11 2 3 IPPERWASH PUBLIC INQUIRY 4 5 6 7 ******************** 8 9 10 BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE SIDNEY LINDEN, 11 COMMISSIONER 12 13 14 15 16 Held at: Forest Community Centre 17 Kimball Hall 18 Forest, Ontario 19 20 21 ******************** 22 23 24 August 18th, 2005 25
21 Appearances 2 Derry Millar ) Commission Counsel 3 Susan Vella ) (np) 4 Donald Worme, Q. C ) 5 Katherine Hensel ) (np) 6 Megan Ferrier ) 7 Murray Klippenstein ) (np) The Estate of Dudley 8 Vilko Zbogar ) (np) George and George 9 Andrew Orkin ) (np) Family Group 10 Basil Alexander ) 11 12 Peter Rosenthal ) Aazhoodena and George 13 Jackie Esmonde ) (np) Family Group 14 15 Anthony Ross ) (np) Residents of 16 Cameron Neil ) (np) Aazhoodena (Army Camp) 17 Kevin Scullion ) 18 William Henderson ) (np) Kettle Point & Stony 19 Jonathon George ) Point First Nation 20 Colleen Johnson ) (np) 21 22 Kim Twohig ) Government of Ontario 23 Walter Myrka ) (np) 24 Susan Freeborn ) (np) 25 Michelle Pong ) (np)
31 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 Janet Clermont ) Municipality of 3 David Nash ) (np) Lambton Shores 4 5 Peter Downard ) The Honourable Michael 6 Bill Hourigan ) (np) Harris 7 Jennifer McAleer ) 8 9 Ian Smith ) (np) Robert Runciman 10 Alice Mrozek ) (np) 11 Harvey Stosberg ) (np) Charles Harnick 12 Jacqueline Horvat ) (np) 13 Douglas Sulman, Q.C. ) Marcel Beaubien 14 Dave Jacklin ) (np) 15 Trevor Hinnegan ) (np) 16 17 Mark Sandler ) Ontario Provincial 18 Andrea Tuck-Jackson ) Ontario Provincial Police 19 Leslie Kaufman ) (np) 20 Ian Roland ) Ontario Provincial 21 Karen Jones ) (np) Police Association & 22 Debra Newell ) (np) K. Deane 23 Ian McGilp ) (np) 24 Annie Leeks ) (np) 25 Jennifer Gleitman ) (np)
41 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 Julian Falconer ) (np) Aboriginal Legal 3 Brian Eyolfson ) (np) Services of Toronto 4 Kimberly Murray ) 5 Julian Roy ) 6 Clem Nabigon ) (np) 7 Adriel Weaver ) (np) Student-at-Law 8 9 Al J.C. O'Marra ) Office of the Chief 10 Robert Ash, Q.C. ) (np) Coroner 11 12 William Horton ) (np) Chiefs of Ontario 13 Matthew Horner ) 14 Kathleen Lickers ) (np) 15 16 Mark Fredrick ) (np) Christopher Hodgson 17 Craig Mills ) (np) 18 Megan Mackey ) (np) 19 Erin Tully ) 20 21 David Roebuck ) (np) Debbie Hutton 22 Anna Perschy ) 23 Melissa Panjer ) (np) 24 Danya Cohen-Nehemia ) 25
51 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 PAGE NO. 3 List of Exhibits 4 5 CHRISTOPHER JAMES ASH COLES, Resumed 6 7 Continued Cross-Examination by Mr. Julian Roy 8 8 Cross-Examination by Mr. Mark Sandler 131 9 10 THOMAS BERNARD O'GRADY, Sworn 11 Examination-in-Chief by Mr. Derry Millar 185 12 13 14 15 Certificate of Transcript 244 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
61 EXHIBITS 2 No. Description Page 3 P-577 Biographical sketch of Commissioner 4 Thomas B. O'Grady (Retired) OPP. 186 5 P-578 Ministerial Control and the Ontario 6 Provincial Police: A Discussion Paper 7 prepared by the Legal Services Branch 8 of the Ministry of the Solicitor 9 General 1991. 200 10 P-579 Ministry of Community Safety & 11 Correctional Services, Roles & 12 Relationships between the Minister, 13 a Deputy Minister nd the OPP: 14 A Summary (undated). 203 15 P-580 Document number 2002659, March 16 02/89. Agreement between Canada, 17 Ontario, Grand Council Treaty Number 18 3 Nation, Nishnawbe-Aski Nation, the 19 Association of Iroquois and Allied 20 Indians. the Union of Ontario Indians 21 and The Chief and Council of the Six 22 Nations of the Grand River Tract. 235 23 24 25
71 LIST OF EXHIBITS (cont'd) 2 Exhibit No. Description Page No. 3 P-581 Document number 2002660, December 4 01/ 89, Agreement between Canada, 5 Ontario, Grand Council Treaty Number 6 3 Nation, Nishnawbe-Aski Nation, the 7 Association of Iroquois and Allied 8 Indians. the Union of Ontario Indians 9 and The Chief and Council of the Six 10 Nations of the Grand River Tract. 235 11 P-582 Document number 2000311 OPP Orders- 12 First Nations Self- Policing Plan. 13 (undated) 243 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
81 --- Upon convening at 9:00 a.m. 2 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 4 now in session, the Honourable Mr. Justice Linden 5 presiding. Please be seated. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 7 morning. Good morning, Mr. Roy. 8 MR. JULIAN ROY: Good morning, Mr. 9 Commissioner. I'm all set, Mr. Commissioner. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Carry on. 11 MR. JULIAN ROY: Good morning, Mr. Coles. 12 THE WITNESS: Good morning. 13 14 CHRISTOPHER JAMES ASH COLES, Resumed; 15 16 CONTINUED CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JULIAN ROY 17 Q: I want to follow up on -- on an 18 answer you gave towards the end of the day yesterday 19 about that decision to send the CMU team down the road. 20 Do you remember we were talking about 21 that? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: All right. And what you told us 24 yesterday, is you felt that it was appropriate to send 25 that CMU down the road because John Carson didn't
91 understand what was happening down there; is that 2 correct? 3 A: Part of it, yes, sir. 4 Q: Yeah. And the CMU team was going to 5 be used as a means to assist John Carson to figure out 6 what was happening down there at the Park, right? 7 A: I believe so, yes, sir. 8 Q: Okay. And your view of the 9 appropriateness of using the CMU in that fashion is 10 driven by the fact that other efforts to find out what 11 was going on down there had failed, correct? 12 A: That was part of it, yes, sir. 13 Q: Okay. For example, the intelligence 14 operation. Intelligence measures that were used had not 15 succeeded in assisting John Carson in figuring out what 16 was happening down there, right? 17 A: I don't think Jack -- John Carson's 18 lack of knowledge, I wouldn't like it, to believe that it 19 was strictly because it was just an intelligence -- lack 20 of intelligence. 21 Q: Sure. But that would be part of it, 22 wouldn't it? 23 A: It would be part but it also would be 24 the situations that had arisen. 25 Q: Sure. And your belief that the CMU
101 was being used as a means of finding out what was going 2 on down there is your basis for saying to this Commission 3 that that decision is appropriate, correct? 4 A: Well I said it was part of the -- of 5 why they were sent down not solely. 6 Q: Okay. And the other part? 7 A: The other part in my opinion would be 8 also that the decision to send a, I'll use the word 'show 9 of force' because I believe that has been eluded to on 10 behalf of the CMU. 11 Also had a, I think if I recall 12 discussions about the strategies involved, also showed -- 13 also had what was believed to be a tactical component to 14 it, to basically -- so people would see that there was a 15 -- a presence that should be considered. 16 Q: Okay. And the people that you're 17 talking about, the people that you want to see this show 18 of force are of course the people in the Park, correct? 19 A: Possibly both sides. But yes, I 20 think for the most part the -- the persons in the Park -- 21 Park who had -- whose thoughts or -- or possible actions 22 were -- were not peaceful. 23 Q: Okay. The -- the -- in other words, 24 the occupiers? 25 A: I don't -- I can't say all those
111 occupiers. I think I would say some of those occupiers. 2 Q: All right. And, you said both sides, 3 you -- you -- you then you also mean the police as well, 4 correct? 5 A: Or the public. 6 Q: Okay. 7 A: The cott -- the cottage people that 8 were there also. 9 Q: I see. So, the CMU -- not only was 10 the CMU sent down the road to send a message to the 11 occupiers, it was also meant to send a message to the 12 cottagers, correct? 13 A: I don't suggest that it was sent down 14 for the visibility just so the cottagers could see it. 15 What I'm suggesting is that they need -- they needed to 16 know that was going on so that the police also, as part 17 of their other mandate, is the protection of property in 18 that area. 19 Q: Okay. And, a little parade by the 20 CMU down that road at night is a good way of conveying 21 that message to those cottage owners? 22 A: I -- I don't like your use of the 23 word, "parade." 24 Q: It was glib and I'll withdraw it. 25 A: Thank you, sir.
121 Q: A march down the road by the CMU in 2 full riot regalia using shield chatter is a good way to 3 send the message to the cottage owners that the police 4 are there to protect property? 5 A: I think you've expanded on what I 6 thought -- 7 Q: Okay.. 8 A: -- what I had said. 9 Q: That's what lawyers do. We -- we 10 take what you said last and we try and move it forward, 11 so I apologize for that, but could you clarify that, 12 please? 13 A: I had mentioned that the -- what I 14 thought also was in John Carson's mind was the fact that 15 the CMU was also being utilized tactically in the fact 16 that if people are in the Park who had bad intentions, 17 they would thought better given what they would see; that 18 -- I also said that not -- I suggested not everyone in 19 that Park had bad intentions. 20 Q: That's very fair, thank you. 21 A: I also believe that there was a need 22 for -- for the command to know that what was going on in 23 order that they were also following the mandate of 24 keeping the peace between native and non-native cottagers 25 because of the threats that had been alluded to earlier
131 on about the cottages. 2 Q: Okay. So -- oh, I see. So -- 3 A: And the -- and, the visibility, if 4 seen -- if seen by members of the public would also show 5 a heightened police presence given the heightened 6 situation that was there. 7 Q: And the CMU team being marched at 8 night is an appropriate means to show the public or give 9 the public that message? 10 A: It might be, but -- but I -- I don't 11 really like the vision of that. But -- but I don't 12 believe -- 13 Q: Me neither. 14 A: -- I -- I think John Carson has 15 answered why he sent them down. I wasn't in his mind. I 16 just gave you explanations that you asked me why I 17 thought I supported the CMU going down the road. 18 Q: Sure. Okay. Now, this -- let's go 19 backwards a little bit to the -- to the information 20 gathering aspect of this march. 21 Is that something that John Carson told 22 you he was doing? 23 A: I beg your pardon? 24 Q: Did John Carson -- it was a terrible 25 question -- did John Carson tell you that one (1) of the
141 reasons why he sent the CMU down that road was to gather 2 information? 3 A: I don't recall John Carson and I 4 having that specific information. 5 Q: Okay. Did John Carson tell you that 6 one (1) of the reasons why he sent the CMU down the road 7 was to send a message to certain of the occupiers? 8 A: I believe it came up in discussions 9 and probably John -- I -- I suggest John Carson would 10 have been the person that would have said that. 11 Q: Yeah. And, likewise, it would have 12 been John Carson that told you about the message that he 13 was attempting to send to the general public by using the 14 CMU? 15 A: I'm going to say I have no 16 recollection of that and I think in answering your 17 question, maybe I took licence with that. 18 Q: Sure. Can you comment on -- on -- as 19 a police officer and as somebody who's been an incident 20 commander, somebody who's familiar with the capabilities 21 of a CMU, the appropriateness of, given that the CMU is 22 marching at night in full riot regalia with the shield 23 chatter, the appropriateness of using that tool as a 24 means of gathering information? 25 A: The use of the CMU, in my opinion, as
151 a strategy was -- was started because of incidents that 2 had happened before. The over -- the violence at -- at 3 the entry of -- of the Park on September the 4th and the 4 situation involving the cruisers and -- and the fires 5 when the cruisers were damaged. 6 And if you're now going to place a OPP 7 presence down to the Park at night, you have to have some 8 consideration of what might happen. And I think when 9 John looked back the night before, there had been ERT 10 team members that lost some cruisers -- had some damages 11 -- lots of cruisers. 12 That the -- there had to be consideration 13 of the protection of the officers who were being sent 14 down. When you utilize the CMU, the uniform changes. I 15 don't know if you've seen it here. I believe there was, 16 but it is a -- it is more of a protective uniform, pads, 17 et cetera, helmets, et cetera. 18 And that -- and it's in that role that I 19 believe why John Carson would have considered that 20 option, i.e., the protection of the people that go down, 21 should there be a -- should there have been violence. 22 Q: So, who is it that's actually making 23 the -- like in the terms of gathering the information, 24 who is it that's -- that's making the observations, in 25 this theory about how the CMU is being used?
161 A: The whole CMU -- the whole CMU group, 2 not only the CMU, the people in the helmets with -- with 3 the shields, et cetera, but also their command structure 4 behind them and observers that were behind them; 5 basically two (2) team members or ERT members that were 6 in observation type positions. 7 Q: Okay. So, there's sort of a phalanx 8 of CMU members -- 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: And then there's people behind who 11 are sort of peeking over and making observations and 12 gathering information? 13 A: As to the direction of what the CMU 14 should do, yes. 15 Q: All right. And it's also the CMU 16 members with the helmets and the shields that are also on 17 the lookout for information? 18 A: Well, I think they have limited 19 capability through those situations, given that they're 20 there to take instructions and to face whatever comes 21 their way. 22 Q: Sure. In -- what about -- I thought 23 the TRU team had some expertise in -- in, sort of, covert 24 surveillance and hiding in the dark and -- 25 A: Yes, they do.
171 Q: -- sneaking around and making 2 observations. I thought they had that expertise. 3 A: Yes, they do. 4 Q: And if they're going to sneak around 5 and not be seen and make these observations, they can do 6 that without the CMU team can't they? 7 A: Yes, they can. 8 Q: Okay. And do you know why that 9 wasn't used as a means of gathering information as 10 opposed to -- because you can't really miss the CMU team. 11 It's marching down the road, it's -- it's not like that's 12 covert surveillance of any kind. 13 You just can't miss it, right? 14 A: My recollection of before the TRU 15 team -- before the CMU was sent down, that the TRU team 16 was utilized in an observer category. 17 Q: Okay. And -- and presumably when 18 that failed, we had to use this different strategy or 19 rather John Carson had to use this different strategy of 20 using the CMU, correct? 21 A: It's your use of the word 'failed', I 22 guess it failed to satisfy Inspector Carson that he knew 23 completely of what the situation was and more 24 importantly, what it potentially could turn into. 25 Q: Okay. Well, I -- I'm going to keep
181 moving to a different area and I want to -- I want to go 2 -- we've talked about information gathering by using the 3 CMU. I want to talk now, move onto another area, of 4 information gathering, another means of information 5 gathering, and that's that whole -- the whole issue of 6 negotiation or communication with the people inside -- 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: -- inside the Park. All right? 9 A: All right. 10 Q: And, I want to start by -- remember I 11 told you how I was going to be jumping back and forth a 12 little bit? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: I'm going to jump to after the 15 shooting again. 16 A: All right. 17 Q: All right. And, I'm going to ask you 18 questions about your involvement with Mr. Mercredi. 19 A: Yes, sir? 20 Q: And, I -- I recall your testimony on 21 that. 22 Am I right in saying that when you learned 23 of Mr. Mercredi's contact with the OPP that that was 24 something that was very significant to you, when you 25 became involved after the shooting?
191 A: Yes, sir. 2 Q: In -- in fact, you sort of instantly 3 recognized Mr. Mercredi's potential involvement as a 4 golden opportunity to deal with a very bad situation, 5 correct? 6 A: I -- I definitely welcomed his -- the 7 fact that he was -- he was willing to come and he did 8 come. 9 Q: And, it didn't take you very long to 10 recognize that it was a pretty good opportunity? 11 A: Especially after I -- that I found 12 out that he had, in fact, called the night before, yes. 13 Q: Yeah. And, you wouldn't perceive a 14 contact like that as -- as some kind of -- just another 15 person that I have to get back to, another person who's 16 asking me for information? You would see a contact like 17 that not as some kind of nuisance, but as an opportunity, 18 correct? 19 A: It was very positive to me. 20 Q: Yeah. Now, at the time that you hear 21 of Mr. Mercredi's potential involvement and you seize on 22 it, you have a very, very bad situation on your hands, 23 correct? 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: Yeah. And, you used a phrase on
201 August 16th, and for Counsel it's August 16th at page 2 113, that really, really struck me, okay? 3 You said, But I have people inside that 4 Park that don't know what I'm doing. 5 A: Correct. 6 Q: Do you remember that? 7 A: Yes, sir. 8 Q: Okay. And, you're identifying the 9 people in the Park not knowing what you're doing as 10 you're starting to take control of the situation after 11 the shooting. 12 You're identifying that as a very bad 13 thing, aren't you? 14 A: Yeah. I suspect I have people in the 15 Park who are -- who are scared and -- and anxious and 16 don't know what I'm doing, or the police might do next, 17 yes. 18 Q: Yeah. And, you've told us a number 19 of times that you view police officers as peacemakers or 20 peacekeepers, correct? 21 A: Yes, sir. 22 Q: And, it's very bad when you want to 23 take on a peacekeeper role for the people who you're 24 dealing with not to understand that you're trying to be a 25 peacekeeper, right?
211 A: Yes, sir. 2 Q: You want to telegraph to them what 3 your intentions are, right? 4 A: Yes, sir. 5 Q: You want them to know that you have a 6 peaceful intent, right? 7 A: Yes, sir. 8 Q: That's your only prospect for 9 resolving the situation peacefully, isn't it? 10 A: Hopefully, yes, sir. 11 Q: Now, if you want to arrest somebody 12 on the other hand, the element of surprise is going to be 13 a good thing, right? 14 A: Sometimes it helps, yes, sir. 15 Q: Yeah. You kind of want to conceal 16 what your intentions are if you want to take somebody by 17 surprise, right? 18 A: If you want to take them by surprise, 19 yes, sir. 20 Q: But in these -- these protest and 21 occupation situations, we want to do the opposite. We 22 don't want to take people by surprise, we want to 23 telegraph to them what our intentions are, right? 24 A: Right. 25 Q: And, you in -- in an earlier answer,
221 you identified what -- what the problem is, is that if 2 the people in the Park are mis-perceiving what you're 3 doing, they may interpret something that's not a threat 4 as a threat, and that may prompt them to take action, 5 correct? 6 A: That's correct. 7 Q: And, that increases, exponentially, 8 the potential for violence in a situation like this, 9 correct? 10 A: Possibly, sir. 11 Q: Now, again the backwards and 12 forwards, I have to go back to the CMU one (1) more time. 13 A: All right. 14 Q: And, you can probably tell what my 15 next question's going to be. 16 A: Okay. 17 Q: Right. My next question is: Can you 18 comment on the potential if the CMU team is just being 19 used in this sort of benign information gathering role, 20 the potential for misinterpretation on the part of the 21 people who were in the Park as it's marching down the 22 road with shield chatter at night? 23 A: I -- I understand that some people 24 might misinterpret that, yes, sir. 25 Q: It's a little stronger that they
231 might misinterpret that. Isn't it almost inevitable that 2 they∆re not going to perceive that as some kind of 3 information gathering exercise? 4 A: Yes, sir. 5 Q: Yeah. And even leaving aside the 6 CMU, in terms of the occupiers misinterpreting what the 7 intentions of the OPP are, even when they're not in their 8 riot regalia, the police officers are carrying weapons; 9 correct? 10 A: Yes, sir. 11 Q: They have their uniforms; correct? 12 A: Yes, sir. 13 Q: And that turns up the temperature, 14 right? 15 A: Usually. 16 Q: And increases the chance for 17 misinterpretation; correct? 18 A: Yes, sir. 19 Q: And an incident commander has to be 20 very conscious of all that; correct? 21 A: Yes, sir. 22 Q: And then there's the -- we're not 23 even going to mention the background of mistrust that 24 there might be of the police, and the OPP in particular; 25 correct?
241 A: I under -- I understand mistrust. 2 You said, "the OPP in particular." I don't know. I 3 think there is mistrust of all police. I don't want the 4 OPP to wear -- completely wear that policing mantle that 5 they are distrusted. 6 Q: And the OPP shouldn't; I didn't mean 7 to suggest that. 8 A: I appreciate that. 9 Q: Now, Mr. Mercredi's offer of 10 assistance. You've told us you gave it a very high 11 priority; correct? 12 A: Yes, sir. 13 Q: Now, it's not a sign of weakness or 14 failure on the part of you or the OPP to see the offer of 15 outside assistance as -- as an opportunity or as being 16 helpful; is it? 17 A: No, sir. 18 Q: It's the opposite; isn't it? 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: It's the sign of confidence of an 21 organization that it -- when it needs help, it can ask 22 for help, correct? 23 A: Yes, sir. 24 Q: And Mr. Mercredi is important because 25 he is a very -- potentially, a vital means of
251 communicating what your intentions are to the people who 2 are in the Park; correct? 3 A: If he undertook that role, yes, sir. 4 Q: Yeah. And it doesn't have to be Mr. 5 Mercredi, it could be somebody else, correct? 6 A: Exactly. 7 Q: And often it's going to be somebody 8 from a First Nation community, correct? 9 A: Yes, sir. 10 Q: They are very likely candidates to 11 fulfill this role; correct? 12 A: Yes, sir. Again, if they're willing 13 to undertake that role -- 14 Q: Yes. 15 A: It's a difficult role. 16 Q: And -- yes. And you would expect, 17 given how important this channel of communication could 18 be, you would expect that an incident commander would 19 give an offer of assistance such as that very, very high 20 priority, correct? 21 A: Yes, sir. 22 Q: Now, communication is a two-way 23 street; isn't it? 24 A: Sometimes three (3), sometimes four 25 (4).
261 Q: All right. Not only may the people 2 in the Park not understand what your intentions are, you 3 may not understand what the people in the Park, what 4 their intentions are; correct? 5 A: Exactly. 6 Q: And that danger that you may 7 misinterpret what's going on, that the Pinery's are next, 8 potentially? Maybe that's a misunderstanding. 9 A: Yes, sir. 10 Q: That can lead to mistakes on the part 11 of the police; can it not? 12 A: Yes, sir. 13 Q: And in dealing with a First Nations 14 occupation or protest, would you agree with me that an 15 incident commander and police authorities, generally, 16 have to be very conscious of their limitations, that 17 there may be misunderstandings in terms of what the 18 people in the protest, what their ultimate intentions 19 are? 20 A: They should be, yes, sir. 21 Q: I -- I didn't see in the oper -- I'm 22 not going to ask you to turn up the operational plan, but 23 I didn't see anywhere in the operational plan 24 identification of outside resources such as Mr. Mercredi 25 or persons in his position, identifying them in advance
271 as part of contingency planning? 2 A: No, I -- I think that comes under 3 the veil in the plan of negotiations. 4 Q: Okay. But I don't see that resource 5 identified in the operational plan. 6 A: No, sir, it was not. 7 Q: Yeah. And, very fairly, you 8 suggested a recommendation to this Commission of Inquiry 9 which is to have sort of a flying squad of people who can 10 fulfill this role; correct? 11 A: Simply put, yes. 12 Q: Yeah. I like to put things simple, 13 or I try to, but am I right that that's what you're 14 addressing? 15 A: Yes, sir. People willing -- people 16 willing to go, yes. 17 Q: Yeah. 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 Q: Now, I'm going to flag this again for 22 you, I have another series of -- of questions that bare 23 on John Carson on this issue of negotiation. 24 A: Yes, sir? 25 Q: And, again, I always try and disarm,
281 or I'm going to try and disarm any defensiveness you 2 might have or reluctance about being implicitly critical 3 of a subordinate, all right, because that's not what this 4 exercise is about in terms of my questioning; all right? 5 A: I will listen to your questions, sir. 6 Q: Thank you. You still don't trust me. 7 All right. And let me -- let me start by 8 saying this, John Carson and any incident commander in a 9 situation like this has an incredibly hard job; correct? 10 A: Yes. Yes, sir. 11 Q: And you've read John Carson's 12 evidence have you not? 13 A: Not only did I read John Carson's 14 evidence, I saw John Carson before the incident and after 15 the incident, yes, sir. 16 Q: Yeah. And you saw the -- the 17 evidence about the many hats? 18 A: Yes, sir. 19 Q: You would agree with the suggestion 20 that John Carson is wearing many hats? 21 A: Yes, sir. 22 Q: And maybe a couple too many hats? 23 A: Maybe. 24 Q: And the -- the result of potentially 25 wearing a couple two -- two hats, is that -- too many
291 hats, is that, prior to the shooting, there's an offer of 2 assistance from a Cindy Elder and that that phone call, 3 that offer of assistance from Cindy Elder is not returned 4 by John Carson. 5 A: I think I remember what you're 6 talking about. 7 Q: Yeah. 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 Q: And when I say it's not returned by 10 John Carson, I'm not being critical of John Carson 11 because I understand that he's wearing many, many hats. 12 A: I think if I recall, he qualified to 13 some degree why he did not see to return that call -- 14 Q: Yeah. 15 A: -- in his explanation, I believe, to 16 a Staff Sergeant Bob Drummelsmith. 17 Q: Yeah. Somebody did call her back and 18 give her an explanation? 19 A: I don't know. 20 Q: Yeah. In any event, perhaps -- am I 21 right in saying that perhaps John Carson was wearing too 22 many hats to recognize this is a golden opportunity, 23 potentially? 24 A: Possibly. 25 Q: Yeah.
301 A: I don't like the idea of too -- just 2 wearing too many hats, I think that -- that the -- that 3 he had a -- a fast situation -- 4 Q: Yeah. 5 A: -- on his hands with -- with many 6 decisions that were asked to be made and -- and many new 7 parameters coming into his decision making roles. 8 Q: Okay. There's a lot on his plate? 9 A: There sure is. 10 Q: Yeah. And -- and when I talk -- when 11 I was making suggestions to you about why this is a 12 golden opportunity, the golden opportunity is using this 13 resource, somebody from the community to get information 14 about what's going on in the Park and also to perhaps 15 have the people in the Park communicate back to you; 16 correct, that's why it's a golden opportunity? 17 A: Possibly. I also believe that it's 18 the presence of a person that does not have any thoughts 19 of escalating the situation, but de-escalating the 20 situation. 21 Q: Sure, that's part of it also. 22 A: That's what I -- I think that person 23 was offering, I think. 24 Q: But when you miss out on a golden 25 opportunity like that, you miss out on the potential
311 information gathering aspect of it, correct? 2 A: Yes, but again I think that you have 3 to be careful that when you accept a person's offer of 4 assistance in this manner, that you're not seem to be 5 using that person in a -- my point is that person, if 6 they offer that assistance into going to that situation, 7 I think for the police to basically say, Yeah we're going 8 to use that person as a source, that's not the intent, or 9 would not be an intent if I had been involved in -- in 10 sending that person -- 11 Q: I understand. You cannot set up a 12 person like this as being perceived as a spy reporting 13 back to the police on where the protesters are located in 14 the Park. 15 A: That's correct. 16 Q: But you're using them as a conduit of 17 information as to what the intentions are of people, 18 correct? 19 A: And as a conduit of de-escalation, 20 yes, sir. 21 Q: That's right. And when you miss out 22 on that conduit, and you miss out on that opportunity, 23 you have to use other means, maybe more blunt means, to 24 gather information, correct? 25 A: Possibly, yes, sir.
