11 2 3 IPPERWASH PUBLIC INQUIRY 4 5 6 7 ******************** 8 9 10 BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE SIDNEY LINDEN, 11 COMMISSIONER 12 13 14 15 16 Held at: Forest Community Centre 17 Kimball Hall 18 Forest, Ontario 19 20 21 ******************** 22 23 24 August 23rd, 2006 25
21 Appearances 2 Derry Millar ) Commission Counsel 3 Susan Vella ) 4 Donald Worme, Q. C ) 5 Katherine Hensel ) (np) 6 Megan Ferrier ) 7 Rebecca Cutler ) (np) 8 9 Murray Klippenstein ) The Estate of Dudley 10 Vilko Zbogar ) George and George 11 Andrew Orkin ) (np) Family Group 12 Basil Alexander ) 13 14 Peter Rosenthal ) Aazhoodena and George 15 Jackie Esmonde ) Family Group 16 Amanda Rogers ) (np) Student-at-law 17 18 Anthony Ross ) Residents of 19 Cameron Neil ) (np) Aazhoodena (Army Camp) 20 Kevin Scullion ) 21 22 William Henderson ) Kettle Point & Stony 23 Jonathon George ) (np) Point First Nation 24 Colleen Johnson ) 25
31 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 Kim Twohig ) Government of Ontario 3 Walter Myrka ) (np) 4 Susan Freeborn ) 5 Sheri Hebdon ) (np) Student-at-law 6 7 Janet Clermont ) Municipality of 8 David Nash ) (np) Lambton Shores 9 Nora Simpson ) (np) Student-at-law 10 11 Peter Downard ) The Honourable Michael 12 Bill Hourigan ) (np) Harris 13 Jennifer McAleer ) 14 15 Ian Smith ) (np) Robert Runciman 16 Alice Mrozek ) (np) 17 18 Harvey T. Strosberg, Q.C.) (np) Charles Harnick 19 Jacqueline Horvat ) (np) 20 21 22 23 24 25
41 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 Douglas Sulman, Q.C. ) (np) Marcel Beaubien 3 Mary Jane Moynahan) (np) 4 Dave Jacklin ) (np) 5 Trevor Hinnegan ) 6 7 Mark Sandler ) Ontario Provincial 8 Leslie Kaufman ) Police 9 10 Ian Roland ) Ontario Provincial 11 Karen Jones ) (np) Police Association & 12 Debra Newell ) K. Deane 13 Ian McGilp ) (np) 14 Annie Leeks ) (np) 15 Jennifer Gleitman ) (np) 16 Robyn Trask ) 17 Caroline Swerdlyk ) (np) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
51 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 Julian Falconer ) (np) Aboriginal Legal 3 Brian Eyolfson ) (np) Services of Toronto 4 Kimberly Murray ) (np) 5 Julian Roy ) (np) 6 Clem Nabigon ) (np) 7 Linda Chen ) (np) 8 Chris Darnay ) (np) 9 Sunil Mathai ) (np) 10 Adriel Weaver ) (np) Student-at-Law 11 12 Al J.C. O'Marra ) Office of the Chief 13 ) Coroner 14 William Horton ) (np) Chiefs of Ontario 15 Matthew Horner ) (np) 16 Kathleen Lickers ) (np) 17 18 Mark Fredrick ) Christopher Hodgson 19 Craig Mills ) (np) 20 Megan Mackey ) (np) 21 Peter Lauwers ) (np) 22 Erin Tully ) (np) 23 Michelle Fernando ) 24 Maanit Zemel ) (np) 25 Patrick Greco ) (np)
61 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 3 David Roebuck ) (np) Debbie Hutton 4 Anna Perschy ) 5 Melissa Panjer ) 6 Adam Goodman ) (np) 7 8 Gary Penner ) (np) Allan Percy Howse 9 10 Craig Benjamin ) Amnesty International 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
71 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 PAGE NO. 3 Opening Comments 8 4 5 FINAL SUBMISSIONS FOR THE CHIEF CORONER OF 6 THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO 9 7 FINAL SUBMISSIONS BY THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO 22 8 FINAL SUBMISSIONS BY THE ONTARIO PROVINCIAL 9 POLICE ASSOCIATION 39 10 FINAL SUBMISSIONS BY THE ONTARIO PROVINCIAL 11 POLICE 77 12 13 14 15 Certificate of Transcript 154 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
81 --- Upon commencing at 9:03 a.m. 2 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 4 now in session, the Honourable Mr. Justice Linden 5 presiding. Please be seated. 6 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Good morning, 7 Commissioner. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 9 morning, everybody. 10 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Before we begin this 11 morning with Mr. O'Marra there is a couple of things that 12 we need to deal with. 13 Firstly, I just want to let everyone know 14 that we've had confirmation that all the drums are 15 available for Thursday so the closing with be Thursday at 16 2:00; Thursday afternoon at 2:00 p.m. in this room at 17 Kimball Hall. 18 And secondly Ms. Perschy wanted to -- 19 there were a couple of small matters that she simply 20 wished to address with respect to her presentation 21 yesterday. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 23 morning, Ms. Perschy. 24 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: Good morning, 25 Commissioner, just a couple of housekeeping matters. I
91 thought I was done yesterday but I had forgotten to 2 advise you that the Aazhoodena fact sheet which I 3 referred to yesterday, the exhibit number for that is P- 4 148. And the other matter was simply a correction that I 5 forgot to advise you of with respect to our reply 6 submissions. 7 At page 13 paragraph 41 the last sentence 8 is something of a run-on sentence and doesn't make sense 9 and it's a question of punctuation. There should be a 10 period after the word, "views." The next word is "and"; 11 that should be taken out and replaced with a capital 12 "We". 13 And with that, that's all I have to say. 14 Thank you very much, Commissioner. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 16 Ms. Perschy. 17 Okay. Mr. O'Marra, I think you're on now. 18 MR. AL O'MARRA: Good morning, 19 Commissioner. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 21 morning. 22 23 FINAL SUBMISSIONS FOR THE CHIEF CORONER OF THE PROVINCE 24 OF ONTARIO: 25 MR. AL O'MARRA: Sir, let me start as
101 others have done by lending the voice of the Chief 2 Coroner to the chorus of praise for the -- the work of 3 the Commission and -- and your Counsel in achieving what 4 you have set out to achieve and that's a thorough 5 balanced and fair process in the examination of all of 6 the evidence relating to the circumstances leading to the 7 tragic and untimely death of Mr. Dudley George. 8 Certainly no one in the community can say 9 that any stone was left unturned in this process. The 10 late Justice John Sopinka, who had considerable 11 experience as you know as counsel doing commission work, 12 indicated that the work of a commission is to ensure that 13 the white light of truth is shone on the evidence and 14 that certainly took place in this process, sir. 15 It is probably fair to say that in the 16 history of this province and perhaps even in the history 17 of Canada that no one (1) person's death has received 18 such an extensive public investigation as has occurred 19 here. No on can say that the death of Dudley George was 20 overlooked, concealed, or ignored. 21 My submissions, Mr. Commissioner, will be 22 relatively brief and are being made largely to inform a 23 larger audience of the role of the Chief Coroner in this 24 process and the nature of the recommendations that have 25 been made on his behalf.
111 My submissions will be based, as our 2 written submissions are, on our participation in both 3 Parts 1 and 2 of the Inquiry. 4 All of the parties to Part 1 had either 5 direct involvement in the circumstances as they 6 transpired on or before September 6th, 1995, or they will 7 be acutely affected by the recommendations that issue 8 from this process. The Chief Coroner and the Office of 9 the Chief Coroner on the other hand was involved only 10 after the fact as a result of its investigation as was 11 required under the Coroner's Act into the circumstances 12 of the death of Dudley George. 13 The Chief Coroner chose to participate in 14 order to assist the Commission in the examination of 15 certain issues where he felt we could be of assistance in 16 providing a medical perspective to the Inquiry. Our 17 participation has been quite focussed as a result. 18 While you granted the Chief Coroner full 19 standing we have chosen to refrain from examining some of 20 the broader issues and making submissions on issues of 21 credibility or causation as others have or suggesting 22 recommendations with respect to the relationship between 23 government and police and First Nation peoples. Our 24 focus has been on the post-shooting events in this 25 process.
121 As the Commissioner knows when Dudley 2 George died the Coroner was required to commence an 3 investigation. That investigation commenced with the 4 attendance of Dr. Gary Perkin, our local coroner, when he 5 attended to the Strathroy-Middlesex General Hospital on 6 September 7th, 1995, and it followed by the post-mortem 7 examination conducted under the Coroner's warrant 8 performed by Dr. Michael Shkrum, our Regional 9 Pathologist. 10 Thereafter the Special Investigation Unit 11 and the Ontario Provincial Police investigations and 12 subsequent criminal proceedings took precedence. 13 As you know, as well, that if an inquest 14 had been called by the Chief Coroner during that time it 15 would have to have been deferred until the criminal 16 matters had been finalized. 17 Once Acting Sergeant Kenneth Deane's 18 matter was in fact concluded before the Supreme Court we 19 were able then to review the results of those other 20 investigations. During that review period Mr. Perry or 21 Pierre George met with senior members of the Office of 22 the Chief Coroner in order to inquire about the conduct 23 of an inquest into the death of his brother. He also 24 raised concerns about the medical response to his 25 brother's injuries.
131 It was also clear that Mr. Pierre George, 2 not a witness at this process, suffered great anguish and 3 distress over his direct involvement in trying to save 4 the life of his brother that night. 5 He had certain questions. Did he make 6 right choices? To drive his brother, firstly. To go to 7 the Strathroy-Middlesex General Hospital versus Sarnia or 8 some other location? The route that he took? Had 9 everything been done by others in advance of the 10 shooting? And had everything been done after the 11 shooting that might have been done to save his brother 12 life? Those were the questions he anguished and was 13 distressed over. 14 These were concerns and questions that had 15 not been addressed in any of the other investigations. 16 Consequently the Chief Coroner directed a subsequent 17 investigation to address -- address those questions and 18 to access the availability of emergency medical support 19 and the survivability of Mr. Dudley George in light of 20 his injuries. 21 Could timely medical intervention, planned 22 for in advance or provided afterwards have led to 23 prevention? To that end, as you know, Dr. Andrew 24 McCallum an expert in trauma medicine was retained by the 25 Chief Coroner to review the results of the investigation.
141 You heard his evidence in this process and sadly based on 2 his view, te injuries suffered by Mr. George were not 3 survivable even perhaps in the most optimal of 4 circumstances. 5 We also assembled for the benefit of the 6 Inquiry and this process a panel of medical and policing 7 experts to conduct a public discussion to explore the 8 issue of emergency medical response planning when police 9 face an involvement in policing public order events. 10 In addition, a research paper prepared by 11 Dr. Michael -- Michael Feldman, Dr. Brian Schwartz and 12 Dr. Laurie Morrison entitled, The Effectiveness of 13 Tactical Emergency Medical Support, was submitted for 14 consideration by the Commission. 15 As noted in my written materials, Mr. 16 Commissioner, the Coroner and the Commission have 17 overlapping mandates. Although the Coroner in the 18 conduct of an inquest is, of course, much narrower in 19 scope. It's focus, of course, is on a particular death 20 and the circumstances leading to it and issues of 21 prevention regarding it; not as broad as yours in terms 22 of the prevention of violence, in general, in those 23 circumstances. 24 When an inquest is called, it is held to 25 address three principle issues to answer five questions:
151 who died; when the person died; where the person died; 2 how -- what's the medical cause of death and by what 3 means or the manner of death, as to whether it was 4 homicide, suicide, accident, natural or undetermined; and 5 thirdly or secondly rather, to inform the community of 6 the true circumstances of a fatality; and then thirdly, 7 the likelihood that there will be recommendations 8 directed to the avoidance of death in similar 9 circumstances. 10 With respect to the later two, of course, 11 there is that overlapping mandate. In our materials, we 12 have asked for specific findings in order to satisfy the 13 Coroner's mandate, had an inquest been conducted. They 14 are the same findings that a jury would be required to 15 make in a similar process. 16 And we are asking you, sir, to make those 17 findings in order to obviate the need of an inquest in 18 the circumstances of Mr. George's death. I've asked Mr. 19 Miller to project the final request or summary of the 20 findings requested. And I'll just go through those 21 briefly if I might. 22 The coroner under Section 31(1) of the 23 Coroner's Act would be required to, of course, reflect 24 the identity Mr. Anthony O'Brien Dudley George. When 25 death occurred -- as you know in the evidence sir, death
161 was formally pronounced at 12:20 a.m. on September 7th, 2 1995 at the Strathroy-Middlesex General Hospital. 3 It was, of course, observed in the 4 evidence of Dr. McCallum and to some other extent by the 5 other physicians who testified that Mr. George appeared 6 to have become vital signs absent in a period of time 7 prior to his arrival at the hospital. 8 And you'll require -- recall the 9 significance of the observation about the mottling to the 10 skin of Mr. George when he was first seen in the back 11 seat of his brother's vehicle, a sign of lividity. 12 We ask that you incorporate that 13 observation in your findings, sir. I think to some 14 extent as well the observations of Dr. McCallum, perhaps 15 if -- if for no other reason than to provide some benefit 16 to Mr. Pierre George as a result of his grave concerns as 17 to whether he took the right course that night. And it 18 appears that any course taken would not have made, 19 unfortunately, a difference in the circumstances of Mr. 20 Dudley George. 21 Where he died, of course, where Mr. George 22 was formally pronounced at the Strathroy-Middlesex 23 General Hospital. How he died, you have the evidence of 24 Dr. Michael Shkrum in his post mortem examination report, 25 gunshot wound of the upper chest. And by what means or
171 the manner of the death we ask that you observe that it 2 was a homicide. 3 And in terms of the Coronial process, sir, 4 and death classification homicide takes on its def -- 5 dictionary definition of a person killing another person. 6 It does import any culpability. 7 I did note that in some of the materials 8 submitted by other parties reference was made to the word 9 'murder'. And I suggest, with respect, sir, that that 10 would be wholly inappropriate given the factual 11 circumstances and, in particular, the findings of other 12 courts in terms of criminal liability. We would ask 13 simply that it be referred to as a homicide. 14 Now, sir, if I might turn to the 15 recommendations that we have offered. There are eight 16 (8) in number and the first six (6) are based on the 17 expert opinions and medical evidence heard at this 18 Inquiry. 19 In terms of numbers 1, 2 and 3 which have 20 some connection they speak to the observation of our 21 researchers and, as well, as the opinion of other experts 22 that there is great benefit to having, in a planning 23 process, tactical emergency rep -- support -- medical 24 support component where police are engaged and have the 25 services of Emergency Response Teams or Crowd Management
181 Teams or TRU teams. 2 It is also observed, certainly in the 3 field of military activities, that there is a great 4 benefit to having that kind of ready medical support in 5 these kinds of operations. It is also observed that 6 there would be a benefit to having a full-time component. 7 I observed in the responses by the OPP 8 that -- that they, of course, have installed many of 9 these concepts. Your recommendations, sir, of course, 10 don't just speak to the parties directly involved but 11 will have a broader resonance to other police services as 12 well as to others, not only in this Province but 13 throughout Canada. 14 And I would submit, with respect, sir, 15 that these recommendations should be made for that 16 purpose. We find that certainly in the inquest process 17 many parties do respond to the appropriate change in a 18 proactive way as has the OPP in this matter and that 19 should, I would submit with respect, be reflected in your 20 commentary to recommendations if you agree to -- to issue 21 these. 22 The -- the benefit of having a full-time 23 TEMS component in the police situation is that they then 24 would be able to have a fulsome knowledge of the services 25 that are available in any given area and also to
191 coordinate. 2 You will know, sir, that in this 3 particular case, while there was notification to the 4 local hospital, it was within an hour or just a little 5 better than an hour prior to the arrival of the -- of the 6 victims, the injured and, of course, Mr. -- Mr. George 7 that night. 8 The other recommendations, sir, I think, 9 in effect, speak for themselves. The one that drew some 10 response from the other parties perhaps that I should 11 address is that of number 7, with respect to the St. 12 John's Ambulance equipment and vehicles. 13 I note that the residence of Aazhoodena 14 and the Family Group has suggested that there should be a 15 regulatory aspect to this or a criminalization of it if - 16 - if it were violated whereas the Ontario Provincial 17 Police have indicated that perhaps it would be more 18 appropriate not to make use of such equipment that would 19 be contrary to the mandate and purpose of the agency or 20 if it would put that agency's personnel in -- in 21 jeopardy. 22 And I submit with respect that it -- it's 23 the thrust of the recommendation that's important, it's 24 that they have to make sure that the equipment used 25 doesn't impact on the -- the good work of the agencies
201 that they -- they would involve. 2 Certainly in this context the St. John's 3 Ambulance has appreciated the need to evaluate the -- the 4 use of their equipment beforehand because they directly 5 suffered the consequences and no doubt will be more 6 vigilant in its -- in granting its approval. 7 The last recommendation, sir, comes from 8 the -- the evidence that we heard at the Inquest from 9 the direct participants in the events that night. And 10 from my perspective is -- is a most important 11 recommendation that there is a need for a Provincial 12 and/or Federal authorities responsible for First Nation 13 affairs to provide timely access to counselling services 14 for those who experienced debilitating, emotional, and 15 psychological consequences from exposure to or 16 involvement in violent and traumatic events involving 17 police actions. 18 No doubt your recommendations, sir, will - 19 - will go to avoiding like circumstances if followed, but 20 where circumstances do occur that lead to conflict and 21 violence there needs to be a -- a response to that. 22 We had of course in this case not only the 23 physical injury and fatality but there is great 24 psychological and emotional trauma. You heard from J.T. 25 Cousins who was a teenager at the time who has carried
211 the scars into his life today, the nightmares that he 2 experienced. You heard from the others who were 3 youngsters at the time who are now young adults who also 4 carry those scars into their -- their adult lives. 5 You heard from Carolyn George who suffered 6 as a result of her experience and you also heard from 7 Chief Tom Bressette about the impact upon his community 8 as well as himself. 9 Tears flowed freely in this process, sir, 10 from witnesses who were on both sides of the fence in the 11 sandy parking lot at the Provincial Park that -- that 12 night and yet many years later that is palpable evidence 13 that the trauma and the emotional -- and emotional impact 14 prevails. 15 Individuals, their lives, have been 16 debilitated and affected. Families and communities have 17 been rent apart as a result of the situation. And as I 18 said before no doubt many of your recommendations will go 19 to avoid like circumstances if adopted, but where they do 20 occur there needs to be recommendations such as this that 21 will motivate governments who have control of -- of 22 resources and services that will go to repairing the 23 wreckage of person's lives in the wake of such trauma. 24 So I recommend this -- this particular 25 suggestion perhaps over all the others.
