the 13 transcript from Monday, you would talk about operational 14 issues with Inspector Fox in a -- in a broad sense. 15 Although you didn't have that many conversations with 16 him, you -- you would talk about operational issues with 17 him in a broad sense because he needed to have some of 18 that information to do his job. 19 But you didn't discuss specific logistics 20 with him to any significant extent; is that fair? 21 A: I certainly didn't get into any 22 detail with respect to any operational plans. 23 Q: And that's because there was -- there 24 was no need to do so, right? 25 A: That's correct.
251 Q: Because he -- he's not -- Inspector 2 Fox was not part of the OPP command making operational 3 decisions, right? 4 A: He had no part in the operational 5 decisions. 6 Q: Right. And he was outside the OPP 7 chain of command, right? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: And as I understand your evidence to 10 the extent that Inspector Fox was provided with 11 operational -- you know some operational information that 12 he needed to do his job, you expected that he would not 13 pass on operational information to others in government, 14 right? 15 A: I not only expected, I knew he 16 wouldn't. 17 Q: Right, right, right. In fact, what - 18 - what you firmly expected, based on his role, your 19 knowledge of the man, was that he would vet what he 20 needed to and he would filter out information that should 21 not be passed on to government, right? 22 A: Correct, sir. 23 Q: And you relied on his discretion? 24 A: Totally. 25 Q: Right. Now, were you aware of any --
261 I think I know what the answer to this is, but were you 2 aware of any established, written rules or protocols that 3 would govern what information Inspector Fox, in 4 exercising his discretion, could provide the government 5 officials and that would assist him in making his 6 decisions as to what to provide and what not to provide? 7 A: I can't think of any policy 8 specifically. It would all relate to his experience and 9 knowledge in dealing with government officials that they 10 need not be privy to police operational matters. 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 Q: And you would simply rely on his -- 15 his experience and judgment as to what was operational 16 and what wasn't? 17 A: Correct, sir. 18 Q: Right. And if I can suggest this to 19 you, I take it that the fundamental reason for not 20 conveying police operational information to government is 21 to maintain a separation between the decision-making 22 process that police have to go through to make the 23 decisions that police must make in operations, and the 24 government policy making decisions the Government must 25 make in light of the considerations that are relevant to
271 government for its purpose, such as whether to get an 2 injunction. 3 Is that fair? 4 A: Correct, sir. 5 Q: It's to maintain that separation of 6 functions, right? 7 A: Yes, sir. 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 Q: Now, at quite an early stage of 12 developments to the extent they related to Ipperwash 13 Provincial Park, just -- just after the takeover of the 14 built-up area of the Army Base on July 29th, 1995, you 15 were invited to participate in a teleconference with the 16 Government Interministerial Committee meeting in Toronto. 17 Do you recall that be reviewed your 18 evidence, briefly? 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: And you chose not to participate, 21 right? 22 A: That's correct, sir. 23 Q: And your evidence on Monday was that, 24 and I'll just quote it: 25 "We were busy and I didn't have any
281 desire, particular desire to sit in on 2 a teleconference call with a group of 3 individuals who I didn't know. I 4 wouldn't be aware of, perhaps, where 5 the conversation might go." 6 Now, where were you concerned that the 7 conversation might go? 8 A: My concern would be just that fact 9 that, you get on a teleconference you have no agenda. I 10 would have no way of knowing what might come up as a 11 question, so just not a position that I would want to be 12 in. 13 Q: Did you have any concern at that time 14 that it would be the better idea not to participate in 15 that teleconference with the Interministerial Committee 16 so as to maintain that distance between police 17 operational functions and government policy decisions? 18 A: I can't say that thought process went 19 through my mind. But I do -- do recall that I did not 20 want to be part of that teleconference. 21 Q: Okay. Do you recall what you said to 22 Ron Fox about why you didn't want to be in the 23 teleconference? 24 A: I can't recall exactly what I said. 25 I -- I believe I did get into the issue around being busy
291 which may have been more of an excuse than fact at that 2 time. 3 Q: Do you recall raising with him that 4 you might be concerned where the conversation might go? 5 A: No, I don't recall that, sir. 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE 8 9 Q: All right. So we've talked about how 10 you expected that Ron Fox, in receiving some police 11 operational information, would filter out what should be 12 filtered out before he conveyed any of that information 13 to government officials. 14 So -- so we have that -- the information 15 flow from police to government and we have -- not to 16 unduly simplify his role, we have a filter in between, 17 being Inspector Fox. 18 Now, I take that you would have understood 19 that as an advisor in the Ministry of the Solicitor 20 General's office, Inspector Fox would become privy to all 21 sorts of Government policy making information, right; 22 that would be your ordinary expectation? 23 A: Yes, sir. I didn't know the whole 24 role that he assumed but -- 25 Q: Sure.
301 A: -- that would seem reasonable. 2 Q: Sure. But you knew he was attending, 3 for example, the Interministerial Committee regarding 4 Ipperwash and at early August and in September, right? 5 A: That's correct, sir. 6 Q: And you knew that he was privy to the 7 -- the Government policy, decision making, discussions 8 and process that was in place at that time, right? 9 A: Certainly. 10 Q: All right. And did you have a -- I 11 take it you'd have an expectation that there would be 12 some communication from Inspector Fox back to police 13 about what was happening at Queen's Park even if it was 14 only say, well the Government is going to get an 15 injunction, right? 16 You had some expectation that there would 17 be some information flowing back from Fox, right? 18 A: That would be reasonable. 19 Q: Okay. Did you have any expectation 20 that Inspector Fox would perform any sort of a filtering 21 function in that flow of information coming back the 22 other way from government to police? 23 A: Ron would have told us what we needed 24 to know. And if that required some confidentiality on 25 his part with respect to what he knew in his position in
311 the Solicitor General's office, I would expect him to be 2 cognisant of the -- of the private matters that he 3 shouldn't divulge back to the OPP. 4 Q: And so really, what -- is it fair to 5 suggest that all you really wanted in terms of 6 information coming back, was what -- what the police 7 needed to know, right? 8 A: Yeah, I would just like to qualify 9 this. I wasn't anticipating or expecting any particular 10 feedback from Ron Fox. 11 Q: Okay. And -- and why is that? 12 A: We were feeding information to him 13 just to give him a general awareness. Our normal chain 14 of command would have been from me to Chief 15 Superintendent Coles; Chief Superintendent Coles would 16 have dealt with the Commissioner's office. 17 The Commissioner's office, I believe, 18 would regularly have been apprised from Ron with respect 19 to anything that they needed to know to work at that 20 level between the Solicitor General's office and the 21 Commissioner's office. 22 Q: So your ordinary expectation would be 23 that Ron Fox would provide any information to the 24 Commissioner's office and if -- and if anything flowed 25 down from there, it would -- you'd get what the
321 Commissioner thought was appropriate for people lower in 2 the chain of command to have; is that right? 3 A: Yeah. Through discussions that would 4 have been held either with the Commissioner or Deputy 5 Commissioner Boose and Chief Superintendent Coles. 6 But having said that, I didn't see 7 anything wrong with Ron calling occasionally to John if 8 there was information that he needed to know on a timely 9 basis. 10 Q: What -- what sort information as an 11 Incident Commander would Inspector Carson need to know on 12 a timely basis from Ron Fox? 13 A: I can't really give you an example of 14 that. That would be up to the incident commander. But I 15 believe, and I stand to be corrected, that most of the 16 calls were from Ron to John as opposed to from John to 17 Ron. 18 Q: Yes. Okay. Well, I take it you're 19 not aware of any written rule or -- or protocol that 20 would have any application to those sorts of 21 communications from someone in government to the police? 22 A: You're referring to Ron as someone in 23 government? 24 Q: Sure, yes. Absolutely. 25 A: Okay. No, I'm not aware of any
331 specific policy. 2 Q: Okay. And you were telling us that 3 at -- at some point Chief Coles made a call to Ron Fox 4 and said that he should not be speaking directly to John 5 Carson. Do you recall telling us that? 6 A: Yes, sir. 7 Q: When did that happen? 8 A: I believe that happened the afternoon 9 of the 6th, I believe it was when we were down visiting 10 Inspector Carson. 11 Q: Okay. And it's -- did -- did you 12 observe Chief Coles making that call to Ron Fox? 13 A: I believe I was aware that he was 14 talking to Ron. I know that I wasn't keeping track of 15 what was being said and I -- and I -- that's when I 16 believe I was doing other things. 17 But I knew that at one point he was 18 talking to Ron. I can't say with all certainty that that 19 is when that conversation took place with respect to him 20 not calling John but I think it was. 21 Q: Well, can you tell us when and how 22 you became aware that Chief Coles had told Ron Fox he 23 should not be speaking directly to Carson? 24 What's -- what's the basis for your saying 25 that?
341 A: Well, I was certainly aware of it 2 when we arrived at Grand Bend Detachment the morning of - 3 - after the shooting, after the incident. 4 Q: The -- the morning of September 7th? 5 A: Yes, sir. 6 Q: And do you -- do you recall how you 7 became aware of it? 8 A: I would have become aware of it 9 through Chief Superintendent Coles. 10 Q: And -- and is it -- is it likely that 11 he told you that he had told Ron Fox that the afternoon 12 before? 13 A: Very likely. 14 Q: Okay. Now, when -- well, first of 15 all, we had some -- some tape recordings of conversations 16 between Ron Fox and John Carson that were produced in -- 17 in this -- this Inquiry and played and there were stories 18 in the papers and so on, that include Ron Fox saying a 19 number of things and using colourful language and being 20 critical of the Government and so on and so forth. 21 I take it you're aware of those 22 conversations, right? 23 A: Yes, sir. 24 Q: And in fact when Ron Fox testified 25 here on July 18th he said that he or that -- that after
351 he was played these tapes he had a -- a non-disciplinary 2 interview with you about the things that he said on those 3 tapes. 4 Do you recall that? 5 A: I recall that I went with Inspector 6 Fox to meet with Deputy Commissioner Pilon at which time 7 the tape was played and Ron was disciplined in a 8 discussion by the Deputy Commissioner, Morris Pilon, and 9 at which time he apologized for his language and some of 10 his remarks. 11 Q: All right. Can you tell us when -- 12 when you say apparently the focus of this was language 13 used in some of the remarks can you tell us anything more 14 about what was said to Inspector Fox on that occasion? 15 16 (BRIEF PAUSE) 17 18 A: By Deputy Pilon? 19 Q: I beg your pardon? 20 A: From Deputy Pilon? 21 Q: Yes. 22 A: I believe when Ron heard the tape, 23 and it was my impression that he had long ago forgotten 24 about the conversation, he was quick to apologise. 25 Deputy Pilon certainly told him about the
361 inappropriateness of the language, the position that it 2 had put the OPP in, as far as an embarrassing situation, 3 and he acknowledged that unequivocally and that's about 4 all I can remember, sir. 5 Q: Well, in the tapes there -- apart 6 from language, there are some controversial statements 7 that don't involve any bad language, per se. 8 For example, there's a passage in the 9 transcripts where Inspector Fox tells John Carson that 10 the Premier believes he has the authority to direct the 11 OPP, words to that effect. 12 Was there any discussion of -- of that 13 sort of com -- impropriety or appropriateness of that 14 sort of communication between Ron Fox at Queen's Park and 15 Incident Commander Carson? 16 A: Not that I independently recall, sir. 17 Q: Okay. Was there any discussion of 18 Inspector Fox discussing political matters of any sort 19 with the incident commander on the ground? 20 A: I don't believe so, sir. 21 Q: Okay. And what was your function in 22 this meeting? 23 A: Deputy Pilon called me, I can't 24 recall the date, I believe it was in 2003. 25 Q: Yes.
371 A: He asked if Ron was around. I 2 indicated no, I believed Ron was on holidays, actually. 3 The Deputy advised me that a tape had come to their 4 attention that was going to cause some embarrassment and 5 Ron was involved in it. 6 He asked me if I could locate Ron and 7 perhaps arrange a meeting. 8 I did that. We arranged to meet at 9 Cambridge Detachment on the 401. I picked up Ron and we 10 drove to meet the Deputy and it was at that time that the 11 tape was played. 12 That was the first time that I heard that 13 particular tape. 14 Q: Okay. Did you take any notes of this 15 -- of this meeting? 16 A: If I -- I don't have them with me. 17 If I did, it would have been to the effect of the fact 18 that I got the call from the Deputy and I got Ron and 19 went with him to Cambridge where the tape was played; 20 that would probably have been the extent of my 21 involvement. 22 Q: But -- 23 A: The Deputy was there to -- to give 24 the discipline. 25 Q: Okay. But it is possible that you
381 have notes? 2 A: It is possible. 3 Q: All right. And with respect to the 4 giving of discipline, would, in the ordinary course, 5 there be any record created of this event? 6 A: I would believe so, sir. 7 Q: What sort of record? 8 A: Could be simply deputy Pilon noting 9 the fact that he had counselled then-Superintendent Fox 10 with respect to the -- to the tape recording. 11 Q: Thank you. 12 13 (BRIEF PAUSE) 14 15 Q: Now, I want to refer you to one more 16 conversation and it's at Tab 3 of the brief of 17 transcripts. This is a conversation between yourself and 18 John Carson from September 5th at about 4:00 p.m. 19 And I want to refer you to just one brief 20 passage, if you'll bear with me for a minute. 21 22 (BRIEF PAUSE) 23 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. Worme, 25 this is one of those tapes that was made an exhibit
391 earlier. Is this part of Exhibit -- 2 MR. DONALD WORME: I think that's part of 3 444A. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 444? 5 MR. PETER DOWNARD: Yes. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Exhibit 444? 7 MR. PETER DOWNARD: Yes. 8 9 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER DOWNARD: 10 Q: All right. And I'd like to refer you 11 to page 169 and there's a passage there that starts with 12 Inspector Carson saying: 13 "No, I appreciate that because..." 14 Do you see that? It starts towards the 15 top of the page. 16 A: Yes, sir. 17 Q: And Inspector Carson says: 18 "No, I appreciate that because uh, uh, 19 you have -- you..." 20 Pardon me. 21 "No, I appreciate that because uh uh, 22 you -- you -- have you talking to Ron 23 Fox?" 24 You say -- you figured that out and you 25 say:
401 "Yeah, I have been." 2 And he says: 3 "Yeah, yeah. That Blockade Committee - 4 - sounds like there is some waffling 5 going on there by some individuals." 6 And you say: 7 "Yeah, and apparently they want to go 8 for the regular, uh, injunction." 9 And then a little further down Inspector 10 Carson says: 11 "Are we prepared to live with that?" 12 And you say: 13 "It depends who you listen to. 14 Apparently the uh -- the people from, 15 uh, the Government are saying that, you 16 know, why don't' we treat them just 17 like a bunch of bikers." 18 Now, I take it, sir, that setting aside 19 Ron Fox, you never observed anyone in Government at 20 Queen's Park saying "Let's treat the occupiers like a 21 bunch of bikers. " 22 A: I didn't, no, sir. 23 Q: So this is information that you have 24 that is second hand at best, right? 25 A: Correct.
411 Q: And is it likely you got this 2 information from Ron Fox? 3 A: Yes, sir. 4 Q: Okay. Now, sir, setting aside 5 whether that information that you got about Government 6 saying, "Why don't we treat them just like a bunch of 7 bikers" is -- is an accurate report or not? 8 Did Incident Commander John Carson need 9 that information to do his job? 10 A: No, sir. 11 Q: Thank you, those are my questions. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 13 Ms. Perschy...? 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Mr. Commissioner. 18 Just briefly. I didn't want to interrupt Mr. Downard's 19 examination. 20 There has been some evidence, you've just 21 recently heard and come certainly to me for the first 22 time, that there may be notes that Mr. Parkin has with 23 respect to the meeting with Mr. Pilon. 24 And I say maybe notes, because he says he 25 doesn't have them here, I think was the line used, and
421 then he went on to speculate about what might be in the 2 notes. 3 I thought perhaps, certainly from the 4 point of view the examination I propose to do, I would 5 certainly ask respectfully for the benefit of those 6 notes. And I thought if I raised it now there might be 7 some reasonable prospect that they could be obtained. 8 Obviously, I think other parties deserve 9 the same right. But it's obviously relevant in my 10 submission maybe it's best to -- to address it now rather 11 than wait. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Do you have 13 any comment either Mr. Sandler or -- 14 MR. DONALD WORME: I think we can make 15 those enquiries, Mr. Commissioner. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Are you 17 aware of whether or not there are any notes? 18 MR. DONALD WORME: I am not aware whether 19 or not there are. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You're going 21 to make enquiries? 22 MR. DONALD WORME: And we'll certainly 23 make those enquiries. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: All right. 25 Would you make those enquiries between now and -- well
431 between now and the lunchbreak if possible? 2 Ms. Perschy, you indicated earlier that 3 you might be twenty (20) minutes to a half hour; is that 4 still -- I'm sorry. 5 MR. MARK SANDLER: I'm sorry, I was just 6 going to say I -- I would just like, if you would, 7 Commissioner, to relief me from my obligation not to 8 speak to Tony Parkin so I can simply canvas with him 9 during the break whether any such notes exist and where 10 they might be. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. Yes. 12 Ordinarily you -- 13 MR. MARK SANDLER: Otherwise I won't be 14 able to ascertain that. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. Yes, 16 for that limited purpose you are relieved of that. 17 MR. MARK SANDLER: Thank you. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 19 Ms. Perschy, you originally estimated 20 twenty (20) minutes to half hour, is that still a 21 reasonable estimate? 22 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: I think I should be 23 somewhat less than that, you should be happy to know 24 that. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you.
441 2 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. ANNA PERSCHY: 3 Q: Good morning, Mr. Parkin. 4 A: Good morning. 5 Q: Do you prefer Mr. Parkin or 6 Superintendent Parkin or -- you're retired now so -- 7 A: I'm retired now. 8 Q: -- Mr. Parkin? 9 A: That's fine. 10 Q: I just wanted to ask you a few 11 questions about the timeframe prior to the occupation of 12 Ipperwash Provincial Park. 13 You testified in-chief that you had 14 suggested in the summer of 1995 that research be done on 15 the ownership of the Park and we've heard some evidence 16 at this Inquiry that the OPP did receive information from 17 MNR in August 1995 confirming that the Province had legal 18 title to the Park and I take it that by the end of August 19 you had been made aware of that? 20 A: I can't recall if we had any specific 21 documentation. I do know that there was certainly verbal 22 discussions with Les Kobayashi, and he was dealing with 23 Peter Sturdy and his superiors. They reiterated -- 24 reiterated the fact that there was no issue with respect 25 to the ownership of the Park.
451 We eventually did get a letter to that 2 effect. 3 Q: Okay. Thank you. Inspector Carson 4 when he was here testified that -- and -- and I'm 5 referring to the benefit of my -- my colleague, to his 6 testimony on May 12th at page 192. 7 He testified that he regarded any 8 occupation of the Park as different from the issues at 9 West Ipperwash Beach where there was a civil dispute. He 10 testified that he regarded a potential occupation of 11 Ipperwash Provincial Park as an illegal occupation and 12 that he communicated that to various officers at a 13 meeting on August 29th, 1995. 14 And I don't believe that you were at that 15 meeting, but is that something that he communicated to 16 you; is that something that you were aware of? 17 A: I don't recall ever having the 18 discussion and John indicating that he felt that these 19 were separate issues. 20 Q: I'm sorry, he did feel that they were 21 separate issues? 22 A: No, telling me -- 23 Q: Okay. 24 A: -- that he felt that these were 25 separate issues.
461 Q: Now, you testified that on August 2 3rd, 1995, you updated the Commissioner's office 3 regarding the strategy in the event of a worse case 4 scenario. And I think in answer to Mr. Worme's question 5 you indicated that the worse case scenario was an 6 occupation of the Park. 7 And we've heard evidence at this Inquiry 8 that a couple of days earlier on August 1st, 1995, 9 Inspector Carson outlined to Peter Sturdy of MNR three 10 (3) possible scenarios for an occupation of the Park and 11 how he would see proceeding. 12 And again for the benefit of My Friends 13 the three (3) scenarios and responses are summarized in 14 an e-mail from Peter Sturdy and I just wanted to make -- 15 reference to that. It's Document Number 3000626. But 16 I'll just summarize it for the sake of expediency. 17 The first one was: 18 "If a small group, six (6) to ten (10) 19 people entered the Park and made a 20 claim, the OPP response would be small 21 enough to make arrests and remove from 22 Park." 23 The second possibility was a blockade of 24 the Park entrance and the OPP response would be arrest 25 and have vehicle towed to allow and maintain unrestricted
471 access to Park for emergency vehicles, et cetera. 2 And then the third possibility was a large 3 group including women and children enter Park and make 4 claim similar to tactics used at Camp Ipperwash. And 5 there the suggested OPP response was evac -- evacuate, 6 excuse me, Park of staff and public, negotiate, 7 physically remove from Park. 8 And Inspector Carson indicated to Peter 9 Sturdy that in the event of scenario number 3, that would 10 require the MNR to seek a court injunction. 11 And I'm just wondering, were you made 12 aware of these possible scenarios and the responses that 13 Inspector Carson was contemplating at this point in 14 August? 15 A: I don't have separate recollection of 16 that, no. 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 Q: But I think you testified that you 21 were aware that the OPP was going to require an 22 injunction before proceeding with respect -- with respect 23 to any -- any removal of any occupiers, taking any action 24 in that regard? 25 A: That's correct, we wanted an
481 injunction. 2 Q: Yes, I'm sorry, the document I was 3 making reference to, Document Number 300066, just for the 4 benefit of the record, that's previously been made an 5 exhibit, P-777. 6 Now, you testified that Inspector Carson 7 advised you on August 31 of the contingency plans in the 8 event of an occupation of the Park. And I take it the 9 incident commander's role is to think about all of the 10 contingencies and to try and prepare for them; is that 11 right? 12 A: Correct, correct. 13 Q: And it was Inspector Carson who was 14 the incident commander on the ground, but you received 15 briefings regarding what the plans were, both prior to 16 the occupation as you mentioned, on August 31st, and 17 between September 4th 6th by way of briefings. 18 And I take it that you had confidence in 19 Inspector Carson and were comfortable with his plans? 20 A: That's correct. 21 Q: And you testified that you received a 22 copy of Project Maple and I take it that you approved 23 that plan as you saw it, once you'd seen it? 24 A: I believe by the time I got it, it 25 was, you know, already being acted upon.
491 Q: Well, when you spoke to Inspector 2 Carson on August 31st, the -- in terms of the contingency 3 plans, were they not similar to what was contained in 4 Project Maple in terms of the general approach? 5 A: The plan for Ipperwash Provincial 6 Park was Project Maple. 7 Q: Yes. No, I appreciate that, but you 8 mentioned previously that Inspector Carson had advised 9 you on August 31st of contingency plans in the event of 10 an occupation of Ipperwash Provincial Park. 11 And I don't believe in-chief you indicated 12 what it was that he had advised you in that regard. And 13 I'm simply suggesting to you that it would have been 14 similar to what -- what ultimately became Project Maple. 15 A: That's quite possible. 16 Q: And as a housekeeping matter, I'm 17 wondering if the Witness could be provided with Exhibit 18 P-424, because I don't think you actually saw the -- the 19 document that, we've heard testimony at this Inquiry, 20 forms Project Maple. 21 22 (BRIEF PAUSE) 23 24 A: Thank you. 25 Q: If you could just take a moment to
501 quickly review the document. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 A: This -- 6 Q: You've had a chance to review it? 7 This is the document -- 8 A: This is Project Maple. 9 Q: And this is the document that you 10 received, I believe it was on September 5th? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: I just have one (1) quick question 13 with respect to this document. If you could turn to the 14 Tab under "Investigation", about four (4) pages in, 15 there's a chart. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 Q: And the chart refers to action, 20 reaction and then possible charges. And it envisages 21 certain possible scenarios and various responses on the 22 part of the OPP and possible charges, excuse me, that 23 could apply under the Trespass to Property Act and the 24 Criminal Code. 25 And I take it that you were aware that
511 these were possible charges that might apply, depending 2 on what occurred? 3 A: Yes. This is somewhat of a standard 4 operating procedure when developing a plan. 5 6 (BRIEF PAUSE) 7 8 Q: And you knew that this potential 9 occupation, which actually occurred, was going to be 10 treated as a trespassing issue? 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 A: That would be one of the 15 possibilities, yes. 16 Q: Well, when Inspector Carson advised 17 you of the occupation on the morning of September 5th, 18 the conversation which took place at 9:43, so just before 19 10:00 a.m., which is in the audio tape brief, one of your 20 first questions was in fact to ask if the occupiers had 21 been told that they were trespassing. 22 You recall that? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: Now, we've heard evidence that one of 25 the objectives of Project Maple was to contain the
521 situation. You -- you understood that. 2 A: That's the very first page of the 3 project plan, yes. 4 Q: And you discussed the fact that the 5 OPP didn't have containment with Inspector Carson on 6 September 5th; this -- this conversation on the morning 7 of -- of the 5th at 9:43? 8 A: Not -- not containment as we normally 9 know it. 10 Q: Containment in what sense? 11 A: When we talk about containment at a 12 difficult situation such as a barricaded person or 13 potentially a hostage situation, the first thing that you 14 want to do is -- after you arrive at the scene, is 15 contain it so that it can't spread or so if you're -- if 16 it's a person inside a resident, you want to make sure 17 that they can't leave. So you have an inner and an outer 18 perimeter. 19 And then your next course of action, once 20 you have everything set up -- excuse me -- set up is to 21 attempt to open up the lines of communication with the 22 person that might be inside. 23 But given that the Provincial Park backed 24 into the former Military Base, there was easy egress and 25 access. So in that sense it wasn't containment as we
531 normally know it. 2 Q: So you couldn't -- you couldn't 3 achieve containment or you were thinking of some other 4 form of containment? I'm just confused by your answer. 5 A: We had to adapt to -- to the type of 6 containment that we had. 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 Q: So you were trying to -- to adapt to 11 the situation as you saw it; what was your understanding 12 as to what the OPP was going to try and do in terms of 13 containment then? 14 A: Simply maintain the type of 15 containment that we had and open the lines of 16 communications through negotiation. 17 Q: So were you going to try and prevent 18 or limit the number of additional people that -- that 19 could enter the Park? 20 I'm trying to understand what you mean by 21 containment in -- in this circumstance. 22 A: Well, containment in its usual sense 23 is that you have an outer perimeter, that is you totally 24 surround the site that you're dealing with. 25 And then inside that outer perimeter you
541 put an inner perimeter, and that is a closer perimeter 2 again around the situation you're dealing with. 3 The other perimeter is there to prevent 4 people from coming further into the site. We were unable 5 to do that with respect to Ipperwash Provincial Park 6 because of the geography. 7 Q: And you, in fact, discussed 8 containment with Inspector Carson again on the afternoon 9 of September 5th when you speak to him at four o'clock, 10 16:04. 11 And I was wondering if you could just turn 12 to your audio brief at Tab 3. I believe it's page 167. 13 And again you're -- you're referring to the containment 14 issue and three (3) lines from the bottom you say: 15 "Right. And the more that would go in 16 there, the harder it's going to be for 17 us to get out." 18 And do I take it that what you're 19 referring to here is that it's harder to bring about an 20 end to an occupation if additional people can get into 21 the Park. 22 A: That's correct. You -- you don't 23 want the scene to get any larger. 24 Q: And you go on -- Carson says: 25 "Yeah, but the reality is that, you
551 know." 2 And Parkin -- that's you, say: 3 "Go in the other way. 4 Carson: That's right, a hundred (100) 5 of them go in there so like, you know. 6 And then Parkin: 7 "We make an issue of stopping them on 8 Army Camp, they just go in the back 9 door." 10 And I think this is what you were just 11 referring to in terms of the geography of the situation; 12 is that right? 13 A: That's correct. 14 Q: And then Carson says: 15 "That's right, so, yeah, there's no -- 16 there's no [and then it's 17 unintelligible] to go in there. I 18 don't think. 19 And then Parkin: 20 "Ah, I agree with you, but it sets up a 21 big problem for [and then it's 22 unintelligible] 23 CARSON: Oh, I know, I know, but until 24 we can get control of that perimeter in 25 the Park itself, we're at a loss."
561 And then you say: 2 "Ah, I don't mind so much in the day 3 time, but at night. 4 CARSON: Yeah. 5 PARKIN: Christ." 6 And then: 7 "CARSON: I hear you. Doesn't give 8 you the warm, fuzzy feeling that's for 9 sure." 10 And then: 11 "PARKIN: No, okay, all right." 12 And then you indicate you're referring to 13 -- you're sort of thinking out loud about this. 14 And I take it what it is that you're 15 thinking about is that this inability to control access 16 to the Park created a possible safety issue in that the 17 OPP wouldn't even know how many people can go in, whether 18 or not they've got weapons, you know, generally what -- 19 what it is that you may be dealing with. 20 And is that -- is that a fair assessment 21 of some of the concerns or some of the thoughts that you 22 were having with respect to the geography, the physical 23 situation that you were faced with? 24 A: That's fair. 25 Q: Now, you testified that in the -- in
571 the event of an occupation, the OPP would want MNR to -- 2 to seek and obtain an injunction. 3 Project Maple, in fact, was sort of 4 premised on the MNR seeking an obtaining an injunction 5 from the Courts. 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: And on September 5th, 1995, you knew 8 that Inspector Carson was expecting MNR to proceed to 9 obtain an injunction in a timely way? 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: And you knew that MNR and the OPP had 12 attempted to serve notice that the occupiers were 13 trespassing around 11:30 during the night of September 14 4th? 15 A: I had been advised of that. 16 Q: The following morning? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: And we've heard evidence that the 19 purpose for serving the notice that night was so that 20 work could move ahead in terms of getting the injunction, 21 and I take it you understood that? 22 A: Yes. 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25
581 Q: Now, you testified that you were 2 first told on the morning of September the 5th by 3 Inspector Carson that there was a government meeting, an 4 Interministerial Committee meeting to discuss the 5 Government's support for an injunction; you were told 6 about that on the morning of the 5th? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: And during your call with Inspector 9 Carson that afternoon, at 16:04 -- and Mr. Downard made 10 some brief reference to this -- to this call, and if I 11 could just take you to page 169. 12 A: The same -- 13 Q: The same -- the same tab we were just 14 looking at. 15 During your call with Inspector Carson, 16 Inspector Carson refers to the Blockade Committee and 17 what he described as waffling by some in government and 18 that was how he expressed to you his perception; I take 19 it you recall that? 20 A: I don't -- other than by reading 21 this, yes. 22 Q: So you don't have a specific 23 recollection, but you don't dispute it since it's -- 24 A: I don't -- 25 Q: -- in the transcript?