321 Q: And in this case it was the CMU -- 2 A: Possibly. 3 Q: -- in your mind. 4 A: Yes, sir. 5 Q: Now, we -- we've just identified who 6 are good people we might want to utilize or being 7 assistance from in pursuing in negotiation. 8 I want to talk to you a little bit about 9 some of the principles that ought to be followed in a 10 negotiation once we have the right people, all right? 11 A: Yes, sir. 12 Q: And I know you have some expertise 13 and some experience in this and I want you to assist the 14 Commission if you can, all right? 15 A: Okay. 16 Q: I want to start with -- with the very 17 serious limitations that the police operate under in any 18 occupation and protest situation. I want to start with 19 that. 20 First of all, the police are not in a 21 position to negotiate a land claim, correct? 22 A: No, they are not. 23 Q: No. So, they come to the table with 24 pretty much in arm -- they come to any negotiation pretty 25 much with an arm tied behind their back, right?
331 A: They do. 2 Q: Because they cannot give up what the 3 people in the Park -- what they really want, correct? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: Just -- even if they wanted to, they 6 couldn't do it, correct? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: And that's frustrating? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: And it creates a lot of operational 11 difficulties, correct? Let me -- let me withdraw that 12 question. 13 It creates a lot of -- it impairs or 14 creates obstacles for a good negotiation to get started? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: So, if you're not there to negotiate 17 what's going to happen with the land, really what your 18 role is is of peacekeeper. 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: Now, you can't negotiate the big 21 picture but you can negotiate the little things on the 22 ground, correct? 23 A: Yes, sir. 24 Q: And those are really important too, 25 are they not?
341 A: They were to me. 2 Q: You can move a roadblock back, 3 correct? 4 A: Yes, sir. 5 Q: And in an exchange for moving the 6 roadblock back, you can ask for something from the people 7 in the Park potentially? 8 A: That's usually what you do in 9 negotiations -- 10 Q: Yes. 11 A: -- tit-for-tat so to speak. They 12 really didn't follow that course in this case. 13 Q: Before the shooting, correct? 14 A: No -- before the shooting? 15 Q: Yeah. It didn't follow that process. 16 A: Yeah, we did. 17 Q: You did? 18 A: Well, we were trying to have -- no, 19 not tit-for-tat in that -- we weren't negotiating before. 20 We were trying to have people -- find people to negotiate 21 with; the Lorne Smith's and Brad Seltzers of the world. 22 Q: But that sort of tit-for-tat 23 negotiation did occur after the shooting to some extent? 24 A: That -- that was what -- after? 25 Q: Yes.
351 A: That's what I was eluding to that it 2 -- not quite. There was -- there was some of that, yes. 3 But, it was much more a negotiation, in my opinion, a 4 negotiation of a place where people who knew both -- who 5 had been into the Park and in my -- my place knowing what 6 was going on in the policing community of a table to talk 7 and negotiate where we could go from there as opposed to 8 harsh positions -- I'll give you this, et cetera. 9 That -- that was the spirit of those 10 negotiations up until the -- 11 Q: I'm not -- I'm not suggesting that 12 this -- that this tit-for-tat negotiation of things on 13 the ground has to be a harsh quid pro quo. It's a faith 14 building exercise on both sides, is it not? 15 A: Yeah. I'm just telling you what 16 those negotiations -- or how I perceived them to have 17 undertaken. 18 Q: As I understood your evidence, one of 19 the things that you did, was you agreed to move a road 20 block back. You suggested that that happened in exchange 21 for an undertaking about the cottages, right? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: And that's the kind of negotiation of 24 the facts on the ground that's important, is it not? 25 A: Yes, sir. It was a harsher
361 negotiation if we used the word "harsher" or more 2 directed negotiation to -- basically up two (2) nights 3 following the shooting, yes. 4 Q: But, when you see that the people on 5 the other side of the wall, when you see that they comply 6 with their end of the deal, you have a little more faith 7 moving forward, correct? 8 A: When you say the people on the other 9 side of the wall -- 10 Q: Yeah. 11 A: -- I guess the point was that we had 12 people on the other side of the wall, Bruce Elijah, 13 Marvin Connors, that were telling me basically that they 14 were there, they had a presence. 15 I had people that I -- I believed were 16 well -- were well-directed and well-intentioned and would 17 -- knew my problems as far as keeping the -- the peace 18 and protection in the area. 19 Q: Sure, but they were communicating to 20 you what -- what the occupiers were prepared to do, 21 correct? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: And every time, in -- in this kind of 24 process what will happen, I'm going to suggest to you and 25 you can agree or disagree, is that as you see the people
371 on the other side that you're negotiating with, through 2 the conduits that you've talked about, when you see that 3 they are complying with these little things and they see 4 that you are complying with what you're undertaking to 5 do, that's how that relationship can form such that real 6 communication can start, correct? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: It's a trust building exercise -- 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: -- correct? 11 A: Yes, it is. 12 Q: And you can't -- this isn't something 13 that happens overnight, is it? 14 A: In that case, no, it couldn't happen 15 overnight. 16 Q: This is something -- it requires an 17 incredible amount of patience and forbearance on the part 18 of the police, does it not? 19 A: And faith, yes. 20 Q: What did you say? 21 A: And faith. 22 Q: And faith? 23 A: That the people -- I had not dealt 24 with Bruce Elijah before, Ovide Mercredi before or Marvin 25 Connor, before and I was -- it was a step of faith that
381 those people were, in fact, well-intentioned. 2 Q: Yeah. And this development of faith 3 doesn't happen in the blink of an eye or overnight, does 4 it not? 5 A: No, sir. 6 Q: No. It's something that requires a 7 lot of patience to develop, doesn't it? 8 A: I would suggest it does. 9 Q: You don't walk up to the Park, have 10 one (1) conversation with somebody, and say, They weren't 11 listening and you walk away, and say, Well negotiations 12 failed. 13 You don't do that, right? 14 A: No, you try again. 15 Q: Yeah. And you keep trying, right? 16 A: Yes, sir. 17 Q: And it's a trial and error process 18 until you find the right people who can communicate for 19 the people in the Park or assist them to communicate with 20 you; is that not correct? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: And that trial and error process 23 takes a lot of time, doesn't it? 24 A: Sometimes yes, sir, it does. 25 Q: And you don't take the approach that,
391 well, there's a box on our procedure form that says, 2 okay, negotiations start here and once you've tried and 3 you don't tick off the box and then move to the next 4 step, do you? 5 A: No, you don't. 6 Q: You just keep going, right? 7 A: Yes, sir. 8 Q: It requires faith and it requires 9 hard work, doesn't it? 10 A: Yes, sir. And well-intentioned 11 people. 12 Q: And patience? 13 A: Yeah, and well-intentioned people. 14 Q: Yeah, and patience, right? 15 A: Yes, and patience, yes, sir. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 Q: I want to talk to you about another 20 aspect of -- of these negotiations -- 21 A: Sir. 22 Q: -- that we want to have happened. 23 Now, you'd agree with me that when you're 24 talking about a First Nations occupation or protest, 25 there's a lot more going on in the background than there
401 is with any kind of garden variety hostage taking or 2 barricading situation that the police might deal with out 3 in the community, correct? 4 A: Generally speaking I would say yes. 5 Q: And the big thing that's in the 6 background in all these situations is that the people who 7 were in the park in this case, have a profound attachment 8 to this land, correct? 9 A: I -- that's one thing, yes. 10 Q: Yeah. And that's one of the things 11 that separates this type of situation from an ordinary 12 trespassing or protest, correct? 13 A: Yes, sir. 14 Q: And that reality is something that -- 15 that has to be in the forefront of the minds of an 16 incident commander or any police officer who's dealing 17 with a situation like that, correct? 18 A: Yes, sir. 19 Q: Because what you don't want to do is 20 walk up to the people in the Park and announce, You're a 21 trespasser, you must leave, correct? 22 A: Initially that's what was done 23 because, initially, it was considered to be a trespass. 24 As events unfolded and information came out about the 25 burial grounds, et cetera, then yes, you wouldn't, and
411 that wasn't done. 2 Q: But -- but -- I -- I -- the issue of 3 the burial ground, regardless of whether there's a burial 4 ground there, the police must have had some kind of 5 understanding that the people moved into the Park for 6 this broader reason that they felt they had an attachment 7 to the Park, at least in their minds, correct? 8 A: Yeah, I think that was in the mind -- 9 Q: Yeah. 10 A: -- that was in the mind of some of 11 the people that were there, yes. 12 Q: And that's -- it's their mind set 13 that you have to deal with when you're engaging in a 14 negotiation, correct? 15 A: Not totally. 16 Q: But it's part of it? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: So you'd agree with me that -- that a 19 simple announcement to the people in the Park that 20 they're trespassers, given the mind set that they have at 21 that point, is not likely to be very effective, is it? 22 A: At what time are we talking? 23 Q: At any time, frankly. It's just an 24 approach that's just not going to work. 25 A: It wasn't effective.
421 Q: Yeah. And, in your view, it's just 2 not an approach that's ever likely to be effective in 3 situations like this, realistically? 4 A: No. But I think that there was -- 5 that was a thought of the Ontario Provincial Police, 6 initially, that we were, in fact, enforcing the trespass. 7 Q: I -- I can -- 8 A: Once the breach of peace occurred, 9 then we realized that the situation was different. 10 Q: All right. I understand that that 11 might have been the OPP's position or it may have been 12 the OPP's position that they were trespassers. 13 What I'm addressing my questions to is 14 whether an approach that involves announcing to people 15 that they're trespassers, please leave, is likely to be 16 effective in terms of getting started the kind of 17 negotiation process that we're talking about? 18 A: As I said, it didn't work. 19 Q: Yeah. Now, you would agree with me, 20 given that there's more going on than in an ordinary 21 trespass situation, would you agree with me that an 22 injunction is not going to be some kind of magic bullet 23 that resolves the situation? 24 A: No. But I believe that it was a -- 25 that it was a suitable strategy that the police, in this
431 situation, would embrace. 2 Q: I -- I'm not suggesting that that 3 might not be something that the police want in a 4 situation like this, what I'm suggesting to you is that 5 any kind of faith that just, once we get an injunction, 6 everything's going to be fine, that's pretty unrealistic; 7 isn't it? 8 A: Oh -- oh, for sure. You don't know 9 what the injunction's going to say. 10 Q: Regardless of what the injunction 11 says, it's pretty unrealistic to think that as soon as we 12 have a piece of paper -- given the mind set of the people 13 who were in the Park, it's pretty unrealistic, given what 14 you know, they have this attachment, the attachment to 15 the land, it's pretty unrealistic to think that this 16 piece of paper that says, Please leave, is going to be 17 any more effective than an announcement from a police 18 officer that you're trespassing? 19 A: I think you're mistaken if you think 20 I thought that's what the injunction was going to say. I 21 was -- I was more of the opinion that the injunction 22 would basically tell the occupiers or somebody in the 23 Park with -- with leadership that I'm expecting you to 24 come back to the courts with whatever, rather than just 25 I'm -- I didn't expect the injunction would -- would just
441 say, You will leave, I expected it to be more considered 2 by the person who would have looked at all the 3 circumstances. 4 Q: I'm oversimplifying, I acknowledge 5 that and you pointed out -- that out to me in -- in your 6 answer, but my point is, is that it's a little 7 unrealistic to believe that an injunction is going to be 8 a solution, correct? 9 A: I -- 10 Q: By itself? 11 A: Yeah, I never saw it as the solution. 12 Q: Yeah. 13 A: My point is, is that everything that 14 we've talked about, about negotiation still has to go on, 15 correct? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: And this -- these conduits that we've 18 talked about for information to go back and forth and 19 this trust building, that doesn't stop because somebody 20 has an injunction, right? 21 A: No. 22 Q: They all have to move together; 23 correct? 24 A: Hopefully. 25 Q: Now, this process that we've talked
451 about of negotiation in this context, this isn't 2 something that -- that a person can be expected to know 3 without having proper training, is it? 4 A: Training is always helpful I believe, 5 yes. 6 Q: Yeah. It's either going to come from 7 formal training or it's going to come from the school of 8 hard knocks. 9 In other words, people who've done it 10 before, failed a number of times and learned each time; 11 correct? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: That's how you're going to know how 14 to do what we've just talked about, correct? 15 A: And hopefully your experience helps 16 you in the -- 17 Q: Yeah. 18 A: -- the next set of circumstances. 19 Q: If you could turn to Tab 72 of your 20 documents? 21 22 (BRIEF PAUSE) 23 24 Q: Mr. Commissioner, I think this was 25 one of the documents that I identified I -- I might use.
461 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: It's P-457 and it's page 7 of that 4 document. 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Page 7, are you with me? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: Thank you. You've mentioned a 9 Sergeant Seltzer who was involved in -- in efforts at 10 negotiation prior to the shooting? 11 A: He and Lorne Smith, yes, sir. 12 Q: Yeah. And I'm just pointing out to 13 you what Sergeant Seltzer says in your de-briefing of 14 February 21st, 1996. 15 Sergeant Seltzer -- well, this is -- this 16 is not a quote but this is an idea that Sergeant Seltzer 17 is communicating to this debriefing. 18 He's saying: 19 "Sergeant Seltzer raised concern that 20 training was stalled. In future it 21 should be noted that we all have other 22 jobs that need to be maintained. This 23 is a management issue. Why have 24 someone in training when we need him on 25 the line."
471 Do you see that? 2 A: Yes, I do. 3 Q: And that's under the heading, 4 Negotiators; do you see that? 5 A: Correct. 6 Q: So Sergeant Seltzer seems to be 7 articulating a concern about the quality or the amount of 8 training that he has access to, in engaging the kind of 9 role that -- the function that we've been talking about. 10 Do you see that? 11 A: I'm having difficulty under -- 12 understanding the point, this point here, as I read it. 13 Q: Sure. 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: "Raised concern that training was 16 stalled." 17 A: And my thought is, what training? 18 Q: Okay. That's my thought also. 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: What is the training for people in 21 Sergeant Seltzer's position to engage in the type of 22 process that you and I have just been discussing for a 23 little bit longer than the Commissioner might want. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, I 25 haven't said a word.
481 MR. JULIAN ROY: Thank you, Mr. 2 Commissioner. I must confess that I might be a little 3 bit longer than I've -- I've undertaken to, and I 4 apologize but... 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just 6 continue, we'll see where it goes. I'd like -- 7 MR. JULIAN ROY: Not much longer, though. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, I'd 9 like to see if you could finish before the break, so 10 we'll just go as long as is appropriate. 11 MR. JULIAN ROY: Thank you very much, Mr. 12 Commissioner. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Carry on. 14 15 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 16 Q: So my last question was, what 17 training is it that the OPP has about -- in terms of 18 assisting people in Sergeant Seltzer's position, engaged 19 in the kind of process that you and I just talked about? 20 A: And that's what I said I'm having -- 21 I'm having trouble, like, reading or understanding what 22 the note taker was saying in that particular case. 23 Q: Yes. 24 A: Brad Seltzer -- my understanding is, 25 although, he was called upon in this role as a
491 negotiator, I believe that his -- his job at that time 2 was, in fact, in service training and -- and so I don't 3 know. 4 Is this talking about training the 5 negotiators, is it talking about training of officers in 6 various -- I don't know what that means, is what I'm 7 saying. 8 Q: Well, it's -- it's under the heading 9 -- and there are a number -- in this document there are a 10 number of different headings, like crime management on 11 the first page, identification on page 6 -- 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: Intelligence and TSB on page 7. ERT 14 on page 8, there are a number of -- it's a de-briefing 15 where there are -- there's presumably an agenda of some 16 kind and a number of issues are discussed, correct? 17 A: And Brad was representing the 18 negotiator part of the exercise. 19 Q: Okay. And under the heading the 20 note-taker, under the heading: 21 "We're at the part -- point of the 22 meeting where negotiators are being 23 discussed." 24 It's at that point that Sergeant Seltzer 25 raises a concern about training was stalled; do you see
501 that? 2 A: Yes. And what I'm saying is, my lack 3 of understanding is the first three (3) points in my 4 opinion all do go to negotiations. 5 Q: Yeah. 6 A: The closeness of the command centre, 7 et cetera, et cetera. 8 Q: Yes. 9 A: That they do. Then there is a break 10 and then it said that Sergeant Seltzer raised concerns. 11 And I had asked at the beginning of this, if anyone had 12 any concerns to raise them and maybe Brad Seltzer chose 13 to raise his concern of training issues at that time. 14 I don't know and I don't -- because I 15 don't see where it necessarily fits into the negotiator 16 role. But I don't know what he was talking about. 17 Q: Leaving aside what -- what Sergeant 18 Seltzer was talking about, what is the training that the 19 OPP had in place at the time? 20 A: For negotiators? 21 Q: Not just negotiators, because we've 22 agreed that the type of negotiation involved in a 23 situation like this is going to be a little bit different 24 than an ordinary negotiation and a hostage taking. 25 So I want to know about the training for a
511 First Nation occupation or protest, a negotiation in that 2 context. Just what you and I have been talking about the 3 last half an hour. 4 A: When it comes to -- I would prefer 5 not to answer that question in order for you to seek the 6 advice of somebody else as to what that training 7 basically was or was not. 8 At my level, I wasn't involved in 9 training. I -- I had knowledge of what -- of what 10 training courses, but as to the content of those courses, 11 et cetera, I -- I don't know. 12 Q: Did you take training -- a training 13 course on negotiating in -- in a First Nations context? 14 A: No I didn't. 15 Q: No. You learned it in the school of 16 hard knocks, right? 17 A: Yes, I'm afraid I did. 18 Q: Yeah. What about John Carson? 19 A: I believe John Carson did have 20 formalized training. I'm not sure but I believe he did. 21 Q: On negotiating in a First Nations 22 context? 23 A: An incident command of which 24 negotiations would have been a part -- a part of, I 25 expect.
521 Q: In a First Nations context? 2 A: I don't know. 3 Q: Okay. 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 Q: Would you agree with me -- well I was 8 going to ask you a hypothetical question, you know, and I 9 have a lot of other area I want to cover and I'll -- I'll 10 just keep moving. So you can close Tab 72 -- 11 A: Oh, thank you. 12 Q: -- if you want. You told us, in your 13 evidence earlier, that you were not critical of John 14 Carson in any way for losing the Park, correct? 15 A: No, sir, I was not. 16 Q: You did -- you did testify, though, 17 that the fact that containment was lost made a situation 18 more volatile; correct? 19 A: I don't know if I said it that 20 simply. But if -- I agree it did make it -- it changed 21 the situation anyway. 22 Q: And it makes it more volatile; 23 correct? 24 A: Well, yes, it was more volatile 25 because of what happened, yes.
531 Q: Okay. So losing containment wasn't a 2 good thing to have happened; correct? From your point of 3 view? 4 A: It -- it really didn't concern me. 5 It was just, that's what happened? Okay, what do we do 6 next? 7 Q: Okay. So there would be no point in 8 trying to maintain containment in a situation like that? 9 A: A containment in this situation that 10 we said was extremely difficult, given the proximity and 11 the geography, that what was involved. 12 Q: But it's not an important goal on the 13 part of the OPP in a situation like this? 14 A: Containment? 15 Q: Yeah. 16 A: Yes, it is. And, again, we talked 17 about what containment is. It's not just containment of 18 people in the Park, it's -- it's knowledge and 19 containment of people that might be innocently driving 20 into a situation that perhaps they need to be advised 21 that they might want to take another course of action. 22 Q: So you said the type of approach you 23 took with John Carson is, Oh, well, we've lost 24 containment, what next; correct? 25 A: I don't think I said, Oh, well, but
541 I -- 2 Q: Well, I think you said it just a few 3 minutes ago. 4 A: Well, I -- I said that, Okay, if we 5 lost containment, what next? 6 Q: Okay. What you didn't do is, you 7 didn't say, John I want to know how we lost containment? 8 A: No, I didn't say that. 9 Q: And you didn't instruct anybody else 10 to ask John Carson that question, did you? 11 A: No, I didn't. 12 Q: And you have very good reasons for 13 not doing that, correct? 14 A: One (1) because I -- I was not overly 15 concerned. Two (2), that I knew the decision had been 16 made for -- it wasn't the time to get into a fight. 17 Q: Yeah. 18 A: And that it was more prudent that 19 people made a decision that it was more prudent to leave 20 given the situation and, therefore, I supported that. 21 Q: Yeah. And -- and, the way you show 22 support for that is, you don't say, John, I want to know 23 how we lost containment? 24 A: That wasn't my style and I wouldn't 25 do that.
551 Q: No. And it's not your style because 2 taking that kind of approach and asking that coin -- kind 3 of question might imply criticism, correct? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: Coming from a superior? 6 A: Yes, it might. 7 Q: And you didn't want to imply 8 criticism; correct? 9 A: I didn't criticize, that's right. 10 Q: No. And you didn't want to leave the 11 impression that you were criticizing, correct? 12 A: Yes. I never -- I -- I -- what I'm 13 saying is, I never specifically thought, oh well, we've 14 lost it, this is wrong, I didn't think that. 15 Q: Yeah. And because you didn't think 16 that, you didn't want to imply that you were critical of 17 John Carson to him, correct? 18 A: Definitely, I would not want to imply 19 to him that I was criticizing him. 20 Q: You've told us about running 21 interference for your incident commander? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: And running interference is trying to 24 alleviate some of these extraneous pressures that might 25 distract the incident commander from the operations on
561 the ground; right? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: And the distractions can come from 4 political people, people have talked to you about that; 5 correct? 6 A: And, police officers. 7 Q: Yeah. The distractions can come from 8 General Headquarters, right -- 9 A: Yes, sir. 10 Q: -- and the pressure and distraction 11 can even come from somebody's immediate superior or two 12 (2) levels up, correct? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And you didn't want to add to the 15 burden that John Carson was already facing, correct? 16 A: I didn't want to add to the burden, 17 but -- but what I'm saying is, it was never in my mind to 18 put in the -- put in the burden. 19 Q: Yeah. 20 A: It wasn't in my mind that that was an 21 incident that I would have been critical of and I -- I 22 didn't have it in my mind that, well, maybe I should say 23 it, but I won't because I'll be -- 24 Q: I see. 25 A: -- increasing his -- his problems.
571 Q: I understand your point. Now, Tony 2 Parkin, you've described him as -- in your evidence as 3 your right-hand man, right? 4 A: Yes, sir. 5 Q: Yeah. And you had a lot of 6 confidence in him as your right-hand man; right? 7 A: Extremely, a lot of confidence. 8 Q: And you delegated a lot of your 9 authority to him as your right-hand man, right? 10 A: Yes, sir. 11 Q: And part of delegating authority is 12 he speaks for you on occasion, correct? 13 A: Yes, sir, he did. 14 Q: And you don't know him as a person 15 who has a habit of going too far in speaking on your 16 behalf; does he? 17 A: No, sir, he does not. 18 Q: He's a measured guy, he chooses his 19 words carefully? 20 A: Extremely measured. 21 Q: Okay. Could Exhibit P-444A Tab 6 22 page 35 be put before the Witness? I apologize, Mr. 23 Commissioner, I should ask that that be pulled earlier. 24 I knew it was coming and I -- I just simply forget. I 25 apologize.
581 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No problem. 2 What page? 3 MR. JULIAN ROY: 35. Tab 6 page 35, a 4 discussion between John Carson and Tony Parkin at page 5 35. 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE) 8 9 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 10 Q: It's at the very bottom of 35. 11 A: Yes? 12 Q: Where Tony Parkin says the following: 13 "Ah -- ah -- I'm going -- I'm only 14 going to ask this question because I'm 15 sure that the Chief is probably going 16 to ask it." 17 And can I stop you right there? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Who do you think he's referring to 20 when he refers to the chief? 21 A: Me. 22 Q: Okay, we'll keep going. 23 "How did we, given the fact we have 24 people in there when this all happened, 25 how did we lose containment?"
591 Do you see that? 2 A: Yes, sir. 3 Q: Did you tell Tony Parkin to ask John 4 that question -- John Carson that question? 5 A: No. 6 Q: Did you know he was going to ask him 7 that question? 8 A: No. 9 Q: Given your and my discussion just a 10 few minutes ago, it's pretty unfortunate that Tony Parkin 11 asked him that question, isn't it? No? 12 A: No. 13 Q: Okay, you're not concerned, given our 14 discussion a few minutes ago, that coming from a superior 15 that question in this context might imply some sort of 16 criticism? 17 A: No, there's a difference between me 18 saying it and Tony Parkin. Tony Parkin is a -- is a -- 19 is John's first level supervisor, although they're of 20 much higher rank -- 21 Q: Sure. 22 A: -- and I think for Tony to ask that 23 operational question of -- of a person, I think that's 24 appropriate. 25 Q: Okay. But, it's not only Tony Parkin
601 that's asking the question, Tony Parkin is implying that 2 it's a question that you want answered. 3 Do you see that? 4 A: Those are his words, yes. 5 Q: Yeah. And you agree with me that 6 that's the implication; that it's the Chief that wants to 7 know the answer to that question from John Carson, 8 correct? 9 A: You threw your hands up. I don't 10 think Tony was throwing his hands up. 11 Q: No. 12 A: He just asked the question. 13 Q: It's -- I'm very demonstrative, okay. 14 I apologize for that if it's distracting. 15 A: Tony Parkin -- Tony Parkin isn't. 16 Q: Okay. So, when I ask the question, 17 I'll hold my hands on the lectern when I do it. 18 He's purporting -- he's implying that that 19 question, how did we lose containment, is coming from the 20 Chief? 21 A: Yes. He's saying the Chief might 22 ask. 23 Q: Yeah. 24 A: Might or will. I think -- it says 25 the Chief is probably going to ask.
611 Q: Okay. And you've told me that it's 2 not unfortunate coming -- the question coming from Tony 3 Parkin, but you've agreed with me that it's not the best 4 case scenario for it to be coming from you, correct? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Do you now agree with me that it's 7 unfortunate, this question, implying as it does that you 8 want an answer to that question, that that's unfortunate? 9 A: I don't see why it's unfortunate. 10 Q: All right. 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 Q: Now, I want to get back to this 15 concept of running interference, because I think it's a 16 good concept for us to discuss and I think it's important 17 in this case, all right? 18 A: Yes, sir. 19 Q: You told us about running 20 interference for John Carson as the incident commander, 21 right? 22 A: Not only John Carson but any incident 23 commander that was there, yes. 24 Q: Yeah. it's not -- I'm not implying-- 25 A: No.