221 Mr. Commissioner, I thank you for your 2 kind attention to my submissions and to the consideration 3 I no doubt that you will give to the Chief Coroner's 4 recommendations. And may I just add Godspeed to you, 5 sir, in the remainder of your journey. Thank you. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 7 very much, Mr. O'Marra. 8 Ms. Twohig...? 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 MS. KIM TWOHIG: Good morning, Mr. 13 Commissioner. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 15 morning. 16 17 FINAL SUBMISSIONS BY THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO: 18 MS. KIM TWOHIG: I thought just before I 19 begin that I should clarify for the public and perhaps 20 the media who I act for. For purposes of Part 1 and 2 21 the OPP and the Officer of the Chief Coroner have, of 22 course, been separately represented even though they are 23 technically part of the Government of Ontario. 24 For purposes of Part 1, we do not 25 represent the former elected government. But, for
231 purposes of Part 2 we do represent the current elected 2 government, as well as the civil service. 3 Ontario is pleased to have provided an 4 opportunity to examine the events and circumstances that 5 led to the death of Dudley George at Ipperwash on 6 September 1995 and to have participated as a party to 7 this Inquiry. The Province hopes that all parties and, 8 in particular, the George Family have had many of their 9 questions answered during the course of the Inquiry. 10 The written submissions of all parties to 11 the Inquiry have been thorough and we appreciate, Mr. 12 Commissioner, that you are familiar with the Province's 13 position on the facts and issues, so I do not intend to 14 spend much time on the evidence other than to summarize 15 the Province's position very briefly. 16 I would then like to turn to some of the 17 broader issues raised in Part 2 and highlight some 18 positive developments since 1995. 19 With respect to the evidence, there seems 20 to be no real dispute among the parties to the Inquiry 21 that the civil servants were knowledgeable, experienced 22 and sensitive to Aboriginal issues. They were conscious 23 of the complexities of the situation at Ipperwash and on 24 balance, preferred a cautious, measured approach to the 25 occupation that would ensure no one was hurt. The advice
241 they gave to the Government reflected that approach. 2 For the most part there seems to be no 3 dispute that the civil servants represented by the 4 Province in Part 1 of this Inquiry, at all times acted in 5 good faith within the scope of their duties and where 6 applicable on instructions from their respective 7 Ministers. 8 There is little that the Province could 9 add to the submissions of others who have already made 10 those points. The Province would however, like to 11 address the broader issues that have arisen at the 12 Inquiry recognizing that it is important to understand 13 the past, to learn from the past and to look to the 14 future. 15 We have heard at this Inquiry that the 16 occupation of the Park was the result of a great deal of 17 frustration on the part of the Stoney Point Group. The 18 Inquiry has provided an opportunity to better understand 19 the depth of the frustration over issues of land and 20 burial sites among others. It has also revealed the need 21 for governments at all levels and for Aboriginal people 22 to work together. 23 The Province believes that negotiations 24 provide an effective process for addressing the legal, 25 constitutional and practical issues raised by Aboriginal
251 land claims. Ontario has also committed to ensuring that 2 land claim negotiations address the interests and 3 concerns of municipalities, private property owners, 4 users of Crown land and others whose land based interests 5 are affected by Aboriginal land claims. 6 The Province tries to reach agreement with 7 the Aboriginal claimant and the Federal Government 8 regarding the participation of others in public 9 consultations, because it has recognized that meaningful 10 public involvement leads to more enduring settlements 11 that are broadly acceptable. 12 The Ontario Secretariat for Aboriginal 13 Affairs website, contains a wealth of information about 14 land claims, including the background and status of 15 current negotiations and the implementation of ratified 16 agreements. 17 This is designed to increase public 18 understanding and acceptance of such agreements and to 19 provide transparency to the process. The Province's 20 current approach to land claims negotiations is set out 21 in the paper submitted to the Inquiry entitled, The 22 Resolution of Land Claims in Ontario. The Province is 23 certainly willing to consider ways of improving and 24 expediting the process and ensuring that it is fair to 25 all.
261 The Province acknowledges the importance 2 of dealing with Aboriginal sacred and burial sites 3 appropriately and submits that the frustration expressed 4 by the Stoney Point Group about the burial site at 5 Ipperwash arose from a lack of communication by all 6 concerned, including the Province. 7 The evidence at this Inquiry has revealed 8 the importance of good and regular communication by 9 affected parties about issues of concern. The Province 10 is willing to share the responsibility all parties have 11 for communicating better with one another. 12 The Province is also willing to work 13 cooperatively with the First Nation to ensure that any 14 sacred or burial site at Ipperwash Provincial Park is 15 properly respected and protected. 16 As noted in the Commission's discussion 17 paper on Treaty and Aboriginal rights, the issues 18 relating to Aboriginal heritage sites, including 19 archeological, burial and sacred sites are extremely 20 complex. Ontario looks forward to continuing to work 21 with all Aboriginal people, developers, private land 22 owners, municipalities, archeologists and others to 23 develop best practices, protocols and guidelines for 24 addressing the many issues and the concerns related to 25 Aboriginal heritage sites.
271 In March 2006 the Ministry of Government 2 Services released for public consultation a draft 3 regulation and proposed legislative amendments relating 4 to burial sites and other cemetery specific provisions. 5 Two (2) items identified during the 6 Ipperwash Inquiry's public consultation on burial sites 7 have been addressed in the draft regulation. The 8 Ministry has, first of all, removed the term 'unapproved' 9 from the context of Aboriginal people burial sites 10 because it was identified as problematic by Aboriginal 11 people. 12 And, secondly, the Province has introduced 13 a requirement for the registrar to advise the likely 14 representative of the persons interred in a burial site 15 upon being advised of the possible cultural origins of 16 the human remains. 17 As part of its consultation process the 18 Ministry posted the amendments on its website and the 19 Assistant Deputy Minister of Government Services wrote 20 directly to seventeen (17) Aboriginal groups seeking 21 comments on the proposed draft regulation and amendments. 22 The groups were provided with a copy of the draft 23 regulation, the Act and a summary chart of the proposed 24 amendments to the legislation. 25 In the Assistant Deputy Minister's letter
281 to the Aboriginal groups he advised that the Ministry was 2 awaiting the conclusion of the Ipperwash Inquiry and any 3 recommendations that may be made before considering 4 substantive policy changes. Ontario continues to welcome 5 and encourage comments from Aboriginal communities on the 6 clusters of regulations and related legislative 7 amendments. 8 The Province would like to build on 9 positive experiences with Aboriginal people and there 10 have been many. The Province recognizes that there is 11 still much to be done and that there will be challenges 12 for all involved in any new initiatives. 13 One (1) theme that has clearly emerged 14 from this Inquiry is the importance of relationships with 15 a focus on relationships among Aboriginal people, 16 governments and police. The OPPA will adequately deal 17 with the relationships involving the police. 18 Since the events at Ipperwash the Province 19 has announced that it is charting a new course for 20 constructive, cooperative relationships with Aboriginal 21 peoples of Ontario, relationships sustained by mutual 22 respect and recognition. 23 The Province's new approach, which was 24 shared in June 2005, calls for working with Aboriginal 25 peoples to build this relationship and through it develop
291 productive partnerships, collaborate on key initiatives 2 and achieve real progress on common goals. 3 In April 2005 Ontario, along with First 4 Nations and Canada, re-established an intergovernmental 5 forum to -- to improve relations among the three (3) 6 levels of government. The process known as Rebuilding 7 Canada, First Nations, Ontario, is trying to create 8 protocols for working together, mandating negotiations, 9 and developing effective dispute resolution processes. 10 Ontario remains committed to the renewal 11 of this process and will make every effort to sure -- to 12 ensure its success for all parties. 13 Following recent decisions of the Supreme 14 Court of Canada the Province has developed a framework 15 for consultation. The policy paper entitled, Draft 16 Guidelines for Ministries on Consultation with Aboriginal 17 Peoples Related to Aboriginal Rights and Treaty Rights, 18 was released in June 2006 and is now subject to 19 consideration by Aboriginal communities and groups. 20 In the area of natural resources there are 21 also positive steps being taken. The Ontario Government 22 and the Nishnawbe-Aski Nation Chiefs are developing a 23 framework for a northern table in order to ensure that 24 First Nations in the north are able to participate in the 25 benefits of resource development.
301 As noted by the Chiefs of Ontario in their 2 submissions, the Province collaborated with First Nations 3 to establish the Anishnaabeg Fisheries Resource Centre in 4 1995. 5 In 2000 the Anishnaabeg nation and the 6 Province established the Anishnaabeg Ontario Resource 7 Management Council which is an advisory body to the 8 Minister of Natural Resources and the Grand Council 9 Chief. The Council has facilitated productive 10 discussions in the areas of enforcement policy and 11 natural resources management. The Province has offered 12 and will continue to offer to expand these initiatives to 13 other First Nations. 14 Ongoing implementation of the Ministry's 15 interim enforcement policy has resulted in greater 16 awareness and understanding on the part of enforcement 17 staff about the constitutionally protected rights of 18 Aboriginal people and has reduced conflict as 19 conservation officers and Aboriginal people interact in 20 the field. The policy has promoted the pursuit of 21 negotiative resolutions that provide certainty and 22 clarity for all, as Aboriginal people exercise their 23 treaty and Aboriginal rights. 24 The Ministry of Natural Resources has made 25 efforts to improve the awareness and understanding of
311 Aboriginal issues by Ministry staff through internal 2 training programs. Equally, the enforcement staff of the 3 MNR seeks opportunities to liaise with Aboriginal 4 communities and organizations to provide awareness 5 training about the enforcement-related activities and 6 practices of Ministry enforcement staff. The Enforcement 7 Branch has also pursued the hiring and training of 8 Aboriginal conservation officers where there is interest. 9 Awareness and sensitivity have been 10 significant factors in reducing conflict and confusion, 11 reducing the number of charges against Aboriginal people 12 and enhancing cooperative and mutually respectful 13 relationships. 14 The Province's Part 2 submissions set out 15 ways in which the Ministry of Northern Development and 16 Mines continues to work to foster relationships and to 17 open lines of communication with Aboriginal people. 18 Many parties have made the point that the 19 education of non-Aboriginal people about Aboriginal 20 history, culture, and perspectives is an important part 21 of relationship building and they have suggested that 22 there be changes to the public school curricula. 23 In 2005/2006 the Ministry of Education 24 implemented a revised curriculum for public, elementary, 25 and secondary schools that incorporates Aboriginal
321 perspectives. Aboriginal perspectives were incorporated 2 into social studies, Canadian and world studies, 3 geography, history, law, politics, and economics courses. 4 The Province is currently revising the 5 English curriculum to include the work of First Nations 6 and Metis writers. 7 The Ministry of Education has met and will 8 continue to meet with Aboriginal representatives to find 9 ways of addressing the desire for more content about 10 Aboriginal cultures, histories and perspectives in the 11 public school curriculum. The Ministry will be making 12 more changes during each cycle of curriculum revision. 13 In relation to policing the OPP has 14 addressed many of the concerns raised at this Inquiry and 15 those are set out very well in the OPP's Part 2 16 submissions. 17 The Province also wishes to note that in 18 April 2006, Bill 103, the Independent Police Review Act 19 was introduced. If passed by the Legislature it will 20 create a new independent police review director that will 21 enhance civilian oversight of policing and improve the 22 public complaints process. 23 The Province has outlined in its Part 2 24 submissions and I have mentioned today examples of 25 positive steps taken by various Ministries, particularly
331 those most relevant to the Ipperwash Inquiry, to improve 2 its relations with Aboriginal people. 3 The Province's submissions do not include 4 the SIU, as it is not a focus of the Inquiry. However, 5 in light of the submissions made by the African Canadian 6 Legal Clinic, we would like to make one clarification and 7 highlight some recent initiatives of the SIU for the 8 record, as they are not included in our written 9 submissions. 10 By way of clarification, the African 11 Canadian Legal Clinic in its Part 2 submission at 12 paragraph 26 discusses its analysis of data extracted 13 from SIU records. The ACLC may have inadvertently 14 created the impression that it was given access to SIU 15 files including Director's reports. 16 The raw data was, in fact, collected by a 17 person who was retained by the SIU. The data was then 18 provided without personal identifiers to the ACLC's 19 researcher for his analysis. 20 In terms of recent initiatives, last year 21 the SIU implemented a First Nations liaison program to 22 improve the delivery of SIU services in those cases 23 involving First Nations persons, whether as injured 24 parties or deceased persons and their families. 25 The First Nations liaison program is
341 delivered by a full-time First Nations investigator with 2 assistance from other, as needed, investigators of First 3 Nations ancestry. 4 There was wide consultation by the SIU 5 with the Provincial Treaties organizations in the design 6 and implementation of the First Nations liaison program. 7 The SIU remains open to suggestions as to how to adjust 8 the delivery of this important service. 9 Other initiatives by the SIU to engage 10 First Nations communities over the last few years include 11 an ongoing dialogue with the Nishnawbe-Aski Nation on 12 ways to improve relations with the SIU, including the 13 development of a First Nations Centre Training Program 14 which is scheduled to be delivered this September. 15 The development of a protocol with 16 Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto whereby the SIU 17 notifies the ALST of incidents involving the death of 18 First Nations persons so they can offer legal services to 19 the families. 20 Plans to form a northern version of the 21 Director's Resource Committee, the members of which 22 represent various racial and cultural communities, which 23 would include members of First Nations communities. 24 The ACLC's submission refers to the Adam's 25 Report recommendation about providing cross-cultural
351 educational opportunities for SIU investigations and 2 recruitment from more culturally and racially diverse 3 backgrounds. 4 The Province is pleased to note that the 5 SIU has made cross-cultural education a component of 6 every single training program organized for SIU 7 investigators. The SIU is committed to improving 8 recruitment of qualified investigators from culturally 9 and racial diverse backgrounds, through the Director's 10 Resource Committee. 11 Both the African Canadian Legal Clinic and 12 Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto are members of the 13 Committee. The SIU welcomes any recommendations that 14 would assist it in its cross-cultural training and 15 recruitment efforts. 16 The events at Ipperwash and more recent 17 events have shown that disputes involving First Nations, 18 governments and non-Aboriginal peoples are often very 19 complex and have features that are unique to each 20 community. In addition, disputes can change and evolve 21 over time. 22 The Commission no doubt recognizes the 23 need for flexibility and the exercise of discretion in 24 any proposed recommendations for avoiding violence in 25 similar circumstances.
361 Ontario agrees with the observation of 2 many parties that honest and open dialogue in an 3 environment of mutual respect must be the starting point 4 for resolving any dispute. This Inquiry has provided a 5 long awaited opportunities -- or opportunity for parties 6 with varying interests and perspectives to listen to one 7 another and to consider different points of view. 8 Ontario is listening to the submissions of 9 the parties so that it can continue to strengthen its 10 relationship with First Nations and other Aboriginal 11 communities with local municipalities and with all 12 Ontarians. 13 In closing, the Province would like to 14 thank you, Mr. Commissioner, for your attentiveness and 15 fairness throughout the Inquiry, Commission Counsel for 16 their diligence and skill, and all counsel and parties 17 who have contributed to the success of the Inquiry 18 through the questioning of witnesses and the thoughtful 19 preparation of submissions. 20 On a personal note, and with your 21 indulgence, Mr. Commissioner, I would like to acknowledge 22 the contribution of my colleagues throughout the 23 Government and especially my colleagues at the Crown Law 24 Office Civil and to thank them for their hard work, 25 diligence and collegiality.
371 You have a challenging task ahead of you, 2 Mr. Commissioner, but we know that you are more than 3 capable of meeting any challenge and accomplishing any 4 task presented to you. The Province looks forward to 5 receiving your report and to taking action in response to 6 your recommendations. Thank you very much. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 8 very much, Ms. Twohig. 9 Mr. Roland, may I ask how long do you 10 expect to be? I haven't been doing that with 11 submissions, but just so we could decide whether to take 12 a break because I don't want to break in the middle. 13 MR. IAN ROLAND: I'm not -- I'm certainly 14 not going to be my two (2) hours. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, I know 16 that but -- 17 MR. IAN ROLAND: I may not be -- I may 18 not be an hour. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, then I 20 think would you be offended if we took a break now and 21 then you -- 22 MR. IAN ROLAND: I would not -- 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- and then 24 you -- to just carry on -- 25 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- be offended in the
381 slightest. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- because I 3 would like to have at least one (1) break this morning. 4 MR. IAN ROLAND: Sure. Yeah. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We'll take a 6 short break now and then we'll -- because we do not have 7 another submission after yours until -- 8 MR. IAN ROLAND: I can extend it to three 9 (3) hours if you like. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, I'm not 11 asking you to do that, Mr. Roland, but thank you very 12 much anyway. 13 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 14 for ten (10) minutes. 15 16 --- Upon recessing at 9:48 a.m. 17 --- Upon resuming at 10:06 a.m. 18 19 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 20 resumed. Please be seated. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 22 Roland...? 23 MR. IAN ROLAND: Good morning, Mr. 24 Commissioner. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good
391 morning. 2 3 FINAL SUBMISSIONS BY THE ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE 4 ASSOCIATION: 5 MR. IAN ROLAND: I want to begin where 6 Ms. Twohig finished, that is to thank those persons who 7 ventured on this long two (2) year journey with me. 8 In particular I want to thank my partner 9 Karen Jones who worked so diligently throughout the 10 Inquiry and did much of the heavy lifting. I also want 11 to thank Deb Newell for her tireless help, her guidance 12 through the evidentiary record, not only for us but I 13 think for others, and her inspired suggestions. 14 And finally, I want to thank those who 15 assisted us, Ian McGilp, Jennifer Gleitman, Robyn Trask, 16 Caroline Swerdlyk, Annie Leeks and Val LeBlanc. 17 Mr. Commissioner, we represent the 18 interest of the OPPA, it's members and former members. 19 One of those former members was Ken Deane. Your mandate 20 is to inquire into the events surrounding the death of 21 Dudley George, which certainly include the interaction 22 between Ken Deane and Dudley George and its context. 23 At the time the Inquiry was called by 24 Attorney General Michael Bryant, he announced that it 25 would be a thorough review of the events at Ipperwash.
401 There is no doubt that such a review, logically includes 2 the facts concerning the shooting of Dudley George, 3 including the findings of Judge Fraser. We dealt in 4 detail with those findings in our written submissions. 5 More about Ken Deane in a moment. 6 I first want to commend you, Mr. 7 Commissioner, for the patience and attention to the 8 evidence that you've shown throughout this Inquiry. 9 You've sought to find the proper balance between 10 relevance and the appearance of fully and fairly 11 inquiring into the matters that are set out in your 12 mandate. For this we applaud you. 13 The OPPA members who were called to tell 14 their story appreciated the professionalism showed to 15 them by Commission Counsel and their staff, in assisting 16 them to make their way through this difficult process, 17 and in assisting at least some of them with the 18 opportunity to tell their account of the events for the 19 first time in public. 20 The OPPA members called as witnesses by 21 Commission Counsel are or were frontline officers 22 employed by the OPP, who daily carried out their assigned 23 duties to police our communities. They carried out these 24 same duties under the direction of their superiors in the 25 area of Ipperwash Provincial Park in September 1995.
