11 2 3 IPPERWASH PUBLIC INQUIRY 4 5 6 7 ******************** 8 9 10 BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE SIDNEY LINDEN, 11 COMMISSIONER 12 13 14 15 16 Held at: Forest Community Centre 17 Kimball Hall 18 Forest, Ontario 19 20 21 ******************** 22 23 24 August 17th, 2005 25
21 Appearances 2 Derry Millar ) Commission Counsel 3 Susan Vella ) (np) 4 Donald Worme, Q. C ) 5 Katherine Hensel ) 6 Megan Ferrier ) (np) 7 Murray Klippenstein ) (np) The Estate of Dudley 8 Vilko Zbogar ) George and George 9 Andrew Orkin ) (np) Family Group 10 Basil Alexander ) 11 12 Peter Rosenthal ) Aazhoodena and George 13 Jackie Esmonde ) Family Group 14 15 Anthony Ross ) (np) Residents of 16 Cameron Neil ) (np) Aazhoodena (Army Camp) 17 Kevin Scullion ) 18 William Henderson ) (np) Kettle Point & Stony 19 Jonathon George ) (np) Point First Nation 20 Colleen Johnson ) 21 22 Kim Twohig ) Government of Ontario 23 Walter Myrka ) (np) 24 Susan Freeborn ) (np) 25 Michelle Pong ) (np)
31 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 Janet Clermont ) Municipality of 3 David Nash ) (np) Lambton Shores 4 5 Peter Downard ) The Honourable Michael 6 Bill Hourigan ) (np) Harris 7 Jennifer McAleer ) 8 9 Ian Smith ) (np) Robert Runciman 10 Alice Mrozek ) (np) 11 Harvey Stosberg ) (np) Charles Harnick 12 Jacqueline Horvat ) 13 Douglas Sulman, Q.C. ) Marcel Beaubien 14 Dave Jacklin ) (np) 15 Trevor Hinnegan ) (np) 16 17 Mark Sandler ) Ontario Provincial 18 Andrea Tuck-Jackson ) Ontario Provincial Police 19 Leslie Kaufman ) (np) 20 Ian Roland ) Ontario Provincial 21 Karen Jones ) (np) Police Association & 22 Debra Newell ) (np) K. Deane 23 Ian McGilp ) (np) 24 Annie Leeks ) (np) 25 Jennifer Gleitman ) (np)
41 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 Julian Falconer ) (np) Aboriginal Legal 3 Brian Eyolfson ) (np) Services of Toronto 4 Kimberly Murray ) 5 Julian Roy ) 6 Clem Nabigon ) (np) 7 Adriel Weaver ) (np) Student-at-Law 8 9 Al J.C. O'Marra ) Office of the Chief 10 Robert Ash, Q.C. ) (np) Coroner 11 12 William Horton ) (np) Chiefs of Ontario 13 Matthew Horner ) 14 Kathleen Lickers ) (np) 15 16 Mark Fredrick ) (np) Christopher Hodgson 17 Craig Mills ) (np) 18 Megan Mackey ) (np) 19 Erin Tully ) 20 21 David Roebuck ) (np) Debbie Hutton 22 Anna Perschy ) 23 Melissa Panjer ) (np) 24 Danya Cohen-Nehemia ) 25
51 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 PAGE NO. 3 List of Exhibits 6 4 5 CHRISTOPHER JAMES ASH COLES, Resumed 6 7 Cross-Examination by Mr. Doug Sulman 14 8 Cross-Examination by Ms. Anna Perschy 20 9 Cross-Examination by Mr. Vilko Zbogar 36 10 Cross-Examination by Ms. Jackie Esmonde 70 11 Cross-Examination by Mr. Kevin Scullion 177 12 Cross-Examination by Mr. Matthew Horner 224 13 Cross-Examination by Mr. Julian Roy 252 14 15 16 Certificate of Transcript 293 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
61 EXHIBITS 2 No. Description Page 3 P-576 Document number 1001088 September 4 07/95 OPP News Release "Clarification 5 of Events" chronology of events: 6 September 6-7/95 from 19:55 hrs 7 to 3:29 hrs. 13 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 NOTE: Correction to prior exhibit 22 P-499 Document No. 2003790, Handwritten notes of 23 Tony Parkin July 30/'95 to September 08/'95 24 and Parkin's statement March 30/'04 25
71 --- Upon commencing at 9:02 a.m. 2 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 4 now in session, the Honourable Mr. Justice Linden 5 presiding. Please be seated. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 7 morning, everybody. 8 Good morning, Mr. Sandler. 9 MR. MARK SANDLER: Good morning, 10 Commissioner, I wonder if I can just raise a procedural 11 matter before we continue on. 12 Last night at about 7:00 p.m., we received 13 by e-mail transmission a notice from the ALST concerning 14 the documents that would be the subject of -- or 15 potentially the subject of cross-examination of Mr. 16 Coles. 17 What we received is a series of -- of 18 numbers corresponding to the database and -- and no 19 description of the documents or which portions within 20 that database were going to be referred to. There were 21 over six thousand (6,000) pages there. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Did you read 23 them all? 24 MR. MARK SANDLER: No. No, and I 25 couldn't impose that on -- on Mr. Coles and -- and I have
81 to say that -- that -- and I -- and I think a number of 2 Counsel here can -- can attest to this and -- and you 3 won't know this, but the OPP has tried to take a flexible 4 approach about the notices. 5 We haven't always been receiving notices 6 twenty-four (24) hours in advance. In some instances, 7 and Mr. Falconer's an example though he's not here, a 8 number of documents were put to Mr. Carson and to 9 Superintendent Fox that were not the subject of a notice 10 and if it -- if it can be dealt with in an accommodating 11 way, then we've done that. 12 But, in my submission our -- our witnesses 13 and all witnesses here are entitled to review documents 14 that they might be cross-examined on in advance of being 15 cross-examined. I can't discuss them with Mr. Coles or 16 any of my witnesses because he's under cross-examination, 17 but I also like to review the documents so that -- so 18 that I know if the cross-examination is fair and whether 19 it refers to the appropriation portions. 20 And, I don't understand why -- why we have 21 to get a notice that simply lists numbers and -- and 22 which totals six thousand (6,000) pages. And, we asked 23 Mr. Roy last night to particularize them and -- and we 24 didn't receive any particularization of them. 25 Mr. Roy advises me this morning that he
91 may only refer to a couple of the documents in there. 2 Well, that's not helpful to us, with great respect 3 because it means that we're doing a lot of work for 4 nothing or unable to do the work. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 6 MR. MARK SANDLER: And -- and, I didn't 7 think it was appropriate to ask Mr. Coles to read six 8 thousand (6,000) pages on the -- not knowing which areas 9 were of interest. And I -- and I point up that 10 Commission Counsel's done a very good in isolating the 11 documents of the witnesses, putting them in binders and 12 showing them, so most of the time we receive a notice and 13 in this instance is a perfect example. 14 These may refer sometimes to Mr. Coles, 15 but these aren't Mr. Coles' documents in any -- these are 16 -- these are discoveries of -- of other witnesses, these 17 are newspaper clippings. They're materials that aren't 18 his documents, so he wouldn't review them in the ordinary 19 course unless they've been provided by Commission 20 Counsel. 21 So -- so, my respectful submission is that 22 there's a certain unfairness in that process. And I'm 23 not asking you to do anything about it at this stage, 24 because it may be that -- that it will become a non-issue 25 on this cross-examination and I'd like to see this cross-
101 examination finished today, if at all possible. 2 So, we'll see how it -- how it develops, 3 but in my submission, I'm putting My Friend on notice 4 that that is not notice, as far as I'm concerned and I 5 would ask that some more consideration be given to the 6 Witness and to Counsel for the Witness. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 8 very much, Mr. Sandler; that's the purpose of the rule, 9 of course. The rule exists for that very reason, so I'm 10 grateful. 11 Do you want to say something about that 12 Mr. Roy or -- 13 MR. JULIAN ROY: I could. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You don't 15 need to, but I think at this point -- 16 MR. JULIAN ROY: I -- I can let -- Mr. 17 Commissioner, you know that I have spoken to My Friend -- 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 19 MR. JULIAN ROY: -- and have spoken to 20 your Counsel. I must say, with the holiday et cetera, I 21 was away for a number of weeks. 22 This original list was a list that, in the 23 ordinary course, would have been called down further. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 25 MR. JULIAN ROY: It wasn't because of the
111 holiday, et cetera, and I didn't really turn my mind to 2 the alarm that it might cause My Friend and perhaps I -- 3 I ought to have, and I apologise for that. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 5 very much. 6 MR. JULIAN ROY: But I can assure 7 everybody I'm not intending to go through six thousand 8 (6,000) documents. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: But you can 10 understand why the Witness would be -- 11 MR. JULIAN ROY: I fully understand now. 12 And as for not responding to -- to the e-mail last night, 13 I just didn't have my computer on last night. I was 14 working on paper, so -- 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 16 MR. JULIAN ROY: -- I -- when I got -- I 17 did respond this morning. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 19 Let's carry on then. 20 MR. JULIAN ROY: Thank you. 21 MR. DONALD WORME: Commissioner, perhaps 22 just before we do, I don't intend to speak to the subject 23 that was just raised other than to thank both Mr. Sandler 24 as well as Mr. Roy for their collegial manner of dealing 25 with this.
121 And I think it reminds us all that there 2 are rules that, if we observe, we can avoid these kinds 3 of things. 4 Having said that -- 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: They're just 6 notwithstanding rules, there's collegiality which is 7 probably even more important than the rules. So, there 8 has been collegiality here and I hope we can keep it up. 9 MR. DONALD WORME: As I was suggesting, 10 that's -- that's correct, sir. 11 Just further to my examination yesterday 12 of Mr. Coles, there are one -- there is one (1) document, 13 it is a four (4) page document, Inquiry document number 14 1001088. 15 It is a Ontario Provincial Police news 16 release dated September 7th that I'd referred to 17 yesterday. It is at Tab 35 and I would ask that that be 18 made an exhibit, please. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think 20 that's the one I mentioned that I don't think -- 21 MR. DONALD WORME: It is. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- had been 23 made an exhibit. 24 MR. DONALD WORME: I believe that's 25 right, sir.
131 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 2 THE REGISTRAR: P-576, Your Honour. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 4 very much. 5 6 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-576: Document number 1001088 7 September 07/95 OPP News 8 Release " Clarification of 9 Events" chronology of events: 10 September 6-7/95 from 19:55 11 hrs to 3:29 hrs. 12 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I see Mr. 14 Sulman is here. I believe that your cross-examination, 15 on behalf of Mr. Beaubien, is next. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 20 morning. 21 MR. DOUG SULMAN: Good morning, Mr. 22 Commissioner. I've -- I have been absent for a while, 23 but I'm glad to be back and to start off good morning, 24 with a surprise for me. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well --
141 CHRISTOPHER JAMES ASH COLES, Resumed 2 3 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. DOUG SULMAN: 4 Q: Chief Coles, by very nature of that 5 my cross-examination is going to be somewhat discrete and 6 I really want to touch on two (2) areas. 7 So, you know, I represent Marcel Beaubien 8 who was the Member of Provincial Parliament at the time 9 of the incident. 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: And I really want to talk to you 12 about two (2) areas. First, before September 6th 1995 13 and then I'll to the period after September 6th, 1995, 14 okay? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: And I understand -- I'm not going to 17 go through all the evidence that you've given earlier, 18 but I understand that you have testified that on a 19 particular area of importance to this Commission, that 20 you generally have said that you took no instructions 21 from any politicians with regard to operational matters 22 of -- in the days leading up to September 6th, 1995; is 23 that correct? 24 A: That's correct. 25 Q: And to be more particular, I
151 understand that you had a telephone conversation with my 2 client, Mr. Beaubien, in that period of time, prior to 3 September 6th? 4 A: I have a recollection that I did 5 speak to Marcel Beaubien on the telephone. When the date 6 exactly, or the -- the exact contents, I don't have 7 knowledge of. 8 Q: Yeah, I understand that, but it was 9 prior to September 6th? 10 A: I believe so. 11 Q: Okay. And if you had -- if he had, 12 in that conversation, advocated a strong position with 13 you, I take it you would -- that, you would recall? 14 A: We would have had a discussion, yes. 15 Q: Okay. And can you confirm for me 16 then, that in that conversation, you don't recall Mr. 17 Beaubien advocating any position, strong or otherwise, 18 with regard to how the OPP would operate in this crisis? 19 A: No, sir. My recollection of my -- of 20 my -- of a telephone conversation was basically that Mr. 21 Beaubien was expressing that he did have concerns that 22 constituents were calling him and raising concerns. 23 And as far as the -- my duties, I would 24 relate to him that I felt that we were acting in an 25 appropriate manner and had the resources required. And
161 that's basically where I -- what -- how I recollect the 2 conversation. 3 Q: Okay. So, he's -- he's acting 4 somewhat as a con -- passing on his constituents concerns 5 to you? 6 A: Yes, sir. And I -- and I do recall 7 as I did with all politicians, and the fact that I would 8 try to keep them in the loop. And by those politicians I 9 mean Rosemarie Ur who was a Federal member. I had the 10 same -- similar conversation with her, with Mr. Beaubien, 11 with Mr. Fred Thomas and with Mr. Tom Bressette. 12 And if they wanted me to call them, I 13 would call them to try to -- kind of a -- to update as 14 best I knew. And that's what I chose to do. 15 Q: So, let me describe what I understand 16 you just told me then and you can confirm or not confirm 17 it. And that is that they would call you and express 18 constituents concerns so that you knew what was going on 19 from their perspective on the ground as elective 20 officials. 21 And you would tell them basically what you 22 felt was appropriate information that you knew that they 23 would then convey to the constituents? 24 A: Throughout my notes, it shows that in 25 some cases I had conversations and it was basically me
171 calling them when it -- when I -- when it was convenient 2 to the incident. Post the shooting, I was still trying 3 to apprise them of -- of what was going on, that we were 4 still in the presence and what we were doing, but taking 5 no direction from them at all. 6 Q: That's what I want to know. In 7 particular with regard to Marcel Beaubien and so can you 8 just confirm for me that he didn't attempt to instruct 9 you with regard to OPP operations whatsoever at the 10 Ipperwash Park occupation. 11 A: To the best of my recollection, no, 12 sir, he did not. 13 Q: And I suppose from that you can also 14 confirm for me that you took no instructions whatsoever 15 from Mr. Beaubien? 16 A: I did not. 17 Q: And can you, prior to September 7th 18 which would be the day after the unfortunate incident, 19 can you confirm for me that Mr. Beaubien did not deliver 20 or otherwise communicate any instructions, messages or 21 information whatsoever to you from Premier Harris, any of 22 the ministers of the Crown -- Provincial Crown or any 23 other government employee or representative? 24 A: He did not. 25 Q: Thank you, sir. Now, if we could
181 turn to the period after September 6 just for a moment. 2 And it's my understanding that in the aftermath of the 3 September 6th incident, you would have had more regular 4 communication with Mr. Beaubien both by telephone and in 5 person. Am I correct in that? 6 A: Yes, I did, sir. 7 Q: And I understand that it's your 8 evidence that you found it important to continue to 9 liaise after this incident, liaise and work with local 10 political leaders, whether they're members of the 11 Provincial Parliament, Federal Parliament, local 12 municipal council and local Native band councils, 13 correct? 14 A: Yes, sir. Including the community 15 policing committee is also an avenue that we chose to -- 16 also to give regular updates to the community policing 17 committee of Port Franks. 18 Q: Okay. Thank you, sir. And I'm 19 particularly interested obviously in my client's role. 20 A: I understand. 21 Q: And in the aftermath, is it fair to 22 describe the aftermath of the September 6th incident, is 23 it fair to describe Mr. Beaubien's role vis-a-vis you, as 24 one that was helpful? 25 A: Yes, it was.
191 Q: And as cooperative? 2 A: Yes, it was. 3 Q: And as working with you towards a 4 peaceful solution to what in September 1995 was still a 5 very delicate and potentially explosive situation? 6 A: Yes, sir. 7 Q: Okay. And during that period of 8 time, post the incident, did he attempt to tell you how 9 to do operations of the OPP? 10 A: He did not. 11 Q: Okay. Thank you, sir. Those are all 12 my questions. 13 Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 15 Ms. Perschy...? 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: Good morning, 20 Commissioner. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 22 morning. 23 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: Good morning, sir. 24 THE WITNESS: Good morning. 25
201 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. ANNA PERSCHY: 2 Q: My name is Anna Perschy and I'm 3 Counsel for Deb Hutton, who was the Premier's executive 4 assistant at the time in question. 5 And I just wanted to go back to your 6 testimony regarding 1993. I just have a few questions by 7 way of clarification. 8 You testified that in 1993 when some First 9 Nations people occupied the ranges on a small section of 10 the Army Camp, you received a call from the Military and 11 attended at a meeting with Major Vernon, I believe it was 12 May 20th, 1993. 13 A: Major General Vernon, yes. 14 Q: And, you described a couple of days 15 ago how, at the meeting, you took the position that the 16 Military had jurisdiction over the Base, but that if 17 there was a breach of -- of the peace off the Base, the 18 OPP would help keep the peace. 19 You also testified that you had suggested 20 to the Military that they seek an injunction? 21 A: That's correct. 22 Q: Did the Military indicate at that 23 meeting on May 20th that they wanted the OPP to come onto 24 the Base and remove the occupiers? 25 A: No, there was -- as I think I
211 previously testified, there was the discussion of 2 contingencies, et cetera, but no, not to say we -- we 3 want you to do this. 4 A: Okay. John Carson testified 5 previously at this Inquiry on May 10th that around this 6 timeframe, May 19th/20th, 1993 he was aware that a number 7 of approaches that you just mentioned had been discussed 8 with the Military, but that it was the Military's 9 preference that the OPP take policing responsibility and 10 simply go onto the Base and enforce trespass. 11 Do you recall, sir, being made aware of 12 this preference in this timeframe? 13 A: You're using the word, "preference" 14 and I don't know if -- if that was relayed to me by John 15 Carson; if he would have used the word, "preference." 16 But maybe they did have a preference. 17 Maybe they saw fit that it might help 18 their situation. But I don't recall that I -- the -- the 19 meeting that -- that I had, it did not -- it was not 20 suggested to me and I really don't recall if John Carson 21 told me that there was a preference of the Military to do 22 that, so I can't recall. 23 Q: Did you know that it was one (1) of 24 the options that was being discussed? 25 A: Oh, I realized it was an option.
221 Q: And, as you testified previously, 2 your response to the Military -- or the OPP's response to 3 the Military was that the OPP would assist if the 4 Military applied for and obtained an injunction? 5 A: We would be acting on the injunction 6 of the Courts, so really whether or not we were assisting 7 the Military or not, I'm suggesting we would be taking 8 direction from a Court and taking certain action to -- to 9 do -- 10 Q: Fair enough. And, Inspector Carson, 11 who was then the incident commander, had meetings and 12 conversations with, I believe it was a Major Bob Howell 13 on June 23rd and 24th, 1993. And you were aware that 14 there were those meetings and conversations, right? 15 I think -- believe Commission Counsel took 16 you through some of that? 17 A: I was aware that John Carson was 18 meeting with the Military, yes. 19 Q: And, again, Inspector Carson advised 20 you that the Military didn't really want to bring an 21 injunction and was looking at, for example, Section 41 of 22 the Criminal Code and also the defence, the Federal 23 Defence Access Regulations? 24 A: I recall in the literature that -- 25 that there -- that there was that, whether or not it was
231 portrayed specifically to me, if you could point it out, 2 that if it was in John Carson's notes that he told me 3 that. I -- I have no direct recollection. 4 Q: Fair enough. I understand that you 5 don't recall today what are the Defence Controlled Access 6 Regulations. 7 Do you recall what is Section 41 of the 8 Criminal Code? 9 A: I believe it's the mischief code -- 10 part of the code. 11 Q: I'm sorry, I didn't... 12 A: I believe it's the mischief part of 13 the Code. 14 Q: I understand it's actually -- it's 15 the section that refers to the defence of real property. 16 And it provides that everyone who's in peaceful 17 possession of real property is justified in using force 18 to either prevent any person from trespassing or -- from 19 the real property or to remove them as long as they use 20 no -- no more force than necessary. 21 A: I stand -- 22 Q: Do you recall that section? 23 A: -- I -- I stand corrected. If that's 24 what you're telling me it says, that's what it says. 25 Q: But you're familiar with the section?
241 A: Yes, I am. 2 Q: You recall it? 3 A: Yes, I am. 4 Q: And, Inspector Carson testified that 5 he had a meeting in London with six (6) or seven (7) 6 Military personnel and Superintendent Wall on June 25th, 7 1993, and again, at that meeting, the Military indicated 8 that they preferred some -- some of the other options 9 was, the OPP reiterated their preference that the 10 Military apply for an injunction. 11 Do you recall Inspector Carson advising 12 you of that meeting? 13 A: No, I don't. If Tom Wall was at that 14 meeting, he was super -- he was a person under -- under 15 me -- 16 Q: So you -- 17 A: -- but I don't recall either John 18 Carson or Wall saying that. 19 Q: Fair enough. But, you were aware 20 that Inspector Carson and Superintendent Wall met on June 21 28th in Toronto with Major General Vernon and some of the 22 other Military personnel? 23 A: I think the evidence that I okayed 24 for John to -- to go, yes. 25 Q: And again, the subjects of the
251 meeting were these various options; the injunction, the 2 criminal code, the Federal Access Regulations? 3 A: Correct. 4 Q: And you knew, I take it, that 5 Inspector Carson was told by the Military the following 6 day that they were going to send a written request to the 7 OPP Commissioner for assistance pursuant to the Criminal 8 Code of Federal regulations? 9 A: Would you repeat that again, please? 10 Q: Sorry. Inspector Carson testified 11 that he had -- that he was told in advance by the 12 Military that they were going to send a written request 13 to the OPP Commissioner for assistance, and I'm just 14 wondering if you were aware of that? 15 A: No. 16 Q: Well, you testified that you knew a 17 letter was delivered to Commissioner O'Grady. This is -- 18 maybe I can take you to the letter, this is -- 19 A: That's fair. I recall that letter 20 but I guess -- 21 Q: You didn't know in advance? 22 A: That's right and I -- and you're 23 suggesting that letter says that the Military was asking 24 for assistance? 25 Q: Yes. Maybe I should just take you to
261 the letter, sir. 2 A: Please. 3 Q: This is P-402. It's one of the 4 previous exhibits and I believe it's at tab -- let's see. 5 I don't have the tab number, I believe it's Tab 13. 6 A: Thank you, I have it. 7 Q: You have it? 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: What's the 9 tab number, if you know it? 10 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: I thought it was Tab 11 13 of Commission Counsel's documents, but I stand to be 12 corrected. 13 MR. MARK SANDLER: Tab 17, I believe. 14 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: 17. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 17. 16 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: Thank you, Mr. 17 Sandler. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 19 20 (BRIEF PAUSE) 21 22 THE WITNESS: I see it as a letter of 23 appreciation in the first paragraph -- 24 25 CONTINUED BY MS. ANNA PERSCHY:
271 Q: Yes. 2 A: -- but I don't see it as anywhere 3 that he refers to assistance to the Military by the 4 Ontario Provincial Police. I see that it does talk about 5 joint cooperation, et cetera. 6 Q: Well, if I can just turn you, sir, to 7 paragraph 3, it states: 8 "However, if there should be a change 9 in the circumstances at Camp Ipperwash 10 that would represent a threat to 11 personnel training or working at Camp 12 Ipperwash, or the imminent threat of 13 destruction of public property, it 14 would then be necessary to take action 15 to effect the eviction of the SPG from 16 Ipperwash." 17 A: I -- I believe -- 18 Q: And then the following paragraph, 19 sorry: 20 "Removal of the SPG from the defence 21 establishment at Camp Ipperwash is 22 provided for under the Defence 23 Controlled Access Area regulations; 24 copies attached for your information. 25 Please note that paragraphs 9 and --
281 please note paragraphs 9 and 10, and 2 Section 41 of the Criminal Code of 3 Canada. 4 It is our hope the situation may be 5 resolved without resort to the use of 6 physical force as provided for by the 7 aforementioned regulations. 8 Our most recent information, however, 9 indicates that the SPG is firmly wedded 10 to the object of a permanent of the DND 11 property. 12 Should the circumstances warrant, an 13 order will be issued under paragraph 9 14 of the attached. We trust that we may 15 rely upon you, as peace officers, to 16 respond to our call. We believe that 17 the appearances presented by the 18 Ontario Provincial Police would be less 19 confrontational than unilateral action 20 on the part of the Federal 21 authorities." 22 Now, I understood your testimony 23 previously was that you didn't recall seeing this letter 24 at the time, but I was wondering, were you aware of its 25 contents at the time?