591 A: I don't dispute it. 2 Q: And I take it that's an understanding 3 that you had at that point; the government hadn't yet 4 made a final decision regarding an injunction? 5 A: Correct. 6 Q: And you understood from your 7 conversation with Inspector Carson that Inspector Carson 8 preferred that the Government go ahead and make a 9 decision, hence the reference to waffling? 10 A: Yes, that's his terminology. 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 Q: And in the various transcripts that 15 Mr. Worme took you to, and I don't propose to go through 16 them, you're getting different information in terms of 17 the possible timing of this injunction, at various times 18 during the course of the 5th and of the 6th; is that 19 fair? 20 A: That's fair. 21 Q: So between September 4th and 6th 22 there was mixed or changing information regarding the 23 Government's position with respect to the timing of an 24 injunction, but you understood, during that time, that 25 the only action that the Government was contemplating was
601 the injunction? 2 A: That I was aware of? That's correct. 3 Q: And you understood from the briefings 4 that you were getting between the same time frame, the 5 4th and the 6th, that the OPP were still continuing to 6 try and have discussions with the occupiers, regardless 7 of what was going on with respect to an injunction? 8 A: Correct. 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 Q: Between September 4th and 6th, I take 13 it that none of the -- the OPP officers on the ground, 14 that you were in communication with, suggested to you 15 that they had received any direction or instruction from 16 Queen's Park, from the Government, with respect to 17 operational decisions? 18 A: That's correct. 19 Q: And you testified that you attended 20 at the Command Centre in Forest with Chief Coles on 21 September 6th? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: And you couldn't specifically recall 24 what you discussed but you thought you would have 25 discussed logistics, how the people on the ground were
611 feeling, how things were going. 2 And I take it you don't recall any change 3 in approach or operational plans? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: And I take it you didn't perceive 6 that Inspector Carson was feeling any sort of pressure 7 from anyone within government? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: And as you left the Command Centre, 10 you understood that the OPP was going to continue with 11 the status quo, pending the MNR seeking and obtaining an 12 injunction? 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: And later, when you spoke to Dale 15 Linton that evening, I take it that you didn't perceive, 16 from your communications with Dale Linton, that he was 17 feeling any pressure from Queen's Park with respect to 18 OPP operational decisions? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: Those are all of my questions. Thank 21 you very much. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 23 very much, Ms. Perschy. 24 I suppose this would be a good point to 25 take a break for the morning and have an opportunity to
621 see whether or not you can resolve the question of these 2 notes. We'll have a morning break now. 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 4 for fifteen (15) minutes. 5 6 --- Upon recessing at 10:10 a.m. 7 --- Upon resuming at 10:41 a.m. 8 9 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 10 resumed, please be seated. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 12 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Commissioner, before 13 we begin there's just two (2) housekeeping matters that I 14 want to draw to your attention. The first is we've 15 distributed a missing page from the discipline records. 16 It's Tab 29, page 3, and I believe that's in Volume 1 17 which would be Exhibit P-1051. 18 And secondly, Mr. Parkin's going to look 19 for his notes of the meeting this evening and we'll 20 provide the notes to Mr. Sandler and Mr. Falconer. 21 Hopefully, we will be finished today but tomorrow 22 morning, if there is anything in the notes, he would like 23 the opportunity to address that with the Witness, if 24 necessary, and in my submission that's appropriate. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you
631 very much, Mr. Millar, that's great. I appreciate Mr. 2 Falconer will try to finish today, but if there's 3 something arising out of those notes, that's fine. 4 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I anticipated being 5 a half day to a day, Mr. Commissioner, and I'll do my 6 best to get it done today, and I know that the -- the 7 estimate of a half day to a day was kind of -- 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Was kind of 9 a general estimate. 10 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- was not met with 11 a lot of happiness so I'm doing my best to -- to end up 12 on the right side of the range. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 14 Mr. Falconer. 15 16 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 17 Q: Good morning, Mr. Parkin. 18 A: Good morning, sir. 19 Q: My name is Julian Falconer and I act 20 on behalf of Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto. 21 Mr. Parkin, if I could ask you to turn up 22 the binder of transcripts, taped transcripts, passages 23 that Commission Counsel provided to you? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: Do you have that there?
641 A: Yes. The audiotape? 2 Q: Yes, that's right. You should have a 3 -- a form of index on that, do you? 4 A: They're all tabbed. 5 Q: Is there an index at the front? All 6 right. Thank you. 7 Without an index we'll do it -- we'll do 8 this quickly, but it would have been easier with an 9 index. But suffice it to say this -- 10 A: Excuse me, there are some other pages 11 here if that's what you're referring to? 12 Q: No, I mean the front of the binder, 13 of the -- of the -- you should have approximately 14 seventeen (17) tabs. Your Counsel has provided the index 15 that was distributed by Commission Counsel so I'm going 16 to -- thank you. Mr. Clerk's going to hand you an index. 17 I'm just trying to do this so we don't 18 have to, Mr. Commissioner, flip through tabs, but I'm 19 getting the feeling that as I'm doing it I may have been 20 better off just flipping through the tabs. 21 Now, the index that you have there 22 reflects a series of conversations over a number of days. 23 Do you see that? 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: And what Commission Counsel Mr.
651 Worme, with the -- the able assistance of Ms. Hensel, did 2 is establish that there were numerous conversations you 3 were having with Incident Command right up to and 4 including the moments that Dudley George was fatally 5 shot, correct? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: And what I note, in just looking at 8 the dates set up, is that if you look at the times, Tabs 9 1 through 7, in essence, represent the hours or days 10 leading up to the critical incident that occurred in or 11 around 11:00 p.m. on September 6th, 1995; is that 12 correct? 13 A: Correct, sir. 14 Q: All right. Now, I'm going to ask 15 you, to some extent, to take my word for it, but what 16 we'll start off by doing, so that you don't have to, 17 because I'm sure your Counsel has given you good advice 18 in that regard, is if you turn to Tab 1 at page 30, and 19 this is just an example, it -- it -- we see it a number 20 of times. 21 At -- at -- in -- in a conversation you 22 have on September 5th, 1995 at 9:43 a.m. with Mr. Carson 23 at page 30, we see you introducing the issue of a video 24 in the kiosk. 25 Do you see that, four (4) lines from the -
661 - the bottom of page 30? It says: 2 "Parkin: Okay. Um, how did they set 3 up the video --" 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: "-- is the case where somebody has to 6 go in and retrieve tapes?" 7 Do you see that? 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 Q: And the idea is there's going to be a 10 video feed into the kiosk that allows for video 11 surveillance, correct? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: And that's the kiosk in Ipperwash 14 Provincial Park. In essence, you've got a location or a 15 method for intelligence gathering, correct? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: And we see that the discussion you 18 have with Mr. Carson, about this issue, actually goes 19 over two (2) pages; is that right? 20 If you just flip over you'll see that the 21 idea is that the feed is to go back to the Grand Bend 22 Detachment. Do you see that at page 30? 23 A: That's -- 24 Q: At the bottom of page 30? 25 A: That -- I do see that. Not to Grand
671 Bend Detachment though, sir. 2 Q: It -- it says that and that's being 3 fed back to Grand Bend Detachment. You see that that's 4 what Carson says? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: But Carson's not right, correct? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: Right. But in any event -- not a lot 9 rides on that at this stage. But in any event, there is 10 a discussion you and Incident Commander Carson are having 11 over the issue of 1) the video feed and 2) the question 12 of whether there could also be audio, that is, can we not 13 only see whatever the camera picks up in that kiosk, but 14 can we hear and listen to the people, correct? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: All right. And I take it that's 17 simply part of your function as the Superintendent in 18 charge of -- of managing Incident Commander Carson. 19 It's part of your function to provide 20 support, guidance, advice and direction on the issue of 21 the video surveillance, correct? 22 A: Not entirely correct, sir. To be 23 aware of it, yes. The direction of those officers that 24 do that work wouldn't fall to me. 25 Q: All right. But you're talking about
681 -- now you're -- you're being very precise and I 2 appreciate that. You're saying that the direction of the 3 technological whizzes that go into kiosk or set up what 4 they set up wouldn't fall to you, correct? 5 A: Correct. 6 Q: But the big picture, that is: 7 "Incident Commander Carson: Do we have 8 video surveillance? 9 Yes. 10 Is it doing the following things? 11 Yes." 12 Because that's important. Those are 13 things that are properly your job? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: And I call that giving support; yes? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: Guidance, yes? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: And direction to Incident Commander 20 Carson, if necessary, on that issue, correct? 21 A: If required. 22 Q: Right. And would you agree with me 23 that, in fact, to you, the issue of video surveillance in 24 the kiosk was -- was an important issue? 25 A: It was important to all of us, yes.
691 Q: But you in particular; is that fair? 2 A: It was important to me, it was 3 important to the Incident Commander; that's fair. 4 Q: All right. Because if I look at Tab 5 2, page 66, that's the next conversation you have with 6 John Carson, you raise the issue of the video again, 7 right? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: And then if I -- that's the next 10 conversation you have. Then if I look at Tab 3, page 11 158, you don't have to look at each one but you can take 12 my word for it, but you should feel free to look if you 13 want, page 158, Tab 3, you raise the issue of the video 14 again? 15 A: Correct, sir. 16 Q: And, in fact, at page 158, Tab 3, you 17 actually indicate that: 18 "These guys piss me off. That's a 19 whole day." 20 And you're referring of course to the fact 21 that it took a whole day to get the video surveillance 22 in, correct? 23 A: Correct, sir. 24 Q: And then if you look at Tab 4, page 25 8, you're having a conversation with Dale Linton. And at
701 page 8 you're asking: 2 "Have they got that video up and 3 running?" 4 That's page 8. That's 9:50 at September 5 5th. Same idea; you're still -- you're -- you're 6 pursuing this issue diligently, yes? 7 A: I want to make sure I'm on top of it, 8 yes, sir. 9 Q: Yes. And then the next conversation 10 you have with John Carson, that's Tab 5, page 3, you're 11 still pursuing the issue of the video, page 3. You're 12 getting a report on it, correct? 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: And whether it's working. And then 15 the next conversation you have, you and John Carson 16 again, on September 6th at 9:50 a.m., pages 221 right 17 through to 223, you're having a lengthy chat with John 18 Carson about the video again. 19 A: Correct, sir. 20 Q: Is that right? 21 A: Yes, sir. 22 Q: Now, in that conversation, if you 23 could look at page 221 for a minute, and you'll notice 24 that what I've done is we've gone through six (6) tabs 25 where every conversation you have with either Carson or
711 Linton, you focus, in part, on this video in the kiosk, 2 right? 3 A: Correct. 4 Q: At page 221 the -- the discussion, I 5 just want to direct your attention to -- about the video: 6 "Parkin: Where do we sit with the 7 video. [You say is] They're both 8 there, both operating probably?" 9 You see that? And I apologize. If you 10 look at -- at four (4) or five (5) lines down from the 11 top of page 221 you'll see you're quoted. 12 "What -- what's -- where do we sit with 13 the video?" 14 A: Yes, sir. 15 Q: All right. And then: 16 "CARSON: Yep, they're both running. 17 PARKIN: Where are they located? 18 CARSON: One's in the maintenance 19 shack. 20 PARKIN: Okay. Now the maintenance 21 shack, is that where they broke into? 22 CARSON: Yes. 23 PARKIN: Oh excellent. 24 CARSON: And they're in there and a 25 matter of fact there was some footage
721 of somebody sweeping the floor, this 2 through the night, a lady in there 3 doing the housekeeping. The other 4 one's in the kiosk and all they get, 5 the odd time, somebody passing by. 6 It's really not doing anything for us." 7 Do you see that? 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 Q: And Parkin: 10 "Yeah, but boy oh boy, you know. 11 PARKIN: And if we got probes in the 12 maintenance shack, like that'd be so 13 critical." 14 You see that? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: And your explain -- you'd agree with 17 me that Carson saying, you know, it's -- it's -- the 18 quote he says is it's not doing anything for us, you see 19 that? 20 A: I see that. 21 Q: But you say, Boy oh boy, and it could 22 be -- it could be critical, right? 23 A: It is critical, yes, sir. 24 Q: Right. And then the next 25 conversation is -- you have is with Linton. Now it's
731 9:40 that night. Page 45. 2 Now, this is the very next conversation, 3 so we've got seven (7) contacts, all of the contacts 4 Commission Counsel's included in the binder, leading up 5 to the critical incident, the fatal shooting of Dudley 6 George. 7 And at page 47, I apologize, page 45, you 8 have an exchange with Dale Linton, the alternate incident 9 commander, again about the video, correct? Page 45? 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: And halfway down the page: 12 "What are you getting on the videos 13 back in Grand Bend? 14 LINTON: The videos are getting almost 15 nothing out of that kiosk. They're 16 blurry and, you know, you can't see 17 people coming and going. 18 PARKIN: I was -- we stopped at Grand 19 Bend, too, and took a look -- looked at 20 the videos and they were very clear 21 pictures, yeah. 22 LINTON: Yeah. 23 PARKIN: But they, due to the lack of 24 lights or whatever..." 25 And then Linton goes on to talk to you
741 about the TRU team on the next page. 2 But you thought that the pictures were 3 clear, right? 4 A: Yes, sir. At -- 5 Q: But -- 6 A: At one point in time. 7 Q: Right, but Linton is telling you 8 they're blurry, you can't see people coming and going, et 9 cetera, right? 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: So both incident commanders have 12 communicated to you that it's less than ideal as a 13 surveillance mechanism, correct? 14 A: I wouldn't take it that way, sir. 15 Q: All right. Would you agree with me 16 that both incident commanders in the passages I've read 17 to you have expressed some reservations about its 18 effectiveness? 19 A: The way it was working at the time, 20 yes, they expressed their reservations. 21 Q: All right. And would you also agree 22 with me that it was a recurring, repeating theme for you, 23 personally, with your incident commanders throughout 24 every conversation leading up to the critical incident? 25 A: It was an issue, yes, sir.
751 Q: As a repeated, recurring theme, am I 2 correct to infer that you thought that this was an 3 important means of surveillance? 4 A: There's no doubt about that, sir. 5 Q: And you saw it as consonant with your 6 role as Superintendent, to be aware of this important 7 method of surveillance, yes? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: To give guidance if necessary, yes? 10 A: Guidance with respect to ensuring it 11 was done. 12 Q: Right. And -- and you kept repeating 13 to them, Is this being done, right? 14 A: Right. 15 Q: You managed them in what some might 16 describe as a hands-on way on this issue, correct? 17 A: No, sir. 18 Q: All right. Let me back up, let me 19 rephrase so that we don't get into just a word issue. 20 You were very direct and specific on what you hoped for 21 and expected from the video surveillance? 22 A: Yes. My position, in this incident 23 and others that were going on in the region at the same 24 time, was from an overall organizational viewpoint. 25 Prior to the occupation, part of the
761 strategy was around intelligence information and video, 2 and the installation of same. While I didn't direct 3 that, I was aware that it should be being done. 4 Q: I'm going to ask, with the assistance 5 of Mr. Clerk, if a couple of excerpts of evidence could 6 be put in front of you. I have a copy for the 7 Commissioner and a copy for the Witness. 8 I'm referring to the evidence of Inspector 9 -- or actually at the time, Superintendent Ron Fox, of 10 July 18th, 2005. Ron Fox, July 18th, 2005, and I'm at 11 page 151. 12 13 (BRIEF PAUSE) 14 15 Q: So, July 18th, 2005, Ron Fox, page 16 151. And this -- I just want to ask you, sir, if you 17 agree or disagree with Mr. Fox's view on the issue of 18 facts and intelligence gathering and do you have it in 19 front of you, sir? 20 Do you -- if you flip, you see how the 21 page numbers end up at the top and in the middle? 22 A: Yes, sir. 23 Q: Okay. Good. Just so you can follow 24 me. 25 So at page 150 line 24, and this is my
771 cross-examination; that is, I'm cross-examining Mr. Fox. 2 Line 24: 3 "Q: It's Document Number 100162. 4 It's an e-mail from you to Deputy 5 Solicitor General Todres and Kathryn 6 Hunt who was then the EA at the 7 Solicitor General's office, correct? 8 Yes, EA of the Solicitor General." 9 Now, I'm going to do this in detail 10 because there's a point to this and I apologize for 11 having to go so slow but it's not too long. 12 And then I take -- I take Mr. Fox through 13 an e-mail that describes certain facts that were going on 14 at the scene and Mr. Fox is dealing with those facts. 15 I'm giving you context, sir, to be fair to you because 16 I'm leading up to some evidence. 17 So in other words -- and you've seen those 18 e-mails where Fox says, Well, the facts aren't "A" 19 they're "B" or there should be a clarification or there 20 should be context to the facts you're hearing from MNR, 21 et cetera? You've seen that? 22 A: Yes, sir. 23 Q: And this is a pretty typical example. 24 Now, going to page 153 line 11: 25 "Now, those are facts, correct?
781 A: I believe they are, yes. 2 Q: And you were very careful that you 3 provided facts, correct?" 4 Do you see that? I'm at line 13. And 5 it's not your fault. The way the page number is set up 6 it's a bit confusing. Do you see 153, page 153, and then 7 you go to line 11? 153. 8 A: Hmm hmm. 9 Q: And you should be at line 11 and I 10 say: 11 "Now, those are facts, correct?" 12 See I -- I list a whole series of facts 13 he's provided by e-mail and then at page 153 line 11, 14 right after the quote, right after the quote it says -- 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: "Now, those are facts, correct?" 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 Q: I thank Mr. Millar for that. 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: And you take your time. You're a 23 very experienced officer who's testified many times so 24 you know it's important you have to follow me so you take 25 your time.
791 So line 11: 2 "Now, those are facts, correct?" 3 That's what I say to -- to Mr. Fox: 4 "A: I believe they are, yes. 5 Q: And you were very careful that you 6 provided facts, correct? 7 A: Yes, sir. 8 Q: Because you know that decisions 9 that involve very sensitive issues such 10 as major concerns of Aboriginal 11 communities that have ramifications 12 across the board have to be based on 13 facts, correct? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: And that's why you kept putting in 16 quotation marks the number of times you 17 did the so-called quote/unquote, quote, 18 "informed sources", correct? 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: You were sending a signal to the 21 Deputy Solicitor General as well as the 22 Executive Assistant to the Solicitor 23 General that the information that they 24 may be operating on may be 25 questionable, correct?
801 A: Whether they were operating on or 2 they could be in receipt of information 3 that may not be correct, yes, sir." 4 Do you see that, sir? 5 A: I don't believe I have that page. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I don't have 7 that page either. My copy that you gave me only goes up 8 to page 153, Mr. Falconer. 9 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I apologize. I -- 10 I thought you had that additional passage. I'm going to 11 read you the last series of -- of questions and answers; 12 they're not long. I apologize, sir, I thought you had 13 that extra page. It's at page 154. 14 THE WITNESS: Where -- where I end up 15 is -- 16 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Yes, you're at the 17 bottom of 153? 18 THE WITNESS: Yes, "You were sending a 19 signal". 20 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: "You were sending a 21 signal". And I apologize, Mr. Commissioner. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 23 If you could read it -- 24 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: If it can go wrong 25 it will.
811 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: If you can't 2 follow it; if you need it we'll get a copy for you. But 3 let's see if we can -- 4 5 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 6 Q: "Q: And you were sending a 7 signal..." 8 And it goes on to say the following at the 9 top of 154: 10 "...to the Deputy Solicitor General as 11 well as the Executive Assistant to the 12 Solicitor General that the information 13 they may be operating on may be 14 questionable, correct?" 15 So I'm asking him, You were sending a 16 signal that there may be questionable information. His 17 answer: 18 "Whether they were operating on or they 19 could be in receipt of information that 20 may not be correct, yes, sir." 21 And Commission Counsel's kindly helped me 22 out and put it on the screen. And I'm at line 7 so if 23 you look at line 7. Page 154 line 7, see that? 24 "Whether they were operating on or they 25 could be in receipt of information that
821 may not be correct? 2 Yes, sir." 3 Do you see that? 4 A: Yes, sir. 5 Q: And I apologize, Mr. -- Mr. Parkin. 6 "Q: And you were expressing through 7 the Ron Fox way that you were concerned 8 that they may well view these people as 9 informed sources and they're not; that 10 was your concern? 11 A: I think that's reasonable and my 12 e-mail was the cautioner in that 13 regard. 14 Q: Would you agree with me that the 15 same goes for how this manner continued 16 to proceed; that facts had to be A) 17 ascertained and B) verified? 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: And would you agree with me that 20 in both ascertaining facts and 21 verifying facts that one (1) of the 22 components for doing that is 23 intelligence gathering? 24 A: That would be a component. 25 Q: And there was nothing about the
831 occupation at Ipperwash Park that made 2 it special to exempt it from 3 intelligence gathering was there? 4 A: No, sir. 5 Q: In fact, it would be one of the 6 ways that you'd ascertain and verify 7 facts? 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 Q: Can you think of anything about 10 the occupation of Ipperwash Park that 11 made intelligence gathering 12 inappropriate? 13 A: No, sir. 14 Q: So you and I can agree that you 15 don't only gather intelligence on 16 motorcycle gangs or criminal 17 enterprises, that's not the only thing 18 intelligence people do? 19 A: That's correct, sir. 20 Q: All right." 21 Now, do you agree, first of all, with Mr. 22 Fox's views on the role of intelligence gathering in a 23 circumstance such as Ipperwash occupation? 24 And, by the way, Mr. Parkin, as a courtesy 25 to you, I'd be happy to now provide you that page, so
841 that you can look at it not with your head turned the way 2 -- I apologize, sir. 3 I'm handing you the last page which I just 4 ask you to add on to the end. 5 6 (BRIEF PAUSE) 7 8 A: And I agree that those are his 9 comments and answers. 10 Q: Sir, having testified many times, you 11 know that that's not what I asked you. I asked you, did 12 you agree with him? 13 A: I agree with him. 14 Q: All right. And the reason you agree 15 with him is the very thing we saw in seven (7) straight 16 tabs, which is surveillance and information gathering is 17 a key ingred -- ingredient to being informed in dealing 18 with a matter, correct? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: And you saw your role as 21 Superintendent to include the monitoring of how 22 information was gathered, correct? 23 A: Not on a daily basis. 24 Q: Well -- 25 A: In an overview.
851 Q: Well, let's look at the first seven 2 (7) tabs. Is it a coincidence that in all seven (7) 3 tabs, you raised the method of surveillance going on 4 through that kiosk; is that a coincidence? 5 A: No coincidence. 6 Q: All right, so in fact, when we say 7 daily basis, we have an example on September 5th and 8 September 6th when you, in essence, establish your 9 management of Incident Commander Carson, we -- and -- and 10 Linton, we have an example of you each day, of those 11 tapes, going back to the question of methods of 12 surveillance and information gathering. 13 A: I'm asking if it's being done. 14 Q: And you're ensuring it's being done. 15 A: I want it to be done. 16 Q: And if it's not done fast enough, the 17 way you put it, to be fair, and I'm not being critical, 18 you said you were, quote, "pissed off", close quotes, 19 right? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: So you took an interest because 22 that's your job? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: All right. And what I want to ask 25 you about is the other methods of intelligence gathering
861 that you took an interest in. 2 What were the other things that you asked 3 incident commander Carson about in terms of intelligence 4 gathering, other than the video in the kiosk which you 5 asked on each of the seven (7) tapes? 6 A: I'm sure I discussed with him about 7 the officers in the Park that were in there as campers. 8 Q: So that would have been important? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: All right. I'm going to suggest to 11 you, if you look through the seven (7) tape transcripts, 12 and you do it at your leisure, but I'm going to suggest 13 to you that while the issue of deployment of resources is 14 raised, there's no repeated return to the question of 15 who's in the camp, who's undercover and what they're 16 doing. 17 There's no repeated, constant theme of are 18 we doing A), B) and C) in terms of undercover officers; 19 would you agree with that? 20 A: Yes, sir. 21 Q: All right. What other method of 22 surveillance gathering did you ensure was -- I apologize, 23 I'll rephrase that. 24 What other method of information 25 gathering, via intelligence work, did you ensure was
871 going on in respect of Ipperwash occupation? 2 A: This particular area was of concern 3 because it was something that we felt hadn't been done 4 quickly enough. 5 The "we" being myself and Chief 6 Superintendent Coles when we took our visit down to 7 Forest to meet with John and then we took a drive around. 8 As far as other forms of intelligence gathering, there 9 were people down there that were in charge of that; that 10 was one facet that came under John's immediate 11 supervision. 12 Q: You said that was, quote, "one facet 13 that came under John's need of (sic) supervision"; is 14 that right? That's what you just said? 15 A: Under John's supervision he would 16 have had somebody informing him as to what was going on 17 in the intelligent side. He wouldn't have been doing it 18 directing the intelligence gathering hands on, but he 19 would have had somebody advising him as to what was being 20 done. 21 Q: Where do I find that in Tabs 1 to 7 22 that you ensure that that's being done because I can't 23 find it. 24 A: If you're speaking specifically to 25 Tabs 1 to 7 where it involves me, I can certainly explain
881 if you wish me to go into detail as to what those 2 conversations mean to me. 3 Q: All right. But would you agree with 4 me, and you should feel free to give whatever context or 5 fulsome answer you want and answer my question, but would 6 you agree with me that with the context you're about to 7 provide, I can't find you actually querying Carson on 8 what steps he's taking to do the things you just 9 described, and whom he's managing in that respect and how 10 intelligence gathering is working that way outside of 11 videos? 12 Would you agree with me that's not there? 13 A: I would agree. 14 Q: All right. Now you wanted to give 15 context though to that, so could -- please proceed. 16 A: As I said, the conversations where 17 I'm enquiring about the video and want to know if it's 18 working rose out of the fact that when Chief 19 Superintendent Coles and I drove down to meet with John 20 Carson and as I think I said, wave the flag, show support 21 for the people, let them know that we were there, we, as 22 part -- part of the plan of course, had gone to General 23 Headquarters to that Intelligence Section asking for 24 things to be done. 25 And this was all prior to the occupation.
891 Clearly we had no firm belief that it was going to happen 2 but it certainly -- there was enough discussion and 3 rumour around that it might take place on the Labour Day 4 weekend. 5 It could have happened on the Labour Day 6 weekend. It could have happened on a day or two after or 7 it may never have happened. 8 But clearly with that information in our 9 minds, it was accumbent on us as a police agency to do 10 everything that we could to show that we were prepared if 11 in fact it took place. 12 There was probably nothing better that we 13 could have had than video at strategic locations to allow 14 us to know on a timely basis what was taking place. It 15 would assist us in our planning as far as trying to 16 resolve this issue and for the safety of everyone 17 involved. 18 So that's the reason, when we went down 19 there, Chief Superintendent Coles was concerned about 20 some of the information he'd received about the lack of 21 power and he clearly had wanted more video than we had. 22 So this became a little bit of an issue as 23 time went by in to getting it done on a timely basis as 24 we had hoped for. 25 Q: I take it your point in saying what
901 you've just said is, that it had really been hoped that 2 in an ideal world prior to September 4th, 1995 that that 3 technology issue would have been solved, right? 4 A: And that there would have been more 5 it. 6 Q: Right. So that would you agree with 7 me that in essence there was a view at least as far back 8 as August 1995 that an occupation of Ipperwash Provincial 9 Park was a very real possibility and it was a very real 10 possibility in and around the Labour Day weekend? 11 A: It was a possibility that had to be 12 taken seriously from a police perspective because clearly 13 we had a community in the area that was not pleased in 14 general with the situation at the Military Base and what 15 the OPP was doing for their safety. 16 And having this information so far in 17 advance of what -- of the Labour Day weekend, the 18 reliability was untested but we couldn't overlook it and 19 we could not -- afford to be prepared. 20 So that's why all these procedures were 21 done and this is why we had Operation Maple. 22 Q: Now, you answered some questions by 23 Ms. Perschy in this area but you and I are clear aren't 24 we that you actually didn't have a copy of the report 25 until either late on September 5th, 1995 or the next day
911 on September 6th, 1995, correct? 2 A: That's when they were picked up and 3 delivered, yes, sir. 4 Q: Yes. So when we talk about Project 5 Maple, you, as the superintendent, did not have a copy of 6 that report until after the occupation of Ipperwash 7 Provincial Park? 8 A: That's correct. 9 Q: And so whatever planning was going 10 on, it didn't include you, as superintendent, reviewing 11 the report prepared by the proposed incident commander at 12 Ipperwash Provincial Park, correct? 13 A: No. The report was put together by 14 Inspector Carson and his team that he pulled in with him, 15 but I know that I was up to speed on what, in a general 16 sense, they were planning. 17 I certainly knew, before I received my 18 copy of the plan, that it referred to contain and 19 negotiate peaceful resolution. And I knew it called for 20 all the other processes that are in there. 21 This was basically standard operation type 22 of plan which could be put together and fit into any or 23 many similar types of occurrences. 24 Q: Whatever planning was going on did 25 not involve you, as the superintendent, reviewing the
921 report prepared by the proposed incident commander, prior 2 to the actual occupation of Ipperwash Provincial Park, 3 correct? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: You made reference to something I 6 don't want to miss, you made reference to the fact that, 7 given what your Chief Coles knew and you knew about the 8 possibility of an occupation, it wasn't entire happiness 9 with the fact that the technology end of this hadn't been 10 straightened out by the time of Labour Day weekend; that 11 was your point? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: And you'd agree with me that one of 14 the issues that you felt was important is that there was 15 some advance notice that this could happen, the 16 occupation, and what was our state of preparedness in 17 view of that occupation? 18 That was a relevant issue to you, as the 19 manager of the incident commander; correct? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: Would you agree with me that one of 22 the things you suggested to your incident commander in 23 your discussions with them, in fact, in your first 24 discussion with them on September 5th, 1995 at 9:40 a.m., 25 one of the things that you raised is the fact that
931 they're going to say that we knew this was going to 2 happen; right? 3 A: Correct. 4 Q: You raised that? Page 42, Tab 1. 5 Taped conversation you and John Carson are having at 9:43 6 a.m. on September 5th, 1995, page 42? 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 A: The tab, sir? 11 Q: Tab 1. So, it's the first 12 conversation you're having with him on -- after the 13 occupation, page 42. It's the last two (2) -- the last 14 exchange at the bottom of the page, Parkin, quote: 15 "They're gonna say..." 16 Sorry, I shouldn't say 'gonna,' I 17 apologize. Quote: 18 "They're going to say that, Well, we 19 knew this was going to happen." Close 20 quotes. 21 You said that to Carson? 22 A: Yes, sir. 23 Q: And you said it because the "they" 24 would be people that might be critical of the approach 25 taken in respect of the police management of the takeover
941 of the Park, correct? 2 A: I believe my concern in that area was 3 the non-Native community that was already not happy with 4 us, and the rumour, if you will, was clearly out and 5 about the community that this may take place. 6 We certainly wouldn't have looked very 7 professional had we not done anything with respect to the 8 Labour Day weekend. 9 Q: But you actually go further; there's 10 no if's here. You say, quote: 11 "They're going to say that, Well, we 12 knew this was going to happen." Close 13 quotes. 14 Right? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: That's not a what if -- 17 A: No. 18 Q: -- that's your assessment of where we 19 are now. 20 A: They would have had a legitimate 21 concern with the actions of the OPP if we weren't 22 prepared, and I was referring to the community at large. 23 Q: But there's no 'if' here, and that's 24 the part I -- I don't mean to be picayune with you, sir, 25 but you say if we weren't prepared.