411 As the evidence has demonstrated these 2 frontline police officers carried out their duties in 3 good faith, conscientiously and in a reasonable manner in 4 all the circumstances, within the context of both the 5 situation which -- which -- with which they were faced 6 and the directions they received from their superiors. 7 Equally important the Commission heard 8 quite appropriate expressions of empathy from rank and 9 file police officers towards those citizens with whom, 10 because of the officer's assigned duties, they were 11 required to engage. 12 Many of the police officers who testified 13 expressed their displeasure with the role assigned to 14 them as intervenors in what was and continues to be a 15 civil dispute over property rights between First Nations 16 people and the Federal and Provincial Governments. 17 Police officers like the rest of society, 18 are not always perfect. Many of the officers who 19 testified acknowledged that, on occasions, their action 20 or conduct could have been better and that it merited 21 improvement. 22 What you heard was an expression of desire 23 by OPPA members who interact daily with individuals in 24 situations of conflict, to carry out their 25 responsibilities in a manner that meets the reasonable
421 expectations of all of the citizens of Ontario that they 2 serve. 3 Now, I said I'd speak further about Ken 4 Deane. And let me turn to Ken Deane just for a moment. 5 Mr. Commissioner, you heard from Mr. Scullion earlier 6 this week when he asked the question, why does the OPP 7 not accept the decision of Judge Fraser? 8 He suggested to you -- or accurately that 9 Ken Deane accepted the decision and we agree he did. Ken 10 Deane also apologize to the George family and to First 11 Nations communities for the death of Dudley George. 12 However, Ken Deane always maintained that he felt his 13 actions on September 6th were justified. He testified as 14 such at his trial and at his disciplinary hearing under 15 the Police Services Act. 16 The Ontario Provincial Police Association 17 is an organization that is committed to representing 18 police officers, their interests, and in promoting 19 officers' safety and in defending officers. The OPPA 20 makes no apology for this. That is why we are here, to 21 defend the actions of OPPA members, past and present, who 22 were directed to respond to the occupation of Ipperwash 23 Provincial Park. 24 Being a police officer is a difficult job. 25 And as I have indicated, they are human, mistakes can
431 sometimes happen. When Acting Sergeant Deane was 2 deployed on the night of September 6th the instructions 3 given to him were clear; protect the CMU. 4 Acting Sergeant Deane did not ask to be 5 sent down East Parkway Drive that night. The decision to 6 be there was no his. Like other TRU members deployed he 7 was there to ensure public -- or to ensure officer 8 safety. 9 The situation that developed that night 10 was dangerous. Officers were put at risk. Vehicles were 11 driven at the police. Shots were fired. In those 12 circumstances Acting Sergeant Deane honestly believed, 13 mistaken or not, that the situation required him to act 14 and he was duty bound to act without delay to protect the 15 lives of police officers. 16 His police training told him to do so, his 17 police experience told him to do so and the orders he 18 received that night told him to do so. He believed his 19 actions were justified and the OPPA defends his belief. 20 Other can argue whether Acting Sergeant 21 Deane should or should not have been there. But once put 22 into that situation the OPPA represents and defends a 23 police officer who asserts that he was doing his job to 24 protect the lives of other police officers. 25 And the significance of this has to be
441 borne in the context of the danger police officers face 2 daily. Since this Inquiry began nine (9) police officers 3 across Canada have been killed by gunfire while doing 4 their jobs. 5 Since the inception of the OPP almost a 6 hundred (100) years ago, twenty-one OPP officers have 7 been shot and killed on the job. Many more have suffered 8 injuries by gunfire. Mr. Commissioner, the firearms 9 threat to police officers doing their job is real. We 10 read about it every day in the newspapers. 11 The threat, however small or 12 unsubstantiated, cannot be dismissed. It must be taken 13 seriously at all times because officer safety is 14 paramount. Unlike other professions in our society we 15 require police officers in their employment to put 16 themselves in personal danger. 17 Section 43 of the Occupational Health and 18 Safety Act permits workers to refuse to work in dangerous 19 situations. However, the Act exempts police officers 20 from the right to refuse dangerous work. They are 21 required to put themselves in harm's way. We require 22 them to do so for our collective benefit. 23 Let me turn, if I could, to the issue of 24 public -- or, sorry, police officer safety, really as 25 raised by Mr. Rosenthal in his submission to you that on
451 September 6 ERT members, in fewer numbers, should have 2 been sent to the sandy parking lot rather than CMU 3 members in the numbers that were sent, approximately 4 forty (40). Of course, ERT officers are CMU members but 5 without protective equipment. 6 Mr. Rosenthal has apparently little 7 appreciation for officer safety. In order to safeguard 8 officers who are required to deal with potentially 9 violent protestors in a non-lethal confrontation, police 10 officers are required to respond and should do so with 11 appropriate equipment to protect themselves. This allows 12 them to engage in the use of non-lethal force and at the 13 same time minimize the risk of them getting hurt. 14 If officers risk serious bodily harm 15 because they do not have the protective body armour, and 16 that's what hard TAC is, it's protective body armour, 17 then officers may be forced to escalate their use of 18 force response in order to protect themselves. 19 Obviously, this puts the safety of the protest -- 20 protesters at greater risk. 21 This should be appreciated, that is that 22 Hard TAC, body armour, protective equipment, is necessary 23 not only in non-lethal confrontations to protect 24 officers, it also protects the protestors. 25 Now, let me turn to, really, a related
461 issue raised by Mr. Scullion when he was in his 2 presentation two (2) days ago critical of the OPPA's 3 position in Caledonia. He didn't really enunciate the 4 nature of that criticism but let me make clear the OPPA's 5 position in Caledonia. 6 Its criticism of the Caledonia situation 7 focussed entirely upon officer safety. As I've said 8 officer safety is a critical concern for our client and 9 its members. 10 In a June 8, 2006, article in the Hamilton 11 Spectator Karl Walsh, the President of the OPPA, 12 expressed the concern of the Association and its members 13 that officers at Caledonia were told not to wear riot 14 gear, that is body armour, hard TAC, and that TRU members 15 were told not to wear tactical uniforms and frontline 16 officers felt that they didn't have strong enough 17 presence at the barricades at Caledonia making it 18 dangerous for them on the frontline. 19 At that stage, that is by June 8, 2006, 20 thirteen (13) OPP officers had already been injured while 21 assigned to the Caledonia standoff. It was the 22 Association's and its members' view that at least some of 23 those injuries could have been avoided if members were 24 allowed to use the equipment available to them for their 25 protection.
471 Mr. Walsh also was reported to have 2 expressed the view that the Caledonia stand-off required 3 Federal intervention to resolve the land dispute. He 4 took issue with the comments of Prime Minister Harper 5 that the dispute was ultimately a provincial law 6 enforcement issue and he indicated that he would be 7 seeking the assistance of the Canadian Professional 8 Police Association to pressure Mr. Harper to step in. 9 Mr. Walsh then stated: 10 "This is clearly a Federal matter. Our 11 officers are the ones who are stuck in 12 the middle of this. We want our 13 officers back in their communities. We 14 want them to go home to their families 15 safe and sound." 16 Contrary to what Mr. Scullion suggests 17 these are not the views of a leader and an association 18 that seeks -- that sees the Caledonia occupation as 19 nothing more than a law and order issue to be resolved by 20 force. 21 Indeed, four (4) days later, that is on 22 June the 12th, 2006, the CPPA, that is the Canadian 23 Professional Police Association, passed two (2) 24 resolutions concerning Caledonia. Those resolutions 25 stated in part:
481 "Be it further resolved that the 2 Canadian Professional Police 3 Association supports a peaceful 4 resolution of the stand-off at 5 Caledonia and be it finally resolved 6 that the CPPA calls on parties on both 7 sides of this conflict including First 8 Nations, Federal Government, and 9 Provincial Government decision makers 10 to make the safety of officers, 11 protestors, and the general public 12 paramount in their minds as they seek a 13 resolution to this stand-off." 14 The second resolution provided in part: 15 "Be it resolved that the CPPA call upon 16 the Federal Government to uphold its 17 constitutional obligations and take a 18 lead role in bringing about a peaceful 19 resolution to the stand-off by 20 remaining at the table in a fully- 21 engaged manner until the situation is 22 resolved." 23 Now, in spite of these resolutions and the 24 resolve of our Client that the stand-off be resolved in a 25 peaceful manner, seventeen (17) OPPA officers have now
491 been injured -- 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm trying 3 not to interrupt you, Mr. Roland, but you've gone on 4 quite a bit on Caledonia. I don't want to go too much 5 longer. 6 MR. IAN ROLAND: Well, let me tell you 7 that the most serious of those injuries has required 8 hospitalization and yet that it continues. 9 The point I want to make is that our 10 Client and our -- and its members seek to have these 11 confrontations resolved peacefully, not by force, not by 12 confrontation, peacefully -- 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 14 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- For everybody's 15 interest. 16 17 CONTINUED BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 18 MR. IAN ROLAND: Now, let me turn to the 19 issue of discipline; that is police discipline. 20 A number of Aboriginal parties have asked 21 you to insert yourself into the police statutory 22 discipline process. It is neither part of your mandate 23 to propose amendments to the provincial discipline 24 scheme, nor is it your mandate to review and criticize 25 the discipline process engaged in by the OPP that at
501 least some parties before you allege under-disciplined 2 OPP officers. 3 On June 5, 2006, you stated -- that's at 4 page 8: 5 "I have said on other occasions this is 6 not an inquiry into the adequacy of the 7 OPP complaint and discipline process, 8 nor of the investigation carried out by 9 the OPP as outlined in Exhibits P-10- 10 51, 10-52 and 10-53." 11 Nevertheless, some parties have pressed 12 upon you alleged inadequacies in the discipline process 13 and the OPP's disciplinary actions. In particular, these 14 parties have called for harsh discipline penalties for 15 police misconduct that involved First Nations individuals 16 or arising from interactions between police officers and 17 First Nations persons. 18 As we indicate in our written submissions 19 there is a highly developed and sophisticated 20 jurisprudence concerning the principles that inform 21 appropriate penalties in the particular context of each 22 individual case. 23 Central to these principles, is the 24 recognition that rehabilitation and reformation of police 25 officers is a critical factor. Fertile ground for
511 reformation requires recognition and admission of 2 wrongdoing by the wrongdoer. 3 It is long understood in the art and 4 science of discipline that overly harsh penalties invite 5 denial rather than recognition and admission of fault. 6 This principle appears to have entirely 7 escaped at least some of the counsel for the Aboriginal 8 parties. All of this is no doubt very familiar to you, 9 Mr. Commissioner, in light of your background and 10 experience in police discipline processes. 11 Mr. Falconer urges upon you a 12 recommendation that there be public trials or hearings of 13 alleged misconduct occurring during interactions between 14 police and First Nations individuals. Quite frankly, 15 this is a spurious request because it's exactly where we 16 are today for any complaint concerning the conduct of 17 police officers, whether the complaint originates from an 18 Aboriginal person or from any citizen. 19 Currently Part 5 of the Police Services 20 Act and Bill 103, gives a public complainant both status 21 and rights in a police investigation of misconduct and 22 party status at a discipline hearing. 23 ALST proposes that there be formal 24 discipline penalties for any racist or culturally 25 insensitive misconduct. A public complaint of any
521 allegation of misconduct gives the complainant the right 2 to know the result of the investigation, to participate 3 or decline to participate in the informal resolution 4 process and to request OCCOPS, the Ontario Civilian 5 Commission on Police Services to refer the complaint to a 6 formal discipline hearing in which the complainant can 7 participate as a party. 8 The role of the complainant in the 9 discipline investigation and resolution process is even 10 further enhanced in Bill 103. If the matter complained 11 of merits a formal discipline proceeding the present 12 Legislative scheme provides for such a result. 13 Let me turn if I could then, to the 14 empathy shown -- I think it's important to emphasize the 15 empathy shown by police officers regarding the land 16 claims issues. Because the OPPA members who testified 17 before you demonstrated a genuine empathy for occupiers 18 grievances regarding the appropriation of the Ipperwash 19 Army Camp lands and to the occupiers frustration 20 regarding the interaction of the Government in returning 21 -- the inaction of the Government in returning those 22 lands to them. 23 For example, Detective Sergeants -- or 24 sorry -- Detective -- Constable Speck, Constable Dougan, 25 Constable Irvine, Sergeant Richardson, Sergeant Seltzer,
531 Sergeant Hebblethwaite and Acting Staff Sergeant Skinner; 2 all specifically testified about the sympathy that they 3 had for the occupiers grievances. 4 The OPP members empathized not only for 5 the occupiers grievances but, they also recognized that 6 they had a job to do. And that included -- included 7 addressing disorderly behaviour in preserving public and 8 officer safety. 9 As stated aptly by Constable Irvine: 10 "The situation at Ipperwash should have 11 been dealt with by the Government as 12 opposed to the police, because we 13 certainly couldn't solve any land claim 14 as police officers." 15 However, political solutions are often 16 drawn out and I think you recognize as did the officers, 17 that they are called upon to maintain public safety. And 18 when this occurs, they're obliged to put their own safety 19 at risk. This safety cannot, in any circumstances, be 20 compromised. 21 Now, the officers all -- that testified 22 before you also showed that they were greatly affected by 23 the events of September 6th. They came to this Inquiry 24 and told you how those events affected them. They found 25 them extremely stressful.
541 They also told you that they believed the 2 events were tragic and all have described the events as 3 tragic. They were tragic for everybody involved. A Part 4 2 paper submitted by the OPP entitled, The Impact of 5 Stress on Police Officers and the OPP Response, makes the 6 point that the stress of belonging to the law enforcement 7 profession affects every officer. It is just a matter of 8 degree. 9 The paper states that policing is the most 10 psychologically dangerous job in the world. The paper 11 also focusses and discuss -- focusses on and discusses 12 critical incident stress. It states that: 13 "It would appear that certain 14 traumatic events are so dramatic, 15 shocking and disturbing to our 16 collective psyches that we agree 17 that they are critical incidents. 18 The majority of officers exposed to 19 a critical incident will be affected 20 by acute stress reactions. Post- 21 incident perceptions for anyone 22 experiencing critical incident 23 stress include diminished sounds, 24 tunnel vision, slow motion time, 25 memory loss for parts of the event
551 and perceptual distortions. Given 2 these natural sensitory deprivations 3 agencies should expect that 4 officers' reports to be incomplete. 5 Each person focusses on different 6 things." 7 All of this, Mr. Commissioner, should be 8 factored into your consideration of the evidence of all 9 of those involved in the sandy parking lot incident of 10 September 6th as you come to write your report. 11 Detective Constable Speck, Constable 12 Jacklin and Constable Bittner all testified that what 13 happened was a tragedy. For Constable Root the events at 14 Ipperwash had a profound effect on him and there is not a 15 week or month that goes by that he does not think of it. 16 Sergeant Lacroix feels that the whole 17 situation was very tragic and that he suffered from post- 18 traumatic stress after the event. For Sergeant 19 Hebblethwaite, September 6th was the -- as he described 20 it, the worst day of his life. For years afterwards he 21 had nightmares. 22 Sergeant Seltzer's experiences at 23 Ipperwash burden him to this day. Acting Staff Sergeant 24 Skinner states that the role of any police officer is to 25 protect life. He understood that these events had a
561 tremendous impacting on Action Sergeant Deane and he made 2 it clear that no police officer will willingly take -- 3 would willingly take on the role of ending a life. 4 Many more officers were affected. There 5 is no doubt that the events of September 6th were a 6 tragedy for all those involved. The post-traumatic 7 stress of the officers and their view that this was a 8 tragedy and a police failure needs to be kept in mind 9 when one comes to consider the actual intent of some of 10 those matters for which their -- the officers have been 11 criticized including the impugned memorabilia. Now -- 12 which I'll turn to in due course. 13 Let me first though deal with the issue of 14 accountability because, Mr. Commissioner, certain parties 15 have suggested that there's been a lack of accountability 16 by OPPA members. We disagree. 17 Let me first speak to the issue of the 18 arrests. With respect to the various arrests you heard 19 officers testify about the circumstances of those 20 arrests. You heard their evidence about the context of 21 those events. You heard about their actions and their 22 motivations for those arrests. They explained to you why 23 they believed their actions were reasonable and based 24 upon their honest belief that those arrests were 25 necessary in the interests of public safety and officer
571 safety. 2 Of course, in hindsight, what happened was 3 most unfortunate and various officers acknowledge this 4 and empathize with how difficult those circumstances were 5 for those arrested. 6 Those circumstances were also very 7 difficult circumstances for the officers. Mark Gransden 8 for instance concerning the arrest of Marcia Simon said 9 when asked the question, the question being: 10 "That's striking, sir, that you came to 11 this Inquiry and even knowing 12 everything you know now you didn't 13 express any regret about your arrest of 14 Marcia Simon. Do you regret it at all, 15 sir? 16 A: From what I understand I 17 understand it was a traumatic event or 18 very serious event for Ms. Simon. 19 Q: Yes? 20 And I wish for all our parts that we 21 didn't have to go through that." 22 Trevor Richardson about the hospital 23 arrest said: 24 "Well, it was a sad situation; there 25 was no about it. You know, I felt bad
581 having to arrest the people and taking 2 them away from -- from their -- it 3 turns out their brother. And -- but on 4 the same circumstances I also had to 5 worry about fellow officers and medical 6 staff and the public as well and so I 7 had to make a decision. I made it 8 and -- 9 Q: All right. 10 A: -- that's where I am. 11 Q: And it didn't give you any pause 12 to think that here are some relatives 13 of a person bringing him to hospital 14 and I'm going to arrest them and take 15 them away and Dudley just goes to 16 hospital? 17 A: Well, I feel bad about that, I 18 really do." 19 Let me turn to the mugs and T-shirts 20 because likewise you heard various officers who testified 21 about this memorabilia. They explained to you why they 22 created or purchased memorabilia and the significance it 23 had for them in relation to the events at Ipperwash. 24 However, there was also acknowledgement 25 by officers that those articles were seen differently by
591 members of the First Nations community and offence was 2 taken to those articles when none was meant by the 3 officers at the time. 4 For example, Bill Klym said about the 5 second T-shirt when asked: 6 "And why did you use the concept of a 7 broken arrow, sir? 8 A: In -- in retrospect it was a poor 9 choice of symbology obviously and I 10 deeply regret, I deeply regret any hurt 11 that has been taken by the George 12 Family or by the First Nations 13 community in general. The symbol was 14 not meant to signify the death of 15 Dudley George or the breaking of the 16 First Nations community." 17 And he's asked: 18 "And today do you believe that it was 19 appropriate to create the T-shirt? 20 A: Absolutely not. 21 Q: And can you tell the Commissioner 22 today why you think it was 23 inappropriate, sir? 24 A: I believe it was inappropriate in 25 the -- the symbology which culturally
601 perhaps was of major significance to 2 the First Nations community and that 3 there's many different interpretations 4 that could be taken in a very negative 5 manner with respect to that. That 6 wasn't my intention but I understand 7 that that is what could be taken from 8 it and for that I apologize." 9 Now, sir, you'll remember George Speck's 10 evidence about the first T-shirt when he acquired the 11 first -- about the fact that he acquired a first T-shirt 12 and he was asked the question: 13 "And do you still have the T-shirt with 14 you? 15 A: No, sir. 16 Q: What's happened to it? 17 A: That T-shirt was long since 18 destroyed. 19 Q: Sorry? 20 A: It was long since destroyed. 21 Q: Were you told to destroy the T- 22 shirt? 23 A: No, sir, I did that of my own 24 accord. 25 Q: And why was that?
611 A: At the time that I purchased the 2 T-shirt I had no knowledge that -- that 3 the eagle feather horizontally 4 positioned on the T-shirt was offensive 5 in any manner to the First Nation 6 community. As soon as I found that out 7 the T-shirt was destroyed and I 8 certainly apologize to any member of 9 the First Nation community that I may 10 have offended at any time that I wore 11 that T-shirt or at the time that -- of 12 the purchase. I did not know it was 13 offensive." 14 George Hebblethwaite said of the second T- 15 shirt: 16 "I understand how it is offensive today 17 and if I hadn't -- haven't said it 18 clearly and I believe I have I'm sorry 19 to Mr. George that this has been taken 20 this way; I really am." 21 Now, the submissions were put to you that 22 there was no -- there was no acknowledgement of 23 responsibility by the officers for the inappropriateness 24 as it turned out of the memorabilia. Not only did they 25 acknowledge that it was inappropriate, they apologized.