291 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 A: I don't know the source of that 4 document. I see that he carbon copied Hef Armstrong of 5 the RCMP and the Deputy Chief of Defence -- and that it 6 went to Commissioner O'Grady. 7 Whether or not that came to me, I can't 8 tell you. 9 Q: And my question simply wasn't whether 10 or not you saw the letter itself, but simply whether or 11 not you were aware of its contents at the time; do you 12 recall? 13 A: No. 14 Q: Fair enough. So, I take it that you 15 have no knowledge with respect to any response that may 16 have been made by the OPP with respect to this -- this 17 request? 18 A: If there had been a response, I think 19 I would have been -- I would have had knowledge of it. 20 Q: Fair enough. 21 A: When I said, "no," I meant I have no 22 -- I have no recollection, specifically, of that -- of -- 23 of that. 24 Q: I understand. 25 A: I mean, is the general --
301 Q: It is a number of years ago. 2 A: -- the general thrust of that letter, 3 I have no problem with, yes, had the Military chosen to 4 evict people from the -- the property and, as we had -- 5 at the previous conversation, I would have -- my officers 6 would have responded to prevent a breach of the peace. 7 So, yes, I had that in my mind if -- if 8 that formed part -- specifically to this letter, I -- I 9 have no recollection. 10 Q: I appreciate that -- that the OPP 11 preferred that the Military proceed by way of a 12 injunction, seeking an injunction, and they made that 13 clear to the Military and you've given some evidence in 14 that regard, but with respect to these various 15 communications that you had with the Military, that -- 16 that Inspector Carson had with the Military, I take it 17 that you didn't have a problem with the fact that they 18 were articulating their -- their views in these 19 discussions regarding possible options? 20 A: No, not at all. 21 Q: And, you didn't have any concerns 22 with the Military speaking with your incident commander, 23 Inspector Carson, with respect to these various options? 24 A: No, he was assigned to -- to liaise 25 with the Military and they -- they gave liaisons officers
311 too. 2 Q: And, I understand that the OPP's 3 position that they required an injunction never changed? 4 You wanted to pursue -- 5 A: That's correct. 6 Q: And, ultimately, the Federal 7 Government never sought an injunction, and in July 1995, 8 when the occupiers took over the barracks, it was the 9 Military who withdrew from the barracks? 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: I'd just like to turn to September 12 1995 and the phone call between first, Inspector Carson 13 and Ron Fox, and then later between yourself and 14 Inspector Fox just for a moment. 15 You testified that during your meeting 16 with Inspector Carson, Inspector Fox called and spoke 17 with Inspector Carson while you were in the same small 18 trailer? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: And, you've testified that you only 21 heard what Inspector Carson was saying, not what Ron Fox 22 was saying? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: Now, we've heard some evidence at 25 this Inquiry that it was not long before this phone call
321 that the Provincial Government had, in fact, decided to 2 apply for an injunction as soon as possible. And if you 3 could actually just turn to the transcript of the 4 conversation; it's Exhibit P-44(a). I believe it's Tab 5 37, I'm not sure what the Tab number is in terms of the 6 Commission Counsel documents. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's 37. 8 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: Thank you, 9 Commissioner. 10 THE WITNESS: I have it. 11 12 CONTINUED BY MS. ANNA PERSCHY: 13 Q: And, if you look at the first couple 14 of pages, pages 258 and 259, you'll see that Ron Fox told 15 Inspector Carson about the Government's decision to apply 16 for an injunction. But of course, you're only hearing 17 Inspector Carson's portion of the phone call and he's 18 simply acknowledging that -- that he's -- that he's 19 hearing what -- what Ron Fox is saying. 20 And so, it's not -- it's not clear what 21 information Inspector Carson has received. For example, 22 at page 259, Inspector Fox says: 23 "They are making move towards getting 24 an ex parte injunction, in other words, 25 one that doesn't have to be served."
331 And, Inspector Carson, which is all you're 2 hearing, says, Okay. And then, Ron Fox says: 3 "What they have to do is show emergent 4 circumstances." 5 And, Carson says, "Right." 6 And then, Ron Fox says: 7 "And, the exigencies of the situation 8 are kind of increasing exponentially." 9 And then, Carson simply says, "Okay." 10 And, I take it you didn't have an 11 opportunity to speak with Inspector Carson before you 12 began speaking with Ron Fox, right? 13 A: About the telephone conversation? 14 Q: Yes, before you have a chance to 15 speak with Ron Fox. 16 A: My recollection is that, as to -- 17 previously testified, he asked me if I wanted to talk to 18 the chief and I was there and I came on so... 19 Q: So, at the time that you spoke to 20 Inspector Fox, you didn't know that the Provincial 21 Government had in fact decided to apply for an injunction 22 as soon as possible? 23 A: I don't know. That's possible. I 24 don't know. 25 Q: And of course at the time you wanted
341 the Government to apply for an injunction? 2 A: I did. 3 Q: So, in fact the Government had made 4 the decision to proceed in the way that the OPP 5 preferred, you just weren't aware of it at the time? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: But you were advised subsequently? 8 A: I believe so. I do know that an 9 injunction ultimately was received and then not served. 10 Q: Right. The following day the 11 injunction was applied for. 12 A: I knew that we had people that were 13 going down and we were involved in the injunction 14 process, yes, that was in my mind. 15 Q: You've testified that you didn't 16 receive any directions from the Government. In fact, you 17 had no conversations or meetings of any kind with Deb 18 Hutton, the Premier's executive assistant, between 19 September 4th and 6th, 1995, correct? 20 A: I have never -- I don't believe I've 21 ever met or seen Deb Hutton. 22 Q: That, I will anticipate, will be her 23 evidence as well. And just one small point of 24 clarification. After September 6th, 1995, I understand 25 that there was a Superintendent Hutton who was involved
351 in an executive operation centre. 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: You may have had some dealings with 4 him but I take it he's a completely different Hutton. 5 You didn't have any dealings with Deb Hutton? 6 A: I don't know who his relatives are. 7 Q: Fair enough. My point is simply, 8 it's a different person. 9 A: Yes. 10 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: No further questions, 11 Commissioner. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 13 very much. Thank you. 14 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: Thank you very much. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm not sure 16 who's examining on behalf of the Estate. 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 21 morning. 22 MR. VILKO ZBOGAR: Good morning, Mr. 23 Commissioner. 24 Good morning, Mr. Coles. 25 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
361 MR. VILKO ZBOGAR: Mr. Commissioner, I 2 apologize. I think I gave an estimate of a half an hour. 3 I might be a little bit longer but hopefully within 4 forty-five (45) minutes or so. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 6 7 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. VILKO ZBOGAR: 8 Q: Mr. Coles, my name if Vilko Zbogar. 9 I'm representing the Estate of Dudley George and Family 10 Members of Dudley George. 11 You may or may not recall we last met on 12 June 21st or 26th, 1991 when Murray Klippenstein examined 13 you for discovery and we'll just start with some 14 questions relating -- well that arise from what Mr. 15 Klippenstein asked on that occasion and -- and we also 16 covered some of them yesterday. 17 And, specifically, you've given evidence 18 that on the afternoon -- afternoon of September 6th, 19 1995, at least until four o'clock in the afternoon when 20 you were present in the area, that the only situation was 21 that a group of people had occupied a piece of land, 22 specifically, of a closed provincial park. 23 And as I recall you've given evidence that 24 there was no urgency to the situation when you were 25 present in -- in that area of Forest and Ipperwash; is
371 that correct? 2 A: There was no -- I guess it goes to 3 the word 'urgency' that I'll -- I'll try to explain. We 4 had a situation, there were in fact blocks -- roadblocks 5 in some parts -- in observation areas that were being set 6 up. 7 So, it was a -- there was a heightened 8 police situation; the implementation of an incident 9 commander and a command trailer. But at the particular 10 time that -- that I went and spoke to John Carson on that 11 afternoon, I believe that the plan was being followed. 12 I believe that the resources were 13 available to John if those problems arose. I believe 14 John was completely in command of the situation and I was 15 satisfied that we would -- that there was a process 16 ongoing to try to seek an injunction so that it would 17 assist us in -- in the actions in this matter. 18 And so with all that in my mind, I believe 19 we were on the right path and so really nothing urgent 20 had to be done pertaining to that meeting. 21 Q: Sure, so there was a situation where 22 some people had occupied a piece of land; the police had 23 responded to that, but -- 24 A: There had been a fight. 25 Q: There had been a confrontation the
381 night before or two (2) nights before, at least -- 2 A: Yeah. 3 Q: -- and some -- but at least at the 4 time that you were there, there was nothing particularly 5 going on at the Park? 6 A: No, but we had lost cruisers -- you 7 brought up, we had lost cruisers -- some damage to some 8 metal the night before. We had -- but at that particular 9 time, I was -- I was satisfied that the situation was 10 being handled. 11 Q: So, at that particular time, all was 12 quiet with -- with respect to the park as far as the OPP 13 was concerned? 14 A: All was quiet to the -- to the 15 incident and the incident plan, yes, sir. 16 Q: Sure. And there was nothing going on 17 until four o'clock there on the 6th you would consider to 18 be an emergency situation; is that correct? 19 A: As I've explained, not an emergency 20 action that I saw that immediately officers had to do 21 something. 22 Q: Exactly. 23 A: At four o'clock in the afternoon, or 24 I was required. 25 Q: That's -- thank you. And I guess
391 also there was nothing happening during the time that you 2 were there that would suggest to you that things would be 3 escalating that afternoon or after you would have left? 4 You had no hint of that? 5 A: No, I had no hint of that, but in -- 6 circumstances can change very fast. 7 Q: Of course. Now, as you said, you 8 were expecting that, as of the afternoon of September 9 6th, the police would continue to contain the situation 10 as best they could, continue the checkpoints, try to 11 continue or open communications with the occupiers; is 12 that fair? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And there was no reason to depart 15 from that plan that was apparent during the time that you 16 were there? 17 A: No, sir. 18 Q: You've been referred, a few times, to 19 this phone call that you had with Mr. Ron -- or Inspector 20 Ron Fox. 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: And Mr. Fredrick and Ms. Twohig, I 23 think, took you to that and asked you a couple of 24 questions, but I don't think that one particular question 25 I have in mind, you were actually given an opportunity to
401 give the full answer to. And specifically I understand 2 your evidence was that you had a concern arising from 3 something you overheard John Carson telling Ron Fox in 4 that conversation. 5 What I'd like to do is ask you, if you 6 could, to -- to look at that transcript and it's at -- 7 it's Exhibit P-444(a), Tab 37. 8 I'd like to give you a minute, if you 9 could, to -- if you can help me and try to identify what 10 specific statement or statements in there would have been 11 the reason for your concern? 12 A: I think I was -- I can't remember the 13 Counsel that, kind of, corrected me, that some of the 14 words that I was hearing, basically, did not involve 15 firearms. I think that was my previous testimony. 16 Q: Yes. 17 A: And I think then what I refer to is 18 the fact, is that John Carson asked Ron Fox if he wanted 19 to talk to the Chief. 20 I didn't, to the best of my rec -- I 21 didn't point to John and say, I want to talk to Ron. It 22 was the other way round. John said, do you, Ron, want to 23 talk to the Chief? 24 And then as a result of that, I'm now in 25 conversation and now I'm saying, Ron, I have some
411 concerns. So that -- if that helps, yes, my mind is 2 thinking that, yeah, I've got some concerns here, Ron. I 3 don't want to be too close here with what we've gone on 4 and then I do that in the conversation. 5 But, I -- I believe I clarified or was -- 6 it was brought to my attention as to what I could have 7 heard. 8 Q: Really -- 9 A: I don't know if that helps you, but 10 that's my recollection. It's a -- but, yes, I was 11 thinking at the time that Ron -- we're talking here, and 12 then when I get on, I then mention the concerns that I 13 have which Ron Fox I didn't take. 14 Q: Sure, because you did talk about 15 those concerns, and the first thing you said when you got 16 on the phone, Ron Fox, is I have some concerns and we 17 have to be careful what we're doing here. 18 And I -- I understood your evidence to be 19 that that concern arose because you thought there may 20 have been operational matters being discussed between 21 John Carson and Ron Fox. Are you telling me now that 22 that -- 23 A: Hmm hmm. 24 Q: -- was not the case? 25 A: No, I -- I wasn't concerned that
421 operational matters was being spoken to between Ron Fox 2 and -- and John Carson. My concern was operational 3 concern was being addressed at an Interministerial 4 Committee where there were other people; that was -- that 5 was my concern. 6 Q: Okay. So -- sorry, that -- that's 7 what I should have said. But yes, your concern, I 8 understand it, was that there was operational discussion 9 happening at that level, at Ron Fox's level, in Queen's 10 Park and that, as I understand, it was apparent to you 11 from what John Carson was saying in that phone call, at 12 least that was -- seemed to be your evidence. 13 A: I think at one (1) time it was my 14 evidence, but as I said, I think I was corrected by 15 Counsel; that they seemed to say, well, how could you 16 hear that? And, when I reviewed the tape, I had -- I 17 could not, from the words, I might have heard that day, 18 sir. 19 Q: So, is there somewhere else? Is 20 there another source that you can identify as being the 21 source of your concern? 22 A: No, just me, Chris Coles, thinking 23 operationally Ron's calling an incident room here and 24 what's being talked about and the room kind of cleared up 25 and then we had that discussion.
431 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: Mr. Sandler just pointed out and I 4 was actually just going to ask this question, but, at 5 some point in that conversation, John Carson and, I 6 presume you would have overheard this, says: 7 "All right, they just want us to go 8 kick ass." 9 Do you remember hearing that or seeing 10 that in the transcript when you were reviewing it 11 recently? 12 A: No, I don't, can you direct me to it? 13 MR. MARK SANDLER: It's 262, page 262. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 THE WITNESS: I don't want to conflict 18 with my Counsel, but I -- don't -- the -- whether or not 19 I have a recollection of those words in my -- at this 20 time, when I give my evidence, I don't have a 21 recollection that that -- those particular words alarmed 22 me. I think it was more my alarm that we -- I have a 23 person talking to an incident commander and I don't want 24 things to go up too fast. 25 I can't recall if that actually was a -- a
441 trigger neck mechanism. All I'm saying, if -- if that 2 had have been a trigger mechanism to it, I think it -- 3 possibly it might have come, Ron, the Chief wants to talk 4 to you as opposed to, Ron, do you want to talk to the 5 Chief. 6 7 CONTINUED BY MR. VILKO ZBOGAR: 8 Q: I'd like to move on if I could to the 9 -- the termination of your call with Ron Fox? 10 A: Yes, sir? 11 Q: I think -- well, the pages are 274 12 and 275. Reading the transcript and -- and having 13 listened to the tape, it appears that you told Mr. Fox -- 14 Inspector Fox -- I think three (3) times that you would 15 be calling him back and on one (1) occasion, or at the 16 very end, said that you didn't want him to get involved 17 in anything else. 18 I -- I presume when you told him not to 19 get involved in anything else, that was presumably so 20 that he would be available to take your call when you 21 called him back? 22 A: I -- I had the intention of calling 23 him back, yes. 24 Q: Right. And, I would suggest to you 25 that you wanted to call him back because the matters that
451 were being discussed by Ron Fox were quite serious. You 2 wanted to discuss them -- discuss them with him further, 3 but not in the command trailer; would you agree with 4 that? 5 A: I've testified I have no recollection 6 why I ended the conversation that way. 7 Q: Okay. In his examination of you, Mr. 8 Worme, I think paraphrased some of John Carson's evidence 9 about what happened following the termination of the 10 phone call, but I wanted to put specific words to you in 11 case that might refresh your memory a little bit. 12 In his evidence of May 18th, 2005, and 13 this is at page 229 about line 13 of the transcript. And 14 I'll read it to you, you don't have to -- you don't have 15 it before you. 16 John Carson stated that after you 17 terminated your conversation with Ron Fox, in the command 18 trailer, that you, quote: 19 "Went into the detachment, made the 20 phone call. And it was clear from that 21 point that I wouldn't be getting calls 22 from Ron Fox." End quote. 23 Does that at all refresh your memory as to 24 what may have happened? 25 A: No, sir, it does not.
461 Q: Is there any reason to believe that 2 John Carson's testimony that you went into the command 3 trailer and made that phone call to Ron Fox to be 4 incorrect? 5 A: If John Carson testified to that, I 6 have no reason to believe that it's incorrect. 7 Q: Do you believe you probably would 8 have called Ron Fox given what we see and given the 9 circumstances? 10 A: Yes, I believe I would, because I 11 specifically asked him not to get involved and I 12 specifically asked him to -- and I usually try to return 13 phone calls to Ron. 14 Q: Fair enough. And if you did call Ron 15 Fox from a phone line inside the Detachment, I take it 16 that would not have been on a recorded line? 17 A: I don't know. I didn't know this 18 phone call was recorded and whether or not tho -- not all 19 lines at Detachments are -- are recorded. I don't know. 20 Q: In your phone call with Ron Fox, the 21 one that we have a transcript of, you told him, I think 22 there's three (3) occasions where you told him, I don't 23 have a problem, or I don't mind you calling John here. 24 Do you remember telling him -- 25 A: Yes, yes, sir, I remember that.
471 Q: -- saying that? John Carson's 2 evidence as I read it out to you before was that he 3 understood after you had gone into the command trailer 4 and, according to him, made that phone call that he would 5 not be getting any further calls from Ron Fox which 6 appears to me to be different than what you were saying 7 to Ron Fox on the recorded phone call. 8 Do you have any explanation or possible 9 reason for that apparent change? 10 A: No, I don't. 11 Q: And during their phone call with Ron 12 Fox, there was some reference to the Commissioner and it 13 appeared that you knew the Commissioner was getting some 14 pressure. Reference to that is page 272. 15 You state: 16 "I know the Commissioner is 17 resurrecting the old, what has always 18 been our approach because he feels he's 19 now going to start getting some 20 pressure." 21 And we'll skip to the next line. 22 "Ron Fox says he's already getting -- 23 he's already got it, Chris." 24 And you say: 25 "Sir, he has and he's trying to
481 resurrect the old [illegible word] of 2 why we go in for injunctions." 3 So, you seem to have an understanding of 4 what the Commissioner's approach was and now that he was 5 getting some pressure. Do you know what the source of 6 that information was? 7 Was it the Commissioner, was it the Deputy 8 Commissioner or possibly some other source? 9 A: I -- I don't recall the source. I 10 don't say -- believe -- Ron is a person -- you say he is 11 getting the pressure. I guess Ron is the person who says 12 that; he is already is. 13 Q: And then you say, sure he is. 14 Affirming that seems according to the -- to what I read 15 that you're affirming that what Ron Fox knows is correct. 16 A: I have no direct recollection of the 17 Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner advising me that 18 they were getting any kind of pressure. As I've 19 testified before, I maybe took some licence when I said 20 'he was resurrecting the old system'. 21 Given the situation, I fully expected that 22 there would be some heightened questions on the behalf of 23 the Government as to what the various agencies were doing 24 and some of that pressure would come his way. 25 Q: Do you believe you probably would
491 have spoken with either the Commissioner or with Deputy 2 Boose sometime between the commencement of the 3 occupation and the shooting? 4 A: I may -- I may have spoken to Boose. 5 But I don't believe my notes show that I spoke to Boose. 6 Q: Right. 7 A: But that's not necessary -- I mean it 8 would have been a telephone to my direct supervisor. But 9 I've no recollection of Mr. Boose, if that would have 10 been the case, of telling me that there was pressure 11 being... 12 Q: All right. 13 A: And as I've previously testified, I 14 wasn't concerned about any of that pressure; that would 15 have been their problem and they were quite capable of 16 handling that, I'm sure. 17 Q: I guess my question was whether you 18 believe you probably did call Mr. -- or Deputy Boose or 19 the Commissioner some time in that period. 20 A: I have no notes of it, or 21 recollection. 22 Q: No notes, but do you believe you 23 probably did? 24 A: No. I don't think I probably -- the 25 situation that I previously testified was we were
501 handling the situation. It was -- I had people handling 2 it. They had supervisors and I was overseeing it. What 3 would I have been calling them for? 4 Q: In -- in the conversation you had 5 with Ron Fox, I think you -- in front of you, on -- on 6 page 273 you're -- you're telling Ron Fox, 7 "I will call the Commissioner. I don't 8 know if he's there, but I'll call 9 Boose's office anyway." 10 A: In -- in that regard, that's because 11 as far as I'm concerned now, as a result of my 12 discussions with Ron Fox, I'm having some concerns that 13 some information now is -- has been presented at the All 14 Ministry Forum, if you will, and that some of that 15 meeting -- some of that information is operational. 16 I've been given the explanation as to how 17 it got there, and I guess at that time, I'm thinking, as 18 I'm talking on the telephone, Yeah, maybe I will call the 19 Commissioner tell him -- just kind of give him a heads up 20 that something might be happening. 21 So, I think that's the logic that I put to 22 that. 23 Q: Sure. Now, given -- so you said, you 24 -- when you say you're going to make a phone call you 25 probably normally will make that phone call.
511 Do you believe you probably would have 2 called the Commissioner Boose's office after this 3 conversation you had with Inspector Fox? 4 A: At the time I said it, I probably had 5 every intention of doing it. Whether or not I did it 6 subsequently as a result of other conversations and what 7 I -- what I did was the available, I don't have a 8 recollection that I did. At the time I said it, I might 9 possibly... 10 Q: If I could refer you to Tab 26 of 11 your document book, and those are the scribe notes of 12 September 4th, 1995, tab 26. 13 And, on page 8, the entry for 23:10 hours 14 says, Chief Coles -- I understand this is probably John 15 Carson reporting back to somebody on -- on the site 16 there. 17 "Chief Coles will be notifying Deputy 18 Commissioner Boose." 19 Does that refresh your memory as to 20 whether or not you might have called Boose sometime after 21 September 4th? 22 A: I -- did I call Deputy Commissioner 23 Boose after September 4th? I think there's some notation 24 that I did. 25 December -- September the 11th update --
521 Q: Oh, sorry -- 2 A: -- et cetera. I mean, yes. 3 Afterwards, yes, I definitely would have. 4 Q: I should have said after September 5 4th, but before September the 6th. 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE) 8 9 A: Well, after September the 4th, there 10 is the -- that's a statutory holiday, and in September -- 11 and at 8:00 p.m. I've been advised that the Natives have 12 occupied the Ipperwash and that on the 5th of September, 13 I show me that I'm in the office re: Western region re. 14 preparation re. Ipperwash. 15 I've every reason to believe that 16 probably, given the -- the -- I'm in my office and I'm 17 near a phone, things have happened the night before. 18 Yes, I probably would have phoned Booth (sic) if he was 19 available. 20 Q: All right. 21 A: I don't know if he was there is what 22 I'm saying. My notes don't show that I -- 23 Q: And you don't for sure and you don't 24 know whether you might have talked to the -- 25 A: No, but I have every reason to
531 believe that if he was -- if I knew that he was in the 2 office, I might have called him, yes, sir, to tell him of 3 what's gone on. I know there had been issue sheets 4 prepared. 5 Q: Okay. Well, let me look to a couple 6 of points that you referred to the other day. One (1) 7 was your reference to a number of cameras being set up in 8 the Park? 9 A: Yes, sir. 10 Q: Your recollection was that -- that 11 you thought there were maybe five (5) or six (6) cameras 12 set up in the Park placed on -- placed on MNR property. 13 Do you have any recollection of where 14 those might have been, in what buildings or what 15 locations? 16 A: At that time, no. Subsequently, I 17 knew where some of them were. 18 Q: Okay. I -- I think you said that 19 there was -- there was one (1) or some that were burned, 20 I take it that was a reference to some of them possibly 21 being in the Park store, which burned after the -- after 22 the incident? 23 A: That's my understanding, yes, sir. 24 Q: And, I understand -- and you've seen 25 footage that was taken from cameras set up, I think, in
541 the kiosk in the maintenance shed; were you aware of 2 cameras in those locations? 3 A: I was only aware of the maintenance 4 shed that -- that remained active after the fact. I 5 stand to be corrected; that was not something that I knew 6 that there -- and I have seen some footage from the 7 camera. I'm not -- I'm not sure about your first point, 8 the implement shed, for sure, I'm -- I'm aware that the 9 camera kept operational. 10 Q: Now, you said your recollection was 11 that there were five (5) or six (6) cameras. Now, in 12 addition to the maintenance shed and -- and the kiosk, 13 which you -- you don't know for a fact and -- and 14 possibly the Park store, do you know if there other 15 locations in which there would have been the cameras? 16 A: That's something I really wouldn't -- 17 that was assigned to people. I mean, I guess you have to 18 decide where cameras are going to show or what they're 19 going to show, something that wasn't portrayed to me. 20 I just -- I just thought that in our 21 discussions that we talked about video cameras and I was 22 led to believe that, yes, that was being done and I was 23 also led to believe that there was, in some cases, some 24 problems with hydro that didn't allow other cameras to be 25 placed.