951 You say here, quote, you don't say, if we 2 don't do A), B) and C), John, it will be D), because that 3 could have happened on September 1st, August 30th, August 4 15th. That 'if' would work then. But now it's happened, 5 and your line at page 42 is, quote: 6 "They're going to say that, Well, we 7 knew this was going to happen." Close 8 quotes. 9 That's not a 'what if', is it? 10 A: No. 11 Q: No. You're commenting on your view 12 that they, being the non-Native community in the area, 13 are going to be critical because the Park was taken over, 14 right? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: And that they're going to be critical 17 of the Ontario Provincial Police for not being better 18 prepared and avoiding the takeover of the Park, correct? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: All right. And one (1) of the things 21 that you're commenting on, lack of preparedness related 22 to, of course, the video surveillance in the kiosk? 23 A: Not the kiosk singularly, in -- in 24 the general area in totality. 25 Q: Yeah. And I'm -- and I -- and I --
961 I'm glad you brought me back to that because that's 2 something that I should have asked you about. 3 The kiosk, per se, would not present an 4 ideal soul method of video surveillance, correct? 5 A: It wouldn't stand alone, no, sir. 6 Q: No. And it almost was doing just 7 that, correct? 8 A: I'm not sure I follow you with that 9 point. 10 Q: Well, it was a poorly framed 11 question, so I apologize. 12 You had a maintenance shack that had some 13 video surveillance in it? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: And you had the kiosk? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: And that was it? 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: And that was one (1) of your 20 concerns? 21 A: From our visit the day before, yes. 22 Q: Well, it's interesting you refer to a 23 visit the day before. You're saying on September 4th, 24 1995? 25 A: Oh, I'm sorry.
971 Q: Yeah. 2 A: I'm -- after the fact. 3 Q: You see on September 5th, 1995 you 4 haven't met with Carson yet to go over management of the 5 occupation at Ipperwash, correct? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: You haven't met with Carson to go 8 over Project Maple; that is, a report in your hands 9 looking at it and talking, correct? 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: You have not, and neither has Chief 12 Coles, sat down with John Carson and gone over a 13 checklist of the things that would be in place for Labour 14 Day Weekend. 15 Neither you, as Superintendent Parkin, nor 16 Chief Coles engaged in that exercise, correct? 17 A: Not line by -- not line by line, 18 correct. 19 Q: And one (1) of the line by lines that 20 never happened, and you're expressing some now 21 exasperation about it, you use the word, "pissed." One 22 (1) of the line by lines that never happened was the 23 establishment of effective video surveillance once the 24 Park had been occupied, correct? 25 A: Correct.
981 Q: And you -- it's not as if you can go 2 in and set up video surveillance once they're occupying 3 the Park, right? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: It's a little bit silly to be walking 6 in with cameras and -- and bags with dark glasses on 7 saying, Okay, we're just here to check things out, and 8 then you leave a camera here or you leave a camera there 9 and you leave. 10 They're going to figure out what you're 11 doing, right? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: Right. So that the important essence 14 of good, effective video surveillance is that it's 15 anticipatory in nature, correct? 16 A: Certainly. 17 Q: And when you say, "They're going to 18 say that, Well, we knew this was going to happen," that - 19 - what you're saying in that sentence is, Given that we 20 knew this was going to happen, Chief Coles and I are kind 21 of wondering why video surveillance is where it's at 22 right now, correct? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: Yeah. Now, one (1) of the other 25 things that you found -- and I'm going to use the word,
991 'unfortunate,' I'm going to suggest to you unfortunate, 2 you found at the time -- when you were talking to John 3 Carson you found that it was unfortunate that the OPP 4 couldn't maintain the Park, correct? 5 A: Correct. 6 Q: That was your view? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: And you had no choice but to be 9 honest with your subordinate and let him know that, 10 correct? 11 A: I discussed it with him. I asked him 12 why we lost containment. 13 Q: And you were of the view that it was 14 unfortunate that you lost containment? 15 A: Yes, I was. 16 Q: And lost containment, for the rest of 17 the world who are listening to us or -- lost containment 18 means, basically, it was unfortunate that you lost 19 control of Ipperwash Provincial Park in the sense that 20 the occupiers were allowed to get in and establish a 21 position such that they controlled the area, correct? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: All right. And you viewed it as 24 unfortunate and you conveyed to your subordinate that it 25 was unfortunate?
1001 A: Which he shared my concern. 2 Q: All right. So the answer to my 3 question is yes? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And then you also made it clear to 6 him, in addition to your view, that it was unfortunate, 7 frankly, the Chief, my boss, that is Parkin's boss, is 8 going to want to -- going to want to know what happened, 9 right? 10 A: That would be a most reasonable 11 question for him to ask. 12 Q: Yeah. Now, speaking for myself, I'm 13 -- I'm lucky in the sense that I -- I made sure that I 14 run a small business so I don't have a boss anymore, per 15 se, but, for example, Mr. Commissioner, when he says, Mr. 16 Falconer it's -- it's unfortunate you said you'd be 17 finished by "X" time but you're not, I know that I'm 18 being, quietly and subtly, sent a message that I'm not 19 doing what I'm supposed to do. 20 Would you agree with me that when you 21 convey to a subordinate that you, as the boss, and your 22 boss, are viewing a particular predicament and situation 23 as unfortunate, you're, in essence, to some extent, maybe 24 gently, commenting on the employee's performance? 25 A: Not in my view, sir.
1011 Q: All right. Would you agree with me 2 that you did have concerns about the establishment of 3 video surveillance in that Park, as at September 5th, 4 1995? 5 A: Yes, sir. 6 Q: And the responsibility for the 7 establishment of that video surveillance was John 8 Carson's? 9 A: No, sir. 10 Q: Whose was it? 11 A: Technical Support Bureau. 12 Q: My understanding was that the 13 Incident Commander has overall responsibility for the 14 site, yes? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: The Incident Commander is who you 17 look to to make sure whatever has to happen, by way of 18 intelligence gathering at that site, happens, correct? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: And so the buck stops with the 21 Incident Commander, in terms of making sure those things 22 happen, correct? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: And if he can't make those things 25 happen, if he can't do his job properly, you expect him
1021 to come to you and say, Tony, I can't get video 2 surveillance in, it's September 2nd, it's September 3rd, 3 Labour Day weekend's coming and the techno guys aren't 4 coming in, or we don't have the money, or the cameras 5 aren't working, you expect him to do that? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: And he didn't. 8 A: I'm not sure that he didn't. I don't 9 recall a conversation with respect to that, but I'm not 10 going to say that he didn't raise a concern. 11 Q: You told me, a little while ago, that 12 you and Chief Coles had developed a concern, as at 13 September 4th and 5th, 1995, as to the poor state of the 14 video surveillance, correct? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: That concern was, in essence, a 17 concern you developed on the 4th and 5th when you went 18 and asked for the status of video surveillance, correct? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: And so you didn't have the 21 information, the week before, that video surveillance 22 wasn't working, did you? 23 A: No. 24 Q: No. So given that you didn't have 25 that information, am I safe to infer from that that John
1031 Carson did not come to you and say, Video isn't working 2 in the Park; he didn't? 3 A: He may not have. I can't say that he 4 didn't. 5 Q: Right. And then, in addition to 6 that, and this is the part that I want to focus on for a 7 minute, you have raised with him, in this conversation of 8 September 5th, 1995, that given what we knew and given 9 what people's expectations in the community were -- you 10 remember you talked about the non-Native community? 11 A: Yes, sir. 12 Q: It's unfortunate that we lost the 13 Park; you're conveying that to him, right? 14 A: That's -- that's my concern, yes -- 15 Q: Yeah. 16 A: -- I'm -- it is unfortunate. 17 Q: And, ultimately, it was his 18 responsibility to maintain the Park, yes? 19 A: That would -- within the context of 20 the plan, yes. 21 Q: Yes. And you asked him something 22 that I found very telling; it's at page 37. You asked 23 him, Do you have enough resources now? 24 Page 37. Can you look at that for a 25 moment?
1041 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Is this the 2 same tape at Tab 1? 3 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Yes. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Are we 5 looking at the same tape at Tab 1? 6 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Sorry, page 37 Tab 7 1, September 5th, 9:45 a.m. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm just 9 looking for that. 10 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Yeah, I'm sorry. 11 12 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 13 Q: And at page 37 -- 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 15 16 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 17 Q: -- you say to him, and I apologize my 18 notes say page 37, of course -- 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, I 20 can't find it on page 37. 21 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: My apologies. 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER:
1051 Q: I'll find you the passages I'm 2 speaking to, sir. Would you agree with me that during -- 3 during the con -- did you find it, Mr. Commissioner? 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No. I seem 5 to recall that somewhere -- 6 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Yeah. I know it's 7 there and as I -- as I speak I'll find it and my 8 apologies. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 10 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: For some reason my 11 note is incorrect. 12 13 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 14 Q: Would you agree with me that that was 15 one of your concerns. It's at page 39. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 39? 17 18 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 19 Q: I don't know why my 37 is a 39 but at 20 the bottom of the page: 21 "Parkin: Okay. And you have enough, 22 uh, resources there now?" 23 Do you see that? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And you'd agree with me that the gist
1061 of the conversation you were having with Mr. Carson, 2 Incident Commander Carson at the time, now Deputy 3 Commissioner, the gist of the conversation you were 4 having with him as he was saying, You know, when they 5 came in we had a certain number of guys there but in my 6 view public safety would have been jeopardized if I tried 7 to maintain the Park because there weren't enough people 8 in place. 9 Would you agree that that was the gist of 10 what he was telling you? 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 A: I'm going to have to ask you to 15 repeat that one again, sir. 16 Q: Would you agree that the gist of what 17 you were being told, in and around 9:45 a.m. on September 18 5th, by John Carson, the gist of what you were being told 19 is they just didn't have the numbers to maintain the Park 20 when they -- when the First Nations community entered the 21 Park, that he was telling you that? 22 A: No, sir, I didn't take it that way. 23 Q: All right. 24 A: They made a conscious decision, as 25 opposed to putting more resources in there, to simply
1071 escort the day campers out. 2 Q: But leave aside, as opposed to 3 putting more resources, I'm not saying you march a CMU 4 team down now that you don't have the numbers in place 5 because that's reactive, that's not proactive is it? 6 A: That's correct. 7 Q: Right. But proactive would be to 8 have enough of a presence in the Park so that you could 9 control the situation before having to call in enough 10 resources, correct? 11 A: There would be no way we -- we would 12 have been, or John would have been able, probably, to 13 anticipate how many resources he might need initially. 14 Q: Fair enough. But at the bottom -- 15 the bottom line to all of it is that he was telling you 16 they just didn't have the numbers to do it; isn't that 17 right, to keep -- maintain the Park? That's what 18 happened; isn't that what happened? 19 A: That's one (1) way of looking at it. 20 Q: Well, no, but isn't that what he's 21 telling you? 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 Q: Could you look at the bottom of page
1081 36, please, sir? 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 Q: This is John Carson at the bottom of 6 36. 7 A: Hmm hmm. 8 Q: He's speaking to you. 9 A: Yes, sir. 10 Q: In the context of losing the Park. 11 "CARSON: I'm not sure what, you know, 12 device they used, but somehow or other 13 they smashed, threw a rock through it 14 or a baseball bat or something. But 15 they were prepared to take us on at 16 that point and we just didn't have the 17 numbers to do it." 18 Now, do you want to flip back and get the 19 context? This -- he's talking about when the occupiers 20 showed up there was a stand-off between them and the 21 officers, they smashed a window in the cruiser, and John 22 Carson tells you, his boss, that he did not have the 23 numbers in place to address this aggressive action by the 24 First Nations people of breaking a window on a cruiser. 25 A: I agree.
1091 Q: All right. So he didn't have the 2 numbers in place, correct? 3 A: Correct. 4 Q: He didn't have the video surveillance 5 in place, correct? 6 A: No. 7 Q: Did he? 8 A: I think you're taking the -- 9 literally. When he didn't have the numbers in place, he 10 had numbers -- he had people in there; the number that he 11 could live with, that he thought was perhaps sufficient. 12 Couldn't anticipate how many people he may 13 have to deal with, so he could have had one (1) officer 14 in there, or he could have had a hundred (100) officers 15 in there, but at the end of the day, he had to make a 16 decision as to how many he was going to put in there. 17 He put so many -- he put as many in there 18 as he felt reasonable. It turned out, yes, that it 19 wasn't enough. But he would have no way of knowing when 20 enough was enough. 21 Q: So whether he decided to put one (1) 22 officer in there or, as you say, a hundred (100), you 23 stand by his decision? 24 A: And the ultimate decision with 25 respect to the fact when they were confronted with what
1101 they eventually were, they made a decision to look to the 2 safety of the day use campers and escort them out. 3 Q: I'm not talking about his decision of 4 deciding given the numbers to -- to back off and concede 5 control of the Park. I'm -- and I'm not talking about 6 the benefits of engaging in violence because obviously 7 the use of force or violence wouldn't -- wouldn't be what 8 you're talking about. 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: What I'm talking about is the initial 11 decision on the numbers he put in. I asked you a 12 question and the question was as follows: Whether he 13 decided to put one (1) officer in there or a hundred 14 (100), you stand by his decision on the numbers he 15 deployed to that Park prior to the occupation? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: All right. So when I ask you that -- 18 I just need to understand something. In standing by his 19 decision whether he put one (1) or a hundred (100), what 20 you're saying to me is I trust his judgment and if that's 21 what John Carson decided to do, then it was right? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: Would you agree with me that in 24 addition to providing that level of unquestioned loyalty 25 to Mr. Carson, as his supervisor you're also required to
1111 critically look at his performance as you manage the 2 situation? 3 You are actually required to critically 4 assess what he is doing? 5 A: I never had any difficulty doing that 6 in my career, sir. 7 Q: Fair enough. So it's not just about 8 whether he deployed one (1) or a hundred (100), it's 9 whether he did the right thing, isn't it? 10 A: He did the best he could. 11 Q: No, I didn't ask if he did the best 12 he could. I said it's not just about whether he did one 13 (1) or a hundred (100), it's whether he did the right 14 thing, correct? 15 A: He did the right thing at the time. 16 Q: All right. And that's what I want to 17 ask you about because when you say to him and I'm -- I'm 18 going to wrap up this area, Mr. Commissioner. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 20 21 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 22 Q: But when you say to him at page 36 -- 23 I apologize. I'm going to flip between two (2) sets of 24 notes. At page 35, the bottom, when you say to him, on 25 page 35 at the bottom, now so we have some context, you
1121 testified already, the community, as far as you were 2 concerned, the 'They're going to say' people? Remember 3 I quoted you, 'They're going to say'? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: The community at this stage feels 6 that rightly or wrongly, the non-Native community feels, 7 in your mind, that the OPP dropped the ball in losing the 8 Park, correct? 9 A: I'm concerned that that would be what 10 they would think. 11 Q: Yes, that's in your mind? 12 A: Hmm hmm. 13 Q: Yes? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: All right. Any reason to doubt that 16 John Carson has your level of perceptions; that he would 17 also share that concern; that would be in his mind? 18 A: No reason at all. 19 Q: Right. So in that context you say to 20 him at the bottom of 35: 21 "PARKIN: I'm only going to ask this 22 question because I'm sure that the 23 Chief is probably going to ask it." 24 That's your boss, right? 25 A: Yes.
1131 Q: All right. 2 "How did we -- given the fact we have 3 people there when all this happened, 4 how did we lose containment? 5 CARSON: Well, it was a matter of 6 safety like somebody's going to get 7 their head caved in if we'd stayed in 8 there. 9 PARKIN: Okay. 10 Because they're really getting irate 11 with our guys and I'd suggest the 12 damage to the cruiser is indicative of 13 what more we were going to get into." 14 All right. And so he describes a 15 situation where he felt best to basically cede control of 16 the Park because he didn't want to see anybody get hurt, 17 right? 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: Would you agree with this that part 20 of the function of the police, in an enforcement 21 function, is a presence in a given place or a scene, like 22 the actual presence can act as a deterrent? 23 A: Absolutely. 24 Q: All right. And that one of the 25 things that you had hoped your Incident Commander would
1141 do was ensure there was enough presence in the Park to 2 actually deter, for example, a small group of people 3 declaring they own the Park; that was something you hoped 4 would be in existence? 5 A: That's a decision that he had to make 6 as to how many people he would put into the Park. 7 Presence certainly sometimes can be a deterrent but 8 sometimes you can escalate an issue. 9 Q: Fair enough. And so you say the 10 Chief is going to want to know and -- and Carson answers 11 you. And then you repeat -- and this is the passage that 12 I took you to already so I'll do it very quickly. At 13 page 42 then you repeat to him -- at page 42: 14 "Yeah, I'm just -- I guess it's 15 unfortunate we couldn't maintain the 16 Park." 17 Do you see that? Right? 18 A: Yes, sir. 19 Q: So remember we talked about your view 20 that it was unfortunate? You actually say to him it's 21 unfortunate, right? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: Right. And then -- and then you go 24 into what they're going to say. You say halfway down the 25 page:
1151 "PARKIN: They're going to say we got 2 caught by surprise, is that accurate?" 3 A: Yes, sir. 4 Q: He says: 5 "Well, not." 6 Then you go: 7 "They're going to say that we knew this 8 was going to happen." 9 Right? You're canvassing all the 10 different criticisms that are going to be levelled, 11 frankly, at Carson and at you, correct? 12 A: No, sir. 13 Q: Oh, all right. 14 "They're going to say we knew this was 15 going to happen," is not meant to address the issue of 16 criticism against the OPP? 17 A: Yes, it would be criticism against 18 the OPP but I wasn't criticizing John Carson. 19 Q: No, I understand. Okay. I think you 20 -- you didn't necessarily understand my question but I've 21 got your answer that -- that makes it clear. 22 I want to ask you, sir, whether this 23 surprises you. Immediately after speaking to you on 24 September 5th, 1995, and if could simply have P-444A 25 placed in front of the Witness. I have three (3) lines
1161 to read to you based on your answers you just gave. 2 P-444A, I'm at Tab 7. Right after his 3 conversation with you because this conversation with you 4 happens at 9:43 a.m. on September 5th; that is John 5 Carson's conversation with you, correct? 6 A: Yes, sir. 7 Q: In the logger tape Volume I, Tab 7, 8 John Carson, right after speaking to you, calls Dale 9 Linton. And I'll -- it's a -- literally a... 10 11 (BRIEF PAUSE) 12 13 Q: You've encouraged, in your discuss -- 14 if you turn to Tab 7, you've encouraged in your 15 discussion with Carson, that he talk to Linton and make 16 sure that they get their -- their ducks in a row in terms 17 of alternating incident commanders, right? 18 A: Yes, sir. 19 Q: That's part of your job to make sure 20 that the people on the ground are covering each other's 21 shifts, right? 22 A: To make sure there's enough incident 23 commanders to work the project, yes. 24 Q: It's part of your job? 25 A: Yes.
1171 Q: Right after -- 2 A: Not -- not to set up their schedule. 3 Q: No, no, no. That's fair enough. You 4 just want to make sure there's coverage? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: So Tab 7 is a conversation with Dale 7 Linton and -- and it's not going to be long. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: What's the 9 time of that call? 10 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I apologize. It's 11 at 10:10 a.m. on September 5th, 1995. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 13 14 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 15 Q: You speak to him at 9:43 a.m., at 16 10:10, probably... 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I don't have 18 mine in front of me, but if it's just a short excerpt I 19 don't need it. It's 10:10 and it's Carson to Linton, 20 right? 21 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That's correct. 22 THE WITNESS: I have it now. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 24 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Thank you. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine.
1181 If it's just a short excerpt I can follow it. 2 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I appreciate My 3 Friend helping me in having it front of you. 4 5 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 6 Q: At page 44, you see at Tab 7? Page 7 44 there's the regular exchanges between -- actually it 8 starts, I believe, with Mr. Linton's wife but I -- I 9 don't want to presume it. It looks somebody 10 domestically, a female, at his home. 11 So Carson calls and -- and he's talking to 12 someone. He wants to speak to -- to Dale Linton, all 13 right? That's just page 1 of that. 14 A: Yes, sir. 15 Q: Page 44 is the bottom, so that's Tab 16 7. You got that? 17 A: Yes, sir. 18 Q: And you see how it's 10:10 a.m. 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: And you'd agree with me, your 21 conversation with John Carson was not a short one at 9:43 22 a.m., correct? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: So really the time would have been a 25 matter of short minutes between the time he hangs up with
1191 you and he calls Dale Linton. 2 Would you agree with that? 3 A: I agree with that. 4 Q: All right. So as soon as the 5 pleasantries are done and he gets Dale Linton on the 6 phone at page 45, you'll see halfway down the page, he 7 says: 8 "Good morning, John. Good morning, 9 Dale. How are you today?" 10 Do you see that? Page 45, second page in: 11 "Good morning, John. Good morning, 12 Dale. How are you today?" 13 Page 45 -- 14 A: I -- I have the page. I'm just 15 looking for the location. 16 Q: Sure. 17 "Carson: I think I'm okay, I feel 18 okay. Did you get much snoozing in the 19 night?" 20 This is page 45, go to the bottom. 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: Okay. So basically, they're just 23 talking for the first time. You get -- you get to the 24 next page; John Carson reports that things are settled 25 down, right?
1201 A: Yes, sir. 2 Q: And before he evens gets into the 3 logistics of a shift change, he starts, and this is 4 Carson, page 46: 5 "Yeah, and brief you on, you know, 6 what's going on. All I'm going to try 7 to do is hold the line. Uh, we lost 8 the Park last night. We're not in the 9 Park at all. We got more or less, lack 10 of a better term, run out before 11 somebody got hurt. 12 The cruiser rear window smashed. There 13 was a nose to nose and it wasn't good 14 for a little while. We didn't have 15 enough ERT guys. We only had eight (8) 16 there so we just didn't have the horses 17 to do it. 18 Uh huh. 19 And so rather than get somebody into a 20 confrontation, get hurt, we chose Plan 21 B [et cetera]." 22 Now I'm just going to point out to you, 23 sir, that's almost the first thing, within a page, the 24 first thing he's telling is basically he's equal; not a 25 subordinate, he's equal, right?
1211 They're -- they're equal in authority? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: The first thing he tells him is, You 4 know, we got more less run out before somebody got hurt 5 and we lost the Park last night. 6 Now, you'd agree with me that your 7 conversation with him made clear that it was unfortunate 8 the Park had been lost, right? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: And the first -- one of the first 11 things he tells Linton is, We lost the Park, right? We 12 got run out. 13 A: That doesn't strike me as unusual, 14 but that -- 15 Q: Okay, fair enough. 16 A: -- that's the fact. 17 Q: That's the mind set of the Incident 18 Commander, that you and he, as a unit, didn't -- didn't 19 hold the line, didn't maintain the Park, didn't keep 20 containment, didn't perform according to the expectations 21 of the non-Native community in that area on September 22 4th, 1995; isn't that true? 23 A: I had no issue or difficulty with 24 what John had done. The fact that the Park was overrun 25 was just an issue we were going to have to deal with.
1221 Q: Didn't have the horses to do it, 2 means insufficient resources, correct? 3 A: There was no way he could have 4 predicted what sufficient forces might have been. 5 Q: Quote: "They're going to say that we 6 knew this was going to happen." 7 That's what you said to John Carson, 8 right? 9 A: Yes, sir. 10 Q: I'm going to suggest to you, sir, 11 that if nothing else, John Carson would have received the 12 message on September 5th, 1995 that the outcome of the 13 Labour Day weekend in terms of his performance as an 14 incident commander was less than ideal? 15 A: He shouldn't have from me. 16 Q: All right. I'm also going to suggest 17 to you that the meeting of August 11th, 1995 with Marcel 18 Beaubien, one of the things -- and this is, we're now a 19 month earlier, all right? And I'm not -- we don't need 20 paper for this. 21 A month earlier there was a meeting in 22 which basically Beaubien passes on the -- a sense of 23 personal frustration, right, yes? 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: He passes on a sense, also, of
1231 frustration on behalf of his constituency, right? 2 A: Yes, sir. 3 Q: You got the sense of both things, 4 right? 5 A: Yes, sir. 6 Q: This wasn't the man simply neutrally 7 showing up in a robotic way, saying there's some 8 constituents that contacted me. 9 He was personally frustrated with the 10 situation, correct? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: All right. And I'm going to suggest 13 to you in mid-August 1995, at a meeting that John Carson 14 was at, it was made clear that the non-native community 15 in the area felt there was a lack of policing going on, 16 correct? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: All right. And so, weeks later, 19 September 5th, 1995, one of the first things you say to 20 John Carson, I'm sorry, I misstated it, one of the things 21 you say to John Carson when you first talk is they're 22 going to say that we didn't police enough; isn't that 23 right? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: Okay. So the theme -- the theme
1241 that's attending the mindsets of those incident 2 commanders is an under-policing as alleged by the non- 3 native community; correct? 4 A: Possibly. 5 Q: All right. And Wade Lacroix, he's a 6 man of strong opinions, that's how you described him? 7 A: Strong character. 8 Q: Well, you said he had strong 9 opinions. I could take you to the transcript. 10 A: If I said I -- that he had strong 11 opinions, I wouldn't take that back. 12 Q: All right. And if you didn't say it, 13 would you take it back? 14 A: No. 15 Q: Okay, good. So, the bottom line is, 16 strong character, strong opinions. 17 Those are the kinds of people that can be 18 very useful, right? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: But, you want to make sure that 21 there's proper management of that kind of person? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: And that's what you were conveying to 24 Dale Linton? 25 A: Yes, sir.
1251 Q: Now, that person with the strong 2 opinions that you want to make sure is properly managed, 3 he was the one in charge of getting the sense of 4 frustration from Beaubien, right? 5 That was his job? 6 A: He was the Detachment commander in 7 Petrolia at the time. 8 Q: Yes. 9 A: And had a relationship with Mr. 10 Beaubien, simply because Mr. Beaubien's constituency 11 office was right across the road. 12 So clearly, he would have known Mr. 13 Beaubien's concern with respect to policing in the area-- 14 Q: But -- 15 A: -- and the constituents. 16 Q: Will you -- will you agree with me 17 that part of his job was to run interference with 18 Beaubien for John Carson? 19 Carson actually tells you that, that Wade 20 Lacroix, I would have said Lacroix, but he calls -- he 21 pronounces his name Lacroix? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: Right. Wade Lacroix, his job was to 24 be the go-between, between Beaubien and Carson; isn't 25 that right?
1261 A: You'll have to show me where that is, 2 sir. I don't recollect that. 3 Q: All right. Did you not understand 4 that Wade Lacroix ended up being the person who did most 5 of the communications with Beaubien? 6 Did you not understand that that's what 7 was happening? 8 A: I don't think that specifically I was 9 aware of that. 10 Q: Oh, okay. And stopping there for a 11 minute, would you agree with me that that would -- if, 12 for example, on September 5th, 1995 if, for example, John 13 Carson said to you, Superintendent Parkin, well I have 14 Wade Lacroix handling communications with the local MP, 15 and I'm also going to be suiting him up to run ERT or 16 CMU, that that would not necessarily be an ideal 17 situation, if he had said that to you? 18 A: Wade Lacroix would have had a job to 19 do. As a crowd management leader, that's what you're 20 referring to? 21 Q: Yes. 22 A: I don't see the issue that you're 23 raising with Marcel. 24 Q: All right. So you wouldn't have a 25 problem with it if he had said to you on September 5th,
1271 1995, this person with the strong opinions that needs to 2 be managed, he's going to handle receiving the political 3 information from Beaubien, what Beaubien has to say. 4 He's going to be in charge of those 5 communications and he's going to be suited up and running 6 our CMU team. 7 You wouldn't have a problem with that? 8 A: No, sir. 9 Q: Would you agree with me that 10 absolutely essential to the functions of a police officer 11 is their ability to exercise their discretion when it 12 comes to the application of force in a given situation 13 purely based on the facts before them; that that's an 14 essential component of a police officer's function? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: That a police officer has to carry a 17 very heavy responsibility of disabusing themselves to 18 prejudices or biases or outside pressures and focus on 19 the rules for use of force, correct? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: And the rules on use of force is not 22 what's popular or unpopular, right? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: The rules on use of force have 25 nothing to do with what your friends do or don't want,
1281 right? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: The rules on use of force have 4 nothing to do with community pressure, right? 5 A: Correct. 6 Q: The rules on use of force are 7 supposed to be restricted to only one (1) thing, the 8 facts of the interaction with the person who is the 9 target of the use of force, correct? 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: Would you agree with me that it is 12 less than ideal to have someone who's supposed to have 13 that narrow view who's in charge of sixty (60) officers 14 using force; that it's less than ideal to have that same 15 person in charge of receiving community concerns through 16 a politician; that that's less than ideal? 17 A: I don't agree with that, sir. 18 Q: All right. So if it's not less than 19 ideal then that circumstance would be ideal? 20 A: Wade Lacroix, through his position as 21 Detachment Commander, and it's something that we would 22 encourage all our Detachment Commanders to do is to 23 become familiar with the local politicians be they 24 mayors, the local constituents, and the local MPP's and 25 federal members.
1291 We encourage them to get out into the 2 community and meet those people and have a relationship 3 so that they're not just a name, they're also a face. 4 Q: You're talking about his role as 5 Detachment Commander, correct? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: Now, we're not talking about the 8 Detachment Commander, we're talking about the leader of 9 the CMU team who could be charged or is charged in the 10 end with leading the CMU team in respect of the 11 occupiers, right? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: Okay. That is a different function, 14 correct? 15 A: We have to wear many hats, sir. 16 Q: Well then I'm only asking you to work 17 with me apples for apples. We're not talking about what 18 he did as a Detachment Commander, we're talking about 19 that other hat. All right? 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, with 21 respect, you're asking him about that other role as well. 22 So I -- 23 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Fair enough. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 25
1301 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 2 Q: But I'm talking about the hat as the 3 leader of CMU. All right? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: Okay. And would you agree with me 6 and it's a simple point really that ideally the function 7 of receiving political concerns and community concerns 8 would -- should probably be severed from the function of 9 manning a sixty (60) man team on the use of force against 10 the occupiers and in an ideal world those functions 11 should be divided? 12 A: My expectations of him as a platoon 13 commander once given an assignment, the focus of his 14 assignment would be done from a purely policing 15 perspective. 16 Q: Your expectation of John Carson was 17 that there would be full video surveillance set up as of 18 September 3rd, 1995, was there? 19 A: That wasn't my expectation of John 20 Carson, that was my expectation of the Technical Support 21 Bureau. 22 Q: And did that happen? 23 A: Not to our satisfaction. 24 Q: So sometimes you can have 25 expectations and as you've put it you can end up, quote,
1311 "pissed off," right? 2 A: Yes, sir. 3 Q: So the fact that you have 4 expectations doesn't mean it's reasonable to expect 5 people to meet them, agreed? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: Did you know that up until 1993 in 8 addition to having his office, that is Marcel Beaubien 9 having his office across from Wade Lacroix's detachment, 10 that Marcel Beaubien was also the insurance agent; that 11 is he handled personally the insurance for Wade Lacroix 12 for years? 13 Did you know that? 14 A: No, sir. 15 Q: You'd agree with me that that imports 16 a personal relationship between the two (2) of them? 17 A: To a degree. 18 Q: Yes. That -- I'm not going to try to 19 overstate this but the bottom line is he personally 20 relies on Marcel Beaubien to help him with his private 21 life and did so for years. 22 Did you know that? 23 A: No, sir. 24 Q: Would you agree with me that that 25 might be less than ideal in terms of the same person who
1321 is supposed to, without fear of favour from the wider 2 community -- 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well -- 4 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- to lead the CMU 5 team, that's less than ideal. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You don't 7 have to be dramatic. 8 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Fair enough. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You can ask 10 the question. Ask the questions. 11 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Fair enough. 12 13 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 14 Q: That's less than ideal? 15 A: No, sir. 16 Q: It's not less than ideal? It's okay? 17 A: I can live with it. 18 Q: Yeah. 19 20 (BRIEF PAUSE) 21 22 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I see it's about 23 ten (10) to 12:00. I just want to inquire of you, Mr. 24 Commissioner, at what point would be an appropriate time 25 for a break?