621 Q: -- it's specific to John Carson. 2 A: No. 3 Q: You also said something in your 4 evidence about John Carson being concerned at a point 5 prior to the shooting about the intelligence bureau at 6 general headquarters, contacting his constables directly 7 with enquiries. 8 Do you remember that? 9 A: I have knowledge of that, yes. 10 Q: Yeah. And it was alarming people at 11 John Carson's detachment, correct? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And John Carson, as you understood 14 it, he wanted to be, sort of, a filter for enquiries from 15 general headquarters for intelligence enquiries, correct? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: Yeah. He didn't want that -- those 18 sort of raw, unvarnished enquiries to be coming directly 19 to his people, correct? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: He wanted to assign the right people, 22 in his view, to make those enquiries, correct? 23 A: No, I think he wanted to keep control 24 of how members were being -- what members, first line 25 members, were being asked and that the information should
631 be directed towards him; that he should have knowledge. 2 Q: Okay. So, it's an exercise of 3 information control, control? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: Yeah. In other words, he -- he wants 6 to be able to control who gets the information or the 7 request from general headquarters, correct? 8 A: I think it was more that he wanted to 9 make sure that what information was being gathered that 10 he would receive, but I think he was also concerned that 11 there was a certain alarms by one officer asking other 12 officer questions -- 13 Q: Yeah. 14 A: -- that may be alarmist to -- to the 15 officers of that detachment. I think -- I think that was 16 the gist of what he wanted. 17 Q: Jumping to another context, you said 18 to Ron Fox, "Sometimes too much information is a 19 dangerous thing." 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: Yeah. And this is an instance of it 22 because there are some people who may be alarmed by those 23 types of inquiries? 24 A: Yes, possibly. 25 Q: So, the point is, is that John
641 Carson, part of his role is to ensure that he runs 2 interference in a certain respect for the people, for the 3 officers that he's responsible for; is that not correct? 4 A: Well, I think it's more the control 5 of the situation that he's trying to control information 6 much the same as you say, the analogy to Ron Fox, but 7 he's trying to control the situation and obtain the 8 information. 9 Q: He's trying to make sure that the 10 right amount of information gets down to his subordinates 11 and they don't get distracted by extraneous things, 12 correct? 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: And that's -- I'm not in any way 15 suggesting that that's inappropriate. 16 A: No. 17 Q: I'm in fact suggesting that's the 18 opposite; that's properly part of John Carson's role, 19 correct? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: Now, your discussion with Ron Fox 22 occurs on the telephone in a closed room, correct? 23 A: In the trailer as I understand it, 24 yes. 25 Q: And the door is closed to the
651 trailer, correct? 2 A: I don't know, sir. 3 Q: Okay. Your discussion with John 4 Carson and Tony Parkin occurs, the three (3) of you alone 5 with no other officers present, correct? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: And the door is closed, correct? 8 A: I believe so. 9 Q: And that's not accidental, correct? 10 A: No, it was basically that we wanted 11 some time amongst ourselves, yes. 12 Q: Yeah. And it's in and around that 13 time that the phone call comes in from Ron Fox, correct? 14 A: Yes, sir, it does. 15 Q: Given that the phone call comes in, 16 in and around the time that you're in this private 17 meeting in the trailer, is it -- is it reasonable -- does 18 it refresh your memory that the phone call you had with 19 Ron Fox, you were in the trailer with John Carson and 20 Tony Parkin and nobody else? 21 A: I -- I don't have a recollection of 22 that. From my readings I have -- my understanding is 23 that phone was in that trailer. I don't specifically 24 have a recollection that I was on a phone in the trailer. 25 Q: In any event, the -- the type of
661 conversation that you were having with Ron Fox is not the 2 type of conversation that you want to have in front of a 3 lot of subordinate officers, correct? 4 A: No. 5 Q: No. It's the kind of conversation 6 that you want to have with at most, John Carson and Tony 7 Parkin present, correct? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: And why is it that you don't want to 10 have that conversation with a lot of other officers 11 present? 12 A: When I have a conversation with 13 somebody on the phone, for the most part I'm talking to 14 the person on the phone. I'm not talking because I have 15 an audience. I'm not suggesting that there haven't been 16 times that I might have done that, but in this particular 17 case I did not. 18 My -- my speaking with Ron was I was 19 speaking to Ron and I wouldn't have -- I wouldn't 20 necessarily have wanted lots of people hearing that 21 conversation. It didn't bother me that Tony Parkin and 22 John Carson would have been there because the 23 conversation I had with Ron was relative to the 24 situation. 25 Q: Sure. But, what I'm suggesting to
671 you, it's not just an ordinary telephone conversation is 2 it? 3 A: It was to me, in an operational 4 sense, yes it was an ordinary conversation as one police 5 officer to another. 6 Q: So, an ordinary operational 7 conversation might involve discussion about how the 8 Premier is critical of how the operation is being 9 conducted? 10 A: Repeat that. 11 Q: Well, the conversation that you have 12 with Ron Fox, part of it -- I'm a little gunshy with 13 objections, I guess -- 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, there's 15 none. 16 MR. JULIAN ROY: -- Mr. Commissioner. 17 18 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 19 Q: Let me start over. The -- the 20 subject matter of the conversation that you were having 21 with Ron Fox was about interest in the operation on the 22 ground at Ipperwash from the Premier, correct? 23 A: The initial part of the conversation 24 really didn't involve the Premier. 25 Q: All right.
681 A: It was the very last part of the 2 conversation, I suggest, that involved the Premier. It 3 was about -- the majority, as I saw it, was about 4 information flow, automatic weapons, et cetera. 5 Q: Yeah. 6 A: Just to me, normal incident command- 7 type conversations that you had, not normal maybe, but 8 normal to those situations, yes. 9 Q: Okay. I -- I don't want to -- I 10 don't want to take you line by line through that 11 conversation -- 12 A: Thank you. 13 Q: -- because we -- we can all read it. 14 You and I don't have to repeat it back and forth, but 15 just generally, it's not just -- the conversation is not 16 just about information flow; that's part of it, the 17 information is going too fast -- 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: -- up to Queen's Park; that's part of 20 it. 21 A: All right. 22 Q: But there's another part of it about 23 potential political pressure or interference back down to 24 the incident commander, correct, that's the second aspect 25 of it?
691 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Mr. 2 Downard? 3 MR. PETER DOWNARD: I'd be obliged if My 4 Friend would put to the Witness the portion of the 5 transcript that says -- 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's right 7 here. 8 MR. PETER DOWNARD: -- there's political 9 pressure coming down to influence the incident commander 10 and what he's doing at that time on the ground and in the 11 -- in the future. I think he should be very clear and 12 very careful about these statements. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I 14 agree, but I think what he's trying to do is save some 15 time by summarizing it, but you may be wiser to refer 16 exactly to the conversation. 17 MR. JULIAN ROY: In -- in my worst 18 nightmare, I never expected somebody would insist that I 19 go back and -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, I can 21 understand Mr. Downard's concern. 22 MR. JULIAN ROY: I'm not trying to be 23 critical of Mr. Downard. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 25 No, no, that's fine.
701 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 MR. JULIAN ROY: Now, the pagination of 4 my transcript is, I think, different than -- than the 5 exhibit before this, but it's on the last page of the 6 transcript. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You've got a 8 different copy? 9 MR. JULIAN ROY: I think so. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: This is -- 11 MR. JULIAN ROY: It's Tab 33 -- sorry. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: This is 13 Tab -- 14 MR. JULIAN ROY: Exhibit 444(a). 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Tab 37, I 16 think, is the one -- 17 MR. JULIAN ROY: Tab 37. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- the one 19 you're referring to. 20 MR. JULIAN ROY: Correct. It's just the 21 pagination -- 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yeah, the 23 pagination is different in some. 24 MR. JULIAN ROY: -- is different in mine. 25 My page says 13 of 13, in the transcript.
711 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 4 Q: If you'll look on page 274? 5 A: Yes, sir? 6 Q: The bottom right, 274? 7 A: Yes, sir. 8 Q: Where Ron Fox -- about the middle of 9 the page -- where Ron Fox says the following? 10 "Okay. The Premier is quite adamant, 11 this is not an issue of native rights. 12 And in his words, ah, I mean we've 13 tried to pacify and pander to these 14 people for too long, it's now time for 15 swift, affirmative action. 16 I walked in the tail-end, Chris, with 17 him saying things like, Well, I think 18 the OPP have made mistakes in this one. 19 They should have just gone in. He 20 views it as a simple trespass to 21 property; that's in his thinking. He's 22 not getting the right advice, ah, or if 23 he's getting the right advice, he's 24 certainly not listening to it in any 25 way, shape, or form."
721 Do you see that? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: That would qualify as -- the subject 4 matter of the discussion is about the Premier's views on 5 how the operation is being conducted, correct? 6 A: That's correct. 7 Q: And, discussion of that nature, of 8 that -- of those types of issues, you want to have that 9 behind closed doors without a lot of officers present, 10 correct? 11 A: Possibly. 12 Q: Yeah. And why would you want to have 13 it without a lot of other officers present? 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 A: I'm -- when I'm on the telephone, as 18 I said, for the most part, I don't want a lot of people 19 present -- 20 Q: Sure. 21 A: -- because I'm talking to an 22 individual. 23 Q: Sure. 24 A: That conversation there, to have Tony 25 Parkin or Ron Fox even to be listen; that wouldn't have
731 bothered me. 2 Q: Okay. But moving that aside -- 3 A: And -- but I have other people, it 4 might lead other people to -- to include that Coles was 5 having conversation of what the Premier was or wasn't 6 thinking and I don't think that would have been useful to 7 a person below me -- 8 Q: Yeah. 9 A: -- necessarily. 10 Q: And it wouldn't be -- in fact, it 11 would be more than not useful, it would potentially 12 distracting to them, correct? 13 A: Yes, it could be. 14 Q: And you wouldn't want them to be 15 distracted by what the Premier might be thinking about 16 how the operation is conducted, correct? 17 A: More important to me is I wouldn't 18 want them to be distracted if they thought that I was 19 reacting to what a Premier was saying. 20 Q: Sure. But what the Premier was 21 saying, it's not just your reaction, it's also what the 22 Premier is saying. You wouldn't want them to know that, 23 either, would you? 24 A: Possibly. I think I've already 25 previously testified that I thought he was wrong.
741 Q: Yeah, I understand that. 2 A: But, it's not -- my point is, is it's 3 not just that you believe it's wrong, you don't want the 4 Premier's wrong views to be known to the other officers 5 below John Carson and Tony Parkin? 6 A: Or, as I said, that I'm reacting to 7 it in some way? 8 Q: Okay. It's both, correct? 9 A: More important to me that I'm not 10 reacting to it in -- in any way. 11 Q: Now, this running interference 12 function, we've talked about how you do it for John 13 Carson and we also talked a little bit about how John 14 Carson does it for his subordinates. 15 Do you remember that? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: Part of John Carson's job would be to 18 run interference for his subordinates so that they don't 19 know about the Premier's views about the operation, 20 correct? 21 A: Possibly. 22 Q: For example, you wouldn't want the 23 leader of the CMU team to know that the Premier had some 24 sort of interest directly in the operations, correct? 25 A: For the most part, no, of course --
751 Q: Yes. 2 A: -- I wouldn't have wanted that. 3 Q: You used the term "optics" before? 4 A: Yes, I did. 5 Q: That's that optics, right? 6 A: And timing as well as anything else. 7 Q: And that optics, right? 8 A: Well, I think it was -- we were 9 talking about the knowledge that the -- that the head of 10 the CMU would have so, yeah, I -- I wouldn't want it in 11 his mind that he had any concerns, yes. 12 13 (BRIEF PAUSE) 14 15 Q: And you would expect that the 16 incident commander would take steps to make sure that his 17 subordinates are not bothered with those types of issues, 18 correct? 19 A: The optimum word is, I guess, 20 'bothered'. 21 Q: Yeah. That there -- let's -- let me 22 -- let me rephrase -- 23 A: They may have knowledge of them, but 24 I wouldn't want them bothered by that information. 25 Q: Okay.
761 A: I think that's what you said. 2 Q: But you wouldn't want them to have 3 knowledge of that information, either? 4 You've already -- 5 A: If -- if -- if I had an option of 6 them having it or not having it, yes. As an incident 7 commander, it wasn't something that they needed to 8 consider themselves with, because I see incident 9 commander as a policeman, was -- was not bothered by it 10 or should not be bothered by it. 11 Q: Okay, leaving aside the incident 12 commander -- 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: My point is, is that you said if he 15 has the option, so if an incident commander has an 16 option, he should take measures to make sure that his 17 subordinates do not become aware of those types of 18 political pressures, correct? 19 A: No, I think what I said is that they 20 would not be bothered by them. I mean, I think it was 21 general knowledge at this time that there was political 22 interest, that there was citizens concerned, et cetera. 23 And if that now faces the incident 24 commander that he sees fit that he wishes to deal with 25 them, his job is to make sure that it is clear to the
771 people underneath him or her that this doesn't fit in 2 part of the equation. There's no reason to be bothered 3 about this. This is a policing matter. 4 Q: Okay. So the incident commander, if 5 he doesn't prevent the information about political 6 pressures going down to his subordinates, what he should 7 do is give a speech and a warning to them that they're 8 not to be influenced, correct? 9 A: If he thought that -- he thought that 10 political interference was being considered by people 11 that, yes, I would suggest that he -- he would tell his 12 people that -- make sure that his people were aware that 13 it was not in his mind and we were not acting in any way 14 under the direction other than normal policing duties. 15 Q: Now, you mentioned that it was common 16 knowledge that there was political interests that the 17 cottagers and the citizens in the surrounding area were 18 following what was happening. 19 A: I think so, yes. 20 Q: And I think that's a fair -- fair 21 statement. And the common knowledge you're talking about 22 is the common knowledge among the officers who are 23 subordinate to John Carson, correct? 24 A: And others. 25 Q: Okay. Was it common knowledge -- are
781 you saying that it was common knowledge among the 2 officers that, quote: 3 "The Premier is quite adamant that this 4 is not an issue of Native rights." 5 And then his words: 6 "Ah, I mean we've tried to pacify and 7 pander to these people for too long. 8 Now it's time for swift affirmative 9 action." 10 Was that part of the common knowledge that 11 the officers subordinate to John Carson had? 12 A: I don't think at two o'clock on 13 September the 6th it would have been. 14 Q: And you wouldn't want that to become 15 common knowledge among the officers subordinate to John 16 Carson? 17 A: No, no. Not common knowledge, no. 18 Q: We -- in your evidence you discussed 19 the Ministry of Natural Resources representative in the 20 command post? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: Mr. Kobayashi? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: All right. And you thought on 25 balance it was a good idea to have Mr. Kobayashi in the
791 command centre, correct? 2 A: On balance given the situation and 3 the geography involved, I was not opposed to it. It was 4 a incident commander's decision and -- and I knew of his 5 presence and therefore was not necessarily opposed. I 6 know it created some problems but I basically was not 7 opposed. 8 Q: And again it's a sort of a pros and 9 cons analysis that you have to engage in, correct? 10 A: Yes. Yes, sir. 11 Q: Because of course it's a good thing 12 that there's some liaison between the police and the 13 Ministry of Natural Resources; correct? 14 A: I think Mr. Kobayashi's presence did 15 help the situation as much as there was a situation that 16 some problems arose. 17 Q: But you acknowledge, in your 18 evidence, that there's a different culture in that 19 Ministry than the traditional policing, correct? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: And the tradition in policing is that 22 there's independence from the political masters; correct? 23 A: Yes, sir. 24 Q: That's a hollowed principle and all 25 police officers either are familiar with or ought to be
801 familiar, correct? 2 A: Yes, sir. 3 Q: But the MNR bureaucrats they operate 4 in a different way, correct? 5 A: In at least one situation, particular 6 individuals in the MNR that I dealt with, operated under 7 a philosophy that was different than I and the Ontario 8 Provincial Police was operating on, yes. 9 Q: They have sort of a stovepipe model 10 where the information just goes straight up to the top, 11 correct? 12 A: I don't want to be seen to be seen to 13 be criticizing the MNR. I can only talk of the one 14 situation that I eluded to with Ron. I said three (3) 15 but really the one in the current situation. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We're going 17 to need to take a washroom break pretty soon, Mr. Roy. 18 Would you give me some indication of how much longer -- 19 MR. JULIAN ROY: I could be done the MNR 20 issue in about three (3) to four (4) minutes. Is that -- 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Are you 22 finished then? 23 MR. JULIAN ROY: I regret to advise that 24 I'm not. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: How much
811 longer will you be in total? 2 MR. JULIAN ROY: During the break I will 3 do a slash -- 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You'll make 5 an assessment? 6 MR. JULIAN ROY: -- a slash and burn, if 7 I can. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: All right. 9 Well why don't you finish the MNR issue and then we'll 10 take a break? 11 MR. JULIAN ROY: Okay. And then I'll -- 12 I'll advise you right after the break -- 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 14 MR. JULIAN ROY: -- if you don't mind. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 16 17 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 18 Q: Acknowledging that there's this 19 tension that on one (1) hand it's a good thing for there 20 to be some communication between the MNR and incident 21 command and acknowledging on the other there's this 22 problem about information flows that you've already 23 talked about and I don't want to get into in any great 24 detail. 25 Can you give the Inquiry, the Commission,
821 any suggestions about as to how we might structure 2 liaison between OPP differently? 3 Are there other options, other than having 4 Mr. Kobayashi at the incident command that might 5 facilitate the proper kind of information flow and -- 6 A: A couple of options, I guess, was 7 that as you run the incident you could facilitate the 8 direct participating -- participation of a resource 9 person, be they Ministry of Natural Resources or whatever 10 the incident involved, and allow those people to have 11 kind of a direct audience with the incident commander, 12 once in a while, so that the resource could go back and 13 forth; that would be one (1), I guess, way of doing it. 14 Or if, in fact, the situation and -- and 15 I'm going to suggest something involving technical -- I 16 had a situation once in -- in Jarvis, Ontario where 17 methane gas was -- was coming up through community wells 18 and was -- was in the danger of blowing up and so we 19 evacuated people. 20 The need for technical people to be in 21 that room was very important to me because I had no 22 technical expertise as far as what gas does or doesn't 23 do, but I think what -- if I had that, one (1) of the 24 things I could do would be, basically, to caution the 25 person coming in to the incident room of the
831 ramifications of higher-ups, what it can do. There could 2 be that caution if you put over to a person coming into 3 an incident room of policing but not knowing the policing 4 philosophy. The trouble is that is if you invite 5 somebody else in, you don't -- you can't dictate to them 6 or shouldn't. 7 Q: What -- what I want to ask you just 8 to follow up on that very quickly is, you -- you 9 mentioned the methane gas example -- 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: -- which is a clear example of why 12 the technical expertise of the MNR is going to be 13 required right at incident command, right next to where 14 the incident commander is, in fact. 15 Was that kind of -- did -- did John Carson 16 require any of that type of technical expertise from the 17 MNR in this situation? 18 A: No, he didn't. I -- I was trying to 19 give an example of how a technical person might be 20 welcome in an incident room. 21 Q: Yeah. But we don't -- we're not in 22 that situation here. 23 A: No. No, you're not, bad example, 24 possibly. 25 Q: So we could -- potentially, we could
841 have an MNR representative liaise with the OPP in some 2 fashion other than them being at the elbow of the 3 incident commander, correct? 4 A: Correct. If I -- if I can, though, 5 in -- in fairness, we're talking, generally, here about-- 6 Q: Yes? 7 A: -- future incidents and I guess -- 8 Q: Yes. 9 A: -- what I'm saying is, if the 10 situation changed, it was exactly the same except the 11 occupies -- occupiers had chosen to go in at the height 12 of a summer weekend when there were lots of campers and 13 you needed to know what was going on in the camp at that 14 time. Would not, then, the fact of having an MNR person 15 in that incident room be useful -- 16 Q: You're right. 17 A: -- and I think it would. 18 Q: You're right. So what you're 19 suggesting to the Commission is that we ought to be 20 cautious about having an MNR person at incident command. 21 There -- there ought to be a good technical reason for 22 them to be there, correct? 23 A: Or any outside resource person that 24 you choose -- 25 Q: Yeah.
851 A: Yes. 2 Q: They're not just there gratuitously, 3 there has to be a good, technical knowledge reason for 4 them to be there, other -- otherwise, let's get them out 5 and not have incident command distracted. 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: Am I right? 8 A: Yes, I agree with that. 9 Q: Can we have a break now, Mr. 10 Commissioner? 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 12 We'll take a morning break now. 13 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 14 for fifteen (15) minutes. 15 16 --- Upon recessing at 10:28 a.m. 17 --- Upon resuming at 10:46 a.m. 18 19 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 20 resumed; please be seated. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Can you give 22 us some estimate, Mr. Roy? 23 MR. JULIAN ROY: I think we're in the -- 24 I think we're in the twenty (20) to thirty (30) minute 25 range remaining.
861 I did -- I did what I undertook to do 2 which is to remove some of the things I intended to cover 3 and -- 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Let's carry 5 on. 6 MR. JULIAN ROY: -- the answers have led 7 us in different directions that I hope were helpful, but 8 Counsel always think their questioning is helpful. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, twenty 10 (20) to thirty (30) minutes is your estimate now. 11 MR. JULIAN ROY: Yes. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Let's carry 13 on. 14 15 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 16 Q: Now, the operational plan, I'm not 17 going to ask you to turn it up, but it makes reference to 18 scribe -- to a scribe or scribe notes. 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: And the scribe is -- is actually 21 attached to the incident commander, correct? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: And that's typical of any incident or 24 operation like this, correct? 25 A: Yes.
871 Q: And it's typical, because it has a 2 very important purpose, both the fact that there's scribe 3 notes and the fact that the scribe is attached to the 4 incident commander. 5 It's because we want to have a record, 6 later on, of decisions made by the incident commander; 7 information received by the incident commander, correct? 8 A: And relieves the -- the incident 9 commander from the every day note taking that would take 10 some of the time away from him or her. 11 Q: But the bottom line is there has to 12 be a note of what the incident commander is doing in 13 terms of his decision making and information he receives, 14 correct? 15 A: That's logic. 16 Q: Yeah. And we need to have a record 17 for that, I suggest to you, because we need to ensure 18 that there's some mechanism of accountability on the part 19 of that incident commander in the sense that others, 20 perhaps in the police hierarchy or perhaps in terms of 21 civilian oversight, so that other people can take a look 22 at those records and form judgments or analysis of that 23 incident commander's work. 24 Is that correct? 25 A: I don't think that is the purpose of
881 scribe notes. I think -- 2 Q: All right. 3 A: -- the purpose of scribe notes is 4 that the incident commander is aware of things that have 5 gone on either in his presence or other people have told 6 him, definitely in his presence, in order that he can 7 better conduct himself or herself, as the incident 8 commander. 9 I don't think it's there based on this is 10 -- it is a record of the event, I agree that's what it 11 forms. But I think it is -- it is -- it is formed at the 12 time to assist the incident commander in his or her 13 decisions. 14 Q: So, in your mind, the scribe 15 functions not as a means of having outsiders, perhaps 16 people outside the force or up the chain of command, 17 reviewing the incident commander's work, it's really for 18 the incident commander himself or herself, correct? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: Do you agree with me that, even 21 though that's not in your mind, in terms of what the 22 scribe notes are for, that scribe notes are a pretty good 23 mechanism for facilitating that type of accountability to 24 others that I just put to you? 25 A: I think it's assisted in this case in
891 any event. 2 Q: Yeah. Well, it assists us in this 3 case as long as the scribe is -- is actually there with 4 the incident commander, right? Correct? 5 A: Usually they are. 6 Q: Yeah. And when they're not, we don't 7 have this type of record of what the incident commander - 8 - decisions he's making, information that he gets, 9 correct? 10 A: You would not, no. 11 Q: Because as you've said earlier, in 12 terms of the purpose of scribe notes, is that we can't 13 really expect the incident commander to be in his police 14 memo book, taking notes of things, correct? 15 A: That's correct. 16 Q: So if there's no scribe notes, 17 there's nothing, correct, in terms of note taking? 18 A: There's nothing on behalf of the 19 scribe. 20 Q: And nothing on the part of the 21 incident commander either? 22 A: Other than their own recollection or 23 if they chose -- choose to make notes afterwards. 24 Q: And, if they have -- they did not 25 choose to make notes after and if they have no
901 recollection, then there's nothing, correct? 2 A: There would be nothing. 3 Q: So, that's why it's very important to 4 have the scribe and the scribe note take directly 5 attached to the incident commander, correct? 6 A: Important to who, I guess, would be 7 my question? 8 Q: Well, that's part of my question. 9 A: If -- if scribe notes are being taken 10 as you mentioned because of accountability, I don't think 11 that -- that necessarily is what they're for, as I 12 explained. 13 Q: Okay. Are you aware of any 14 regulations or policies that the OPP had concerning the 15 maintenance of scribe notes? 16 A: No. 17 Q: Okay. What about regulations or 18 guidelines or requirements in terms of somebody in your 19 position when you're talking to an incident commander? 20 A: No, in the training of incident 21 command, there, I believe, is the -- the teaching of the 22 -- that there should be a person taking scribe notes. 23 And if it's in your training, I suggest that is an 24 adjunct to your policy. 25 Q: Okay. So, you would -- given that
911 there's training on the need for scribe notes, you give - 2 - you view that as a requirement that there be scribe 3 notes for the incident commander, correct? 4 A: For the most part, yes. 5 Q: Yes. When you say, "for the most 6 part,"; lawyers get very curious when witnesses say 7 things like that. Is there some sort of exception to 8 that? 9 A: I don't believe it's mandated. 10 Q: What's not mandated? 11 A: The use of scribe notes in every 12 situation. 13 Q: Okay. 14 A: It's at the discretion of the 15 incident commander, I guess. 16 Q: So, John Carson, in this situation, 17 the OPP policies, training and regulations at the time 18 would permit him to not have scribe notes whatsoever in 19 this incident? 20 A: I -- I don't know. 21 Q: That sounds like what you just said 22 about a minute ago. 23 A: But, when you ask me specifically 24 about the policy, what I'm saying is I don't know what 25 that was --
921 Q: Okay. 2 A: -- or what the training was in the 3 manuals per se. 4 Q: But, you would -- wouldn't you have 5 received that training at some point, too? 6 A: I think I said, no. I'm afraid I 7 don't think I did. I received, on an Inspector 8 Development course one (1) time, there was a component of 9 incident command and I've taken emergency planning 10 courses outside of the Ontario Provincial Police. 11 Q: Okay. But, in this case, there was a 12 decision made to have scribe notes, correct? 13 A: Yes, there was. 14 Q: Okay. And, once you make that 15 decision you're going to have scribe notes, you can't 16 really think of any reason why you'd, sort of, want to 17 shut off the scribe notes for a period of time? 18 A: Not for operational matters of the 19 incident, no. 20 Q: Okay. So, if it's an operational 21 matter, you've got to have those scribe notes going, 22 right? 23 A: I would like to think that they're 24 being recorded, yes. 25 Q: And operational matters would
931 include, sort of, tactics or strategies for dealing with 2 the occupation, correct? 3 A: Operations of the incident, yes, 4 correct 5 Q: And -- but it would include 6 discussions about tactics and strategies and approaches 7 as to how to deal with the situation, correct? 8 A: Possibly. 9 Q: Yeah. That would -- that would be 10 part of operational matters? 11 A: I think I know where you're going and 12 I'm trying not to forecast that way, but I guess what I'm 13 saying is -- 14 Q: It's hard. It's - -it's coming right 15 up Central Avenue. 16 A: I -- I understand. Yes, for 17 strategies when I mentioned operations, I think it's 18 important that if there's directions as far as 19 strategies, et cetera, strategizing between people who 20 are on the ground and know what's going on immediately on 21 the ground, I -- I think there's some good utility in 22 having the scribe record those. 23 Q: Yes. And, those were the kinds of 24 discussions that you were having with John Carson in the 25 trailer, correct?
941 A: Well, our discussions, as I've 2 testified, I think, went the whole gamut of the who, 3 what, where, why, when. 4 Q: And, when you, "the whole gamut," it 5 would -- that would include some operational matters, 6 correct? 7 A: Possibly, yes. 8 Q: Yeah. And, there's no -- there was 9 no scribe in the room at the time, correct? 10 A: No, there were not. 11 Q: No. And, whose decision was it that 12 the scribe not be there? 13 A: It just happened. But I guess as a 14 senior ranking person in the room, I'll take 15 responsibility that that person wasn't there. I didn't 16 specifically say, I want a scribe here. 17 Q: Okay. But, did you -- did you say, 18 specifically when you were in the room, I don't want a 19 scribe here? 20 A: No, I did not. 21 Q: Okay. Did John Carson say -- did you 22 hear him say, I don't want a scribe here? 23 A: Not -- I -- I -- my evidence is, I 24 don't know what went on, but I do not recall any 25 conversation pertaining to a scribe.