551 Q: Okay. That's something I may have to 2 follow up in some other manner. 3 Another topic which you mentioned the 4 other day was, you mentioned that you do some private 5 investigation work or have done since your retirement and 6 that on -- specifically on one (1) occasion, it was 7 suggested to you that you do some investigation in 8 relation to the Ipperwash situation -- 9 A: That's correct. 10 Q: -- which you declined. 11 A: Yes, I did. 12 Q: Do you recall approximately when that 13 would have been or how long after the incident? 14 A: Years after the incident. 15 Q: And, are you able to say who 16 suggested to you or on whose behalf it was suggested to 17 you that you undertake that investigation? 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I don't... 19 MR. MARK SANDLER: I have to say it -- it 20 wasn't me, of course, but I'm just not sure whether that 21 raises a privilege issue. I'm -- I'm not sure how 22 important that is, but... 23 24 CONTINUED BY MR. VILKO ZBOGAR: 25 Q: That's why I'm asking if you're able
561 -- you're able to share it. If you're not, then I 2 appreciate that. 3 A: I would prefer not to share it, I 4 guess is my point. I don't want anybody to go away 5 thinking there's something -- I guess my point -- I -- I 6 think it would be -- in regard to the -- to the civil -- 7 to the -- to the civil matter, I knew people had hired 8 some private investigators. One (1) of those private 9 investigators had suggested that perhaps I would do it 10 having retired and... 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You said, 12 "no" and that's it. 13 THE WITNESS: Thank you, very much, sir. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think 15 that's all we need to know -- 16 MR. VILKO ZBOGAR: That's fine. The 17 reason I was just asking was to see if there might be 18 some other documentation that might be available for this 19 Inquiry that we haven't seen that's -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, if 21 there is -- 22 MR. VILKO ZBOGAR: That would be -- 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- that 24 would be a good question to ask. 25 MR. VILKO ZBOGAR: -- it should be
571 produced. Yeah. No. That's fine, I'm satisfied with 2 that. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: If there is 4 other material that we haven't seen or -- 5 MR. JULIAN ROY: That -- that was the 6 issue that I wanted to raise. I intend, on behalf of 7 ALST, to explore the issue of whether or not there is 8 some other parallel investigation. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You want to 10 see if there's any other relevant -- 11 MR. JULIAN ROY: Litigation privilege 12 would not apply because the litigation's over, so I -- I 13 can't imagine how Mr. Sandler's objection applies. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm not sure 15 where you're going with this. I don't want to go down a 16 path that's not relevant, but if it is, then that's 17 different. 18 MR. VILKO ZBOGAR: I'll leave it to Mr. 19 Roy to follow-up if he wishes. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Okay. 21 22 CONTINUED BY MR. VILKO ZBOGAR: 23 Q: Now, you were involved after the 24 shooting in -- in negotiations and -- and that sort of 25 thing.
581 A: Yes, I was, sir. 2 Q: And, we've looked at a couple of OPP 3 press releases, I think, from about September 10th that 4 talked about the OPP wanting to reach a peaceful 5 conclusion through continuing negotiations and -- and I 6 think you were specifically quoted in one of those press 7 releases as saying that I'm -- that you're hopeful the 8 situation will continue to remain stable. 9 Do you recall that? 10 A: Yes, sir, I do. 11 Q: Indeed, a primary objective about 12 your involvement after the shooting was to try to 13 maintain stability and peace in the area? 14 A: Prior and after. 15 Q: Okay, including after when you were - 16 - when you were, I guess, much more directly involved. 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: Now some background work. Were you 19 aware at the time, including your -- in negotiations 20 after -- during the time that you were involved in 21 negotiations after the tragedy, that the occupation of 22 the Park took place because of long standing grievances 23 by the First Nations about their burial grounds and the - 24 - what they perceived as a wrongful taking of their 25 Treaty lands which were guaranteed to them?
591 A: I testified to that. Yes, I was 2 aware. 3 Q: Now since September 1995 and I 4 appreciate you may only be able to speak for the period 5 up to your retirement, to the best of your knowledge 6 there -- there has been no violence as between the 7 occupiers and the OPP or the occupiers and residents or - 8 - or anything of that nature; is that correct? 9 A: That's my understanding. 10 Q: And there has been no further 11 deployment of the CMU or -- or TRU or any such force. 12 But as I understand there's been actually scaling back of 13 the presence of the OPP to more or less pre-occupation 14 levels; is that fair? 15 A: That's my understanding, yes. 16 Q: And I also understand the First 17 Nation occupiers have not been threatened with eviction 18 or removal or given any reason to believe they might 19 forcibly removed since tensions subsided post-September 20 6th, 1995? 21 A: Nobody has informed me to that -- 22 that that has happened. 23 Q: And -- and as far as you know, the 24 situation of the Park has remained stable and peaceful 25 since --
601 A: Since -- I sincerely hope so, sir. 2 Q: Right. You have no reason to believe 3 otherwise? 4 A: No, sir. 5 Q: Would you agree that there's no 6 reason -- given your experience, that there is no reason 7 to believe that the situation would cease to remain 8 peaceful so long as the land was allowed to remain in the 9 hands of the people to whom the land was guaranteed in 10 the Treaty and so long as there's no threats or perceived 11 threats to attempt to remove them from that land? 12 Do you believe that there's no reason to 13 believe the situation would -- would cease to remain 14 peaceful under those circumstances? 15 A: I sincerely hope so, that it does. 16 Q: Now, on the other hand if there -- if 17 there were threats or perceived threats or attempts to 18 remove the First Nations people from that land, would you 19 agree that there is a real potential for peace and 20 stability to be disturbed? 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Mr. 22 Worme...? 23 MR. DONALD WORME: I note that My Friend 24 is almost at end with his examination. I'm just a little 25 concerned about this line of questioning. I think he's
611 asking the Witness to venture into an area, frankly, of 2 speculation -- 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's all 4 speculation. 5 MR. DONALD WORME: -- which I don't think 6 assists. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's all 8 speculation from here on. 9 MR. VILKO ZBOGAR: Fair enough, I'll move 10 on. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 12 13 CONTINUED BY MR. VILKO ZBOGAR: 14 Q: And I assume you're aware that as a 15 result of the events at Ipperwash, there was an 16 investigation by the SIU as a result of which an OPP 17 officer was charged with criminal neg -- criminal 18 negligence causing death? 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: Namely Kenneth Deane or Tex Deane as 21 he's been referred to? 22 A: Yes, sir. 23 Q: There was trial of several days in 24 which -- at the -- in which Justice Hugh Fraser heard 25 evidence from a number of witnesses including police
621 witnesses after which he weighed the evidence, made 2 findings of fact and credibility and ultimately found Ken 3 Deane guilty as charged. 4 Are you aware of that? 5 A: I'm aware of that. 6 Q: Have you seen the judgment of Mr. 7 Justice Fraser before? 8 A: I was provided last night. 9 Q: Okay. I -- I have put a copy before 10 you. 11 A: Yes, sir. 12 Q: Now, you -- while you may not have 13 seen the specific contents of that document before, were 14 you generally aware of the findings of the court in that 15 case before this Inquiry? 16 A: I think your word was 'generally 17 aware'. I was aware of the conviction. Until last night 18 where I read this, with much more attention being paid, 19 there was some items that I was not aware of. 20 Q: Okay. 21 A: Because I hadn't read the judgment in 22 that entirety. 23 Q: Sure. All right. I want to take you 24 just briefly to a couple of points in that judgment and 25 then tie it into some -- tie into some of the evidence
631 that you gave yesterday. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Mr. 3 Sandler? 4 MR. MARK SANDLER: Yes, Commissioner, you 5 may recall that when I tried to use one of the other 6 judgments with -- with Deputy Commissioner Carson, there 7 was a course of objections based upon a variety of 8 grounds and I'm just a little concerned that My Friend's 9 going -- Mr. Coles retired before this judgment came 10 out -- 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And never 12 saw it before last night. 13 MR. MARK SANDLER: And never saw it 14 before last night. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No. 16 MR. MARK SANDLER: I have a feeling that 17 where we're going is really a matter of argument as 18 opposed to anything else, because those are the findings 19 of the Court. 20 You'll be making other findings or other 21 judgments where other findings were made and I just don't 22 want go down that path with a witness who had no 23 involvement in the trial and no knowledge of the reasons. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm not sure 25 how helpful his answers to these questions might be. I
641 really don't see how his answers to this judgment are 2 going to be helpful. 3 MR. VILKO ZBOGAR: I don't expect him to 4 be able to confirm or deny or have much to say about the 5 content of it, but the reason I'm -- I'm raising it is in 6 relation to the -- one of the OPP press releases that was 7 discussed in yesterday's evidence in which there were 8 some apparently contradictory statements and I -- that -- 9 that's an issue that will be discussed at length in the 10 future -- 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's a live 12 issue at this Inquiry. 13 MR. VILKO ZBOGAR: Certainly. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 15 MR. VILKO ZBOGAR: And -- but from my 16 client's perspective, that press release is -- is a real 17 concern. The fact that it's still out there is a real 18 concern and I wanted to ask some questions about whether 19 anything was done in relation to the press release as a 20 result of this judgment. 21 So, that's my line of questioning. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Whether 23 anything was done in a disciplinary way, is that what you 24 mean? 25 MR. VILKO ZBOGAR: In -- in -- in a sense
651 of clarifying that press release. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Oh, I don't 3 think you need the judgment to do that. I mean, I really 4 don't think you need the judgment to do that. That may 5 be a fair question, but I don't think you need the 6 judgment to do it. 7 8 CONTINUED BY MR. VILKO ZBOGAR: 9 Q: Well, if I could maybe just short 10 shrive this and ask maybe a couple of very quick 11 questions. And instead of referring to the judgment, and 12 you're -- you're aware that Mr. Kenneth Deane was 13 convicted of the charges of criminal negligence causing 14 death? 15 A: Yes, sir. 16 Q: And I take it you're now aware, also, 17 of some Mr. Justice Fraser's findings about -- well, his 18 findings that he didn't -- that there were no witnesses 19 who saw guns in the hands of occupiers; that Mr. Kenneth 20 Deane did not see a firearm in the hands of Dudley George 21 and -- and therefore, was not responding or returning 22 fire against Dudley George. 23 So, having seen those, I want to refer you 24 to the press release that we looked at yesterday and 25 that's Exhibit P-576 and Tab 35 of your -- of your brief.
661 And this was -- this was reviewed 2 yesterday and I want to specifically refer you to the 3 last two (2) sentences on that page, on the first page of 4 the press release there which say: 5 "It was at this time that OPP personnel 6 were fired upon from the vehicles. The 7 officers felt their safety was 8 endangered and returned fire, fatally 9 injuring one man." 10 Now, I'm not going to refer you to and 11 compare all the details of the judgment and compare that 12 to the press release, but I want to ask you whether 13 you're aware and I take it this was after your 14 retirement, so probably you may not know, but whether 15 you're aware -- whether there has been any clarification 16 of this statement in that press release since September 17 of 1995, given apparently different judicial findings? 18 A: I -- I'm not -- I'm not aware, I 19 guess, is what I'm saying because I didn't -- I didn't 20 read the transcripts of -- of the trials, et cetera or 21 the findings. I did read some -- I -- I did read some -- 22 some decisions. 23 As far as this press release, I stand to 24 be corrected, but I don't know that I gave evidence as to 25 this -- as to this particular September the 7th one. I
671 don't know that I did. 2 Q: I -- I think -- 3 A: There were other ones, subsequent 4 ones, that I did. If you can say that I did, please tell 5 me. 6 Q: I think your evidence was that, in 7 fact, you were not the source of the specific statement 8 in that press release although you did receive verbal 9 reports that were consistent with what's in that press 10 release. 11 A: Yes. I have -- I -- I testified 12 yesterday that as September the 7th and the 8th, that is 13 -- that the information that I had at that time, I would 14 have believed that this press release was correct, yes, 15 sir. 16 Q: All right. I guess we'll let the 17 Court Decision speak for itself in relation to that. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 19 MR. VILKO ZBOGAR: That will be 20 discussed by others in this -- in this forum. 21 22 CONTINUED BY MR. VILKO ZBOGAR: 23 Q: One (1) last question for you, sir, 24 and you may know in -- in about three (3) weeks or so, it 25 will have been ten (10) years since this unfortunate
681 tragedy, and I know you're gracious to share your 2 condolences with Sam George and his family at about the 3 time or shortly after this incident, but I imagine you've 4 also had an opportunity to reflect on -- on these matters 5 in the many years that have passed since? 6 A: Many, many times. 7 Q: Yes. And, as you know, Sam George is 8 here today and -- and has been for almost everyday of 9 this Inquiry and I know his -- some of his siblings are 10 also watching this Inquiry being broadcast and they've -- 11 they've asked me to invite you if -- if you care, to 12 offer any personal comments to the George family, which 13 you might wish to make if -- if you wish to be so 14 gracious as to do so? 15 A: I would be pleased to do so and I'll 16 try not to do it with emotion, but it will be difficult. 17 Yes, I attended after the funeral and gave 18 condolences to the George family and was graciously 19 received. After I retired, there was a civil judgment 20 that a -- a civil case that was brought. I was involved 21 in reviewing that as to my evidence and at that time I 22 met Sam George again. So, many times I've sat across 23 from Sam George and I've looked in his eyes. 24 In my initial meeting with Sam George and 25 the initial meeting of -- of the Council, I -- I
691 undertook and have always tried to tell the truth the 2 best that I knew at the time, to give the facts as I knew 3 at that time. And, I gave an undertaking to Sam that I 4 would try to get him the answers. At the time of my 5 condolences I could not do that because of other things 6 that were going on, but I was graciously received. 7 I have seen the course of events. I was 8 one (1) of the people in the civil litigation that was 9 named. I -- I have no brothers, but I believe sincerely 10 in my heart that if I had a brother, Sam George is an 11 example of a brother I would have liked. And so I have 12 nothing but respect for Sam and for many of the George 13 family who I've interacted with at different times, but 14 specifically Sam. 15 I have told Sam at different times, and I 16 hope my words here are not misconstrued, if Sam George 17 thinks I did something wrong or omitted to do something 18 that he thinks I owe him an apology, I'll graciously give 19 it to him and -- and to the family if -- if Sam thought 20 that was right. I thank you for the opportunity. And I 21 thank you for the opportunity of looking in Sam's eyes 22 when I say it. That's what I have to say. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 24 very much. 25 MR. VILKO ZBOGAR: Thank you very much.
701 Just -- we should say that Mr. George has another 2 commitment so he has to leave and so don't take that as 3 anything that might have been said. So, thank you very 4 much, Mr. Coles. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 6 Thank you very much. I think this is a good time to take 7 a morning recess. Thank you very much. 8 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 9 for fifteen (15) minutes. 10 11 --- Upon recessing at 10:15 a.m. 12 --- Upon resuming at 10:34 a.m. 13 14 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 15 resumed. Please be seated. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Ms. Esmonde, 17 are you examining. 18 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: Yes. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You're on. 20 21 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: 22 Q: Good morning, sir. 23 A: Good morning. 24 Q: My name is Jackie Esmonde. I'm one 25 of the lawyers representing the Aazhoodena and George
711 family group. 2 Now you are aware today that after you 3 left Forest on September 6th, there was an incident at 4 the corner of Army Camp Road and East Parkway Drive 5 around eight o'clock? 6 A: Around eight o'clock, yes. 7 Q: That evening. And you're aware today 8 that there was a councillor by the name of Gerald George 9 who had written an extremely provocative letter to the 10 editor regarding the Stoney Pointers in the Park? 11 A: I didn't know about the provocative 12 letter. 13 Q: Okay. Did you know -- 14 A: But I knew that Gerald George was a 15 councillor, yes. 16 Q: Okay. And were you aware that there 17 were some hard feelings between him and the Stoney 18 Pointers in the Park? Are you aware today? 19 A: Yes, I am. 20 Q: And you're aware that this councillor 21 went to that intersection and there was a dispute with 22 one of the Stoney Pointers? 23 A: I believe so, yes. 24 Q: That resulted in one Stuart George 25 throwing a rock at Gerald George's car?
721 A: I have knowledge of that. 2 Q: Okay. 3 A: The specifics of Stuart, et cetera, 4 I'm -- 5 Q: Okay. You don't -- you're not sure 6 of the name, but you're aware that one individual threw a 7 rock at the car? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: And caused some damage? 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: Now I believe you told us yesterday 12 that you believe it was Superintendent Parkin who called 13 you at around 12:30 to let you know about the shooting? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: And do you recall if he told you at 16 that time about the incident at the intersection, at 17 eight o'clock? 18 A: I don't recall. 19 Q: Do you recall if he spoke to you 20 about that in the car right on your way to Forest? 21 A: If he had that information, I have 22 every reason to believe that we probably would have 23 discussed it, yes. 24 Q: Do you recall when you learned the 25 facts of the incident as we've outlined them just now?
731 A: After 2:30 -- 2:15 when I arrived and 2 we received a briefing, I would have believed that I 3 would have been updated at that time and that's when it 4 would have been in my -- possibly been in my mind. 5 Q: Okay. So you believe it was sometime 6 in the early morning hours of September 7th that the 7 facts, as we've generally outlined them, were given to 8 you? 9 A: I have reason to believe, yes. 10 Q: Now you've already discussed in your 11 testimony the policy of trying to obtain injunctions in 12 the -- in the course of First Nations blockades or 13 occupations? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: And that, in your experience, that 16 was the policy that was followed? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: And one of the reasons for obtaining 19 injunctions in these circumstances, is due to the 20 ambiguities that can arise when there are land claims, I 21 believe you used that word? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: And given these ambiguities, it's 24 important to have both sides in the dispute put forward 25 their case to be determined by a Court?
741 A: Correct. 2 Q: And that helps to guide police action 3 in ambiguous areas? 4 A: Hopefully so. 5 Q: Right. So the police don't appear to 6 be taking sides, they're just following the Court's 7 direction? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: But you had mentioned the Temagami 10 situation that you had some experience with a blockade in 11 Temagami? 12 A: A roadway, yes. 13 Q: Okay. And you had said that that 14 protest had ended without obtaining an injunction? 15 A: That's correct. 16 Q: And is it the case that that protest 17 ended with the mass arrest of protesters? 18 A: No. 19 Q: No. And how did that end? 20 A: Basically, as I recall it, it was a 21 two (2) or three (3) day event that I was asked to 22 attend. It was a First Nation community that was 23 challenging the -- the ownership of the road because the 24 road was also being used by logging companies and there 25 was a dispute in that area.
751 And there was to be a demonstration. It 2 was a remote road. The Ministry of Natural Resources 3 were claiming ownership to the road and to access to the 4 road and there was discussions with MNR again for the 5 injunction process if, in fact, protesters arrived. 6 It was very -- as I recall it, it was very 7 inclement weather, freezing rain, et cetera. The 8 remoteness of the road and the road itself led to the 9 fact that people would have difficulty getting in and out 10 of that road, given the weather conditions at the time. 11 I -- I would like to say that it was more 12 a protest. People wanted to protest the situation, First 13 Nations people. Basically how it was resolved was 14 protesters did go. The media actually were assisted in 15 this case to get in because we didn't want media going in 16 and getting stuck in cars. 17 And the media actually went in, they took 18 picture -- the took some pictures and -- and the First 19 Nations put on the record so to speak of what their 20 concern was and then people left. 21 I -- I had had some talks at the Bear 22 Island I believe it's called. Very low key, very -- 23 there was no -- no violence, threat of violence of any 24 concern in my mind. It was just a -- a situation that 25 was happening.
761 Q: Now you told us how the injunction 2 approach was central in the Ipperwash incident -- 3 A: Central in our strategy, yes. 4 Q: -- and in strategy. 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And you reviewed this morning already 7 that the injunction strategy was being employed when the 8 Stoney Pointers returned to the land in 1993? 9 A: Correct. Well it was suggested that 10 it should be employed. 11 Q: It should be employed? 12 A: Yes. Correct. 13 Q: And that position didn't change when 14 the Stoney Pointers moved into the barracks -- 15 A: No. 16 Q: -- in 1995? 17 A: No. 18 Q: And again, that was because the 19 Stoney Pointers were claiming that land was theirs and 20 given that ambiguity, the police position was that a 21 court should decide to speak -- 22 A: Correct. The ownership problems, 23 yes. 24 Q: And we have also heard evidence from 25 Inspector Carson that the Township of Bosanquet was
771 looking into the possibility of obtaining an injunction 2 with respect to Matheson Drive after the occupation had 3 commenced. 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: Were you aware of that? 6 A: I -- I was aware that there was -- 7 they had sought some legal advice, yes. 8 Q: Right. And you would have supported 9 that approach again, given the dispute over the ownership 10 of that property? 11 A: Every reason to believe we would 12 have, yes. 13 Q: Now the land on which the sandy 14 parking lot was -- was located was also a dispute of 15 land; correct? 16 A: Subsequently I believe it became 17 disputed land by -- by the First Nations people. After 18 the fact I understand that it did. 19 Q: Were you not aware before September 20 4th that, in fact, the First Nation was claiming that 21 that was a part of their territory? 22 A: No. I believe that the MNR's 23 position stopped at the fence, at the gate, if you so to 24 speak, and that that was, I thought, Bosanquet. I 25 thought there had been some discussions that it was
781 Bosanquet Township property. 2 Q: Okay. Could I take you to Tab 15 in 3 your book? This is Inquiry Document Number 2002627. And 4 it's a letter from Acting Staff Sergeant Beacock to the 5 Superintendent of the Ontario Police dated June 11th, 6 1993. 7 You were taken to this letter by Mr. Worme 8 in your examination. Do you recall looking at this 9 letter? 10 A: I don't specifically recall it. Mr. 11 Worme one did, if you're telling me he did. I've seen a 12 lot of documents in the last day or so. 13 Q: Well my note -- according to my 14 notes, you -- you had a -- you testified that you were on 15 leave from, I believe, June 10th to the 20th, so during 16 the time that this letter was written but you testified 17 that you were aware that there was a larger claim. 18 And I refer you, specifically, to the 19 second paragraph of the letter. 20 A: Yes. I do recall. 21 Q: Where it says: 22 "I was informed that Maynard George and 23 Carl George attended Bosanquet Township 24 office on June 14th, 1993, with large 25 maps indicating land claims from
791 Ravenswood Road east to Parkhill and 2 north to Goderich, with the exception 3 of the Village of Grand Bend." 4 A: Yes, I did testify that I was aware 5 of it. 6 Q: So you were aware that their land 7 claim extended beyond the Park boundaries; correct? 8 A: Yes, yes. 9 Q: You're not aware of any discussion, 10 prior to September 7th, regarding seeking an injunction 11 with respect to the land in the sandy parking lot? 12 A: No, other than our previous -- my 13 previous testimony about -- that I thought Bosanquet was 14 making, you mentioned the word, "Matheson Drive." I 15 didn't -- I knew that Bosanquet was -- had gone and 16 sought legal advice, possibly for an injunction, but not 17 specifically for Matheson or if this was part of that. I 18 -- I didn't -- I can't testify to that. 19 Q: Is it your testimony that you believe 20 Bosanquet is the owner of the sandy parking lot land? 21 A: At that time, yes. 22 Q: That was your belief then? And so is 23 it your testimony that you were of the belief that 24 Bosanquet County was in the process of obtaining an 25 injunction with respect to the sandy parking lot land?