1331 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I was going 2 to break around 12:00. 3 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That's fine. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Somewhere 5 between 12:00 and 12:15, whatever suits you. 6 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That's fine. I 7 just wanted to -- to clarify what would be a -- a good 8 time. 9 10 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 11 Q: I'd like to canvass a number of other 12 issues that arise in these tapes if you can help me. 13 First of all would you agree with me that 14 the only indication that you ever got that First Nations 15 persons had consumed an excessive amount of alcohol 16 related to a conversation you had about what they did on 17 the night of September 4th, 1995; not what they did on 18 the night of September 6th, two (2) days later, but you 19 got some actual hard information about alcohol 20 consumption on the night of September 4th, 1995? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: And that arises just for Counsel's 23 edification that arises at page 70 of Tab 2 and -- and 24 that's John Carson reporting to you that there had been 25 excessive drinking?
1341 A: Correct. 2 Q: And other than that report of 3 excessive drinking you've talked about them being "boozed 4 up" on the night of September 6th, 1995, but in fact you 5 had no actual data on that did you? 6 A: Do I not say that they might be? 7 Q: All right. No, what you say is, 8 quote: 9 "Probably all boozed up." 10 Close quotes. That's what you say at page 11 49. 12 Now, when you say somebody's probably all 13 boozed up that's going to impact on how officers deal 14 with them isn't it? 15 A: Where -- I just need some context 16 around that, sir, -- 17 Q: Sure. 18 A: -- where that comes in. 19 Q: Tab 7. Tab 7. 20 A: Of the audio? 21 Q: Of the -- that binder that you have 22 in front of you, yes? It's your conversation with 23 Incident Commander Linton on the evening of September 24 6th, 1995, in the last hours before the fatal shooting of 25 Dudley George. At 9:42 p.m. you speak to the Incident
1351 Commander and at page 49 you make a reference to your 2 view, quote: 3 "Probably all boozed up." 4 Do you see that? 5 A: Yes, I found that, sir. 6 Q: And you'd agree with me that when it 7 came to the consumption of alcohol and -- and you know 8 I'm sure you're familiar with the -- the Grwat case 9 though I may be misquoting it. Mr. Sandler will help me. 10 You know, individual citizens, not just 11 police officers, can form opinions about impairment and 12 whether it's obvious that someone's impaired by alcohol, 13 right? 14 You know that? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: But it always has to be based on some 17 kind of indicia: odour, how they walk, how they talk, 18 something that indicates they've consumed alcohol, right? 19 That's how it works? 20 A: Yes, sir. 21 Q: Okay. So at page 49 you don't say 22 "might" do you? 23 A: No, sir. 24 Q: No. You say, They're probably all 25 boozed up, right?
1361 A: Correct. 2 Q: And you repeat it; they're probably 3 drinking, right? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: That's not because they were native 6 was it? 7 A: No, sir. 8 Q: Okay. And because you're familiar 9 with the fact I take it in your work over the years that 10 one (1) of the unfortunate stereotypes that has developed 11 around people of First Nations background is that they 12 tend to be drunks. 13 You know that that's one (1) of the 14 unfortunate impressions created of First Nations persons? 15 A: That stereotype is out there. 16 Q: Yes. And you know that's something 17 that the OPP and all the rest of us have to work at 18 addressing in a -- in a constructive way to educate 19 people that that's not necessarily so, right? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: Now, you referred to them being 22 pissed up because of the September 4th information two 23 (2) days before you had it, right? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: During the Labour Day Weekend, right?
1371 A: Yes. 2 Q: But now we're in the week September 3 6th and, by the way, would you agree with me just based 4 on common experience, that the people that drank on 5 September 4th, 1995 during Labour Day weekend might not 6 be the only people that drank on Labour Day weekend? 7 A: Absolutely. 8 Q: Okay. But on September 6th, 1995, 9 two (2) days later, you had no indication of alcohol 10 consumption in terms of smell of alcohol, presence of 11 bottles in people's hands or things like that, correct? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: Okay. You simply inferred by virtue 14 of the stories coming in about, for example, the eight 15 (8) to ten (10) natives beating a woman's car with a 16 baseball bat, they must have been, quote unquote, "boozed 17 up"; correct? 18 A: A possibility that would have to be 19 taken into consideration. 20 Q: No. You just used possibility, but 21 then you used probability, right? 22 A: That's the word there. 23 Q: Well, when you say that's the word 24 there, I'm just trying to make sure that you and I are 25 agreed that that's the word you used, because obviously
1381 you're entitled to the benefit of having a tape played 2 for you again. 3 The Commissioner -- that would be one of 4 those moments that I get a negative feeling from my 5 superior for doing it, but half way down that page, you 6 repeat twice: 7 "Not to try and serve papers a bunch, 8 and they're probably all boozed up, 9 they're probably drinking." 10 You use "probably" twice, so do we have to 11 play the tape? 12 A: No, sir. 13 Q: So it's not a possibility, it's a 14 probability; right? 15 A: Yes, sir. 16 Q: And it's a probability you convey to 17 your incident commander, right? 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: Okay. 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 Q: You'd also agree with me that what 24 was presented to you, that is what was presented to you 25 as a central fact of concern to Mr. Linton on the night
1391 of September 6th, 1995 at 9:42 or thereabouts, by the 2 incident commander, was his concern over the attack on a 3 woman's vehicle by eight (8) to ten (10) Natives bearing 4 bats and stuff. 5 That was a concern expressed to you by 6 Dale Linton, incident commander? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: And, in fact, it was the opening 9 concern he expressed to you in the conversation you had 10 that night? 11 A: Without reviewing it right now, I'll 12 agree to that, though. 13 Q: But that's consistent with your 14 memory? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: Right. And, now there was some back 17 and forth with Deputy Commissioner Carson as to whether 18 it was the concern, the central concern or the key 19 concern. It moved in terms of wording. Lawyers, you 20 know, argued with the witness. 21 But at minimum, in his evidence to Mr. 22 Rosenthal, he acknowledged it was a key concern, was this 23 issue of the eight (8) to ten (10) baseball bats on a -- 24 on a woman driving by. 25 You knew that was a key concern for the
1401 incident commanders? 2 A: It should have been, yes, sir. 3 Q: And it was a key concern for you? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And you've since learned it just 6 simply wasn't true? 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Mr. -- 8 MR. MARK SANDLER: I don't think that's 9 fair because parts of it were not true and parts of -- 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, it's 11 not -- it wasn't a fair way to put it, Mr. Falconer. 12 There was an incident, exactly what it was -- 13 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I'll back up. 14 15 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 16 Q: Eight (8) to ten (10) natives bearing 17 baseball bats and stuff struck a woman's car with the 18 baseball bats, who was driving by who had no relationship 19 or involvement with those natives. 20 That was the story you were told? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: You subsequently learned there was no 23 woman driving by; correct? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: You subsequently learned that there
1411 were no applications of baseball bats to a motor vehicle, 2 correct? 3 A: At a time later, correct. 4 Q: Yes. And that's why I keep saying 5 subsequently, right? Because we're just dealing with the 6 truth of what happened, right? 7 A: I -- I agree. 8 Q: So, (1) you've learned there was no 9 woman, unrelated to the occupiers driving by. 10 You've learned there was no application 11 of baseball bats to a car, correct? 12 A: I don't know when I learned -- 13 Q: I'm not asking when -- 14 A: -- that there was no -- 15 Q: You just subsequently learned it, 16 true? 17 A: I believe so. 18 Q: Yeah. You subsequently learned that 19 the only incident in terms of damage to a car going by 20 that night was a single stone being thrown at a side 21 panel of a vehicle, correct? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: You subsequently learned that the 24 driver of that vehicle was a man by the name of Gerald 25 George, otherwise known as Booper George, correct?
1421 A: Correct. 2 Q: And that he actually not only had a 3 relationship with the occupiers in terms of involvement, 4 but he was in an adversarial relationship, having written 5 an editorial about why they shouldn't be there. 6 You learned all of that later? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: You also learned that the damage to 9 the car from a single stone was thrown by, of course, one 10 (1) person, yes? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: And you learned that the damage 13 consisted of a four hundred dollar ($400) scratch to the 14 car. 15 A: I don't know that I ever learned the 16 value, but I'll accept that. 17 Q: It's in the report of the officer. 18 Will you take my word for it? 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: Okay. Let's go back a step. Would 21 you agree with me that, as a key event, eight (8) to ten 22 (10) Natives beating a woman's car with a baseball bat, 23 that would trigger one response by you. 24 And had you known the real facts on 25 September 6th, 1995 at 9:42, as they were being reported
1431 to you 9:42 p.m., if instead of Dale Linton spending 2 pages in a conversation with you about those eight (8) to 3 ten (10) baseball bats beating a woman's car who drove 4 by, who had nothing to do with them, if what he'd said 5 is, Well, Tony, I can tell you things are getting thick 6 here, and you say, Yeah, what happened, Well, a guy by 7 the name of Gerald George drove by the Park and one of 8 the occupiers threw a stone at his car and caused four 9 hundred dollars ($400) damage to the car, scratched it or 10 dented it, and Gerald George had written an editorial 11 against the occupiers and obviously somebody threw a 12 stone, would you agree with me -- 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Again, Mr. 14 Sandler has an objection. 15 MR. MARK SANDLER: That -- that's very 16 unfair. I mean -- 17 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well, what's the 18 unfair part? 19 MR. MARK SANDLER: -- because if he's 20 going to -- if he's going to put, had you known the real 21 facts, namely that were eight (8) to ten (10) people out 22 there, they were brandishing baseball bats and other 23 objects and so on and there had been this encounter with 24 Mark Wright, I mean, I don't think one can cherry pick 25 the -- the incident.
1441 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, well -- 2 MR. MARK SANDLER: And we've -- when -- 3 we've acknowledged that the information was inaccurate -- 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 5 MR. MARK SANDLER: -- John Carson was 6 fairly candid -- 7 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: My Friend's doing 8 argument now and not an objection. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, no. 10 He's not giving arguments. He's not -- 11 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: He's not doing -- 12 he's talking about what he's acknowledged; that's not an 13 objection to the question. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, no, no. 15 That's not what he's doing. He's putting context on the 16 incident. 17 MR. MARK SANDLER: Right. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's what 19 he's doing. He's trying to make it so that the incident 20 is portrayed fairly. 21 MR. MARK SANDLER: Exactly. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: So the 23 witness can respond. That's what he's doing. 24 MR. MARK SANDLER: With all of this 25 positive and negative features, one can't just cherry
1451 pick them, that's all. 2 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well, first of all, 3 I want to be clear. I will take the witness through the 4 transcript -- 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, you 6 don't have to do that -- 7 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- that will -- so 8 that -- 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- you just 10 have to -- 11 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well I do. I do 12 because we're going to -- 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You have to 14 portray the incident fairly. 15 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: And I just did. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, you 17 didn't. You left part of it out. If you're going to 18 portray the incident fairly, you have to put the context 19 to the incident so that the witness can respond. 20 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Let me back up. I 21 hear you, Mr. Commissioner. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Some of what 23 he heard was clearly inaccurate, that's been 24 acknowledged. 25
1461 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 2 Q: Let's -- let's back up a step. I, 3 sir, am directing my questions to the damage to the car. 4 All right? I think what's happened here is that Mr. 5 Sandler is concerned with other things going on. 6 I'm simply asking you, had you known 7 certain facts on how the car got damaged, would it have 8 changed your view. All right? Do you understand? 9 So the circumstances around which the car 10 got damaged, that's what I'm talking to you about. All 11 right? 12 A: I understand what you're talking to 13 me about. 14 Q: Okay. And you'd agree with me that 15 everything I just finished saying to you, about how that 16 car got damaged, is now you know, accurate. Right? 17 A: Yes, sir. 18 Q: That a person -- and I have to do -- 19 I apologize, but we ran into a discussion. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 21 22 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 23 Q: A person who had an ongoing dispute 24 with those who occupied, he wrote an editorial, like this 25 person, whose identity being Gerald George, was driving
1471 his sister's car and one of the occupiers threw a stone 2 and caused four hundred dollars ($400) damage to the side 3 panel. 4 That was the circumstances of the damage 5 to the car. And that was substantially different than 6 the account you were provided on how a car was damaged, 7 correct? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: And I'm going to suggest to you that 10 one of the features of the story you were given on the 11 night of September 6th, 1995 by then Incident Commander 12 Linton, one of the features that was particularly 13 disturbing, and you -- you cover it in this transcript, 14 is that the woman who was theoretically the driver of 15 this car which was damaged by eight (8) to ten (10) 16 Natives brandishing baseball bats, she was a woman in a 17 non-Native community who was at a meeting of cottagers 18 and was simply driving by the Park and eight (8) to ten 19 (10) Natives came out with baseball bats and stuff and 20 beat the car. 21 That was the story you were presented. 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: And that, you'd agree with me, 24 because you're not here to be self serving, are you? 25 A: No, sir.
1481 Q: All right. You would agree with me-- 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You don't 3 have -- 4 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I'm allowed to ask 5 that question, it's a fair question. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, you 7 don't have to ask if he's here to be self serving. Carry 8 on. 9 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I ask -- is -- he's 10 not here; I made a suggestion that he's not. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 12 13 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 14 Q: Right. You're not here to be self 15 serving. So you'd agree with me that there's a world of 16 difference between beating a woman's car with eight (8) 17 to ten (10) Natives with baseball bats and throwing a 18 stone by a single occupier and causing four hundred 19 dollars ($400) damage to the car that someone had a 20 dispute with. 21 There's a world of difference, would you 22 agree, in terms of the car and the damage to the car? 23 Would you agree with that? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: All right.
1491 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Is this -- 2 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: This is a good 3 time. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: This is a 5 good time to break? Thank you. 6 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry stands 7 adjourned until 1:20. 8 9 --- Upon adjourning at 12:05 p.m. 10 --- Upon resuming at 1:21 p.m. 11 12 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 13 resumed. Please be seated. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 18 Q: Good afternoon, Mr. Parkin. 19 A: Good afternoon, sir. 20 Q: If you could direct your attention, 21 please, to Tab 7 of the transcript binder. We'll call 22 this the transcript binder, that's the tapes that we've 23 been in most of the morning. 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: All right. Is it all right if I call
1501 it transcript binder? Will you know what I'm talking 2 about or shall I call it tape binder? 3 A: Transcript's fine. 4 Q: Okay. So at -- at Tab 7 of the 5 transcript binder, I had drawn your attention to a 6 conversation you were having with Mr. Parkin (sic) at 7 21:42, that's 9:42 hours on the night of September 6th, 8 1995. 9 And I take it you and I are agreed that 10 this would have been the last conversation you had with 11 incident command prior to the fatal shooting of Dudley 12 George? 13 A: Correct, sir. 14 Q: All right. And I don't propose to do 15 this with you with every transcript, but I am going to 16 take you through this, sort of contextually, to -- and 17 not repeat what Mr. Worme did, but contextually to go 18 over what you were told by Mr. Linton at the time, all 19 right? 20 Now, on the first page of the -- of the 21 transcript, page 1 -- now Mr. Linton, Dale Linton, has 22 taken over for John Carson. John Carson has -- is off 23 and getting much needed sleep; that's the idea, right? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: And Carson is the principle incident
1511 commander, basically, and Linton is the alternate; is 2 that right? 3 A: They would be equal. They're just 4 sharing times of the day. 5 Q: But isn't it fair to say that it was 6 Carson who developed Project Maple? 7 A: That would be correct. 8 Q: And isn't it fair to say that Dale 9 Linton was sort of brought in, shown Project Maple, 10 literally, just before he took over his duties and 11 because he was away on a course or something; isn't that 12 true? 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: And so that base -- and isn't it fair 15 to say also that it was John Carson who had 16 responsibility for the Military Base issue and the 17 occupation at the Military Base since 1993? 18 A: He had the continuity, yes. 19 Q: And so that really the -- the persons 20 that were the most hands on in charge of the incident on 21 a day to day basis were John Carson and his right-hand 22 man, Detective Sergeant Mark Wright; isn't that true? 23 A: That would be true. 24 Q: Okay. But your point, pure and 25 simple, is that John Carson and Dale Linton shared equal
1521 rank, correct? 2 A: Equal rank, and when Dale was there 3 as the incident commander then he had all the authority 4 and accountability and responsibility of that position. 5 Q: Fair enough. And the theory went 6 that your most experienced guy, who's the guy who's been 7 in charge all along, has to sleep sometimes? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: Okay. And so that was one of those 10 times, and were you -- will you accept my word for it 11 that the gist of the evidence of incident commander John 12 Carson was that in and around the time that he left, in 13 and around 7:00/7:30 on the evening of September 6th, 14 1995, things were status quo and that things were pretty 15 well settled, as in there was no unusual incidents or 16 dangerous incidents or concerns, unusual concerns that he 17 had; things were status quo. 18 Will you accept that? 19 A: I'll accept that. 20 Q: Was that your -- also your 21 understanding? 22 A: Yes, I don't think there had been any 23 issues that I'd been made aware of different. 24 Q: All right. So whatever you're about 25 to be made aware of, when we cover this conversation
1531 between you and Linton, it's basically incidents that 2 have developed between 19:00 and 21:42, in other words, 3 7:00 p.m. and -- and 9:42 p.m., correct? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: Okay. Now on the first page you -- 6 you make the -- you speak to Mr. Linton. It's fair to 7 say there's an -- you seek updates every two (2) hours, 8 correct, roughly? 9 A: I think we -- had we not fallen away 10 from the every two (2) hours? When Dale was in charge 11 that evening I thought I left it with Dale that he just 12 need call me if he thought there was something I had to 13 be brought up to speed on. 14 Q: Okay. So on an as needed basis? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: All right. So fair enough and I 17 apologize for the inaccuracy. So that -- that evening at 18 9:42 there's a conversation and it goes -- and halfway 19 down the page: 20 "PARKIN: Yeah. How are you doing, 21 Dale?" 22 And he's called you at home, correct? 23 A: Yes, sir. 24 Q: All right. And Linton, quote: 25 "Well, it looks like we're in the thick
1541 of it." 2 Right? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Now, you'd agree with me and you say: 5 "Oh, Jesus." 6 Right? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: And you'd agree with me that that 9 basically is as quick a way that, you know, effective 10 senior officers can have for giving to each other than an 11 -- that an incident has become a serious incident, right? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: Okay. 14 "And about two (2) hours ago a car went 15 down. It was on the Army Camp Road? 16 Yeah. 17 There was..." 18 And -- and I'm quoting you. I'm sorry, 19 I'm quoting Mr. Linton. And you say: 20 "Yeah." 21 Then Mr. Linton says: 22 "There was a group of people, Bosanquet 23 Township people met as citizens and 24 they expressed their displeasure." 25 And at the top of page 39:
1551 "Now there was the people that Fred 2 Thomas was leading. He's the mayor of 3 Bosanquet. You say: 4 "Yes." 5 And Linton goes on: 6 "And they were irate that nobody's 7 doing anything in the meeting earlier 8 and I guess one (1) of the people from 9 that meeting, we believe from that 10 meeting, drove down Parkway and onto, 11 right at the corner there, Army Camp 12 Road just in front of the gate to the 13 Park." 14 Linton continues: 15 "And there were eight (8) Native males 16 out there with baseball bats. Four (4) 17 of them had bats and stuff and they 18 started banging on her car and so..." 19 PARKIN: On her -- her car? 20 LINTON: Yeah. So she had a damaged 21 vehicle so we're taking a statement on 22 that and this is, which is outside the 23 Park, that's where the fire was this 24 morning. 25 Hmm hmm."
1561 Now, stopping there. So it's fair to say 2 that first you're told by Incident Commander Linton that 3 the incident has turned serious, right? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And the first thing he points to as 6 an indicator of the serious situation is this attack on a 7 woman's car, a non-Native woman who'd come from a 8 citizen's meeting, by eight (8) Native males with 9 baseball bats. Four (4) of them had bats and stuff and 10 they started banging on her car; that's the first 11 indication you're told of? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: All right. And then he continues at 14 the bottom of 39: 15 "And Mark Wright had driven down. They 16 told him to get out of there, that, you 17 know, to get off the roads. So we were 18 to -- we were planning or sending ERT 19 down to make arrests and while we were 20 doing that [top of page 39] they were 21 moving bus back to the area and the 22 dump truck back to that area. 23 Hmm hmm. 24 And they were in the kiosk pulling down 25 the blinds so it looked like they were
1571 setting us up like, Come on down here." 2 So the -- the next thing you're apprised 3 of is that there's -- there's a movement of the dump 4 truck and a bus but he doesn't give much detail does he? 5 A: No. 6 Q: Okay. And then the next thing you're 7 told is I'm talking -- I'm talking about actions by the 8 occupiers, all right? I'm just trying to break down what 9 you're being told at 9:42 p.m. by Dale Linton, all right? 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: And the next thing you're told is 12 that someone in the kiosk has pulled down the blinds, 13 right? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: And then: 16 "And so we called the TRU guys. We 17 didn't bring the vans into town but the 18 TRU guys are in now and the 3 and 6 19 District guys from day shift are held 20 over and all the women and children on 21 the Base were at the -- at the front 22 gate at 21 Highway and they were all 23 supposed to be evacuated. They said 24 that they were leaving earlier this 25 evening because there was going to be
1581 trouble tonight and now there's 2 bonfires down at the bottom by the 3 entrance to the Park." 4 And he goes on: 5 "And there's maybe ten (10) -- twelve 6 (12) people down there and more 7 congregating. There's another big 8 bonfire up at 21 and there's twenty 9 (20) or thirty (30) people congregating 10 there." 11 You ask: 12 "Up at 21? 13 Right. You know." 14 You ask: 15 "At the Military Base?" 16 And I'm at the top of 41. He says: 17 "Military Base gate." 18 You say: 19 "Yeah. So..." 20 And then you ask: 21 "But inside the grounds? 22 Yeah." 23 Now, stopping there. Why was it important 24 to you that the fire was inside the grounds? 25 A: I was just probably trying to specify
1591 location. 2 Q: You'd agree with me though that if 3 there was a fire that was going -- that was inside the 4 Military Base or inside the Park that that was less of a 5 concern than if there had been movement outside of the 6 Park and they were lighting fires beyond the Park, 7 correct? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: Okay. And so one (1) of the things 10 you needed to establish is whether the fire was inside 11 the grounds still? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: And you were being told that the 14 Military Base fire was inside the grounds, yes? 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just a 16 minute, Mr. Falconer. 17 MR. MARK SANDLER: Just a comment he -- 18 he's combining two (2) concepts there. A concern would 19 be that they're moving outside of the Park and there's 20 fires outside of the Park. 21 The next line deals with movement outside 22 of the Park so -- 23 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: No, no. That's not 24 a proper objection and one of the things I want to 25 emphasize is I'm not going to have -- I'm not going to
1601 spend the day with Mr. Sandler ask -- reframing my 2 questions to deal with argument and that's my concern. 3 Like, that is an example of a proper 4 question where he would prefer to add things and he 5 should do it on re-examination; that's how you do it. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine, 7 Mr. Falconer. I'm going to have to deal with this and 8 just carry on. 9 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Thank you. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I believe 11 that what Mr. Sandler is doing for the most part is 12 helpful -- 13 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Right. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- but let's 15 carry on. Let's just carry on. 16 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Thank you. 17 18 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 19 Q: So backing up, you established that 20 the fire was inside the grounds in terms of the Military 21 Base. At page 40, there's a reference to the bonfires at 22 the bottom by the entrance to the Park. 23 Do you see that? Page 40 halfway down. 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: Now you'd agree with me that there
1611 was some indication or some impression you gained that 2 evening that there was fires outside the Park in the 3 sandy parking lot; is that true? 4 Did you gain that impression that night? 5 A: I don't believe so, sir. 6 Q: Okay. So as far as you were 7 concerned, any fires that were going on, were going on 8 inside the Park? 9 A: Yes, sir. 10 Q: Okay. Now, would you also agree with 11 me that in fact it subsequently was indicated or -- or 12 confirmed that in fact that's what happened that any 13 fires that were happening were inside the Ipperwash Park; 14 is that true? 15 A: To the best of my knowledge, yes. 16 Q: All right. So we've now gone through 17 a number of factors. The other thing that's brought to 18 your attention is that women and children were leaving 19 earlier. 20 You see that at page 40; because there was 21 going to be trouble tonight? Do you see that halfway 22 down page 40? 23 That's another factor that's brought to 24 your attention, correct? 25 A: Correct.
1621 Q: In terms of actions of occupiers, 2 correct? 3 A: Correct. 4 Q: Okay. And I'm just stopping you 5 there so we can take stock. This shouldn't take too long 6 but I want to take stock. 7 You're told about an attack on a vehicle, 8 by Natives bearing baseball bats, of the woman, right? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: You're told of a fire in the Military 11 Base and a fire in the Park, correct? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: And you're told of someone lowering 14 the blinds in the kiosk? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: And you're told in terms of the 17 actions of the occupiers, you're told that the women and 18 children have -- are starting to leave because there's 19 going to be trouble? They've hear that; that is Linton's 20 people have heard that, correct? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: Okay. Now -- and if we move to the 23 next page, 41, halfway. 24 "But the ones down below are out or 25 were out so we've got TRU's down at TOC
1631 and they've got two (2) Sierra teams." 2 Now when he says "The ones down below" is 3 he not referring to the fires? No? 4 "The ones down below are out or were 5 out". 6 so we've got TRU's down at the TOC and 7 they've got two (2) Sierra teams." 8 Wasn't that what you were being told? 9 A: I thought he was referring to the 10 people down at the Park or out on the roadway. 11 Q: Okay. That's fair enough. And I 12 don't -- obviously Mr. Linton is deceased so we're not 13 going to know what he meant. I just wanted to know what 14 you thought. Okay. 15 "Hmm hmm. Doing surveillance. We just 16 want to know what we got. We don't 17 want to go in there and arrest guys out 18 in front of Ipperwash if we're going to 19 get sniper fire." 20 So now Mr. Linton is giving you an update 21 on how he's conducting surveillance through the TRU team, 22 correct? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: So you're being told that they're 25 going to conduct surveillance, right?
1641 A: Correct. 2 Q: And is it fair to say that -- we're 3 now at night time, it's 9:42 p.m., correct? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: It's September so it may still be a 6 little light but it's going to be dark, right? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: All right. And TRU members are 9 people who are in -- in vernacular for us uneducated 10 people, they're SWAT team members, correct? 11 A: Tactics and Rescue Unit, yes, sir. 12 Q: All right. And there -- they have 13 abilities to work in the dark, yes? 14 A: And equipment, yes. 15 Q: All right. And so when they go do 16 surveillance it's a little bit of different than your 17 average community policing officer going to do 18 surveillance? It's a bit different, right? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: And so the idea is these -- these 21 officers are going to be deployed to see what's going on, 22 right? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: All right. At the bottom of the 25 page:
1651 "Well the other thing is to probably if 2 you start sending people down there, 3 they're going to retreat back into the 4 Camp into the bush." 5 That's what you said, correct? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: All right. And -- and the top of the 8 page: 9 "While they may, but the other thing 10 was we had a whole list of automatic 11 weapons that somebody gave us this 12 evening too, that are supposed to be 13 down there." 14 Do you see that? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: Now that's a new item we now add to 17 the list, isn't it? We've got the -- the attack on the 18 car with the baseball bats, we've got the fires, we've 19 got the lowering the blinds in the kiosk, right? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: We have woman and children leaving 22 and now we have this notion of information that a whole 23 list of automatic weapons are supposed to be down there; 24 is that right? 25 A: Correct.
1661 Q: Okay. So you've been given a list of 2 -- of obviously very disturbing information, correct? 3 A: Correct. 4 Q: And -- and you answer: 5 "Supposed to be, yeah. Well, I heard, 6 ah, we were there today and talking to 7 John and that information that's, this 8 Buck Doxtator has supposedly brought -- 9 Yeah. 10 PARKIN: -- some weapons out. 11 LINTON: Yeah, well, John -- John is 12 down at the TOC and I'm at the command 13 post up here. 14 PARKIN: Oh, okay." 15 Stopping there. This information that 16 there was a whole list of automatic weapons that are 17 supposed to be down there, what you were being told by 18 your incident commander is that they had information that 19 there was a, quote, "whole list of automatic weapons", 20 that the occupiers at the Park had in the Park, correct? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: And that was information that 23 obviously would make this incident more critical, 24 correct? 25 A: If confirmed, correct.
1671 Q: In your mind, when you were told 2 that, had that information been confirmed? 3 A: Not to me, no, sir. 4 Q: All right. And when you say "not to 5 me", explain? Can you elaborate? What do you mean? Did 6 you think it was confirmed to Linton? 7 A: No, I believe it was just some 8 information that he had. 9 Q: All right. So are you and I agreed, 10 then, am I right when I say that this amounted to an as- 11 yet unverified rumour? 12 A: I can't speak to whether it was 13 rumour. Dale possibly could have had information that, 14 for whatever reason, didn't get shared with me in this 15 conversation. I don't know that. 16 But I'm not aware that it was confirmed 17 information. 18 Q: Okay. And so if I took out the word 19 rumour and I used some other word that wasn't as self- 20 serving to me, right, if I used a word such as unverified 21 information; is that fair? 22 A: From my perspective, that's fair. 23 Q: Okay. And that's what you saw this 24 as at the time? 25 A: Yes, sir.