951 Q: So, it's totally fortuitous that 2 there's no scribe there at the time that you're having 3 that meeting with John Carson in the trailer? 4 A: That's correct. 5 Q: You talked about optics a couple of 6 times in your evidence. 7 A: Yes, sir. 8 Q: Would you agree with me that in -- to 9 be honest with you, when I -- a couple of times I've 10 alerted you to the fact that I'm going to be impliedly 11 critical of John Carson in my questioning. 12 A: Yes, sir, you have. 13 Q: And now I'm going give -- extend the 14 same courtesy to you, okay? 15 A: Yes, sir. 16 Q: I'm -- a little even more than 17 impliedly critical of the failure to have scribe notes at 18 that meeting in these circumstances. 19 But, I want to start with the topic of 20 optics, all right? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: At a minimum, you'd agree with me 23 that it's very bad optics that that two (2) hour meeting, 24 wherein there's a telephone call where discussion about 25 political pressure happens, in or around that meeting,
961 that it's very bad optics that we don't have any scribe 2 notes for that period? 3 A: I can see where you may consider it 4 being bad optics given the mandate of this Inquiry and 5 that you're trying to find out, and the Commissioner's 6 trying to find out and report on what went on, that you 7 may consider that bad optics. 8 But, given the date, on 2:30, on September 9 the 6th, the -- my role was going was to talk to an 10 incident commander about the situations and with not 11 envisaging this audience or that it would be construed or 12 -- bad optics that I chose. 13 I honestly did not intend to do anything 14 wrong. I did not intend to, in any way, go apart from my 15 duties as a police officer and the law I swore to uphold. 16 Q: Yes. 17 A: So, it was no intention of mine and I 18 suggest to you that at that meeting, there was nothing 19 that couldn't have been scribed. 20 Q: There is -- 21 A: That I would have -- I -- that I 22 would be apologizing for, in my opinion. 23 Q: I didn't understand the last part of 24 it. There was nothing that happened in that meeting that 25 could be scribed?
971 A: That could not have been scribed that 2 I wouldn't be willing to discuss in this forum. 3 Q: There's too many negatives. My -- 4 A: I'm sorry? 5 Q: It's making my head hurt. There is 6 nothing that was said in that meeting -- 7 A: If a scribe had -- 8 Q: Yes. 9 A: -- taken notes -- 10 Q: Okay. 11 A: -- at that meeting -- 12 Q: Yes. 13 A: -- I could have report -- I could 14 have given evidence for them and I would have not have 15 been ashamed or -- 16 Q: I understand. 17 A: -- embarrassed of anything that would 18 have occurred. 19 Q: I understand. Now, your point about, 20 you didn't intend bad optics, nobody intends bad optics: 21 is that correct? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: And -- and the police, in this 24 society, operate somewhat under a microscope; is that 25 correct?
981 A: I believe in the civilian 2 governments, yes. 3 Q: Yes. And that's a good thing, right? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: You believe in that, right? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: And for that microscope to work, we 8 got to have records, right? 9 A: Possibly. 10 Q: And without records, the microscope 11 can't work, right? 12 A: Possibly. 13 Q: And that good thing called police 14 accountability can't operate as for what happened in that 15 trailer, right? 16 A: Possibly. 17 Q: The fact that I'm asking you these 18 questions makes it more than possible, doesn't it? 19 It's actually what happens, right? 20 A: Ten (10) years later, I don't know 21 what's happening in incident command. I've been -- I've 22 been apart from that. 23 Q: Yeah. And the optics get worse when 24 nobody who's in that meeting can remember what was said, 25 right?
991 A: I understand that, yes, sir. 2 Q: And that's the case here, is it not? 3 A: Yes, sir, some ten (10) years later. 4 Q: Yes. And -- and the ten (10) years 5 later is why we have scribe notes, right, part of the 6 reason? 7 A: Possibly. 8 Q: Yeah. 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 Q: Okay, that -- that ends the criticism 13 session. I'm going to move on to another -- 14 A: Okay. 15 Q: -- all right? Because I know you've 16 been -- other people have taken you up on it, and I think 17 we've gone as far as we can, all right? 18 A: All right. 19 Q: I want to ask you about -- there was 20 a couple of allusions in your evidence before, and this 21 is a bit of a housekeeping matter. 22 A: Okay. 23 Q: To you and your private consulting 24 after the OPP? 25 A: Yes.
1001 Q: Remember that? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: In that -- that what you do in 4 private consulting is you do some investigative work; is 5 that correct? 6 A: Sometimes. 7 Q: And -- are you part of a private 8 investigation company or...? 9 A: I received my license for a private 10 investigation company but I've only -- I have only 11 investigated one (1) case for that company which did not 12 involve anything of Ipperwash. 13 Q: And was it that company that was 14 approached to investigate the Ipperwash incident that you 15 made reference to? 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 A: I believe so, yes. 20 Q: Okay. 21 A: I don't know if they did. What I'm 22 saying is I believe so. 23 Q: All right. And the name of the 24 company? 25
1011 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 MR. MARK SANDLER: Maybe I'm missing the 4 point here of what the relevance of this is but I don't 5 see any apparent relevance. And I can see that Mr. Coles 6 is reluctant to get into this area and I understand why 7 in the absence of some real showing of relevance. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm not sure 9 what the relevance is either. I don't see what the -- 10 MR. JULIAN ROY: All right. I described 11 it as -- as that it's not relevant to the incident in 12 terms of the facts. It's relevant to production quite 13 frankly. That's why I described it as a housekeeping 14 matter. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, if 16 it's not relevant, I'd move on. 17 MR. JULIAN ROY: Well, it -- the evidence 18 may lead to relevant information such as perhaps there 19 was a parallel investigation that was conducted by 20 somebody, perhaps an authority about this incident. And 21 I only know about the SIU investigation. 22 I know about, Mr. Commissioner, about your 23 investigation. I know about the police investigation of 24 alleged criminal conduct on the part of the occupiers. I 25 know about this debriefing.
1021 But I don't know about who asked for some 2 other kind of parallel investigation to be conducted, 3 whether there was a report that was yielded by it, 4 whether or not there were witnesses interviewed, material 5 witnesses. I'm not going to get all those answer from 6 this Witness. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: He didn't 8 participate in it. He said that yesterday. 9 MR. JULIAN ROY: That's right. But what 10 I'm -- my next areas of questioning is to figure out who 11 was it that asked for that investigation to be conducted, 12 because if it's the Ontario Provincial Police for 13 example, hypothetically, if it's the Ontario Provincial 14 Police that's requesting that a parallel investigation be 15 conducted that separate from your process, we ought to 16 have the results of that investigation and the documents 17 that underlie it. 18 And I made elusion to this when -- when -- 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You did. 20 MR. JULIAN ROY: -- Counsel for the 21 George family was -- was asking questions. I mean this 22 isn't -- it shouldn't be a surprise to anybody with -- I 23 don't mean to be disrespectful, Mr. Commissioner, but 24 that -- that's the issue. 25 So, when I say it's not relevant to these
1031 facts, it's -- it's relevant to production of facts that 2 are going to be highly relevant potentially. And there 3 may -- somebody may have had the gleam in their eye that 4 they want an investigation and then they decided they 5 weren't going to pursue it. 6 But, we can't get there until we ask two 7 (2), three (3), four (4) more questions about this issue. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Do you have 9 a comment, Mr. Worme? 10 MR. DONALD WORME: I hope that I might be 11 able to perhaps simply add to this. And Mr. 12 Commissioner, I think that -- that the question, I 13 suggest, is probably fair. 14 And obviously I think that Mr. Roy is 15 right that the answers that ultimately he's seeking is, 16 as he has at least outlined them, likely not to be able 17 to come from this Witness, if in fact such answers exist. 18 I mean, there's a number of investigations 19 that have gone on here and certainly the investigation of 20 this Inquiry is -- is what we ought to be focussed upon. 21 If in fact there are other investigations then I think 22 certainly we will want to know about those and certainly 23 the purpose is for which such investigations were 24 undertaken. 25 I can appreciate that the parties may well
1041 have engaged in processes, not unlike the processes we've 2 engaged in terms of contacting witnesses, interviewing 3 witnesses and such. 4 And I think that perhaps the point that 5 Mr. Roy is making, if those have gone on, then any of the 6 information that might have been gleamed by such 7 examinations certainly should be shared with this 8 Commission. And I'm interested in seeing what the 9 answers to that are. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. Sandler, 11 do you have any comment you want to make or -- 12 MR. MARK SANDLER: I thought Mr. Coles 13 had suggested this arose out of a civil proceeding and -- 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well -- 15 MR. MARK SANDLER: --- and not some 16 official capacity. And -- and I thought that -- I 17 thought that this matter had been determined yesterday. 18 But in any event, I have some difficulty with seeing how 19 this continues to be relevant having regard to what Mr. 20 Coles has already said. 21 He turned down the opportunity to be 22 involved in it. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I understand 24 that. 25 MR. MARK SANDLER: And -- and if the --
1051 and if the OPP had been involved in an investigative 2 process that yielded the documents, then we'd have 3 production requirements. So, I don't quite see -- 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's why I 5 think -- 6 MR. MARK SANDLER: -- why this is 7 relevant. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, the 9 questions, if it's asked, will be answered and it will 10 shut down, but if we don't -- I think Mr. Roy could be 11 right or Mr. Worme could be right if there is a parallel 12 investigation. I mean, we haven't got any evidence that 13 there is -- 14 MR. JULIAN ROY: We don't. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- but 16 unless you ask the question, we won't know. 17 MR. JULIAN ROY: We have -- we have 18 evidence that somebody requested one of this Witness so. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I don't see 20 the harm in asking the question then. 21 MR. JULIAN ROY: Thank you. 22 THE WITNESS: Mr. Commissioner, I would 23 like the opportunity to speak to legal Counsel so that I 24 know my rights and the -- and the rights of who I may be 25 identifying.
1061 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Absolutely. 2 I wouldn't want to put you in a position where you're 3 uncomfortable. 4 MR. JULIAN ROY: Do you want me to move 5 to another and then -- 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, I think 7 we'll just take a short break and -- 8 MR. JULIAN ROY: Thank you. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- give 10 Counsel an opportunity to speak to the Witness and then 11 we'll come back. We'll just take a short break. 12 MR. JULIAN ROY: Thank you very much, Mr. 13 Commissioner. 14 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess. 15 16 --- Upon recessing at 11:07 a.m. 17 --- Upon resuming at 11:22 a.m. 18 19 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 20 resumed. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 22 THE REGISTRAR: Please be seated. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: How are we 24 going to resolve this? Have we got a resolution? 25 MR. JULIAN ROY: I -- I propose just to
1071 ask -- 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I'm not 3 sure, Mr. Roland is coming to the microphone. 4 MR. JULIAN ROY: I see Mr. Roland. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. Roland 6 will enlighten us. 7 MR. IAN ROLAND: Well, I'm not sure I'm 8 going to enlighten you much, but let me say this. I have 9 spoken to the Witness at the break and it appears from 10 the approach that was made to him in timing, that -- and 11 it was simply an approach -- whether, as I understand it 12 -- whether he was interested in participating in an 13 investigation or not and he indicated he wasn't; that the 14 approach was made in the context of, it appears, the 15 fresh evidence application in the criminal proceedings, 16 the criminal appeal proceeding involving Ken Deane. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Oh. 18 MR. IAN ROLAND: And that there was -- 19 you may -- you may know from the record that Allan Gold 20 acted for Ken Deane -- 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 22 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- with respect to that 23 proceeding and there was fresh evidence put before the 24 Court. That evidence was gathered, I gather, by 25 investigators retained on behalf of Ken Deane in -- in
1081 that process and it appears that that was the context of 2 the approach that was made to this Witness. 3 That material has been provided to the 4 Commission. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: So there is 6 no -- 7 MR. IAN ROLAND: Yeah. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- no 9 parallel investigation that you're aware of? 10 MR. IAN ROLAND: Well, there was -- there 11 was a parallel investigation in that sense, parallel in 12 the sense that it was parallel to the -- I guess it was 13 going on at the same time the civil proceedings were 14 going on and it was an investigation that was parallel to 15 -- parallel -- I guess it was after the police 16 investigation, but it was for the purpose of fresh 17 evidence put -- to put fresh evidence before the Court in 18 the Deane appeal. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I understand 20 there was some allegation of parallel investigation in 21 the Stonechild matter and there's nothing like that here. 22 There's no suggestion, no -- 23 MR. IAN ROLAND: Certainly not from the - 24 - from the OPPA's or Ken Deane perspective. This 25 investigation, it appears, was for the purpose of the
1091 fresh -- of putting fresh evidence before the -- 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: In the Deane 3 trial? 4 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- appellant courts. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: In the Deane 6 appeal? 7 MR. IAN ROLAND: Leading -- in the 8 context of the Deane appeal. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Okay. Where 10 are you on this now, Mr. Roy? 11 MR. JULIAN ROY: Well, before Mr. Roland 12 sits down, I would ask for some clarification on one (1) 13 particular issue before I address it. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, why 15 don't you speak to him one-on-one -- 16 MR. JULIAN ROY: That's a better way, 17 yes. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- and then 19 we can -- why don't we just sit in place while you do 20 that. 21 22 (BRIEF PAUSE) 23 24 MR. JULIAN ROY: Mr. Commissioner, I have 25 asked, from My Friend, for some clarification. I
1101 understand that the appeal file, meaning the actual final 2 affidavits in the fresh evidence application, have been 3 produced here. 4 I don't issue with that, and that's -- 5 that's a good thing that that's been done and it's 6 publicly accessible. 7 In any event, what it doesn't answer is if 8 there was an investigation firm who was doing an 9 investigation of the incident for that fresh evidence 10 application. 11 The fact that the affidavits have been 12 filed doesn't speak to any other witness statements they 13 might have gathered or any other reports that they might 14 have prepared on that issue. 15 And presumably it's Ken Deane -- Ken Deane 16 on his behalf. Ken Deane is a party here. Ken Deane has 17 Counsel here who is Mr. Roland. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 19 MR. JULIAN ROY: So in my respectful 20 submission, if there's anything that's beyond the 21 affidavits that are filed in the Court of Appeal, we 22 ought to have those too and I'm not -- 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We ought to-- 24 MR. JULIAN ROY: -- saying there is. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- have
1111 them, but that's a different issue and we're going -- if 2 we don't have them, we'll make every effort to get them. 3 MR. DONALD WORME: I think, perhaps, Mr. 4 Commissioner, in order to assist, it might be prudent 5 that, as Commission Counsel, what we can do is simply 6 circulate to the parties the information and materials 7 that we've received and the parties can then make their 8 own determinations as to whether or not that satisfies 9 them. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, I 11 assume that that will be done. 12 MR. DONALD WORME: It will be done. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think you 14 can move on now. 15 MR. JULIAN ROY: I think I can and I'm 16 operating a little bit on the fly and something may come 17 up. I may, tonight, as I review this matter and think 18 about it some more -- this is the first that I'm hearing 19 that has to do with the fresh evidence application -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: But it has 21 to do with Deane appeal. 22 MR. JULIAN ROY: Yeah. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: So let's 24 move on. 25 MR. JULIAN ROY: I may have something
1121 else to say about it down the road, but -- 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: All right. 3 MR. JULIAN ROY: -- let's not cross that 4 bridge until we -- we have to. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I presume 6 you're just about finished now. 7 MR. JULIAN ROY: We are just about 8 finished, there are two (2) issues left. 9 THE WITNESS: Before you go on, I think - 10 - I'm sorry, Mr. Commissioner, but on -- on speaking to 11 my Counsel, I -- I may have misspoke, I think is the 12 term. 13 MR. JULIAN ROY: Oh, oh. 14 THE WITNESS: In -- when I answered the 15 question suggesting that pertaining to this that it was 16 civil. I should have said I -- I don't know, so I don't 17 know what it was. I just want to clear up that I didn't 18 mean to mislead anyone. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 20 21 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 22 Q: I appreciate that clarification. The 23 reference to the -- in -- in cross-examination, 24 previously, you've been referred to the term, "war room;" 25 do you remember that?
1131 A: Yes. 2 Q: And you kind of bristled when you 3 heard that term, "war room," right? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: You don't like it, right? 6 A: No, sir. 7 Q: It's not consistent with the notion 8 of police officers as peace keepers, is it? 9 A: It is a matter of optics, definitely. 10 Q: It is, but -- 11 A: I don't like the use of the word, 12 that's right. 13 Q: But optics, you've told us, are 14 important, right? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: Both for people outside the force and 17 people inside the force, correct? 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: And that's why you don't like terms 20 like, "war room," right? 21 A: No, I don't. 22 Q: I take it, in addition to not liking 23 terms like war room, you would not appreciate subordinate 24 officers using expressions like, "We're about to go to 25 war," in reference to this incident?
1141 You wouldn't appreciate that, either? 2 A: Police departments don't go to war, 3 no. 4 Q: Or, "We're bringing in the marines," 5 right? 6 A: There are no marines working for the 7 Ontario Provincial Police. 8 Q: And you would have some concern if 9 you heard that subordinate officers who were involved in 10 this incident are using language like that? 11 A: Yes, I would not like it. 12 Q: And what would you do about it? 13 A: If I heard it being said, I would, I 14 believe suggest that that terminology was inappropriate. 15 Q: Yeah. And as a manager, trying to 16 interpret what you're hearing, and trying to deal with -- 17 with an issue like that, in your mind, what would -- what 18 would -- what would it give rise to in terms of concern 19 about the attitude of the people that are using language 20 like that? 21 It's a horrible question, but if you 22 understand it, please answer. 23 A: I think the only thing that those 24 terms suggest is an aggressiveness that I do not believe 25 was part and parcel of any Ontario Provincial Police
1151 response. 2 Q: And you weren't aware of -- of 3 subordinate officers using terms like that, correct? 4 A: At that time, no, I was not. 5 Q: No. But if you had heard it you 6 would have counselled that right away, correct? 7 A: I believe I would have, yes. 8 Q: Out of a concern about an undue 9 aggressiveness on the part of that officer, correct? 10 A: About the use of those words, yes. 11 Q: Yeah. My last area, I bet you that's 12 a welcome phrase. My last area is about the t-shirts and 13 mugs. Okay? 14 A: Yes, sir. 15 Q: Okay. And -- and your happiness 16 about being almost finished is tempered by this very 17 unpleasant area I'm sure. When I saw your evidence, you 18 were -- what I saw from you and I heard from you was 19 disappointment, an embarrassment about this issue of the 20 t-shirts and mugs. 21 A: Yes, sir, it was. 22 Q: And it's disappointment and 23 embarrassment because you've been -- you were with the 24 OPP from the age of 19, correct? 25 A: Correct.
1161 Q: And you have a great fondness for 2 that organization, right? 3 A: I did and I do. 4 Q: Yeah. And you believe it's an 5 honourable organization, right? 6 A: I know it to be one. 7 Q: Yeah. And you believe yourself to be 8 an honourable police officer also, correct? 9 A: I hope so. 10 Q: And you believe you're part of an 11 honourable profession, correct? 12 A: Yes, sir. 13 Q: And these t-shirts and mugs, they go 14 totally against your belief in the honour of your 15 profession and the honour of this organization, correct? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: It's a very serious matter, isn't it? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Now as a manager trying to interpret, 20 let me suggest to you that these -- the mugs and t-shirts 21 and the beer can with the feather, these are sort of like 22 red flags for a manager; are they not? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: Because they are sort of a window 25 into the minds of the people within your organization;
1171 are they not? 2 A: They're a window in the minds of some 3 people in the organization. 4 Q: Okay. We'll deal with that. I'm 5 going to make some other suggestions to you about that 6 also. 7 But clearly it speaks to the mind-set of 8 the person who creates the article, correct? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: The person that -- that ordered away 11 for the mugs to be created and the t-shirts, that person, 12 it speaks to their mindset pretty clearly, right? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: We know that. But I'm going to 15 suggest to you it speaks to something a little bit 16 broader than that. Because in order for the -- it's your 17 understanding that the mugs and t-shirts that the 18 intention was that these be widely distributed among the 19 officers, correct? 20 A: I don't know what the intention was. 21 Q: If that was the intention, would you 22 agree with me that the people who are doing the 23 distributing, in their mind they believe that the other 24 officers in their company are not going to have any 25 difficulty with those mugs and t-shirts?
1181 A: I was not part of the investigation 2 so I don't know. I don't know if there was a monetary 3 fee put to these -- these items. I don't know if it was 4 -- I do not like the fact that they were produced. 5 Q: Yes. 6 A: I would even feel worse if they -- if 7 it was done in some entrepreneurial type of exercise. I 8 don't know what it was done for. 9 Q: But it's one thing for somebody to 10 create a mug in the privacy of their own home and keep it 11 there for themselves, that's one thing. It's another 12 thing to have the mugs and t-shirts intended to be 13 visible to many other police officers. 14 That's a different matter is it not? 15 A: I would suggest that it is. 16 Q: Yeah. And because what it speaks to 17 is the creator of the mug and the t-shirt believes that 18 that viewpoint represented by those mugs and t-shirts is 19 going to be accepted by their colleagues. 20 A: Yes, sir. 21 Q: And that is pretty worrying; is it 22 not? 23 A: Yes, sir. 24 Q: Because it's not just the three (3) 25 or four (4) people. It's the environment itself; is it
1191 not? 2 A: I would not like the environment to 3 have that in it so I guess I will agree with you. 4 Q: Yeah. You want an environment where 5 the first officer that comes across this mug or t-shirt, 6 one officer creates it, the first officer that comes 7 across it goes, This is not acceptable, I'm going to my 8 superior and I'm going to raise this. 9 That's what you want. That's the kind of 10 organization you want, correct? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: But that's not what happened here is 13 it? 14 A: Obviously not. 15 Q: No. It wasn't an OPP officer that 16 brought this to the attention of management, was it? 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 A: I think there were two (2) 21 situations, the mugs and the T-shirt and then the -- the 22 can. 23 Q: Yes. 24 A: I don't know if they were all one (1) 25 and the same person. I don't know.
1201 Q: All right. Well, we may hear 2 evidence about that. There -- there's an issue about 3 documents that relate to these incidents. 4 But, let's assume that no Ontario 5 Provincial Police officer that -- sorry, that the source 6 of the complaint is somebody who's outside the 7 organization, that would be worrying to you, would it 8 not? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: That if it was left to one (1) lone 11 First Nations MNR employee to raise the issue, it was 12 left to that one (1) individual, that would be worrying 13 to you about your organization? 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 A: I -- I'm having a little trouble with 18 your question. If a lot of -- if -- if people in the 19 Ontario -- I -- I answered that I believe that if one (1) 20 OPP officer, the first person, saw it, took exception to 21 it, and reported it, that would be the best possible 22 situation. 23 Q: Yeah. 24 A: And if there were others around that 25 had not, that would be worrisome; if that answers your
1211 question. 2 Q: I think it does. I think it does. 3 We'll -- we don't have all the facts yet and they -- 4 A: And, I don't -- and, I don't have all 5 the facts. 6 Q: All right. But you -- nevertheless, 7 you've agreed to me about -- you'd agree with me about, 8 that it's more than just what those three (3) or four 9 (4) people who create the products or the -- the items, 10 it's more -- the issue is more than about those people, 11 it's about the organization more broadly? 12 A: But I think your question was based 13 on an assumption. You asked me to assume -- 14 Q: Sure. 15 A: -- that something happened and I 16 don't know, is what I'm saying. 17 Q: But, if my assumption is correct, 18 those mugs and T-shirts, the issue is more than the three 19 (3) or four (4) people, it's much more broad than that. 20 You agree with that? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: And, the way an organization like the 23 OPP would address a matter like this is through 24 discipline, correct? 25 A: Yes.
1221 Q: And if my assumption is correct, that 2 discipline has to do more than just address the issue 3 between the OPP and that individual officer, correct? 4 A: I don't know that I can answer that. 5 I guess it would have -- not being -- I guess you would 6 have to consider discipline in light of how discipline is 7 handled within the Ontario Provincial Police for -- for 8 all matters and does this fit in -- 9 Q: Sure. 10 A: -- much the same as -- as any -- 11 Q: Yeah. 12 A: -- court. 13 Q: Well, as I understand it, there's 14 sort of a fork in the road in terms of discipline; 15 there's a formal public process or potentially public 16 process and there's another avenue where there's informal 17 private resolution? 18 A: Informal, yes, sir. 19 Q: Yeah. And, the informal private 20 resolution is between the individual officer who creates 21 the material and the organization, correct? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: And, that -- and you agree with me 24 that discipline, it does more than just deal with the 25 actual individual offender, it deals with -- it serves to
1231 educate more broadly within an organization, correct? 2 A: I believe it would, yes. 3 Q: And, if it's the private informal 4 discipline type, it's not capable of educating more 5 broadly in the organization, is it? 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Mr. 7 Sandler? 8 MR. MARK SANDLER: Just so we don't 9 proceed on false premise, there's nothing unfair about 10 that question, but -- 11 MR. JULIAN ROY: Thank you. 12 MR. MARK SANDLER: -- informal discipline 13 standing alone doesn't accomplish that purpose, because I 14 -- I think there'll be evidence specifically on this 15 point. 16 MR. JULIAN ROY: Well, I'm -- I'm 17 fighting with one (1) hand, maybe both hands behind my 18 back on this issue because if I don't know the facts -- 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You don't 20 know what's in the -- 21 MR. JULIAN ROY: -- so I have to -- the 22 false premises are not my fault, with respect -- 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Go ahead. 24 MR. JULIAN ROY: -- and I'm -- I'll do my 25 best.
1241 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. Sandler 2 said there's nothing wrong with the question, so -- 3 MR. JULIAN ROY: Sure. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- ask him. 5 MR. JULIAN ROY: Thank you. 6 7 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 8 Q: Would you agree with me that -- that 9 the informal private type of discipline would not address 10 the issues raised more broadly within the organization 11 about the creation of the mugs and T-shirts? 12 A: Generally, yes, I'll agree with you. 13 The issue, though, is the organization itself, knowing 14 that there was informal, knowing that there -- that the 15 person had chosen to go in an informal manner, may choose 16 then to remedy that situation, if you will, itself. I 17 don't know -- 18 Q: Yeah. 19 A: -- if the organization did or did not 20 do that. I don't know. I was -- 21 Q: Through other means like education 22 and workshops and that type of stuff, I understand that. 23 A: Memos, et cetera, yes. 24 Q: But discipline, we've talked about 25 how it -- it addresses the individual offender. It's a
1251 criminal justice system, it's specific deterrence, right? 2 We don't need to go there, but what I'm 3 saying to you is that there's nothing like discipline to 4 get the attention of not only the person, the offender, 5 but his peers, also. 6 A: Well, I'm sorry. I don't want to 7 belabour it, but I guess my point is that in -- at one 8 time, when I joined the organization, there was no such 9 thing as informal discipline. 10 The structure of formal discipline became 11 extremely unwieldy, in my opinion, and the fact is that 12 if everything became a legal process for the most 13 simplest of things, and I'm not suggesting this is simple 14 in any way, shape or form. 15 Q: Yeah. 16 A: I -- my point is, informal 17 discipline, in my opinion, was brought in and it was 18 advantageous to -- to the command of the OPP to be able 19 to attack things in a -- in a formal but an informal 20 way -- 21 Q: Yes. 22 A: -- that people were receptive to 23 without going through the position. So I'm saying if 24 you're suggesting that every form of discipline in the 25 Ontario Provincial Police should be formal, I suggest
1261 that that's not a good management approach. 2 Q: And I -- I'm entirely in agreement 3 with you that there -- it's a good thing that there's 4 these two (2) routes, but it has to be used in the right 5 scenario; does it not? 6 A: Yes, sir. 7 Q: And when you're talking about racist 8 views expressed through mugs and T-shirts, that assuming 9 has a broad circulation and -- and nobody raised an issue 10 with it in terms of officers, that that would be the type 11 of scenario where we'd want to use the public discipline. 12 A: And should be addressed by the 13 management of the Ontario Provincial Police, yes. 14 Q: So you agree with my question, in 15 addition, it should be addressed, correct? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: There's another audience. 18 MR. MARK SANDLER: I'm sorry, I said 19 support you. I think that was a little cute, because I'm 20 not sure he agreed with the first part of it, with great 21 respect. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, you 23 want to go back over it? You want to ask the question 24 and make sure that he either does or doesn't agree with 25 it?