801 A: Oh, no, that's not my testimony. 2 Q: Okay. Thank you. 3 A: That's fine. 4 Q: Now you've told us that you did not 5 know in advance that the CMU was going to be marching 6 down the road towards the sandy parking lot? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: And so you had no knowledge about it 9 until you were phoned at 12:30 that evening? 10 A: That's correct. 11 Q: And is that not something that you 12 would have thought you would have been advised of in 13 advance? 14 A: Oh no, not necessarily. 15 Q: Not -- okay. 16 A: No, it's -- that's -- that's a role 17 of the incident commander to make the decisions and he -- 18 if he feels he has some request to notify somebody he 19 would go to one (1) person, possibly about -- in this 20 case, himself. 21 Q: Okay. And -- and what -- 22 A: But -- but he wouldn't -- he would 23 not go to that person to seek authority to do it, he had 24 the authority to do it. 25 Q: Certainly he had the authority to do
811 so, but my understanding is that you wished to be updated 2 on major events as they occurred? 3 A: Not necessarily as they occurred, as 4 soon as reasonable that the incident commander made the 5 decision that he thought somebody should be updated, but 6 not necessarily me. There was a chain of command -- 7 Q: Right. 8 A: -- below me. 9 Q: Okay. It appears as though 10 Superintendent Parkin was advised of the plan. Were you 11 aware of that? 12 A: I believe he was -- to send down the 13 CMU? 14 Q: Yes. 15 A: I -- I don't have -- recall whether 16 he was or it was done pre or post. I -- I don't know. 17 Q: Assuming that he was advised in 18 advance, is that something you would have expected 19 Superintendent Parkin to have notified you about? 20 A: No, not necessarily. As a result of 21 what happened, definitely, but not -- not just that we're 22 going to move the CMU down the road. 23 Q: Now you would agree with me that, 24 based on what you know about what had occurred prior to 25 the decision to send the CMU down the road, this was not
821 a situation where there was an immediate probability of a 2 threat to life or serious bodily harm? 3 A: Would you repeat that, please? 4 Q: I'm making reference to the -- the 5 1991 policy that you reviewed the other day -- 6 A: Yes? 7 Q: -- which sets out the policy of 8 seeking injunctions and negotiating for forces used? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: And the only exceptions that are set 11 out in that document, you can look at it if you wish, is 12 when there's a probability of a threat to life or of 13 serious bodily harm. 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: And you would agree with me that at 16 the time that the CMU was marching down the road, it was 17 not the case that, in fact, it was a situation where 18 there was a threat to life or of serious bodily harm? 19 A: I disagree with you. I had reason to 20 believe that the incident commander did have expectations 21 that there possibly might be a threat. We have the 22 situation where when they first dealt with the occupiers, 23 initially with the -- with the initial entry into the 24 Park, there was violence. There had been violence the 25 night before, September the 5th, when responding officers
831 in cruisers, the metal had been damaged, the cruisers 2 were damaged -- 3 Q: Hmm hmm. 4 A: -- and so, to send down -- number 1 5 to -- even to -- for him to -- I think that was the 6 reason that he thought that he had to go to the remedy of 7 the -- of the CMU, was to send them down, so I believe 8 there was, in his mind, the expectation that there could 9 be violence. 10 Q: There was no evidence at the time 11 that any person was at risk of serious bodily harm on the 12 evening of September 6th, before the CMU marched down the 13 road; is that not correct? 14 A: Oh, I believe that given the events 15 of September the 4th and September the 5th, that the 16 incident commander had in his mind that the -- there was 17 an expectation that there might be violence. 18 Q: Against -- against whom? 19 A: Against the officers; that we had 20 cruisers that had been damaged on the 5th, we've had the 21 fight and the flare thrown and the cruisers damaged on 22 the 4th. 23 So, now if you were going down to actually 24 meet with those self -- same people, the occupiers on 25 there, I think there was a possibility that there could
841 have been violence. 2 Q: Certainly, and the facts show that 3 there violence that occurred when the CMU marched down 4 the road. I'm talking about absent police action, there 5 was no risk to -- there was no risk at that time of 6 serious bodily harm -- 7 A: If -- 8 Q: -- or threat to life. 9 A: To whom? 10 Q: To anyone. 11 A: I think there's evidence to the fact 12 that that people -- that -- that there was cottagers who 13 had -- who were irate and had threatened to go down to 14 the Park. 15 I think there was evidence that there were 16 people outside the Park with, I believe, it was axe 17 handles. And I believe that people had spoken to the fact 18 that they would do talking with their guns to my officers 19 and the -- as I previously said that the damage to the 20 cruisers on -- on two (2) occasions. 21 Q: Hmm hmm. 22 A: When the incident commander made the 23 decision that he wanted to go down and find out what was 24 going on, I think that there was an expectation that 25 there might be the potential for violence.
851 Q: Against the officers? 2 A: I can't say against who, because it - 3 - I can't say against whom. 4 Q: Now, Deputy Carson had testified at 5 great length here -- 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: -- and I understand you have reviewed 8 some of those transcripts? 9 A: Yes, I did. 10 Q: And I could be corrected but my 11 memory of his evidence was that at that evening, there 12 was no evidence that the people in the Park had any plans 13 to attack the cottagers; would you agree with that? 14 MR. MARK SANDLER: His actual evidence 15 was that they did not have information that it was going 16 to specifically happen that night, but it was a concern 17 of his, together with what was happening in the parking 18 lot. 19 20 CONTINUED BY MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: 21 Q: That's what I was trying to say and 22 perhaps didn't say as clearly as Mr. Sandler, but -- 23 A: If that's what he testified, that was 24 his -- in his mind at that time. 25 Q: And if I could just -- are you at Tab
861 1? Can I ask you to turn to Tab 1 just to look at the 2 wording of the policy, which is P-472 in this proceeding, 3 Document Number 3000759. 4 A: I have it. 5 Q: And one (1), two (2), three (3), four 6 (4) -- the sixth line down. It -- the first line says, 7 "Outline the policy as we've described it", and then it 8 says: 9 "The only exception to this approach 10 has been in situations where death or 11 serious injury was immediately probable 12 if force was not used to control 13 events." 14 A: Okay. 15 Q: And you would agree with me, sir, 16 that there was no evidence that death or serious injury 17 was immediately probable on the evening of September 6th 18 at around ten o'clock? 19 A: I would agree with that. 20 Q: Okay. Now, you were asked some 21 questions about your communications with Marcel Beaubien? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: And you had testified that you spoke 24 directly with Marcel Beaubien prior to the 6th of 25 September?
871 A: Yes, at some time. 2 Q: And that was by telephone? 3 A: I believe so, yes. 4 Q: And was it once or more than once? 5 A: I have no recollection. I do have 6 recollection of a telephone conversation. 7 Q: Okay. And your recollection is that 8 you phoned him? 9 A: I don't have a recollection of -- 10 Q: Okay. 11 A: -- who placed it. 12 Q: I thought that might be what you had 13 said, but you're not -- you don't recall now? 14 A: I do not. 15 Q: And Mr. Beaubien advised you of the 16 concerns of his constituents as he -- 17 A: I testified to that. 18 Q: -- saw them? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And I take it that he advised you 21 that his constituents wanted the occupiers out of the 22 Park as soon as possible? 23 A: I didn't testify to that. 24 Q: No, I'm asking you. 25 A: I don't recall that --
881 Q: Okay. 2 A: -- conversation. 3 Q: What do you recall him conveying to 4 you about the concerns of his constituents? 5 6 (BRIEF PAUSE) 7 8 A: I'm having trouble recalling the 9 conversation. That's why I'm -- I'm -- specifically I 10 don't recall but other than that there was -- that 11 citizens were -- was concerned. 12 Q: Okay. We'll perhaps -- 13 A: I guess about the events -- I guess 14 I'm going to assume about the events. And I believe I 15 can recall or have recollection that some of the concern 16 was also of police response. But not necessarily 17 specifically as to -- that the occupiers should be 18 removed, et cetera. I don't recall that. 19 Q: Sorry, about police response or -- 20 A: Yeah. I mean at that time we had 21 police in the area. 22 Q: Right. 23 A: The citizens -- we had checkpoints 24 that are setup, so that's not normal policing. 25 Q: I see.
891 A: And so that concern if you will of 2 the heightened police presence and what his constituents 3 perceived of that. 4 Q: Now you also spoke to him about what 5 the OPP were doing in response to the occupation of the 6 Park? 7 A: Yes. It would be -- I would have -- 8 the -- the police about the injunction et cetera, yes. 9 Q: Okay. And you also spoke with him 10 about the fact that the Army may need to get involved in 11 the dispute of the Park? 12 A: I do not recall that. 13 Q: Okay. This may help to refresh your 14 memory. I would like to refer you to the examination of 15 discovery of Marcel Beaubien, from the 18th of September, 16 2001. I have a copy for you and a copy for the 17 Commissioner as well. I -- I don't have a document 18 number for that. That was sent out in an e-mail. 19 I'm beginning at page 147 and I think I've 20 marked on your copy the sections that I'm going to refer 21 to. There's a -- there's a question and there's a 22 somewhat meandering answer that I'll try to take you to 23 the -- 24 A: Okay. That's fine. 25 Q: Now, near the bottom of the page that
901 I've given you, Marcel Beaubien is asked -- and this is 2 reference to the scribe notes and we have reviewed this 3 with other witnesses this portion of the scribe notes. 4 But the question is referring to the handwritten version, 5 it states: 6 "Marcel Beaubien states that he doesn't 7 mind taking controversy if situation 8 can't be handled by police services. 9 Something has to be done to handle the 10 situation." 11 And the corresponding handwritten notes 12 say: 13 "MB making comments that police 14 services can't do it. Get someone who 15 can. 16 MB: Don't controversy." 17 And then he's asked: 18 "First of all, do you recall making any 19 statements of that nature?" 20 And then he is providing some explanation 21 for those comments in his -- in his answer which goes 22 over several pages. 23 If I could take you to what is I believe 24 your third page in the photocopy before you. It's at 25 page 150. Marcel Beaubien is quoted as saying:
911 "So coming back to this, I was also 2 told by police officers that this may 3 not be a policing matter, it may be an 4 Army problem. What do you do when 5 you're an MPP and police officers tell 6 you that and you find out that you've 7 got armoured personnel vehicles. 8 So, that's why my comment, if it's not 9 a policing matter, if the police can't 10 handle it then somebody else who can 11 handle it should be handling it. Is 12 that clear? 13 Q: Did the police tell you that this 14 was an Army matter? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: Who told you that? 17 A: It was Staff Sergeant or 18 Superintendent Christopher Coles." 19 And then he repeats that, that you were 20 the source of that information in -- in the other 21 portions I've provided to you. 22 A: My evidence is, he says it was a 23 staff sergeant who I believe if it was said would have 24 probably been Staff Sergeant Lacroix -- 25 Q: Yes.
921 A: -- or Superintendent Christopher 2 Coles. I disagree. I would not have said that because 3 it was not an Army matter. 4 Q: Okay. If I -- then if we could look 5 at -- I believe it's the last page that I've put in front 6 of you. It's just beginning at page 152 and continuing 7 on 153. 8 "Q: So I can take it you spoke with 9 Chief Coles sometime prior to your 10 meeting at the OPP command post on 11 September 6th? 12 A: Yeah. I did not meet with 13 Superintendent Coles at the command. 14 Q: You spoke with him before that 15 meeting. 16 A: It would have been on the phone 17 that I would have talked to him." 18 And then, sorry, continuing on further: 19 "Q: Correct me if I'm wrong, but was 20 it your evidence that the information 21 that you were given about the army 22 potentially having to be involved was 23 from Chief Coles? 24 A: I was getting information from 25 many individuals, not just
931 Superintendent Coles. I was getting 2 information from -- so I can't recall, 3 I can't, you know, I can't box it as to 4 who gave me what, when, where at this 5 point in time. 6 Q: But it was one OPP officer or more 7 officers who told you that the army may 8 potentially have to become involved? 9 A: Well, he told me that specifically 10 was Superintendent Coles." 11 A: He -- 12 Q: Does that assist your memory in -- in 13 refreshing your memory regarding your conversation with 14 Marcel Beaubien? 15 A: It refreshes my memory to the fact 16 that he's wrong. Given my background in Akwesasne, I can 17 assure you that he would not have got it from me that I 18 would have needed the Military or wanted the Military in 19 this situation for this -- for this concern. 20 It was the Military's business as far as 21 the base, but not in regard to the Provincial Park or my 22 command. 23 Q: Do you have any idea what you might 24 have said to him that led him to believe you were telling 25 him it was an army matter?
941 A: I believe I did not say any of those 2 things and whether or not he got it from another source, 3 another police source or whatever, it did not come from 4 Chris Coles. 5 Q: Are you aware of any other police 6 officer making comments that it was an army matter and 7 not a police matter? 8 A: No, no. 9 Q: And I have a few questions regarding 10 your -- your telephone call with Ron Fox and I assure you 11 I will try not to be repetitive. 12 You've been asked many times about this 13 conversation, but you had testified you were concerned 14 that there was operational information that was going up 15 to the political sphere? 16 A: That's correct. 17 Q: Correct. And it appeared to you that 18 politicians were taken, perhaps an undue interest, in 19 operational matters? 20 A: I don't think I said that. 21 Q: I don't think you did. I'm asking 22 you if you agree with that statement? 23 A: No. I mean, they're not politicians. 24 This is a ministry. It's a bureaucratic ministry that 25 might -- that I have some concerns as to where the
951 information -- I'm not suggesting politicians. 2 Q: Okay. You were aware, though, from 3 your conversation with Inspector Fox that the Premier and 4 various ministers had had some involvement in discussing 5 the incident? 6 A: If we can go to that conversation, 7 most of that conversation I think, now that I see this, 8 is between Ron Fox and -- and John Carson. 9 Q: Yes. 10 A: The point that you're raising about 11 the political awareness when Ron -- Ron does start page 2 12 -- 274. 13 I have knowledge of this. You see that 14 there was a meeting, Deputy Sol Gen at the legislature. 15 So I -- 16 Q: And then he makes some comments about 17 the Premier -- 18 A: Yes, in that one paragraph there. 19 Q: Yes. 20 A: That's about -- that's about what I 21 can testify that I -- Ron would have told me about 22 political interest. 23 Q: Right. And you knew that the Premier 24 was saying that the OPP had made mistakes? 25 A: Yes, sir -- yes, ma'am. I --
961 Q: And I believe you testified yesterday 2 in your view he was wrong in that assessment? 3 A: Yes, he was. 4 Q: So you -- as you said, you were 5 concerned about information going up to the 6 Interministerial Committee operational information -- 7 A: Too fast. 8 Q: Too fast. You were concerned about 9 losing control? 10 A: That -- yes. That û- not -- I wasn't 11 concerned about losing -- me, personally, losing control. 12 There would have been much -- a lot more discussion if 13 they had tried to take away control from me, I assure 14 you. 15 And if they tried to take control away 16 from my knowledge of Commissioner O'Grady, that wouldn't 17 have happened. 18 But my concern was that information was 19 going to go up in a pathway suggesting that it was the 20 OPP that was the source, and that would have brought what 21 I -- what we mentioned about pressures. 22 So, but I say to Ron, Ron, I'm worried 23 about losing control, but that's in my words to Ron -- 24 Q: Yes. 25 A: û- I want to keep control of it.
971 Q: Yes. 2 A: I want to run it from here, as I -- 3 as I say. 4 Q: Now were you also -- you were also 5 concerned about information coming back down the line to 6 the incident commander through Ron Fox? Were you not 7 concerned that that information could be distracting -- 8 A: Not -- 9 Q: -- to him when he had other matters 10 to deal with? 11 A: Yeah. Interfering with his time -- 12 with -- with his time schedule, et cetera, as far as what 13 he had to do in the incident. It would have been a 14 concern, yes, but that was not just from the Ministry, 15 that was also, as I mentioned, from the executive rooms, 16 et cetera. 17 Q: Yes. 18 A: And my job was to keep some of that 19 off his back so to speak. 20 Q: Right. To run interference as you 21 said? 22 A: That's correct. 23 Q: And did you turn your mind as well to 24 the -- you've told us that you were concerned with 25 optics, the optics for the OPP.
981 Were you not also concerned about the 2 optics of having information about the views of the 3 premier and other politicians and civil servants being 4 communicated to the incident commander? 5 A: That would concern me, yes; that -- 6 that would concern me. 7 Q: Now with respect to your meeting with 8 Inspector Carson and Superintendent Parkin on the 9 afternoon of September 6th, is it not the case that there 10 was an inspector from the RCMP there as well during your 11 meeting? 12 A: I believe somewhere I read that there 13 was a -- that there was an RCMP officer there. I don't - 14 - I can't really recall what -- 15 Q: I can take you to the reference. 16 A: I have a vague -- I have a vague -- I 17 have a vague recollection that there -- that there was -- 18 Q: Okay. 19 A: -- for a while and -- and he had come 20 there for a meeting. Whether or not when -- when 21 Superintendent Parkin and I arrived he was already there 22 speaking to John Carson and I just walked in on that, I 23 don't recall or can't give evidence that he specifically 24 came and talked to me, but I do know that in the 25 literature I have seen --
991 Q: Okay. Well, can I show you the 2 reference and perhaps that might help to refresh your 3 memory -- 4 A: Sure, please? 5 Q: -- and I can ask you some questions 6 about it. 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: I believe you have P-444A in front of 9 you, that's the -- the legal-size book of transcripts? 10 A: Yes? 11 Q: At Tab 34. There's a record of a 12 telephone call between Ron Fox and Mark Wright -- 13 A: Yes? 14 Q: -- on September 6th, 1995, at 12:06 15 p.m. and on the first page -- the first page of that 16 transcript -- 17 A: Yes? 18 Q: -- Staff Sergeant Wright is quoted as 19 saying: 20 "The Inspector is busy with the Chief 21 and Tony Parkin and an inspector from 22 the Mounties?" 23 A: Okay. 24 Q: So does -- does that refresh your 25 memory, that you were meeting with an inspector from the
1001 Mounties? 2 A: I -- I think that's the -- 3 Q: That's what -- 4 A: -- what I said I thought I'd read in 5 the literature some place. 6 Q: And why was an inspector from the 7 RCMP at the command post on September 6th? 8 A: I don't know. 9 Q: Do you remember anything about your 10 conversations with the -- the Mountie? 11 A: No. Whether or not it was a liaison 12 role, an offer of help to John, I don't specifically have 13 a recollection of it. That -- if I can, that's at 12:06? 14 Q: Yes. 15 A: I'm trying to find my conversation 16 with Ron Fox, at what time that was. 17 Q: I think that was at two o'clock. 18 A: Okay. So quite some time had gone on 19 between, yes. 20 Q: Okay. 21 A: So I -- my evidence is I do not 22 recall the conversation I had with the Mountie, that Mark 23 Wright is alleging is in that room. 24 Q: Okay. But you do have a memory of 25 speaking with an inspector from the RCMP at some point on
1011 that date? 2 A: At some time. I spoke to a lot of 3 people, but at some time, yes, but -- but on that 4 specific day? 5 Q: Now I take it you were aware of the 6 fact that many people in the area of Ipperwash Park had 7 negative stereotypes about First Nations people? 8 A: Oh, yes. 9 Q: And that some were quite hostile to 10 First Nations people? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And you were concerned, during this 13 incident, that some people might take the law into their 14 own hands and attack the Stoney Point people in the 15 former Army Camp or Park? 16 A: Take the law into their own hands? 17 Yes. 18 Q: And in those circumstances it would 19 be very important to try to lessen or at least minimize 20 that hostility as much as you could? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: Now the OPP released two (2) 23 different press releases on September 7th, 1995, and I 24 don't think you have the first in front of you; I do have 25 a copy here.
1021 A: Okay. 2 Q: I have a copy for the Commissioner as 3 well. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 5 6 CONTINUED BY MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: 7 Q: This is marked as P-440, Document 8 Number 1009047 and it's up on the screen as well. Have 9 you seen this press release? 10 A: I believe I have. 11 Q: Okay. Now we heard from Deputy 12 Commissioner Carson that he, personally, approved the 13 wording of this release and, in fact, he dictated 14 portions of it over the telephone and that this was done 15 in the early morning hours of September 7th, 1995? 16 A: Okay. 17 Q: And if I could turn your attention to 18 the first paragraph, it states: 19 "A private citizen's vehicle was 20 damaged by a number of First Nations 21 people armed with baseball bats." 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: "As a result of this, the OPP crowd 24 management team was deployed to 25 disperse the crowd of First Nations
1031 people, which had gathered at that 2 location, which is township property 3 adjacent to Ipperwash Provincial Park 4 and local cottages." 5 A: Yes, yes. 6 Q: Now Deputy Carson agreed that he now 7 knows that that description of events was inaccurate, and 8 I take it you would agree? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: And the way it's written would give 11 the impression that an unrelated individual who's 12 uninvolved in the dispute was the victim of an unprovoked 13 attack by First Nations people with baseball bats. 14 Would you agree with me? 15 A: It just says a private citizen's 16 vehicle was damaged, you're -- you're assuming more, I 17 believe. Repeat the -- 18 Q: Well, as we reviewed earlier, you're 19 aware that it was a councillor from Kettle Point -- 20 Kettle and Stony Point First Nation who was the -- the 21 victim in this disturbance and that there was some 22 animosity between him and the people in the Park? 23 A: That I -- 24 Q: We went over that earlier; right? 25 A: And I testified that -- that I give
1041 that information afterwards. 2 Q: Well I'm asking you now. 3 A: Yeah. 4 Q: I'm asking you -- 5 A: Yeah. Yes, yeah. 6 Q: And as it's described here, this 7 wouldn't -- this would not give the -- this does not 8 provide the information that there was a personal dispute 9 between the people involved in this incident; right? 10 A: That's correct, it does not. 11 Q: It gives the impression that it's 12 somebody who's unconnected to the -- the dispute who was 13 attacked by First Nations people with baseball bats; 14 correct? 15 A: It just says, a private citizen's 16 vehicle. I agree, it does not say that, in relation to 17 Gerald George, that there was a dispute. It does not say 18 that, but I can't say I can go on any further than what 19 it says and you say Inspector Carson dictated it? 20 Q: Yes. 21 A: Okay. 22 Q: But you would agree with me that 23 there's a difference between describing it as a personal 24 dispute between two (2) individuals and describing it as 25 a private citizen having his vehicle damaged?
1051 A: Yes, there's a difference. 2 Q: And given that these are not an 3 accurate description of what occurred and given your 4 agreement that itÆs -- it may give a different impression 5 than what actually occurred, would you agree that such a 6 press release would serve to inflame the community rather 7 than minimizing hostility? 8 A: No. I -- I believe that it's -- it's 9 just what it states. It's a press release of what the 10 incident commander had in his mind that had occurred. 11 Subsequent events changed different -- were -- were 12 different. 13 There was no intent that -- to inflame, I 14 suggest it's just a fact that the Ontario Provincial 15 Police are putting out. If it -- if it later inflamed 16 the situation, I -- there was no intent on anyone's part, 17 it was just a reporting of the facts with a requirement 18 that we give the media some indication as to what has 19 gone on and I think that's what was attempted here. 20 Q: Okay. 21 A: Even though, in hindsight, Mr. Carson 22 is -- John Carson has testified that there were some -- 23 some facts that were not correct. 24 Q: Right. It's -- it's unfortunate, you 25 would agree, that this press release went out without --
1061 with these -- with this misinformation? 2 A: It's always unfortunate if -- if 3 something is proved to be false that the Ontario 4 Provincial Police has put out, yes. It wasn't meant to 5 mislead, I don't believe. 6 Q: Now, you've been asked about the 7 second press release that was issued on September 7th, 8 1995; that's at Tab 35 of your materials. 9 A: Okay. 10 Q: And I believe it was marked as 11 P-576 this morning. 12 And this one is called the Clarification 13 of Events. 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: Now I wasn't clear from your 16 testimony perhaps I missed it, if I did, I apologize, 17 but were you involved in the decision to issue this 18 clarification of events? 19 A: I don't recall that I was. 20 Q: Did you review this press release 21 before it was released? 22 A: No. I do not believe that I did. I 23 see that it comes from general headquarters. I don't 24 have a date -- a time of it. I think it's the Media 25 Relations Branch of the Ontario Provincial Police.
1071 The higher level of scrutiny, if you will, 2 as far as -- as media press releases by the OPP that they 3 chose -- the heading is Clarification of Events. 4 Q: And do you know why it was felt a 5 clarification of events was needed? 6 A: No, I don't. 7 Q: And you would agree with me that this 8 Clarification of Events does not correct the record 9 insofar as the previous press release had described the 10 incident at the corner of Army Camp Road and -- 11 A: That's correct -- 12 Q: -- Parkway Drive? 13 A: -- it does not. It does not refer to 14 the other press release either. 15 Q: Now you were aware that upon 16 notification of the shooting, the SIU would certainly 17 have launched an investigation immediately? 18 A: Upon notification by the Ontario 19 Provincial Police the procedure would then be the SIU 20 assigns somebody to investigate, yes. 21 Q: That's the role they investigate 22 incidents involving the police in Ontario where there is 23 a serious injury or a death? 24 A: That's correct. 25 Q: Now we know that -- we know from the
1081 testimony of Deputy Carson that prior to issuing the 2 first press release, an investigator from the SIU had 3 already called for him and left a message for him to call 4 back. 5 Are you aware of that? 6 A: No. 7 Q: And Deputy Carson took the view that 8 nonetheless he could send out the press release as the 9 SIU hadn't invoked it's mandate yet. 10 Are you aware of that? 11 A: Quite possibly. I -- I'm not aware 12 specifically that that was John Carson's testimony but -- 13 Q: You are aware that once the SIU 14 becomes involved in an incident, the OPP are not to send 15 out press releases regarding an incident? 16 A: For the most part that's correct. 17 But this was a little different. 18 Q: And why is that? 19 A: In the fact that there was also an 20 investigation going on into the attempted murder of my 21 officers. Therefore the Ontario Provincial Police does 22 have a responsibility to make press releases pertaining 23 to that. 24 So there is a difference in this 25 particular case because you had a criminal event of the
1091 attempted murder of the officers by the bus -- the school 2 bus -- the school bus and the car. That's a separate 3 investigation. 4 I believe the Ontario Provincial Police is 5 free to comment on that. And what they are not free to 6 comment on necessarily is the specifics of the SIU 7 investigation or once the SIU become -- come on the 8 scene. 9 There is two (2) and there is a function 10 in the policies of the -- the old policies of SIU as I 11 recall them, that basically they do talk about a joint 12 investigation in some matter. 13 Q: Now the facts that led to the SIU 14 investigation and the facts that led to the attempted 15 murder investigation was arising out of the same 16 incident. Is that not so? 17 A: Yes. Yes they arose out of the same 18 incident. 19 Q: And you knew that the SIU was doing - 20 - was investigating? 21 A: The -- the tragic death of Dudley 22 George at the hands of the Ontario Provincial Police, 23 yes. 24 Q: And would you not agree with me that 25 in those circumstances where the facts that are part of
1101 the criminal investigation are also the same facts that 2 are part of the Special Investigation Unit investigation, 3 the OPP should take great care if they're going to issue 4 a statement? In fact shouldn't issue a statement at all. 5 A: Well I think they took care in the 6 fact that the original statement that was not just left 7 to the hands of a normal press officer, John Carson the 8 Incident Commander who had the most knowledge of the 9 situation chose to make the press release. And chose as 10 you said, to dictate it so I think that's one step. 11 The clarification of the events came from 12 the Media Relations Branch as I said that's the -- that 13 oversees all media. In relation to the attempted murder 14 investigation that was being conducted, I think the 15 Ontario Provincial Police does have a right, hopefully, 16 that what they say is completely correct. 17 But to -- to do a report on it. We do 18 report, as a matter of fact, on attempt murder 19 investigations and so I suggest that -- I'm not trying to 20 split hairs, I'm just trying to say I think that I can 21 see where there was a decision made to make a press 22 release. 23 Q: So you agree with the decision to 24 issue these two (2) press releases, despite the SUI 25 investigation?