1681 Q: All right. All right, and you: 2 "Yeah, some weapons out." 3 Now you mentioned Doxtator. There's a 4 Doxtator character that you -- you refer to, correct? 5 A: Correct. 6 Q: And explain. You had been there 7 during the day, you met with John Carson and you met with 8 Chief Coles, together with John Carson at incident 9 command, right? 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: Now, we don't have the benefit of any 12 notes of that meeting, right? 13 A: Not that I'm aware. 14 Q: And -- and you didn't disagree with 15 Mr. Worme when he put to you John Carson's recollection 16 that that meeting may have lasted up to two (2) hours; 17 you didn't dispute that, correct? 18 A: I didn't dispute that it may have 19 lasted that long. I wasn't sure whether I was in there 20 for the duration of the meeting. 21 Q: You might have been, you might not 22 have been? 23 A: Well, I'm almost positive that I 24 wasn't. That's when I recall being out in the garage 25 talking to some of the ERT people out, having a coffee
1691 and whatnot. 2 Q: For a portion of the two (2) hour 3 meeting? 4 A: For a portion, yes. 5 Q: And so, for example, a purely 6 speculative exercise, you could have been in the meeting 7 for an hour and a half and then you could have taken half 8 an hour to go and talk to people? 9 A: Yeah, I would suggest when we got 10 there, it was part of calling John and number 1, giving 11 him a heads up that we were going to come down and was a 12 -- was it a good time and he agreed. 13 As soon as we arrived, I know that we met 14 with John and I know I was in the meeting at the start. 15 What I can't recall is how long that I was in there. 16 Q: And you have no notes to assist you, 17 correct? 18 A: That's correct. 19 Q: But we do know from page 42, that 20 among other things that you talked to John about at that 21 meeting, was the existence of automatic weapons. 22 A: That would seem to be correct. 23 Q: And that's from page 42. 24 A: That's correct. 25 Q: So one of the things that you
1701 discussed with the incident commander, John Carson and 2 Chief Coles was the operational reality of what weapons 3 did or did not exist with the occupiers, right? 4 A: He would have given us that 5 information, correct. 6 Q: And you would have discussed the 7 information with him. You wouldn't just -- 8 A: We may have. 9 Q: Yeah. And the idea is, the existence 10 or non-existence of weapons is a very important feature 11 for controlling a scene for police officers, right? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: Okay. And in any event, you go on to 14 say, "some weapons out". 15 Now, do I take, and I could be wrong, do I 16 take from this passage that you still had some healthy 17 skepticism about the reliability of information as to the 18 existence of automatic weapons in the Park; that you had 19 some skepticism about the reliability of that information 20 at this stage? 21 A: I think, as a police officer, you're 22 always cognizant of intelligence information and until 23 it's confirmed by independent sources you always have to 24 be cautionary in how you use it. 25 Q: Okay. How -- how would one confirm
1711 this information? 2 A: It could be a number of alternatives: 3 Potentially video, perhaps an undercover officer, perhaps 4 surveillance people, uniformed patrol. 5 There are a number of ways that somebody 6 might have either observed or gotten closer to 7 individuals and may have determined that, in fact, the 8 information was true. 9 Q: And to your knowledge, none of that 10 had happened yet? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: All right. And -- and certainly 13 Linton doesn't change that state of knowledge, correct? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: All right. So going on: 16 "Yeah. John -- John's down at TOC and 17 I'm at the Command Post up here." 18 And just for the world when we say, "TOC," 19 we're talking about Tactical Operations -- 20 A: Operations Centre. 21 Q: Command or Centre? Centre? 22 A: I -- I usually refer to the Tactical 23 Operations Centre. 24 Q: Fair enough. 25 A: But certainly Command is appropriate.
1721 Q: Thank you. 2 "Okay. 3 Linton: And so what's happening now 4 is TRU's going to do their observations 5 to see what they've got and see if 6 there's any threat to us." 7 And then you say: 8 "Well, is -- is there any threat to us? 9 Linton: Well, this, you know, I mean 10 they defiantly were out on the road and 11 -- 12 Yeah." 13 And -- and Commission Counsel pointed out 14 that that may actually be, I mean they definitely were 15 out on the road. Let's use 'definitely' or 'defiantly,' 16 either one they're out on the road. Is that his point? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: I don't know if My Friends have a 19 view on whether it's defiantly or definitely. I -- I 20 just don't want to mislead us, I just thought Mr. Worme 21 had said he was -- he was uncertain. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, he said 23 the transcript said defiant and I think he used the term, 24 defiant. I don't have any reason to think -- 25 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: All right. Fair
1731 enough. I just wanted to be fair. 2 3 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 4 Q: All right. So Linton indicates that 5 they're defiantly out on the road. 6 "Yeah. 7 And we can block off the road, right? 8 Yeah. We have." 9 And then you go back to the woman. Do you 10 see that, and the car? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: Okay. I want to stop you there. 13 First of all, you actually asked the question: 14 "Is there any threat to us?" 15 Do you see that halfway down 42? 16 A: Yes, sir. 17 Q: And -- and am I right, this is sort 18 of a -- we call a Socratic exercise? You're a manager 19 that's probing your people for what's going on, right? 20 A: I'm concerned about their safety. 21 Q: Sure. And you're concerned about 22 assisting in handling the situation, right? 23 You want to provide some assistance to 24 your managers, don't you? 25 A: Correct?
1741 Q: All right. And you can't do that 2 without facts, right? 3 A: True. 4 Q: And so you're doing your job, which 5 is to get some facts, right? 6 A: And so you want to know about the 7 threat. 8 Q: Would -- would you agree with me that 9 certainly when you ask, Is there any threat, he says, 10 They're defiantly were out on the road. 11 Now, alone that doesn't show a threat, 12 does it? 13 I mean I -- I'm -- I'm not trying to be 14 artificial. I know he said other things to you 15 throughout this. I'm just asking that single answer, I 16 mean they defiantly were out on the road, that -- 17 that's -- 18 A: Doesn't constitute a threat. 19 Q: No. And you say: 20 "Yeah. And, uh..." 21 And would you agree with me you're likely 22 waiting for more, aren't you? You've asked, Is there a 23 threat? He says: 24 "They're defiantly out on the road." 25 You say:
1751 "Yeah." 2 And now you're waiting for more, right? 3 A: I'm prepared to listen to whatever 4 he'll give me. 5 Q: Right. Because you've asked. It's 6 not as if you had an answer to your question because if 7 you knew, from the previous pages, there was definitely a 8 threat, you wouldn't ask, Is there a threat, would you? 9 A: No, sir. 10 Q: No. So when you ask, Is there a 11 threat to us, at page 42, it's because you now want to 12 know how this information combines or what is the threat. 13 You want some crystallization of the threat, right? 14 A: True. 15 Q: So he says: 16 "Defiantly out on the road." 17 And you answer, at the top of 43: 18 "Well, we can block off the road, 19 right?" 20 Is that what you said? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: And that's because you're taught, in 23 managing any incident, in managing any issue around use 24 of force, that you try to use the minimal force to 25 control the situation, right?
1761 A: Correct. 2 Q: And so blocking off the road will 3 avoid a confrontation and that's the way to do it, if it 4 would, right? 5 A: That's certainly one (1) option. 6 Q: And you -- and you want it raised and 7 discussed, right? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: And so you say: 10 "We can block off the road, right? 11 And he says: 12 "Yeah, we have." 13 And then you go back to the issue of the 14 woman in the car attacked by the five (5) to ten (10) 15 Natives with bats and stuff that trash her car, right? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: Because as far as you're concerned, 18 he raised that as the very first incident that made him 19 think he was in the thick of it, right? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: And you asked if there's a threat and 22 he said, They're defiant, and then you -- you went to the 23 only incident you heard so far where there was a real 24 threat, which is the woman, right? 25 A: Correct.
1771 Q: And so that's your focus and, 2 interestingly enough, if you take a look, or it was 3 interesting for me, you spent page 43 on the issue, page 4 44 on the issue and up to top of page 45 on the issue. 5 In other words, now you're trying to get a 6 sense of what's the threat to the public at large, 7 outside of the Park, such that you may have to do 8 something different. 9 Am I right? 10 A: Yes, you're right. I'd just like to 11 go back to when I address the issue of, "Okay, this 12 woman," that in itself wasn't a threat to the police. 13 Q: Right. Fair enough. But you -- you 14 quite properly have to assess not just threat to the 15 police but threat to the public? 16 A: Public safety. 17 Q: And public safety, not just for non- 18 Natives but for Natives? 19 A: Everybody involved in the situation. 20 Q: Right. And so if the only thing that 21 your mind triggered the threat issue was this notion of 22 Natives outside of the Park randomly attacking a car and 23 trashing it with baseball bats, right? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: That's disturbing.
1781 A: Yes. 2 Q: All right. So you go to that and you 3 say: 4 "Okay, this woman. 5 A: Yeah. 6 Q: At -- that went down there. 7 A: Yeah. 8 Q: You say that she was at some kind 9 of council meeting tonight? 10 A: No she was just like at a public 11 meeting. A park and public meeting. 12 LINTON: It was actually -- it turned 13 out to be right by our TOC area. 14 Q: Oh, okay. 15 Unbeknownst to us [says Linton]. 16 PARKIN: All right. All right. And 17 the Mayor was there? 18 A: And I understand that Fred was 19 there. 20 PARKIN: All right." 21 Next, top of page 44. 22 "And the people were quite irate and 23 what's going on and -- 24 PARKIN: Okay. So then she drives 25 from there --"
1791 And just stopping there. You're kind of 2 keeping him focussed, right? 3 You're trying to keep him focussed, isn't 4 that what you're doing? 5 A: I obviously have some questions in my 6 mind that I want to get answered. 7 Q: Right. And he's about to tell you 8 about how upset the townspeople are, right? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: Yeah. And you know that, right? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: You got that, so what you're trying 13 to do is talk about the lady driving the car. Right? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: "Okay, then she drives from there 16 [you say] but, uh, how? 17 Linton: But he got them settled down. 18 Like they're not a problem to us now, 19 they're going to -- they're gone home." 20 And he's talking about the non-Native 21 community that have gone home, right? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: "PARKIN: Okay. 24 LINTON: Okay. 25 PARKIN: But then she drove from
1801 there... 2 You're trying to get him to continue the 3 story about the lady, right? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: "She -- 6 Yeah, and that by -- [says Parkin] 7 Linton: I believe she was one of the 8 people at the meeting and then she gets 9 her vehicle damaged with baseball bats 10 as she drives by the entrance." 11 And I take it you understood at the time 12 that this woman, leaving a citizen's meeting, a non- 13 Native woman leaving a citizen's meeting, drives by the 14 Park and there's this damage that's randomly caused to 15 her by these five (5) to ten (10) Natives with the 16 baseball bats. 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: All right. And when I say 'to her' 19 I'm talking about to her vehicle. 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: And you'd agree with me that would be 22 a pretty terrifying experience for someone driving by and 23 having five (5) to ten (10) Native persons holding 24 baseball bats, come at your vehicle randomly and start 25 trashing it; that would be terrifying.
1811 A: The incident, under any 2 circumstances, would be terrifying. I don't know that we 3 knew whether or not those five (5) or six (6) individuals 4 were First Nations. 5 Q: Well, if you could go back, please, 6 to page 39, second page in -- second page in, 39, halfway 7 down: 8 "Linton: And there were eight (8) 9 Native males out there with baseball 10 bats. Four (4) of them had bats and 11 stuff and they started banging on her 12 car." 13 There's no issue, they were Natives. 14 A: That was -- that was his words and 15 his information. 16 Q: Well, was there anybody else on the 17 call? 18 A: Pardon me? 19 Q: Was there anybody else on the call, 20 other than him? 21 A: No. But it didn't preclude anybody 22 else from being down on the roadway. 23 Q: Agreed. But would you agree with me 24 that he calls you and says, We're in the thick of it, 25 right?
1821 A: Yes. 2 Q: And you say: 3 "Oh Jesus." 4 Right? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Then he says this woman was attacked 7 -- her car was attacked by five (5) to ten (10) Natives 8 with bats, right? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: Okay. So that's all you're working 11 on right now, and you're trying to get more details about 12 it. 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: Okay. And that -- and you don't have 15 other information that they weren't Natives or they were 16 somebody else. Your information, that you're operating 17 on, from your incident commander, is that five (5) to ten 18 (10) Natives attacked a car with baseball bats, randomly. 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: And this woman is a non-Native who 21 actually is at a citizen's meeting where they expressed 22 concern about their safety, right? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: That was the point of Fred Thomas, 25 Mayor of Bosanquet and his people, being upset. They
1831 were at a meeting where they're saying, We're not safe, 2 right? 3 A: Correct. 4 Q: We're not safe in our own homes, 5 right? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: And they're saying what are the 8 police doing about it, right? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: And Dale Linton's in charge of that 11 situation, right? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: And he sent Mark Wright to go check 14 that situation out, didn't he? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: Yes. And so right in the context of 17 that, right in the middle of that, this woman, this self- 18 fulfilling prophecy happens, she's attacked by five (5) 19 to ten (10) Natives with bats, right? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: The nightmare scenario, right? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: And so you're being called at 9:42 24 and you're being told it's happening. This has happened, 25 they're lowering the blinds, they're doing the things I
1841 told you. There's fires, it looks like it's going to 2 happen tonight. 3 I mean, isn't that the impression you're 4 getting? 5 A: Dale's concerned about that 6 possibility. 7 Q: Okay. Now, continuing, trying not to 8 be dramatic. Page 44 -- I'll try harder. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 10 11 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 12 Q: Page 44, half way down: 13 "But then she drove down there from 14 there. 15 Yeah. 16 I believe she was one of the people at 17 the meeting and then she gets her 18 vehicle damaged with baseball bats as 19 she drives by the entrance. She was 20 driving by or -- 21 Yeah. 22 Yeah, hmm hmm. 23 And there's eight (8) or ten (10) 24 people on the road and they whack the 25 vehicle."
1851 You got that? 2 A: Yes, sir. 3 Q: All right. Now, from there you then 4 go over a series of measures with him. That stops -- and 5 again I'm just trying to explain the con -- that stops 6 directly addressing the issue of the attack on the 7 woman's car, all right? 8 Now you go on -- Linton goes on: 9 "But at the same time, like, when we're 10 going to respond then, they really 11 build up big time inside. So that, you 12 know, our original plan was go down and 13 arrest these guys, unlawful assembly, 14 mischief, wilful damage, that kind of 15 stuff. 16 PARKIN: Whatever, yeah. 17 LINTON: But they've built us so fast 18 inside, were pull -- you know, and were 19 pulling the blinds down in the kiosk so 20 that, you know, it became obvious they 21 were probably setting us up." 22 Right? He told you that? 23 A: Yes, sir. 24 Q: And from that you infer that there 25 was an intention, on the part of Linton, to go down and
1861 effect arrests as a result of the five (5) to ten (10) 2 Natives attacking the woman's car, right? 3 That that was their intent? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: And -- but because they saw people 6 pulling down blinds and there appeared to them to be a 7 big time build-up, or build-up big time, that's how he 8 called it? 9 A: That's the words that he used. 10 Q: So he hesitates because he feels 11 they're being set up, right? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: "PARKIN: What are you getting on 14 the videos back in Grand Bend? 15 LINTON: The videos are getting almost 16 nothing out of that kiosk. They're 17 blurry and, you know, you can't see 18 people coming and going. 19 PARKIN: I was in -- we stopped at 20 Grand Bend too, and I took a look -- 21 took a look at the videos and they were 22 very clear pictures. 23 LINTON: Yeah. 24 But they due to the lack of lights or 25 whatever [says Parkin]."
1871 Top of page 46: 2 "LINTON: Yeah, but so what's 3 happening now is the TRU team is down 4 there and they're doing those 5 observations. 6 PARKIN: Hmm hmm. 7 LINTON: If anybody is out there, 8 there's a lot of traffic along the 9 beach too, from Ipperwash to Army Camp 10 Road -- 11 TONY: From Ipperwash to -- uh, okay. 12 LINTON: -- with their vehicles. And 13 if the people are outside the fence and 14 lighting fires and got clubs and stuff, 15 then they're gonna make arrests. 16 PARKIN: Hmm hmm." 17 Now, stopping there. Is it fair to say 18 that you're being told by your incident commander that, 19 first of all, your first option, which you raise with the 20 incident commander, of video surveillance isn't working? 21 That's the firs thing you're being told, 22 right? 23 A: Not satisfactory -- not 24 satisfactorily. 25 Q: Right. Is there a difference between
1881 you can't see people coming and going and isn't working? 2 Is there a difference? 3 A: To me there is. 4 Q: Okay. 5 A: If they're not working, then you're - 6 - they're not up and running. 7 Q: Okay, Fair enough. And then right 8 after that, you mention that maybe it's due to the lack 9 of lights or whatever. And then the top of the page he 10 tells you that we do have TRU team down there trying to 11 make observations, right? Top of 46. 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And that's the second time he's told 14 you that, right? Yes? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: Now, you don't ask them what they're 17 seeing, TRU, do you? 18 A: I don't appear to. 19 Q: And you didn't the first time he 20 raised the TRU team observations, did you? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: Okay. You'd agree with me that you'd 23 want some method of surveillance and if the video cameras 24 didn't work reports back from TRU on what's going on 25 would be a -- a good alternative?
1891 A: The TRU Sierra Team I think he 2 referred to. 3 Q: Yes. Reports back from them would be 4 a good alternative? 5 A: Which isn't a full TRU team. 6 Q: Fair enough. 7 A: Okay. 8 Q: But they're -- they're surveillance 9 people, aren't they? 10 A: I just want to make sure we're 11 talking about the same scenario, yes. 12 Q: And -- and I appreciate it and I 13 shouldn't have gone on so quickly because when I say 14 "TRU" and don't say "TRU Sierra" then I'm leaving out the 15 -- TRU Sierra does not -- does that imply snipers? 16 A: Yes, but it could be two (2) officers 17 or it could be four (4) officers working together as 18 opposed to a whole team of twelve (12). 19 Q: Fair enough. So as far as you're 20 concerned when -- when he uses -- well, not as far as 21 you're concerned. The fact is with your police training 22 when he uses the term, "TRU Sierra," he's saying two (2) 23 to four (4) TRU officers are down there doing 24 surveillance? 25 A: That would be what I would be
1901 thinking, yes. 2 Q: Fair enough. And you would have been 3 thinking that then? 4 A: I believe so. 5 Q: But I can't find where you ask how 6 he's gathering information from them. And is it fair, if 7 you look at this transcript would you agree with me you 8 don't ask that? 9 A: I would agree. 10 Q: Okay. And as you look back on the 11 incident now, can you in your mind identify any point in 12 time up to and including the shooting when TRU Sierra 13 provided intelligence information that you know about, I 14 mean between 9:42 and the shooting of Dudley George? 15 A: No, sir. 16 Q: Then right after the reference to the 17 TRU Sierra Team or TRU Sierra I think is the term on page 18 46: 19 "LINTON: And if anybody's out there, 20 there's a lot of traffic along the 21 beach too from Ipperwash to Army Camp 22 Road [et cetera]" 23 Now, this passage where he says: 24 "With their vehicles and, ah, if the 25 people are outside the fence and
1911 lighting fires and got clubs and stuff 2 then they're going to make arrests." 3 Now, is it fair to say that Linton is 4 expressing a concern to you that members of the broader 5 community moving in traffic along the beach from 6 Ipperwash to Army Camp Road could be caught in some kind 7 of act of violence? He's expressing that concern to you 8 isn't he? 9 A: I don't believe I would have taken it 10 from him that he was worried about the non-Native 11 community. I -- I believe he's referring to the traffic 12 as being First Nations persons in that area. 13 Q: Okay. And I appreciate that. And so 14 -- what you -- and -- and when you say, "First Nations 15 persons" you're referring to occupiers or non-occupiers? 16 A: Occupiers, but potentially -- 17 Q: All right. 18 A: -- people going in. 19 Q: With their vehicles, he's referring 20 to the vehicles of those people moving around isn't he? 21 A: Yes. sir. 22 Q: And if the people are outside the 23 fence and lighting fires, do you see that? 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: Now, he's linking being outside the
1921 fence with lighting fires, isn't he? 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 A: You could read it that way. 6 Q: "And got clubs and stuff then they're 7 going to make arrests." 8 Obviously the people that are going to 9 make arrests are your officers, right? 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: So his point is if you've got this 12 vehicle traffic, if you've got people outside the fence 13 lighting fires and they've got clubs and stuff then 14 they're going to get arrested, right? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: Okay. You say: 17 "Hmm hmm. 18 LINTON: I'm going to use the three 3 19 and 6 District ERT teams with the TRU 20 teams and they're going to use 1 -- and 21 one 1 and 2 (2) teams just as 22 [something] stuff." 23 Do you see that? 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: Now, he's telling you about a
1931 deployment, isn't he? 2 A: He's telling me what he's thinking 3 about doing. 4 Q: Well, he said he's going to use. 5 A: That doesn't prevent him from getting 6 off the phone and not doing it. 7 Q: Okay. But he's told you the plan is 8 to use them, fair? 9 A: He's told me he's thinking about 10 using them. 11 Q: All right. Would you assist me on 12 how I distinguish between he's going to do something; 13 that is the person that reports to you says, quote: 14 "Going to use the 3 and 6 District ERT 15 teams with the TRU team and then 16 they're going to use 1 and 1 and 2 17 teams just as stuff." 18 How do I distinguish between that and what 19 you say he might be saying which is, I'm thinking about 3 20 and 6 District ERT teams? How do I distinguish between 21 those two (2) things? 22 A: A lot of times, you know, when you 23 get a call like that the person is thinking out loud. 24 Q: Okay. 25 A: And perhaps if I'd have interjected
1941 and said, I don't think that's a good idea, he might 2 have, you know, changed the plan, or upon hanging up and 3 getting more information he himself may have changed the 4 plan. 5 Q: Did you interject and say that's a 6 bad idea? 7 A: No, sir. 8 Q: Okay. So if you didn't interject and 9 say that's a bad idea from your analysis we can assume 10 that's what he was going to do? 11 A: Yes. I'm just trying to give some 12 insight into my thinking because I've handled so many of 13 these types of situations in calls. 14 Q: You're two (2) professionals 15 discussing your options, correct? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: And as a professional talking to his 18 superior he's raising an option he's going to do and if 19 he doesn't hear don't do it then he'll go ahead with his 20 judgment? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: And so far, what you've heard from 23 him is that there's a bunch of, let's call it unverified 24 information or information that doesn't represent a 25 threat as you put it, and then there's this woman with
1951 the car; that's what you've heard from him? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: And you haven't told him, You know, 4 we don't have a heck of a lot here; you haven't said 5 that, have you? 6 A: No, I haven't. 7 Q: Okay. Now: 8 "PARKIN: Okay. So basically, I mean, 9 you're kind of saying that if something 10 happens on the road or off the Park. 11 LINTON: Yes. 12 PARKIN: Park in proper. 13 A: Yes. 14 You're going to take whatever action is 15 reasonable. 16 LINTON: [top of page 47] Yeah. 17 PARKIN: And -- but if it stays inside 18 the Park -- 19 LINTON: Yeah. 20 -- we're -- we're not planning on going 21 in? 22 LINTON: No." 23 Stop there for a moment. And this is the 24 part, and this is why I've been so careful to -- to spend 25 -- to do each line, Mr. Commissioner. I need to
1961 understand, sir, from you what happened here because I'm 2 going to suggest to you that you give him a "what if". 3 You say, quote: 4 "Okay. So basically you're kind of 5 saying that if -- if something happens 6 on the road or off of the Park -- 7 Yes? 8 -- you're going to take whatever 9 reasonable action is necessary." 10 Right? That's what you're saying, "if 11 something happens", right? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: You haven't told them that you think 14 it's happened have you? Have you said to him in this 15 statement, You know, what you described to me, it's 16 happened so you're going to do what's right? That's not 17 what you say to him, is it? 18 A: That's correct, I don't. 19 Q: You -- you actually create a 20 contingent. You say if something happens, right? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: Something beyond what is in these 23 pages so far, right? 24 A: It reads like that. 25 Q: Well, and that's why, you know, the
1971 Commissioner doesn't make determinations based on a 2 transcript. You're a witness; you're here. It reads 3 like that but tell me it's different. Tell me that's not 4 what you were saying. 5 A: I can't. 6 Q: Okay. So isn't it fair to say that 7 first of all when it came to the automatic weaponry if 8 you knew that was unverified information that was hardly 9 a reason to move a team in? 10 A: Unverified to my knowledge. 11 Q: Right. Well, but only you can use 12 your knowledge for your opinions. Other people can use 13 their knowledge but you have to have an opinion, right? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: You're in charge of this man; yes? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: And you know this man has the power 18 to invoke an awesome amount of force in a democracy, 19 right? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: And so you, being the person in 22 charge of him, have to feel comfortable with your 23 knowledge base and your opinion, correct? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: And with that knowledge base and
1981 opinion you say if something else happens then you'll do 2 something, right? 3 A: It reads like that, sir, yes. 4 Q: Okay. And isn't it fair to say that 5 you used your seasoned experience to realize that so far 6 the information while potentially disturbing and 7 warranting very close scrutiny didn't meet the test yet 8 and that really you'd -- you'd want to know there's more 9 going on? 10 A: This is a discussion between Dale and 11 I taking place on the phone. While this discussion is 12 taking place there's all kinds of activity continuing 13 that even he isn't aware of. 14 Q: Fair enough. 15 A: So at the end of the day I can ask 16 questions, discuss with him but he's the individual on 17 the ground and as you say if I don't order him not to do 18 something then I have to trust in his experience, 19 knowledge and skills and ability with respect to the 20 decisions that he makes. 21 Q: And -- and I appreciate that and it's 22 a difficult line to walk, isn't it? 23 A: Very. 24 Q: Because on the one hand, as a 25 professional, you want to use every ounce of judgment you
1991 have to make the right call, right? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: On the other hand if you're going to 4 work with people and have them be effective managers and 5 do their jobs you can't micro-manage them, correct? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: So you -- you walk that line between 8 being comfortable with how they perform their job and 9 having to be ready to put on the brakes if you sense 10 something's gone wrong, right? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: Now, in this circumstance you gave a 13 view, you said if something happens on the road or off 14 the Park, then you're going to do what's reasonable, 15 right? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: And that should be read by the 18 Commissioner as, If something else is happening here, I 19 won't even probably know about it, then you're probably 20 going to have to do the right thing and move in, right? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: Okay. Now, you said other activity 23 that Dale Linton is not even aware of. You made 24 reference to that before. You said -- your answer was 25 basically, among other things, I'm not trying to -- to
2001 restrict you here but you said, you know, There's a lot 2 going on, there's things going on that Dale Linton 3 doesn't even know about, right? 4 A: While he's on the phone to me, 5 correct. 6 Q: Right. But can I just take us a 7 little bit back to the facts. As you sit here today, 8 having reviewed the records, having testified for a 9 number of days now. 10 And I take it you've had occasion to think 11 about this case over the years, one (1) or two (2) times? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: Are you familiar with something 14 having gone on at that time while Dale was on the phone 15 with you? 16 A: No, sir. 17 Q: All right. So it was sort of a 18 hypothetical? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: Okay. Now, you make it clear we're 21 not planning on going in, that's 47, right? Page 47, 22 right? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: So you've created two (2) realities; 25 reality number 1, additional factors in your mind.
2011 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Do you want 2 to wait for a minute and see what Mr. Sandler's objection 3 is? 4 MR. MARK SANDLER: Yes, I -- My Friend 5 then goes to 47 and he just skips the first line that Mr. 6 Parkin says, and goes right to, "we're not planning on 7 going in". 8 I just don't think it -- he's giving -- 9 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I don't mind. I'll 10 just read all -- 11 MR. MARK SANDLER: -- this Witness -- 12 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- of the lines. 13 MR. MARK SANDLER: -- the context. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 15 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I'd be happy -- 16 that's why I'm trying to line by line it. I'm happy to. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 18 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Very important. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's an 20 important line. 21 22 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 23 Q: I'm at the bottom of 46: 24 "You're going to take whatever action 25 is reasonable."
2021 Then the top of 47: 2 "LINTON: Yeah. 3 PARKIN: And but if it stays inside 4 the Park. 5 LINTON: Yeah. 6 PARKIN: We're not planning on going 7 in. 8 LINTON: No." 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: See that? 11 A: Yes, sir. 12 Q: All right. Now, you would have been 13 concerned that someone died and you knew, and you've 14 testified about all of the procedures that are put in 15 place, including invoking the mandate of the Special 16 Investigations Unit, SIU, correct? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: And you knew that SIU's job, based on 19 the work you've done over the years and your work as a 20 Chief Superintendent, SIU ultimately is responsible for 21 reporting to the Attorney General on the facts 22 surrounding use of force by a police officer causing 23 serious bodily harm or death, right? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: I'm putting in front of you, and it's
2031 just for one (1) brief passage, frankly it's for three 2 (3) lines, but I don't like to hand out a piece of 3 something because then I ... 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 MR JULIAN FALCONER: I have Document 8 1005870. Mr. Sandler, quite properly, if I'm wrong, if 9 Mr. Sandler feels that I'm not accurately describing this 10 as report of SIU, I have a document dated July 11th, 1996 11 signed by James M. Stewart QC, acting director, Special 12 Investigations Unit. 13 Whether there are also other reports, I 14 have no difficulty with that, but suffice to say this is 15 one (1) report of the SIU and if there's others, I'm sure 16 Mr. Sandler will bring it out in re-exam. 17 I'm just trying to -- I'm just -- I'm only 18 interested in the front page, the front three (3) pages. 19 MR. MARK SANDLER: Oh, I'm sorry. 20 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That's okay. And-- 21 MR. MARK SANDLER: There's two (2) -- 22 there's two (2) reports put together. These are actually 23 drafts, but Mr. Stewart signed the first one, the second 24 one is only a draft. 25 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Right. I'm only
2041 interested -- 2 MR. MARK SANDLER: Fine. 3 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- in the first 4 page and I don't think it's going to be contentious. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Do you need 6 the second part attached to it? Why don't you just -- 7 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Hmm hmm. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Are they -- 9 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I do not. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, why 11 don't you just take it off and then we won't -- 12 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That's fair enough. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- have any 14 problem. 15 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That's fair -- it 16 came off as a -- I believe, a single document, but that's 17 fine. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Okay. The 19 first part is -- 20 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That's right. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- three (3) 22 pages, signed by James Stewart, July the 11th. 23 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That's correct. 24 25 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER:
2051 Q: Now, if you could just direct your 2 attention to the -- the two (2) paragraphs in this report 3 on -- on the use of force in the Ipperwash incident. 4 It's the last two (2) paragraphs. 5 And on the first page: 6 "Prior to their departure -- " 7 This is on page 1, last two (2) 8 paragraphs. 9 "Prior to their departure for the 10 boundary fence at the Park, the 11 involved OPP officers were briefed by 12 Commanders regarding the operation. 13 Officers were ordered not to enter Park 14 property but to remove protesters who 15 are outside the Park and arrest them. 16 Some but not all officers were apprised 17 of information received that the 18 protesters allegedly possessed a 19 significant arsenal with a variety of 20 firearms and ammunition. Some officers 21 were warned of the possible existence 22 of incendiary devices (Molotov 23 cocktails) also being in the possession 24 of the protesters." 25 And this is the part I want to ask you to
2061 focus on: 2 "The investigation reveals that when 3 the group of officers arrived at the 4 incident scene, they could see there 5 were no fires immediately outside the 6 Park property and that most protesters 7 were behind the boundary fence. 8 The CMU [or this is scratched] and some 9 reports indicate that the CMU 10 approached the boundary fence and stood 11 just feet away from the protesters who 12 are on the other side. At some 13 point..." 14 And it goes on to describe the encounter 15 with two (2) protesters, but just stopping you there. 16 Was that your understanding that in 17 essence the fires that happened were fires not outside 18 the Park and that when CMU marched down there, they were 19 fires inside the Park first of all? 20 Was that your understanding? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: And secondly, that when they marched 23 down there, most of the protesters were actually behind 24 the fence. 25 Is that also true?