621 With respect to the inappropriate 2 comments, Mr. Commissioner, we've addressed in our 3 written submissions the issue of inappropriate remarks 4 captured on tape. We don't intend to repeat our 5 submissions to you here. 6 However, the OPPA members acknowledge 7 their comments as being inappropriate and apologies were 8 extended. You heard those apologies and they were made 9 here public to the communities at large. 10 So we reject that there has not been 11 accountability by the officers who made those 12 inappropriate comments. Now, in his submissions -- oral 13 submissions to you, Mr. Rosenthal indicated that he 14 didn't like the distinction that we've drawn between 15 cultural insensitivity and racism. 16 We accept that the impact of the 17 memorabilia on his clients or other First Nations persons 18 may be much the same whether one characterizes the 19 memorabilia as culturally insensitive or racist, in the 20 absence of any knowledge or awareness of the purpose or 21 intent of the memorabilia. 22 But, what we know from this Inquiry, is 23 that the officer who created the memorabilia and the 24 officers who acquired the memorabilia, did not intend to 25 denigrate the occupiers or the aboriginal community.
631 We know from the evidence that the 2 memorabilia represented for the officers, not simply the 3 evening of September 6, it was about the entire Ipperwash 4 event. 5 Yet even with the knowledge gained from 6 these Hearings of the intent of the officers who created 7 the memorabilia, Mr. Rosenthal and to a lesser extent 8 other counsel representing Aboriginal parties continue to 9 accuse the officer of express, intentional or overt 10 racism. 11 Even when the officer express regret and 12 apologies for creating the memorabilia and also when they 13 express regret and apologies for the inappropriate 14 comments; counsel is not satisfied and instead seeks a 15 determination from you to find the OPP is plagued by 16 individual and systemic problems of racism. 17 Unfortunately, some counsel for Aboriginal 18 parties denied the existence of the apologies to the 19 persons affected by the inappropriate memorabilia and 20 comments. Quite frankly, it's not at all helpful for the 21 improvement of awareness and sensitivity to racial, 22 ethnic or cultural differences in our society, whether 23 one is focussed on police officers or any other segment 24 or professional group in society; to label unintended and 25 misinformed conduct that turns out to be insensitive to a
641 particular race, culture, ethnic group, as overt racist 2 acts. 3 Overt racist acts and comments that are 4 meant to or designed to express racial superiority, 5 prejudice, enmity or hostility are very different -- very 6 different from unintended and uniformed acts that are not 7 ill-motivated but are viewed by a particular cultural 8 group as inappropriate because they are insensitive. 9 The OPP and its members do not condone 10 racist comments or attitudes amongst its membership. The 11 comments made by Constables Dyke and Whitehead, which 12 have been referred to at the Inquiry were discovered by 13 other police officers on review of the tapes in response 14 to a Freedom of Information and Privacy Request. 15 The comments were reported by the officers 16 who discovered them and a professional standards 17 investigation was carried out. The OPPA apologized for 18 these comments made by two (2) of its members. The OPPA 19 does not condone the remarks and does not accept them as 20 being representative of the views of the men and women 21 who are members of the OPPA. 22 In its January 2004 press release the OPPA 23 stated: 24 "The Association and its members, past 25 and present deeply regret both the tone
651 and content of the remarks on this tape 2 made by two (2) of our members. We do 3 not condone the remarks and we do not 4 accept them as being representative of 5 the views of the vast majority of men 6 and women who are members of the OPPA. 7 On behalf of all our members we are 8 very sorry and offer our apologies for 9 these hurtful remarks." 10 Now, this collective apology by the OPPA 11 has remained on its website to today for the last two and 12 a half (2 1/2) years. 13 It's unfair quite frankly and insensitive 14 to a professional group to label all the members of the 15 group as racist on the basis of a few comments or actions 16 of some of its members. 17 Now, let me turn if I could Mr. 18 Commissioner, to, for a moment, to Cecil Bernard George. 19 I would have thought, Mr. Commissioner, that after Cecil 20 Bernard George's evidence about his actions there would 21 be little controversy about how the events of his arrest 22 began. However, Mr. Henderson submitted to you that 23 Cecil Bernard George was arrested as a peaceful 24 negotiator. 25 This is entirely inconsistent with
661 Mr. George's own evidence. On December the 7th, 2004, at 2 pages 61 and 62 Cecil Bernard George testified that he 3 was in the Park when the CMU arrived at the sandy parking 4 lot. On his own testimony he picked up a pipe and went 5 over the fence. 6 He told you that he was so full of anger 7 at that point that he's still trying to understand it. 8 He raised the pipe in his hand, swung it at an officer 9 and told you that all he heard was an echo, the breaking 10 of a plexiglass shield. 11 Now, Mr. Commissioner, the plexiglass 12 shield of a CMU officer does not break without 13 considerable force being applied to it. You heard 14 evidence from Staff Sergeant Lacroix that during CMU 15 training ERT members would hit each other with hockey 16 pucks, pieces of wood and PVC pipe so that they could 17 build confidence in their equipment. Staff Sergeant 18 Lacroix testified he never saw a shield break during 19 training. 20 Let me turn to another topic, Sergeant 21 Stan Korosec. Mr. Falconer and others have attempted to 22 paint a picture of Sergeant Korosec as a command officer. 23 An officer involved in strategic and operational 24 decisions. In particular, an officer involved in the 25 decision making processes to deploy the CMU.
671 The evidence does not support these 2 submissions to you. Sergeant Korosec was not a command 3 officer. He was not a senior officer. He was not an 4 officer involved in any decision making processes 5 concerning Ipperwash and certainly not the officer who 6 made the decision to deploy the CMU. 7 Our reply submissions set out the true 8 facts of his involvement in substantial detail. However, 9 Mr. Commissioner, it must be said that it is 10 extraordinarily unfair to this process and to Sergeant 11 Korosec to suggest for the first time in final 12 submissions that he was a critical part of the decision 13 making process to deploy the CMU. 14 He testified here for three (3) days. And 15 no one suggested to him in cross-examination that he was 16 a critical decision maker or that he covertly suited up 17 and/or deployed the CMU without authorization or 18 instructions from the Incident Commander. 19 Yesterday, Mr. Falconer put up on the 20 screen a quote taken from 20:32 hours on September 6th 21 that read "Lacroix is on his way up to do these guys". 22 Mr. Falconer puts forward this evidence for the purpose 23 of showing that Sergeant Korosec made the decision to 24 deploy the CMU before Inspector Carson, the Incident 25 Commander, had decided to do so.
681 Of course, Mr. Falconer ignores the 2 evidence that Sergeant Korosec called Staff Sergeant 3 Lacroix to report for duty as the CMU commander because 4 he was told to do so by Inspector Linton. 5 The only reason Mr. Falconer and others 6 are motivated to create the illusion that Sergeant 7 Korosec is a decision maker is to tie into the decision 8 making process the recorded conversation between Sergeant 9 Korosec and Constable Jacklin which took place on the 10 night of September 5. 11 There's no connection between that 12 conversation and the decision to deploy the CMU and 13 Sergeant Korosec was at pains to contextualize the 14 inappropriate content of the conversation he had with 15 Constable Jacklin. 16 Let me turn to another topic, just 17 briefly, the use of force report for pointing long guns. 18 Mr. Rosenthal's asked you to recommend that the 19 regulation in the Police Services Act be amended to 20 require the use of force -- a Use of Force report 21 whenever a police officer points a long gun at a person. 22 Such a recommendation is at the outer 23 limits of your mandate, if not beyond your mandate. But, 24 Mr. Commissioner, you have no evidentiary basis for you 25 to evaluate the competing considerations between this
691 proposal and the current provision in the Police Services 2 Act. 3 You don't have the benefit of any analysis 4 -- analysis or consideration of all of the circumstances 5 during which long guns are used by police officers. All 6 we know is that long guns are used by some special units 7 like TRU and ERT. 8 You also have very little evidence 9 concerning the purpose of Use of Force reports. What we 10 do know is that they are used for the purpose of 11 statistics and to monitor normal day-to-day use of 12 handguns by police officers. 13 Mr. Commissioner, you shouldn't lightly 14 stray into recommendations for which you have so little 15 information or evidence and which may have implications 16 that you cannot anticipate. 17 Now, let me turn to one (1) of Mr. 18 Scullion's concerns expressed to you two (2) days ago. 19 Mr. Scullion was concerned that our client had not made 20 any written recommendations to you in either Part 1 or 21 Part 2. 22 It may come to him as some disappointment 23 that there's no disconnect and no dissidence between the 24 views of the OPP and the OPPA concerning appropriate 25 recommendations to you. The OPPA has had the benefit of
701 knowing the recommendations of the OPP in both its Part 1 2 and Part 2 submissions long before they were made here. 3 Indeed the OPPA has supported all of the 4 measures that have been introduced by the OPP over the 5 last ten (10) years and its members have embraced them. 6 The OPPA agrees with and supports the OPP recommendations 7 in both its Part 1 and Part 2 submissions. 8 The Association accepts the underlying 9 factual basis for these recommendations as put forward by 10 the OPP. The recommendations are widespread and are 11 informed not only by the evidence you've heard but also 12 by the institutional experiences of the OPP and its 13 officers. Importantly, these recommendations are 14 informed by the experience of the OPP and its officers 15 from 1995 to today. 16 The OPP has brought forward in evidence 17 and its -- and in its submissions measures to improve 18 relations between police officers and First Nations 19 communities. These are detailed in its submissions, 20 particularly at pages 54 to 57 and includes such things 21 as the creation of the Aboriginal Relations Teams, 22 Regional Aboriginal Strategy Committees, Major Event 23 Liaison Teams, and a host of other measures. 24 You've also heard a great deal about 25 native awareness training courses instituted by the OPP.
711 The OPP and its members are very supportive of such 2 training and have welcomed it. 3 All across Ontario there are local 4 relationships between our members and Aboriginal 5 communities. Our members have benefited from an 6 excellent relationship with members of the Aboriginal 7 communities, its leaderships, and organizations. Indeed 8 the evidence you've heard concerning the relationship 9 between local OPP officers and the Kettle and Stony Point 10 community members prior to September 1995 makes this 11 point. 12 Relationships between Aboriginal 13 communities and OPP officers can always be improved no 14 matter what their current state may be. It's not a 15 static relationship. The relationship between police and 16 any community requires constant attention and 17 maintenance. 18 The OPP and its members are fully 19 supportive, fully supportive of efforts, programs, and 20 training that may bring about a mutually beneficial 21 partnership between its members and the communities they 22 police. As Sir Robert Peel said the community are the 23 police and the police are the community. 24 Incidents such as Ipperwash pose serious 25 risks to the safety of the public and to police officers.
721 A cooperative relationship between police and Aboriginal 2 communities will go a long way to avoid such risks. 3 The OPPA also supports the position taken 4 by the OPP that Aboriginal communities that prefer self- 5 policing to OPP policing should be assisted to police 6 themselves. They should receive sufficient and adequate 7 resources to do so. They need such resources to ensure 8 effective policing as well as public and police officer 9 safety. 10 Now, in conclusion, Mr. Commissioner, let 11 me make just a few comments about the fundamental 12 difficulty that's apparent to reaching a peaceful 13 resolution of disputes over competing claims to land and 14 the problem that this presents for OPPA members. 15 In some of the submissions of the native 16 parties it is said that First Nations people have never 17 surrendered their sovereignty, that they'd been deceived, 18 cheated, dispossessed, and oppressed for generations; 19 that they have a spiritual connection to their 20 traditional lands; that they do not recognize Canadian 21 property law or the courts that enforce it. 22 That relations between Canada and First 23 Nations must be on a nation to nation basis. That they 24 have treaty rights, aboriginal rights, constitutional 25 rights and colour of right.
731 And that at Ipperwash Provincial Park, 2 they were defending their homeland. OPP officers were 3 sent to Ipperwash to enforce the law of trespass, 4 mischief, assault, threatening, obstruct justice, 5 prohibitive weapons, et cetera. To protect persons and 6 property, to keep the peace. 7 They acted on instructions from their 8 superiors and they had a statutory and common-law duty to 9 uphold the law, Canadian law. They were expected to 10 safeguard and enforce Canadian law, Canadian property 11 rights and Canadian sovereignty. 12 So the stage was set. Two (2) groups 13 acting for just cause. Two (2) forces with their right 14 on their side. One (1) armed with the might of history 15 and its compelling grievances. One (1) armed with the 16 might of law, the rule of law. 17 Sadly, but not surprisingly the two (2) 18 forces clashed, tragically one (1) man was killed. 19 People were injured, property was destroyed, peace was 20 shattered, the law was not enforced. 21 The finger of blame is pointed in all 22 directions. At a hawkish Premier, at his Ministers and 23 advisors who said the law applies to everyone. At the 24 Federal Government who did not return the Army Camp after 25 World War II.
741 At Aboriginal persons who threatened to 2 take over people's homes, who were alleged to have 3 intimidated campers on the beach and who attacked the 4 police with clubs and rocks. 5 At warriors from other First Nations who 6 wanted another OKA. At police commanders who deployed a 7 riot squad at night because as it turned out, one (1) 8 protestor threw one (1) stone at one (1) car. 9 At individual police officers said to have 10 used excessive force, arrested innocent persons and who 11 made inappropriate comments and memorabilia. 12 At local officials accused of pressuring 13 the police. At local residents who demanded police 14 action. At St. John's Ambulance whose vehicles were used 15 for police operations and at the press for sensational 16 reporting. 17 But, are individual politicians, police 18 officers or First Nations protestors, really to blame for 19 what went wrong? Or is the fault lying inherent in the 20 relationship between Canada and First Nations 21 communities? Can confrontation be avoided while the 22 underlying issue of sovereignty, land and particularly 23 law are unresolved. 24 The same issues are being played out today 25 in Caledonia. Is it reasonable to expect peace, order
751 and good government when two (2) communities claim 2 sovereignty over the same territory? 3 Isn't conflict inevitable if two (2) co- 4 extensive communities do not agree on the law that 5 applies to them? Law exists to protect persons, property 6 and liberty. Laws grant rights and impose obligations. 7 However, without the police and the 8 Courts, laws are but words that protect no one and 9 nothing. When the inevitable clash occurs between groups 10 that claim sovereignty over the same territory, it is the 11 police who are sent into the midst of that clash as they 12 were at Ipperwash and as they are today at Caledonia. 13 It is police officers who must shoulder 14 the burden of the two (2) groups inability to resolve 15 their differences. Later when the finger pointing takes 16 place, as it does with such clashes, it is police 17 officers who have their conduct measured by many against 18 a standard of perfection. 19 Service as a police officer is the most 20 demanding of all public services. On any reasonable 21 standard of measure of performance that takes into 22 account the very difficult and human circumstances under 23 which the individual OPP Officers were working on 24 September 6, 1995 and that was not -- that was not of 25 their making; they should not be readily or quickly
761 criticized or faulted. 2 Police officers are asked to be the best 3 amongst us. We send them into harms way where the rest 4 of us fear to tread. We ask them to be strong, 5 relentless and fearless and also fair, detached and 6 reasonable. 7 We ask them to use force, but according to 8 law, only when necessary and then as little as possible. 9 We give them the authority to use the sword, but ask them 10 to be angels. 11 Mr. Commissioner, you have a very 12 demanding task ahead of you in resolving, trying to 13 resolve or help us all resolve these very difficult 14 issues. We wish you the best and God Speed. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 16 very much, Mr. Roland. Thank you very kindly. 17 MR. IAN ROLAND: I also have a 18 typographical correction which rather than read into the 19 record I'll simply give to your counsel. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 21 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Commissioner, the -- 22 Mr. Sandler will be here at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon and 23 I suggest that, as I indicated yesterday, that we adjourn 24 until 2:00 p.m. this afternoon. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: So we'll
771 adjourn now until two o'clock. 2 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Yes. 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry stands 4 adjourned until 2:00 p.m. 5 6 --- Upon recessing at 10:57 a.m. 7 --- Upon resuming at 2:02 p.m. 8 9 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 10 resumed. Please be seated. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 12 Sandler...? 13 MR. MARK SANDLER: Good afternoon. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 15 afternoon. 16 17 FINAL SUBMISSIONS BY ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE: 18 MR. MARK SANDLER: Commissioner, over two 19 (2) years ago on April the 20th of 2004, I stood in this 20 very place seeking standing on behalf of Commissioner 21 Boniface, the OPP and its commissioned officers. 22 And I said this to you at this -- at that 23 time, quote: 24 "There are divergent views in this room 25 as to what happened and why in
781 September 1995 and those divergent 2 views will undoubtedly find expression 3 during this Commission. 4 But I do want to publicly express on 5 behalf of my Commissioner, Gwen 6 Boniface who I believe is well known to 7 the First Nations community that it is 8 also our hope that what will come out 9 of the Commission will enhance, not 10 take away from the relationship between 11 the OPP and the First Nations community 12 in dealing with the difficult and 13 complex policing issues that will be 14 explored." 15 I indicated to you, sir, that one of my 16 tasks would be to provide you with information as to what 17 improvements have taken place since 1995. 18 I noted the submissions of Sam George and 19 Mr. Klippenstein, that what they'd like to see happen 20 here that's part of the healing process and that 21 something good come out of something bad. 22 And I said this: 23 "Despite the fact that there will be 24 divergent views, we also share in those 25 sentiments. We'd like to see something
791 good come out of something bad. We'd 2 like to see a healing process that 3 might be improved upon through the work 4 of the Inquiry and we intend to commit 5 ourselves to assist this Inquiry in any 6 way that we can to make that happen." 7 Throughout a difficult, often painful 8 process, the OPP delivered on what I promised to you two 9 (2) years ago. 10 We came to this Inquiry prepared to listen 11 and to learn and we did. We came to this Inquiry 12 prepared to contribute to the healing process and we 13 have. 14 Commissioner Boniface expressed her 15 deepest apology and sympathy to the First Nations 16 community, to Sam and his family for the loss of Dudley 17 George. 18 She personally told Sam; 19 "Sam as I've watched your persistence 20 to firstly get an inquiry and secondly, 21 attend here every day, I'm so impressed 22 by your commitment for change. 23 T-shirts, mugs and inappropriate 24 comments, more t-shirts, I know have 25 caused you further pain and I deeply