1111 A: Yes. Regretfully, that they were not 2 complete, yes. 3 Q: Now, it appears from the scribe notes 4 that you were heavily involved in managing the police 5 operation after the shooting at Ipperwash? 6 A: Yes, I was. 7 Q: Even more so than you had been 8 involved prior to the shooting? 9 A: Definitely. 10 Q: And it appears that many of the major 11 decisions about deployment of officers and about scaling 12 back of the operation were either made by you or you 13 participated in -- participated in those decisions? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: And you've said at various times 16 during the notes that you were satisfied with the 17 operations at Ipperwash? 18 A: Overall, satisfied. 19 Q: For example, if I could take you to a 20 comment that's attributed to you in the scribe notes 21 that's at Tab 51 of the binder. 22 These are the scribe notes from September 23 18th, 1995, and it's Document Number 1002419 and I 24 believe it's P-426. 25
1121 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: On the third page in, that's page 335 4 of the notes. You'll see there's a number of sub- 5 headings and the third one up from the bottom says: 6 "Comments from Chief Superintendent 7 Coles and Superintendent Parkin." 8 Do you see that? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: And the following comments are 11 attributed to you and Superintendent Parkin: 12 "Pleased with operations to date. Had 13 a warm, fuzzy feeling about incident to 14 date. Confidence in members." 15 You see that? 16 A: Yes. I believe I can. 17 Q: And you recall making comments such 18 as that? 19 A: No. 20 Q: You don't? 21 A: No. Because, I'm going to go back to 22 1100 hours. Superintendent Baranoski, who is the 23 incident commander in the presence of -- on -- "in the 24 presence of Staff Sergeant Kenna (sic) on the 25 expectations of his duty if activated.
1131 So, what I'm trying to do is who is making 2 these words? It's not me. I'm not there when a scribe 3 is taking notes. 4 So, what I'm trying -- if you can help me 5 to -- 6 Q: Well, the -- 7 A: -- tell me who -- 8 Q: -- page that you're looking at is not 9 in the -- actually doesn't come immediately before -- the 10 pages that you have in your binder are selected from 11 different portions of the scribe notes, so you'll see 12 that the one you're looking at is page 331 and I was 13 referring you to page 335. 14 A: Yeah, could I ask for 334 or 333, 15 please? 16 Q: Yeah. Could we put that up on the 17 screen? 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 Q: Perhaps P-426 could be put in front 22 of the witness if that's of assistance? 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Have we got 24 that somewhere? 25
1141 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 CONTINUED BY MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: 4 Q: 334 is the one immediately preceding. 5 It says: 6 "Unit leaders meeting Monday, 18th 7 September '95, 11:00 hours." 8 A: If I can, the third -- in the third 9 point down at what I was going to say is that you can see 10 that I'm not at that meeting. 11 So any words that are being attributed to 12 me are being presented by whoever is there -- 13 Q: Right. 14 A: -- and I have a suspect who might 15 have -- who might have been the innocent person because 16 of his particular sense of -- of words, but I didn't have 17 a warm and fuzzy. 18 I've heard that expression; that's not a - 19 - that's not Coles. 20 And somebody is saying that I am. I think 21 they're taking that I'm not -- I'm not taking objection 22 and somebody's used the word warm and fuzzy , but -- 23 Q: You would agree with the sentiment, 24 but not use those words? 25 A: Oh, I'd like to see the specifics of
1151 what was said in -- in that. 2 Q: Well, all we have is the record of 3 the scribe notes which say, "had of warm, fuzzy feeling 4 about incident to date." 5 A: And then -- 6 Q: I'm just asking you -- 7 A: -- that's -- 8 Q: -- at that point do you agree that 9 you would have had that sentiment, though perhaps you may 10 not have used those words? 11 A: I'm asking you if you can assist me 12 in the date? 13 Q: It's -- 14 A: It's 11:00 at what -- 15 Q: September 18th, 1995. 16 A: So there's -- there's some twelve 17 (12) days of activities of people coming in, people 18 leaving, negotiations and negotiations with First Nations 19 people, inroads being made with Ovide Mercredi et. al., 20 so overall, yes, I was -- I was somewhat contented with 21 what had gone on post shooting. 22 I know that previously, in my reading of 23 the transcripts, somebody suggested that I was somewhat 24 contented of the shooting and I take objection to that. 25 Q: Now, you told us that you thought it
1161 was important to separate incident command from 2 negotiations? 3 A: Yes, it is. 4 Q: But you would agree that your role as 5 a negotiator gave you some insight into how best to de- 6 escalate the situation? 7 A: Hopefully, yes it did -- 8 Q: And then -- 9 A: And I think -- and I think it did. 10 Q: Yes, and you shared that information 11 with the incident commanders? 12 A: Yes, and -- as I've given you the one 13 (1) example where my participated management style with 14 Jim Gordon was maybe a little more directive in a certain 15 degree, but I'll let you judge that. 16 It was participation and I tried to, but I 17 did have other knowledge that they didn't have -- 18 Q: Right. 19 A: -- and I was conveying it to them. 20 Q: I'm not -- I'm not trying to -- 21 A: No, I understand. 22 Q: -- criticize you. And I take it you 23 learned from your discussions in the negotiations that 24 the presence of a large number of officers, particularly 25 wearing the tactical uniform, was viewed by the First
1171 Nations people as inciting? 2 A: I believe it does. 3 Q: And it didn't help to de-escalate 4 matters? 5 A: It -- it doesn't help matters as far 6 as people who want to believe that the situation is being 7 escalated. 8 Q: And you were also of the view that 9 moving in the resources prior to the shooting of officers 10 in uniform had escalated the situation? 11 A: The escalation of the situation 12 occurred when the occupiers chose to use violence at the 13 gate; that's what escalated the situation, the violence. 14 As I mentioned in my recommendations, 15 there's a difference between a peaceful protest and a 16 protest where people start to use violence; the violence 17 that was used towards the vehicles, et cetera. 18 So that all escalated, yes, it did, but 19 I'm not saying that the presence of TRU -- of the TRU and 20 the ERT was the sole responsibility for that escalation. 21 It was -- 22 Q: It played a role -- 23 A: -- it was a situation -- it was a 24 situation that had escalated. 25 Q: And the presence of the officers in
1181 tactical uniforms also escalated -- that was a factor 2 that escalated the situation and raised tensions? 3 A: It may have in some people's minds. 4 Q: And I take it the -- the fact that 5 the TRU officers and the ERT officers, that their 6 uniforms are so similar, caused some confusion for people 7 on the area? 8 You came to learn this -- 9 A: I can't testify to -- 10 Q: Okay. 11 A: -- what people know or don't know. 12 Q: In any event, you made a commitment 13 to downsize the OPP presence at checkpoints and in the 14 area generally? 15 A: I think I took exception in my 16 testimony before. I said that "downsizing"... 17 Q: Right, you did clarify that you 18 weren't reducing the number of officers, you were 19 reducing their public -- 20 A: The visible -- 21 Q: -- presence? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: And as a result of that agreement 24 that you made with Mr. Mercredi, I take it ERT members 25 were supposed to stay out of view at the checkpoints
1191 unless they were needed for support? 2 A: Not as a result of the agreement with 3 Mr. Mercredi. It was an operational decision that we 4 would try to have regular blue uniforms, as I would say, 5 on the -- on the checkpoints, where possible. 6 Q: Right. And, in spite of this order, 7 you found that there was a problem with ERT members at 8 the checkpoints remaining highly visible and using their 9 weapons -- pointing their weapons at First Nations people 10 at the checkpoints? 11 A: I don't believe I can give testimony 12 to the fact that I was aware of that, I was aware of that 13 the ERT presence at checkpoints was there. 14 Q: Hmm hmm. 15 A: And remember, I think it's been 16 explained, ERT are just police officers in green 17 uniforms. 18 A: Right. 19 Q: And the pointing of weapons or not 20 pointing of weapons was something that those individual 21 officers would have to give evidence to. But the 22 presence of the uniforms, knowing full well that the 23 uniforms do have a different appearance from regular 24 policing, but it wasn't regular police -- what I'm trying 25 to stress is, it wasn't regular policing.
1201 This was a situation where I had a threat 2 to my officers or was of the belief there were threats to 3 my officers and there had been continued violence, but I 4 was of the position as my -- my dealing with it, I was 5 trying to calm things down. 6 I was trying to reduce the presence of the 7 visibility of the police officers without tactically 8 reducing the size of the complement that was had there. 9 And I was trying to portray that to my incident 10 commanders and I think it's evident that they were 11 pushing that I had tried to do that, given my agreement 12 with Mr. Mercredi. 13 Q: Okay. I'd like to take you to the 14 scribe notes and ask you some questions with respect to 15 this issue. 16 If you could turn to Tab 36 in your 17 binder. 18 A: Yes? 19 Q: And you'll see there are some scribe 20 notes there from September 8th of 1995. 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: If you turn to page 147, you'll see 23 there's a number on the top right-hand corner? 24 A: Yes? 25 Q: Okay. And the -- the last entry at
1211 15:39 hours is a briefing and I'm just going to read it 2 to you and ask you about what you knew about this and if 3 you can provide any further details about it. It says: 4 "Jim Gordon, a meeting with Chief Coles 5 and Superintendent Parkin today. Jim 6 Gordon advises we don't want ERT and 7 TRU members in the media." 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: "Dale Linton advises to members that 10 the Chief made a commitment to downsize 11 our presence, during a meeting with 12 Ovide Mercredi. ERT members should be 13 out of view, still want them for 14 support. Blocks are being moved. 15 Dale Linton did a check on all points 16 where we have officers advising ERT 17 leaders that media is all over the 18 place. Dale Linton advised ERT leaders 19 of some of his concerns regarding the 20 ERT members at the checkpoints. 21 All barriers moved, but can be put back 22 in place if needed. Jim Gordon, 23 regarding checkpoints, purpose of ERT 24 is so that uniforms don't get overrun. 25 Thought your people were instructed to
1221 stay low." 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: "Dale Linton advised ERT mem -- 4 advised ERT at checkpoints to stay back 5 out of the way. Jim Gordon stressed to 6 the ERT members their duty out there. 7 Keep encouraging your people." 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: Now -- so again, this is confirming 10 what you said that your -- your desire that ERT members 11 stay out of view was passed on to the ERT members at the 12 checkpoint? 13 A: It was being discussed in that 14 meeting. 15 Q: Yeah. 16 A: I can also talk of the -- the 17 checkpoints, that ERT members were at checkpoints, but 18 they were basically pushed back in the bush. They were 19 just in support and their uniforms would, in fact, 20 facilitate that role that they could have been there, but 21 they were there just in support of the regular members, 22 as it mentioned. 23 Q: Yes. Now does it not appear, though, 24 from this entry that although the ERT members had been 25 asked to stay out of view, there was a problem of them
1231 actually doing so, that they continued to maintain their 2 visibility? I'll refer you again to the sentence: 3 "Jim Gordon regarding checkpoints, 4 purpose of ERT is so that uniforms 5 don't get overrun. Thought your people 6 were instructed to stay low." 7 A: I didn't have the information that 8 they weren't. 9 Q: You didn't have any information about 10 them? 11 A: No, no. 12 Q: Okay. 13 A: That's -- that's a briefing meeting-- 14 Q: Yes. 15 A: -- where people are getting together 16 so the head of the ERT, the head of the -- the whatever 17 resources that Incident Commander Gordon had and so it 18 was an operational proceeding where basically he is 19 reiterating points and asking questions and making -- 20 giving direction. 21 Q: Okay. Well, if you have no further 22 information, I won't ask you further then. But you were 23 aware that one (1) of the negotiators for the Stoney 24 Pointers, Bob Antone, was, himself, held at gunpoint at a 25 checkpoint --
1241 A: I -- 2 Q: -- on September 16th, 1995? 3 A: I became aware of that, not 4 specifically in my recollection that it was Bob Antone, 5 one (1) of the negotiators. I'm trying to go back as 6 what -- when I first was apprised of that information. 7 I do have a recollection of -- of a high 8 risk stop based on some information. But I'm not sure 9 that that was Bob Antone unless you can -- 10 Q: Well Bob Antone did testify here on 11 March 10th, 2005 and he described the incident. And he 12 testified that he was on his way to a negotiating 13 meeting, which I believe you were at, and that he advised 14 the meeting of what had occurred at checkpoint. 15 Do you have any memory of that? 16 A: I read the material that was provided 17 for me and I'm trying to put -- place my mind back to, 18 did I remember when Bob Antone came in, that the 19 specifics were relayed to me; I -- I don't know. 20 Q: Now I understand as well that ERT 21 members were told not to wear camo paint? 22 A: If that was the incident commanders 23 decision, yes. 24 Q: Well first of all what is camo paint? 25 Is it what I think it is?
1251 A: Camouflage paint. 2 Q: Okay. The green and browns. 3 A: My position would be -- well the 4 incident commander also took the position that he didn't 5 want camo paint being worn. 6 Q: Okay. Now I understand from 7 reviewing the minutes of the Ipperwash Review from 8 February of 1996 -- 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: -- that there was some expression of 11 disagreement by ERT members with the decision that they 12 should not wear camo paint; do you recall that? Should I 13 turn you to the reference? 14 A: Yes, please, if you could. 15 Q: Okay. It's at your Tab 72. And this 16 is Document Number 2000556. I believe it's an exhibit as 17 well but I don't have that exhibit number. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: What's the 19 tab number again please? 20 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: 72. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 72. 22 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: It's P-457, thank 23 you. 24 25 CONTINUED BY MS. JACKIE ESMONDE:
1261 Q: If you could turn to page 9? Near -- 2 it begins near the bottom. 3 "Uniform and equipment was taken away 4 from us that was required to do the 5 job. Campaign for the face masks 6 paint. Checkpoint people thought they 7 were being used as bait. However, 8 they were used as checkpoint people 9 only." 10 There's -- it goes on. There's a comment 11 attributed to Inspector Parkin on page 10. Do you see 12 that, near the top? 13 A: Inspector Parkin -- 14 Q: Near the middle it says: 15 "Inspector Parkin was unaware of 16 direction not to use camo paint. 17 Perhaps there was a mis-communication. 18 Chief Coles responded that he was 19 trying to de-escalate the situation at 20 that time and the instructions were for 21 people [sorry] the instructions for 22 people where they were not to use camo 23 paint. 24 It goes on: 25 "Superintendent Baranoski asked to why
1271 no camo. Chief Coles responded that in 2 the negotiations, First Nations people 3 did not want us in camo paint. Concern 4 of decision as to why this was done. 5 ERT did not agree with the order. They 6 should have communicated their concerns 7 and been able to get input as to why 8 the order was given." 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: Does that refresh your memory then? 11 A: It refreshes my memory û- it 12 refreshes -û in any normal situation review, I'm not 13 suggesting this is normal, because of the tragic events, 14 but it is a review of the -- the incident which I wanted 15 done before I retired. 16 Many of these reviews sometimes do become 17 a wish list, if you will, for officers who are spending 18 saying we should have more equipment and we should have. 19 This is a specific to camo paint that they had. 20 Tony Parkin said he was not aware of not 21 to give it. He was aware that they -- that we didn't 22 want those people in uniform going into restaurants, et 23 cetera. 24 And that I report I'm trying to de- 25 escalate. And it says in there that I do recall, that
1281 they did not -- that the First Nations people had -- had 2 expressed concerns about people in camouflage, et cetera. 3 So, whether or not the First Nations 4 people, the negotiators, actually said camo paint or 5 whether or not we were talking generally about the whole 6 camouflage unit -- uniform, that might have caused some 7 concern, that was the point that was being discussed. 8 Q: Right. But my -- I suppose my 9 question though was that it -- you were aware that there 10 were ERT members who disagreed with the decision -- 11 A: Oh, oh sure. 12 Q: Who felt they were being used as bait 13 at checkpoints? 14 A: My -- no, not ERT team members being 15 used as bait, the regular officers being used as bait. 16 My position to that is, you serve as a police officer and 17 there are risks of being a police officer. 18 It was a decision of command that -- that 19 we would keep these checkpoints and we had reasons for 20 doing them. If the officers felt that they were being 21 made as -- as bait, I disagree with them. I have no 22 intention of using my officers as bait if I felt the 23 situation warranted, and I think that's what the incident 24 cam -- command was also saying. 25 Q: Of course. Now you worked very
1291 closely with Superintendent Parkin in the weeks following 2 the shooting? 3 A: Extremely. 4 Q: You told us that you had set up in 5 Grand Bend? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: And I take it you saw each other 8 every day? 9 A: We did. 10 Q: Okay. So his notes can be helpful in 11 terms of aiding us in -- they're more detailed than your 12 notes in -- 13 A: Yes, they are. 14 Q: -- any event, so they may help us to 15 determine what knowledge you had during the weeks 16 following the shooting? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: Could you then turn to his notes 19 which are Tab 71. They've been marked as P-499, and 20 they're Inquiry Document 2003790. 21 I'm going to take you to several entries 22 in here that refer to -- perhaps some conduct by OPP 23 officers that was brought to Superintendent Parkin's 24 attention and perhaps to yours -- 25 A: Yes.
1301 Q: -- that caused some concern to the 2 OPP? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Now if we could start at the entry 5 for October 4th which, I believe, if I'm reading this 6 correct, is the -- front number is 0036197. 7 Do you have the entry? 8 A: Yes, I do. 9 Q: Okay. The entry at 10:15 on October 10 4th? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: "Review Pinery plan with Chief Coles. 13 Charlie Bouwman called to advised he 14 had information that a beer can wrapped 15 in crime scene tape with feathers 16 sticking out of it and hole in it had 17 been turned over to [a redacted name] 18 by a First Nations employee at MNR. 19 Apparently [again the name is redacted] 20 is offended by it and also some coffee 21 mugs with arrows were made and they are 22 seen to be insensitive. 23 I asked Staff Sergeant Bouwman to confirm 24 his information and forward what he had found out. Spoke 25 to Sergeant Major --
1311 A: Edginton. 2 Q: û- Edginton? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: ôAnd briefed him re possible internal 5 investigation." 6 Now, were you -- your name is referenced 7 here. I take it you were with -- 8 A: I -- 9 Q: -- Superintendent Parkin at the time 10 that this information was provided by Sergeant Bouwman -- 11 Staff Sergeant Bouwman? 12 A: No, not necessarily. 13 Q: But you were aware of that -- 14 A: Well -- 15 Q: -- information? 16 A: -- it -- what it is, is October the 17 4th it says that we're at the regional office. Now 18 Superintendent Parkin would have his own office and I 19 would have mine, so as to the 10:15, was that the review 20 of the Pinery with Coles and then did Charlie Bouwman 21 call? So did Tony take that with me or did he take it in 22 his own -- on his own phone? 23 I don't know, but I was aware of this so, 24 okay? 25 Q: That's -- but I needed to know. So
1321 you were aware of it? 2 A: Long answer, I'm sorry. 3 Q: Now starting first with the -- the 4 beer can wrapped in crime scene tape with feathers 5 sticking out of it, and a hole in it, can you provide me 6 with any other information about where that was found and 7 the significance that was attached to it? 8 A: My understanding is that that 9 particular one was found in a bunkhouse facility at the 10 Pinery Park, if I recall. 11 Q: And was that a bunkhouse facility 12 where OPP members had been staying during the course of 13 the incident? 14 A: Yes, I believe it was. 15 Q: And what significance was attached to 16 finding this object there? 17 A: A member of the First Nations found 18 out about it -- 19 Q: Hmm hmm? 20 A: -- and expressed concern as he 21 should. 22 Q: Hmm hmm. 23 A: And brought it to the attention of 24 the staff sergeant, who brought it to the attention of 25 Inspector Parkin, who suggested that -- that -- has
1331 called in the Sergeant Major who looks after discipline- 2 type matters. 3 Q: Okay. And there's also the reference 4 to coffee mugs, which you've been asked about already. 5 A: That also became part of that 6 investigation, I gather. 7 Q: Okay. Did you, yourself, receive one 8 (1) of those coffee mugs? 9 A: No, I did not. 10 Q: Or, one (1) of the T-shirts that was 11 made? 12 A: No, I did not. 13 Q: So, when you briefed Sergeant Major 14 Edgington regarding a possible internal investigation, 15 was that with respect to both of these issues, the beer 16 can and the coffee mugs? 17 A: Repeat your question? 18 Q: Well, what was the internal 19 investigation of, it's an easier question? 20 A: Of the offensiveness -- of the 21 offensiveness of that memorabilia, if that's a word; I've 22 seen that word used, the offensiveness of what was done 23 as far as the beer can, T-shirts and the coffee mugs. 24 Q: Okay. And as far as you are aware, 25 is this the -- the first time that this was brought to
1341 Sergeant Major Edgington's attention and the 2 investigation is launched? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Okay. Now, if you could turn to the 5 entry for October 8th, which is on the next page? It 6 says: 7 "10:00 to 14:00 at Pinery Park. Review 8 situation re: Pinery Park takeover. 9 Very quiet. Received documentation re: 10 complaint of anti-native feelings by 11 some OPP members. Investigation to 12 continue." 13 Now, can you assist us with the details of 14 there were complaints of anti-native feelings by some OPP 15 members? 16 A: I don't believe I can assist you. I 17 -- I think I've given evidence that I knew of that 18 situation and that I knew that there was an ongoing 19 investigation. And I have knowledge as a result of my 20 reading last night that there was a particular course of 21 action in one (1) thing that has been disclosed; that -- 22 that's about what I can remember. I knew there were some 23 actions taken. 24 Q: Okay. My question -- this seems as 25 though it's referring to a new issue, a new complaint
1351 unrelated to the ones I've just reviewed, can you -- can 2 you provide me with any confirmation of that? 3 A: No, I can't and also at that day, on 4 -- on the 8th of October, it appears that Superintendent 5 Parkin has gone up to the Pinery by himself, I'm not with 6 him. It shows that I'm off on a weekly rest day. 7 Q: Okay. 8 A: It's a Sunday. 9 Q: And do you recall any information he 10 may have provided you that he had received on that date? 11 A: No. 12 Q: Now, on October 11th, there's a 13 further entry at 11:50: 14 "Spoke to Sergeant Grodzinski --" 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: "-- Professional Standards and 17 advised him of internal complaint we 18 were initiating as a result of actions 19 of some of our members at Ipperwash." 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: Okay. And -- and what actions in 22 particular are the subject of the internal complaint? 23 A: I -- I believe that's the -- the 24 whole issue surrounding the T-shirts, the -- the cups. I 25 -- I recall that as being separate to the issue of the
1361 beer can with feathers. They -- they were -- it was a 2 different set of -- different people involved; that's my 3 recollection of it. 4 Q: Okay. Do you -- can you tell us what 5 happened with the -- the beer can investigation, if I can 6 call it that? 7 A: I'm going to say, not exactly. 8 Q: Do you have some information? Just 9 tell us what you can. 10 A: What I'm saying is specific to 11 whether or not any knowledge that there was some kind of 12 discipline action -- disciplinary action whether or not 13 my knowledge goes to the beer can, to the coffee cups or 14 to the T-shirts, I'm going to say not exactly, and 15 suggest there are other people that might be able to 16 enlighten you as to what went on or not. 17 Q: You had no direct involvement with 18 that investigation? 19 A: No, other than I was -- I testified 20 that I was notified by Superintendent Parkin that there 21 was one -- an investigation being conducted. 22 Q: Okay. Are you aware whether there 23 was an individual or individuals who were identified as 24 being involved with the beer can? 25 A: I don't know.