2071 A: By this report. 2 Q: All right. What I want -- I ask you 3 that because when we discussed the issue of planning on 4 going in, as you see at page 47, and before that, if 5 something happens on the road or off the Park, remember 6 that? 7 A: Yes, sir. 8 Q: Okay. When we were discussing those 9 two (2) things, you are actually saying to -- to Linton, 10 your view, you're sharing with him your view without 11 barring him, right? 12 You're sharing him your view that if 13 something else happens, it may be necessary to do the 14 reasonable thing and invoke a substantial amount of 15 force, right? That's what you're saying to him? 16 A: I would leave that decision to him, 17 yes. 18 Q: Yes. But you pointedly say if 19 something else happens, so am I right in inferring from 20 that, that if nothing else happens, that the opposite is 21 also true as far as you were concerned? 22 You're not micro-managing, but as far as 23 you were concerned the corollary would have to be if 24 nothing else happens then you keep status quo; is that 25 fair?
2081 A: I understand what you're saying, sir. 2 I don't know or I can't sit here today and say I said it 3 with that thought in mind. 4 Q: All right. Fair enough. And am I 5 also correct in inferring though, that you knew that some 6 of the information you received from Linton that night, 7 was simply to unverifiable to be information to marshal a 8 substantial amount of force? 9 It was simply too unverifiable at that 10 moment? 11 A: I don't know that I knew it at that 12 moment because I was relying on what he was telling me. 13 Q: Okay. Now, I'm going to finish the 14 pages. We'll go much faster now, all right? 15 Okay. At page 47 where you've already 16 talked to John, I guess you're aware that they're going 17 for the injunction. I have copies of that stuff and 18 you've discussed the service of the injunction, and I 19 want to be clear that's not what I'm talking about right 20 now so we could go through this quite quickly. Pages 47 21 to 48. 22 You're issue of the obtaining of an 23 injunction. You discuss the obtaining of the injunction 24 at pages 48 to 49. 25 A: Correct.
2091 Q: And you discuss -- we already 2 focussed or discussed this question of -- of the -- of 3 the issue around drinking. But halfway down 49, that's 4 where I want to direct your attention to. 5 "PARKIN:" 6 I'm sorry. 7 "LINTON: Yeah, yeah. They're setting 8 fires..." 9 Do you see that? It's halfway down 49. 10 We're back to facts Linton and -- you see? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: Okay. And what I'm doing, sir, so 13 you know, is I'm trying to only for now, squeeze out of 14 this transcript, what this Incident Commander's telling 15 you that causes him to believe he's in the thick. 16 Do -- do you follow me? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: Okay. So: 19 "LINTON: Yeah, yeah. They're setting 20 fires and there's some rumour they 21 stole a thousand (1000) gallons of gas, 22 of whatever gas they could today from 23 an MNR tank in there as well, and you 24 know, the rumours of Molotov cocktails 25 and that kind of stuff so.
2101 [And] PARKIN: Yeah, but uh -- 2 LINTON: So it looks like tonight's 3 the night. They're -- they're revved 4 up for action. The women and kids and 5 leaving and it really surprised me 6 they'd, you know, be this aggressive." 7 Top of page 50. 8 "The women and kids are leaving. 9 That's a bit unusual too [you say]. 10 LINTON: So I'll let you know when we 11 have uh -- 12 PARKIN: Well that injunction surprised 13 me because the one that they were going 14 for, and I guess John told you what 15 happened today about me going up MNR 16 about the possibility of automatic 17 weapons. 18 LINTON: Yeah. And then that hit the 19 fan down in Toronto. 20 Well, that didn't come from us. I'm 21 wondering that how -- 22 [And] PARKIN: No, no, it went up 23 through MNR and Kobayashi reported 24 that." 25 And then at the -- at the top of 51:
2111 "And then it got -- the next thing it 2 was sitting in the Deputy Solicitor 3 General's office [this is you talking, 4 Parkin] and so there was some concern 5 that, you know, maybe we weren't doing 6 the right thing. 7 LINTON: Marcel Beaubien was in 8 tonight and he had talked to the 9 Solicitor General and -- 10 PARKIN: Yeah. 11 LINTON: -- the Attorney General and 12 they were comfortable but he -- 13 PARKIN: Well, that's right. We -- we 14 called the Commissioner tonight. 15 LINTON: Yeah. 16 PARKIN: And he'd been talking to 17 Runciman and they were more than 18 pleased with what the OPP were doing so 19 it was no problem there. What happened 20 though, by that information about the 21 automatic weapons going up the MNR 22 side, they went from that -- that 23 regular type of injunction, the 24 emergency type, which you know really 25 isn't in our favour.
2121 LINTON: Yeah." 2 And at the top of page 52: 3 "PARKIN: We want a little bit more 4 time. 5 LINTON: Yeah." 6 Now first of all, can I ask you this: You 7 were of the view that there was no great rush, in 8 allowing a regular injunction to happen would be 9 consistent with safety, protecting the community and 10 basically de-escalating this matter, correct? 11 A: Correct, sir. 12 Q: All right. And then secondly you 13 expressed, and I ask you this because of answers you gave 14 Commission Counsel, Mr. Worme, on this issue, you said 15 that you didn't know whether automatic weapons and their 16 existence or alleged existence were the reason that the 17 regular type of injunction was switched to an emergency 18 injunction; you told that to Mr. Worme, right? 19 A: I'll trust your recording what I 20 said. 21 Q: Okay. But I -- I'm just interested 22 in -- in what your knowledge is now. Isn't it fair to 23 say, what you told Linton, second sentence the bottom of 24 page 51, what you told Linton was simple, quote: 25 "What happened though, that by
2131 information about the automatic weapons 2 going up the MNR side, they went from 3 that regular type of injunction to the 4 emergency type which, you know, really 5 isn't in our favour." 6 Do you see that? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: You're conveying to Linton your view 9 that the information about the automatic weapons that 10 went up the MNR side, in your view, switched the intent 11 to pursue a regular type of injunction to an emergency 12 injunction, correct? 13 That was your view you passed on to 14 Linton? 15 A: It was my impression at the time, 16 yes, I believe. 17 Q: Okay. And I take it you don't recall 18 where you gained that impression? I mean you might, I'm 19 sorry. 20 Do you recall where you gained that 21 impression from? 22 A: That information, with respect to the 23 call with the Commissioner, I would have gotten from 24 Chief Coles. 25 Q: Okay.
2141 A: If he got that information at the 2 same time or around the same time, then he would have 3 passed it on to me. 4 Q: So -- and -- and it's fair to say 5 that you and Coles were kind of like partners on this 6 thing, right? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: I mean he's your boss, but you two 9 (2) had to work closely together, right? 10 A: We did. 11 Q: And you had a great deal of respect 12 for one another? 13 A: I certainly respected Chief Coles. 14 Q: And he respected you, from what you 15 could tell? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: Right. And what he knew, you knew, 18 and what you knew, he knew, right? 19 Fair enough. Let me rephrase. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You can't -- 21 22 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 23 Q: To the best of your experience, Chief 24 Coles made a point of briefing you on what he learned, as 25 related to Ipperwash, so you could do your job?
2151 A: He certainly would keep me informed 2 of what I had to know. 3 Q: All right. Did you have the 4 impression that there were things he didn't tell you 5 about? 6 Good point. I -- I'm going to object 7 myself. I'm going to audit -- 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I'll 9 take your objection. 10 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That's fine, I 11 object. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Your 13 objection is sustained. 14 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I finally won one. 15 MR. MARK SANDLER: I'm feeling flattered 16 that I don't even have to stand up anymore. 17 18 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 19 Q: At any time did you -- did you have 20 an impression that there were matters that -- relating to 21 -- to -- I'm going to withdraw the question. I don't see 22 a good way to pose it. 23 Moving on. You made a point of keeping 24 Chief Coles as abreast of matters as you could in terms 25 of what you learned about Ipperwash?
2161 A: Yes, as he did with me. 2 Q: Fair enough. And you worked closely 3 together? 4 A: Very closely. 5 Q: Okay. Now, what I want to understand 6 then is, when -- now that you've looked at this line and 7 focussed in on it for a minute, you'd agree with me that 8 whatever you told Mr. Worme before and however you 9 learned this information, Coles, Commissioner, or 10 otherwise, it was your view, as expressed to the Incident 11 Commander, that the information about automatic weapons 12 that had gone up the MNR side was the reason the regular 13 type injunction switched to an emergency type; that was 14 your view? 15 A: That clearly would have been an 16 essential part of my view. I don't know if there was 17 anything else. 18 Q: All right. You didn't tell Linton 19 about anything else? 20 A: No, sir. 21 Q: You don't remember anything else? 22 A: No, sir. 23 Q: Good. Now, the other thing I want to 24 ask you about is, you make a point of discussing a number 25 of things, you discuss the -- the views of the Solicitor
2171 General, Linton discusses the Attorney General and you 2 discuss what's going on at the deputy Solicitor Generals. 3 I'm just trying to figure out where you 4 ask for more information about the theft of the thousands 5 of gallons of gas from the MNR tanks. Where do you ask 6 about that? 7 That's at 49. He tells you about it. 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 A: Where do I ask about it? 12 Q: Yeah. 13 A: I -- I don't see. 14 Q: Would you agree with me that he puts 15 out -- first of all, can we agree on this: If the 16 occupiers stole thousands of gallons of gas, and they 17 were making Molotov cocktails and that kind of stuff with 18 it, that would be a very serious threat to you and your 19 officers; is that true? 20 A: Certainly had the potential. 21 Q: And so that kind of information, 22 would be information you would want to know something 23 about? 24 25 (BRIEF PAUSE)
2181 A: Yes. 2 Q: But when I look at this transcript, 3 and other documents, I can't see any inquiries by you 4 whatsoever about it. 5 Am I right that that just might have been 6 an oversight? 7 A: It would appear I didn't ask any 8 further questions on that. 9 Q: Is it possible that when you heard it 10 was a rumour and there were rumours of Molotov cocktails 11 that you -- you just simply discounted it as non-verified 12 information? 13 A: I don't know that, sir. 14 Q: Okay. But I do need to get a bit 15 into your thinking, right? 16 Linton -- it's 9:42 p.m., right? It's 17 9:42 p.m. the night of September 6th, right? 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: In an hour and eighteen (18) minutes, 20 or thereabout, Dudley George dies because he's shot, 21 right? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: And in that hour and eighteen (18) 24 minutes there is no question that you had the authority 25 to tell Dale Linton that, based on what he was telling
2191 you, that he was not to move a CMU team down that road. 2 There is no question you had that 3 authority, is there? 4 A: I had the authority. 5 Q: Fine. And there's also no question 6 that you made clear to him, in a previous page that I 7 read to you, that as far as you were concerned, you would 8 expect something else to happen before actions get taken. 9 You said that to him. 10 A: That's the way you're interpreting 11 it, sir. I can't argue with that, but I don't know that 12 that's what I was thinking. 13 Q: Fair enough. And would you agree 14 with me that if you did take these allegations of the 15 theft of thousands of gallons of gas and the making of 16 Molotov cocktails on tables spread out, building an 17 arsenal, if you took that seriously, you would have given 18 instructions on what to do about it, right? 19 A: I possibly could have. 20 Q: All right. But you didn't? 21 A: No, I didn't. 22 Q: Now, again, it would be or could be 23 something, for example, TRU Sierra might have picked up 24 intelligence on, correct? 25 A: Correct.
2201 Q: Because they're down there, they have 2 special equipment for night vision, right? 3 A: Correct. 4 Q: They -- for example, we know that you 5 can move around the sandy park area in the bushes, right? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: And -- and see what people are doing 8 in and around the fence line, right? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: You can see whether people have 11 Molotov cocktails in their hands, right? 12 You conceivably -- 13 A: Conceivable. 14 Q: Right. But it's part of your job in 15 determining how to use or work with data, is to determine 16 what is possible, not anything, but what is reasonable to 17 expect that I might be able to gather by way of 18 information, right? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: Okay. And so this would be one of 21 the things; you could see weaponry using these TRU Sierra 22 people, correct? 23 A: Potentially, yes, sir. 24 Q: In the hour and eighteen (18) minutes 25 from 9:42 p.m., would you agree with me that you, sitting
2211 here today, first of all, know of no observation by the 2 TRU Sierra observers, prior to the march of CMU, that 3 would have confirmed the existence of automatic weaponry 4 or Molotov cocktails, that you know of? 5 A: Not that I know of. 6 Q: All right. And would you also agree 7 with me, all right, I -- I talked about sitting here 8 today, back then, you have no recollection of somebody 9 calling you and saying, Look, TRU Sierra just -- just 10 determined that AK-47s, Molotov cocktails are in the 11 hands of occupiers at the fence line. 12 You don't remember anything like that 13 happening? 14 A: No, sir. 15 Q: All right. Now you spend some time, 16 at page 51, on the various views of the politicians. 17 And this is what I want to ask you: Were 18 the views of the Attorney General and the Solicitor 19 General relevant to the job Dale Linton had to do at 9:42 20 p.m. on September 6th, 1995? 21 A: No, sir. 22 Q: Would you agree with me that Mr. 23 Linton, the Incident Commander, had just finished telling 24 you, quote: 25 "They're -- they're revved up for
2221 action. The women and kids are leaving 2 and it really surprised me -- be this 3 aggressive. Tonight's the night." 4 I'm at page 49. Do you see that, bottom 5 of 49. He just finished telling you that, two (2) pages 6 earlier, They're revved up, it looks like tonight's the 7 night, they're revved up for action, women and kids are 8 leaving. 9 Right? 10 A: Yes, sir. 11 Q: You're getting all the signs in the 12 world that, from your Incident Commander's point of view, 13 this is becoming critical, right? 14 A: He's concerned about what was taking 15 place, yes, sir. 16 Q: Well he's more than that. He said, 17 "tonight's the night," he said that. 18 A: He said it. 19 Q: Right. He also said a number of 20 things about marshalling various troops, right? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: And two (2) pages later you talk to 23 him about how the politicians feel, right? Page 51. 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: Now you say it wasn't relevant,
2231 right? That's what you say. 2 A: It wouldn't be information that he 3 would be taking in to use with his decision making. 4 Q: Remember how we discussed that, that 5 an officer who commands this kind of force, who's got to 6 make decisions, has to make those decisions purely on 7 what is happening in front of him? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: It wasn't relevant to those 10 decisions, right? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: What was it relevant to? 13 A: It just came up in discussion. 14 Q: I'm going to suggest to you that when 15 an Incident Commander is reporting to you on the 16 possibility of using a vast amount of force against a 17 small number of Canadian citizens, trespassers or not, if 18 you have the time to discuss just anything that comes up, 19 you are not doing your job; isn't that fair? 20 I mean, it couldn't have just been a 21 discussion of anything. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Mr. 23 Sandler...? 24 MR. MARK SANDLER: I think it fair My 25 Friend should take him to the passage of how it came up.
2241 As if it just came out -- out of the blue, with great 2 respect. 3 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That is re-exam. 4 That is pure re-exam. That is pure re-examination. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: The only 6 issue is whether or not you're putting the information to 7 him fairly and accurately. 8 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That's right. 9 That's right. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And that's 11 the basis on which Mr. Sandler is making a comment. 12 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: No. You know what, 13 I'm happy to -- just to keep us moving. The bottom line 14 is, you got into the discussion about politicians because 15 you were discussing how the automatic weaponry 16 information made it up the MNR side, right? 17 Isn't that right? 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, I'm 19 not sure if you're asking Mr. Sandler. 20 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: No, no. I'm not -- 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You're not? 22 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- asking Mr. 23 Sandler anything. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, you're 25 not, okay.
2251 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I rephrased the 2 question to help out Mr. Sandler's concerns so we keep 3 moving. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 5 6 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 7 Q: If you look at the bottom of page 50 8 and you look at -- and you look at the top of 51, it's 9 fair to say that the issue of the weaponry information, 10 the automatic weaponry information and how it got up -- 11 and how it got up the MNR side and how it came to your 12 attention sitting in the Deputy Solicitor General's 13 office, was how the Deputy Solicitor General came up, 14 right? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: Okay. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 18 19 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 20 Q: Now, having said that, I didn't ask 21 you what the Deputy Solicitor General's views were, I 22 asked you about the Attorney General and the Solicitor 23 General, right? Yes? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: And you said to me that it's not
2261 relevant to the work this man has to do; we got there. I 2 suggested to you that the incident had reached critical 3 proportions and you discussing things that had nothing to 4 do with this man's job, at this critical time, an hour 5 and eighteen (18) minutes before Dudley George gets shot, 6 it may be an example of you, with respect, not doing your 7 job. I'm suggesting that to you, sir, with respect. 8 A: I don't agree, but that's your 9 position. 10 Q: Let me back up a minute. Remember 11 how you suggested that Wade Lacroix -- it was okay and -- 12 and it wasn't less than ideal that Wade Lacroix would 13 have this exposure to politicians and political views 14 while he would be suited up as the leader of the CMU 15 team, that you didn't have a real problem with that, 16 right? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: And this was premised on this theory 19 that Wade Lacroix, you trusted his judgment, right? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: This would be the man that you 22 cautioned Linton, You've got to control him, remember? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: That man? Yes? 25 A: Correct.
2271 Q: And then here, it's fair to say, when 2 you tell Mr. Linton what the Attorney General or the 3 Solicitor -- when you discussed that it's because you're 4 trusting his judgment to keep politics and operations 5 separate, right? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: Can -- is there anywhere in this 8 transcript or in this entire record where such a caution 9 is actually given to your incident commanders, by you, as 10 the man in charge, about the importance of keeping 11 politics on the one (1) hand and operations on the other 12 hand separate? Is there any caution that you give them 13 in this period at all? 14 A: No, sir. 15 Q: It's simply you just trust them to do 16 that? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: Is there an example anywhere in this 19 record where you say to Carson, for example, Incident 20 Commander Carson, If you're going to discuss the views of 21 the deputies, or if you're going to discuss the views of 22 the Solicitor General, or you're going to discuss the 23 views of the Attorney General, or if you're going to 24 discuss the views of the Premier with your command team, 25 you gotta caution them that that has nothing to do with
2281 their operational duties? 2 Is there anywhere in this record I can 3 find where you tell Carson to caution his command team? 4 A: No, sir. 5 Q: Does it surprise you that while 6 Carson did discuss those very issues with his command 7 team he didn't caution them? Does that surprise you? 8 A: It doesn't surprise me, sir. 9 Q: It's fair to say that it's all based 10 on trust, right? 11 A: Yes, sir. 12 Q: You trust that every officer will be 13 capable of not succumbing to pressure; that's what -- 14 that's their job? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: You expect them to do their duty? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: Unfazed, uninfluenced by any other 19 factor, right? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: Because they know that they must 22 operate without prejudice, without fear of any form of 23 reprisal and without any hope of benefit; they must do 24 that, right? 25 A: Correct.
2291 Q: And you know they will? 2 A: I trust them to. 3 Q: Each and every one (1) of them, yes? 4 A: The Commanders, yes, sir. 5 Q: And the command team, yes? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: Carson's entire command team, yes? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: Did you know Carson's entire command 10 team? 11 A: No, sir. 12 Q: Would I be overstating it if I called 13 that blind trust? 14 Would I be overstating it if I called that 15 blind trust? 16 A: I don't believe so. 17 Q: This may be a good time, Mr. 18 Commissioner. We've been going for an hour and fifteen 19 (15) minutes. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just over an 21 hour? Okay. We'll take a break now. I still hope 22 you'll finish today, Mr. Falconer. I mean I'm counting 23 on it. So it's now 2:30... 24 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well, I have -- 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Except for
2301 the one (1) part that you -- 2 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I have to be candid 3 with you, Mr. Commissioner, I expected to be a half day 4 to a day. I've canvassed My Friends -- I've canvassed My 5 Friends, there is no issue in terms of our ability to 6 finish this week. 7 And it may well be that I'm towards the 8 day versus the half day. And if I'm towards the day I 9 would be finished tomorrow at 10:30. 10 So I -- I just don't know at this stage. 11 So you -- you said -- 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, the 13 times that have been estimated by the parties that follow 14 you -- 15 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Yes? 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- are 17 approximately eight (8) hours. They may be shorted, but 18 at the moment they're approximately eight (8) hours. 19 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: They were -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: But I 21 understand they may be shortened and I hope that they 22 are, but still -- 23 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: We had a 24 discussion, in other words we -- 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine.
2311 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- we determined 2 the time so that this Commission's time wasn't unduly 3 taken up. I'm simply indicating -- 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I just hope 5 that you'll do your best to finish today. 6 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I'm doing my best, 7 sir. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 9 very much. 10 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 11 for fifteen (15) minutes. 12 13 --- Upon recessing at 2:33 p.m. 14 --- Upon resuming at 2:50 p.m. 15 16 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 17 resumed, please be seated. 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Mr. Commissioner, 22 subject to your approval, I've proposed to make the -- 23 the report of James Stewart dated July 11th, 1996, the 24 three (3) page report which is Document Number 1005870 25 the next exhibit.
2321 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 2 Exhibit number? 3 THE REGISTRAR: P-1068, Your Honour. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 1068. 5 6 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1068: Document Number 1005870. The 7 James Stewart Report, July 8 11/'96. 9 10 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 11 Q: A version of this is already an 12 exhibit but I was told that it's different, so if you -- 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: This one 14 looks like a draft, it's marked up. So I don't know if 15 it's -- 16 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: My suggestion is 17 that, at this stage, we leave it as an exhibit until we 18 figure out if there's a difference, so that the record's 19 clear on which version is put to the Witness. 20 21 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 22 Q: In terms of the process we've 23 undertaken, which I appreciate is somewhat tedious, Mr. 24 Parkin, the idea was to go over, in some detail, the 25 facts that Linton imparted to you in respect of what had
2331 become a critical incident, fair? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: So now I want to know, first of all, 4 did you inform yourself, subsequently, that is, later 5 that evening, as to each of the, may I call them forms of 6 misconduct of the occupiers? 7 Did you inform yourself as to each body of 8 allegations as to whether or not this information was 9 accurate or inaccurate, later that evening? 10 A: How much later are you talking, sir? 11 Q: Any time that evening or early the 12 next morning. 13 A: I don't believe so, sir. 14 Q: All right. Now, I had gone to some 15 length in discussing with you the accuracy of the 16 allegation that five (5) to ten (10) Natives with 17 baseball bats and stuff had damaged a woman's vehicle. 18 And I had put to you that the extent of the damage was 19 four hundred dollars ($400) and you had, understandably, 20 indicated that you couldn't confirm, one way or another, 21 whether, indeed, that was the case. 22 I'm going to put in front of you a report 23 or statement -- I should have -- I'm looking at the notes 24 of Zacher. These are the notes of officer Zacher which 25 are filed in these proceedings as Exhibit P-475. They're
2341 Document Number 1000888, that is Document Number 1000888. 2 If you could simply direct your attention 3 to them for a moment. And there's a copy for the 4 Commissioner. 5 6 (BRIEF PAUSE) 7 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 9 10 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 11 Q: Now, you'll note from these notes and 12 -- and you'll note from these notes, you will -- you will 13 read from these notes that they're somewhat difficult to 14 read, but if you look at the screen, it's actually 15 easier. I don't know if from your angle it's easier, but 16 from mine it is. 17 It seems when they're enlarged, they're 18 easier to read. Do you see that? 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: It's almost like officer Zacher knew 21 what he was doing. 22 If you look at the first page which is 23 September 6th, 1995, there's an entry for the time period 24 of 1900 to 2200. Now, will you take my word for it that 25 it was officer Zacher who took a statement in respect of
2351 the damaged car? 2 MR. DERRY MILLAR: No. 3 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I'm sorry, officer 4 Poole did and Zacher was present for the statement. 5 Don't take my word for it. Officer Zacher was present 6 for the statement of the driver of the damaged -- 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, I don't 8 think -- I see Mr. Roland saying that's not completely 9 accurate. Let's get it straight. 10 MR. DERRY MILLAR: I don't believe that's 11 the case. 12 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I apologize. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 14 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Poole -- it was 15 Constable Poole was there and took the statement as 16 Constable Zacher, I do not believe was -- was there at 17 that time when the statement was taken. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, 19 perhaps Mr. Roland can enlighten us. 20 MR. IAN ROLAND: Mr. Commissioner, I 21 think the evidence will be that the statement was taken 22 by Constable Poole alone. No one else was present when 23 he was taking it, that is in -- to hear it. 24 I think Constable Zacher was at -- was at 25 the -- at the checkpoint, but he was -- he wasn't with
2361 Constable Poole when the statement was written out. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 3 very much, Mr. Roland. 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 8 Q: I'm going to read to you from the 9 second document in light of what was just said, and it's 10 a statement by Mark Zacher and it may go some distance to 11 explaining to you why I thought Zacher was there. 12 This is a -- an interview statement dated 13 September 7th, 1995 of Officer Zacher. Hand it up 14 please. 15 And I'm only reading a brief passage to 16 you. This is Document Number 1000448. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Is this 18 already an exhibit? No. 19 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I do not believe it 20 is. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I don't 22 think so. 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25
2371 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I'm sorry, it's 2 Exhibit P-474, Mr. Commissioner. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Oh, it is an 4 exhibit. 5 6 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 7 Q: Do you have that in front of you, 8 sir? This -- now as Mr. Roland pointed out, Zacher was 9 at the same checkpoint with Officer Poole who took the 10 statement, all right? 11 Now you see Zacher being quoted? 12 "I believe the --" 13 A: Is this -- is this the copy with 14 Pierzchalski? 15 Q: Yes. And it says 1953 in the top 16 right hand corner. Dated September 7th, 1995, time of 17 interview 11:57. Time of interview concluded 13:01. 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: Do you see that? And then 20 Pierzchalski asks: 21 "At this time you're not considered to 22 be a subject officer in this 23 investigation. What can you tell me 24 about what you saw during your tour as 25 part of ERT exercises on the 6
2381 September 1995, paying particular 2 attention to an incident that occurred 3 at the junction of Parkway Drive and 4 Army Camp Road? 5 ZACHER: I believe the incident 6 occurred after 10:00 p.m. I was 7 assigned to checkpoint 'C' which is 8 located on Army Camp Road east of 9 Matheson Road. 10 A male Native name Gerald George 11 approached our checkpoint in a vehicle, 12 a blue Pontiac. He was alone in the 13 vehicle and he had just come from the 14 intersection of Parkside Drive and Army 15 Camp Road. 16 He advised us that his car was struck 17 by a thrown rock by a Native in the 18 overflow parking area. His driver side 19 rear quarter panel was damaged. I 20 estimate about four hundred dollars 21 ($400) damage." 22 Right? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: Will you take my word for it that 25 there was no other incident in which there is an
2391 allegation of dam -- of occupiers damaging a vehicle that 2 drives by the Park that evening, right? 3 A: Correct? 4 Q: Now that's where I got the four 5 hundred dollars ($400) damage, all right? 6 A: Yes, sir. 7 Q: And now there had been this issue 8 though that Mr. Sandler raised which was: 9 "There was in fact occupiers with 10 either bats, clubs or it's alleged axe 11 handles in and around the Park entrance 12 area." 13 All right. That's also an allegation 14 separate and apart from any attack on a car. Do you 15 understand? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: All right. And that's what I'm 18 trying to clarify the record so I can find out what you 19 knew or didn't know at the time, all right? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: Now, I have the notes of Staff 22 Sergeant Mark Wright. They represent Exhibit P-471. A 23 brief indulgence. 24 And it's Document Number 1000886. And I'm 25 at page 1063. And I'm simply going to again hand up
2401 copies to you, Mr. Commissioner. 2 And so you know, sir, it is Mark Wright, 3 Detective Sergeant Wright who at the relevant time sees 4 occupiers with the -- the bats, clubs, axes or handles. 5 And I'm going to read to you from the note and ask you if 6 you knew this at the time. 7 This is again with reference to the 8 evening of September 6th, 1995. Detective Sergeant Mark 9 Wright states in his notes as follows at page 1063: 10 "As I travelled up past this road 11 allowance, I observed eight (8) to ten 12 (10) male Natives standing on the edge 13 of the road. 14 Approximately four (4) to five (5) of 15 these males were holding clubs, sticks, 16 axes, bats, handles. I was in an 17 unmarked surveillance vehicle, not 18 readily identifiable as a police 19 officer. 20 I had conversation with these males. I 21 asked them what they were doing and 22 they told me to leave. It wasn't my 23 problem and I would best get out of 24 there. I asked them if I could go 25 where they were into the parking lot of
2411 the Park outside and they said no. 2 They told me to leave and as they were 3 telling me this they were tapping their 4 clubs in their open palm. 5 I went to the checkpoint south of the 6 entrance to the Park and advised the 7 ERT members present [next page] of what 8 I had just encountered. I told them 9 to be careful as it looked like things 10 were escalating. 11 I then moved further south on Military 12 Road to one (1) of the ERT checkpoints 13 and advised them of the situation. 14 While there I was advised from the 15 first checkpoint that a civilian 16 motorist had attended their checkpoint 17 and reported his vehicle damaged by 18 Natives on the road. I instructed 19 Provincial Constable Poole from ERT to 20 take a victim statement from the male." 21 Now, stopping there. The information 22 gathered by the checkpoint, by Poole, is reflected in the 23 last exhibit I read to you being the statement of Officer 24 Zacher. Do you accept that? 25 A: Yes, sir.
2421 Q: Secondly, the issues surrounding 2 occupiers with bats or handles amounted to individuals 3 standing by the Park entrance tapping their handles in 4 their hands and telling and individual they did not know 5 was a police officer to move on. Did you know that? 6 A: I believe at some time later I became 7 aware of it but I don't know when -- 8 Q: Would you -- 9 A: -- or to the same detail. 10 Q: Now, I've taken the time to give you 11 this detail because you will agree with me that that 12 again is a world of difference from five (5) to ten (10) 13 Natives with baseball bats attacking a car driven by a 14 woman coming home from a citizen's meeting who has 15 nothing to do with these people, right? 16 A: It's different from the information I 17 had, yes. 18 Q: Very different, right? 19 A: It's different from the information I 20 had. 21 Q: Okay. And the information you had 22 represented the notion of random attacks, right? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: This does not represent the notion of 25 random attacks does it?
2431 A: Correct. 2 Q: Okay. And would you agree with me 3 that there's sort of an undertone that -- that we 4 shouldn't ignore. You've -- you've said you've dealt 5 with First Nations issues in the past. There is an 6 unfortunate stereotype of the notion of, sort of, savages 7 attacking people randomly that -- that we have to dispel, 8 that that's not the way First Nations people are, 9 correct? 10 A: No, I don't believe that's correct at 11 all. 12 Q: Right. And -- and -- but there -- 13 can -- there can be that kind of stereotyping can't 14 there? 15 A: There may be people that think that 16 way. 17 Q: And in a climate such as the climate 18 on September 6, 1995, where the mayor of Bosanquet is 19 attending, Fred Thomas, with these citizens who are 20 quote, "irate," that the police aren't controlling the 21 Natives, with that context the notion that a woman would 22 be attacked this way as described by Linton would do 23 nothing but add fuel to the fire; would you agree? 24 A: They certainly wouldn't like to hear 25 that that was happening.