1271 MR. JULIAN ROY: Well I'm flattered by 2 the cute remark and I'm happy to go back to it. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You'll leave 4 it at the cuteness? 5 MR. JULIAN ROY: Any compliment from Mr. 6 Sandler I'm prepared to accept. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Okay, then. 8 MR. JULIAN ROY: If it was a compliment, 9 maybe it wasn't. 10 11 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 12 Q: You'd agree with me that the mugs and 13 T-shirts -- 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: -- on the theory, on the assumption 16 that they were seen by many other officers and those 17 officers did not go up the chain of command with it when 18 they saw it, that that would be the type of case that 19 we'd want to engage in the public form of discipline, 20 because we'd want to educate, send a message to the 21 officers -- 22 A: You use -- 23 Q: -- not only the ones that are 24 creating the mugs, but the ones that see it, the silent 25 majority, that do nothing about it --
1281 A: Yeah -- 2 Q: -- those people? 3 A: Yes. You use the word "we" and I 4 guess I'm saying, specifically, the -- the management of 5 the Ontario Provincial Police -- 6 Q: Yes. 7 A: -- would want to address the issue, 8 yes. 9 Q: Through public discipline? 10 A: Through discipline that becomes 11 knowledgeable to other people that may need to be aware 12 of the gravity of the situation, yes. 13 Q: And that would include the officers, 14 right? 15 A: Yes, yes it would. 16 Q: But isn't there another audience that 17 we might want to speak to when an issue like this arises? 18 A: I think if I know -- if you're 19 speaking of First Nations, I think in this incident I 20 have read material where, basically, an apology was 21 given. 22 Q: To who? 23 A: To the George family, in this 24 particular case, if I recall what I have read. 25 Q: Okay. But about more broadly than
1291 that? The George family is not, with respect, is not the 2 First Nations community, is it? 3 A: Of course not. 4 Q: But you would agree with me that -- 5 that the audience for this discipline has to go broader 6 than the officers. It should go to the broader 7 community? 8 A: I think it has some futility, yes. 9 Q: I'm closing my questioning, Mr. 10 Commissioner. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You've 12 closed your book. 13 MR. JULIAN ROY: I have. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 15 MR. JULIAN ROY: I have. There's one -- 16 there's one issue that I'd like to address you on and 17 that's the -- the discipline records, should those ever-- 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 19 MR. JULIAN ROY: -- appear. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We 21 understand that. 22 MR. JULIAN ROY: I cannot -- in my 23 respectful submission, it's conceivable that there could 24 be matters raised in those records that may bare on 25 evidence that -- that Mr. Coles could give.
1301 Without being critical of Mr. Coles, there 2 -- there are memory issues when things happen ten (10) 3 years ago and he's been quite candid in saying where 4 that's the case and there have been records, sometimes, 5 that have assisted him in refreshing his memory. 6 There may be something that comes out of 7 these records that -- that we may want to address through 8 -- through Mr. Coles. It's unfortunate and I don't want 9 to cross a bridge that we're not there yet, but -- 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think we 11 all understand that when those records are -- if those 12 records produced, we'll deal with it then. 13 MR. JULIAN ROY: Yes. I don't want to be 14 presumptuous but that -- with that caveat those are my 15 questions, Mr. Commissioner. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 17 very much. 18 MR. JULIAN ROY: I apologize for the -- 19 for the long -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I 21 understand. Let's move on. I don't think you wasted any 22 time. Thank you very much. 23 MR. JULIAN ROY: And thank you very much, 24 Mr. Coles, I appreciate it. 25 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
1311 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Mr. 2 Sandler. Can you now make some reasonable estimate as to 3 how long you might be? 4 MR. MARK SANDLER: I was going to say 5 forty -five (45), thirty (30) to forty-five (45) minutes. 6 What -- what's your pleasure, Commissioner? 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Because we 8 break at 3:30 on Thursday, I don't want to delay the 9 lunch hour too long. I'm not trying to interfere with 10 your time estimate but just how to break it up. 11 MR. MARK SANDLER: I'm happy to break now 12 and -- and commence after the lunch. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think we 14 can split it. I think if we can go until about 12:00 and 15 then finish your examination after lunch. 16 MR. MARK SANDLER: Happy to do that. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I realize 18 that Commissioner O'Grady is here and is waiting to go on 19 so we'll just move as fast as we can. 20 MR. MARK SANDLER: All right. 21 22 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. MARK SANDLER: 23 Q: Mr. Coles, you're in the homestretch. 24 A: Thank you. 25 Q: Just dealing with the last point
1321 first and Mr. Roy raised some valid issues about the t- 2 shirts and mugs and we'll be hearing from former 3 Commissioner O'Grady who will be addressing some of those 4 issues even in the absence of the -- of the records at 5 this stage. 6 I take it you'd agree that in determining 7 what the appropriate discipline is in any matter, whether 8 this or any other, you'd expect the Commissioner of 9 professional standards to have regard to all of the 10 circumstances including the intention of the officers, 11 what other measures the Force would put into affect to 12 address these issues systemically and the like. 13 Am I right? 14 A: I agree. 15 Q: Do you feel that you're in a position 16 today to advise this Commissioner as to what the 17 appropriate discipline or other measures should have been 18 in this particular case? Or would you want to have more 19 information about that? 20 A: I want to have more information and I 21 am retired. 22 Q: Okay. I'm not suggesting you now 23 want more information about it, but simply that if you 24 were situated back then, you might want more information 25 about it, right?
1331 A: Yes, I would. 2 Q: All right well let's switch to a 3 different topic. The decision to appoint John Carson as 4 an incident commander was made by Superintendent Wall and 5 supported by you. Am I right? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: And even before the events of 8 September 4th to 6th of 1995, Inspector Carson served as 9 the incident commander for over two (2) years. 10 From May 1993 on, am I right? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: So when Mr. Roy talks about the 13 school of hard knocks, then I take it you would 14 acknowledge that -- that in the school of hard knocks 15 here was John Carson as an incident commander in a First 16 Nations occupation that involved a helicopter incident, 17 that involved the takeover of the Military Camp, that 18 involved a toll booth incident on Matheson Road well 19 before he was called upon to exercise his judgment and 20 discretion in September of 1995. Am I right? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: Now I described a few of the 23 incidents that -- that he had to deal with as the 24 incident commander from May of 1993 until September of 25 1995.
1341 And you were aware generally of those 2 incidents that I've described; am I right? 3 A: I was. 4 Q: And were you confident in his ability 5 to deal with those incidents at the time? 6 A: Yes, I was. 7 Q: And during that period before 8 September of 1995, to your knowledge, your incident 9 commander John Carson spoke with the various 10 stakeholders, the Military, the occupiers, the Kettle and 11 Stony Point Band, non Native citizens and their 12 representatives and so on; am I right? 13 A: That's correct. 14 Q: And were you confident of his ability 15 to relate to those people? 16 A: Yes, I was. 17 Q: Now prior to September 4th of 1995 18 and let's confine ourselves right now to that period. 19 Did you ever have cause to regret the 20 decision made to appoint him as incident commander? 21 A: No. 22 Q: Now I'd like to talk to you a little 23 bit about the qualities that you'd like to see in an 24 incident commander respecting First Nations issues. All 25 right? I'm going to list a few. You tell me if I'm
1351 right or wrong -- 2 A: Okay. 3 Q: -- and then I'm going to ask you to 4 comment upon a few of them. First of all you'd like to 5 see someone trained as an incident commander, am I right? 6 A: Correct. Right. 7 Q: John Carson we know was trained as an 8 incident commander and had experience as an incident 9 commander, am I right? 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: And this was all before May of 1993, 12 right? 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: And -- and Mr. Roy's point is well 15 taken that John Carson didn't specifically act as an 16 incident commander on a First Nations occupation prior to 17 May of 1993. 18 But were you aware that he had served as 19 an incident commander in First Nations issues? 20 Do you recall that now? 21 A: I don't specifically recall the 22 issues. 23 Q: All right. But that would be 24 something that would be of value to an incident commander 25 who's been asked to serve in the context of a First
1361 Nation's occupation? 2 A: That's correct. 3 Q: Secondly, you'd be looking for 4 experience as an incident commander, so not merely 5 training, but somebody who's been on the ground and done 6 it, right? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: And we know that he had been on the 9 ground and had done it, right? 10 A: Yes, sir. 11 Q: The third thing you'd be looking for, 12 I'm going to suggest, is an understanding of the concept 13 which you've described as a peacekeeper's role of a 14 police officer, in other words, an understanding that 15 you're there as a peacekeeper in these situations; am I 16 right? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: And, part and parcel of that is an 19 understanding of the importance of restraint in the use 20 of force, isn't it? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: I mean, if there's anything that's 23 clear from your testimony I'm going to suggest to you, is 24 that you understand and are sensitive to the use of 25 restraint in dealing with these kinds of issues, right?
1371 A: Hopefully, that's the case. 2 Q: What about John Carson? 3 A: I believe he has that, too. 4 Q: Any doubt about that? 5 A: No. 6 Q: Now, another thing that you might be 7 looking for is an understanding of the approach to be 8 taken to First Nations occupations generally, and I would 9 call that as the, "injunction first approach" on the part 10 of the OPP, right? 11 A: Right. 12 Q: Did he understand that? 13 A: Yes, he did. 14 Q: Any doubt about that? 15 A: No. 16 Q: You might also be looking for -- I 17 suggest you would be looking for a sensitivity to First 18 Nations issues and respect for the First Nations 19 community? 20 A: Definitely. 21 Q: Now, Commissioner Linden's been able 22 to evaluate Deputy Commissioner Carson without your 23 assistance, but I'll ask you this, what can you tell us 24 about John Carson's respect for and sensitivity to the 25 First Nations community?
1381 A: It is very high. 2 Q: Now, you might also be looking for 3 leadership skills, would you not? 4 A: Yes, sir. 5 Q: And from what you've said I would 6 take it that you'd prefer somebody who shares your 7 participatory style of leadership, am I right? 8 A: Yes, I would prefer that type of 9 person. 10 Q: Okay. What about John Carson? Where 11 does he fit in the -- in the continuum, so to speak, in 12 terms of leadership skills? 13 A: Probably better than me and -- and I 14 think he is possessed of great leadership skills. 15 Q: All right. Now, I want to stop 16 there to ask you about something that was raised by Mr. 17 Roy and -- and he raised some very interesting questions 18 with you about telling the subordinates under John Carson 19 about the Premier's interest in the events, do you 20 remember that line of questioning? 21 A: Yes. Yes, I do. 22 Q: And he suggested that one (1) of the 23 roles that John Carson would perform is -- is try, if one 24 could, to -- to screen this type of interest from -- from 25 his subordinates so they wouldn't be distracted by it and
1391 do you remember that dialogue with Mr. Roy? 2 A: I do. 3 Q: And, you said, you know, you can't 4 always keep from the people under your command that kind 5 of interest and you said that in the very least, we knew 6 that there were citizens and politicians, maybe not the 7 Premier, who were known out there to be very interested 8 in the situation, right? 9 A: Right. 10 Q: And I'm going to suggest to you that 11 as part of a participatory management process, one (1) of 12 the things that you might do is say, you know, the 13 Premier or some politician has expressed interest or 14 concern or -- or is more adamant and so on, but we're 15 staying the course guys. 16 This is our policy, this is what we do and 17 this is where we're going; that would be a participatory 18 leadership style that you'd approve of, wouldn't you? 19 A: Yes, I would. 20 Q: Okay. Now, you might also be looking 21 -- I would suggest you'd have to be looking for common 22 sense judgment, right? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: Where does he stack up on common 25 sense?
1401 A: Very high. 2 Q: Good judgment? 3 A: Yes, he does. 4 Q: Now, I'll ask you this because Mr. 5 Roy says sometimes difficult to criticize your -- your 6 subordinates and -- and part of your rationale as I heard 7 it is that the buck stops with you, so you're sometimes 8 reluctant, perhaps, to unduly criticize someone 9 particularly where the decision ultimately rests with 10 you. Remember you had that discussion -- 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: -- with Mr. Roy? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: Well, let me ask you this, if -- if 15 John Carson had bad judgment or indifferent judgment or 16 judgment that was of concern to you, leave aside how 17 you'd respond to Mr. Roy today, ten (10) years later, 18 would you have kept him on an incident command for almost 19 two (2) years and four (4) months? 20 A: No, I wouldn't have kept him on if I 21 thought he didn't have those qualities. 22 Q: Well, let me ask you something else. 23 Even after the shooting took place, and again, at this 24 Inquiry we're engaged in a very important function which 25 is to evaluate how things might have been done
1411 differently, and -- and John Carson participated in that 2 very Inquiry here, but he was picked as the incident 3 commander after the shooting in relation to the potential 4 takeover of the Pinery, wasn't he? 5 A: Yes, he was. 6 Q: And did you participate in that 7 decision? 8 A: I was involved in that decision. 9 Q: And did you have any difficulty with 10 that? 11 A: No, I did not. 12 Q: And why did you pick him? 13 A: I picked him for two (2) reasons, 14 because my review of the situation of the shooting led me 15 to believe that he had conducted himself in -- in an 16 admirable way and -- and did his very best. 17 When the Pinery situation came up, I had a 18 person that I believed needed the -- the fact that I 19 supported him, that I -- and I did. I questioned myself 20 if it was a good decision, because if things had gone 21 operationally bad in -- in the Pinery that I would have 22 placed him in a position that could have hurt him more, 23 given what had happened at the -- at -- at the Provincial 24 Park. 25 But I had faith in the man that he was the
1421 man for the job and I thought it was good for the man, 2 even thought I might not -- in my way, maybe it was not 3 the best decision that I could have made in light of his 4 future. 5 But, I supported it at that time and I 6 think it goes to show my faith in John. 7 Q: Okay. Now, and that doesn't mean 8 that the operation was perfect, and can't benefit from 9 the kind of microscopic examination that -- that we see 10 here, right? 11 A: They never -- they never are perfect. 12 Q: Okay. Now something else you might 13 look for in an incident commander would be knowledge of 14 local issues, and the players involved. Am I right? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: Now, your incident commanders may not 17 have that. You don't have the luxury of that in all 18 cases, being able to come into, say, a hostage situation 19 or an occupation and -- and know the players that are 20 involved, right? 21 A: That's correct. 22 Q: But he did, didn't he? 23 A: He did. 24 Q: Did you regard that as an asset or a 25 liability?
1431 A: It was an asset - one of the reasons 2 we did choose him. 3 Q: Okay. Now, the last quality that I'm 4 going to put to you is perhaps the most important one 5 that I want to talk about and that is that much has been 6 said here about the pressures associated with incident 7 command. 8 And we know the pressures are significant. 9 You need an individual as incident commander who can 10 handle pressure in an appropriate way, am I right? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: So we can talk -- we can talk at an 13 academic level or an esoteric level about -- about the 14 optics of what the Premier has to say, or the optics of 15 what Mr. Beaubien had to say and -- and might have been 16 communicated, but you need somebody in place who has the 17 independence to be able to say, this is the course. 18 I stay the course, it's the right thing to 19 do, I take my direction from tony Parkin and Chief 20 Coles. I don't take my direction from the Premier or 21 anybody on the exterior -- external, am I right? 22 A: I'd like the individual to have those 23 qualities. I would also like him to have the qualities, 24 if he thinks I'm wrong to tell me I'm wrong. 25 Q: Okay. Now, let's talk about John
1441 Carson in this connection. How does he measure up on 2 that score? 3 A: High on both counts. He has told me 4 I've been wrong on different occasions. 5 Q: I mean, did you ever get an inkling 6 during the -- your participation in the events concerning 7 Ipperwash that -- that John Carson was succumbing to 8 external pressure in the decision making process -- 9 A: No, sir. 10 Q: -- even an inkling of that? 11 A: No, sir. 12 Q: How about now? I mean, you've read 13 all of the material, or much of the material, and 14 certainly John Carson's evidence. 15 I mean, is that a concern for you now? 16 A: No, it's not a concern. 17 Q: Now, after September the 6th, and I'm 18 sorry, and I should ask you something else, because -- 19 because we also kind of talk about the pressures that 20 occurred internally when -- when a superior may have 21 something to say. 22 And do you remember Mr. Roy showed you 23 Tony Parkin's conversation with -- with John Carson, and 24 in the conversation, Tony Parkin, in effect, says to him, 25 well, the Chief's probably going to ask so I'm going to
1451 ask you how did we -- how did we lose containment, you 2 know, what happened? 3 I mean, to put too fine a point on it, but 4 I mean, are you really concerned that -- that your 5 superintendent would ask the incident commander what 6 happened? 7 A: Not at all. 8 Q: I mean -- and the fact that he 9 dressed it up as and probably Chief Coles is going to 10 want to know what happened. I mean did you see John 11 Carson as so brittle or sensitive that he'd take that and 12 say, I'm being criticized here, I have to act 13 differently? 14 A: No, sir. 15 Q: Maybe you were concerned about 16 subliminally that would affect him in some way? I mean, 17 does that -- does that cause you any concern when you 18 look at that transcript? 19 A: It did not. 20 Q: Does it now? 21 A: No, it doesn't. 22 Q: Now after September the 6th, you came 23 to learn quite a bit about why John Carson made the 24 decision to send the CMU down the road on that day -- 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think this
1461 might be a good point to break here. You're moving into 2 another area. 3 MR. MARK SANDLER: Yes. That's fine. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY: It's exactly twelve 5 o'clock. Why don't we take a lunch break now and come 6 back and finish your examination? 7 MR. MARK SANDLER: Thank you. 8 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry stands 9 adjourned until 1:15 P.M. 10 11 --- Upon recessing at 12:00 p.m. 12 --- Upon resuming at 1:15 p.m. 13 14 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 15 resumed. Please be seated. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 17 afternoon. 18 MR. MARK SANDLER: Good afternoon. 19 20 CONTINUED BY MR. MARK SANDLER: 21 Q: Mr. Coles, earlier on in your 22 testimony you said that you agreed with John Carson's 23 decision to send the CMU and TRU down the road. I want 24 to examine that decision a little bit differently than 25 some others.
1471 I don't want to examine it from the 2 perspective of everything that we now know or based upon 3 the information that could never have been known by an 4 incident commander even -- even in a perfect situation. 5 All right? 6 A: Right. 7 Q: So, I want to try to put you back in 8 the position of an incident commander. All right? 9 A: Okay. 10 Q: And I want you to assume for the 11 purposes of my question that you were advised as an 12 incident commander correctly that a number of the 13 occupiers were again in the sandy parking lot on the edge 14 of the roadway and that some of them were brandishing 15 baseball bats, axe handles, or other items that could be 16 characterized as weapons. 17 And I want you to assume that that 18 information came directly from an officer's observations 19 and that the individuals were speaking and acting in an 20 aggressive manner, all right? 21 A: Yes, sir. 22 Q: I want you to assume that you were 23 advised correctly that a Kettle and Stony Point 24 councillor had driven to the intersection near the 25 parking lot where one of the occupiers in the group
1481 punched him in the face and damaged his car with a rock. 2 And that there was a pre-existing 3 animosity between that councillor and the occupiers. So, 4 stopping there for a moment, I want you to assume the 5 correct facts in relation to the vehicle incident so that 6 we're not distracted by -- by the issue of how that 7 information about the car changed when its made its way 8 to the incident commander, okay? 9 A: Okay. 10 Q: I want you to assume that you were 11 advised correctly that there had been much talk about 12 moving or taking -- moving into or taking the adjacent 13 cottages and the entitlement to that and other land, 14 although in fairness I want you to assume that there had 15 been no specific indication that it would necessarily 16 happen that night. Okay? 17 A: All right. 18 Q: I want you to assume that you were 19 advised correctly that non Native citizens had been 20 constrained from taking matters into their own hands and 21 from marching down either to or into the Park. All 22 right? 23 A: All right. 24 Q: I want you to assume that you were 25 advised correctly that a fire was burning, if not in the
1491 sandy parking lot itself then in close proximity to it. 2 And that also assume that you knew that MNR picnic tables 3 had been brought into the parking lot and set on fire in 4 recent days. Okay? 5 A: Okay. 6 Q: I want you to assume that you were 7 advised correctly that there had been some women and 8 children who had left the Park that evening and that the 9 bus which had been involved in a somewhat violent 10 takeover of the built-up area of the Army Camp was 11 possibly moving towards the sandy parking lot and 12 certainly was in close proximity. Okay? 13 A: Okay. 14 Q: And I want you to assume that you 15 were aware that officers that morning had attended the 16 parking lot, removed the picnic tables without incident 17 and that several occupiers had returned to the Park. All 18 right? 19 A: Okay. 20 Q: And finally I want you to assume that 21 you knew correctly that gunfire had been heard within the 22 area controlled by the occupiers, whether or not it was 23 automatic gunfire, and that there was a possible sight- 24 line from the kiosk to the sandy parking lot. All right? 25 A: All right.
1501 Q: And I want you to assume in that 2 regard that you had information that there was an 3 individual in the kiosk and that the blinds had been 4 pulled down within the kiosk. Okay? 5 A: Okay. 6 Q: Now, as I said, forget the retroscope 7 for a moment and let's just look at -- at you in the 8 position of incident commander, knowing that information 9 and, of course, the background information to -- to the 10 incident. 11 First of all, you make a decision as the 12 incident... 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 Q: No, I didn't and -- and to be clear, 17 I'm not suggesting that Gerald George told the police 18 that he was punched in the face, I'm assuming that, as 19 the incident commander, you've gotten the accurate facts, 20 but, you know what, in fairness, Mr. Worme makes a good 21 point. Take that out of the equation. 22 A: Okay. 23 Q: Let's -- let's say you don't know 24 that he was punched in the face, you were accurately told 25 what the police received from Gerald George and, namely,
1511 that there was a pre-existing relationship and that a -- 2 a rock had been used by one (1) of those people in the 3 sandy parking lot and one (1) person only to damage the 4 vehicle, all right? 5 A: All right. 6 Q: Okay. Now, thank you. So let's look 7 at the first decision that you make as an incident 8 commander. 9 Let's assume you say, I want to send a 10 team to see whether there's a sight line from the kiosk 11 to the location of the sandy parking lot where I'm 12 contemplating sending my officers to, all right? 13 A: All right. 14 Q: Valid decision? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: Now, there's been some criticism 17 directed to that decision and, part of the criticism is, 18 well, you don't know that there's a sniper in that kiosk. 19 You're acting on raw data. 20 Perhaps the person was closing the blinds 21 and going to sleep in the kiosk and was not a sniper, all 22 right? 23 A: All right. 24 Q: Now, would that affect your decision 25 to send a -- observers down to ascertain whether there's
1521 a sight line from the kiosk to the parking lot? 2 A: No, I would send a team down. 3 Q: I mean, the fact that it's 4 unsubstantiated that there's a sniper in the kiosk does 5 not enable you to ignore that risk and to take reasonable 6 measures to accommodate him, right? 7 A: It might be a potential threat to my 8 officers, yes. 9 Q: Okay. I mean, so these general 10 statements and, again, we tend to talk about things at a 11 very general level at times, but these general statements 12 that you can never make tactical decisions based upon raw 13 data or unproven information, that's just not a valid 14 observation, is it? 15 A: It's not. 16 Q: Now, the way you deal -- just 17 stopping there -- with raw data, I'm going to suggest to 18 you is, first of all, you don't treat it as substantiated 19 when it hasn't been substantiated, you recognize its 20 quality, right? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: The second thing you do is, I'm going 23 to suggest to you, is you have a healthy scepticism about 24 unsubstantiated information, right? 25 A: Yes.
1531 Q: And we actually see John Carson in 2 his testimony here and -- and in his actions during the 3 events has a healthy scepticism about some of the 4 intelligence that's coming in about weapons that have 5 made their way into the Park, right? 6 A: Right. 7 Q: Okay. The third thing is that you 8 don't make a radical move to address an unsubstantiated 9 matter. 10 In other words, if you've got information 11 that -- that a rocket launcher is about to come into the 12 Park, to take an extreme example, you don't send the men 13 in to -- to deal with the occupiers who have a rocket 14 launcher in the Park based upon that completely 15 unsubstantiated information, right? 16 A: That's right. 17 Q: And the fourth thing that I'm going 18 to suggest to you when you're dealing with raw data is, 19 you don't ignore it. 20 A: That's correct, you don't. You do 21 not ignore it. 22 Q: In other words, sometimes you have to 23 take action, measured action, to address the risk that 24 that raw data represents, fair enough? 25 A: Fair enough.
1541 Q: So dealing with another example that 2 we've seen, the debate over automatic gunfire and, again, 3 you've said that it wasn't terrible material in your mind 4 whether it was automatic gunfire as opposed to semi- 5 automatic gunfire, the relevance of the distinction had 6 more to do with how it ratchets up tensions on the part 7 of other people and that creates problems for an incident 8 commander, am I right? 9 A: That's correct. 10 Q: But by the same token, that data 11 coming in has to be considered and certainly should not 12 be ignored by the incident commander because it 13 represents potential risk? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: Now, let's go to the next decision 16 that you make as an incident commander. You know -- 17 you've been told and, correctly, that very recently there 18 are these individuals in the parking lot, brandishing the 19 weapons that I've described. 20 Not firearms, but the weapons that I've 21 described. You know the cottages are nearby and all of 22 the other information that I gave. 23 Was it a valid -- would it be a valid 24 decision on your part as an incident commander to say, 25 first of all, I want the CMU with TRU support to go down
1551 that road to determine whether those people are still in 2 that parking lot with those weapons? 3 A: I think it's valid. 4 Q: Pardon me? 5 A: I think it is valid. 6 Q: Now, when Mr. Roy was asking you 7 questions in a very skilful way, you said to him that 8 your understanding was that one of the rationale -- 9 rationale, yeah, for John Carson sending the officers 10 down was to gather information that he didn't know about, 11 right? 12 A: Right. 13 Q: And -- and that's what we're talking 14 about here? I mean, we're not talking about in the 15 abstract, we're talking about it in the context of an 16 incident commander who's been told that there are people, 17 with weapons, outside of the Park proper, in close 18 proximity to the cottages with all the other activity 19 we've described, and that has to be dealt with, right? 20 A: It did. 21 Q: Now, Mr. Roy said to you, Well, let's 22 talk about information gathering. I mean, the CMU with 23 their shields and riot gear and so on, I mean, these are 24 the last people that would be performing a function of 25 information gathering.