1371 Q: And I did want to ask you about an 2 entry from October 5th. So, if you could go back one (1) 3 page you'll see at October 5th at ten o'clock, it says: 4 "Accompanied Chief Superintendent 5 Coles, met with TRU team, explained 6 rationale for attending at deceased's 7 home." 8 A: That's correct. 9 Q: So -- now I take it this meeting 10 arose, the TRU team had requested a meeting for an 11 explanation as to why you had attended at the home of 12 Dudley George's family; is that correct? 13 A: I think I maybe requested the 14 meeting. 15 Q: I see. And why did you feel you had 16 to have this meeting? 17 A: Got a situation. I think I received 18 information that maybe some people had some concerns as 19 to why I would have attended. It was my position that 20 the people who had done the shooting at Ipperwash and -- 21 as of October the 5th that I believe also had been shot 22 at, were members of the TRU team. 23 The TRU team are a fairly close knit group 24 of individuals as a team. I realized that and know that. 25 There had been a death, a tragic death of an individual
1381 and it was my position that I was going to go and I was 2 going to talk to that TRU team. 3 I recall my -- as I have mentioned to Sam 4 at the time that I went to the family, I could not give 5 them answers. My suggestion was that I was going to go 6 and talk to my TRU team -- the TRU team that had 7 responded to this and been assigned and I was going to 8 tell them -- and that I thought that the actions, what I 9 took -- and it was a kind of a meeting with the TRU. 10 It's Tony who said that I specific 11 explained rationale for attending at the deceased's 12 house. That obviously came up in -- in the discussion 13 but I wanted to talk to the TRU team. 14 Q: Okay. But you had received 15 information that members of the TRU team were unhappy 16 that you had visited Dudley George's family home? 17 A: I'm not going to testify that it was 18 specifically that that came from TRU team people. I 19 don't know. I chose to go to the TRU team. I -- I don't 20 have a direct recollection if it was a member. But I 21 chose to go to the TRU team. I think it was on my own 22 hope that I went. 23 Q: And I believe you testified that you 24 were retired and so not aware of the outcome of the 25 investigation regarding the T-shirts and the mugs. You
1391 were not -- 2 A: I retired as of March 29th. Anything 3 that came down as of -- well as of April the 2nd 4 actually. But -- but my last day at work, that I ever 5 went into the office for any kind of commanding control 6 was March 29th. 7 Q: Okay. But prior to your retirement I 8 -- you were aware -- were you aware that four (4) 9 officers, that being a sergeant and three (3) constables 10 had been identified as having been involved in the 11 creation of the crested items? 12 A: I don't know if I was. I read that 13 press release last night, so I'm aware now. 14 Q: Now if you could turn to Tab 24 in 15 your materials? That's the Executive Summary that you 16 testified you wrote. 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: That's Exhibit 482, Document Number 19 2000588. Now, you told us yesterday that you were asked 20 to prepare this Executive Summary in anticipation of a 21 meeting with some deputy ministers? 22 A: With anticipation of discussing it 23 with the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner and 24 then a subsequent meeting with the Deputy Ministers, yes. 25 Q: And this report then was reviewed by
1401 your superiors? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: And it formed the basis of the report 4 that you made to the deputy ministers? 5 A: And I don't have a recollection how 6 that report -- I do know that -- that I was asked to give 7 a briefing, et cetera. 8 I -- I can't quite recall how that meeting 9 -- what was -- if documentation was provided or if I 10 spoke off overheads, I can't remember that. 11 Q: Okay. In any event, you would agree 12 it would be important that this report be accurate? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And you stated, yesterday, that you 15 believed the report to be accurate at the time? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: I'd like to review a number of areas 18 in this report regarding their accuracy. If we could 19 start at page 1? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: The fourth paragraph states: 22 "Attempts to start talks were 23 continually frustrated by the fact no 24 one in the Park would talk. Retired 25 Staff Sergeant Lorne Smith, a respected
1411 person and former Detachment Commander 2 at Kettle and Stony Point was utilized 3 and made attempts to have respective 4 people of Kettle and Stony Point begin 5 negotiations on our behalf, to no 6 avail." 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: Now I take it and you've testified 9 that you were aware that there had actually been 10 discussions with a Bert -- is it -- it was either Bert or 11 Bruce Manning? 12 A: Bert Manning had been spoke -- had 13 been spoken to -- 14 Q: Right. 15 A: -- at the Military Base, if I recall. 16 I think John Carson and Mark Wright spoke to him. 17 Q: Right. 18 A: But not at the Park. 19 Q: But in relation to the occupation? 20 A: They were trying to get somebody to 21 talk to them, yes. 22 Q: Right. And he was willing to speak 23 with them? 24 A: I beg your pardon? 25 Q: And he was willing to speak with
1421 them? 2 A: I don't know if he was or not. 3 Q: Were you aware that arrangements had 4 been made to have a second meeting the next day at twelve 5 o'clock? 6 A: No. 7 Q: And -- now you make reference here to 8 retired Staff Sergeant Lorne Smith -- 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: -- who was working, I believe, with 11 Brad Seltzer -- officer Brad Seltzer in trying to get 12 negotiations started? 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: And were you aware -- was it brought 15 to your attention that Officer Lorne Smith and Officer 16 Seltzer had, in fact, met with Ron George and Ron 17 George's father on the 6th of September? 18 A: Yes, I knew -- I knew that. The date 19 I don't know; I do know that they had met. 20 Q: Okay. And were you advised that Ron 21 George and Ron George's father had suggested two (2) 22 potential people to speak with in the Park, but that they 23 would want assurances that they wouldn't be arrested? 24 Was that information passed on to you? 25 A: No.
1431 Q: Were you advised that Ron George was 2 attempting to follow up with Robert George in order to 3 start negotiations? 4 A: This is? 5 Q: On the 6th. 6 A: On the 6th, no. 7 Q: Would you agree with me that if those 8 facts are correct, that this paragraph is somewhat 9 misleading? 10 MR. MARK SANDLER: I think that's a 11 subject of argument, because there's a number of facts 12 that I would be putting in addition to those that -- that 13 I suggest would leave a different impression. 14 So he can only speak to what he knows and 15 what he doesn't know, with great respect. 16 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: Well, if My Friend 17 wishes to put those other factors to -- to the witness 18 during the re-examination he can do so. 19 I'm just asking this witness, based on the 20 information I've provided to him, if he would agree that 21 that paragraph is misleading. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: All right. 23 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: I think that -- I 24 don't believe that's argument. I believe that's a proper 25 question.
1441 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Okay, yes. 2 THE WITNESS: I believe that if I had 3 known all those factors and at the time I wrote this 4 report, that had chosen not to put them in, that might 5 have been considered misleading. 6 I'm suggesting my evidence is I did not 7 know those factors other than I did know the factor with 8 Bert Manning. 9 10 CONTINUED BY MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: 11 Q: Hmm hmm. 12 A: But, if I can, this is an executive 13 summary. This isn't a police report going into the nitty 14 -- the minutia, if you will, of every day events. It was 15 just an overall summary that I was provided to executive. 16 Q: Certainly. I understand you wouldn't 17 go into every detail in an executive summary, but an 18 executive summary, you would agree, is important in that 19 it's the first thing that's read and will leave an 20 impression on the reader? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: So it's important to be accurate in 23 an executive summary? 24 A: I think I was accurate. 25 Q: And in everything.
1451 A: I think I was accurate. 2 Q: Now, you make reference here to -- in 3 the next paragraph: 4 "On Tuesday, September 5th, 1995, at 5 approximately 22:43 hours, OPP officers 6 attended near the main gate to the Park 7 on Army Camp Road to determine the 8 origin of fires that had been set out 9 on the roadway in that area. The 10 occupiers in the Park threw rocks at 11 four (4) cruisers. The windshields of 12 the cruisers were smashed and the hoods 13 dented. The officers were ordered to 14 withdraw back to their checkpoints." 15 And you've made some reference to this 16 incident in your -- in your testimony? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: Are you aware of testimony at this 19 proceeding that provides a different version of events in 20 that we've heard from a number -- quite a number of First 21 Nations witnesses that they were in the process of moving 22 picnic tables into the sandy parking lot on that evening 23 when a cruiser came up and smashed into the picnic tables 24 and that the cruisers were damaged in the events that 25 followed that?
1461 A: I wasn't aware to the detail that 2 you've just provided. I was aware that there possibly 3 was other information as far as the picnic table removal. 4 Q: Okay. And when did you learn that 5 information? 6 A: Very -- very recently in preparation 7 for my -- for my -- for my testimony here. 8 Excuse, me, Your Honour, could I ask for 9 a washroom break, please? 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Oh, by all 11 means. It's twelve o'clock. How much longer do you 12 think you think you might be so we might take a lunch 13 break? 14 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: I expect another 15 half an hour? 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think we 17 might take a lunch break now. 18 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: Certainly, I'm in 19 your hands. 20 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much. 21 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: Thank you for 22 asking. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: By all 24 means. 25 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry stands
1471 adjourned until 1:15. 2 3 --- Upon recessing at 12:00 p.m. 4 --- Upon resuming at 1:15 p.m. 5 6 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 7 resumed. Please be seated. 8 9 CONTINUED BY MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: 10 Q: Good afternoon, Mr. Coles. 11 A: Good afternoon. 12 Q: Now as I'm sure you recall when we 13 left off before the break we were looking at, the 14 Executive Summary. 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And we were reviewing some of the 17 entries there. I'd like to continue with that if we 18 could, at page 1, the last paragraph. 19 "At 23:43 hours officers at the OPP 20 checkpoint on Army Camp Road reported 21 hearing between fifty (5) and a hundred 22 (100) rounds of automatic gunfire 23 coming from the Ipperwash Army Camp 24 area." 25 A: That's correct.
1481 Q: Now I -- I'd like to ask you about 2 your use of the word 'automatic gunfire'. Yesterday you 3 were asked some questions about what was the appropriate 4 terminology to use when referring to the gunfire. 5 And we heard in the taped conversation 6 that you had with Inspector Fox that you took some 7 exception to using the word 'automatic gunfire' and yet 8 you use it here in this report. 9 A: Correct. This report was composed of 10 summaries that I'd received, chronologies that I had 11 received and as I wrote it I was utilizing some of those. 12 I guess if I look at it and say in light 13 of what I had said yesterday, speaking about automatic 14 gunfire, I can understand your concern. But I guess that 15 report is; officers did report automatic gunfire. 16 My point yesterday was the discerning of 17 automatic gunfire or non-automatic gunfire is somewhat 18 difficult. 19 But, I think my testimony was to me it 20 really didn't matter. I mean it was the fact, is that 21 gunfire was heard. And it wasn't just one (1) shot, it 22 is fifty (50) or a hundred (100) rounds. 23 Q: Well, it appears to me, sir, that 24 clearly you did think there was an important distinction 25 between automatic versus semi-auto gunfire such that you
1491 thought you needed to comment on that in your 2 conversation with Inspector Fox. 3 A: Correct, I did. 4 Q: And this report it is -- it is true 5 that there were officers that reported they heard 6 automatic gunfire, but you didn't clarify here what 7 you've explained to us over the last few days that it can 8 be very difficult to tell the difference between 9 automatic and semi-auto gunfire. 10 A: Again, it's an Executive Summary. 11 Q: Right. 12 A: And for the intent of me informing 13 people that gunfire was heard, I don't think if I had 14 just mentioned gunfire as opposed to automatic that it 15 would have had any different substance. But in -- in the 16 role of an Executive Summary, the fact is fifty (50) to 17 one hundred (100) rounds, it says automatic of gunfire 18 were heard. 19 Q: Do you agree it would have been 20 better if you had just said gunfire? 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Mr. 22 Sandler, do you have an objection? 23 MR. MARK SANDLER: I just think in 24 fairness, it actually says, "Officers reported hearing." 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes.
1501 MR. MARK SANDLER: It -- it doesn't say 2 there was automatic gunfire. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, I 4 understand that but I think the question's fair. 5 THE WITNESS: I'll stand that I -- I 6 guess what I'm standing by, I think your question was, 7 would it have been better? 8 9 CONTINUED BY MS. JACKIE ESMONDE. 10 Q: Hmm hmm. Could -- 11 A: My answer -- 12 Q: -- can I add something to that 13 question? 14 A: Please, please. 15 Q: One of the audiences you had in mind 16 when you were preparing this were -- was deputy 17 ministers. 18 A: No. When I wrote this report I 19 didn't know how this -- I was writing a report to the -- 20 my -- my supervisor, Deputy Commissioner Boose and/or 21 O'Grady. How they saw fit or what they wanted me to do 22 or say at the deputy ministers meeting, I -- I was not 23 100 percent aware of what -- what I was going down or 24 what I was to face. 25 I -- it turned out I was asked to give a
1511 briefing, basically, as I recall. I still haven't 2 answered your question. 3 Q: Yes. 4 A: Was it -- was it better? I'm going 5 to say that my report is factual because it's what 6 officers reported. So, I -- I'll stand by that answer. 7 Q: Would you agree with me, sir, that a 8 lay person such as a deputy minister probably wouldn't 9 understand the difference between automatic and semi- 10 automatic. They may think automatic sounds more serious? 11 A: They might, possibly. 12 Q: Now, if you could turn to page 2, the 13 third paragraph? 14 A: Yes? 15 Q: "At approximately 19:55 hours a 16 private citizen advised police officers 17 assigned to a checkpoint on Army Camp 18 Road that his vehicle had been damaged 19 by occupiers in the intersection of 20 Army Camp Road and East Parkway Drive." 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: And, I believe we went over this 23 earlier, the -- the information that you had was that 24 there was one (1) person who had caused the damage to the 25 vehicle; is that not right?
1521 A: I thought I reported that I didn't 2 exactly know how the damage was inflicted on the car. I 3 thought that was my testimony. 4 Q: I thought your testimony was you 5 didn't know the name of the individual, but you 6 understood it was one (1) person? 7 A: If -- if you're telling me that, yes. 8 Q: Well, I suppose the transcript will - 9 - will tell us which one of us is correct. 10 A: Exactly, I'm sorry. 11 Q: Okay. So, this is very -- very 12 similar to the wording that we saw in the press release, 13 correct? 14 A: Yes, it is. 15 Q: Again, you've used the term, 'private 16 citizen'? 17 A: Yes, I do. 18 Q: And, you've referred to occupiers, 19 and the plural being responsible for causing the damage? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: And, you know today, sir, that it was 22 one (1) individual that was responsible for causing the 23 damage? 24 A: I wasn't here for the testimony. I 25 guess, is what I'm saying, so to be perfectly -- at this
1531 point whether or not it was one (1) or two (2), I don't 2 know what has been testified to. 3 Q: I'm asking what you know. 4 A: I guess then, my answer has to be, I 5 don't know for sure. 6 Q: Okay. So, to this date do you -- as 7 far as you can recall, you were never advised that it was 8 one (1) person who was responsible for causing the 9 damage? 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: Okay. If I could turn your attention 12 to page 3. 13 The first full paragraph describes the CMU 14 deployment and I'm interested in the -- the last 15 sentence: 16 "The occupiers continued to throw rocks 17 at the CMU as the officers withdrew 18 down the East Parkway Drive." 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: And, can I take it, sir, that you 21 intended with that sentence to -- to state that the OPP 22 were leaving the area at the time that, as you read on, 23 the school bus emerged out of the parking -- parking lot? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: And, have you had an opportunity to
1541 listen to the -- the radio recordings from that evening? 2 A: I've read transcripts, whether or not 3 I heard -- 4 Q: Okay. 5 A: -- the recordings, I don't know. 6 Q: So, you have read transcripts of it? 7 A: I have read -- I have read a 8 transcript, yes. 9 Q: Have you recently read a transcript? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: Last night? Did you read it last 12 night, actually? 13 A: I think so. 14 Q: Okay. That's good. So, I have a 15 copy here to look at if you require it, but would you 16 agree with me, sir, that there's no indication in that 17 transcript that there was any order to withdraw from the 18 area? 19 A: In the transcript? 20 Q: Yes. 21 A: If -- if you're suggesting that it 22 isn't there, I -- I will believe you. 23 Q: Do you -- do you wish to look at it? 24 A: No, if you say it's there. 25 Q: And, it appears to me, sir, and
1551 perhaps you can correct me, that the executive summary 2 makes no mention of the fact that Cecil Bernard George 3 was badly beaten while he was in police custody? 4 A: No, it does not. 5 Q: And, why is that not included in the 6 executive summary? 7 A: I make note that at one (1) point, 8 one (1) occupier was arrested -- 9 Q: Yes. 10 A: -- and I thought that that was 11 sufficient for an executive summary. 12 Q: You didn't think it was important to 13 include the fact that somebody was badly injured at the 14 hands of your police officers that evening? 15 A: Not in this report, no. 16 Q: And similarly, the executive summary 17 makes no mention of the fact that a young First Nations 18 person was injured by a projectile and taken to hospital 19 with a suspected gunshot wound? 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 A: The fact that a young person was 24 injured is important. The fact that I chose not to put 25 it in that report I will explain -- by this report was
1561 written I think for -- between September 24th and we'll 2 say the 27th when I gave the report. 3 The investigation of the matter was being 4 conducted by the Special Investigations Unit and 5 therefore I was not privy to all the information to the 6 minutiae that what happened. So, I -- I'll give that as 7 an explanation of why it was not put in. 8 Q: You -- 9 A: But, again, I go back to the fact 10 that I believed I was right in an Executive Summary. I 11 wasn't writing a police report or a brief that somebody 12 would have to act upon. 13 Q: I see. I would suggest to you, sir, 14 that the details that I brought to your attention in the 15 report, the -- what I describe as inaccuracies and the 16 omissions would tend to make the First Nations people in 17 the Park appear more violent than was actually the case. 18 Would you agree with that? 19 A: I disagree with your suggestion that 20 I don't make that -- was in my mind any intent to portray 21 that in any report to my superiors, no. 22 Q: And I would also suggest to you that 23 your -- the details here and the omissions tend to hide 24 any police wrongdoing during the incident. 25 A: At the time I wrote that report and
1571 to this day -- at the time I -- I'll rephrase that. 2 At the time that I wrote this report, I 3 did not believe that there was any police wrongdoing, 4 therefore, I had no reason to believe that I was hiding 5 any facts. And if there has been wrongdoing found on 6 behalf of the Ontario Provincial Police, I believe that 7 has already been reported on by other people other than 8 me. 9 And I had retired at that time when that 10 information as to further actions by the officers were 11 analysed. 12 Q: So, you accept now that there was 13 some wrongdoing by OPP officers during the incident? 14 A: A Court of this land has so found, 15 yes. 16 Q: And I take it you're referencing the 17 Kenneth Deane trial? Is that -- 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Anything else? 20 A: That's the one I'm thinking of. 21 Q: What about with respect to the 22 beating of Cecil Bernard George? 23 Would you agree that there was some police 24 wrongdoing in using excessive force? 25 A: I don't believe a Court has so found.
1581 I believe that a Court found that -- well, I believe it's 2 a matter of record. 3 Q: Now, the -- the last document I'd 4 like to turn you to is at Tab 72. This is the Ipperwash 5 Review. 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: February 21st, 1996, P-457, Document 8 2000556. 9 A: Correct. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: What tab is 11 that again? 12 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: Sorry, that's Tab 13 72. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 72 again, 15 right. 16 17 CONTINUED BY MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: 18 Q: Now, you've already explained to us 19 the -- the reason for holding this meeting and that you 20 wanted to have a form of debriefing before you retire 21 regarding the incident. 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: And you wanted a chance to hear from 24 your officers what their views were regarding the 25 operation?
1591 A: Correct. 2 Q: And it would appear from the contents 3 of the report that some of the officers raised some 4 criticisms of the operation? 5 A: Yes they did. 6 Q: At page 2 there is a statement that 7 is attributed to Inspector Goodall. Now I realize this 8 isn't a transcript, but just past the middle of the page 9 it says: 10 "Inspector Goodall raised issue of 11 concern of First Nations people being 12 allowed to accompany CIB. Precedent 13 setting issue and is a concern because 14 SIU represents the First Nations 15 interests." 16 Do you see that? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: Now, sir, I take it you wouldn't 19 agree with such a statement that the SIU represents the 20 First Nations interests? 21 A: They shouldn't. 22 Q: Right. 23 A: They shouldn't. 24 Q: They shouldn't and they don't? 25 A: Well, no. They -- they should be
1601 impartial; it's an impartial investigation. That's what 2 I believe the SIU does. 3 Q: Right. They serve the public 4 interest? 5 A: Exactly. 6 Q: They're an objective body that is 7 supposed to investigate incidents involving police? 8 A: That's correct. 9 Q: Now do you recall the statement being 10 made? 11 A: Not specifically. 12 Q: Do you recall making any comments 13 during that meeting regarding the SIU and the public 14 interest that it serves? 15 A: Do I recall, at that meeting? No. 16 Q: Now it appears that members also 17 raised some concerns regarding the legality of certain 18 arrests that took place at Strathroy Hospital on 19 September 7th in the early morning? 20 A: Yes? 21 Q: I'm just looking for the reference. 22 It's on page 4? 23 Again, it's -- Inspector Goodall is 24 attributed with the comments that innocent people were 25 placed in jail due to lack of proper information being
1611 passed on. 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: And was that a concern that you 4 shared? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: So you were aware that two (2) of 7 Dudley George's siblings and another young person had 8 been arrested at the hospital after taking him... 9 A: Arrested and released, subsequently, 10 yes. 11 Q: And they were held overnight? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And they were told they were being 14 charged with attempted murder? 15 A: I'm not aware of that. 16 Q: Okay. And according to the comments 17 in the review, it appears as though they could have been 18 released earlier, but that proper information wasn't 19 passed on? 20 A: According to the review, yes. 21 Q: And were you aware of that before the 22 review? 23 A: I knew the people had been released. 24 I knew that investigation had been done and that the 25 people had been arrested, but -- but then were -- were
1621 released? 2 Q: Okay. But have any concerns been 3 brought to your attention, prior to this review, that 4 innocent people had been put in jail and had been held 5 longer than they ought to have been? 6 A: Specifically, not the -- the placing 7 of them jail, specifically that there was an area of, as 8 Goodall has reported, lack of communication that led to 9 police officers making decisions. 10 In fairness to those -- the police 11 officers who actually made the arrest at the time, if 12 there was a breakdown in communication that could have 13 better been done by command, I take responsibility for 14 that, but I also like to believe that those officers, 15 those officers who made the arrest were acting in good 16 faith as police officers. 17 Even if that good faith is in error, it 18 was still good faith on their part that they were acting 19 as police officers. 20 Q: I see. Did you make any inquiries 21 into the basis for those arrests? 22 A: I don't know. I -- I don't know. It 23 was -- I believe it was brought out in briefings and I 24 was -- I was -- I'm trying to recall. I -- I guess I'll 25 just have to say I -- I did know that people were
1631 arrested that, in hindsight, should not have been 2 arrested; that's the best I can do. 3 Q: Are you aware whether any formal 4 apology was made to those people? 5 A: Not prior to my leaving the Ontario 6 Provincial Police. 7 Q: Was there any discussion of doing so? 8 A: I beg your pardon? 9 Q: Was there any discussion of doing so? 10 A: I want to back up on the one (1) 11 answer that I gave as far as was any apology given. 12 At the night of the circle, a female from 13 the First Nations, a person who -- who advised me -- 14 advised us in the group that she was a relative and had 15 been with, at that time at that -- it was -- I didn't 16 know who she had particularly been with and that she 17 stated that she had been arrested wrongly. 18 And I believe I don't -- and I don't think 19 there were records, but I believe that I said, If you 20 were wrongly dealt with by the Ontario Provincial Police, 21 I will apologize for that; that's as close as I can say. 22 But I really can't say that that is one (1) of the 23 persons who were arrested that night. 24 But I did know at that evening, that a 25 person very distraught did bring that to the attention
1641 and I did say that if we made errors, that I would 2 apologize for those. 3 So I don't know if that's -- I do have 4 that in my mind that that's what I said, the night of 5 that -- the night of the meeting of which Ovide Mercredi 6 was present? 7 Q: So if I can say what I think I 8 understand from your evidence, though, sir, is that as 9 far as you know, no formal apology and admission of 10 wrongdoing was given to the people who were arrested at 11 the hospital that evening, as far as you know? 12 A: I believe that, in the literature 13 somewhere, that Jim Potts, Inspector Jim Potts of the 14 Ontario Provincial Police is -- that a person said that 15 Jim Potts did make an apology. 16 I don't know what that apology was for. 17 Q: You don't know what it was for? 18 A: That's a -- no, no, I don't, and 19 that's the best that I can -- 20 Q: Okay. I have your answer, I think. 21 A: Okay. 22 Q: And if you could turn to page 7. 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25
1651 Q: There's a comment that is attributed 2 to you at the bottom: 3 "Chief Coles: Gustafsen Lake was 4 definitely connected." 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And on what basis do you say that 7 Gustafson Lake was definitely connected to the incident 8 at Ipperwash? 9 A: My understanding of Gustafsen Lake, 10 and I got this information, basically, through Inspector 11 Hutchinson, I believe, at the time or -- or a report, is 12 that Gustafsen Lake was a similar situation. 13 There was negotiations that broke down, a 14 difference of opinion as to a -- a land ownership of what 15 was believed to be private land. 16 That's one where there might a possible 17 connection to a similarity, if you will. There was also 18 the -- we were also advised that there were some First 19 Nations people from the Brantford area that were there 20 and I believe that that's the two (2) reasons. 21 Q: Well I've heard you say that there 22 were some similar issues, in both incidents? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: But you would agree with me that 25 there was no one at Gustafsen Lake who was also at the
1661 Ipperwash incident? 2 A: No. There's another example. I 3 understand at Gustafson Lake a helicopter was shot at, 4 and of course, at the Military base there was also a 5 helicopter shot at; that's another connection. 6 Q: When you use the term, "connection," 7 I understand there being some link between the two (2) 8 incidents, apart from there being some similarity between 9 what occurred at each one. 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: And you would agree with me that 12 there was no person who was at Gustafsen Lake who was 13 also at the Ipperwash incident? 14 A: Not to my knowledge. 15 Q: And, in fact, they involved two (2) 16 completely different First Nations? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: And, in fact, the only connection 19 between them is the fact that there were First Nations 20 involved in both issues? 21 A: I think this just comes under the 22 intelligence branch who is -- it -- this is under the 23 intelligence part of the review and I am making the oh -- 24 the point that, in my opinion, there was a connection. 25 This was just a briefing and that's my --
1671 my view that there was a connection, be -- be that they 2 were connected by the incident, by the type of incident, 3 by the fact that negotiations had broken down et cetera. 4 Q: If there was a burglary committed by 5 two (2) white youths in Toronto and a burglary committed 6 in Vancouver by two (2) white youths, would you say that 7 they were connected? 8 A: Connected in the fact that two (2) 9 white youths committed burglary, a -- an offence. 10 Q: So that's all that's required -- 11 A: It can û- can -- 12 Q: -- for you to consider there to be a 13 connection? 14 A: Well thereÆs û- it's a connection 15 that they're doing the same -- it's the same incident. 16 It's the same type of crime. 17 Q: It's a similar crime. 18 A: Of course they're not connected. I'm 19 not suggesting -- 20 Q: Right. 21 A: -- that they're connected that way, 22 and I don't think that was my intention. 23 Q: Right. And in the same way Gustafson 24 Lake and Ipperwash were not connected either. 25 A: Not operationally, if -- if that
1681 helps. We saw fit enough to send an officer -- an 2 Officer Hutchinson that went to Gustafson Lake. 3 Q: At page 8 at the top, I'm not sure if 4 this is connected -- this is attributed to you or not. 5 You see at the bottom of page 7 that the Gustafson Lake 6 comments is attributed to you and then at the top it 7 says: 8 "Need to make sure that raw 9 intelligence given out has been 10 analysed to some degree." 11 Did you make that comment? 12 A: I don't know. I don't know. 13 Q: You would agree that was a problem at 14 the Ipperwash incident that raw intelligence was given 15 out that hadn't been analysed? 16 A: Yes. Yes, to some degree. I think 17 you said it had not been analysed? 18 Q: Yes. 19 A: The words here says, "analysed -- 20 Q: To some degree. 21 A: -- to some degree". Yes. 22 Q: Okay. And that it would be improper 23 to make operational decisions based on raw intelligence 24 that hadn't been fully been analysed? 25 A: No. It's not necessarily wrong.