801 regret that." 2 She also acknowledged that through our own 3 officers' testimony, in her own observations, there have 4 been errors made and that we will ensure that we look 5 forward to continuing the change that we have. 6 I make that commitment to you, Sam George, 7 to your family, to the First Nations community and to the 8 Province of Ontario. 9 Former Commissioner O'Grady took personal 10 responsibility for the members of the OPP, including Ken 11 Deane, and apologized again to Sam George and his family 12 and the First Nation for Dudley George's death. 13 Commissioner, if you harken back to the 14 current and former senior OPP officers on -- on whose 15 behalf these submissions are made today, they 16 demonstrated without a single exception through their 17 approach to this Inquiry a willingness to learn, an 18 acknowledgement of error and a willingness to contribute 19 to the healing process, sometimes even in the face of 20 vigorous cross-examination, and for several of them, even 21 in the face of personal attacks upon their integrity, 22 that, I submit, do not withstand careful scrutiny. 23 In over five hundred and thirty (530) 24 pages of written submissions and reply on Part 1 of this 25 Inquiry we have addressed each and every one of those
811 allegations, including ones repeated orally in the last 2 few days. I do intend to provide you, perhaps more 3 importantly the public, with a brief overview of a few of 4 the many points made in those lengthy submissions. 5 But at the outset I prefer to focus on 6 what is the most important work of this Inquiry, Part 2. 7 A focus too easily forgotten in the adversarial zeal that 8 lawyers are often guilty of. What has been done to 9 lessen the likelihood of violence in similar 10 circumstances in the future and what remains to be done? 11 The OPP devoted a great deal of work to 12 Part 2 of this Inquiry, as you know. At the OPP forum, 13 through a series of papers and in a simulation exercise 14 conducted in Orillia, we outline initiatives that the OPP 15 has undertaken to build respectful relationships with the 16 Aboriginal community. Those initiations -- initiatives, 17 I can say without a fear of contradiction, represent 18 collectively the most ambitious measures undertaken by 19 any police force to enhance and improve relations with 20 our First Nations. 21 Now, that's a tribute not only to 22 Commissioner Boniface's personal vision but equally 23 important to the many officers who have committed 24 themselves to work with the First Nations leadership and 25 community members to overcome the difficult relationships
821 of the past. And you, Commissioner, met many of those 2 during the OPP forum and the other Part 2 exercises. 3 It should be no surprise, by way of 4 example, that over two thousand (2,000) officers have 5 taken the one (1) week Native awareness training course 6 that is now heralded as the finest of its kind and have 7 come away from it with a better understanding of the 8 First Nations perspective. 9 Yesterday I appeared, as you know, in the 10 Court of Appeal on behalf of the OPP in support of a 11 motion to stay an order made at Caledonia. I don't 12 intend to talk about Caledonia or its merits but I do 13 wish to draw one (1) matter to your attention. 14 James O'Reilly appeared as amicus curiae, 15 or friend of the court, for the Aboriginal perspective. 16 And he has worked on behalf of First Nations for much of 17 the past forty (40) years and he told the court how 18 pleasantly surprised and uncharacteristic it was that he 19 was speaking in support of the submissions made by the 20 OPP and by the Provincial Government. My message to him 21 yesterday and to the First Nations community listening to 22 me today is, Don't be surprised, we get it. 23 The Court of Appeal heard, through 24 Superintendent Kane of the OPP, who served for some time 25 as the Commander at Caledonia, about the OPP's adherence
831 to the framework for police preparedness for critical 2 incidents. A policy that was publicly introduced here, 3 at this Inquiry, in January of this year. The Court of 4 Appeal heard how in Caledonia that policy is complemented 5 by the involvement of the Aboriginal Liaison Officer 6 Operations, Superintendent Ron George, who you've met and 7 who you've seen promoted, and members of the Aboriginal 8 Relations Team, or ART. 9 I pause to note that in the past few days, 10 and you may not be aware of this, the ART program was 11 just made the recipient of an international policing 12 award for its contribution to civil rights. 13 Our Part 2 submissions and reply were 14 drafted to do four (4) things. 15 1. To outline what the OPP has done to 16 reduce the likelihood of violence in the future. 17 2. To respond one by one to each systemic 18 issue identified by you, sir, and your Inquiry in its 19 discussion papers as important to you. 20 3. To make recommendations for your 21 consideration. 22 And 4. To comment on each of the policing 23 related recommendations made by all of the other parties 24 to this Inquiry. 25 It was an ambitious task, I won't pretend
841 it was otherwise. But, we believe well worthwhile. And 2 I'm sure it wasn't lost on you Commissioner, that the OPP 3 responded to each of the First Nations recommendations by 4 first stressing the common ground that exists between the 5 First Nations and the OPP. 6 Indeed, many of the OPP's recommendations 7 draw upon the perspectives and aspirations of First 8 Nations peoples; the desire for a timely and fair 9 resolution of outstanding claims; for respectful 10 relationships, for bias free policing; for the capacity 11 for First Nations to police themselves and for the 12 peaceful resolution of disputes when they arise. 13 The only frustration with the Part 2 14 process, to be completely candid with you sir, has been 15 the lack of interest on the media's part to date in what 16 the OPP has done since 1995. 17 It would be unfair to label without 18 differentiation the media coverage of this Inquiry, some 19 of which has been very accurate even when critical, I 20 dare say, of the OPP, and some of which appears 21 uninterested in evidence that challenges preconceived 22 notions about the facts. But, leave aside those concerns 23 which we can all debate. It cannot be denied that the 24 media is often uninterested in positive news. 25 The media frenzy during former Premier
851 Harris' testimony is to be contrasted with the complete 2 lack of media interest shown by the mainstream media 3 organizations in the wealth of evidence tendered on how 4 the OPP has evolved as a police service and how its 5 initiatives to build respectful relationships with the 6 Aboriginal community have been created. 7 It's not just an OPP complaint or sour 8 grapes. It's deeply unfortunate that the media does not 9 better contribute to informing the Aboriginal community 10 hearing my words now or the public at large, about the 11 significant positive relationships that do exist. 12 It makes recruitment of Aboriginal 13 officers more difficult. It results in missed 14 opportunities to reduce tensions and anxieties in the 15 community, and it perpetuates one dimensional views of 16 the police, in the same way, I must say that ALST has 17 made the perfectly valid point that media coverage often 18 promotes stereotypical notions about Aboriginal peoples. 19 So while disproportionate voice is given 20 to those, sometimes anonymous who challenge the OPP 21 measured response at Caledonia, to the point that the 22 website address devoted to trashing the OPP is published 23 in a Toronto newspaper, you can comb the papers with 24 little or no success to find a Grand Council Chiefs -- 25 Chief of the Union of Ontario Indians public support for
861 the OPP's approach at Caledonia as peacekeepers. 2 No wonder James O'Reilly was surprised at 3 the OPP's approach. He would have been hard pressed to 4 read about it anywhere. 5 So this is my modest opportunity at your 6 expense, to convey to the public and to the First Nations 7 community what has been done since 1995. 8 Some of these initiatives originated with 9 the OPP, their breadth is unprecedented in policing. 10 Some have been identified as best practices, they have 11 been institutionalized within the OPP. And that is 12 important sir, because they survived Commissioner 13 Boniface who is a good friend of the First Nations 14 community. 15 But, to be blunt the OPP needs you, 16 Commissioner, to identify them as best practices, to 17 ensure they are recognized, understood, supported, 18 nurtured and adopted elsewhere. And you see that in our 19 recommendations to you. 20 Briefly, here are the highlights. The OPP 21 promise, it's focus on professionalism, mission critical 22 issues and business planning, collectively entrench 23 strong diversity policies and building relationships with 24 the Aboriginal community. 25 Senior managers are now accountable for
871 ensuring that their programs comply. The commissioners 2 select liaison and Aboriginal Affairs bring together 3 respected First Nations people to advise on sensitive 4 Aboriginal issues. 5 Over four hundred (400) children have 6 attended the annual OPP youth summer camp. The camp's 7 goals are to create positive youth police relations in 8 the communities served. Many of these campers are 9 Aboriginal children. 10 The police ethnic and cultural exchange 11 provides temporary employment in partnership with our 12 communities to youth from diverse, ethnic and religious 13 backgrounds. 14 Band Councils are funding participation in 15 the program for Aboriginal youth. They're working with 16 OPP officers and relating to them. OPP Bound is an award 17 winning outreach recruitment program that has attracted 18 international attention, designed to attract people 19 interested in a policing career from identified groups 20 such as women, Aboriginal people and visible minorities. 21 Candidates experience a week in the life 22 of an OPP recruit in an atmosphere where there are 23 cultural -- and diversity are supported. Commissioner 24 Boniface also described for you in-reach strategies to 25 internally recruit Aboriginal officers for specialties
881 including integrated or emergency response units. 2 Emergency Services Bound as a one week 3 program designed to provide Aboriginal OPP officers with 4 information to make informed decisions about becoming 5 emergency response officers. 6 Workshops have been held throughout 7 Ontario to encourage Aboriginal officers to become crisis 8 negotiators with real success. The OPP has consistently 9 and repeatedly demonstrated its support for self directed 10 First Nations policing. 11 As well, the First Nations and contract 12 policing staff have acted as technical advisors in every 13 single transition to a new police service. Five (5) of 14 nine (9) First Nations chiefs of police in Ontario are 15 former OPP officers. 16 The Nishnawbe-Aski Police Service 17 Investigative Support Unit brings OPP and NAPS officers 18 together to work on significant policing issues within 19 the Nishnawbe-Aski Nation. 20 The Integrated Support Services Unit was 21 developed with Ontario's First Nations Chief of Police to 22 enable the OPP, the RCMP and the First Nations Police 23 Services to develop crime prevention initiatives that 24 target suicide prevention, youth empowerment, community 25 wellness.
891 Based upon consultation with Elders, 2 Aboriginal leaders and officers, the OPP offers extensive 3 Native Awareness Training on First Nations issues ranging 4 from training for all recruits and probationary officers 5 including job shadowing with a First Nations police 6 officer to the intensive one (1) week, and dare I say it 7 again, award winning course where officers learn through 8 the life experiences of OPP Aboriginal officers and 9 leaders. 10 Another class will be graduating just this 11 Friday and I can tell you that the Native awareness 12 training that they have been and will be exposed to will 13 not be surmounted anywhere. 14 It's important to emphasize for you, sir, 15 that the Native Awareness Training course upon which we 16 place much emphasis is only part of a larger strategy to 17 select and train officers in a way that enhances their 18 awareness of Aboriginal culture and roots out racism. 19 Commissioner Boniface took you through the 20 life of an OPP officer presently joining the force to 21 show just all of the screening and training that now 22 occurs as individuals move through the ranks. 23 In the recruitment process, interviews now 24 include questions designed to identify prejudices, biases 25 and intolerance towards others. Reference checks include
901 specific questions regarding acceptance of diverse 2 communities and the past use of racial slurs or negative 3 remarks. Psychological testing is also done now. 4 Recruitment officers are themselves 5 diverse and are all required to take the Native Awareness 6 Training course. 7 And what about promotional boards? When 8 officers seek promotion, the criteria for selection of 9 board members includes diversity. And at least one of 10 the questions directed to applicants for promotion 11 requires those officers to address Aboriginal issues. 12 The framework now figures prominently in the promotional 13 process. 14 When officers apply to join integrated 15 response units such as TRU and ERT and POU, their 16 selection and training includes extensive Native 17 Awareness Training that I will describe shortly. 18 The OPP is unique in mandating that Native 19 Awareness Training for integrated or emergency response 20 officers. In addition to those officers, the one (1) 21 week program is mandatory for in-service trainers and 22 recruiters. All of the senior professional standards 23 bureau officers that address discipline issues have 24 attended the course and more will be attending. 25 I can assure you, Commissioner, that an
911 investigator who would be assigned today to a complaint 2 raising First Nations issues will have attended the 3 Native Awareness Training Course. 4 The Aboriginal Liaison Operations position 5 that you've heard so much about was created in 1996 to 6 provide operational support to senior members of the OPP 7 by enhancing relationships with the Aboriginal community. 8 Regional Aboriginal strategy committees 9 were established across the Province to assess the status 10 of our relationship with the Aboriginal community and 11 make ongoing recommendations as for improvement and for 12 service delivery. 13 The Aboriginal relations team that I spoke 14 about earlier involves selected police officers, largely 15 Aboriginal, trained in mediation and conflict resolution. 16 These officers build relationships and trust pro- 17 actively. All forty (40) of these members have now 18 served at Caledonia with distinction. 19 The Major Events Liaison Team is a new 20 team designed to specifically address major events or 21 critical incidents to support their successful 22 resolution. 23 The framework that you've heard so much 24 about is now incorporated into police orders and is part 25 of the OPP critical policy. Critical policy are the most
921 significant policies of the organization. It articulates 2 best practices, governs the OPP's response to critical 3 incidents. And if you're an applicant for a level two 4 incident command position you must successfully complete 5 mandatory fields including managing Aboriginal issues and 6 their assessment includes a scenario, like the scenario 7 that you saw, sir, in Orillia involving the application 8 of the framework. 9 The Crisis Negotiator Program has been 10 enhanced to ensure that all crisis negotiators receive 11 full Native Awareness Training. Every one of them. 12 There are now seven (7) OPP Aboriginal officers trained 13 and assigned as crisis negotiators and with their 14 involvement comes significantly increased language 15 capacity. 16 The Annual Aboriginal Officers Leadership 17 Forum enables OPP Aboriginal officers to share their 18 experiences and generate recommendations to the 19 Commissioner on issues of importance. 20 In 2002 a traditional Aboriginal drum was 21 gifted to the OPP Aboriginal officers. There are eleven 22 (11) officers who sit at the drum and, of course, you 23 will be seeing them perform tomorrow at our closing 24 ceremony. 25 For those who are not Aboriginal sometimes
931 it -- the importance of the traditional drum is 2 misunderstood, but it forms an important part of all of 3 the things that I'm telling you about because it supports 4 a respectful equal place for Aboriginal people, both in 5 the OPP and in the Aboriginal community. 6 What about the newer activities that the 7 OPP supports? Building upon the success of the 8 Commissioner's Liaison Council we're establishing 9 regional liaison councils. Selection has commenced of 10 new members in the northwest region and an annual meeting 11 has taken place in the eastern region with Elders and 12 Chiefs since 2002. 13 We recognize the need to ensure continuity 14 of the Aboriginal Liaison Operations position. So the 15 current officer, Superintendent George, is now mentoring 16 four (4) officers. 17 We've identified the need for additional 18 ART members. And, as a result, the OPP intends to expand 19 the number and the regional representation of ART 20 members. 21 At present, candidates applying to the OPP 22 who self-identify as Aboriginal are tracked to ensure 23 that their file is dealt with expeditiously. If they're 24 unsuccessful in the recruitment process, they're also 25 mentored by OPP officers, where it's appropriate of
941 course. As well, mentoring by more senior Aboriginal 2 officers is facilitated through the leadership forum. 3 And we're introducing additional means of 4 mentoring Aboriginal officers and supporting their 5 advancement. For example, last year Aboriginal sergeants 6 began to job-shadow the manager of First Nations 7 programs. And we've offered development secondments to 8 Aboriginal officers and these are secondments designed to 9 develop or enhance their abilities and qualifications. 10 This fall, while you're writing your 11 report, sir, the coaching triangle concept will be 12 introduced at the Aboriginal Officers Leadership Forum, 13 linking senior, middle level and junior officers in three 14 (3) person mentoring partnerships. We are currently as 15 well providing counselling for stress and trauma to 16 Aboriginal officers by both clinical and traditional 17 Aboriginal counsellors. 18 We've recognized that the Native Awareness 19 Training Course should not be confined to any single 20 culture. One (1) day of the current course is devoted to 21 familiarizing its participants with varied cultured. As 22 well, the course has been adopted with local input from 23 Elders and community leaders to emphasize locally 24 relevant cultures. Recently, we've offered courses at Six 25 Nations and Akwesasne devoted to the Haudosaunee culture.
951 And this November there will be a train 2 the trainers program designed to increase the number of 3 our available trainers that are already overburdened with 4 the demands for the course, and enhance their own 5 cultural and practical knowledge. 6 We're working to enhance training for 7 officers posted in remote locations by designing an 8 interactive DVD program that addresses unique issues for 9 the Nishnawbe-Aski police in sexual assault cases. It's 10 now available, complimented by chat room tutors and the 11 program is being used to deliver similar programs. 12 And I hope that you'll be delighted to 13 hear that we are also developing an E-learning tool now 14 to be used at the OPP Academy that will utilize extracts 15 from the OPP forum conducted here on DVD together with 16 multiple choice questions to teach all recruits about 17 First Nations policing. 18 The OPP has instituted an award honouring 19 Jim Potts a member of your advisory committee, which 20 recognizes the uniformed or civilian individual or team 21 best achieving the OPP's vision, mission and the promise 22 by their contributions to policing and First Nations 23 communities. And I invite you to read some of the 24 winners over the last few years, their work has been 25 sterling.
961 The OPP has worked in partnership with the 2 Law Enforcement Aboriginal and Diversity Network or LEAD 3 of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, and this 4 year, as you know, the Aboriginal and Diversity Policing 5 Conference was sponsored in Toronto, the Chair and Vice- 6 Chair were both senior OPP officers and one of your 7 counsel kindly attended. 8 Every bureau, region and detachment must 9 not only support these corporate initiatives but must 10 articulate in writing what activities and initiatives 11 will be undertaken within their bureaus, their regions, 12 their detachments to build relationships. 13 Now, what about changes to the OPP's 14 integrated response to high risk incidents since 1995? 15 What could be more topical to the work that you have 16 undertaken? The framework is now part of OPP policy. 17 The use of a minimum of three (3) crisis 18 negotiators has been formalized and you've seen how that 19 worked through the simulation. Due to in-reach 20 initiatives crisis negotiators as I've said earlier 21 increased to seven (7) so we see Aboriginal crisis 22 negotiators in Aboriginal critical incidents. Their 23 course is two (2) weeks long exceeding Provincial 24 adequacy standards. They receive one (1) day Aboriginal 25 component on the course together with the full one (1)
971 week Native Awareness Training. 2 Level 2 incident command course, now 3 includes sessions on Aboriginal socio-economic, legal and 4 cultural teachings. The framework, ART, MELT and the use 5 of intelligence; one (1) of the mandatory assessment 6 areas I've described earlier and the scenario involving 7 the framework. 8 The one (1) week Native Awareness Training 9 is mandatory for every single level 2 Incident Commander 10 now. 11 And there is now a structured mandatory 12 review of the performance of those Incident Commanders 13 which specifically examines how that Level 2 Incident 14 Commander applied the framework. 15 As a result of our own internal review, 16 TRU selection has changed. Selection includes 17 behavioural competencies which is fancy lingo for saying 18 that human rights skills and appreciations are now 19 considered. 20 TRU members now participate in an ethics 21 module as part of their first phase training. Their 22 fourteen (14) week training exceeds Provincial adequacy 23 standards and again the Native awareness training course 24 is mandatory unlike any other police force for every 25 single TRU member.