1561 And, of course, in the abstract, that's 2 exactly right. I mean, looking at that in isolation, you 3 don't send a CMU down for the sole purpose of 4 information, do you? 5 A: Correct. 6 Q: But let's look at it in the context 7 of what happens here. The CMU comes down the road, 8 together with the TRU support, and John Carson has in 9 mind that they're going to determine whether or not there 10 continues to be a threat in the area of the parking lot 11 with people brandishing weapons in close proximity to the 12 cottages, and the CMU arrives and there's nobody there, 13 all right? 14 A: Right. 15 Q: John Carson would say under those 16 circumstances, if so advised, the troops withdraw. 17 Correct or incorrect decision? 18 A: Correct. Correct decision. 19 Q: But let's assume that there are still 20 occupiers who are potentially at risk to the adjacent 21 cottages who are out in the sandy parking lot. 22 You decide, as the incident commander, to 23 give instructions to your CMU commander, and here are the 24 instructions. 25 You say go down the road, under no
1571 circumstances whatsoever go into the Park itself, and if 2 the occupiers are still in the parking lot, given all the 3 history that we've described, cause them to go back into 4 the Park and, if they go back into the Park without 5 incident, even though they may be committing a criminal 6 offence by possessing the weapons, let them go back into 7 the Park. 8 That's your instruction. As an incident 9 commander, is there any problem with the validity of that 10 decision? 11 A: No, sir. 12 Q: Then or now? 13 A: No, sir. 14 Q: Now, let's say at once, because the - 15 - because this is an Inquiry that looks at systemic 16 issues, everyone would have to agree that it's important 17 that the occupiers know that the officers are not coming 18 down the road to go into the Park as opposed to perform 19 the action the I've just described, am I right? 20 A: Right. 21 Q: And John Carson explained to 22 Commissioner Linden why he thought, rightly or wrongly, 23 that it would have been clear to the occupiers from the 24 history of what had happened in the previous days, on the 25 part of the police, and from what the CMU actually did
1581 once they came to the fence line of the Park, what the 2 OPP intentions were. 3 But let's assume he was wrong about that, 4 okay? 5 A: Okay. 6 Q: And there's been some evidence about 7 that. 8 A: Yeah. 9 Q: One of the things that we've heard is 10 that later in the piece there was a bull horn on scene; 11 Officer Gordon is talking about that. 12 And you were asked about the bull horn and 13 you said, you know, incident commanders have to make the 14 decisions they can make at the time and what I took from 15 that is that, you know, we can think of things to improve 16 our responses after the fact sometimes but you weren't 17 disagreeing with the proposition that perhaps a bullhorn 18 might have been used to communicate the message, these 19 are the limits of our objectives, correct? 20 A: I agree it could have been used, yes. 21 Q: It could have been used. We don't 22 know whether it would have had the desired affect or not 23 but you agree it could have been done, right? 24 A: Yes. Yes, sir. 25 Q: And a lot has been said here about
1591 whether every possible step was taken by John Carson or 2 those under his command to establish communications or 3 negotiations with the occupiers. 4 And there's been some very helpful 5 suggestions here as to how communications might be jump 6 started when -- when they're difficult. All right? 7 A: Right. 8 Q: We've also heard some evidence that 9 the occupiers, certainly a number of the occupiers, had 10 no interest in speaking to the police for a variety of 11 reasons. All right? 12 A: Yes, sir. 13 Q: And we've also heard some evidence 14 that although there was a kind of a promising discussion 15 that one might characterize with Bert Manning. The 16 following day there was no interest, no one to speak to 17 when the police, again, attended at the Park. All right? 18 A: All right. 19 Q: And we've also heard some evidence 20 that, prior to these events, there had been some 21 unsuccessful effort to bring Ovide Mercredi into the 22 process. And I want to talk to you about that in a 23 different context in a moment. All right? 24 A: Right. 25 Q: And we've also heard from John Carson
1601 a certain sense of frustration that -- understanding and 2 frustration that certain members of the First Nations 3 community were not actively coming forward to engage in 4 the process. All right? 5 A: All right. 6 Q: And we've also heard that there were 7 some -- there were some efforts made to engage some 8 members of the First Nation community that were still 9 outstanding when these events occurred. Okay? 10 A: Okay. 11 Q: Now you were aware of -- of some or 12 all of that when you attended at the command centre on 13 September the 6th because you were briefed on the history 14 of the events up to date. Right? 15 A: Right. 16 Q: So one of the things that you would 17 have learned and you've already described this, is that 18 the police were making efforts to communicate with the 19 occupiers but had been unsuccessful. Right? 20 A: That's correct. 21 Q: And of course at the time you come, 22 you've said there wasn't a sense of urgency. And one 23 aspect of that, of course, is that -- is that nobody 24 knows when you're sitting in a room with John Carson and 25 Tony Parkin that -- that the communications have to be
1611 established within the next hour or so because 2 circumstances are going to change and -- and events are 3 going to escalate just within the next few hours. Right? 4 A: Right. 5 Q: I mean, we don't have a -- we don't 6 have a crystall ball do we? 7 A: No, sir. 8 Q: So what I want to ask you is this. 9 Based upon what John Carson told you at the time and I 10 understand the limits of your recollection, but were you 11 satisfied at least that good faith efforts were being 12 made by the police to communicate with the occupiers and 13 they'd been unsuccessful. 14 A: I was satisfied with that. 15 Q: Now one of the things that John 16 Carson has said here and -- and reasonable people can 17 debate the effect of an injunction and what it means. 18 But one of the things that he said was, 19 that what he was hopeful for, is that the injunction 20 itself might jump start the communication between police 21 and occupiers in the sense that when police come to the 22 occupiers with a piece of paper and say, Well this is 23 what the court has said, then it might cause them to 24 engage in the process. 25 One has to discuss what one's going to do
1621 with the piece of paper. How it's going to be 2 implemented, what further court action's going to be 3 taken and the like. 4 Do you agree with them or disagree with 5 them about that? 6 A: I agree with them. 7 Q: All right. So -- so looking forward 8 to the injunction and was that something that -- that you 9 contemplated on September the 6th, that the injunction 10 might jump start that kind of a communication? Or do you 11 recall? 12 A: I really don't recall that we had 13 that discussion. 14 Q: But putting yourself in the shoes of 15 an incident commander, is -- is that a valid perspective 16 to have on the process? 17 A: Yes, it is. 18 Q: Okay. Now going back to the decision 19 to send the CMU and TRU down the road, it was suggested 20 to John Carson, Well, you know, why don't you send ten 21 (10) officers down the road or an arrest team down the 22 road to deal with the people on the corner of the parking 23 lot? Would that have been a valid decision for him to 24 make? 25 A: I don't think so.
1631 Q: Why not? 2 A: Given the numbers that had been 3 encountered when the initial confrontation took place and 4 given the incidents that occurred the night before with 5 fire, I think ten (10) was not adequate. 6 Q: So, again, everything looks better 7 than the CMU when we know that the shooting has taken 8 place. I mean, that -- there's no doubt about that, that 9 is the disadvantage of a retroscope to some extent. 10 But it was a valid decision, I'm going to 11 suggest to you to say, I'm not simply sending ten (10) 12 officers down that road given how the Park was taken at 13 the first instance and given the altercations that had 14 taken place on the previous day, right? 15 A: That's right. 16 Q: And, indeed, sending ten (10) people 17 down might have heightened the risk. It's not how it 18 turned out, but it might have heightened the risk at that 19 time of actual violence being used as -- as opposed to 20 diminishing the risk, right? 21 A: Right. 22 Q: Now, let's talk about another 23 alternative that was put to John Carson. 24 It was suggested to John Carson, Well, why 25 didn't you just withdraw the officers, in other words,
1641 kind of move back the perimeter to a -- to a broader 2 area; create a -- a broader buffer, even though that term 3 was only used with you, but I think it's fair to say this 4 was a suggestion -- a broader buffer between the 5 occupiers and the police? 6 Now, the reason I ask you about that is 7 because I suspect that down the road when submissions are 8 made to Commissioner Linden, somebody's going to say, You 9 know, that wise old -- wise Chris Coles -- I almost said 10 wise old Chris Coles -- that wise Chris Coles, he spoke 11 with Ovide Mercredi and he agreed to withdraw the police 12 some distance. And if it worked for Chris Coles, why 13 couldn't it work for John Carson? 14 Is -- is that a valid criticism to be 15 directed to John Carson? 16 A: I don't think it is because I think 17 that what I gave the example of, they were different 18 circumstances. 19 Q: What were the different 20 circumstances? 21 A: That we'd had the shooting, that we 22 didn't know what was in the mind of -- of occupiers, that 23 there was a hundred and fifty (150) people, I suggest, or 24 a large number of people that was moving down the road at 25 that time when I was asked to move the people back.
1651 Q: It's -- it's a sad commentary, but 2 nonetheless true, I'm going to suggest, that -- that the 3 shooting changed the dynamic in some respects for the 4 worse of course, but in some respects for the better in 5 the sense that people were now highly motivated to be 6 talking to each other, weren't they? 7 A: Yes, they were. 8 Q: And, you saw that, didn't you? 9 A: Yes, I did. It's a sad commentary. 10 Q: Did it -- did it surprise you based 11 upon your experience as a police officer that sometimes 12 it takes a tragic event and -- and this is what we have 13 to avoid because it shouldn't take a tragic event, but 14 sometimes it takes a tragic event to change that dynamic 15 and cause people to be talking? 16 A: Yes. Sometimes, regrettably, it 17 does. 18 Q: Now, you were cross-examined about -- 19 about Commissioner O'Grady's policy, and former 20 Commissioner O'Grady's here now, so -- so he can hear 21 what you say about it, but -- but one (1) of the things 22 that was suggested to you, there was a little bit of a 23 legalistic parsing of the words of the policy, all right, 24 and, you were actually shown a note for -- for a -- for a 25 group as opposed to the policy itself, but -- but that's
1661 okay. 2 When you were shown the -- the note, it 3 talked about -- and I won't take you to it -- but it 4 talked about using force in these situations where 5 there's probable serious injury or death. 6 And, the word, "probable" was seized upon 7 and -- because you had talked about the possibility of 8 serious injury or death in these circumstances. Okay? 9 So, I want to ask you, did you regard the 10 decision made by John Carson as a deviation from the 11 policy as you understood it? 12 A: No, I didn't. 13 Q: Did you ever call up Commissioner 14 O'Grady or Deputy Commissioner Boose and say that our 15 incident commander deviated from the policy? 16 A: No, I didn't. 17 Q: Did you believe that? 18 A: No, I did not believe he did. 19 Q: I mean, just talking pragmatics for a 20 moment, first of all, it's a policy, isn't it, as opposed 21 to something that purports to define the precise 22 circumstances in each and every case where force can be 23 used, right? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: The second thing I'm going to suggest
1671 to you is that -- is that there is always the residual 2 discretion on the part of the incident commander to deal 3 with the circumstances as they arise on the ground, is 4 there not? 5 A: There is. 6 Q: And -- and we'll hear from 7 Commissioner O'Grady as to that, and -- and what exists 8 in writing that speaks to that issue. 9 What I'm going to suggest to you is that, 10 could any incident commander simply leave individuals 11 brandishing weapons outside of the Park proper, in close 12 proximity to the cottages and other homes and not address 13 their presence or their possible intentions? 14 Would that have been responsible to do? 15 A: I don't think it would have been. 16 Q: Now, I want to talk a little bit 17 about -- with you about intelligence, because there's a 18 lot been said, again, sometimes in the abstract, about 19 intelligence and the collection of intelligence and 20 intelligence analysts and so on. 21 And I want to talk to you about it in a 22 concrete way and ask you for your opinions as -- as 23 opposed to in the abstract. 24 So, let's take some information that came 25 to the incident command, that -- that there were certain
1681 kinds of firearms that were being imported into the Camp. 2 And that was some information that this incident 3 commander did receive, before the shooting. 4 A: Okay. 5 Q: And a little bit -- I'm going to 6 rehash what we talked about before in the context of the 7 kiosk. It was suggested to you that it would be improper 8 to act upon that raw data; agree or disagree? 9 A: That's what was suggested. 10 Q: All right. Do you agree with the 11 proposition that it's improper to act upon that data? 12 A: Do I agree with that? No, I don't. 13 Q: The point earlier made was you don't 14 treat it as substantiated, you don't ignore it 15 altogether, and you recognize with some skepticism what 16 you have and what you don't have, right? 17 A: Correct, yes. 18 Q: Okay. Now, so had John Carson taken 19 unsubstantiated intelligence that certain weaponry was in 20 the Park, and said, Well, we now have to go into the 21 Park, would you have agreed with that decision? 22 A: No, I wouldn't. 23 Q: Now, intelligence was also raised in 24 the context of this car incident with Gerald George. 25 And, interestingly, there's been a lot of discussion
1691 about, you know, intelligence officers, analysts and so 2 on, in the context of incorrect information about the 3 car, okay? 4 A: Okay. 5 Q: Does that have anything to do with, 6 kind of, discrete intelligence officers or -- or having 7 analysts in place to -- to deal with what a victim says 8 when he comes forward and says his car is damaged? 9 A: I think it's got more just to do with 10 reporting. 11 Q: I mean, what should happen is that 12 any officer who takes a report from that individual, gets 13 the information correct and it's communicated correctly 14 to the incident commander, right? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: And that, obviously, was a failing 17 that has been identified here -- 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: -- right? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: And we'll later debate how material 22 that the difference was between what was accurate and 23 what was inaccurate. 24 I'm not interested in that now because 25 everybody agrees it's better to operate on accurate
1701 information as opposed to inaccurate information. 2 But that really has little do with how 3 many intelligence officers you assign or what role you 4 give intelligence officers or whether you have an analyst 5 in place, does it? 6 A: No, it does not. 7 Q: Let's talk about an analyst, because 8 it's been suggested that perhaps one of the failings of - 9 - of this incident is that there was no analyst in place 10 to -- to evaluate the raw data that was coming in. 11 Do you think it was a failing of this 12 incident not to have kind of a formal, designated analyst 13 to -- to evaluate the raw data? 14 A: No, I think it -- incident command 15 doesn't allow really for that; things happen too fast. 16 Q: I mean, what does an analyst -- 17 perhaps you can advise the Commissioner, I'm talking 18 about this Commissioner now, not that Commissioner. 19 A: He's not the Commissioner any more, 20 sir. 21 Q: That's right. perhaps you could 22 advise Commissioner Linden of -- based upon your prior 23 experience as an analyst, as to what an analyst 24 conventionally does. 25 A: An analyst basically takes the
1711 information and -- and sees if, within the files, that 2 that analyst is dealing with, that there's any other 3 information that might help substantiate. 4 But the analyst can only go on the 5 information that he's given. 6 Q: So -- so, we see this typically in a 7 situation, for example, where investigators are having 8 some difficultly with identifying the perpetrator of a 9 homicide and they take their file and they give it to an 10 analyst. 11 And an analyst can bring a new perspective 12 on it and analyse -- and analyse the material in a 13 different coherent way and perhaps glean from it 14 something that's of assistance to advancing the 15 investigation. Do I have that right? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: Okay. 18 A: An objective look if you will from 19 outside. 20 Q: I mean here the intelligence that was 21 coming in, I'm going to suggest to you was largely 22 sources whether inside or -- or outside the occupied 23 area; am I right? 24 A: That's correct. That's what I 25 believe them to be.
1721 Q: And would an analyst really be the 2 most appropriate mechanism to evaluating just how 3 reliable that information is? 4 A: No. 5 Q: Now your evidence has been used to 6 challenge John Carson's testimony in another way. John 7 Carson testified here that, in his mind, the progression 8 of events and as of the time that you were meeting with 9 him. 10 So -- so I want you to assume that -- that 11 this is his mind set as of the time he and you were 12 speaking to Ron Fox. Okay? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And he said that the progression of 15 events justified the application for a speedier emergent 16 injunction. Although that decision wasn't ultimately his 17 to make. 18 And as you may recall because you have 19 reviewed what John Carson had to say, he relied upon the 20 altercation with the police when the Park was first taken 21 over. The violent confrontation that had occurred on the 22 road. The damage to the police vehicles and the 23 dangerous status quo that that created. 24 The significant damage that was occurring 25 to property within the Park. The imperfect containment
1731 that existed within the Park that would enable others to 2 come into the Park and -- and add to the number of 3 occupiers. 4 Concerns about maintaining long term 5 security as between the non Natives and the Natives who 6 were occupying the Park and as between the Kettle and 7 Stoney Point community and the occupiers. 8 And as I -- as we've talked about earlier 9 that an injunction might stimulate communication which 10 could only be a good thing. And finally he talked about 11 gunfire that had occurred though he didn't want to place 12 too much weight on that, given the limitations of what we 13 knew. 14 Now, what was put to John Carson and what 15 I want to put to you, is your testimony at the 16 examination for discovery, which is identical to your 17 testimony before Commissioner Linden, and it was 18 suggested to him by Mr. Klippenstein, that's a fair 19 comment, that you said the situation wasn't urgent when 20 you were there. 21 So Mr. Klippenstein, in affect, and I'm 22 engaging in a little bit of license myself, in affect was 23 suggesting to John Carson, if Chris Coles is right that 24 the situation wasn't urgent when he was there, could you 25 really support an urgent ex parte injunction?
1741 Is -- is that a valid criticism of what 2 John Carson's perspective is on the injunction? 3 A: I don't think so. Because John is 4 trying to work a solution out to this problem and that is 5 part of the solution that he's looking for. 6 Q: And what I'm going to suggest you is 7 that -- that the status quo was calm, when you were 8 there. 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: But that doesn't mean that it wasn't 11 desirable to get a hasty court action, and hasty may have 12 a pejorative context, to get a speedy court action 13 because that status quo became more dangerous as time 14 passed? 15 A: Yes, it did. 16 Q: Now I want to switch to the 17 conversation with Ron Fox and I -- you have been cross- 18 examined by more people about a conversation that you 19 don't remember than -- than normally would take place. 20 But I do want to ask you a couple of question arising out 21 of all of this. 22 The first has to do with the response to 23 what Mr. Fredrick asked you. On August the 16th -- on 24 August the 16th you gave him this answer and you don't 25 have to go to this, it's page 220.
1751 And there's no secret about it that Mr. 2 Fredrick was trying to show that -- that there was some 3 difficulty with Ron Fox's credibility because he just 4 didn't get it. 5 You kept telling him about the difficulty 6 of operational information up there and you -- and he 7 just didn't get it. And -- and you and Mr. Fredricks had 8 this debate about whether you were giving him three (3) 9 warnings or you were just making three (3) points in the 10 context of the -- of the same warning. 11 And -- and, at page 220, he suggests to 12 you: 13 "I suggest even at that point, 14 Inspector Fox was still having 15 difficulty, as far as you could 16 appreciate it, with the notion that 17 these operational matters were things 18 that he shouldn't get drawn into 19 discussion about regardless of where 20 the source of that information comes 21 from; would that be fair? 22 It might be fair, yes." 23 And, this is what I want to ask you: As 24 you understood it, and you can't read Ron Fox' mind, but 25 as you understood it, was he having difficulty
1761 understanding the concept of operational information 2 being discussed at Queen's Park or was his difficulty 3 translating that into what he should do when the 4 informational -- operational information is making its 5 way there through other sources? 6 A: I don't think he was having any 7 trouble with the concept and the issue, basically, was 8 that information that was coming from the outside, he was 9 having some difficultly with that. 10 Q: Okay. Now, in response to a question 11 from Ms. Twohig at page 248, you were asked this question 12 and you gave this answer: 13 "Q: So, I take it that when you said 14 there was a concern that the incident 15 would be run from there, you did not 16 mean that the Government would take 17 over and give operational direction to 18 the OPP, but rather that you were 19 concerned that information might be 20 blown out of proportion by people who 21 did not have a police perspective and 22 that might cause unnecessary anxiety or 23 concern on the part of the public; is 24 that fair? 25 A: I agree with your second point;
1771 that's what I was concerned about, not 2 that Thomas O'Grady or myself would 3 have been politically directed to do 4 anything." 5 Now, that's a hot debate here at the 6 Inquiry, so at some point someone may suggest that -- 7 that that's not an accurate reflection of what you were 8 concerned about. 9 But -- but when you were later asked about 10 -- about the same issue, you indicated that you weren't 11 concerned about how political pressures would affect the 12 decisions made by the incident commander and I want to 13 draw a distinction for you and ask you whether this 14 distinction is a valid one and, if it is, then 15 Commissioner Linden may hear about it later on. 16 I'm going to suggest there's a distinction 17 between an incident commander being influenced by what 18 politicians and media say and do so as to do their 19 bidding, and an incident commander as a result of what 20 politicians and media say and do having a changed dynamic 21 as part of their incident. 22 Do you -- do you understand the 23 distinction that I'm making? 24 A: Yes, yes. 25 Q: Do you agree that that is a
1781 distinction? 2 A: Yes, it is. 3 Q: It's the latter that concerned you, 4 isn't it? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And -- and, if there's any doubt 7 about it, let's look at your -- at your words and you 8 don't have to go here, I'll read them to you. You've 9 probably got them memorized by now. 10 At page 271 of the transcript of the 11 conversation with -- with Ron Fox, and this is Tab 37 of 12 the logger tapes, you say this: 13 "My position has just been here some 14 half an hour. Mark, you downplay all 15 the heavy weaponry because [I want to 16 read this to you from a different 17 perspective] I'll have a [leave out the 18 swearing]..." 19 A: Thank you. 20 Q: "...safety and backup issue myself 21 here and it was the same as I had at 22 Akwesasne. Everybody said, Oh, there 23 was guns -- automatic guns going off, 24 all the frigging time and it wasn't -- 25 it wasn't. It was just semi-automatic;
1791 it was pulling the frigging triggers. 2 But you've got three (3) or four (4) 3 guys shooting, nobody knows the 4 difference." 5 Now, Akwesasne has been described to His 6 Honour as a situation where the media were being spoken 7 to by various people, whether it was the RCMP or the 8 Surete or the OPP or -- and I don't want to tread that 9 ground again, but -- but what you were talking about on 10 Akwesasne that had direct application to what we're 11 dealing with here is that the debate over the kind of 12 gunfire or the kind of weapons employed at Akwesasne got 13 into the public forum, didn't it? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: And, it created a heck of a problem 16 for managing the incident, didn't it? 17 A: Both publicly and internally. 18 Q: Of course, and one of the things it 19 does is, when that's out there in the public forum, it 20 ratchets up the tensions of all the players that are 21 involved, doesn't it? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: And that's what you're talking about 24 here, isn't it? 25 A: Yes.
1801 Q: And when you say, I'll have a safety 2 and backup issue myself here, the incident changes -- 3 A: Correct. 4 Q: -- as a result of what's out there in 5 the public forum, right? 6 A: Right. 7 Q: So Akwesasne had some real analogy to 8 what was happening here, as you saw it? 9 A: In my experience and mind, yes. 10 Q: And talking about analogies, I want 11 to ask you about Gustafson Lake, because a valid point's 12 been made that just because a First Nations group acts in 13 a certain way in British Columbia doesn't say anything, 14 necessarily, about how a First Nations acts in Ontario. 15 And you agree with that, of course? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: I mean we don't stereotype the First 18 Nations community on that basis, right? 19 A: Right. 20 Q: But, it was suggested to you that if 21 the same situation as a -- as a burglar in Ontario and 22 being analogized to a burglar in British Columbia. 23 And what I'm going to suggest to you, 24 thinking about Akwesasne and thinking about Ipperwash, 25 the concern is that when something is publicly happening
1811 involving an altercation between the First Nations and 2 the police in British Columbia where violence has been 3 employed, the concern is that that public event may have 4 implications for ratcheting up the tensions in another 5 location, right? 6 A: Right. 7 Q: Any doubt about that? 8 A: No. And the images portrayed in the 9 press, et cetera, it does ratchet it up. 10 Q: And we've heard that Commissioner 11 O'Grady actually sent an officer or we will hear, sent an 12 officer to Gustafson Lake, right? 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: And -- and that could provide 15 potentially useful information for how to deal with the 16 Ipperwash situation; might or might not. 17 A: Right. 18 Q: Commissioner -- Mr. Coles indicated 19 to me and didn't -- didn't talk to me about the content 20 of it, but that there was something that he hadn't said 21 so far that he did want to say and I do want to give him 22 the opportunity. 23 So, I have completed my questions, but 24 perhaps I will ask Mr. Coles: Is there something else 25 that you would like to add to the testimony that you've
1821 already given? 2 A: I have and I will be brief, 3 Commissioner. 4 You asked me if I had any recommendations, 5 and I omitted one (1). And the one (1) recommendation is 6 that I understand you have an inspect -- well, previous 7 Inspector Jim Potts, that is coming to this Inquiry and 8 has been asked for a research paper. 9 I would suggest all listen to the man. 10 Use him -- I think you've been very wise if you're using 11 him as a research person. 12 Jim Potts is the only serving police 13 officer that I know of that was on the fringes of 14 Akwesasne, was at Oka, was at Ipperwash and, after my 15 time, was also at Burnt Church. 16 I have great respect for the man and I do 17 believe that he is a source that you should listen to 18 seriously, and I hope that he gets the opportunity to 19 explain his mind to you. 20 Second point that I would like to make is 21 that my concern is that as the Inquiry continues you 22 will, of course, interview more people plus also the past 23 witnesses that you have interviewed, and that you will 24 place some responsibility to those pea -- to those people 25 for their actions.