1691 Sometimes you have intelligence information that you feel 2 that you must act on or do act on that analysis can't go 3 any further. 4 Q: Can you give me an example of some of 5 the raw intelligence that was given out that hadn't been 6 analysed to some degree in the Ipperwash incident? 7 A: Not right now, but I think I can. 8 But, I can't right now. 9 Q: Thank you. Perhaps -- perhaps during 10 the re-examination that you can -- Commission counsel can 11 canvas if you've remembered anything. 12 A: Very good. 13 Q: Now, turning to the last page, sorry 14 it's page 17, there's comments by Chief Superintendent 15 Coles. 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: And I see the -- the second to last 18 comment is: 19 "We must look at being peacekeepers, 20 kicking ass will not solve anything." 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: And that was a problem I take it that 23 some of the officers had the view that kicking ass was 24 what they were there to do at Ipperwash? 25 A: Repeat that question.
1701 Q: Would -- would you agree with me that 2 there was a problem that some officers, rather than 3 looking at the role as being peacekeepers, felt they were 4 there to kick ass? 5 A: No. I won't agree to that. 6 Q: Well, I must ask you then why you 7 felt the need to make that comment at the review. 8 A: I can't attribute a -- we've got to 9 go and kick ass to any one individual person. I think 10 I'm speaking as -- in the overview there that we must 11 look upon ourselves always as peacekeepers and that the - 12 - the point of using force, kicking ass, if that's what 13 it intends, is not the appropriate thing. 14 This is a review of an operation. Not a 15 specifics of all -- what one person said. 16 Q: And you do say in the second 17 subheading -- the second bullet is: 18 "Satisfied with incident overall, 19 however realizes that Ipperwash is far 20 from over." 21 A: Ipperwash is far from over. The 22 review did not involve anything as it previously states 23 which was under investigation by -- ongoing by the SIU. 24 But overall, given the number of people that were in 25 place and the actions that were taken by the Ontario
1711 Provincial Police, I was satisfied with it overall. 2 Q: And you commented a couple of times 3 during the examination that you took issue with somebody 4 suggesting that you were contented with -- 5 A: Yes, I did. 6 Q: -- someone being killed. 7 A: Yes, I did. 8 Q: And take it you -- you recognize and 9 you would agree with me that there were certain -- that 10 were a number of things that you weren't satisfied with 11 with respect to the operation? 12 A: In many operations, yes, that's a 13 correct -- and in this one, yes. 14 Q: You were not satisfied that Dudley 15 George had been killed by a police officer? 16 A: I was not. 17 Q: Or that Cecil Bernard George had been 18 badly beaten while in police custody? 19 A: I think I've already questioned that, 20 that I don't know that I agree with you on that. 21 Q: You don't agree that he was badly 22 beaten while in police custody? 23 A: I -- I know that he -- that there was 24 a beating, the issue goes to -- and my understanding as I 25 said -- it's up to a Court that's already found that, as
1721 to was it -- was it injuries that were obtained in the 2 normal course of a violent arrest, and I believe that's a 3 matter that -- and a learned judge has made his -- his 4 decision on. 5 Q: You are aware that no officer has 6 been identified as taking part in the assault? 7 A: No, particular officer? 8 Q: Not a single officer has come forward 9 to admit that they were involved in the assault or to 10 identify any other person? 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just a 12 minute, I see Mr. Roland is on his feet. Yes, Mr. 13 Roland? 14 MR. IAN ROLAND: My Friend's using 15 inappropriate language, there's no assault charge, 16 there's no conclusion anywhere that there's been an 17 assault. I mean, she's jumped to a conclusion and put it 18 to this Witness as if it's a conclusion that's been drawn 19 by anybody but her. Certainly nobody officially has 20 drawn the conclusion that it's an assault. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Perhaps when 22 a lawyer uses the term, 'assault', it has a very specific 23 meaning. Maybe you could use a different term to 24 describe the incident. 25 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: Okay. I wasn't --
1731 sorry, I'm just not certain what word I should use. 2 Certainly he was -- 3 THE WITNESS: He was arrested. 4 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: -- he was struck -- 5 he was struck by police batons. 6 THE WITNESS: After he had struck police 7 officers. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well... 9 10 CONTINUED BY MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: 11 Q: Follow -- following his arrest, he 12 was struck by police batons. 13 A: My understanding is that the injuries 14 he received was in the course of the arrest and the 15 course of his actions as he was arrested. How long that 16 arrest takes, I guess, is how long a person decides to 17 continue fighting until he is finally taken under control 18 and I think that is a matter -- I think my recollection 19 of a judge has made those decisions and that's all I can 20 say. 21 Q: Okay. Perhaps I can rephrase it, 22 then. During the course of the arrest you would agree 23 with me he was struck by batons and it appears was also 24 kicked and hit. 25 A: Why was he arrested? He was
1741 arrested, I suggest, because he hit officers. 2 Q: If we can put aside the question of 3 whether the force was excessive or not, because I'm not 4 asking you that question at this point -- 5 A: Okay. 6 Q: -- you would agree me, the evidence 7 is, as far as you know, that he was struck by police 8 batons? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: That he was struck -- that he was 11 kicked and hit by police officers? 12 A: I don't know if he was kicked. I 13 know he was hit. 14 Q: Okay. And, you're aware that no 15 officer has been identified as having taken part in 16 striking Mr. Cecil Bernard George? 17 A: I was not aware of that. 18 Q: You're not aware of that? 19 A: No, I wasn't. Again, if I can -- if 20 I can, the Special Investigation Unit was seized with 21 that -- that part of the -- of -- of the investigation -- 22 Q: Yes. 23 A: -- and I left as of March 29th have 24 not received SIU's version of the events. I only know of 25 the court case that I did read.
1751 Q: Okay. Moving on from there, then, 2 you were also, I take it -- I was asking you about what 3 you were satisfied and what you were not satisfied with, 4 I take it you were not satisfied with the issues of 5 racism within the OPP that have been brought to your 6 attention? 7 A: No, I definitely was not. 8 Q: Nor were you satisfied that innocent 9 people had been placed in jail overnight? 10 A: No, I was not. 11 Q: And, in retrospect, with what you 12 know now, would you agree that it was a mistake to send 13 the CMU down the road that evening in the dark of night? 14 A: No. 15 Q: Thank you, sir, those are all my 16 questions. 17 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 19 very much. I think Mr. Scullion is next up. 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 24 afternoon, Mr. Scullion. 25 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: Good afternoon, Mr.
1761 Commissioner. And although you haven't asked me, I still 2 think that thirty (30) minutes is fairly accurate as an 3 estimate. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 5 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: And I'll do my best 6 to stay close to that timeframe. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 8 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: And if I could, I -- 9 I'm so far aware at the other end of the table, we had a 10 comment from Mr. Sandler earlier on that I just wanted to 11 make a small comment on, which is the last minute 12 delivery of the lists of documents that people are going 13 to address. 14 And I may be accused of this later on as 15 well, with some of the police witnesses, But that's being 16 going on for six (6) or seven (7) months and I'm not sure 17 how much you know about what goes in the background, but 18 it is the collegiality of the Counsel at work that allows 19 that to -- to still play out. 20 The rule is, as soon as you can, but it 21 does happen and no fault is usually attributed and we do 22 our best to get around it and sometimes it requires a 23 break as it has in the past. 24 I just wanted to put in my two-cents on 25 that.
1771 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 2 Mr. Scullion. 3 4 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. KEVIN SCULLION: 5 Q: Good afternoon, Mr. Coles. 6 A: Good afternoon. 7 Q: My name's Kevin Scullion and I'm also 8 one of the Counsel for the residents of Aazhoodena, which 9 you may know as the Stoney Point group. 10 A: I know the Aazhoodena, too. 11 Q: Fair enough. And I will comment that 12 it was my partner that raised the issue with your summary 13 that had the note from somebody else of contentment with 14 the operations at Ipperwash. And I trust you can 15 appreciate the desire of our clients to have that 16 clarified, all right? 17 And it wasn't an accusation that you were 18 content with the death of Dudley George, nobody would be, 19 and it was simply a clarification that was being sought 20 on that term. 21 A: Thank you very much. 22 Q: And I can indicate that being lower 23 down in the list of Counsel, the questions I'm going to 24 ask, they're going to be fairly specific. 25 There's been a lot of ground covered
1781 already and surprisingly enough, we won't be looking for 2 a wrongdoing. The other part of the Commissioner's 3 mandate is to find ways to -- for recommendations on how 4 to prevent this from happening in the future, if we can. 5 And in that regard, I'm looking for your 6 assistance as we had for Mr. Carson's, or Officer 7 Carson's, assistance in figuring out, as we go through, 8 how this can be improved on; not that something specific 9 went wrong, but that the operation itself can be improved 10 upon. 11 And I had mentioned to your Counsel and I 12 take credit it was at the last minute, but it shouldn't 13 be much of a surprise that there was a report 14 commissioned by Inspector Connolley that looked into a 15 number of the issues in this matter and I understand from 16 your Counsel that you've had a chance to review that, 17 even though you had retired by the time this report had 18 been commissioned? 19 A: That's correct. 20 Q: And do you have a copy of that before 21 you? 22 I'd asked Commission Counsel to make an 23 extra copy. I had tried to locate an exhibit number, and 24 it may be that it wasn't made an exhibit during the 25 examination of Deputy Commissioner Carson.
1791 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Is it an 2 exhibit? I certainly remember it being referred to. 3 MR. DONALD WORME: 483. 4 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: I stand corrected. 5 It's P-483, Mr. Commissioner. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I don't have 7 a copy in front of me, unless it's in the binder. But I 8 don't know if it's necessary -- being handed up to me, 9 thank you, thank you. 10 11 CONTINUED BY MR. KEVIN SCULLION: 12 Q: The focus, the theme of my 13 examination, to give you a heads-up on where we're going 14 and how we're going to get there, which I find may be 15 helpful, is the role of intelligence in this operation 16 and the fact that this was a fairly unique situation, 17 because of all the parties that were involved. 18 We had an Army Camp, we had a Provincial 19 Park, we had a First Nation down the road and we had a, 20 what's been termed a breakaway group, that also 21 considered themselves a separate First Nation and 22 entitled to ownership of the lands in question. 23 In the Connolley report, you take a look 24 at number 23 which is at page 8 of the Connolley report. 25 A: 20...?
1801 Q: 23, we've got page 8. 2 A: Oh. 3 Q: At the bottom of the pages 4 themselves. You see question 23 or point 23? 5 A: Mine is whitened out on one half of 6 the page -- 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And so is 8 mine. It's sort of -- only half of -- 9 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: This is more 10 difficult. Up on the screen we have... 11 THE WITNESS: I can read that. 12 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: I feel compelled to 13 blame Derry Millar for that. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It works for 15 me. 16 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: I'm sure I'll see 17 him at the break. 18 19 CONTINUED BY MR. KEVIN SCULLION: 20 Q: 23, it states: 21 "How reliable was the intelligence 22 information that was received? Was it 23 validated before it was acted upon?" 24 That's one of the issues that Inspector 25 Connolley was looking at. And when we turn to his
1811 recommendations which is page 11... 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: Number 6, if we can scroll the screen 4 a little bit. If I can just read that out: 5 "One (1) area that will surely be 6 examined in any statutory forum dealing 7 with the Ipperwash Provincial Park 8 incident will be the intelligence that 9 the OPP possessed during the incident. 10 How was the information obtained; how 11 was it authenticated? 12 These will be questions that will have 13 to be answered. 14 One (1) concern that was identified was 15 that erroneous information was provided 16 by one faction involved and attempts to 17 discredit another faction." 18 Now, that's a conclusion; that's a 19 recommendation made by Inspector Connolley and obviously 20 that relates to my client group and concerns that they 21 have that the OPP received information from one (1) side, 22 one (1) faction, that was in opposition, at least, for 23 certain reasons, to the group that was in occupation. 24 And if I can -- if I can just use a simple 25 example, mostly because it involves one (1) of my
1821 clients, but also it shows the -- the risk of running any 2 decisions based on one (1) document. 3 You had been referred earlier to Tab 14. 4 Do you recall this document that you received from 5 Detective Constable Speck? 6 A: Correct. I think my evidence was 7 that it was -- it had my attention to me, but whether or 8 not I had actually seen it, I could not recall. 9 Q: Okay. I'm not -- I'm not getting 10 into what happened at that exact time, I'm just using it 11 as an example. 12 A: Okay. 13 Q: And in -- in this document which is 14 dated June 13, 1995, which is before the events of July 15 and August '95, we have Detective Constable Speck 16 reporting that Carl George was the Chief of the Stoney 17 Point people on CFB Ipperwash but he was removed. 18 Sorry, I have a note from Mr. Worme that 19 we have an Exhibit Number of 559 for that, just for the 20 record. 21 If I can go back to my reading. 22 "He was removed from that position and 23 replaced by Glenn George. I feel that 24 Glenn George is very militant and open 25 to outside influence such as the
1831 Warrior Society." 2 That's his comment that's being reported 3 back to the, for lack of a better word, upper echelons of 4 the OPP, reporting on the incident. 5 He's reporting back that Glenn George is 6 the new leader of the group; he's very militant and he's 7 open to outside influences such as the Warrior Society. 8 You mentioned you're familiar with 9 Akwesasne and I think along the way you mentioned that 10 you had a meeting with the Warrior Society? 11 A: Yes, I did. 12 Q: So you're familiar, more than simply 13 having this reported to you, you're familiar with what a 14 Warrior Society is? 15 A: In my mind I am, yes. 16 Q: Okay. And, in fact, we've had a 17 number of witnesses come forward and say that, 18 notwithstanding mainstream ideas of what the warriors 19 are, there's another version of what they consider 20 warriors to be. 21 So, there's another side of the story, is 22 my point, with respect to the Warrior Society. 23 A: Yes, there is. 24 Q: Okay. And with respect to Glenn 25 George if you're going simply from this piece of paper,
1841 you'd be, I'd suggest to you, fairly concerned with Glenn 2 George as a new leader who has different ideas, is more 3 militant and is open to influences such as the Warrior 4 Society, if you simply look at this piece of paper. 5 Would you agree that that's a risk? 6 A: I'll agree it's a risk, depending on 7 who has knowledge of -- of either the Warrior or Glenn 8 George, et cetera. 9 Q: Right. 10 A: If it was directed to me, I believe I 11 would analyse it, I do not believe the Warrior Society is 12 a threat in my mind. 13 Q: Right. 14 A: In Akwesasne, the warrior -- when we 15 met with the Warrior Society, they had a structure and 16 were willing to meet with us and therefore I appreciated 17 that there were people that actually identified 18 themselves as warriors. 19 The difficulty is people who are thought 20 to be warriors or people think they are warriors and have 21 the wrong connotations of what a warrior is and I think 22 that's what you're trying to bring to me. 23 Q: There's a lot of misunderstandings 24 that are possible, completely out there. And I 25 appreciate that you've expanded upon that in terms of
1851 your personal experience and knowledge that you bring to 2 a piece of paper like this that puts it in perspective. 3 And I would suggest to you that there's 4 more in terms of Glenn George as well, which hasn't been 5 brought out yet and part of the purpose of me dealing 6 with this. If you turn to Tab 71, which is Exhibit P-499 7 for the record, and if you turn to -- all I can go from 8 are the pages at the bottom of the scanned copies, which 9 is 36168. 10 A: Yes? 11 Q: And there's a notation at 8 -- 08:30, 12 8:30 in the morning of Wednesday the 2nd of August, 1995. 13 And just reading off the screen: 14 "As John Carson advises, Staff Sergeant 15 Bouwman met with Glenn George. Agreed 16 to OPP patrols for public safety 17 including riot checks." 18 And this is following that accident that 19 you referred to in your testimony-in-chief as a tragic 20 accident that occurred in this area. And we now have 21 Staff Sergeant Bouwman meeting with Glenn George to see 22 what can be done about it and there's an agreement to 23 barricade Matheson Drive after dark to prevent traffic 24 problems, the gate's to be open during the day. 25 "They still feel roadway is theirs, [so
1861 there's still a conflict in terms of 2 issues], but there's an agreement as to 3 how to try to prevent something like 4 this from happening again. 5 The mayor of Bosanquet notified to 6 research, still feel Park is theirs. 7 Old burial ground [there's that 8 reference again to comments on the 9 Park] and on top of this, George will 10 talk to militants to stop hassling 11 campers." 12 So you'd agree with me that this note 13 seems to indicate a fair amount of cooperation from Glenn 14 George? 15 A: Yes, it does. 16 Q: And then when you take the additional 17 information from this notation, together with the report 18 that you got back from Detective Constable Speck, 19 together with background knowledge, you get more of a 20 full picture and that you can then make a proper 21 decision; is that fair? 22 A: You've got more information. 23 Q: Sure. And that's the goal of the 24 intelligence end of the OPP, is it not, to provide you 25 with as much information as possible so the incident
1871 commander can make a proper decision? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: Okay. And can I take it that, just 4 as a side note, that that's part of why you suggested 5 let's set up cameras where we can, in the Park, in order 6 to get more information? 7 A: Yes. I saw cameras as a source of 8 intelligence. 9 Q: Right. Not that something was going 10 to happen or that you anticipated something bad 11 happening, it was simply, put cameras in place to get 12 more information? 13 A: No. I think it was in case something 14 bad did happen because as far as I was aware at that time 15 and I stand to be corrected, the cameras were being 16 placed in case something happened so that we did have 17 first hand intelligence. 18 It wasn't a -- I was of the opinion that 19 we might have to seek an order to turn those cameras on. 20 Q: All right. Now -- 21 A: It's not necessarily required I 22 understand. 23 Q: I appreciate that. My wording was 24 actually, Anticipated something bad was going to happen, 25 but I appreciate that there's two (2) parts to what you
1881 are now answering. Is one is to gather intelligence and 2 number 2, that you may have to turn them on in case 3 something does come up. 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: All right. Is there any reason there 6 wasn't a camera set up across the way from that parking 7 lot? 8 A: My understanding -- 9 Q: That you're aware of? 10 A: Yeah. My understanding is that hydro 11 was a problem. 12 Q: Running a cord to that area or simply 13 having an area that you could put it? 14 A: Well I think there's two (2) parts to 15 it. And I'm better asked of the -- of the people who 16 were asked to do the function. Number 1, I didn't know 17 how many cameras they had and number 2, there was the 18 fact to put cameras on the MNR property was not a 19 problem. It was their consent to do that. 20 Across the road whose property is it? 21 Maybe that was a concern. It didn't concern me. My 22 suggestion was can we get some cameras up there? I would 23 have had liked to have seen cameras across the road if -- 24 of course now, after the fact, not knowing. The other 25 issue though is the assignment was given to put up
1891 cameras, where do you put them? 2 It's a -- it's a big park, if you know 3 what I mean and I mean. The incident, yes, took place at 4 the Park but did they -- did the person who put the 5 camera up assume that if there was a fight it was to be 6 there or where it would be. So maybe that was some of 7 the problem they had. 8 My concern was I would have liked to have 9 seen cameras across the road. And one of the reasons 10 that was given to me was that there wasn't hydro 11 available. I mean it's -- you've got to run that hydro. 12 Usually those things are worked out. But that was the 13 explanation that was given to me. 14 Q: All right. And looking back on the 15 fact that the CMU marched down the road to that parking 16 lot, it would have been nice to have a camera in that 17 parking lot -- 18 A: Yes, sir, it would have. 19 Q: -- in -- in that area? 20 A: Yes, sir, it would have. 21 Q: My question is simply whether or not 22 that was considered, to your knowledge. 23 A: I know it was considered by me but -- 24 but I hadn't -- it wasn't my decision as to where the 25 cameras -- my -- my conversation was Incident Commander
1901 Carson involved the use of videos and let's get some 2 videos or let's put some videos in place while we can, in 3 case there was a problem. 4 I didn't -- it was his responsibility then 5 to decide where those cameras should or should not go or 6 the technical support people who would have put those up 7 with the intricacies of hydro, et cetera. 8 Q: Okay. So you weren't aware. It's 9 simply -- 10 A: No. 11 Q: -- someone else's decision? 12 A: No. But all I know is that on 13 September the 6th, the afternoon when I went down and I 14 was told there was no cameras across the road. I wished 15 there had been. And that was pre-shooting. 16 Q: That was on September 6th when you 17 went down with Tony Parkin? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: And is that when you were at -- or 20 meeting with Inspector Carson or is that when you did 21 your drive -- 22 A: No. Well, yeah, after -- 23 Q: All right. 24 A: -- the meeting with Inspector Carson. 25 And I -- we -- we did our drive down. I'm looking and
1911 they're tell -- I'm told that there was not hydro 2 available and I'm looking at places thinking that I think 3 I can see appearances where hydro may have been utilized. 4 And putting my old operation hat on I'm 5 asking the questions, Well why aren't they -- why aren't 6 they there? But the explanation was hydro. 7 Q: Okay. If you leave that to the side 8 for a second. The -- the use of undercover officers in 9 the Park, before September 4th, do I take it that that 10 was for the dual purpose of in case something happens and 11 to gather intelligence? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: All right. And after September 4th 14 were there any undercover officers in the Park at any 15 point in time? 16 A: Not that I'm aware of. 17 Q: All right. Do you know -- 18 A: After September 4th? 19 Q: September 4th. 20 A: Yeah. Not that I'm aware of. 21 Q: And I'm limiting at September 4th to 22 the incident on September 6th. I'm not going beyond the 23 incident. 24 A: Not that I'm aware of. 25 Q: All right. Do you know a fellow by
1921 the name Jim Moses? 2 A: No I don't. 3 Q: Never heard that name before? 4 A: I don't think so. I've heard the 5 name Jim Moses, I'll wait for your next question. I've 6 heard the name Jim Moses. 7 Q: My next question is: Is he part of 8 the intelligence branch of the OPP? 9 A: Not to my knowledge. 10 Q: All right. I'll move on to a 11 separate issue. On Monday you made a comment that I made 12 a note of. When Mr. Worme was asking you about Oka, you 13 referred to something as, "fall out, like Curve Lake.ö 14 And my question to you is: Do you consider 15 Ipperwash to be a fall out of Oka or a separate 16 situation? 17 A: A separate situation. 18 Q: Okay. And it's not in any way 19 related to Oka? 20 A: No. 21 Q: All right. And just -- if I can 22 follow up with the one last question from Ms. Esmonde's 23 line of questioning on your comment that it was -- 24 Ipperwash was connected with Gustafsen Lake. 25 I trust it that you're not saying that
1931 there was any contact, that you're aware of, between the 2 occupiers at Stoney Point and whatever was going on in 3 Gustafson Lake? 4 A: Not that I'm aware of, no, sir. 5 Q: All right. Your use of the word, 6 "connection," is with respect to the issues at hand? 7 A: The issues and I made mention that 8 there were Ontario people there, but I don't know what 9 role those people played, at all. I do not believe there 10 was a connection of those people back to Stoney Point. 11 Q: All right. So the fact that there's 12 Ontario people in Gustafson Lake, weÆre not -- 13 A: No. 14 Q: We're not to take that as being that 15 they were -- they're from Ipperwash or were visiting 16 Ipperwash at any point -- 17 A: No. 18 Q: -- following visiting Gustafson Lake? 19 A: That's correct. 20 Q: All right. Now my understanding from 21 your comments was that, in 1993, you did some research or 22 you had somebody do some research so that you understood 23 what was going on at Ipperwash, in terms of the Army 24 Camp; is that fair? 25 A: I had a general idea, I believe.