2441 Q: I'm -- you don't like my words "add 2 fuel to the fire", correct? 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: The Witness 4 is entitled to use his own words as you know. 5 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I know that. I 6 know. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 8 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: And I'm not 9 contesting his right. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 11 12 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 13 Q: But you -- you don't like my words 14 "add fuel to the fire", correct? You don't -- 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: Okay. But if I took away that and 17 said it would substantially escalate things, correct, 18 would you agree with that? 19 For the -- I mean it's for the community, 20 the citizens. 21 A: Anything at that point in time would 22 have heightened the community's concern. 23 Q: But, you know, I -- this is the part 24 that I -- if you'll allow me to argue with you for just a 25 minute. This isn't just anything, this is the notion
2451 that a woman on her way home from that citizen's meeting 2 would be randomly attacked by a band of Natives five (5) 3 to ten (10) in number with baseball bats. 4 That's not just anything, that is the kind 5 of thing that would seriously escalate the situation, 6 correct? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: And that's what Linton thought 9 happened, correct? 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: So at 9:42 p.m. the Incident 12 Commander in charge of deciding to deploy a serious level 13 of force was operating on misinformation, correct? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: Would you also agree with me that the 16 issue of the blinds in the kiosk is a little bit 17 difficult to discern in terms of its importance or 18 significance? 19 A: It would just be another factor that 20 the incident commander would have to take into 21 consideration amongst everything else. 22 Q: But it -- there could be a completely 23 innocuous explanation for it, correct? 24 A: There could be. 25 Q: 8:00 or 9:00 at night, someone could
2461 simply choose to go to sleep or want some privacy where 2 they're sleeping, right? 3 A: That's the Incident Commander's 4 problem, you'd never know. 5 Q: Well, that's right. So it's just -- 6 it's not very compelling as a fact on its own, correct? 7 A: On its own? 8 Q: Yeah. 9 A: No. 10 Q: Okay. 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 A: Now, one of the -- and I'm going to 15 try not to inundate you with paper on this, but one of 16 the issues that is also raised by Linton in that tape is 17 the issue of women and children went and used the word 18 "evacuating" because there's going to be trouble. 19 Do you remember that? 20 A: Yes, sir. 21 Q: And you note it, actually, in the 22 transcript, you don't have to go back, you note that that 23 was unusual. 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: And certainly, again that would be a
2471 factor that you would want to have some information on in 2 terms of understanding how serious the situation was 3 getting? 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 Q: Yes? 8 A: As the Incident Commander, yes. 9 Q: All right. And you would expect an 10 incident commander doing his job to understand that, or 11 understand as best he can, the relevance of that 12 information? 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: Now, did you know that the TRU team 15 had been called out and had actually driven part of the 16 way to Forest before being turned back? 17 Did you know that? 18 A: At the time? 19 Q: Yes. 20 A: I don't believe so. 21 Q: Did you learn that subsequently? 22 A: I believe I did. I've heard it 23 somewhere. 24 Q: Did you also know that in and around 25 8:00, 9:00 p.m. that Mark Wright on the strength of what
2481 you see there and the information Linton imparts, gives 2 the instruction out for the ERT team that was supposed to 3 leave for the night, to stand back and stay, with the 4 shift coming on. 5 Did you know that? 6 A: No, sir. 7 Q: All right. Would you agree with me 8 if you have a sizeable ERT team that are on shift, and 9 another shift coming in, and you decide to keep both 10 shifts at the site, that you are going to substantially 11 increase the number of officers present? 12 A: If you keep more officers back, 13 you're going to have more officers, yes, sir. 14 Q: Sorry. It wasn't really a trick 15 question. 16 A: You've already got me once. 17 Q: You double the number of officers, 18 don't you? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: Right. In conversations put to 21 Carson between him and Linton, and I can take you to 22 them, but I believe I'm being fair, Carson expresses a 23 concern about having the TRU team trucks drive down the 24 road and be seen, and the idea is instead of doing that, 25 have them turn back and wait at the Pinery.
2491 I think I'm fairly summarizing the 2 evidence. Would you agree that that's a good precaution 3 to take? 4 A: To keep the trucks out of sight? 5 Q: Yeah. 6 A: Yes, sir. 7 Q: Let me ask you this. If it turned 8 out, you know where Northville is, don't you? 9 A: Yes, sir. 10 Q: All right. And you know that it's in 11 between Grand Bend and Forest? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: And you know that the communities of 14 First Nations and non-First Nations with -- all live in 15 and around that area; yes? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: And the presence of, I think 18 sometimes, or colloquially they're referred to gun 19 trucks, but the presence of TRU team trucks would be 20 something the community would notice, correct? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: And not -- not different than the 23 armed personnel carrier. 24 There was a concern about that staying 25 out of community sight, right?
2501 A: Correct. 2 Q: 'Cause it has a tendency to escalate 3 people's fears or concerns, right? 4 A: Certainly. 5 Q: Did you ever make inquiries as to 6 whether the decision to have women and children leave the 7 Park had to do with the sightings of the TRU team trucks 8 driving from Forest? 9 Did you ever make enquiries as to whether 10 it had anything to do with that. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Mr. 12 Sandler...? 13 MR. MARK SANDLER: He can ask that 14 question, but there's absolutely no evidence -- 15 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well, you see, 16 that's not -- 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm sorry, 18 no evidence -- 19 MR. MARK SANDLER: There's no evidence to 20 support the suggestion that that, in fact, was why women 21 and children left -- 22 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: To suggest that -- 23 MR. MARK SANDLER: We -- we just -- 24 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- fair objection-- 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just a
2511 minute. 2 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- ask if there 3 were any inquiries -- 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm 5 listening to the objection. I can only listen to the 6 objection. There's no evidence. 7 MR. MARK SANDLER: One should put a 8 hypothetical that has some basis in the evidence. I mean 9 there is evidence as to why women and children left. 10 There's no evidence that -- that there was 11 an observation of these TRU teams that made their way 12 part of the way and then turned around. 13 So I don't know how that's put as a 14 suggestion that's helpful to you. That's my only point. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 16 I think that's right. I don't think there is any 17 evidence to that affect. 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I'm reading from 22 the statements on the record of Mr. Millar of June 8, 23 2005 on this issue that arose last time in the evidence. 24 But wasn't last time it rose again with my examination. 25 But Mr. Klippenstein's cross-examination
2521 of Carson of June 8, 2005 when this issue arose, Mr. 2 Millar put the following on the record at page 226. Mr. 3 Millar at page 226, line 18. Mr. Millar quote: 4 "But that evidence came out in-chief 5 with respect to the scene and I went 6 through that in great detail." Quote. 7 "I can tell you that I anticipate the 8 evidence will be just one subject. 9 We've isolated where the TRU team 10 trucks were. We think when the call 11 was cancelled and they returned to 12 Pinery Park and it's the notes of James 13 Irvine, Inquiry Document 1002146 and a 14 call at 8:30 and they were near 15 Northville." 16 That's the anticipated evidence that the 17 trucks were near Northville and they were turned around 18 in and around 8:30, that's the anticipated evidence. 19 Secondly -- 20 I'm sorry? 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I'm not 22 sure where that gets you. That's not -- 23 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well secondly -- 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: He's still 25 going.
2531 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Yes. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well I 3 haven't said anything yet. 4 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Okay. It's called 5 that -- 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, just 7 carry on. 8 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- nobody can see 9 other than you and me, Mr. Commissioner. But the point, 10 simple point is in addition to that this Witness has 11 testified that the -- the effect obviously would be of 12 holding a shift back, doubling of the number of officers. 13 And onto that, all I asked the Witness 14 was, did he ever make inquiries as to whether there was 15 any connection between the decision for the women and 16 children to leave the scene and the advancing of the TRU 17 trucks at 8:30 and the doubling of ERT officers at the 18 scene. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You're not 20 saying that is the reason -- 21 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I asked. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- you're 23 just asking the question. 24 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Did he make 25 inquiries?
2541 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, that's 2 fine. 3 Mr. Millar, do you want to -- 4 MR. DERRY MILLAR: The one -- the -- the 5 doubling the -- the evidence was not that there's -- when 6 the ERT team was held back, it was held back in Forest. 7 Not at the scene. 8 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: And I appreciate 9 the assistance. It still gets me the same place. I want 10 to know, did he make any inquiries as to whether these 11 factors that I've raised had anything to do with the 12 decision to remove the women and children? 13 Did he make any inquiries? 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I 15 understand. I understand. 16 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I don't know what - 17 - you know -- you know what the problem I have, Mr. 18 Commissioner, is a completely fair question. He may have 19 made no inquiries, fair enough. 20 MR. DERRY MILLAR: No. But he cannot -- 21 this Witness cannot answer about what was in the minds of 22 the women and children and the people who -- who left the 23 -- left the camp. 24 That's really what he's trying to get at. 25 The -- the -- and firstly, there was a report that women
2551 and children were leaving -- 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 3 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- the camp. That's 4 all. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 6 MR. DERRY MILLAR: So there was a report 7 by the checkpoint. And why left the camp is -- is not 8 something that this Witness can -- can get into the minds 9 of the people who left the camp. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: But asking 11 him if he made any inquiries about that, Mr. Millar, 12 asking the Witness if he made any inquiries. 13 MR. DERRY MILLAR: About why they left 14 the camp? 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: About 16 whether or not the information in some way had something 17 to do with the -- 18 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Oh but how can -- he - 19 - he can ask him a question -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: If he made 21 any inquiries. 22 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- did he make any 23 inquiries? 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's the 25 question --
2561 MR. DERRY MILLAR: But all these 2 assumptions. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, no. No 4 assumptions, but that's the question. If that's the 5 question. I can't see what's wrong with asking that 6 question. 7 MR. DERRY MILLAR: No. 8 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: But that was the 9 question. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: If he didn't 11 make any inquiries, then that's the end of it. Okay, 12 then ask the question. 13 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That last part, 14 that's the end of it, that was scary. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well you've 16 got to ask the question. 17 18 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 19 Q: I asked -- again I ask you, did you 20 make any inquiries? I mean I think you know what the 21 question is. 22 Did you make any inquiries as to whether 23 there was any connection between those factors I 24 mentioned and the women and children leaving the Park 25 area?
2571 A: I'm just wondering. In what 2 timeframe are you asking, sir? While I was on the phone 3 with Dale or -- 4 Q: At any time following your learning 5 of the women and children leaving. 6 A: I don't believe so, sir. 7 Q: And you would agree with me, that you 8 viewed that piece of information, that was them leaving 9 as unusual? 10 A: When it was presented to me, yes. 11 Q: And -- and in fact, it stands in 12 contrast to occupiers stealing thousands of gallons of 13 gas which didn't warrant any comment from you, right? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: This warranted comment from you, 16 right? 17 A: Apparently it did at the time, yes, 18 sir. 19 Q: Okay. And what I'm trying to get at 20 is you can't climb into the minds of the women and the 21 children, right? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: But once information like that, women 24 and children are leaving and the checkpoint notes that 25 they're leaving, there are different ways to analyse the
2581 information you're getting, right? 2 A: Which would be the responsibility of 3 the Incident Commander. 4 Q: Yes, but you still agree with me 5 there are ways to analyse that information, yes? 6 A: There are certainly ways that he 7 could analyse that information. 8 Q: There are ways to collect more 9 information on that issue, yes? 10 A: Yes, there are. 11 Q: The most obvious non-trained police 12 officers such as myself. You know, they're leaving, you 13 could actually say to them, What's up, why are you 14 leaving? You -- there's a whole different host of ways 15 it could be followed up on, right? 16 A: Yes, sir. 17 Q: To your knowledge, was there any 18 steps taken to follow up on this information about women 19 and children leaving? 20 A: Not to my knowledge. 21 Q: All right. Now, I would also 22 appreciate if you can assist me with the question of the 23 automatic weapons. And by that -- and -- and you know 24 what I'm doing, right, I'm making my way through the 25 checklist of information Linton gave you in that 9:42
2591 telephone call, right? 2 A: Yes, sir. 3 Q: And the reason I'm doing this, so 4 we're clear, is that this represented his state of 5 knowledge as he's marshalling this large force, right? 6 A: What he seems to be aware of at the 7 time and what he's telling me. 8 Q: And you -- you routinely, as a 9 criminal investigator, know that courts often, inquiries 10 often concern themselves with what's in the mind of the 11 officer using the force, right? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: So will you forgive me that I'm doing 14 this process, in other words, that we're going through 15 what's in Linton's mind? Do you understand why I'm doing 16 it? 17 A: I don't have a problem with it, sir. 18 Q: Fair enough. 19 A: As long as it doesn't take me down to 20 the level of being the Incident Commander -- 21 Q: That's fair. 22 A: -- and asking questions I wouldn't 23 normally do. 24 Q: No, and you -- and you should feel 25 free to -- to say exactly that. But what you do is your
2601 job, which is to vet what's going on down there, right? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: Okay. And the next issue that you 4 vet or -- I'm sorry, the next issue that's raised is this 5 issue of the arsenal, the automatic weapons; that they 6 got information that night about automatic weapons. 7 Do you recall that? 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 Q: Did you determine where that 13 information came from? You recall, and I don't know if 14 you need me to take you to it again but in the transcript 15 Mr. Linton was quoted as saying to you, We had a report 16 tonight that they have automatic weapons in there, 17 Molotov cocktails. 18 Do you remember that he says that to you? 19 A: I recall that. 20 Q: Right. And you agreed with me. We 21 went into some detail. You agreed with me it was 22 unverified information. Remember we did -- we did that? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: We're now going the next step and 25 actually I'm asking you: Do you know where he got that
2611 information from? 2 A: Not that I recall, sir. 3 Q: Okay. And did you subsequently learn 4 where he got that information from? 5 A: Not that I recall, sir. 6 Q: And what I'm talking about, because 7 there's different references to automatic weapons, so I 8 want to be quite clear on what I'm directing your 9 attention to. 10 What I'm directing your attention to is a 11 statement at page 42 by Mr. Linton: 12 "Well, they [at the top of 42] -- well, 13 they may, but the other thing was we 14 had a whole list of automatic weapons 15 that somebody gave us this evening, 16 too, that are supposed to be down 17 there." 18 Do you see that? 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: All right. Did you learn, at any 21 point in time, what Linton was talking about? 22 A: I don't believe so, sir. 23 Q: Would you agree with me -- well, I 24 think we canvassed that before about its significance. 25 I'm going to put to you a note of Detective Constable
2621 Dew, do you know who Mark Dew is? 2 A: Yes, sir. 3 Q: All right. If that can be handed up, 4 please. 5 The Document Number is 1000477 and I'm 6 about to inquire if this has been made an exhibit. It 7 has not been made an exhibit. 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 Q: It's a pretty brief passage. I'll -- 12 if My Friend -- 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You have to 14 speak into the mic, Mr. Falconer. 15 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Sorry, it's a 16 pretty brief passage. I'll be happy to share my copy 17 with My Friend once I've read the passage to the Witness. 18 19 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 20 Q: Half way down, this is -- appears to 21 be an 8:15 p.m. entry. It's at page 33 of Detective 22 Constable Mark Dew's notes. It starts with the word 23 "receive" half way down the page. 24 It's page 33, I think I said 32 in error, 25 I apologize.
2631 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: So half way down that page it starts 4 "receive", do you see that? Again, it's easier to read 5 on the screen. 6 "Receive information from anonymous 7 source as to weapons. They have four 8 (4) SKS [or it could be AK] Russia 9 semi-autos, with thirty (30) rounds 10 detachable mags. One or two (2) have 11 fixed eighteen (18) round mags, two 12 (2) -- " 13 Can you read that, sir? 14 A: Ruger. 15 Q: "Ruger mini-14s and thirty (30) round 16 mags, several hunting rifles with 17 scopes. Believe they may be making gas 18 bombs. Believe they will bin some 19 bulldogs [sic] on the base tonight, 20 advised Sergeant Rob Graham 21 (phonetic)." 22 Now, stopping there for a minute, 23 obviously as information, this would be very significant 24 and I take it the next step would be to interview the 25 officer who gained this information; is that true?
2641 2 (BRIEF PAUSE) 3 4 MR. MARK SANDLER: Sorry, just to assist 5 My Friend. That actually is: 6 "Believe they will burn some 7 buildings --" 8 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Oh, sorry. 9 MR. MARK SANDLER: "-- on the Base 10 tonight." 11 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I saw bulldogs. 12 MR. MARK SANDLER: Yeah. I was wondering 13 if we were at the same Inquiry. 14 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I apologize to all 15 the bulldogs out there. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Bulldogs. 17 I'm not sure what -- 18 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I don't know. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- 20 significance bulldogs -- 21 MR. MARK SANDLER: Looks like bulldog, 22 sort of. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 24 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I thank Mr. 25 Sandler.
2651 2 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 3 Q: So first of all, it's fair to say 4 that the first thing that one would do would be to 5 interview the officer on the nature of the source; is 6 that fair? 7 A: Are you referring to the incident 8 commander? 9 Q: Yes. 10 A: Probably wouldn't be the incident 11 commander that would do that. It looks like Constable 12 Dew got this information from an informant. That would 13 probably go from him to whoever was in charge of the 14 criminal aspect of the command centre and then at some 15 point in time would get to the inspector. 16 Q: And you would expect that information 17 like this would be taken seriously and followed up on? 18 A: Yes, sir. 19 Q: And you would agree with me that the 20 quality of intelligence information is a function of the 21 quality of the source, yes? 22 A: You can sometimes get very quality 23 information from a source that isn't, perhaps, of such 24 quality. 25 Q: Fair enough. I hear you. And would
2661 you agree with me, though, that when I say quality of the 2 source, I'm -- things that would impact the quality of 3 the source would be opportunity to observe, that would -- 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: Whether there is an incentive or 6 motive on the part of the source to mislead? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: Whether the -- the source has 9 ulterior purposes in providing the information. 10 A: Most definitely. 11 Q: All right. Would it increase or 12 decrease your comfort level to know that the source in 13 this case was the very man involved in the dispute with 14 the occupiers who wrote the editorial being critical of 15 the occupiers? 16 Would that make you less comfortable or 17 more comfortable with the information? 18 A: Less. 19 Q: Would it make you more comfortable or 20 less comfortable with the information if you knew that 21 the source had not been at the Park for over a year, like 22 inside the Park? 23 A: Less. 24 Q: Would it make you more comfortable or 25 less comfortable to know that there was no further
2671 sightings, by anyone else, of these weapons? 2 A: Less. 3 Q: And these would be the questions 4 you'd want to ask, not you personally but your incident 5 command, right? 6 A: Correct. And not necessarily the 7 Incident Commander; he would want the results of the 8 investigation. 9 Q: This is classic intelligence 10 gathering, isn't it? 11 A: One (1) form, yes, sir. 12 Q: And it's fair to say that there's 13 nothing wrong with the way Detective Constable Dew did 14 his job in passing this information on, is there? 15 A: No, sir. 16 Q: And the way intelligence gathering, 17 in part, works -- I'm not talking about the video 18 surveillance in the kiosks anymore, but the way 19 intelligence gathering, in part, works, is that 20 information will come in from a whole host of sources, 21 right? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: And then there will be a form of 24 clearing house in terms of receiving the information, 25 then analysing the information, and then imparting the
2681 information; isn't that right? 2 A: Particularly if you have the time. 3 Q: Right. But in terms of a serious 4 incident like Ipperwash where you have tens, potentially 5 hundreds of officers deployed, it's fair to say that you 6 have already made a decision to allocate significant 7 resources to the problem, right? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: And it's also fair to say that it 10 would be open to the OPP to have someone perform that 11 function as part of Incident Command, yes? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: To your knowledge, did anyone perform 14 the functions I've just described at Incident Command, to 15 your knowledge? 16 A: I'm quite certain there was an 17 intelligence or criminal aspect to the command post. 18 Q: And that's because as far as you're 19 concerned you're -- you don't have a different view than 20 Superintendent Fox had, that that's part of what you'd 21 expect to see happening at Ipperwash, correct? 22 A: Correct. You would expect that to be 23 being done. 24 Q: And you expected it to be done? 25 A: Correct.
2691 Q: As part of that process you'd expect 2 intelligence gathering to include analysing how the 3 different people are connected, that are the occupiers. 4 You know how there was a discussion about warriors and 5 outsiders, et cetera? 6 A: Yes, sir. 7 Q: That would be part of it, yes? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: As part of the intelligence gathering 10 you would want to be assessing the identities of those 11 inside the Park, yes? 12 A: If at all possible. 13 Q: You'd want to know how they were 14 behaving on a day-to-day basis, yes? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: You'd want to know what they're doing 17 on a day-to-day basis, right? 18 A: As much as possible. 19 Q: And as you pushed and pushed, tape 20 after tape, for the video surveillance to become 21 operable, it wasn't as if, in your mind, those questions 22 had been answered, was it? 23 A: No, sir. 24 Q: As far as you were concerned these 25 were very live questions for which you needed
2701 intelligence on, correct? 2 A: For which the Incident Commander 3 needed intelligence on. 4 Q: Yes, and I apologize, but I refer to 5 the OPP. As far as you were concerned, what I've just 6 gone over with you represents live questions for which 7 you thought it was important that the Incident Commander 8 have answers on? 9 A: Correct. That would be part of the 10 role. 11 Q: And there was -- it's -- it's not -- 12 this isn't about a situation where that would only 13 matter, say, for organized crime or investigating bikers 14 or anything, this would apply to Ipperwash, wouldn't it? 15 A: Certainly. 16 Q: And you knew of nothing about the 17 views of your Incident Commanders that would cause you to 18 think that they didn't believe there was a role for 19 intelligence at Ipperwash, right? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: Because if they told you that I don't 22 think intelligence is needed or would operate that way, 23 you'd set them straight and say, no, it's got an 24 important role, correct? 25 A: Certainly it does, yes.
2711 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: I'm going to read you a passage from 4 John Carson's evidence at page 198 and answers to 5 questions by Mr. Millar, it's dated May 31st, 2005. And 6 I'm just going to read you four (4) or five (5) lines but 7 I'd be happy the whole copy available to you. I just 8 want to read you four (4) or five (5) lines and get your 9 impression, please, at page 198, line 15, in answer to 10 Mr. Millar's questions. Mr. Carson says, quote: 11 "And so the intelligence people try to 12 determine, from a whole host of 13 sources, how different people may be 14 connected together to run a criminal 15 enterprise. 16 What they're trying to do is identify 17 the who, the what and the how. Quite 18 frankly, those questions were all 19 answered in Ipperwash." 20 Now stopping there. You wouldn't agree 21 with him, would you? 22 A: I'm not sure which intelligence 23 faction he's dealing with there in that answer. There's 24 an analytical intelligence component that the 25 organization has which is more strategic in nature and,
2721 again, which would be of assistance to the region. 2 That would be separate from the on the 3 ground type of intelligence and criminal investigation 4 that would be being done while the situation was live. 5 Q: Would you agree with this: Based on 6 your knowledge on the functions of intelligence, that 7 intelligence can be broken into a number of components, 8 planning and direction, right? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: The collection of information? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: The collation of that information? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: The evaluation of that information? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: The analysis of that information? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: The reporting and dissemination of 19 that information? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: And the re-evaluation of that 22 information? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: There is nothing about what I just 25 read to you, about the intelligence gathering process,
2731 that would make any of those things inappropriate to 2 Ipperwash, is there? 3 A: No. 4 Q: The reason I ask you this is because 5 so far we've touched on a number of incidents that were 6 reported to the Incident Commander, none of the incidents 7 that we talked about so far, and I'll be happy to quibble 8 with you, but none of them ended up looking, ultimately, 9 like they were portrayed. 10 Do -- do you follow me? 11 A: I follow you, sir. 12 Q: The baseball bats, randomly attacking 13 the woman's car, that just didn't happen, right? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: The fires outside the Park, if that's 16 alleged, and you and I went back and forth, that didn't 17 happen? 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: The information about the automatic 20 weapons from Gerald George was never verified? 21 A: To my knowledge, correct. 22 Q: To this day, we have no idea why 23 women and children left, right? Right? You don't know. 24 I'm sorry if Mr. Sandler, I understand we 25 all get excited --
2741 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, I'm not 2 paying attention, I'm listening. 3 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Yeah, I know. But 4 I -- but I have to -- I have to acknowledge if he'd just 5 keep -- 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, you 7 don't. 8 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- the comments a 9 little quieter so the Witness can't hear them. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Carry on. 11 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Thanks. 12 13 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 14 Q: To this day, you don't know why the 15 women and children left? 16 A: No, sir. 17 Q: You don't know why the blinds were 18 lowered in the kiosk, to this day? 19 A: No, sir. 20 Q: The role of intelligence would be to 21 look at each one of those and -- and I want to be prac -- 22 I don't mean they spend three (3) hours or they process 23 it through computers or you contact the database in St. 24 Catherine's and you run checks. I'm not talking about 25 that.
2751 The role of intelligence could be as 2 simple as a file co-ordinator and an analyst sitting at 3 incident command, receiving a report from a Dew, or a 4 Poole or a Zacher, receiving the report, asking Mr. Dew 5 who is this guy, tell me about him. When was the last 6 time he was in the park, right? And then passing it on 7 to the analyst. 8 It could be that simple, couldn't it? 9 A: It could be and I don't know that it 10 wasn't done. 11 Q: Well, let me ask you something. At 12 9:42 p.m., one hour and eighteen (18) minutes before 13 Dudley George was shot, at page 42 when Dale Linton says: 14 "We had a whole list of automatic 15 weapons that somebody gave us this 16 evening, too, that are supposed to be 17 down there." 18 Did he give you any impression, at 9:42 19 p.m. on September 6th, 1995, that that information had 20 been discredited or checked out? 21 A: No, sir. 22 Q: In fact, by all appearances, would 23 you agree with me it does not appear on this record, on 24 what was told to you at 9:42 p.m. that it had been 25 checked out.