1831 I would like to say that, in my opinion, 2 there is always a chain of command that was within the 3 Ontario Provincial Police during this action. I think 4 the record would show that I had very little 5 communication with my superiors and, as such, that if 6 you're looking for people to put the responsibility, 7 please look at me, because I -- I do take that mantle 8 seriously. 9 Now, for the good news. If I can, and 10 this will be my last point. 11 A good memory from me as I leave would be 12 this: that some time in the future, I drive down 21 13 Highway and there is an Ontario Provincial Police cruiser 14 visible. I hope the person in there looks smart, knows 15 his or her business and is aware of First Nations issues, 16 if they're policing this area. I hope that as I go down 17 21 Highway I get to meet Sam George. 18 And I hope we have a coffee and I hope I 19 hear his infectious laugh and I hope I get to say to Sam, 20 Sam, how's things at Aazhoodena? And I hope Sam George 21 says to me, They're looking up Chris and good things are 22 happening. That will be a good memory for me. That's 23 all I have to say. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's a 25 nice note for you to end your testimony on. I want to
1841 thank you on behalf of the Commission for coming here and 2 giving us the benefit of your testimony and your 3 experience. 4 Thank you very much. 5 MR. DONALD WORME: I'd simply echo those 6 -- those remarks, Commissioner, and thank Mr. Coles for 7 attending here and providing us with his observations and 8 as well as those recommendations. 9 Commissioner, Mr. Millar will be leading 10 the next witness and in order to get set up I wonder if 11 we might just have a very short, perhaps five (5) minute 12 break. Thank you. 13 14 15 (WITNESS STANDS DOWN) 16 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Take a short 18 break and we'll start with Commissioner O'Grady. 19 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 20 for five (5) minutes. 21 22 --- Upon recessing at 2:00 p.m. 23 --- Upon resuming at 2:10 p.m. 24 25 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now
1851 resumed. Please be seated. 2 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Good afternoon, 3 Commissioner. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 5 afternoon. 6 MR. DERRY MILLAR: The next witness is 7 Thomas B. O'Grady, the retired Commissioner of the 8 Ontario Provincial Police. 9 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Mr. 10 O'Grady. Do you prefer to swear on the Bible, sir, or 11 affirm? 12 THE WITNESS: I prefer to swear on the 13 Bible. 14 THE REGISTRAR: State your name in full 15 for us please. 16 THE WITNESS: Thomas Bernard O'Grady. 17 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you, sir. 18 19 THOMAS BERNARD O'GRADY, Sworn; 20 21 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 22 Q: Good afternoon, Mr. O'Grady. 23 A: Sir. 24 Q: You will find the -- you have in 25 front of you the book of documents that we prepared on --
1861 to your left there's that blue folder that also has some 2 documents that I will be referring you to. 3 And the first document that I'd like to 4 refer you to is your curriculum vitae' that is the first 5 document in the blue folder. And it's entitled 6 "Biographical Sketch." 7 And that is a biographical sketch of your 8 career? 9 A: That's right, sir. 10 Q: And it is a sketch because it doesn't 11 detail your whole career; is that correct? All of the 12 steps in your career? 13 A: Not in detail. 14 Q: Perhaps we could mark that as the 15 next exhibit. 16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P-577, Your 17 Honour. 18 19 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-577: Biographical sketch of 20 Commissioner Thomas B. 21 O'Grady (Retired) OPP. 22 23 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 24 Q: And Commissioner O'Grady, I 25 understand -- or Mr. O'Grady, you joined the Ontario
1871 Provincial Police in 1961? 2 A: Yes, I did. 3 Q: And you served for eleven (11) years 4 in field operations; is that correct? 5 A: That is correct. 6 Q: And can you tell us, just briefly, 7 what field operations were back in the '60's when you 8 were in field operations? 9 A: Well I began my career at Bradford 10 detachment and I did general policing there. I was there 11 for a number of years then I was transferred to Stayner, 12 Ontario where we had a detachment and I was involved in 13 general policing there and also general investigations. 14 Q: And that -- field operations refers 15 to general policing? 16 A: That's right. 17 Q: And then I understand in 1972 you 18 were transferred to the investigations area of the force? 19 A: That is correct. 20 Q: And that's called, I think, CIB, 21 Criminal Investigation Bureau? 22 A: At that time, the division was known 23 as Special Investigations Division. There were a number 24 of branches in it and my first posting was to Anti- 25 Rackets Branch, which is a fraud squad and I spent a
1881 number of years there and then I was transferred to the 2 Criminal Investigation Branch. 3 Q: Okay. And how long were you in -- 4 roughly in the fraud squad and how long in the Criminal 5 Investigation Branch? 6 A: I was about four (4) years, four (4) 7 or five (5) years in the Anti-Rackets Branch and six (6) 8 years in Criminal Investigations Branch. 9 Q: And in both of those, I take it, your 10 job involved investigations? 11 A: Yes, it did. 12 Q: And then you were in the 13 investigations area for approximately twelve (12) years, 14 as I understand it? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And in 1983 you were promoted to 17 superintendent? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: And as superintendent you became the 20 director of the Criminal Investigations Branch? 21 A: That is correct, sir. 22 Q: And you held that position for three 23 (3) years until you were promoted in 1986 to Chief 24 Superintendent? 25 A: That's right.
1891 Q: And as Chief Superintendent, you were 2 in charge of the investigations -- excuse me -- 3 Investigative Support Division? 4 A: That is correct. 5 Q: And can you tell us what the 6 Investigative Support Division was, back in 1986? 7 A: The Investigation Support Division 8 supplied assists to investigators in that it would relate 9 to surveillance, physical surveillance, technical 10 surveillance, forensic photography, forensic 11 identification and similar -- similar things that would 12 assist an investigator in completing an investigation. 13 Q: Okay. And you were then transferred, 14 I take it, at some -- when you were Chief Superintendent 15 in charge of Investigative Support Division, how long 16 were you in that role? 17 A: About two (2) years, I believe, and 18 then I was transferred to a -- back to field operations 19 at the same level, but in charge of what was then "B" 20 Division which was eastern Ontario. 21 Q: Okay. And in 1987 I understand you 22 left active duty to take a national defence college 23 course? 24 A: Yes, I did. 25 Q: And at the end of 1987 you were
1901 promoted to Deputy Commissioner? 2 A: Yes, I was. 3 Q: And the national defence college 4 course, can you just tell us what that was? Was it a 5 management course or? 6 A: It's a -- yes, it's a type of 7 management course but, essentially, it's a -- it's a 8 course -- study of Canada and the study of Canada's 9 relationships with other countries around the world and 10 the candidates were senior army, navy or air force 11 officers from various countries and senior bureaucrats 12 within the various federal and provincial ministries and 13 also senior -- senior people from private industry and 14 the various universities. 15 Q: Okay. And you were appointed 16 Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police in February 17 -- on February 15th, 1988? 18 A: That's correct. 19 Q: And you retired on May 31st, 1998? 20 A: That's correct. 21 Q: And when you were -- prior to 22 becoming Commissioner, had you been involved in First 23 Nations policing? 24 A: Not involved in First Nations 25 policing. While I was in CIB I did investigations that
1911 involved First Nations territories and First Nations 2 individuals. 3 Q: And prior to becoming Commissioner, 4 did you have any liaison role with the Ministry -- 5 Minister -- Ministry of the Solicitor General? 6 A: No. 7 Q: And as Commissioner of the Ontario 8 Provincial Police, you served as -- through three (3) 9 separate governments; is that correct? 10 A: Yes, I did. 11 Q: You were appointed during the 12 Government of Premier Peterson? 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: And you served during the Government 15 of Premier Rae? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: And you served during the Government 18 of Premier Harris? 19 A: That's right. 20 Q: And with respect to the -- your role 21 as Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police and the 22 Solicitor General, what was your understanding when you 23 became Commissioner as to the distinction or -- between 24 your role and that of the Solicitor General? 25 A: First of all, I familiarized myself,
1921 of course, with the Police Act of the day, which if read 2 on the face of it, said that I had the control and 3 management of the Ontario Provincial Police, subject to 4 the direction of the Solicitor General. 5 In practice, there was a deputy minister 6 that was responsible under the Solicitor General for 7 operating the -- the ministry and to act as a buffer 8 between the Commissioner and the Solicitor General. 9 Although that did not preclude me from 10 speaking directly to the Solicitor General, most of my 11 interaction was with the deputy minister of the day who 12 was a senior bureaucrat. 13 Q: And what was your understanding as to 14 the role, if any, that the Solicitor General could play, 15 with respect to the operations of the Ontario Provincial 16 Police? 17 A: The Solicitor General could impose 18 general -- general administrative and general policy that 19 would affect the operation of the force and the Solicitor 20 General, I felt, was entitled to know in -- in broad 21 terms, the operations of the Ontario Provincial Police, 22 but was not entitled to give any direction whatsoever in 23 the day-to-day operational activities, nor to give any 24 direction as to carrying out of operations -- operational 25 matters.
1931 Q: And when you say that the Solicitor 2 General had the right to be informed about police 3 operations at a general level, what do you mean by that, 4 sir? 5 A: Well if there were -- if there were 6 things that were contentious, would obviously gain wide 7 media attention, would, in all likelihood, be a subject 8 of discussion in the legislature, then he had to be 9 informed of what the matters were, what the general 10 action of the OPP was, but not the details of the matter. 11 Q: And was there a -- during the -- your 12 tenure, at the beginning, was there a method used by you 13 as the Commissioner to inform the Solicitor General or 14 his department or her department of these issues? How 15 did you got about doing it? 16 A: Yes, there was a written document 17 referred to as an issue note. And on the top of the 18 issue note would be the succinct bullet points of what 19 the issue was and what the approach of the OPP was to 20 that issue and attached to that or on the rest of the 21 page, would be some background detail which would support 22 the -- the few bullet points at the top. 23 And that was designed that way, 24 specifically, so that the Solicitor General could answer 25 a question from one (1) of his colleagues or the media or
1941 anyone, with respect to what the force, that he was 2 responsible for, was doing. 3 The general routing of this document was 4 to the Deputy Solicitor General and then, in most cases, 5 the document was sent over to the -- to the minister's 6 office. 7 Q: So that during your tenure, was -- 8 the normal course was to -- and we'll come to some of 9 these issue notes, but issue notes were prepared by your 10 office then sent to the Deputy Solicitor General and then 11 distributed by the Deputy Solicitor General or his or her 12 office to the minister's office or wherever else they 13 wanted to send them? 14 A: That is correct. 15 Q: And so you wouldn't -- would you pick 16 up the phone and phone the Solicitor General of the day 17 and say X or Y is happening? 18 A: No. I would certainly, from time to 19 time, speak to the -- the solicitor general but it would 20 be on more general terms. 21 Q: And when you say on more general 22 terms, what are you referring -- what do you refer to 23 there? 24 A: Well often times it was more of an 25 administrative nature. For instance, if he was coming
1951 for a tour to headquarters or we wanted him to tour 2 headquarters to get a briefing on something of a general 3 nature, or for any -- any housekeeping matter that we 4 needed to communicate that to him, it was not unusual to 5 pass on that message. 6 Q: And the -- you referred to policies 7 that the ministry or the minister, the solicitor general 8 or his or her ministry could set policies for the Ontario 9 Provincial Police and those policies might affect the 10 operations. 11 Can you tell us -- give us some examples 12 of the type of policy you're referring to? 13 A: Well I suppose the -- the one that 14 sticks in my mind mostly was there was a policy and 15 legislation to allow the use of photo radar. And that 16 had been brought in by the previous government. And it 17 was tool that the OPP used with respect to traffic 18 enforcement. 19 And after the arrival of the Conservative 20 Government who had campaigned on the issue that this was 21 not an effective tool, that regulation and legislation 22 was changed, and so we no longer could use that 23 technology. 24 Q: Okay. Are there any other examples 25 of --
1961 A: Occasionally there were things of 2 interest to the -- to the government. I recall on one 3 occasion, I believe it was the attorney general -- was 4 concerned about issues of hate crime. And, as a result, 5 there was a discussion between the Deputy Solicitor 6 General and the minister and myself as to how that could 7 be upgraded. 8 And of course I explained the resources 9 that I had. The solicitor general and his colleagues 10 seemed to be interested in increasing the effort that was 11 made in that area. And the result -- I received more 12 resources to do just that. 13 Similar issues were experienced with 14 motorcycle gangs. Similar issues were discussed in 15 connection with break and enters in the rural area of 16 Ontario where the prevention, perhaps, and the solve rate 17 could have been improved if we had had additional 18 resources. 19 So all of those required the support of 20 the -- of the minister, essentially to get the resources 21 to do it. 22 Q: And these three (3) examples that 23 you've just given us, the policing in rural areas, the 24 concern about hate crimes and motorcycle policing, were 25 any of those issues that arose during the period of time
1971 after Premier Harris -- Mr. Harris was elected as 2 premier? 3 A: All three (3) of them did. 4 Q: So all three (3) were issues that 5 arose during the -- 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: -- when -- you were a commissioner 8 when Mr. Harris was premier? 9 A: That's correct. 10 Q: And the -- with respect to the 11 concern about hate crimes and the attorney general, was 12 that Mr. Harnick? 13 A: That was. 14 Q: And with respect to policing in rural 15 areas, was that the solicitor general Mr. Runciman? 16 A: It was indeed. 17 Q: And with respect to motorcycle gangs? 18 A: That was Mr. Runciman again. 19 Q: And, so these discussions related to 20 -- if the policy of the Government was X, then you, as 21 Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police, needed 22 resources to carry out those policies? 23 A: Then it was a matter of a decision by 24 the Government to supply them or not. 25 Q: And, so you would -- you discussed
1981 with the government of the day whether -- there must be 2 examples in previous governments that followed the same - 3 - same course? 4 A: Absolutely. As I think about the 5 areas that I mentioned, since they were in existence, we 6 had a hate crimes unit, we had an outlaw biker unit. 7 Those were two (2) things that had been in existence 8 before and were as the result of a plan prepared and 9 resources given by the Government. The new one was the 10 rural crimes approach; that wasn't in existence before 11 the Conservative Government. 12 Q: And, so that the -- on the policy 13 issues that you just told us about, there was -- was 14 there any difference between the Liberal Government of 15 Mr. Peterson, the NDP Government of Mr. Rae, or the 16 Conservative Government of Mr. Harris? 17 A: No, they were all operated quite the 18 same. 19 Q: And, was there any written protocols 20 that you're aware of that defined the relationship 21 between you as Commissioner of the OPP and the Solicitor 22 General of the day? 23 A: I think at the last or -- or a while 24 ago, when we both spoke I couldn't recall any, but I do 25 have an indication of one (1) in my binder now from 1991.
1991 And I have read that and it has refreshed my memory and 2 I'm quite sure that I would have read it at that time. 3 And the protocol that's laid out, I feel 4 is very much like I followed over the ten (10) years that 5 I was Commissioner. 6 Q: And the document that you're 7 referring to, sir, is at Tab 4 of your binder? 8 A: That's correct. 9 Q: And, it's a document entitled, 10 Ministry of Control and the Ontario Provincial Police, a 11 Discussion Paper? 12 A: That's correct. 13 Q: And, we are told that was prepared in 14 1991 and the -- do you recall seeing that back in 1991 or 15 does it...? 16 A: Quite honestly, I can't recall now 17 when I saw it, but as I read it, I knew that this was 18 something that I was familiar and if it was produced in 19 1991, then in all likelihood it was shortly thereafter 20 that I would have seen it. 21 Q: But -- and, this document sets out 22 your understanding of the relationship between the 23 Ontario Provincial Police and the Solicitor General's 24 department? 25 A: I think it's quite accurate.
2001 Q: Perhaps we could mark that as the 2 next exhibit, sir? 3 THE REGISTRAR: P-578, Your Honour. 4 5 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-578: Ministerial Control and the 6 Ontario Provincial Police: A 7 Discussion Paper prepared by 8 the Legal Services Branch of 9 the Ministry of the Solicitor 10 General. 1991. 11 12 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 13 Q: And, during the period of time that 14 you were Commissioner, firstly, under -- again, under Mr. 15 Peterson and then under Mr. Rae and then under Mr. 16 Harris, did the -- was there any change in the 17 relationship between you and the Solicitor General? 18 A: Absolutely none. 19 Q: And, with respect to all of those 20 three (3) governments, was your main contact the Deputy 21 Solicitor General? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: And, so that your chain of 24 communication was through the Deputy Minister, the Deputy 25 Solicitor General, or his or her designate?
2011 A: Correct. 2 Q: And, I note at pages 27 and 28 of 3 Exhibit P-578... 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 Q: Actually, starting at page 23 there 8 is a list of -- entitled, Ministerial -- Ministerial 9 Responsibility. 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: And that runs to page 26 then "Deputy 12 Minister's responsibility", and then lastly at page 27 13 and 28, "Commissioner's Responsibility." 14 And when you were Solicitor General would 15 -- did those pages accurately reflect what your 16 understanding of the minister's responsibility, the 17 deputy minister's responsibility and your responsibility? 18 A: To the best of my recollection, 19 that's accurate. 20 Q: And while we're at it, there's a 21 document that's at Tab 99 of your book; it's entitled, 22 Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services: 23 Roles and Relationships between the Minister, the Deputy 24 Minister and the Ontario Provincial Police. A Summary. 25 And as sometimes government is wont to do,
2021 there's no date on this document but from the cases that 2 are cited within the document, it appears that it 3 probably was, and I believe it was, dated sometime in 4 1998. 5 Can -- have you, prior to these 6 proceedings, seen this document, Commissioner -- Mr. 7 O'Grady? 8 A: I -- I doubt very much -- oh, I have, 9 prior to these proceedings because it was given to me and 10 I have read it. But I -- while I was active, I don't 11 recall having seen this. 12 Q: And -- but you have -- you have read 13 this document -- was that after the Inquiry had been 14 called? 15 A: I'm not sure. I have read this -- 16 this document fairly recently, in the last couple of 17 weeks. 18 Q: Oh, so that -- since -- 19 A: Yes. But prior to that, I don't 20 recall having seen it. 21 Q: And having read this document, does - 22 - does it -- how does it relate to your understanding 23 when you left in 1998 of the roles of you, as 24 Commissioner, the Minister and the deputy Minister? 25 A: This document to me appears to be a
2031 little more brief and to the point but, essentially, 2 reflects the information that was in the previous 3 document that we were talking about from 1991. 4 It's easier to read and I think there's 5 been some updating in the -- in the name of -- the Police 6 Services Act, as it's known today. 7 So there might be some updating, but 8 essentially, it's the same format. 9 Q: And does it set out the relationships 10 as you understood them when you left as -- in 1998 as 11 Commissioner? 12 A: Yes, it does. 13 Q: And perhaps we could mark that as the 14 next exhibit? It would be... 15 THE REGISTRAR: P-579, Your Honour. 16 17 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-579: Ministry of Community Safety 18 & Correctional Services, 19 Roles & Relationships between 20 the Minister, a Deputy 21 Minister nd the OPP: A 22 Summary (undated). 23 24 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 25 Q: Now, the budget for the Ontario
2041 Provincial Police would be worked out between the Ontario 2 Provincial Police and the Government through the Ministry 3 of the Solicitor General; is that correct? 4 A: Yes, it would. 5 Q: And back in -- when you became 6 Commissioner and during your tenure, was a process of 7 budget setting similar under all three (3) governments? 8 A: Yes. Probably the only changes were 9 -- was there a surplus in funds therefore we were able to 10 embark on improving our resources in policing or was 11 there a deficit and therefore there would be a constraint 12 and we would have to find more efficient ways to -- to do 13 things without detracting from our service. 14 That generally was the -- was the focus of 15 attention; do it more efficiently and don't spend as much 16 money but do not -- do not shrink from doing appropriate 17 policing in the province. 18 Q: And can you just tell us briefly how 19 the budget process worked? 20 A: Generally there were a number of 21 divisions within the ministry of the solicitor general 22 and each division prepared its own budget based on what 23 had been occurring the previous year and what additions 24 were required or what deletions could be sustained if it 25 was necessary.
2051 The budget was forwarded to the Deputy 2 Minister and usually as a result I was called to defend 3 the budget at the table with the Deputy Minister and the 4 Minister and the other division heads from the Ministry. 5 When all was satisfied that those things 6 were supportable, the whole budget including the OPP 7 budget, although separate, was rolled up into one and 8 that budget was presented in writing to the management 9 board of Cabinet. 10 And at some point in time, if the 11 management board of Cabinet was concerned over certain 12 areas or not fully aware of what was intended in certain 13 areas, then I would be called along with some of my 14 colleagues to the management board of Cabinet to defend 15 or explain the issues that seem to have raised concerns. 16 And subsequent to that meeting, in due 17 course, I would be advised through the Deputy Solicitor 18 General what budget had been set. 19 Q: And did you -- did the Ontario 20 Provincial Police create its own budget which is then 21 submitted to the Solicitor General's ministry and for 22 their review? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And one of the -- as I understand it, 25 one of the responsibilities of the commissioner is to
2061 appoint commissioned officers; is that correct? 2 A: The commissioner appoints all 3 members, or all employees of the Force including 4 commissioned officers. 5 Q: And on -- with respect to 6 commissioned officers, does the Commissioner make a 7 selection and then the Lieutenant Governor and Council 8 will then provide the commission. 9 A: That is correct. There is a section 10 in the Police Act that it indicates that members of the 11 Ontario Provincial Police can receive a Queen's 12 commission. It goes to those of inspector rank and 13 higher. 14 The promotion to inspector has already 15 been made and then the request is passed on for a Queen's 16 commission which is approved by the Lieutenant Governor. 17 Q: And does the government of the day, 18 and you served under three (3) different governments, 19 does the government of the day have any role in the 20 appointment, or did it have any role in the appointment 21 of commissioned officers while you were the commissioner 22 of the Ontario Provincial Police? 23 A: No, has no role. 24 Q: They simply -- you make the 25 recommendation that a commission should be issued and the
2071 government of the day would carry that out? 2 A: That's correct. I -- I should 3 explain, it isn't as simple as me just making a 4 recommendation. There is a process that's followed which 5 leads to a recommendation internally being made to me; 6 this is the person that we think should be promoted. And 7 then I make my recommenda -- I promote the person and it 8 ends there. 9 Q: Really, I'm really just trying to -- 10 I understand that. I understand that there would be an 11 internal -- 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: -- promotion machinery, if I might 14 put it that way, that ultimately you make the decision 15 based on recommendations that you receive from other 16 members of your administration. 17 18 But, the question I have is: Once you 19 made a decision to appoint an officer -- a member of the 20 Force as an officer, an inspector, or a chief 21 superintendent, or a superintendent, did the government 22 of the day have any role to play in -- after you made 23 that decision, other than simply issuing a commission at 24 your request? 25 A: None.
2081 Q: And did any of the three (3) 2 governments that you served under refuse to issue a 3 commission -- 4 A: Never. 5 Q: -- to a -- an officer, you have to 6 wait until I've finished, to an officer that you 7 recommended? 8 A: Never. 9 Q: Now, we've heard some evidence with 10 respect to the organization of the Ontario Provincial 11 Police and the reorganization of the Ontario Provincial 12 Police and if I might, as I understand it before the 13 reorganization, there were three (3) separate regions. 14 There was 'A' -- 'A' Division, which was 15 the western region; 'B' Division, which was the eastern 16 region; and 'C' Division, which was the northern region? 17 A: That's correct. 18 Q: And then under those three (3) 19 regions there were six (6) -- there were a number of -- 20 can you just tell us, briefly, how the structure went 21 from there? 22 A: The regions were divided up and so 23 totally across the Province there were sixteen (16) 24 districts within those regions and there were a hundred 25 and ninety (190) detachments within in those various
2091 districts. 2 So, the -- in the geographical areas, the 3 smallest unit was the detachment, the next was the 4 district and the next was the division. 5 Q: And so there were -- across the 6 Province there were three (3) regions, sixteen (16) 7 districts and a hundred and ninety (190) detachments? 8 A: Thereabouts. 9 Q: And -- 10 A: The number of detachments fluctuated 11 a little bit. 12 Q: Go up and down. And as I understand 13 it, they -- a decision was made by the government of Mr. 14 -- of then-Premier Rae to that -- or a recommendation 15 made that there should be a reorganization of the Ontario 16 Provincial Police? 17 A: Well, if you can think back to the 18 days of the Premier -- Premier Rae's government, the 19 economic conditions at one point in Ontario were not 20 good, and so the government of the day was looking at all 21 areas of the public service to see where it could become 22 more cost efficient, and the OPP certainly was included 23 in that group. 24 And so we often like to refer to it as 25 we've -- began the project as the cause for action, so
2101 the number 1 was cause we must be able to be more 2 efficient and spend less money. 3 The second cause was, if we're going to do 4 this, perhaps we could do it in a manner that we could be 5 just as efficient, or more efficient and also increase 6 our ability to communicate. 7 And so as a result of that, we began a 8 study to address how that could be done. 9 Q: And was one of the -- the concerns, 10 or one of the objectives that -- that you had as 11 Commissioner, to move towards a model of community 12 policing? 13 A: Yes, indeed. Some of the objectives 14 were to shorten the chain of command, remove the levels 15 of the chain of command to give more authority to the 16 detachment commanders and the regional commanders to make 17 decisions without getting approval from general 18 headquarters. 19 The feeling being that they were more 20 responsive to the needs of the people in the area where 21 they did the policing and were in a better position to 22 make the appropriate decision than somebody at 23 headquarters. 24 Q: So, that under the old system a 25 detachment commander would have to go to the appropriate
2111 person at the district who would then have to go to the 2 appropriate person at the region, who would then have to 3 go the appropriate person -- person at the general 4 headquarters? 5 A: Generally speaking, in a lot of areas 6 that was the case. 7 Q: And the reorganization took a period 8 of time; is that correct? 9 A: Yes, it did. It took a number of 10 years. 11 Q: And in 1995 the reorganization was, 12 as I understand it, almost or was complete or almost 13 complete in the summer of 1995? 14 A: Very close to having been completed. 15 Q: And the new government played -- the 16 new government that was elected on June 26th, 1995, did 17 it play any role with respect to this reorganization of 18 the Ontario Provincial Police? 19 A: Not really, other than when a new 20 government comes in and there's a new minister and 21 oftentimes a new deputy minister then, in my particular 22 role, I would have to familiarize with them what was 23 occurring organizational in the OPP at that time and what 24 -- and so, one (1) of the main issues would be that we 25 are in a reorganization, we are, at this point, in the
2121 reorganization and everything is working out well or 2 everything is not working out well, we may need some 3 assistance in certain areas or we don't. 4 Q: And the reorganization, as I 5 understand it, created a structure where you had a 6 commissioner, which was you, to deputy commissioners at 7 the time and in 1995, I believe there was Deputy 8 Commissioner Boose? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: And Deputy Commissioner Boose was in 11 charge of operations? 12 A: Yes, he was. 13 Q: And then Deputy Commissioner Nagle, 14 and she was in charge of administration? 15 A: That's correct -- Services, I believe 16 we called it then. 17 Q: Services? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: And -- but that would be more 20 administrative items? 21 A: Administrative, yes. 22 Q: And then the province was divided 23 into six (6) regions? 24 A: That's correct. 25 Q: There was the East Region, the
2131 Central Region, the Greater Toronto Area, the Northwest 2 Region, the Northeast Region, and the Western Region? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: And in each region -- and let's -- 5 normally, as I understand it, if we look at the Western 6 Region, which is the region that encompasses Forest and 7 Lambton County; is that correct? 8 A: That's correct. 9 Q: The -- back in 1995, the region was 10 headed by a chief superintendent? 11 A: That's correct. 12 Q: And in this case it was Chief 13 Superintendent Coles? 14 A: Yes, that's true. 15 Q: And back in 1995 there were two (2) 16 superintendents? 17 A: Yes, there were. 18 Q: And the superintendent in charge of 19 operations was Superintendent Parkin? 20 A: That's correct. 21 Q: And there was a superintendent in 22 charge of administration or services, I guess it is? 23 A: I think they -- they merely called it 24 administration and perhaps, for our purposes, that's what 25 it was, and administration's not a bad word.
2141 Q: And was that Superintendent Buroski? 2 A: Baranoski. 3 Q: Baranoski? And then under that 4 structure there were the -- what was the next unit 5 underneath the region, as a result of the reorganization? 6 A: Well there were a variety -- a 7 variety of support groups, there was Human Resources and 8 -- and a variety of units and, of course, the -- the main 9 structure, underneath, were the detachments. 10 Q: So that there were -- were there a 11 number of -- as a result of the reorganization, were the 12 number of detachments reduced? 13 A: Yeah. The detachments, generally, 14 were larger, but the number smaller. 15 Q: And, for example -- take Forest for 16 an example, as I understand it, prior to the 17 reorganization, Forest was a full-fledged detachment. As 18 a result of the reorganization, Petrolia became the 19 detachment and Forest became a sub office? 20 A: That's correct. We refer to them as, 21 "clusters." 22 Q: Pardon me? 23 A: We refer to them as, "clusters," but, 24 obviously, one (1) of them had to be picked as sort of 25 the -- where the Detachment Commander had his office and
2151 so the other ones, of course, were of some lesser 2 importance then, because his office was -- was what it 3 revolved around. 4 Q: So that, in the cluster there would 5 be a unit with a detachment commander and in this case, 6 back in 1995, that was Petrolia and then there was a -- a 7 head of the sub -- what did you call it, a...? 8 A: Well, there -- there -- you could 9 refer to it as a sub-detachment. They were actually 10 full-fledged detachments. The -- the detachment 11 commander was the detachment commander for, for instance, 12 if there were three (3) of them, all three (3). 13 However, he was housed in one of them and 14 obviously that's where he would be most of the time. 15 Q: And there would be, instead of a use 16 -- the detachment commander back would often be a staff 17 sergeant? 18 A: A staff sergeant or an inspector. 19 Q: And then the sub detachment would be 20 headed by a sergeant? 21 A: There would be a number of sergeants 22 there, all answerable to the detachment commander. All - 23 - the only difference was that they were removed by 24 distance. Other than that, the operation would have been 25 the same if they had all been in one.