981 They also receive an annual one (1) day 2 session on Aboriginal issues. That's annual as I've 3 said. They participate in presentations in Aboriginal 4 communities. 5 What about ERT? ERT's selection and 6 training has changed. The one (1) week Native awareness 7 course is built into their basic training which is nine 8 (9) weeks, again exceeding provincial standards. 9 They also participate in presentations in 10 Aboriginal communities. You've heard much about scribes. 11 There's now a one (1) week scribe program. Level 2 12 Incident Commanders must review the scribe notes and 13 correct them and adopt them by initialling each page. 14 How have public order units, formerly 15 crowd management units changed since 1995? Again the 16 framework now represents their operational policy. 17 Complimented by ART, MELT and the Aboriginal Liaison 18 Officer. 19 All POU Commanders are not commissioned 20 officers and fully qualified first as Level 2 Incident 21 Commanders. There is a gold, silver, bronze command 22 structure that allocates operational responsibility. 23 And you recall the questions by Mr. 24 Falconer, how could you Deputy Carson wear all of the 25 hats that -- that you had to wear on the night in
991 question? It was one of those rare glimpses of some 2 sympathy from Mr. Falconer directed to the witness. 3 Now we've got a structure that ensures 4 that the bronze commander is located with the Public 5 Order Unit at the site. Not in the Command Post and can 6 make his or her own assessments at the scene selecting 7 the most reasonable option to ensure that only minimal 8 use of force is employed. 9 A policy is now being developed as a 10 result of a suggestion at this Inquiry. I hope that 11 makes the Inquiry feel good, to articulate the factors to 12 be weighed in determining whether a Public Order Unit 13 will be deployed. 14 What about training for POU Commanders? 15 They now receive two (2) weeks on Level 1, four (4) weeks 16 on Level 2, one (1) week of Native Awareness Training, 17 one (1) week of the basic POU course and a POU command 18 course which will now include instruction on the special 19 consideration and the unique responses when developing 20 tactics and strategies to command an Aboriginal incident. 21 The training for POU members is much 22 enhanced. The use of shield chatter has been 23 discontinued. Again, the Native Awareness Training 24 course for one (1) week is mandatory and basic ERT 25 training has also been amended to include special
1001 instruction on the considerations and unique responses 2 respecting an Aboriginal incident. They're being trained 3 on the framework and the complimentary use of ART and 4 MELT as well. 5 Officers names or badge numbers are now 6 printed on all uniforms including POU helmets and outer 7 vest carriers. Coveralls are worn over tactical pads and 8 protective equipment when deployed covering them from 9 public view. Each bronze POU Commander has a scribe with 10 him or her on scene using a micro-cassette recorder. 11 ERT members are now trained and equipped 12 with additional less lethal options. 13 And on intelligence. What about 14 intelligence? The OPP has radically altered its selection 15 processes for new intelligence bureau members. There's 16 now formal training for analysts and intelligence 17 officers that's greatly expanded. 18 Diversity in culture competence is 19 recognized as a major asset. Key users of intelligence 20 now receive training on how intelligence should be used 21 including the difference between intelligence and 22 information, that you've heard so much about. 23 Frontline officers now receive that 24 intelligence training as well. Analytical resources have 25 been increased dramatically. Intelligence products when
1011 disseminated are subject to the intelligence process. 2 The information is evaluated and analysed whenever 3 possible rather than provided, quote "raw", close quote. 4 When intelligence becomes a integral 5 partner to a critical incident, the analyst is attached 6 as a filter or advisor to the Incident Command. 7 You've also heard about enhanced note 8 keeping. Consistency now in practices respecting the 9 taping of radio and telephone communications. Enhanced 10 video taping for Public Order events. Policies and 11 practices that address the misuse of OPP insignia. OPP 12 press releases for SIU related matters and ethics and 13 accountability. And a policy on access by non police 14 personnel to the Command Post is under development and 15 has been reproduced for your consideration. 16 All of those changes should resonate with 17 the issues that you've seen developed at this Inquiry. 18 We're proud of the progress over the years since 19 Ipperwash. We're proud of the officers who are committed 20 to ensuring that this progress continues. 21 I wish to now turn to the factual issues 22 developed at Part 1 of the Inquiry. And as I said 23 earlier, little or nothing has been set in writing or 24 orally that has not been responded to by the OPP and its 25 lengthy, and I underline the word 'lengthy', written
1021 submissions. 2 Accordingly, I intend to deal with the 3 point within the allotted time and just cover the points 4 that are most significant today. 5 Chief Mercredi noted during his testimony 6 that it's not easy being a police officer. He might have 7 said that about being an Inquiry, Commissioner, as well. 8 Ipperwash makes the point all too well. 9 The challenges of policing the occupation of Ipperwash 10 Park and the nearby area were formidable. Some 11 oversimplify or provide too easy solutions for those 12 challenges. 13 The First Nations community, with respect, 14 was divided over the occupation and how it should be 15 addressed. There was no easy determination of who 16 influenced or directed the occupation, or the role that, 17 quote, "outsiders", close quote, played. 18 Local dynamics did prevent the local First 19 Nation police service from facilitating a resolution. 20 Nearby cottagers and other property owners were both 21 anxious and angry and potentially confrontational. 22 Efforts by the police to maintain a 23 dialogue with the occupiers once the Park was occupied 24 faced considerable impediments. It was difficult to 25 engage outside First Nations resources to facilitate
1031 resolution. The police had no ability to negotiate the 2 substantive issues. Violence or apprehended violence 3 outside of the Park did contribute to the difficulties. 4 The changing situation, particularly on 5 the evening of September 6th, posed its own obvious 6 challenges to the decision-making process, which I'll 7 speak about shortly. 8 Now, contrary to the submission made by 9 one (1) party to this Inquiry, the point here is not to 10 blame others. I think you've seen we've been very 11 careful not to engage in that exercise. The point is 12 that responding to Aboriginal occupations and protest is 13 a difficult, complex undertaking. Some of the 14 difficulties arise from the possible intervention of 15 undesirable elements, the refusal to communicate with 16 police, and internal strife within the First Nations 17 community. 18 Finding solutions is not assisted, with 19 respect, by simply heaping the blame for everything, 20 without any nuance or understanding, upon the police. 21 And I have to say that First Nations leadership, even 22 while critical, sometimes highly critical of the police, 23 understands this. And I say with respect that it's too 24 bad that some counsel to this Inquiry at times do not. 25 I want to briefly examine one (1) of the
1041 difficulties, communicating with the Park occupiers. The 2 evidence is crystal clear that the OPP, including Deputy 3 Carson and Detective Inspector Wright, had ongoing 4 communications with the occupiers at the Army Camp from 5 '93 right up until the occupation of the Park. 6 And as reflected in contemporaneous notes, 7 and you'll see I place a lot of reliance in the course of 8 my submissions upon what's there in writing and existed 9 at the time to corroborate what I'm saying to you today. 10 Mr. Glenn George spoke about the, quote, "spirit of 11 cooperation", close quote, that had developed with the 12 OPP. Carl Tolsma described the cooperation in his 13 testimony as well. And this was all quite consistent 14 with the later expression in Project Maple of the 15 facilitation of a peaceful resolution of outstanding 16 issues through dialogue. 17 Based upon the previous success in 18 speaking with the Stoney Point people a number of OPP 19 officers attempted to speak with them once the Park was 20 occupied. Within hours of the takeover Deputy Carson 21 wanted to open that dialogue, and it's reflected in a 22 9:45 entry in the September 4th scribe notes. 23 Deputy Carson, who is also an experienced 24 crisis negotiator, recognized that Staff Sergeant Seltzer 25 had a very high ability to establish relationships. And
1051 you've seen it here, Commissioner, he is one exceptional 2 officer. 3 Staff Sergeant Seltzer first arrived at 4 the scene at 11:43 p.m. on September the 4th. Early the 5 following morning he was tasked with establishing contact 6 with the occupiers. He enlisted the assistance of 7 retired Constable Lorne Smith who had supervised the 8 First Nations Policing Program at Kettle and Stony Point 9 for years. 10 On the morning of the 6th Deputy Carson 11 met with Staff Sergeant Seltzer again to discuss how the 12 police could effectively reach out to the occupiers, this 13 time using a less direct approach. Direct approaches had 14 been unsuccessful. 15 The Incident Commander suggested that 16 Seltzer and Smith go over to Kettle Point to speak with 17 Robert Nobby George. Seltzer's notes at the time reflect 18 the Incident Commander as having said, We do not want 19 confrontation, We want to settle this with genuine 20 concern to the community. Before meeting with Robert 21 George, Seltzer and Smith reached out to Earl Bressette, 22 another Elder in the Kettle and Stony Point community. 23 Detective Inspector Wright attended the 24 Park about 3:00 p.m. on September the 6th, again, this 25 time in the company of Sergeant Marg Eve, a trained
1061 crisis negotiator on Seltzer's team. Recognizing that 2 women often assumed decision-making roles within the 3 First Nations culture it was thought that Sergeant Eve 4 might be better received. 5 They attended at the fence line and 6 attempted to get someone to speak to them. AT the same 7 time Seltzer and Smith met with Robert George at his 8 home, joined by Ron, and both suggested that perhaps Glen 9 George or Roderick George might be willing to talk if the 10 police agreed not to execute outstanding arrest warrants. 11 Deputy Carson also utilized Sergeant Vince 12 George as a resource, while remaining sensitive to his 13 difficult position within his local community. 14 Now, it was suggested at this Inquiry that 15 the Kettle and Stoney Point Police represented another 16 avenue of assistance. Unfortunately as outlined fully in 17 our submissions, local issues effectively presented their 18 utilization. As well, as described by P/C Kaczanowski, 19 there was a tension between the occupiers and the Kettle 20 and Stoney Point Police Service. It was apparent the 21 occupiers did not want to be policed by them and would 22 not recognize their authority or potential value. 23 Now, again any suggestion that Chief Tom 24 Bressette is being blamed here is misconceived. No blame 25 is being assigned. On the contrary. But simply put is
1071 unreasonable I submit, to maintain that the OPP was 2 deficient in some way in not obtaining the assistance of 3 the Kettle and Stoney Point police. 4 Back in August, the OPP received word that 5 Ovide Mercredi might come to the Ipperwash area to 6 mediate. No mediation occurred. And Chief Gordon 7 Peters, the Regional Chief for Ontario, told you that 8 even if the OPP had asked the Chiefs of Ontario to 9 intervene, he would have required the permission of the 10 relevant First Nations parties before his organization 11 could become involved. 12 During the occupation, neither the Stoney 13 Point occupiers nor the Kettle and Stony Point Band asked 14 him to become involved. He was aware that Chief 15 Mercredi's offer to mediate had been rejected and 16 consequently he wasn't surprised that the First Nations 17 people had not asked him to mediate. 18 Unfortunately, and this is just the way it 19 was, any good faith effort by the police to open a 20 dialogue with the Park occupiers, was met with the 21 attitude that such overtures amounted to harassment. 22 This doesn't just come from the OPP 23 testimony this comes from the Stoney Point occupiers 24 themselves. This was the mindset held by Roderick Judas 25 George, one of the principle men.
1081 When the occupiers forced the OPP out of 2 the Park, they for the most part also stopped speaking 3 and listening to the police. And we provided in our 4 factum numerous examples of this unwillingness. 5 When Detective Inspector Wright, Mr. 6 Kobayashi and Staff Sergeant Seltzer, attended at 7 September 5th at the Park fence, Nicholas Cottrelle 8 admitted he tried to convey to Detective Inspector Wright 9 that the Park occupiers were not interested in speaking 10 to the police. And as I say, we saw a number of examples 11 of that as well. 12 Some of the occupiers were aware that Mr. 13 Manning had engaged in some limited speaking with the OPP 14 and Tina George told you that both she and her brother 15 were unhappy that he was doing so. 16 When Detective Inspector Wright and 17 Sergeant Eve attended at the Park fence line on the 18 afternoon of September 6th, children from within the Park 19 used small wall mirrors to reflect sunlight into their 20 eyes. Les Jewel was present but wouldn't speak to them. 21 A teenager said he wouldn't speak to them. 22 Wright asked them to tell the adults that 23 they wanted to talk; adults did approach Officers Wright 24 and Eve, but only one spoke of future communication 25 advising, We'll do our talking with guns, reflected in
1091 contemporaneous notes. 2 Now, again the point here from the OPP's 3 perspective is not that this has anything to do with the 4 actual possession or use of guns, that's not the issue. 5 The point here is that some have unfairly portrayed the 6 OPP as uninterested in communicating with the occupiers. 7 With respect, there should be some true 8 introspection about the difficulties that were faced 9 here. Many of the Stoney Point occupiers who testified 10 were quite candid about their unwillingness to speak to 11 the police and they offered you various reasons. 12 And again the reasons were understandable. 13 They didn't want to be self identified as a leader for 14 risk of prosecution. They felt they were being unfairly 15 represented in the media and wanted the media hype to die 16 down before they would speak. They didn't want to make 17 themselves available for service of an injunction which 18 they anticipated. 19 And the Park occupation according to some 20 had nothing to do with the police. They should be 21 talking to the Government. It was pointless to talk to 22 the police. 23 This was the first occasion that the 24 Stoney Point people would not readily speak with the 25 members of the OPP. And as I've said this impasse
1101 contrasted greatly with the working relationship that had 2 previously existed. 3 So in summary on this point, we recognized 4 the importance of opening and maintaining a dialogue with 5 the Park occupiers, not to negotiate the substantive 6 issues but to address public safety and to ensure that 7 tension was reduced. Deputy Carson recognized then and 8 now that an open dialogue works to dispel misperceptions 9 held by various stakeholders at an occupation, which can 10 lead to tragic results. He acknowledged that that may 11 have been a significant variable that had play in the 12 events that led to the tragic result. 13 They drew -- the OPP drew upon a variety 14 of resources to try to start that dialogue, through 15 direct communication and otherwise. In fairness, those 16 efforts cannot be seen through the prism of what later 17 developed on the evening of September the 6th. 18 And to emphasize a point made by many 19 parties in a different context, the situation was not 20 urgent for much of that day. Of course, with the benefit 21 of hindsight, knowing what developed situationally on the 22 evening of September the 6th, the need for immediate 23 dialogue becomes apparent now. But at the time it wasn't 24 so apparent. 25 And the first excerpt that I've provided
1111 you in the materials is the testimony of Staff Sergeant 2 Brad Seltzer. And he reflected the efforts, the repeated 3 efforts to make contact. But they didn't see there being 4 a great hurry. They knew there was going to be an 5 injunction. They knew we had time to establish a contact 6 and to establish dialogue. Looking back at it now, very 7 few hours, two (2) days that were gone, we just didn't 8 have time to do the job that we wanted to do, in the 9 fashion that we wanted to. 10 Simply put, it was anticipated that the 11 court proceedings would take place the following morning 12 and this might also generate renewed dialogue, as it has, 13 frankly, for past occupations or protests. 14 Now, all of that being said, largely being 15 directed to -- to criticisms that were voiced through the 16 cross-examination of Deputy Carson, the OPP's ability to 17 stimulate dialogue with Aboriginal protestors, so to 18 speak, has been significantly enhanced since 1995. We're 19 talking daily at Caledonia, as you know. 20 All of the OPP initiatives to build 21 respectful relationships, including the Aboriginal 22 Liaison Officer, ART and MELT, the Enhanced Crisis 23 Negotiation Program and the Commissioner's Select 24 Liaison, have collectively resulted in far greater 25 networking capacity and the high likelihood of
1121 establishing lines of communication. 2 Now that doesn't mean, as some would 3 suggest, that some difficulties, including inter-First 4 Nations division or -- or dynamics that may limit 5 involvement by First Nations leadership, don't persist. 6 They still persist. But it does mean that the OPP has a 7 wide array of resources to facilitate dialogue. 8 Now, I do want to say as well that despite 9 the significant efforts by Deputy Carson and others to 10 stimulate dialogue, he acknowledged and the OPP 11 acknowledges that with the benefit of the detailed and 12 close scrutiny of the events through this Inquiry, there 13 were additional ways that dialogue might have been 14 stimulated. 15 On reflection Deputy Carson wished that 16 he'd approached, for example, Band Councillor Bonnie 17 Bressette for assistance. And he identified, as you will 18 recall, other possible approaches. That's a valid 19 consideration before the Inquiry in your work. 20 I want to now turn to briefly address the 21 allegations of political interference or direction. Now 22 this allegation has evolved somewhat. At times it has 23 been alleged that the Government directed the OPP to 24 evict the occupiers. And of course we know that the CMU 25 was specifically directed not to go into the Park to
1131 evict the occupiers, and they didn't. 2 I have to say that if one were to -- to 3 canvass the members of the public who have read the 4 accounts of -- of Ipperwash, there is a large segment, I 5 assure you, that still think that this is all about the 6 OPP actually going into the Park to evict the occupiers. 7 The evidence is unequivocal that the 8 Government and indeed John Carson's superiors had no 9 knowledge that the OPP would move down the road on the 10 evening of September 6th before the decision was made. 11 Whether that decision was in hindsight correct or not, 12 and I'll be speaking to that matter later, it was 13 situational and it wasn't related to the views expressed 14 by Government or anyone else about the occupation. 15 And I can prove it to you and will. The 16 evidence only permits the conclusion that despite all 17 that has been said about occupation, the OPP intended to 18 preserve the status quo up until the situation at the 19 parking lot changed. 20 Accordingly these allegations of even 21 subconscious influence or pressure explaining the 22 decision of the Incident Commander, and I suggest that 23 the reason you're hearing so much about subconscious 24 pressures, is that it was abundantly clear from both the 25 chronology and from hearing Deputy Carson that he is not
1141 the kind of person that would -- that would be subjected 2 and influenced by those kinds of pressures, are 3 completely unsubstantiated. 4 Now the OPP recognizes as did every senior 5 officer who testified here, that apart from actual 6 direction or influence, things could have been done 7 better to avoid the appearance of direction or influence. 8 And what I've endeavoured to do for you, sir, in the Part 9 2 submissions is make recommendations to assist you on 10 how the appearances of direction or influence can be 11 avoided in the future. 12 Now there are two (2) incontrovertible 13 facts that operate as an underpinning to what I have to 14 say about political interference. 15 The first is this. Notwithstanding the 16 views however they may be characterized here by the 17 various counsel before you of Rosemary Ur, Marcel 18 Beaubien, Fred Thomas or even Premier Harris, all of 19 those views had been communicated to John Carson. 20 Everything that My Friends rely upon to 21 make the case for political pressure had been 22 communicated to Deputy Carson, Ron Fox, Marcel Beaubien, 23 Thomas, all of that before he left for the day for dinner 24 at a friend's house with instructions to maintain the 25 status quo.