2761 Would you agree with that? 2 A: I would agree. 3 Q: Secondly, would you also agree with 4 me that to the extent that there was a statement, a 5 statement as of 8:30 p.m. on what really happened to 6 Gerald George's car, that is the rock thrown by one (1) 7 occupier, to the extent there was actually a statement 8 about what really happened instead of the five (5) to ten 9 (10) baseball bats attacking a woman randomly driving by. 10 To the extent there was an actual 11 statement, it would have been important as part of the 12 process to receive the statement and to analyse it, 13 right? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: Okay. Did you ascertain whether that 16 ever happened? 17 A: Again, sir, you're -- you're driving 18 me down to the level of incident commander. 19 Q: Oh, I'm sorry. Okay, let me back up 20 and rephrase it in a way that -- that addresses what I'm 21 seeking. 22 Did you ever learn that Mr. Linton never 23 did that? 24 A: No, sir. 25 Q: Okay. If he didn't do that, that is
2771 if he didn't vet the statement by Dew and worked on the 2 supposition that five (5) to ten (10) Natives attacked a 3 woman driving by randomly? 4 A: I never learned whether he did or 5 didn't. 6 Q: No, I'm saying, it's a hypothetical. 7 If he didn't read the statement that was created at 8:26 8 p.m. that night, but worked on the assumption that five 9 (5) to ten (10) Natives with baseball bats had randomly 10 attacked a woman's car, that would be a deficiency in his 11 intelligence gathering, given the existence of a 12 statement; would you agree? 13 A: Those would be questions that should 14 be asked. You want to try and confirm your information 15 as best you can. 16 Q: Especially if that information is 17 handy? 18 A: That usually -- that would make it 19 easier, yes, sir. 20 Q: Right. And that's part of a person 21 who's job it is to receive intelligence information, yes? 22 A: Yes, but I -- I don't disagree with 23 you, but I would like to qualify it from the perspective 24 of having been in an incident command centre and having 25 done the job, not at Ipperwash as an incident commander,
2781 but in other locations. 2 You are slowing things down to a pace that 3 no incident commander generally has the luxury of. And 4 while I agree with what you're saying, sometimes in the 5 reality of the situation there isn't time to get it all 6 done as well as we'd like. 7 Q: And so what you're telling me is the 8 practicalities of the situation can be such that we don't 9 do all the things or take all the precautions we would 10 like to take? 11 A: We don't wantonly omit doing them. 12 Q: Right. 13 A: Sometimes they might be expedited to 14 get them done quicker, and sometimes there might not be 15 time to do it at all. 16 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: A brief indulgence. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, sure. 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 MR. WILLIAM HENDERSON: If I might borrow 22 Counsel for a moment? 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Certainly. 24 25 (BRIEF PAUSE)
2791 2 THE WITNESS: May I stand up for a 3 second? 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Would you 5 need a break? 6 THE WITNESS: No, just to stand up. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Oh, by all 8 means. You don't have to ask for that. If you'd like a 9 break we'll take a short break. Would you like a short 10 break? 11 THE WITNESS: No, I'm fine. 12 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I was looking for a 13 -- a note I had but the easiest way for me to do this is 14 simply have P-426 which are the scribe notes placed in 15 front of the Witness, Exhibit P-426 please? 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Other 20 witnesses who have a bad back just stand up when they 21 feel like it so you don't -- 22 THE WITNESS: No, I don't have a bad 23 back, I just have a kink. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 25
2801 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Would you 4 like to take a short break? 5 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: No. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I know we've 7 had a break this afternoon but it's a long stretch. 8 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I'm -- I'm ten (10) 9 minutes -- I'm ten (10) minutes away or five (5) minutes 10 away from taking a break. I just need to finish this 11 part. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You need to 13 finish your piece and then you want to take a break? 14 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: If that's all 15 right. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, that's 17 fine. 18 19 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 20 Q: If you could turn -- you -- you have 21 the typed scribe notes in front of you. 22 A: Yes, sir. 23 Q: If you could direct your attention 24 please to Tab 5. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Which
2811 binder? I'm sorry I didn't -- 2 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Tab 5. It's P-426. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Right. 4 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I'm at the scribe 5 notes. It's just a small passage I'm reading. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Right. 7 THE WITNESS: I don't seem to have -- 8 THE REGISTRAR: Do you have the page 9 number there? 10 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Sure. Page 73. 11 Mine are split up into tabs. If you're -- I -- I asked 12 for P -- 13 MR. DONALD WORME: Tab 18? 14 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I asked for P-426 15 to be put in front of the Witness. Is that P-426? 16 THE REGISTRAR: That's it, we just don't 17 have the tabs. 18 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Oh, I see. Thank 19 you. Page 73, the typed scribe notes. 20 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir? 21 22 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 23 Q: At 20:08, remember you -- you were 24 just raising this notion that we don't always have the 25 luxury of time to look at these things and yes, what I
2821 say would be good in a perfect world but we don't live in 2 a perfect world. 3 I mean, that's the gist of your point, 4 right? 5 A: Yes, it was, sir. 6 Q: When life threatening incidents 7 happen or they appear to be life threatening decisions 8 have to get made, right? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: And they're not always made on 11 perfect information, right? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: You do the best you can and then you 14 -- you -- and you exercise the best judgment you have? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: You work with what you have, right? 17 A: Yes, sir. 18 Q: At 20:08 at page 73 the scribe 19 records the following: 20 "Dale Linton requests Com call out TRU 21 and report here. Dale Linton to Mark 22 Wright: 23 Can you identify any of these guys 24 doing any offences? Mark Wright just 25 drove through and there are numerous
2831 criminal offences." 2 Now, just to direct your mind, Mr. Parkin, 3 this would be the drive through that I read you the notes 4 from. 5 Remember Mark Wright's notes about the 6 guys with the -- the bats -- 7 A: Yes, sir. 8 Q: -- telling him to move along? 9 A: Yes, sir. 10 Q: All right. Then continuing: 11 "Mark Wright: We have possession of 12 weapons dangerous with bats and 13 mischief. Anyone with a bat, they're 14 preventing people from passing through, 15 stopping." 16 That's not the threat you were talking 17 about was it, Mr. Parkin? Was that the threat? When you 18 asked Dale Linton about the threat was that the threat, 19 the mere existence of bats? 20 When you said, Are they a threat to us 21 did you mean do they have bats? 22 A: No, sir. 23 Q: No. Moving on. 24 "Dale Linton: I want something in 25 writing in that statement from the
2841 victim so we have something. Then I'm 2 prepared to act on it." 3 Do you see that? 4 A: Yes, sir. 5 Q: Now, would you take from me based on 6 a review by this court that Dale Linton is referring to 7 the statement collected from Gerald George about the 8 damage to the car? 9 Did you know that? He asked -- 10 A: Not at that time, sir. 11 Q: All right. Have you subsequently 12 learned it? 13 A: I seem to recall either in preparing 14 or reading or hearing something about that. 15 Q: At page 79, could you just flip to 79 16 please at 22:44. 17 At 22:44 you will recall now the Crowd 18 Management Unit is marching, isn't it, sir? Mr. Parkin? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: They're marching, right? 21 A: Yes, sir. 22 Q: They're using shield chatter to 23 announce their presence, you know that? 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: Look at the passage:
2851 "Mark Dew discussed the mischief 2 incident with Dale Linton to give 3 information to Superintendent. Suspect 4 Stuart Bradley George hit car with 5 rock." 6 Now -- now you say to me, you say, well in 7 times of great stress at Incident Command, we don't 8 always have the luxury of getting information, right? 9 Right? 10 A: In -- that's correct. 11 Q: But if we have shifted from five (5) 12 to ten (10) Natives with baseball bats randomly attacking 13 a woman's car to a lone human being throwing a rock at a 14 car, would you agree with me that if it was possible to 15 gather a statement and in this case, a statement was 16 taken at 8:26 p.m., it should have been read by somebody 17 at Incident Command so that Dale Linton when he talked to 18 you at 9:42 p.m., gave you the correct facts? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: If Dale Linton at 9:42 p.m. had told 21 you what I read to you, that is the Mark Wright 22 experience, right? Remember the Mark Wright experience? 23 I saw -- 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: -- five (5) to ten (10) people with
2861 bats axe handles, tapping their hands, they told me to 2 move on, right? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Combined with one (1) person throwing 5 a stone at a car, if he had told you those things and 6 then he had said what he said here "We're in the thick of 7 it. I've called out 'X' and 'Y'." 8 You'd agree with me that in that world you 9 would have put the brakes on? 10 A: I would have -- I would certainly 11 have wanted him to think about what he was doing based on 12 that information. 13 Q: And the way you would have expressed 14 yourself in an effort to get him to think about what he 15 was doing, would have been, well hold on here. 16 What you've just described to me isn't the 17 kind of threat I want to march sixty (60) ERT members 18 down the road for in the dark in the dead of night, 19 right? 20 A: We're second -- we're really arm 21 chair quarterbacking here and -- 22 Q: Well let's stop. Let me -- let me 23 deal with that because you've raised it a number of 24 times. Arm chair quarterbacking can happen. It can 25 happen when a Government orders a Royal Commission of
2871 Inquiry into the actions of the OPP and the Government at 2 Ipperwash. 3 We -- we don't have a choice. Don't we 4 have to do that? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Okay. So given that we have to do 7 that, we'll do the best we can to be fair, right? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: If -- I repeat my question to you, if 10 Dale Linton had told you what Mark Wright experienced 11 with people tapping their hands with bats and clubs as I 12 read to you carefully, and had told you about the stone 13 being thrown against the car, it would have caused you to 14 slow him down, right? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: And you said I would have asked 17 questions but the questions would have been designed to 18 slow him down, right? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: Because on that information, it's 21 really looking weak, isn't it? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: Thank you. This is a good time. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 25 very much. We'll take a break now. I'm not sure what
2881 time we're going to sit until but we'll take a break now. 2 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess. 3 4 --- Upon recessing at 3:50 p.m. 5 --- Upon resuming at 4:06 p.m. 6 7 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 8 resumed, please be seated. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just before 10 you start, Mr. Falconer, everybody here? My objective is 11 to ensure that we complete with Mr. -- with 12 Superintendent Parkin's testimony by the end of tomorrow, 13 and I know that there have been some discussions that 14 there's a likelihood that that will occur. 15 So I'd like to do -- I'm very tired. It's 16 ten (10) after 4:00, I'm sure the Witness is as well. I 17 would like to do a quick canvass of how much longer you 18 might be, Mr. Falconer, and how -- what the estimates are 19 and if we think there's a realistic estimate of us 20 completing the testimony tomorrow, I'd like to adjourn 21 now. 22 If not, I'll sit later, if necessary, 23 today, to make sure that that happens. So I'd like to do 24 a realistic assessment of where we are. 25 Now Mr. Falconer, how much longer do you
2891 think you will be before you're completed? 2 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I -- I assumed if I 3 was examining until 4:30 that I'd be finished tomorrow 4 morning at 10:30 at the latest. So in other words, the 5 day. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You've got 7 about an hour and forty-five (45) minutes left to go? 8 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: To be fair to me 9 would be twenty (20) minutes plus an hour and a half. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: So an hour 11 and -- 12 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- tomorrow. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- fifty 14 (50) minutes. 15 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: An hour and fifty 16 (50) minutes, that's right. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: An hour and 18 fifty (50) minutes -- 19 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: But I definitely do 20 not want to sit longer. Mr. Commissioner, for the 21 record, it's always amazing me how you sit through all 22 this -- 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, that's 24 fine. 25 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- you're not -- if
2901 -- if the day is over, it should be over. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's the 3 Witness and -- 4 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Okay. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm 6 concerned about. But anyway, we'll sit longer if we have 7 to. Now, so if you've got an hour and -- 8 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Fifty (50) minutes. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- fifty 10 (50) minutes. Is it fifty (50) or forty (40), what did-- 11 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Fifty (50). 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: An hour and 13 fifty (50), that's almost two (2) hours. Okay, an hour 14 and fifty (50) minutes. 15 Mr. Rosenthal, your original estimate -- 16 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Three (3) hours. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- was three 18 (3) hours. You're still -- you've still got three (3) 19 hours and -- 20 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: As I said before 21 and it doesn't have anything to do with what has been 22 dealt with so far. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: The cross- 24 examination of Mr. Falconer has not affected your time 25 estimate?
2911 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: It has not covered 2 any of those issues. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine, 4 okay. 5 And Mr. Scullion...? 6 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: I can help you out. 7 Mr. Falconer's cross has affected mine. I think two and 8 a half (2 1/2) hours was originally estimated. I am 9 going to be an hour or less. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: An hour or 11 less? 12 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: Yes. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, are 14 you keeping track of time? An hour and fifty (50), three 15 (3), hour or less. 16 Mr. Henderson...? 17 MR. WILLIAM HENDERSON: Yesterday I 18 suggested an hour and a half, Commissioner. I think I 19 will be about half of that, possibly forty-five (45) 20 minutes, perhaps even less than that. 21 But Mr. Millar and I are waiting 22 instructions from the Chiefs of Ontario. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm sorry, 24 what about the Chiefs of Ontario? Are they -- do we know 25 what they're going to do?
2921 MR. WILLIAM HENDERSON: We're not -- 2 we're not sure if they will be asking me to pose some 3 questions on their behalf or whether they intend to 4 appear tomorrow. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: But if they 6 do it will be short? 7 MR. WILLIAM HENDERSON: That's my 8 understanding. 9 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Their estimate was 10 thirty (30) -- sorry, Mr. Falconer. 11 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: That's okay. 12 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Their estimate was -- 13 that they provided me yesterday was thirty (30) minutes, 14 so -- 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And it'll 16 probably be less than that? 17 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Maybe, I -- 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: So what we 19 need to know roughly, is how long Mr. Sandler estimates 20 at this time. Mr. Falconer isn't finished yet -- 21 MR. DERRY MILLAR: And we have Mr. 22 Alexander first. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Oh, I'm 24 sorry. I forgot about Mr. Alexander. He's usually at 25 the front end, but you're now at the back end.
2931 MR. BASIL ALEXANDER: I anticipate my 2 cross will be affected as well. I think I'll be less 3 than fifteen (15) minutes, if that. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Less than 5 fifteen (15) minutes? 6 MR. BASIL ALEXANDER: If at all. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: If at all. 8 So that means it's up to Mr. Sandler to 9 give us some reasonable estimate at this time, if you 10 can. 11 MR. MARK SANDLER: So far, based on the 12 cross-examination, about twenty (20) minutes. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: So what -- 14 MR. MARK SANDLER: But of course, I 15 haven't heard another day's worth. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You haven't 17 heard the end of it, I understand. What's the estimate? 18 Has somebody got it -- 19 MR. DONALD WORME: Approximately seven 20 (7) hours, Commissioner. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Seven (7) 22 hours? No, I'm not sure we can finish tomorrow. I think 23 we'd better keep going. 24 If it's seven (7) hours, we're not going 25 to finish tomorrow, so let's continue for a while. Let's
2941 -- I think we have to keep going, because I'd like to 2 finish it tomorrow. 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Mr. Commissioner, 7 there's two (2) things. I -- because you've so 8 instructed me, I will keep going. I will also not be 9 boring and I will be very quick. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, that's 11 great. 12 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: All right. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's 14 great. 15 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Because I -- I -- 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You're never 17 boring -- 18 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: It's a long -- it's 19 a long day. I have to ask, subject to your approval, Mr. 20 Commissioner, to file the notes of Detective Constable 21 Mark Dew as the next exhibit, because I believe they have 22 not -- they have yet to be filed. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 24 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: This is the three 25 (3) page note extract from pages 32 through 34.
2951 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I've got it. 2 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Dated September 3 6th, 1995. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Here it is, 5 I've got it right here, yes. 6 Exhibit number? 7 THE REGISTRAR: P-1069, Your Honour. 8 9 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1069: Document Number 1000477. 10 Handwritten notes of 11 Detective Constable Mark Dew, 12 Pages 32 to 34, September 13 06/'95. 14 15 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Thank you. 16 THE REGISTRAR: What was that date again? 17 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Dated September 18 6th, 1995 pages 32 through 34 of Detective Constable Mark 19 Dew's notes. 20 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. 21 22 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 23 Q: Now, very quickly, just as a matter 24 of completeness, sir, we've spent a lot of time at Tab 7. 25 I want to make sure that there's nothing in the remainder
2961 of Tab 7 that would change the information you've given 2 Mr. Commissioner. 3 In other words I don't want to walk away 4 from the transcript with three (3) pages left to find out 5 that if those three (3) pages had been put to you your 6 answers would be different. You know what I mean? 7 A: Yes, sir. 8 Q: Okay. If you could go to page 51 9 then because that's where we left off, Tab 7 of the 10 transcripts binder page 51? 11 A: Yes, sir? 12 Q: We have reviewed the discussions you 13 had with Mr. Linton at page 51 in some detail. We're now 14 at page 52? 15 And there is a discussion again about the 16 injunction, is that right? 17 A: Yes, sir. 18 Q: And you refer to the ball being in 19 your lap and you discussed that to some extent with Ms. 20 Twohig, but moving onto page 53 which for our purposes 21 does raise some facts that -- that are raised by Mr. 22 Linton and I wanted to make sure that there isn't 23 something here that you -- should have been drawn to your 24 attention. 25 So you indicate at the top of 53:
2971 "But I guess what we'd rather have 2 happen is if we can lock that place 3 down so that you know the general 4 public isn't put in any danger. 5 Yeah. 6 And you know if they want to burn 7 picnic tables, if they want to act like 8 yahoos back in there fine. If they 9 come out into your turf and you can 10 safely make arrests well then that's 11 fine too. 12 LINTON: Yeah, well. 13 PARKIN: So..." 14 And then there's a discussion by Linton 15 about evacuating but just stopping there. 16 Am I safe to assume from what you say 17 here, like if you can -- if you can basically contain the 18 place for the night and they want to have fires in the 19 Park obviously it's not that you support that but your -- 20 your point is is that there would be little reason to 21 intervene, right? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: Based on what you knew as of page 53? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: And -- and the whole idea is it's
2981 night-time and it's not a time to be going in and making 2 arrests, correct? 3 A: Not unless again the Incident 4 Commander had valid reason to warrant it. But as a 5 general rule, no. 6 Q: And you have talked to the Incident 7 Commander since page 38 about his concerns, yes? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: In other words, thirty-eight (38) to 10 fifty-three (53), fifteen (15) pages of discussions we 11 listed the inventory of concerns. Your preference at 12 this stage is to lock the place down and -- and let 13 things settle, right? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: Okay. And then -- and then Linton 16 says halfway down 53: 17 "It looks -- if it stays as active down 18 on the point as it is right now we're 19 going to have to evacuate six (6) or 20 eight (8) houses probably and that's 21 going to really -- well, I mean it's 22 for their own safety but it's going to 23 piss them off 'cause I've already had-- 24 PARKIN: It probably will. 25 -- conversation with them today and
2991 they're, you know, the attitude, well, 2 you know, you're moving me out of my 3 house, those guys should be moving not 4 me type of thing. Well, we'll go ahead 5 and do it anyways. It's a safety 6 issue. We'll have to do it." 7 And the top of 54: 8 "Well, yeah, you're right. I mean 9 you're going to at least have to try. 10 Yes." 11 And then there's a reference to John's 12 down in TOC and then you talk about Lacroix. Now, 13 stopping you there. 14 Is it fair to say that what you took from 15 Mr. Linton's comments at the bottom of 53 was that the 16 concerns over the allegations that the occupiers had left 17 the Park area and were now engaged in random violence 18 outside of the Park prompted the notion that there ought 19 to be an evacuation? 20 Is that what you took? 21 A: That's the concern he was expressing. 22 Q: All right. And obviously the reverse 23 probably is also true if it turned out that the alleged 24 violence is a rock against a car and a group of people 25 that are holding a stick at a fence line, you -- you
3001 probably don't have to evacuate, correct? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: At page 54: 4 "He's down in TOC" 5 That's about Lacroix. 6 You ask: 7 "What's Wade doing? 8 He's looking after the team. They 9 suited him up. He knows the area well 10 so I'm okay. We'll just -- all right. 11 Wade's a good guy and I've worked with 12 Wade a long -- a long time. Just make 13 sure you or John control it." 14 Right? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: And you explained that comment. 17 "John is right down at TOC. Wade'll be 18 there. 19 Yeah, okay. 20 So you know it's not that -- going to 21 get away on us I don't think. 22 No. Okay. All right. Just let me 23 know if things start to really take a 24 tumble. 25 All right. Unless we have something
3011 really horrendous I won't bother you 2 again. 3 Well, don't worry about calling but, 4 you know, especially if things really 5 start to get bad. 6 All right. 7 But other than that I appreciate the 8 call. 9 Okay. 10 Good luck. 11 All right. 12 Okay." 13 Having completed the call, has anything 14 changed your answers or anything based on what we 15 reviewed? 16 A: No, sir. 17 Q: Okay. Now moving on then, sorry, 18 indulgence. 19 20 (BRIEF PAUSE) 21 22 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Moving on then, 23 well actually, no, I dismissed Mr. Alexander's reference 24 and I know it's going back to haunt to me, Mr. 25 Commissioner. It's always the other people that are
3021 smarter than I. 2 3 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 4 Q: So let me turn you to page 39 of that 5 Tab 7. It's just this reference by Linton to a -- to a 6 dump truck and a bus back to that area. 7 "And a Mark Wright had driven down. 8 They told him to get out of there, you 9 know, to get off the road. So we were 10 -- so we were uh, we were planning on 11 sending ERT down to make arrests and 12 while we were doing that they were 13 moving their bus back to that area and 14 the dump truck back to that area." 15 Did you ever determine from Mr. Linton 16 whether he had determined what the point of moving the 17 vehicles was? 18 A: No, sir. 19 Q: During the call, did you form any 20 conclusions from Mr. Linton, conversation or indications 21 as to the significance of that? 22 A: No, sir. 23 Q: All right. The next materials I -- I 24 want to bring to your attention is at -- a report which 25 is Exhibit P-483. And I don't want to do this in a
3031 vacuum, sir. I'm going -- I want to take you to two (2) 2 things and -- and the order I take you to them is kind of 3 live but what I'll do is I'll -- I'll take you to first 4 Commissioner O'Grady's evidence on issues around 5 intelligence gathering. 6 Then I'm going to take you to a report by 7 Officer Connolley. I suspect you know the report I'm 8 talking about? 9 A: Generally, yes. 10 Q: Okay. So first if I could ask these 11 two (2) excerpts be passed up to the Witness and the 12 Commissioner. And I'm at the evidence of Commissioner 13 O'Grady dated August 24th, 2005 and I'm at page 115, line 14 15, do you see that? I'm sorry, line 11. 15 A: It starts with 'because'? 16 Q: Yes. 17 A: Yes, sir. 18 Q: I'm sorry, I'm going to ask you to 19 back up to page 114, line 20. Page 114, line 20. And 20 this is me speaking to Commissioner O'Grady. I'm 21 attempting to summarize Deputy Commissioner Carson's 22 evidence on a key point, the deployment of CMU, all 23 right? 24 At line 20, page 114 and it's Julian 25 Falconer talking here:
3041 "I said to him based on everything you 2 know now, right, with the lense of 3 hindsight of course, but based on 4 everything you know now, are you sure 5 you would have deployed CMU that 6 night?" 7 And his answer, the answer that Inspector 8 Carson very candidly I thought gave was: 9 "I'm not sure I would have." 10 Do you see that? 11 A: Yes, sir. 12 Q: And -- and Commissioner O'Grady 13 answers: 14 "I -- you really don't need to double 15 check on that because I completely 16 remember that answer." 17 And I question -- I said: 18 "I appreciate your candour. 19 A: And I think he was being extremely 20 honest. 21 Q: And I appreciate your candour and I 22 appreciate counsel who are all helping 23 me handling the transcripts. I 24 appreciate your candour for this 25 reason. That's not an easy concession
3051 to make. 2 A: It is not. 3 Q: Because ultimately if the heart of 4 the death of Dudley George is a clash 5 that occurred between CMU and the 6 occupiers. 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: Of course, well the occupiers 9 could never be free from any blame or 10 criticism. That's impossible, they're 11 not perfect. The clash wouldn't have 12 happened if CMU had not been deployed, 13 correct? 14 A: I think that's correct. 15 Q: And therefore the decision to 16 deploy CMU must under -- come under 17 very close scrutiny, correct? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: And would you agree with this that 20 if it turns out that the Incident 21 Commander as he has in this case..." 22 Top of page 116: 23 "...says you know, based on the 24 information I have now, I'm not sure I 25 would have done it. That means that,
3061 called into question, certainly, in 2 these proceedings, were the information 3 gathering techniques used at the time. 4 Would you agree with that? 5 A: I would agree with that. 6 Q: And if it turns out that those 7 information gathering techniques, it's 8 not just that they weren't perfect, 9 because you know and I know the real 10 world isn't about perfection, right? 11 A: Right. 12 Q: Correct, but you and I also know 13 that there are certain things that we 14 can do to improve the world, right? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And without looking for perfection 17 w we e can actually improve things, right? 18 A: Right. 19 Q: And there are better ways to build 20 a mousetrap sometimes? 21 A: Yes." 22 I seem to be taking a long time to get 23 there, Mr. Commissioner. 24 "Q: Other times it's simply not 25 realistic, correct?
3071 A: Correct. 2 Q: And if there were better ways and 3 are better ways to build a mousetrap in 4 relation to the intelligence gathering 5 function that occurred during the 6 Ipperwash incident, that would be very 7 significant, correct? 8 A: That would be very significant. 9 Q: And the reason it's so significant 10 is because we've heard from the 11 incident commander that if he knew then 12 what he knows now, he might not have 13 deployed CMU, correct? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: Example, the baseball bat 16 incident, correct? 17 A: Yeah, yes. 18 Q: Let me ask you something else. 19 Had you focussed your mind on potential 20 frailties in intelligence gathering at 21 the time? 22 A: Yes. I think that's why we 23 initiated a study on emergency 24 preparedness and I believe one (1) of 25 the components -- I believe that's one
3081 (1) of the components. 2 Q: Is it fair to say that it would be 3 one of the areas you think that the OPP 4 may have been deficient in, in 5 September 1995 at the Ipperwash 6 incident? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And would you agree with me, in 9 that very candid acknowledgement, built 10 into that acknowledgement [at the top 11 of page 118] built into that 12 acknowledgement is a recognition that 13 human frailty will always be a reality 14 of life, correct? 15 A: Can't be avoided. 16 Q: That's right. We're not computers 17 or robots and therefore we're not, you 18 know, capable of measuring every action 19 with 100 percent precision, correct? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: But while that's built into it, 22 what you're really telling us is 23 something more than that. You're not 24 just telling us that we weren't 25 perfect, you're actually saying you're
3091 looking at it and on reflection this 2 should have been done better, right? 3 A: I think with respect to the 4 intelligence gathering and assessing 5 it, it could have been done better. 6 Q: And that man's brother died, yes? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: So when you say it could have been 9 done better, in your own mind, 'could,' 10 because we're talking about a death, 11 really means 'should,' doesn't it? 12 A: Yes. I think we have a 13 responsibility to look at it and 14 improve to the degree that it's 15 possible." 16 Now, first of all, I read you that section 17 from Commissioner O'Grady and he refers to a report and - 18 - and I could well be wrong, and if I'm wrong I 19 apologize, but I am assuming he's talking about the 20 Connolly report. 21 But Mr. Sandler will tell me I'm wrong, 22 but on intelligence gathering... 23 MR. MARK SANDLER: This is the emergency 24 preparedness report that Mr. O'Marra was interested in 25 and was dealt with. This isn't the Connolly report.
3101 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: But the emergency 2 preparedness report that was produced didn't deal with 3 intelligence gathering. 4 MR. MARK SANDLER: Well, you just asked 5 me that. I -- 6 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: No, no, no, no. I 7 just -- I'm trying to make a point to Mr. Sandler, that 8 based on what I'm seeing, I think what Mr. O'Grady was 9 talking about was the Connolly report, because he talks 10 about intelligence gathering. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, I'm 12 not sure how we can tell that. 13 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: We can't, but I'm 14 saying that the only report I could find that 15 Commissioner O'Grady commissioned, that dealt with 16 intelligence gathering, is the Connolly report. 17 That's -- and I'll take the Witness to 18 that in a minute. I'm just trying to let the Witness 19 know that. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think -- 21 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Whether or not he 22 meant the Connolly report at this stage almost becomes 23 beside the point, because we have it. 24 25 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER:
3111 Q: Now, having said that, and leaving 2 aside the Connolly report, would you agree with me that, 3 based on what I've taken you through in terms of the 4 facts available to Mr. Linton on September 6th 1995, and 5 what was presented to you at 9:42 p.m., and in the 6 minutes after that, that there seemed to be a problem in 7 gathering and adequately assessing information? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: And that, in essence, you would agree 10 with the comments of Commissioner O'Grady, that that is 11 an area that warranted improvement? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: And that, in fact, in terms of the 14 intelligence gathering techniques used by the OPP in 15 September 1995 at the Ipperwash incident, there were 16 deficiencies? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: And those deficiencies were 19 significant to the extent it played a role in the 20 decision to deploy the crowd management unit. 21 A: I can't disagree with that. 22 Q: All right. Now, I'm going to simply 23 take you to Exhibit P-483, which is the Connolly report. 24 And I engaged in some speculation that that was what 25 Commissioner O'Grady was talking about, and I acknowledge
3121 it was speculation, but based on our review we couldn't 2 find any other report Commissioner O'Grady commissioned 3 that dealt with intelligence. 4 So I'm simply going to take you to it and 5 just ask a few questions about this. 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE) 8 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Is this an 10 exhibit already? I think it is. 11 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Yes, it's Exhibit 12 P-483. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, P-483. 14 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: And Document Number 15 2000577. 16 17 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 18 Q: Now, Officer Connolly -- 19 MR. MARK SANDLER: Sorry. I just need 20 two (2) -- two (2) seconds. The reason -- I was just 21 checking this. The reason why My Friend is incorrect 22 about his assumption is actually Commissioner O'Grady 23 testified as to why he had the Connolly Report put 24 together and it was for a very different reason but My 25 Friend doesn't have to rely on --
3131 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No. 2 MR. MARK SANDLER: -- on the reference. 3 He can simply question on the Connolly Report. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: There 5 doesn't have to be a connection -- 6 MR. MARK SANDLER: That's right. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- between 8 the evidence and Commissioner O'Grady's evidence. If you 9 have the report and you want to refer to it go ahead. 10 11 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 12 Q: At the bottom of page 4 under the 13 subtitle, "Intelligence." And I'm going to whip through 14 this quite fast. 15 First of all, can I ask you, Mr. Parkin, 16 did you receive a copy of this report? 17 A: I don't know if I personally received 18 a copy, but I have seen the report. 19 Q: You, at the time, in September 1995, 20 were a superintendent, but subsequent to that you were 21 promoted in rank, correct? 22 A: After 1995, yes. 23 Q: And your rank was that of Chief 24 Superintendent? 25 A: In 1998.
3141 Q: Yes. And you were Chief 2 Superintendent for how long? 3 A: Until I retired last year in March of 4 2005. 5 Q: And, obviously, given your prominence 6 in the higher ranks, if you will, of the OPP, would you 7 agree with me that it -- a report such as this, that 8 basically is an internal audit of what happened at 9 Ipperwash, would be something that it is essential to 10 bring to the attention of managing officers of the 11 incident, such as yourself? 12 A: I don't dispute that, I just... 13 Q: I'm not being critical of you, I mean 14 you -- if you don't know about the report -- it's not 15 your job to go out and find the report, is it? 16 A: No, I said I -- I do recognize the 17 report. I have seen the report but just -- 18 Q: Did you get a copy? 19 A: I would have had one at some time. 20 Q: Oh, okay. See I -- you'd agree with 21 me that, at the end of the day, we -- we want to be 22 comfortable, when the OPP does this kind of audit, the 23 people that were involved in the incident get a look at 24 it, right? 25 A: Yes.
3151 Q: And -- and that's with all the 2 lawyers involved saying you should, shouldn't, we're 3 going to testify, there's a civil suit, all those things 4 that you get harangued by lawyers, such as I, right? 5 A: Correct. 6 Q: But was there any impediment to you 7 seeing this report? 8 A: No, sir. 9 Q: Good. And you think you did? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: Okay. And you would have read it 12 with some interest, correct? 13 A: I believe so. 14 Q: You were fairly front and centre in 15 terms of your actions being considered, right? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: Okay. In terms of the issue that I 18 simply wanted to bring to your attention, at page 4 under 19 the subtitle, "Intelligence," the author says, quote: 20 "It is my belief of that [it seems to 21 be a typo] that the issue of 22 intelligence and its effect on the 23 operations and results will form part 24 of any subsequent debate on actions 25 taken at this incident."
3161 Well, that was reasonably prophetic. You 2 see that where the author states that? 3 A: Yes, sir. 4 Q: All right. Then if you could flip to 5 page 5, at the top of the page under, Issues: 6 "The following summary of issues, 7 opinions, and perceptions that may 8 precipitate discussions in any forum 9 discussing the events surrounding 10 Ipperwash Provincial Park." 11 And under Issues 4, number 4: 12 "Why did the Ontario Provincial Police 13 Crowd Management Team charge the Park 14 occupiers at night rather than during 15 daylight?" 16 And number 5: 17 "There was intelligence concerning 18 automatic weapons and other firearms in 19 the possession of the occupiers. There 20 was also information of women and 21 children leaving the Park because 22 something was going to happen. Why did 23 the Ontario Provincial Police take the 24 action they did with this information 25 known to them?:
3171 6: 2 "What did the Ontario Provincial Police 3 do to quell rumours both internally and 4 externally surrounding the Ipperwash 5 occupation?" 6 And just two (2) sentences in under that 7 number 6: 8 "The atmosphere..." 9 Do you see that? 10 "The atmosphere..." 11 Three (3) lines into that under number 6. 12 Three (3) lines down? 13 A: Yes, sir. 14 Q: "The atmosphere at the time, just 15 prior to, during, and immediately after 16 the shooting incident was extremely 17 tense with rumours constant." 18 You'd agree with that? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: And then at page 8, under number 23. 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: "How reliable was the intelligence 23 information that was received? Was it 24 validated before it was acted upon? 25 Response: A key issue, see issues 3,
3181 4 and 5." 2 And then at page 11, and you'll see that 3 at page 10 there's a subtitle, "Recommendations." 4 A: Yes, sir. 5 Q: See that? At page 11, one of the 6 recommendations is number 6: 7 "The Ontario Provincial Police review 8 how intelligence information is 9 gathered, authenticated and analysed. 10 One area that will surely be examined 11 in any statutory form, dealing with the 12 Ipperwash Provincial Park incident, 13 will be the intelligence that the OPP 14 possessed during the incident. How was 15 the information obtained? How was it 16 authenticated? 17 These will be questions that will have 18 to be answered. One concern that was 19 identified was that erroneous 20 information was provided by one faction 21 involved in attempts to discredit 22 another faction." 23 So suffice to say, whether we look at the 24 information that was provided to you at 9:42 p.m. on 25 September 6th, 1995, or we look at subsequent assessments
3191 of that information, either by virtue of Commissioner 2 O'Grady's evidence, by virtue of your own evidence, or 3 Connolly's report, this case, in part, that is the 4 actions of the OPP at Ipperwash on September 6th 1995, in 5 the determination to march on the occupiers, the issue of 6 the adequacy of the information they were marching on is 7 very live, isn't it? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: And looking back, with the benefit of 10 this hindsight and the reports and the notes I took you 11 through, you don't have much comfort level on the 12 information that was relied upon to march that night, do 13 you? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: And when you say "correct," you're 16 answering a negative. The short answer to my question is 17 you don't have a great comfort level, do you? 18 A: Not -- not like I did at the time. 19 Q: Thank you. This is a good time, Mr. 20 Commissioner. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 22 very much. We'll adjourn now until nine o'clock tomorrow 23 morning, and hopefully we'll finish your evidence 24 tomorrow. 25
3201 (WITNESS RETIRES) 2 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 4 adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, February the 9th at 5 9:00 a.m. 6 7 --- Upon adjourning at 4:34 p.m. 8 9 10 Certified Correct, 11 12 13 14 15 _________________ 16 Carol Geehan, Ms. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25