2161 Q: So I didn't -- in effect, it was just 2 the distance, if you -- 3 A: Exactly. 4 Q: If they'd had been in Petrolia, it 5 was the same organization. It's just that they had 6 different physical offices? 7 A: Exactly. 8 Q: Now, the -- you were responsible, as 9 I understand it, for appointing Chief Superintendent 10 Coles as the chief -- as a chief superintendent? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And did you play any role, other than 13 in the appointment of John Carson as inspector? 14 A: I would have been the one that 15 confirmed his -- his promotion to inspector. Other than 16 that, I would have played no role. 17 Q: And it would have come to you as a 18 recommendation by -- through the ordinary process? 19 A: Exactly. 20 Q: And back in 1995, can you tell us a 21 little bit about how your office was set up, the office 22 of the Commissioner? 23 A: The officer of the Commissioner 24 consisted of an adjudicator, a professional standards 25 branch or bureau, I should say, an executive assistant
2171 for the Commissioner, clerical staff and some support 2 staff for the executive officer. 3 Q: And the force adjudicator, can you 4 tell us what the role of the force adjudicator was? 5 A: The force adjudicator would 6 adjudicate on all Police Act charges that professional 7 standards had instituted. 8 Q: And professional standards was -- its 9 role was? 10 A: It had two (2) roles. One was to 11 look at public complaints, internal complaints, 12 investigate them and make a recommendation. 13 Oftentimes they took it a discipline 14 committee which was a committee of senior officers, and 15 eventually make a decision on the type of discipline that 16 was going to be meted out. 17 Generally, in most cases, before they did 18 that, the director of professional standards bureau would 19 brief me on their approach and their decision and why 20 they had made that decision. 21 Q: And this is before it went to the 22 discipline committee or after? 23 A: Well, in some cases, it would go to 24 discipline committee. In other cases, it was a decision 25 that would be made by the staff of -- of professional
2181 standards. 2 Q: And so the -- back in 1995, 3 professional standards did the investigations and 4 prosecutions, if they determined that there was a breach 5 of the Police Act? 6 A: That's correct. 7 Q: Or police orders? 8 A: That's correct. 9 Q: And I'll get to this later, but I'm 10 just trying to understand, the professional standards 11 would then recommend a hearing? 12 What -- what could they do with respect to 13 a -- a charge? 14 A: Well, in most cases, where there was 15 absolute formal discipline, there would be a -- a 16 briefing to the discipline committee. 17 But out of that then would come the 18 preferring of Police Act charges, if that was the case, 19 or a finding of no -- no case against the individual or a 20 variety of other levels of discipline that could be 21 instituted. 22 Q: Including informal discipline? 23 A: Yes, including informal discipline. 24 Q: So that the -- before -- it was the 25 Discipline Committee, back in 1995, that made the
2191 decision of whether to proceed or not and how to proceed? 2 A: In most cases, that's true. 3 Q: And who were the members, back in 4 1995/1996, by position, not -- I'm -- I'm not asking for 5 their names. I don't know if you can remember who all 6 was there, but who made up the -- what rank of officer 7 made up the Discipline Committee? 8 A: I'm not -- my recollection doesn't 9 help me as much as it should, I suppose. My -- I believe 10 it would be, at least, superintendent rank, but I'm not 11 100 percent sure. 12 Q: All right. We'll come back to that, 13 I think I have some documents that might help, but 14 getting back to your office, your executive assistant in 15 1995 was Inspector Phil Duffield? 16 A: That's true. 17 Q: And did you have, as part of your 18 office, a critical issues group? 19 A: Yes, I did. 20 Q: And what was the role of the Critical 21 Issues Group? 22 A: Well, the Critical Issues Group 23 reported to Inspector Duffield. 24 Q: Yes? 25 A: And their job was to collect up
2201 information that would be used to create an issue -- an 2 issue sheet, which would be forwarded to whoever needed 3 that information but, in particular, to the Deputy 4 Minister. 5 Q: And we've seen the name, Nancy 6 Mansell, was she a member of the Critical Issues Group? 7 A: Yes, she was. 8 Q: And was Nancy Mansell a police 9 officer? 10 A: No, she was not, she was a civilian. 11 Q: Civilian? And how many people were 12 in the Critical Issues Group back in 1995, if you can 13 recall? 14 A: It was a very small number and so at 15 times I think there would be just Nancy and Phil -- 16 Inspector Duffield took part and created those issue 17 notes also. From time-to-time there could have been one 18 (1) more, but it was a rather small group. 19 Q: And I understand it that, back in 20 1995, the Ontario Provincial Police had a media relations 21 office? 22 A: Yes, they did. 23 Q: And I think it was headed back in 24 1995 by Superintendent Murray? 25 A: It was a civilian.
2211 Q: Oh, it was a civilian. 2 A: And her name was Marilyn Murray. 3 Q: Marilyn Murray? 4 A: Yeah. 5 Q: And was the media relations officer - 6 - office attached to your office or was it part of the 7 administrative structure of the Ontario Provincial 8 Police? 9 A: It was part of the -- the structure 10 of the Ontario Provincial Police but, again, without 11 double-checking, my recollection is that it was part of 12 my office. 13 Q: Okay. And were there media officers 14 in -- offices in the various regions of the Ontario 15 Provincial Police? 16 A: Yes, there were. 17 Q: And, in those regions, they -- were 18 the media relations people, police officers? 19 A: In most cases they were -- they were. 20 I think I can think of -- yes, I think they probably all 21 were and I should also distinguish between them and Ms. 22 Murray's office. I'm quite sure that her office was 23 attached to the Commissioner's office. 24 The media people in the regions were 25 attached to the region headquarters, they were not part
2221 of the general headquarters. 2 Q: And the media relations offices, 3 whether at the region or at the general headquarters, 4 what was their role, back in 1995? 5 A: They would collect up any information 6 that related to the activities of the Ontario Provincial 7 Police and on occasion, on a regular basis, deal with the 8 local media and publish media releases and interact with 9 the general headquarters media office with Ms. Murray. 10 Q: And did the media office in the 11 headquarters and the media offices in the regions 12 interact with your Critical Issues Group? 13 A: From time to time, yes they did. 14 Q: And when I say, "interact," what 15 would they do? 16 A: Well there would be an exchange of 17 information. 18 Q: And the issue notes that were 19 prepared by the critical issues group and I take it the 20 media group would -- did they create issue notes as well? 21 A: The media group did not. But they 22 would contribute information if they were in possession 23 of information which was obviously of some import to the 24 issue note that was being prepared. And that would be 25 discovered either by them speaking to the critical issues
2231 unit or vice versa. 2 Q: And with respect to you, as 3 commissioner, were you given all critical issue notes? 4 A: Not necess -- 5 Q: Some? Or how did that work? 6 A: Not necessarily all. I depended very 7 much on Inspector Duffield to make sure that if there 8 were things that were clearly something that would be of 9 interest to me that I would know about it. 10 But there were others that were so mundane 11 and that he knew I was familiar with, that I might not 12 see in some instances. 13 Q: Now if I could take you to -- oh, 14 before I go there -- when -- during your tenure as 15 commissioner, did -- were there management committee 16 meetings held with the senior members of the Force? 17 A: Yes, there were. 18 Q: And can you tell us a little bit 19 about those? And perhaps in 1995, because they may have 20 changed as a result of the reorganization? 21 A: Yea. And I'm trying to the best of 22 my recollection, remember. I know that we had management 23 committee meetings once a month and I think with the 24 advent of -- or the advance of technology, we had 25 teleconferences probably on a more -- more often than
2241 once a month. 2 Generally, this was an opportunity for me 3 to pass onto the regional commanders and maybe I could 4 just add another explanatory note. Besides the regional 5 commanders who were geographical in nature, there were 6 bureau commanders at general headquarters who were 7 functional in nature. 8 All of the regional and bureau commanders 9 and the two (2) deputy commissioners and I, generally, 10 attended those meetings. So it was an opportunity for me 11 to pass on any information that I felt was important. 12 It was also an opportunity for them to 13 update me on any issues that they believed that was 14 occurring in the -- in the region that could be of 15 provincial interest or that could be of particular 16 interest to me. 17 And also to discuss any new government 18 policy that was going to affect policing. 19 Q: And the bureau commanders, can you -- 20 back in 1995, can you recall what the bureaus were? Can 21 you give us an example? 22 A: There was a criminal investigation 23 bureau which was in place to investigate major crime 24 throughout the province and it had deployed offices also. 25 There was a First Nations and contract
2251 policing bureau which was to deal with the locations -- 2 the municipal locations that had made a decision to 3 contract their -- contract police service from the OPP. 4 There was the -- and the other part of 5 that bureau was the First Nations section which dealt 6 with First Nations policing in the role of support to 7 stand alone First Nations. And more support to those 8 that were administered at that time by the Ontario 9 Provincial Police. 10 There was an operational on policy bureau. 11 I believe at that time we had a -- I know there was a 12 anti-rackets bureau or section and there was an illicit 13 drug bureau or section. 14 So those were the types of things and the 15 list I've given you I'm sure is not exhausted. 16 Q: And the opera -- I think you called 17 the operations bureau, what was this for? 18 A: Operational policy and planning? 19 Q: Yes. 20 A: Was to do just exactly that, to draft 21 policy. 22 Q: And when did the Ontario Provincial 23 Police move from Toronto -- the general headquarters from 24 Toronto to Orillia? 25 A: It was prior to -- we opened our new
2261 headquarters in the fall of 1995 but we had been there, I 2 believe, for probably two (2) years prior to that in 3 rented quarters; the date escapes me at the moment. 4 Q: So it was in the early 90's you -- 5 that you -- 6 A: Yeah. 7 Q: -- headquarters moved up there from I 8 think it was 90 Harbour Street? 9 A: That's correct. 10 Q: To Orillia. And then you moved into 11 a new building, the present building, in the fall of 12 1995? 13 A: That's right. 14 Q: Or -- the summer or the fall of 1995? 15 A: Well, it could have been the summer. 16 I believe the official opening was in the fall. 17 Q: And back and prior to September the 18 6th, 1995, during your tenure as Commissioner, did you 19 have meetings from time to time with the Deputy Solicitor 20 General? 21 A: Yes, I did. 22 Q: And were there -- let's go back to -- 23 well, during the period of time, were there regular 24 meetings with the Deputy Solicitor General or with the -- 25 with the Ministry?
2271 A: Yes. There were -- it was -- to 2 distinguish it from the Management Committee of the 3 Ontario Provincial Police, it was referred to as the 4 Senior Management Committee. This was the Management 5 Committee of the Ministry. And those were on a regular 6 basis, I believe those were once a month. 7 And those were attended by all the 8 division heads, the Commissioner of the OPP, the Deputy 9 Minister; that was generally the rule. And on occasion 10 the Minister would drop in, but he didn't attend 11 regularly. 12 Q: And with respect to the Senior 13 Management Committee meetings, was there any difference 14 in the Senior Management Committee meetings under the 15 three (3) governments that you served? 16 A: I don't recall there was. 17 Q: And with respect to the Senior 18 Management Committee meetings, can you just -- and we'll 19 talk about the period prior to September 6th, 1995 -- can 20 you tell us a little bit about them, what went on at the 21 meeting, what kind of areas would be discussed; and just 22 so the Commissioner can have a little better 23 understanding? 24 A: Well -- I think it's sort of self- 25 evident that the Committee is there to bring about a
2281 unified approach to the administration and operation of 2 all Ministry divisions. So, anything that was Ministry- 3 wide would be discussed there. 4 So, budget was one (1) of the things that 5 was discussed; general policies that applied to everybody 6 within the public service would be discussed; suggestions 7 that any particular division head wished to make to 8 receive feedback from his or her colleagues within the 9 Ministry would be discussed; a -- a variety of -- of 10 things. 11 The meeting usually lasted two (2) to 12 three (3) hours, depending on how weighty the discussions 13 were. There was a peculiarity to those meetings, in that 14 the Deputy Minister and division heads depended on the 15 judgment of the Commissioner as to whether certain things 16 that occurred within the OPP, especially operational 17 policing matters, were discussed at that meeting. 18 But it was generally understood that it 19 would be initiated, if there was something that needed to 20 be discussed that would relate to the other parts of the 21 Ministry and the OPP, then it was the judgment of the 22 Commissioner to initiate that. 23 And if it were clearly just operational 24 matters, it would be touched on in a very perfunctory 25 way, more or less, Here's something that's occurring that
2291 the OPP is addressing, You will likely be hearing things 2 about that and -- from -- through the media, Be aware 3 that the OPP are addressing those issues. 4 Q: And I take it from what you've just 5 said that it was really an information -- 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: -- you would pass on information to 8 the Senior Management Committee about other things that 9 were happening or, perhaps, were about to happen? 10 A: Yes. The -- 11 Q: And -- 12 A: Go ahead. 13 Q: Excuse me? 14 A: It's entirely possible that there may 15 be something that I would have needed. For instance, I 16 might have needed some administrative assistance from 17 some other part of the ministry. 18 I might have needed some expertise that 19 was house elsewhere within the ministry and that would be 20 an opportunity for me to put my case before the division 21 head that might have those resources. 22 Q: And during -- from -- during your 23 tenure from the period September 6th to when you changed 24 -- ceased to be Commissioner, was there any change in the 25 role of the senior management committee?
2301 A: No. 2 Q: And did -- during the period of time 3 you were the Commissioner did you, on a regular basis, 4 attend the meetings? 5 A: Yes, I did. 6 Q: You didn't send a delegate? 7 A: On occasion there was a delegate, but 8 it was a -- it was a command performance. Generally, I - 9 - I would say 95 percent of the time I was there. 10 Q: So, it would have been unusual -- it 11 would have to be exceptional circumstances for you not to 12 be there? 13 A: That's right. 14 Q: Now when you became Commissioner in 15 1988, did you hold any views about First Nation policing? 16 A: Yes, I did. 17 Q: And can you tell us what those views 18 were? 19 A: My intention at that time or my -- if 20 I can refer to it as a strategic direction was that 21 having First Nations territories policed by First Nations 22 people in First Nations police services that were 23 governed by a local governing body was the -- the best 24 way to go. 25 And my intention at that time was to do
2311 everything within my power to -- subject to the desires 2 of the First Nations territories involved, to bring that 3 about and so what we found was, essentially, three (3) 4 scenarios. 5 One(1) was where there was a First Nations 6 police service, which was operating very efficiently and 7 in a standalone -- on a standalone basis, and would from 8 time-to-time, perhaps, need some expertise that the OPP 9 as a large police force might have, but other than that 10 was doing its own policing. And to me, that was the -- 11 that was the best way to go about it. 12 The second group were ones which were 13 staffed essentially by First Nations police officers, on 14 occasion, were commanded by a non-First Nations police 15 officer, an officer from the OPP and were supported to 16 varying degrees by OPP resources. I saw that as a -- as 17 a police service in transition. 18 And finally, the third group, which 19 generally related to a police -- or at least a First 20 Nations territory that was extremely small and just could 21 not support a police service, was policed by the nearest 22 OPP Detachment and again, we were looking at ways and 23 means that we might change that. 24 And the thought there was that if they 25 could be regionalised, then even the smaller territories
2321 could take advantage of First Nations policing. 2 So, that was the strategic direction that 3 we wished to move -- move in and I think there's -- there 4 are routine orders that would lay out that strategic 5 direction that are available for perusal. 6 Q: And so during your -- is it fair to 7 say during your tenure as Commissioner, that that 8 strategic direction was a direction that you worked on as 9 a -- as one (1) of your goals? 10 A: That's correct. 11 Q: And the Anishnaabeg Police Service, 12 for example, was developed or expanded during the course 13 of your tenure as Commissioner? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: And as a -- that would be a police 16 service that covered more than a number of areas as I 17 understand? 18 A: Yes, it did. There are a number of 19 detachments. 20 Q: And the OPP as you mentioned earlier, 21 played a role in the tripartite police arrangements? 22 A: Yes, they did. 23 Q: And the -- can you just tell us a 24 little bit about your understanding of the tripartite 25 policing arrangements and how they worked?
2331 A: Well if I go back to theory of it, I 2 guess the theory was that, as a result of agreements made 3 hundreds of years ago between the Crown and the First 4 Nations territories, there was a fiduciary responsibility 5 that the Crown had or -- and that -- that responsibility 6 was then inherited by Canada when Canada became self 7 governing. And so clearly the Federal Government had a 8 responsibility to address the First Nations issues. 9 Secondly, I often refer back to the 10 British North America Act, but we have a new constitution 11 now but, nevertheless, that was transferred into our new 12 constitution where -- which indicated that law 13 enforcement was the responsibility of provinces. 14 So you have the two (2) coming together. 15 And so a decision was made that perhaps we could share. 16 The First Nations territories are in the province and in 17 particular in Ontario, there was a police service there 18 that could be of assistance in building their own First 19 Nations police services and policing them. 20 And so if the province and the Federal 21 Government worked together and brought in the third 22 party, which was an umbrella group of First Nations, they 23 could work out an agreement to fund and resource 24 appropriate First Nations. 25 And essentially, as the word suggests,
2341 that was the tripartite agreement that all of the 2 recognized parties signed agreement running from a point 3 to another point and then re-signing an upgraded 4 agreement. 5 Q: And just, if I might, two (2) 6 examples of tripartite agreements appear at Tabs 1 and 2 7 of the Book of Documents in front of you. The first is 8 dated in April of 1989 and the second December 1st, 1989. 9 And are they -- those examples of tripartite agreements? 10 A: Yes, they are. 11 Q: And the document at Tab 1, which is 12 Inquiry Document 2002659, is between the Government of 13 Canada as represented by the Minister of Indian Affairs 14 and Northern Development, the Government of Ontario as 15 represented by the Solicitor General. 16 The Grand Council Treaty Number 3 Nation, 17 the Nishnawbe-Aski Nation, the Association of Iroquois 18 and Allied Indians, the Union of Ontario Indians and the 19 Chief and Council of the 6 Nations of the Grand River 20 Track, were the parties to that Agreement which is dated, 21 actually, March the 2nd, 1989. 22 And perhaps we could mark that as the next 23 exhibit, Commissioner. 24 THE REGISTRAR: P-580, Your Honour. 25
2351 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-580: Document number 2002659, 2 March 02/89. Agreement 3 between Canada, Ontario, 4 Grand Council Treaty Number 3 5 Nation, Nishnawbe-Aski 6 Nation, the Association of 7 Iroquois and Allied Indians. 8 the Union of Ontario Indians 9 and The Chief and Council of 10 the Six Nations of the Grand 11 River Tract. 12 13 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR. 14 Q: And the next Agreement at Tab 2, 15 which is Inquiry Document 2002660, is dated December 1st, 16 1989 and it's between the same parties. Perhaps we could 17 mark that as the next exhibit. 18 19 THE REGISTRAR: P-581, Your Honour. 20 21 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-581: Document number 2002660, 22 December 01/ 89, Agreement 23 between Canada, Ontario, 24 Grand Council Treaty Number 3 25 Nation, Nishnawbe-Aski
2361 Nation, the Association of 2 Iroquois and Allied Indians. 3 the Union of Ontario Indians 4 and The Chief and Council of 5 the Six Nations of the Grand 6 River Tract. 7 8 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 9 Q: And as I understand it the Ontario 10 Provincial Police have played a role in administering 11 these Agreements? 12 A: That's correct. 13 Q: And can you briefly tell us what role 14 the Ontario Provincial Police played in administering 15 these Agreements, during the period of time you were 16 commissioner? 17 A: There was a commissioned officer that 18 was assigned or seconded to the Deputy Solicitor General 19 whose purpose was to facilitate the interaction between 20 the First Nations groups and the province with respect to 21 resources. 22 The Federal Government provided monetary 23 resources and that -- those resources along with 24 financial resources from the Province were to be used to 25 provide equipment, training and things of that nature to
2371 assist First Nations. 2 And the seconded member from the OPP was 3 to speak on behalf of -- agreement and to ascertain what 4 the various First Nations groups needed and to ensure 5 that that would happen. 6 In addition to that, there was a First 7 Nations section in the First Nations and contract 8 Policing Bureau with a larger staff which could be of 9 assistance to this individual in ensuring the logistics 10 of the agreement were carried out. 11 Q: And in 1995 the person in that role 12 was Inspector Ron Fox? 13 A: That's correct. 14 Q: And did you as Commissioner make the 15 decision to appoint Inspector Fox as the First Nation 16 Liaison Officer? 17 A: I made the decision to recommend him 18 to the Deputy Solicitor General, who was the individual 19 that he was going to report to. And, in fact, my 20 recommendation was accepted by her. And I made that 21 recommendation because I knew that Inspector Fox had a 22 good deal of familiarity with First Nations and First 23 Nations policing. 24 I knew that he was a strong supporter of 25 the strategic direction that we were trying to take and
2381 that he was -- he had very much the interest of First 2 Nations at heart. 3 In addition to that, I knew that he was a 4 very strong-willed individual and was reasonably well 5 informed, and would represent the Ontario Provincial 6 Police and the Ministry of the Solicitor General 7 extremely well with any parties that he had to interact 8 with. 9 Q: And I believe he was appointed in 10 early 1995, March, I believe, of 1995? 11 A: That could very well be correct, I'm 12 not sure of the date. 13 Q: And as the First Nations Liaison 14 Officer he reported to the Deputy Solicitor General in 15 the Ministry of the Attorney General -- I mean the 16 Solicitor General's Department? 17 A: His -- his active work, I guess, I'm 18 -- I'm think of the term that was used -- he wasn't 19 involved in operational police work but the operational 20 things that he did for the Solicitor General, he reported 21 to her in that regard. 22 But because he was still a member of the 23 Ontario Provincial Police, the administrative areas with 24 respect to his -- his housing and feeding et cetera, if 25 you will, was still addressed by the Deputy Commissioner
2391 of Services. 2 Q: And he worked with the First Nations 3 branch of the OPP with respect to administering the 4 tripartite agreement? 5 A: He would interact with them. 6 Q: And as I understand it as well, back 7 in 1995 there was a -- there were other OPP liaison 8 officers or other officers seconded to the Ministry of 9 the Solicitor General? 10 A: Yes. I believe there was one (1) 11 other. 12 Q: And that was -- there was Barbara -- 13 A: Taylor. 14 Q: -- Taylor, yes. And then I think 15 there was as well -- she had an assistant, Scott Patrick? 16 A: Yes. I'm not sure whether Scott 17 Patrick was an assistant -- 18 Q: No. He was Ron's -- 19 A: -- to her or an assistant to Ron Fox. 20 Q: He was an assistant to Ron. I've got 21 that -- 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: -- I'm -- I'm sorry. And -- but 24 Scott Patrick, back in 1995, was as well a serving member 25 of the Ontario Provincial Police?
2401 A: Yes, he was. 2 Q: And what was the role of Barbara 3 Taylor? 4 A: Well, I know at one point she was the 5 executive assistant to the Deputy Solicitor General. 6 Q: But was it normal during your tenure 7 to have a -- a police officer seconded to the Solicitor 8 General with -- separate, apart from the First Nations 9 Liaison Officer? 10 A: I think we did for most of my tenure. 11 Q: And the role of that person was to 12 advise on police issues if requested? 13 What was the role of the person? 14 A: Actually, she acted as the executive 15 assistant to the -- to the Deputy Solicitor General. She 16 was a serving police officer but, I guess, because the 17 largest portion of the Ministry was the Ontario 18 Provincial Police and the Deputy Minister for most of 19 those times was -- was not familiar with policing issues, 20 nor was she a lawyer. This was of some assistance to 21 her. 22 Q: And the office -- the Deputy 23 Solicitor General you're speaking of now, is that Elaine 24 Todres? 25 A: That's correct.
2411 Q: And, Ms. Todres was appointed Deputy 2 Solicitor General, I believe in early July or the end of 3 June, 1995, is that your understanding? 4 A: I'm not sure of that, but you could 5 very well be right. 6 Q: And was Ms. Taylor -- had -- was she 7 -- had she been seconded or another officer seconded to 8 the previous government, the government of Mr. Rae? 9 A: I believe she -- there was one there, 10 yes. 11 Q: And, lastly, if I could take you to 12 Tab 102 of the black book, excuse me... 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 Q: 100. And this is Inquiry Document 17 2000311 and it should be, if you're at 100, Ontario 18 Provincial Police Orders First Nations Self-Policing 19 Plan? 20 A: That's what I have. 21 Q: And can you tell us what this is, 22 sir? 23 A: Well, I had referred to this earlier. 24 This was a strategic statement -- it begins with a 25 strategic statement as to how the Ontario Provincial
2421 Police would like to see First Nations territories 2 policed in that we believe that they should be policed by 3 First Nations people and it goes on to say: 4 "In partnership with First Nations 5 communities and consistent with their 6 aspirations, government policy. The 7 OPP is committed to facilitating a 8 smooth transition to self-policing." 9 And, it goes on to set out objectives, 10 communication strategy, action plans, and then it's 11 backed up by various police orders or policy with respect 12 to the issues that would arise. 13 Q: And this particular document looks 14 like it's a live document in the sense of if you look 15 there's -- there are different dates. For example, under 16 Part 3 Probationary Constable December '89, October '87, 17 May '86, et cetera. 18 Do you know what the date of this 19 particular document is? 20 A: Well, it would have begun shortly 21 after my appointment as Commissioner as far as the 22 strategic direction is concerned and as the various 23 sections of the policy are put in, they are dated as to 24 when they were put in, or they could have been there 25 before and had been amended. So, if this was the -- if
2431 this was the -- the current date, one could say this is 2 what's valid today. This is the direction that the OPP 3 is going. 4 Q: And, perhaps, we could mark that 5 document as the next exhibit? 6 THE REGISTRAR: P-582, Your Honour. 7 8 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-582: Document number 2000311 OPP 9 Orders- First Nations Self- 10 Policing Plan.(undated) 11 12 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 13 Q: This is the document that you 14 referred to when you said the police orders -- there was 15 a document with respect to First Nation policing? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: And that would be an appropriate time 18 to stop for the day, sir. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 20 very much. 21 MR. DERRY MILLAR: And, Mr. O'Grady, we 22 start at 10:30 on Monday. 23 Thank you, Commissioner, that's it for the 24 week. 25 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
2441 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 2 3 (WITNESS RETIRES) 4 5 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Now, I might, for the 6 benefit of My Friends, Part 2 of the program tomorrow, as 7 I understand it, starts at 8:30 at the Metropolitan Hotel 8 in Toronto, which is on Chestnut Street, just south of 9 Dundas. Thank you, sir. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I hope to 11 see some of you there tomorrow and we'll see you all back 12 here on Monday at 10:30. 13 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 14 adjourned until Monday, August 22nd, at 10:30 a.m. 15 16 --- Upon adjourning at 3:32 p.m. 17 18 Certified Correct, 19 20 21 22 _________________ 23 Carol Geehan 24 25