1151 So every purported manifestation of 2 political pressure had already occurred before Carson 3 left with those directions to maintain the status quo; 4 some direction, some influence. 5 And second of all, despite whatever could 6 arguably be taken from those political comments the OPP 7 did not enter Ipperwash Provincial Park on the night of 8 September the 6th. It's a fact that no party to this 9 Inquiry can challenge. 10 What could be more compelling proof that 11 Deputy Carson's decision to deploy the CMU and the 12 actions of those under him who executed that direction 13 were not influenced by political views that allegedly 14 promoted the occupiers immediate removal from the Park. 15 The eviction of the Park occupiers later that night was 16 the furthest thought from Deputy Carson's mind. 17 Now the Estate of Dudley George has argued 18 that -- that Deputy Carson was motivated by political 19 pressure to support an ex parte or emergent injunction. 20 And I ask you to carefully review his conversation with 21 Tim McCabe where he articulates, again rightly or 22 wrongly, his view as to why a more immediate or ex parte 23 or emergent injunction should take place. 24 Surely if he's feeling the political 25 pressure to support the Government's view, he would have
1161 played up the report of automatic gunfire rather than 2 continually seeking to minimize it and ensure that it's 3 not overstated or overreacted to by Government. 4 And you'll recall the conversation. I 5 suggest that it belies the suggestion that his request or 6 his desire for an injunction was fuelled by political 7 pressure. 8 Now let's look at the deployment of the 9 CMU. The allegation has been made as I've said that the 10 Government wanted the OPP to immediately evict the 11 occupiers from the Park. But let's look at the purpose 12 for deploying the CMU. 13 Deputy Carson was emphatic in his 14 instruction to then Staff Sergeant Lacroix that his 15 officers were not to go into the Park; some direction, 16 some influence. 17 He further testified that if the occupiers 18 move back into the Park they were to be permitted to do 19 so. And the direction is recorded in contemporaneous 20 scribe note 21:22: 21 "JOHN CARSON: If they go back into 22 the Park, let them go." 23 And Lacroix confirmed that he told -- that 24 he was told, Under no circumstances go into the Park. 25 And I asked rhetorically, If you're
1171 feeling the pressure to evict the occupiers or even to 2 make a show of arresting the occupiers outside of the 3 Park do you give instructions if they go back into the 4 Park, let them go? 5 I mean, can you imagine being a fly on the 6 wall if the theories about Mike Harris are correct?. You 7 know, Mike Harris listening to those instructions; what 8 are you telling your underlings; let them go back into 9 the Park; don't go into the Park. I mean, it makes no 10 sense whatsoever and it's time someone said so, with 11 great respect. 12 The activities of the CMU on scene were 13 inconsistent with instructions to evict the occupiers. 14 And the CMU was in the process of withdrawing when the 15 physical confrontation took place and you'll hear that in 16 the radio transmissions. There's no indication of any 17 direction to enter the Park. It's nowhere suggested that 18 the CMU did enter the Park. 19 And indeed I suggest, as we've argued in 20 the factum, that the transmissions compel the inference 21 that the CMU was in the process of taking a defensive 22 position and then withdrawing once the occupiers had 23 returned to the Park. 24 Indeed, not a single Stoney Point occupier 25 testified here that a member of the CMU even crossed the
1181 fence line and entered the Park. Some people just aren't 2 prepared to listen to the incontrovertible evidence. 3 John Carson was so influenced by 4 Government pressure that he repeatedly instructed his 5 people not to go into the Park. He doesn't take very 6 good direction from a Government intent on removing them. 7 Now, as I've said, some parties here were 8 compelled or driven to say, Well he was pressured to take 9 some action against the occupiers; arrest them outside of 10 the Park for example. And again Carson doesn't take very 11 good direction from the Government when on the 12 contemporaneous records he says, Let them go back into 13 the Park. Some direction, some influence. 14 Now, Deputy Carson shared some of the 15 political comments being made with his command staff and 16 there's been criticism levelled at him for doing so, and 17 it was unwarranted. It was no secret that strongly-held 18 views were held about the occupation. It would likely 19 have been known to officers whether Deputy Carson told 20 them or not. He expected his officers to act 21 professionally and to obey the chain of command as they 22 were trained to do. 23 Moreover, the scribe notes reflect that on 24 a number of occasions when he referred to outside 25 opinions, he reiterated the, quote, "business as usual",
1191 close quote, approach to the occupation. 2 Expressions such as, 'Maintain the status 3 quo', Commissioner, speak volumes to the officers under 4 his command. 5 And I suggest that it's also significant 6 to note that Superintendent Fox, who was quite accurately 7 commended by a number of counsel making this allegation 8 of political pressure, for his candour, his honestly, his 9 integrity in 1995 and when testifying, was totally 10 unconcerned about Deputy Carson being influenced by what 11 he had told them or that he would capitulate to political 12 pressure. 13 Now, what we have done to assist you, 14 Commissioner, in our factum, and I've reproduced it again 15 in the materials for you today, is we've taken the ALST 16 chart, which has identified the political pressure or 17 political comments that the ALST and others rely upon to 18 support their position, and we've supplemented it. We've 19 made it a better chart. 20 And in this chart what we have done is 21 we've reflected not only the comments but we've added all 22 of the comments that have been relied upon in this 23 regard. And we've also added what one can actually see, 24 both in the testimony and in the contemporaneous records, 25 that reflects the reaction, the response on the part of
1201 Deputy Carson and others to the purported political 2 pressure. 3 I've highlighted five (5) or six (6) of 4 them for you, and if I can take them to you briefly. The 5 first highlighted one is in the second box. 6 Marcel Beaubien calling the Premier. You 7 know, here's an example of alleged political pressure. 8 Look at the handwritten scribe entry referencing this 9 call. Marcel Beaubien calling the Premier, that's fine. 10 Sit tight, take it slow. Some influence, some pressure. 11 If you turn to the next page, the last 12 entry. The Premier has made it clear to Deb Hutton 13 purportedly his position that there be no different 14 treatment, Native as opposed to non-Native. 15 And this is in a telephone call between 16 John Carson and Ron Fox on September the 5th. What do 17 Carson and Fox say: 18 "I mean we're going to do that over 19 trespassing? 20 FOX: That's exactly right and I said 21 you just can't do that. 22 CARSON: That's right. I mean if 23 you're going to do that we have to have 24 the force of the law behind us to 25 provide some recognition by a Court in
1211 this land. Well and I'm hesitant to 2 get too excited about moving on the 3 Park until we have some Court 4 injunction. 5 FOX: That's right." 6 Some direction, some pressure. Then you 7 see the next entry: 8 "Premier no different treatment from 9 anyone else." 10 But, let's look at the complete 11 handwritten scribe entry: 12 "Premier no different treatment from 13 anyone else. We're okay. On the right 14 track." 15 And then reflects concern the notice 16 wasn't accepted, Ron Fox dealing with the legal issues. 17 "We see it over and over again. That's 18 all very interesting what politicians 19 may think but, we're okay. Maintain 20 the status quo. We're on the right 21 track. We're doing the right thing. 22 All of that over a trespassing? No 23 way." 24 Then if you skip two (2) pages to the next 25 entry that I've highlighted. And again I could do this
1221 for every entry, I'm just picking the ones that most 2 dramatically make the point -- well it'd be for you to 3 say how dramatic it is or isn't at this point, after four 4 (4) days of submissions. 5 "Heat from political side." 6 Well, there's one that's been relied upon 7 over and over and over again. Let's look at the complete 8 handwritten scribe entry, not simply that portion relied 9 upon. 10 "JOHN CARSON: If someone can get to do 11 it tonight bring it here to the office. 12 Skinner be part of the command team. 13 Heat from political side, made strong 14 comments in the House. Court 15 injunction moving along, keep tonight 16 quiet. Keep on the checkpoints. 17 Wherever you are let the logistics 18 know. Keep it up." 19 I'm suggesting this speaks volumes and 20 commends John Carson. Yeah, sure there's heat out there, 21 there's noise out there, there's pressure out there and 22 so on; but we're staying the course. 23 And then if you skip a little bit further 24 along to the next entry which is at page 10, we see this 25 entry that I referred to in the conversation from Tim
1231 McCabe to John Carson. 2 So -- this has been relied upon by some of 3 the parties here to say, here's Tim McCabe saying that 4 John Carson: 5 "People are concerned about the reports 6 of gunfire last night." 7 And then here John Carson says: 8 "Well I have to be frank with you, I 9 haven't seen a weapon pointed as us, 10 haven't seen one fired in any 11 direction. There's no reason to 12 believe that the firing we heard last 13 night was anything more than audio for 14 our benefit. When you hear there's 15 gunfire you can't really use that, I 16 mean it's a significant factor from a 17 safety point of view. I mean obviously 18 there's weaponry in there, but I can't 19 say our officers have been threatened 20 with weapons. I mean just as long as 21 it's understood in the big picture, not 22 in isolation because I don't want 23 people to think or that your affidavit 24 to suggest that we've been fired on or 25 any of those kinds of things."
1241 I mean this is why Deputy Carson is being 2 paid the big money as the Incident Commander. He's a 3 person that can make independent judgments and show 4 objectivity. 5 Then skipping down: 6 "Marcel Beaubien sent a fax to the 7 Premier and he wants a return phone 8 call regarding his intentions." 9 Well, let's look at the whole entry. 10 We've reproduced the whole entry, immediately after it 11 the typed police scribe notes state: 12 "Inspector Carson advised there's a 13 Court Hearing for the injunction at 14 9:00 a.m. Marcel Beaubien is aware of 15 the situation. JOHN CARSON: We 16 normally try to serve them, give them a 17 chance to leave. If they won't be 18 cooperative, then sit down and talk 19 about a peaceful resolution without 20 confrontation." 21 Some direction, some pressure. And then 22 the last one (1) that I've highlighted, Marcel Beaubien 23 states: 24 "He doesn't mind taking controversy. 25 If the situation can't be handled by
1251 the police something has to be done to 2 handle the situation." 3 Well, immediately after that entry that 4 was reproduced we have this: 5 "John Carson states that we want it 6 resolved but we don't want anyone to 7 get hurt. We want everything that can 8 be done to stress the point of no one 9 getting hurt." 10 And as you've heard my familiar refrain; 11 some direction, some pressure. Those are my submissions 12 in relation to political interference. 13 Then if I can turn with you to the last 14 topic that I intend to cover in my oral submissions and 15 that's the decision to deploy the Crowd Management Unit. 16 Much has been said about it. 17 I have submitted to you in writing that it 18 was a reasonable decision based in good faith upon the 19 circumstances known to Deputy Carson at the time. And 20 even on a correct apprehension of the facts, it was one 21 (1) option reasonably available to the Incident 22 Commander. 23 Now, it was noted by one (1) party in oral 24 submissions that I couldn't even maintain that the 25 decision was the correct one (1). But I had to fall back
1261 on it being just a reasonable decision based in good 2 faith at the time. 3 I have to say with respect, someone died. 4 It would be insensitive or callous to say that the 5 decision was the correct one. As Deputy Carson said: 6 "Every other option looks good when one 7 knows after the fact what happened 8 here." 9 That was the right thing to say. And -- 10 and it recognizes as well that with the benefit of the 11 scrutiny that we've had here, that some of the 12 information was inaccurate. 13 Now Deputy Carson and Detective Inspector 14 Wright identified the factors that informed the decision 15 to call out the CMU shortly after 8:30 p.m. And -- and 16 there's been much that you've heard, I'm sure you've 17 memorized all of the factors and the ebb and flow that 18 have taken place here as to the extent to which they 19 informed the Incident Commander's decision. 20 But I want to make some points here based 21 upon the contemporaneous records that exist. And in my 22 submission the factors that John Carson and Mark Wright 23 identified as informing the decision of John Carson to 24 call out the CMU are each borne out by testimony, often 25 that of the Stoney Point occupiers themselves, which has
1271 not been cited in other parties' submissions, at times 2 the scribe notes and contemporaneous radio transmissions 3 and telephone calls. 4 And in my submission collectively they 5 support the inference that the situation had escalated 6 and that the occupation was no longer contained within 7 the Park boundaries. 8 I'll briefly deal with each. The 9 gathering of cottagers in the sandy parking lot. 10 Detective Inspector Wright advised Deputy Carson of this 11 in their telephone call which occurred about thirty (30) 12 minutes after the group disbursed. 13 And Wright advised his superior that quote 14 and this is on a contemporaneous tape. This isn't what 15 he's saying today: 16 "I just took care of the public for now 17 but if we don't deal with this, we're 18 back." 19 So to suggest that this wasn't a concern 20 that existed at the time and before the decision of CMU 21 is not valid. 22 Second, the presence of armed individuals 23 in the sandy parking lot. You've heard that shortly 24 after 7:30 p.m. Detective Inspector Wright spotted eight 25 (8) to ten (10) First Nation males outside of the Park
1281 fence line standing in a string from the fence to the 2 edge of the sandy parking lot. 3 Four (4) or five (5) had clubs or bats. 4 He was in plainclothes. He was not readily identified as 5 a police officer and the conversation that followed 6 suggested that the Park occupiers had no idea at least 7 initially, that he was an officer. 8 He was asked to leave stating it wasn't 9 his problem and he'd be best get out of there. Wright 10 asked if he could go where they were into the parking 11 lot. He was told 'no'. 12 The men were tapping the clubs in their 13 open palms and it appeared that they were taking control 14 of the sandy parking lot. Now, he's been much maligned 15 for -- for that evidence. But with great respect, it's 16 compatible with what we know from other testimony and 17 from contemporaneous records. 18 What continues to be overlooked for 19 example, is that Glenn Bressette whose candor and honesty 20 was obvious as a witness here at the Inquiry. Not simply 21 on this issue but generally, supported generally 22 Detective Inspector Wright's account of this exchange. 23 And I've provided in the next excerpt, the 24 testimony of Glenn Bressette that provided some 25 circumstantial support for what Detective Inspector
1291 Wright had to say. 2 Indeed, a number of the Stoney Point 3 occupiers acknowledged that they carried clubs or bats in 4 the area of the sandy parking lot at the time. Clayton 5 George acknowledged that he was armed in this manner to 6 assert his ownership in that land. 7 This is significant testimony that hasn't 8 been referred to anywhere else. One (1) of the things he 9 was doing was asserting his ownership interest in the 10 land. This is our land, we'll go here if we want. We'll 11 be armed with these items because we're entitled to. 12 There were other Stoney Point witnesses 13 who acknowledged that they were armed or saw others armed 14 with a club or a stick. And we know that right after the 15 incident Detective Inspector Wright attended at 16 Checkpoint Charlie and advise the officers to be careful, 17 that it looked to him like things were escalating, and 18 that he reported the incident to the Command Post at 7:54 19 p.m. 20 And what does he tell Deputy Carson in 21 that same phone call earlier alluded to, We've got a bit 22 of a situation here right at the curb. They've got about 23 eight (8) of them there with baseball bats right on the 24 road edge. And what does Deputy Carson want to know, 25 Commissioner? He wants to know if they're coming out of
1301 the Park and that he was of the firm view that, quote: 2 "We've got to deal with them, We can't 3 just let them out in the area with 4 that stuff." Close quote. 5 And that's a contemporaneous reflection 6 that sums it up. You can't have containment. I mean, 7 one -- one can parse all of the reasons that are given, 8 one can engage in this analytical exercise that we've 9 seen over days and days of cross-examination, but the 10 bottom line is that, with great respect, if individuals 11 are armed with clubs and bats and they're out and they're 12 extending beyond the location of the occupation with 13 cottages next door and so on, it has to be dealt with in 14 some way. 15 And I recognize all of the work that we 16 had been doing at Part 2 is to find a better way to avoid 17 the situation from happening in the first place. But one 18 can't deny the reality of what existed there. 19 The incident represented a significant 20 turn of events. At no time during the occupation of the 21 Army Base or the Park had the Stoney Point people come 22 off the occupied land, armed and taken a position of 23 apparent defiance. And this was the third advance into 24 the sandy parking lot within the twenty-four (24) hour 25 period.
1311 Now, the Gerald George incident. The 2 valid point has been made here time and time again that 3 Deputy Carson's decision to deploy the CMU was informed 4 by an inaccurate and more serious description of this 5 event than what in fact occurred. However, the actual 6 events would have been properly considered in determining 7 what action to take. 8 John Carson candidly told you he couldn't 9 say today whether his decision would have been the same 10 in light of this. The point to be made, that it 11 represented an option that was available to the Incident 12 Commander. This was the first occasion that an occupier 13 had assaulted a civilian member of the community outside 14 of the occupied territory. And those are the real facts 15 as we know them. 16 The movement of the school bus and dump 17 truck. Right around the time the Gerald George incident 18 was unfolding officers radioed the Command Post to advise 19 of an increase in movement by the school bus and the dump 20 truck towards the runway. And again Detective Inspector 21 Wright conveyed that to Deputy Carson in that eight 22 o'clock telephone call. They were concerned that the 23 vehicles would pierce the fence line and come out into 24 the roadway. 25 Detective Inspector Wright directs other
1321 officers, We want a situation report on those things, The 2 instant they move out I want to know about it. And this 3 was in response to Deputy Carson's question about whether 4 they were coming out of the Park. 5 Now let's be candid, the presence of a 6 school bus had to raise a red flag. Just a little over a 7 month earlier it had been employed as a weapon to ram a 8 military vehicle and the doors to the drill hall during 9 the takeover of the built-up areas. 10 Then there were the fires. At 11 approximately 8:20 officers on the ground advised the 12 Command Post about a fire that existed. And at 13 approximately fifteen (15) minutes following the first 14 report, a report of a second fire further back in came 15 into the TOC. And it's no answer to say now that it 16 turned out that the fires were not in the sandy parking 17 lot. I mean, this was information from people on the 18 ground that the Incident Commander was entitled to 19 utilise to inform his decision. 20 The departure of women and children. 21 Detective Constable Dew who went to the Park to collect 22 the statement generated by Gerald George learned from 23 Checkpoint Delta that women and children were leaving out 24 of fear there was going to be trouble here tonight. 25 And again I'm not denying that with the
1331 benefit of everything that we now know we can see the 2 mis-communication issues that arose. I'm simply looking 3 at the reasonableness of the state of mind that existed 4 at the time. 5 Because a number of the Stoney Point 6 witnesses supported the account of those officers and no 7 one reported to the police as they were coming out that 8 the evacuation, so to speak, was prompted by a concern 9 that the police would be coming at them or entering the 10 Park. 11 Then there's the intention to move into 12 the sandy parking lot and cottage area. Between 1995 -- 13 '3 and '5, the Stoney Point Group incrementally enlarged 14 their occupation in the area. Each expansion was 15 premised on a belief that the land in question was 16 rightfully theirs. 17 And we've amassed the evidence that makes 18 the point that it was reasonable for Deputy Carson to 19 infer from the words and actions of the Stoney Point 20 people that the next targets of expansion were the sandy 21 park lot and possibly the cottage properties. 22 Just before the Park takeover, Sergeant 23 Korosec overheard Glenn George say Ravenswood was next. 24 On the evening of September the 5th, ten 25 (10) to twenty (20) park occupiers moved off of the Park
1341 into the sandy parking lot, creating a barrier of picnic 2 tables. 3 On the morning of September the 6th, the 4 Stoney Point occupiers pitched a tent, lit a fire and 5 again erected a barrier of picnic tables in the sandy 6 parking lot. Deputy Carson was concerned then about the 7 proximity of the tables to the nearby cottages. 8 And these are contemporaneous records in 9 his conversation with Tony Parkin that show quote: 10 "If the tables were set on fire there 11 would be damages to the homes." Close 12 quote. 13 This isn't some fanciful pretext policing 14 that Julian Falconer has introduced here. These reflect 15 contemporaneous concerns even before the events on the 16 evening of September the 6th. 17 Many Stoney Point witnesses readily 18 acknowledge that they moved into the sandy parking lot as 19 early as September the 5th because they believed it was 20 their land, they wanted to reclaim it, as articulated by 21 Mike Cloud, it was part of their homeland. 22 The point was further made when the Stoney 23 Point occupiers told the CMU to get off our land as the 24 Unit stood on the sandy parking lot. And they also 25 claimed that the cottage properties west of the sandy
1351 parking lot was First Nations territory. 2 And Clayton George held the same view. 3 And of greater significance for this Inquiry and on its 4 concern over the breakdown of communication, he 5 acknowledged that the police would have no way of knowing 6 that the Stoney Point occupiers didn't intend to move 7 past the sandy parking lot. 8 This isn't the evidence of John Carson, 9 this isn't the evidence of Mark Wright, this is the 10 evidence of Clayton George. 11 And in the next excerpt that I've provided 12 you, it culminates -- it culminates with the 13 acknowledgement that there would be no way for someone to 14 know that you weren't going to be going to the cottages 15 next because you never communicated that to anybody. Am 16 I right so far? The answer is yes. 17 Now, again it all seems to come back to 18 mis-communication and mis-perceptions. But, the reality 19 of the situation is that there was a reasonable concern 20 given the progression of events that had occurred that 21 the sandy parking lot was next to be taken. It was right 22 beside the cottages and that meant potential problem to 23 public safety. 24 Now, Deputy Carson consistently took the 25 position that's again corroborated by the available
1361 evidence that the CMU could be called off in the event 2 that all of the armed occupiers returned to the Park and 3 remained there. 4 And I've already highlighted what he said: 5 "If they go back into the Park let them 6 go, if they're just having a campfire 7 let's just leave them." 8 But, as it turned out the information 9 coming over the total access channel between the time 10 Deputy Carson left the command post at 9:30 and the time 11 that he headed over to the TOC and the deployment of the 12 CMU at 10:27, did support the inference that the threat 13 posed by the loss of containment still existed. 14 And you'll recall I introduced through the 15 testimony of Deputy Carson and Mark Wright, radio 16 transmissions that had not been introduced up into that 17 point in time, nor could they have been. 18 I didn't want that to be any criticism, 19 John Carson was the first officer who testified. And we 20 saw for example, that at 9:25 the Oscar team reported 21 about twelve (12) out and a lot of vehicle activity. 22 About twenty (20) around the fire, two (2) over on the 23 fence. The fire was outside of the Park. 24 The Oscar team reported shortly thereafter 25 that the number of people on the road had increased to
1371 fifteen (15). And we see it right in the scribe note for 2 21:28. 3 Shortly after 9:30 the Oscar team reported 4 that the fence was down and vehicles are travelling 5 freely between the Park and the parking lot. Again, 6 captured in the scribe notes. At 9:40 officers at 7 Checkpoint Delta reported a large bonfire having been 8 started and an increase in traffic, including movement by 9 the dump truck. They expected rocks to fly momentarily 10 at them. 11 And again, we see it in the scribe notes. 12 Within two (2) minutes of that update, the Oscar team 13 reports lots of traffic at their location and ATV's on 14 the beach. 15 There were people all over the place. 16 Their concern caused them to retreat: 17 "We're moving back a bit as it's 18 getting henky." Close quote. 19 Henky meaning scary. Indeed the OSCAR 20 team was sufficiently concerned about their safety that 21 they asked if there's support nearby. And they're 22 advised to move out of the area if necessary. 23 Within the same time span reports that the 24 occupiers were stockpiling clubs and rocks were coming 25 in. So as the CMU approached the sandy parking lot, it
1381 wasn't empty, it wasn't the scene of an innocent 2 campfire. 3 The CMU came upon Stoney Point occupiers 4 some of whom were armed with bats and clubs in the 5 parking lot. Now, the portrayal of what it was like 6 outside that Park that evening as reflected in 7 contemporaneous recordings by officers, trained officers 8 who are feeling henky, is markedly different from the 9 picture presented by some counsel here. 10 It was a difficult troubling situation. 11 Now a number of counsel cross-examined 12 Deputy Carson at length as to whether the CMU was the 13 most reasonable means to address the loss of containment. 14 And he said that simply a group of ERT 15 officers could affect an arrest. But having regard to 16 the confrontational events that had occurred, the two (2) 17 preceding evenings, he didn't regard that as a feasible 18 option. 19 The third option was the deployment of the 20 CMU comprised of two (2) ERT teams. And he thought and 21 it didn't work out this way as we all know, but he 22 reasoned that the mere presence and psychological affect 23 of the unit, would push the armed occupiers back into the 24 Park. 25 And he alludes to it in his telephone call
1391 with Inspector Linton when he says: 2 "Okay, we'll do the arrest with the ERT 3 guys." 4 After he's talked Linton out of the use of 5 the TRU unit to affect the arrest. 6 "CARSON: I would call out all sixty 7 (60) of them if you have to." 8 Now I understand, I mean the point has 9 been made a number of times to you, Commissioner, that 10 they're not saying CMU there. But I'm suggesting that 11 the distinction between calling out all sixty (60) of 12 them if you have to and calling out the CMU is not as 13 wide a chasm as My Friends would have you find. 14 The point here was that Deputy Carson was 15 of the view that the occupiers in the past two (2) 16 incidents had responded to the presence of the police and 17 retreated into the Park, it was reasonable that they 18 would respond in the same way in the face of a large 19 number of officers going down the road. 20 Now again, stopping there for a moment, 21 I've told you that part of the training that's now 22 underway for the POU Commanders and for the ERT members 23 are on the special considerations and unique responses in 24 Aboriginal incidents or blockades. 25 And one (1) of the things that has to be
1401 thought about very seriously is whether the response to 2 the CMU is different or the same when it involves an 3 Aboriginal occupation. 4 And it's absolutely clear that Aboriginal 5 occupations evoke different responses and different 6 concerns and that has to be factored into the equation 7 and that's acknowledged and -- and has been acknowledged 8 for some time. 9 Now anticipating that the deployment of 10 the CMU might be the response ultimately selected, 11 Detective Inspector Wright who was familiar with the 12 capabilities of such teams, held back the day shift ERT 13 officers to ensure there was resources available. 14 And I have to say with respect, there is 15 no evidence that Detective Inspector Wright caused the 16 CMU members to dress, actually dress in the hard TAC nor 17 was he even asked about this point raised by Mr. 18 Klippenstein in oral submissions. 19 But the evidence is clear in any event 20 that the ultimate decision rested with the Incident 21 Commander. A Second in Command is entitled to anticipate 22 and marshal resources for an expected response. 23 We also see that Deputy Carson wanted to 24 take the least aggressive approach. Look at what he told 25 the TRU people:
1411 "All we're doing is observation. We're 2 not going tactical. Let's get that 3 straight." 4 So much for aggressiveness. So much for 5 Government direction. 6 Now counsel challenged Deputy Carson as to 7 why he didn't simply evacuate the immediate cottages. 8 Pull back the police and erect roadblocks to prevent 9 other members of the public from entering that area. 10 And I've provided you the excerpt of what 11 John Carson had to say when this point was more fully 12 developed. Mr. Rosenthal provided you with one (1) 13 portion of the transcript during his cross-examination. 14 My submission is that I commend this portion that I've 15 provided you here 16 And time doesn't permit me to read it out 17 to you, but it explains why John Carson reasonably was of 18 the view that those were not appropriate options as he 19 saw it, in the circumstances. They didn't accomplish the 20 concern about containment. Without he benefit of 21 hindsight his position was a reasonable one. 22 Now, Deputy Carson was concerned that the 23 cottagers might take the law into their own hands, 24 thereby exacerbating the situation. And Mr. Rosenthal 25 said in oral submissions, Well, 11:00 at night, the
1421 cottagers wouldn't be confronting the occupiers. 2 And I say, with respect, that missed the 3 point. The loss of containment would mean that a 4 confrontation between the two (2); cottagers, non- 5 Aboriginal residents in the area and the occupiers could 6 not be avoided the following day. Containment would have 7 been lost. And Caledonia has shown this is not some 8 speculative concern. 9 Now, in conclusion on this point, looking 10 at decisions in retrospect is, of course, the work of any 11 Inquiry. 12 It's upon close scrutiny and considered 13 reflection, not available often to the decision maker at 14 the time, that recommendations can be made. But, 15 hindsight can't figure too prominently in the evaluations 16 of such decisions. 17 Cecil Bernard George was candid in 18 acknowledging his role in the events that led to the 19 tragic ending. 20 Had the occupier remained in the Park 21 after the parking lot was clear, the CMU would have 22 continued to withdraw, the tactics would likely have been 23 successful. 24 Had the CMU not been deployed and if the 25 occupiers armed with bats and clubs and encountered
1431 nearby cottagers, it may have been a very serious issue 2 that arose that would have resulted in the OPP 3 justifiably criticized for failing to take measures to 4 preserve public safety. 5 Deputy Carson hasn't told you that he 6 remains certain that the decision he made was the correct 7 one (1); it's not surprising given his strength of 8 character and the fact that a tragedy has occurred. 9 Whether the decision to deploy the CMU was in hindsight 10 correct, it was a reasonable decision based in good faith 11 upon the circumstances known to Deputy Carson at the 12 time. 13 Now, I do want to address several issues 14 that arise out of that. The first is that as I've said 15 to you several times, the inability to communicate with 16 the occupiers was undoubtedly a significant impediment to 17 resolving this incident without violence. 18 And I've already told you that the 19 avoidance of unnecessary confrontation through proactive 20 and ongoing dialogue that now takes place has gone a long 21 way to addressing those communication failures. 22 But, as well, the current best practices 23 for public order deployments have addressed lessons 24 learned -- or since or as a result of Ipperwash. The OPP 25 as I've said at the outset discontinued the practice of
1441 shield chatter recognizing that in the context of 2 Aboriginal occupations or protests, in particular, it may 3 not reduce the likelihood of violence. And we see that. 4 The current command structure enhances 5 informed decision makers -- decision making. The bronze 6 commander who I've already described to you has training 7 as a Level 2 incident commander, makes the decisions on 8 the scene that back in '95 might have to have been made 9 by the Incident Commander who is not right there. 10 And I've addressed these points, but in 11 summary they mean that a Commander now has options and 12 tactics available to him that was -- were not available 13 in 1995. 14 Inspector Wright has been much maligned at 15 this Inquiry. Much of our written reply in submissions 16 have been directed to straightening the record in 17 relation to him. 18 But, I want to point out one (1) fact to 19 you, in addition what you have in writing. If he was as 20 antagonistic and uncompromising towards the Stoney Point 21 occupiers as some have argued to you in the last few 22 days, would he have recommended a non-aggressive approach 23 to regaining containment of the Park to Inspector Linton? 24 His recommendation is captured in the 25 handwritten scribe notes. It speaks for itself and stood
1451 unchallenged at this Inquiry. At 20:02 Inspector Linton 2 talks about: 3 "Let's take over the B Team with 4 helmets and the canine. 5 Mark Wright: Disagree. Advise males to 6 back off into the Parks." 7 Now, Mr. Klippenstein pointed out that 8 this is after the CMU were putting on the hard TAC, 9 exactly. I'm -- I'm with him, that could very well be 10 the case. But so much for politically driven motivation 11 to arrest or confront out of the Park or to take back the 12 Park. 13 The entire edifice of the so-called case 14 against Mark Wright collapses with this entry. If he was 15 so dogmatic, if it was so important to arrest and 16 confront those occupiers, why are they discussing the 17 option that he initiates of advising -- simply advising 18 the males to back off into the Park. 19 Deputy Carson, in any event, emphatically 20 rejected this so-called juggernaut theory that -- that 21 the motions were put -- the wheels were in motion and 22 that he could not stop the -- the train or -- or chose 23 not to stop the train from continuing on. 24 He didn't feel that the TRU team had to go 25 in and affect arrest just because Linton had reached that
1461 conclusion before he returned to the Command Post. And 2 he didn't feel that the CMU had to be deployed just 3 because it was assembled and ready to respond if and when 4 needed. 5 And we've articulated for you in our 6 factum why it wasn't the slightest bit improper for 7 Inspector Wright or Sergeant Korosec to take steps for 8 the possible deployment of the CMU prior to the decision 9 actually having been made. 10 And we make the case for how the CMU was 11 not deployed when others have said that it was, and 12 you'll see that in our submissions. 13 It couldn't be deployed in the absence of 14 its leader, Inspector Lacroix, who didn't arrive until 15 9:10 p.m. 16 It couldn't be deployed in the absence 17 of the second in command, Sergeant Hebblethwaite, who 18 didn't arrive until 8:40 p.m. And he told the Inquiry 19 that he'd been advised to prepared for a, quote, 20 "possible," close quote, deployment prior to his 21 departure to retrieve the equipment. 22 And in the Estate of Dudley George's own 23 Appendix A to its submissions, the notebook entries and 24 interviews of many CMU officers were reproduced, 25 referring to being told that around 8:00 p.m. to prepare
1471 for a, quote, "possible," close quote, deployment or 2 remain on standby. 3 Now, in a short period of time I've been 4 through a lot of evidence, Commissioner, and what we have 5 done to assist you on this issue as well is provide you 6 with yet another chart, because you don't have enough 7 charts, so I thought we'd give you one (1) more. 8 And what we've done here is -- is this, 9 that the Chiefs of Ontario made the case in its factum 10 for why the factors articulated by Deputy Carson did not 11 obtain. 12 And what we've done is we've reproduced 13 exactly what COO has had to say on each of those factors 14 and -- and the totality of the evidence which, in our 15 view, responds to and answers COO's position. 16 So this is intended to be a -- a neat and 17 quick way to respond to the submissions articulated by 18 COO in setting out the factors that a number of parties 19 adopted before you in making their submissions. 20 Now, if I can take you to the very last 21 excerpt that I have provided, and that's the excerpt of 22 Brad Seltzer when he testified here on June the 13th of 23 2006. And he said this, and it bears repeating: 24 "Ipperwash was without a doubt the most 25 significant experience of my life and
1481 my career. It had a profound impact on 2 me and still burdens me, almost eleven 3 (11) years later. My wife, my children 4 and all who know me know that to be 5 true. 6 Like others I attended the Ipperwash 7 occurrence because I was assigned to 8 the task. I attended with the goal of 9 doing my job to the best of my ability 10 and towards the mutual goal of peaceful 11 resolution, but that was not to be. 12 When I was briefed by Inspector Carson 13 at 4:00 a.m. on September 7th as to 14 what had happened overnight, I was 15 shocked. The tide had turned so 16 quickly and I experienced a heartfelt 17 disappointment that the goal we had as 18 a group would not be achieved. It was 19 a tragedy beyond expectation. Control 20 was fragile if not lost. Emotions were 21 high and I was deeply concerned for the 22 future of the next few hours or days. 23 I had never experienced a situation of 24 this magnitude but, was comforted by 25 the thought that somehow the collective
1491 professional skill of so many would 2 bring this again under control. 3 Later that day Inspector Carson and I 4 talked again. Where were we? What do 5 we need to do? A citizen had died. 6 Police personnel had experienced a life 7 threatening environment, SIU was or 8 would be on scene interviewing some. A 9 psychologist and trauma counsellors 10 were interviewing others. Morale was 11 shattered by the events. And our hope 12 of a communication contact was gone and 13 we had been so close. 14 I thought of the first question that 15 Bob George asked me the day before. Do 16 you have any power? No. Then they 17 won't talk to you. 18 I said, John we're out of our league, 19 this isn't something we can fix. His 20 response was slow and deliberate. I 21 believed it bothered him as it did me. 22 Emotionally he said, we have to handle 23 it, there's nobody else coming. 24 All at the same time, I felt anger, 25 denial, frustration and despair and
1501 that's the unresolved emotion that I'm 2 still left with today every time I hear 3 the word 'Ipperwash'. 4 Resolution is found at a table in the 5 spirit of inclusion, not with a couple 6 of people yelling at each other over a 7 fence. 8 The police can deal with public safety 9 and security but the police were left 10 to handle a situation that we had no 11 power to resolve. 12 The resolution of these matters lies 13 within our governments, the foundations 14 of power that society leans on when 15 social structures become ineffective. 16 And as we know, this isn't just an 17 occurrence for today or even tomorrow. 18 This is a moment in time in Canadian 19 history and as the old adage says, 20 unless we change our direction we're 21 likely to end up where we are headed." 22 I submit to you Commissioner, that Brad 23 Seltzer gets it. John Carson gets it. The OPP gets it. 24 The OPP has learned from this difficult 25 and painful tragedy. We invite all parties, Aboriginal
1511 and non-Aboriginal, to work with us to prevent it from 2 ever happening again. 3 And if we're all prepared to do that, 4 Commissioner, to quote Sam George as I did at the outset: 5 "Something good will truly come out of 6 something bad." 7 Thank you very much. 8 I would like to take this moment having 9 concluded my submissions to -- you thought I was done 10 didn't you? 11 To thank you Commissioner, as others 12 have, your staff, including your counsel, investigators, 13 researchers and the like, for the exceptional cooperation 14 that they've provided and their commitment to your work 15 and to you sir, for your assistance throughout the 16 Inquiry. 17 You've had the patience that is really 18 quite remarkable. 19 I also want to make two (2) other points. 20 And the first is that we tend to focus when we're giving 21 out thanks to counsel in particular. But, I have to tell 22 you in some twenty-seven (27) years I have never worked 23 with the staff that you have here in Forest who are as 24 congenial and as helpful to all counsel. They are truly 25 extraordinary.
1521 And I can't say that I'm going to miss 2 coming to Forest, it would be a lie, but I will miss 3 them. So I want to thank them for their assistance 4 throughout. 5 And finally, in our written submissions we 6 have indicated all of the OPP officers that have been 7 involved in assisting in the preparation of the work of 8 this Inquiry, both at Part 1 and Part 2. 9 And if you'll indulge me just to take a 10 moment, I do want to acknowledge their important work. 11 Detective Superintendent Mark Vanzant who has been here, 12 as you know for much of the Inquiry. Inspector Andy 13 Karski, Detective Sergeant Craig, Detective Sergeant 14 Hurren, Detective Sergeant Ed Kodis, Detective Sergeant 15 Rutledge, Detective Constable Bridget Brousseau, 16 Detective Constable Shawn Evans, Greg Duncan, Mark 17 Blocksdorf, David McClocklin, Josh McFadden, Cathy Jaques 18 and Brenda Van Dyk. 19 And particularly, I have to acknowledge 20 the special contribution of Detective Constable Evans, 21 whose expertise, his good cheer and virtual constant 22 presence through this entire Inquiry facilitated the work 23 of OPP counsel and the Inquiry itself. 24 And I have to say that I'll be completing 25 my submissions in about thirty (30) seconds, he will be
1531 the happiest person on the planet. 2 The following OPP officers and employees 3 were exceptionally -- I'm exceptionally grateful to for 4 their assistance at Part 2. You've met many of them 5 already. 6 Superintendent Deevy, Superintendent 7 Blair, Superintendent Ron George, Acting Superintendent 8 Glenn Trivett, Inspector Robin Jones, Acting Detective 9 Staff Sergeant Morris, Gail Jackson, Julie Grimaldi, 10 Sergeant Kelsall, Sergeant Brennan and again Brenda Van 11 Dyk. 12 Some of those you did meet personally and 13 I'm sure you'll recall during the OPP forum for example, 14 Superintendent Blair, Superintendent George, Acting 15 Superintendent Trivett who showed together with 16 Commissioner Boniface an emotional commitment to the 17 First Nations community. 18 And it's those kinds of officers that will 19 make the Force a better Force. 20 Thank you, sir. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 22 very much, Mr. Sandler. 23 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Commissioner, that 24 completes our work for today. We start tomorrow morning 25 at 9:00 a.m. with the submissions of the -- I believe
1541 it's seven (7) Part 2 parties that will be making short 2 presentations tomorrow morning. 3 And so that we anticipate we will go from 4 9:00 to approximately 12:30 if the parties take the half 5 an hour each. And then at two o'clock tomorrow afternoon 6 we will have the Closing ceremony. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We'll 8 adjourn now until nine o'clock tomorrow morning. 9 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Thank you very much, 10 sir. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 12 very much. 13 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 14 adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, August 24th at 9:00 15 a.m 16 17 --- Upon adjourning at 3:42 p.m. 18 19 20 21 22 ________________ 23 Carol Geehan, Ms. 24 25