1941 Q: All right. You knew the difference 2 between Stoney with an "E" and Stony without an "E." 3 A: I picked that up myself, I'm afraid. 4 Q: All right. 5 A: Yes, I did. 6 Q: All right. So you understood that 7 there was a rift between the Stoney group -- Stoney Point 8 group and the Kettle Point and Stony Point First Nation? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: All right. And you understood from - 11 - there's a number of documents in the OPP archives that 12 we've seen. We understand that the OPP was aware that 13 the Stoney Point group was dissatisfied, following the 14 1985 payout that occurred? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And you were aware of that as a 17 result of your -- 18 A: Yes, I was. 19 Q: -- research? 20 A: Yes, I was. 21 Q: The Stoney Point group considered the 22 Army Camp lands to be theirs? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And they considered them not only to 25 be theirs but theirs to the exclusion of both the Federal
1951 Government and the Kettle and Stony Point First Nation? 2 You were aware of that? 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 Q: Maybe I'll put it differently; it was 7 an issue? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: All right. It was an issue between 10 the Stoney Point group and the Kettle and Stony Point 11 First Nation. 12 Now when the Stoney Point group went into 13 the Army Camp, you'd mentioned that you had notice from 14 Carl George that that was going to happen? 15 A: Yes, we did. 16 Q: All right. When we looked at a 17 document earlier where Carl George refers to the 18 occupation as peaceful, that there's ongoing 19 negotiations, native claims, he also says, traffic won't 20 be effected. It's a peaceful occupation and civil 21 obedience will be maintained. 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: That's a pretty straightforward 24 indication that we're not going to cause any trouble, we 25 just think the land is ours.
1961 A: That's right. 2 Q: All right. And I'm not going to go 3 so far as to say that you sympathized with the Stoney 4 Point group, but you understood that this was a problem 5 for the Military and the Federal Government to deal with; 6 is that fair? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: And if they chose to, I think in your 9 words, throw them over the fence, then it became an OPP 10 issue or if they got an injunction, then it could be an 11 OPP issue, depending on the wording of the Order from the 12 Court? 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: But it was up to the Military or the 15 Federal Government to do something about it. It wasn't 16 up to the OPP to make operational decisions about what to 17 do about the people on the Army Camp lands? 18 A: Not at that time. 19 Q: Right. And absent any major crime 20 that occurred? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: Which would then become OPP issues? 23 A: Correct. 24 Q: And I think your term was that you 25 recognized that the issues were not clear cut?
1971 A: Yes. 2 Q: Do you recall making that comment? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: I also pulled from one (1) of your 5 documents that there was a recognition that the issue 6 with regards to the Army Camp was control of the lands 7 and not ownership. Do you recall that being part of the 8 research done? 9 A: I do know those -- those words, but I 10 can't -- I -- I have a very vague recollection. I'm 11 trying to -- I'm trying to -- 12 Q: I'll help you out. Do you have Tab 13 30? 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 Q: And, that's Exhibit P-564, Mr. 18 Commissioner. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 20 21 CONTINUED BY MR. KEVIN SCULLION: 22 Q: And, I assist in terms of the fourth 23 bulletin summary. And, I appreciate this is September 24 5th, 1995, as opposed to the general timeframe I'm 25 talking about, which is '93 through '95, but my
1981 suggestion to you is that the OPP understood that the 2 issue with the Army Camp was the control of the land and 3 not the ownership and that it was only when the occupiers 4 moved into the Provincial Park that you had both those 5 issues in play? 6 A: Yes, I -- I have some recall now, I 7 can remember discussions where basically -- and I -- I 8 don't know when the Federal Government -- it was through 9 -- when they -- when the Federal Government passed, or 10 made note that they were now going to close Ipperwash -- 11 the Ipperwash Base, my understanding is, people were 12 expecting that Base and my understanding is they said 13 that it would be returned. 14 And that's -- I think what that goes to, 15 ownership was not the issue, it was when the Military -- 16 the control of it, was going to take place. 17 Q: Right. 18 A: I do remember those discussions. 19 Q: Right. And, it would appear from the 20 memo that's produced September 5th, shortly after they go 21 in the Park on September 4th, that that was an issue that 22 the OPP was live to? 23 A: Yeah. This is an issue note that 24 went up, so obviously, that -- yes, we were. We were 25 aware of it.
1991 Q: Okay. So, on the one-hand, I'm not 2 sure how many complications I can get into, I think we 3 can fairly say that this was a fairly unique situation; 4 is that fair? 5 A: Unique? 6 Q: In that we've got three (3) different 7 players; the Federal Government -- four (4) different 8 players, Federal Government, Ontario government, Kettle 9 and Stony Point First Nation and the Stoney Point Group. 10 A: Ontario government in relation to the 11 Park? 12 Q: Right. 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: Right. And, we've got two (2) 15 separate land areas; we've got the Army Camp and we've 16 got the Provincial Park? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: And, we have claims by Chief and 19 Council of the Kettle Point and Stony Point First Nation 20 to get the people off of the Army Camp lands and we have 21 ongoing negotiations in the background between the Kettle 22 Point and Stony Point First Nation and Canada in regards 23 to those lands? 24 You're aware of that? 25 A: I don't think I was aware of that at
2001 that time. 2 Q: All right. Is it fair to say that 3 your Intelligence Branch would have been aware of that if 4 they were doing their research? 5 A: Not -- no, not necessarily because I 6 think the intelligence is -- is looking for more 7 criminality or -- or issues that become -- that might 8 become criminal-type issues or contentious issues, not 9 basically that civil issue, I guess, is my answer to 10 that. 11 I don't know that an intelligence officer 12 would necessarily say that there's negotiations for the 13 Base with the Federal Government. In any event, I did 14 not -- I was not aware of it. I mean, I know that 15 Federal negotiators were -- were placed post-September 16 13th. 17 Q: All right. I simply turn to your Tab 18 5 of the book in front of you, which is your operational 19 plan. And, if you turn to page 3 with the notation 20 titled, OPP Action. I just list that it says: 21 "We are aware that this is a very 22 delicate and sensitive issue that can 23 only be resolved in the political 24 arena." 25 A: Correct.
2011 Q: I just suggest that the OPP is alive 2 to the issues and they are putting it in the Federal 3 Government court to deal with. 4 A: Yes, I believe that to be so. 5 Q: Okay. And as part of your 6 operational plan it seems to be -- if you turn to page 5, 7 in terms of the tactical negotiations, it seems to be 8 that if an injunction is obtained that one of the key 9 considerations, sir, one of the key tactical negotiations 10 that you have listed there is if the need arises to take 11 all the above steps. It would be necessary to have 12 negotiators in place to talk to the individuals involved. 13 It will be necessary to supply the 14 occupants of the base with a field telephone that would 15 be connected to negotiators at the command centre. The 16 police cannot negotiate with the First Nation people 17 regarding the land but if any criminal acts do occur, 18 then we must be in a position of negotiating. 19 Do you recall that tactical -- or that 20 point under tactical negotiations being part of the 21 operational plan? 22 A: I see it there. 23 Q: All right. And you recall that it 24 was an issue, a concern that if you wanted to talk to 25 them, it might be an idea to give them a phone that they
2021 can talk with negotiators. 2 A: Yes, sir. 3 Q: All right. And you followed this 4 Inquiry somewhat. I'm not asking you to quote line by 5 line from the transcripts that we've had, but one of the 6 considerations of our clients was that stepping forward 7 and talking to the police and negotiating with the police 8 directly would single them out. It would target them. 9 Were you aware that that's been some 10 evidence that's comes out of this Inquiry? 11 A: No. 12 Q: You weren't aware that that was a 13 concern of the First Nation -- that members either back 14 then or along the way? 15 A: They have been targeted by whom? 16 Q: The police. 17 A: No. I wasn't aware. 18 Q: Okay. You weren't aware of that? 19 A: No. No. 20 Q: Was any consideration -- was there 21 any consideration at the time of the occupation of the 22 Park either September 5 or September 6 to providing a 23 phone to the occupiers in order that some contact could 24 be made? 25 A: The incident commander did not
2031 discuss that with me. Whether or not it was in his mind, 2 I don't know. 3 Q: No, fair enough. And I'm not -- as I 4 say I'm not looking for -- find wrongdoing or placing 5 blame, I'm looking for options that might have assisted. 6 And I'm -- and I'm asking you now looking 7 back at that being part of the considerations to the Army 8 Camp, would you agree that that might have been of 9 assistance in this situation with the benefit of 10 hindsight? 11 A: Yes, sir. 12 Q: Now if I can skip forward to August 13 1995, you've got Glenn George telling you that the 14 Provincial Park is going to be next, correct? 15 Do you remember arguing that evidence? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: You've got him identified by 18 Detective Sergeant Speck as being the new leader. 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: Presumably, that can be taken that 21 either face value or at least be considered seriously by 22 the police? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: All right. And not only on that 25 basis but other rumours that were generated, you were
2041 aware that this could happen on September 4th? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: All right. And steps were taken. 4 Deputy Commissioner Carson has testified that steps were 5 taken to put people in position and have the right people 6 in the right place. 7 At that point in time, let me step back 8 one (1) step, earlier you were in party to cross- 9 examination, you were asked about an article by Gerald 10 George that was in the local paper in August of 1995. 11 Do I understand correctly that you were 12 not aware of the article -- 13 A: Of that article? 14 Q: -- that criticized the occupiers? 15 A: Of that article? I know that there 16 had been a dispute but I didn't know about the -- the 17 newspaper article or -- it's not in my mind in any event. 18 Q: Okay. Would it have been part of the 19 intelligence branches obligations or responsibilities or 20 was there some direction given to them to determine who 21 Chief and Council were, given that there was going to be 22 this movement into the Park, September 4th? 23 Do you know? 24 A: Can you repeat the -- 25 Q: Stepping back, I have indicated that
2051 there was a rift between the group and Kettle Point First 2 Nation. 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Was -- do you know of any directions 5 to the intelligence officers to determine who were, in 6 fact, the chief and council of the Kettle Point First 7 Nation? 8 A: I don't know that. 9 Q: Okay. 10 11 (BRIEF PAUSE) 12 13 Q: In terms of what happened on the 14 September 4th, I'm suggesting to you that the fact that 15 the OPP officers relinquished control of the area and 16 backed off after the confrontation with the First Nation, 17 was a good idea and it was consistent with what we've 18 referred to a couple of times in here as the governing 19 policy of the OPP. 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: And if I can paraphrase it acceptably 22 that, force, was a measure of last resort. It was only 23 if you didn't have any other options that force had to be 24 considered. 25 A: Hopefully, right.
2061 Q: Absent the immediate threat of 2 personal -- 3 A: Safety. 4 Q: -- safety and/or the possibility of 5 death? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: All right. And I think your term in 8 describing that was that the First nations members chose 9 violence? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: But you weren't familiar with all of 12 what occurred at that point in time? Is that fair, you 13 don't know all -- 14 A: I -- 15 Q: -- the circumstances when you -- when 16 you use that term, "chose violence," it's simply a 17 general summary of what you perceived to have occurred? 18 A: That at September the 4th there was 19 violence against my officers, that's what I'm concluding. 20 Q: Okay. I won't get into that. But as 21 part of that exchange or the confrontation September 4th, 22 the OPP was able to identify, for lack of a better term, 23 the culprits? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: All right. That was Rogerick George
2071 and David George which were the individuals that they 2 identified as being a problem. 3 A: Correct. 4 Q: Smashing a window and throwing 5 flares? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: Okay. And again, I'm looking at 8 options that might have been available. Are you aware of 9 any efforts by the OPP to go to the Army Camp, the front 10 gate, and ask for those two (2) individuals to simply 11 surrender themselves? 12 A: I'm not aware that that was 13 undertaken. 14 Q: You'd agree that that's an option 15 that could have been followed? 16 A: Possibly. 17 Q: All right. And, in fact, that's an 18 option that the OPP had employed previously, when they 19 had difficulties at the Army Camp. 20 They would simply go to the front gate and 21 ask -- if they'd identified the individual, they'd ask 22 for that individual to come out and/or surrender 23 themselves? 24 Can you speak to that issue? 25 A: My answer is, yes. However, at the -
2081 - the movement into the Army Base, the police were not 2 confronted. September the 4th, we're talking about the 3 movement into the Park when there -- when there was 4 confrontation. 5 There was subsequent confrontation when 6 they went into the built up area of the Military base but 7 in the initial occupation of the Military base, the 8 control of the land as you've pit down, there was no 9 violence. 10 Q: No, I û- I appreciate that and I 11 don't think it's -- I'm certainly not suggesting that the 12 OPP are taking it lightly -- 13 A: No. 14 Q: -- that this confrontation occurred 15 on September 4th. I'm simply saying that an option would 16 have been to employ the same methodology as used 17 previously, which was go to the front gate, which is 18 where these people lived and ask them to surrender 19 themselves under your warrants? 20 A: Yes, we could have done that. 21 Q: Okay. Now by September 6th, do you 22 agree with me that there's rumours flying in the 23 immediate area and all around regarding movement into the 24 cottages, firearms, perceived violence, taking over more 25 area.
2091 I mean there's -- there's a lot going on. 2 Is that -- 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: -- fair? 5 A: Yes, there is. 6 Q: And there's an increased level of 7 tension? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: And when you go down and meet with 10 Inspector Carson with Tony Parkin, in the background 11 there's the increased level of tension; correct? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: And I will say up front, I am one of 14 those people that Mr. Worme referred to that has trouble 15 with not knowing what happened during that two (2) hour 16 meeting. 17 And, of course, I create a lot of options 18 and I'm going to put a couple to -- of them to you. I 19 don't know that that'll help your memory, but let me -- 20 let me ask you if you talked about a certain number of 21 things. 22 You indicated that you knew about the 23 violence or the actions of the night before? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: And -- and did you know that they
2101 involved picnic tables that were set up in the parking 2 lot? 3 A: I think I did. 4 Q: Okay. And if you didn't, you 5 certainly would have had an opportunity to hear that from 6 Inspector Carson? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: All right. And, in fact, that 9 occurred after Inspector Carson left the evening 10 previous? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: All right. And -- and Inspector 13 Linton was on during that time? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: Okay. Is there any reason why 16 Inspector Linton wasn't part of this meeting on the 17 afternoon of September the 6th? 18 A: I think he was -- I assume that it 19 was expected that he was getting sleep to be the relief 20 for John Carson in the evening. 21 Q: Right. The fact they were doing two 22 (2) twelve (12) hour shifts meant that he simply wasn't 23 going to be available for this kind of meeting? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: All right. And you expected that
2111 any discussions that you had with Inspector Carson 2 regarding strategy or concerns would be passed on to 3 Inspector Linton? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: My suggestion to you is, that in 6 light of what occurred the night before, as nightfall 7 comes, that part of your discussion with Inspector Carson 8 would have been, If the same thing happens again tonight 9 or at least look for something happening tonight, be 10 careful with what goes on; is that fair? 11 You would have been anticipating that 12 something might happen again in the night and you would 13 have had discussions on how to deal with it 14 appropriately? 15 A: I have no recollection of that -- of 16 the meeting, but I -- I believe that strategies might 17 have been considered in discussion. 18 Q: Okay. And in interpreting the 19 cross-examinations that occurred previous about what 20 somebody told Inspector Carson or directed you or Tony 21 Parkin or Inspector Carson to do, is it fair to say that 22 this incident command is not taking place in a vacuum? 23 Inspector Carson isn't in a trailer and 24 simply receiving guests with information, he's aware of 25 what's going on outside the trailer?
2121 A: Yes, sir. 2 Q: Right. And he's going to be aware of 3 what's being said in the community as are you and Mr. 4 Park -- Tony Parkin. He's going to be aware of 5 criticisms if they are out there? 6 A: Correct? 7 Q: All right. And as part of the role 8 of Incident Commander, he's to take in all of the 9 information and with -- using his discretion, sometimes 10 with your input or your participation as you've described 11 it, make decisions -- make operational decisions? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: All right. So it's fair to -- for us 14 to assume that Inspector Carson's aware of what's going 15 on outside, even if he's not directed to do anything? 16 A: I believe he was. 17 Q: Okay. Is it possible that during 18 your two (2) hour meeting you had that type of discussion 19 with Inspector Carson and Tony Parkin about any 20 criticisms of the OPP operation with Inspector Carson? 21 A: With respect to Carson? 22 Q: With respect to the operations -- re- 23 word it. In your discussions with Inspector Carson, is 24 it possible you discussed with Inspector Carson, the fact 25 that outside the trailer there's criticism that you lost
2131 control of the Park on September the 4th? 2 A: It's -- it's possible. I have no 3 recollection of that. 4 Q: All right. Regardless of whether 5 you're being directed to do anything as a result of it, 6 it's possible that you talked about the fact that there 7 was criticism out there, political criticism as opposed 8 to pressure? 9 A: I'll answer that I don't know. The 10 suggestion that you're making, there's possibly -- the 11 political side, that's the thing that makes me say, no. 12 I -- if I thought that there was political 13 pressure I'm -- then I would have probably -- if -- if I 14 felt John Carson was being politically pressured, and it 15 was concerning him in any way, shape, or form, then we 16 would have had that discussion, we would have had it, but 17 I don't recall having that discussion. 18 Q: Okay. 19 A: I'm sorry. 20 Q: That's the difficulty. 21 A: Well it's difficult because I do not 22 recall what -- what we said. I'm -- I'm suggesting that 23 I know why I went up there. And we were going up there 24 to find out what was -- was going on; who, what, where, 25 why of the situation.
2141 Q: All right. Now my efforts are to jog 2 your memory. It's not -- 3 A: I -- I understand. 4 Q: -- apparently working. 5 A: I understand. 6 Q: One last shot. You've -- you've got 7 resources out there. You've got the ERT team on standby, 8 you got the TRU team on standby. You're looking at 9 APC's, you've got helicopters, boats, canine units, 10 youÆve got roadblocks set up, concepts of infrared radar, 11 a Wescam, RCMP, you've got a lot of resources out there 12 to do something. 13 And I suggest to you that you're 14 discussing with Inspector Carson the fact that with this 15 buildup of resources, he needs to be careful in terms of 16 acting on any one piece of information. And that he has 17 to be sure of all of the circumstances before making an 18 operational decision of any magnitude; is that fair? 19 A: My knowledge of John Carson's ability 20 would lead me to believe that I just believe that he 21 would do those things you've just said. 22 Q: I agree. However, is it possible 23 that you still discussed them with him? 24 A: I'm going to say anything's possible, 25 sir. But I don't recall.
2151 Q: Still not jogging any memory. 2 A: No, sir, you're not. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I want to 4 take a break pretty soon, Mr. Scullion. I just wonder 5 how much longer you're going to be. 6 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: It may be helpful if 7 we take a break at this moment. I'll take a look at what 8 I have left and I may be able to shorten it. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: All right. 10 Well you've been forty-five (45) minutes. We'll take a 11 break now and -- 12 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: My apologies. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- no, 14 that's fine, you have to finish. 15 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: I'm close. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We'll take a 17 break now. We'll take a short break. 18 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 19 for fifteen (15) minutes. 20 21 --- Upon recessing at 2:36 p.m. 22 --- Upon resuming at 2:52 p.m. 23 24 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 25 resumed. Please be seated.
2161 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Commissioner, if I 2 might just take a minute before Mr. Scullion starts. I 3 had canvassed the parties about tomorrow and with respect 4 to perhaps going a little longer. 5 Because the number -- a number of people 6 have made commitments based on what they thought was a 7 3:30 end time, tomorrow we'll stop at 3:30. But I think 8 everyone should plan on, from now on, as we discussed at 9 our meeting, extending -- perhaps going to 4:30 on 10 Thursdays. But tomorrow we won't. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 12 very much, Mr. Millar. 13 Yes, Mr. Scullion. I hope you don't think 14 I was being critical because I'm not. I would rather 15 have you make a real estimate and exceed it rather than 16 estimating longer just to stay within it. So I wasn't 17 being critical at all. 18 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: I thought I had only 19 gone a couple of minutes over so. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, that's 21 fine it doesn't -- 22 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: Apparently I've 23 changed the schedule. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Carry on. 25 You're doing just fine.
2171 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: Okay. And I can 2 advise that I'm -- I'm close to being finished. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 4 5 CONTINUED BY MR. KEVIN SCULLION: 6 Q: Mr. Coles, while you were meeting 7 with Inspector Carson and Tony Parkin, were you aware 8 that Ron French of the Federal Government was also over 9 at the Army Camp? 10 A: No. 11 Q: You didn't know he was making a visit 12 that day? 13 A: No. 14 Q: Okay. How soon after this time did 15 you learn that he had made that visit? Or are we looking 16 at months or years down the road? 17 A: I think I recall from information 18 that was provided to me yesterday and -- and I read that 19 I was advised by one of the incident commanders that a 20 Mr. Ron French was coming up to see me at Grand Bend. 21 And I think that's the first -- the first 22 recollection I have of Mr. Ron French. So I think that 23 would have been post shooting. 24 Q: Okay. But you don't remember any 25 arrangements being made with Ron French to visit with you
2181 or other members of the OPP, following his visit to the 2 Army Camp that day? 3 A: No, sir, I don't. 4 Q: You'd mentioned in your examination 5 in-chief the term, "containment," and how you thought 6 that you had containment as best as possible in the 7 situation. 8 And I take it that's recognizing the fact 9 that most of the people that were in that Park were also 10 living in the Army Camp and were travelling back and 11 forth freely between the two (2)? 12 A: That's correct. 13 Q: Would it also be that the concept of 14 containment was not only trying to keep people within the 15 confines of the park and the Army Camp area, but also to 16 keep the rest of the public away from those areas? 17 A: That's correct. 18 Q: Okay. So it's a -- it's a double- 19 edged sword, so to speak. You're trying to contain the 20 group that's in the camp, but you're also trying to 21 prevent conflict by containing the rest of the public 22 from coming into close contact? 23 A: That's correct. 24 Q: Okay. Is it fair to say that that 25 would be part of the reason why you've got roadblocks set
2191 up so that you can try to control that kind of access? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: Was there any consideration at the 4 OPP level of preventing access by the public to this 5 sandy parking lot area? 6 A: I'm not aware that there was. 7 Q: But you'd agree with me that part of 8 the concept of containment could have and perhaps should 9 have involved keeping the public away from the Park 10 itself? 11 A: It could have. The only issue with 12 that is the -- the cottage -- the white cottage, as I 13 recall, the very first cottage on the -- on that side of 14 that -- 15 Q: Right. 16 A: -- of that sandy parking lot as it's 17 been described. 18 Q: Right. The cottage is immediately 19 adjacent to the sandy parking lot? 20 A: Yes, somebody would have had to have 21 considered that. If you're going to contain that part, 22 then you have to consider between the cottage and what 23 you're containing, that's the only thing. 24 Q: Sure, sure. But in terms of looking 25 at possible recommendations, the concept of a buffer
2201 around where this occupation is taking place, would you 2 consider that might be a good idea? 3 A: My answer, I want my answer to be 4 yes, because I believe if you can -- if you can keep 5 people apart, that maybe is a good idea if it can be done 6 geographically correctly. That's what I'm mentioning 7 about the cottages, et cetera. 8 Q: Sure, there's -- 9 A: But -- 10 Q: -- going to be difficulties. 11 A: I also, at that time of the meeting 12 on September the 6th, we were satisfied with the 13 containment, as far as I'm concerned, not knowing what 14 was going to happen. 15 Q: Right. Well we have the benefit of 16 hindsight seeing that the cottagers subsequently get 17 together and have an idea in their head that they're 18 going to go down and confront the occupiers, and that's 19 something that the OPP had to deal with from their 20 vantage point of containment as well; correct? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: Okay. Since I havenÆt been able to 23 jog your memory as to what happened during the meeting, 24 perhaps I can ask you, when you did leave the meeting and 25 you did the drive along East Parkway Drive, did you go by
2211 the corner where the sandy parking lot was? 2 A: I think we did, yes. 3 Q: Okay. And then you came south on 4 Army Camp Road? 5 A: I think we went down Army Camp Road-- 6 Q: Away from the lake. 7 A: Away from the -- yeah, we went -- I 8 know that we initially went down Army Camp Road past the 9 Military base to -- to the corner of East Parkway and 10 turned on East Parkway. 11 I'm not sure how -- if we turned around 12 and then came back the other way. I think we probably 13 did, because that would have been the focus of what we 14 were looking at. 15 Q: Okay. And when you looked at, when 16 you focussed on it, was there anything in particular you 17 can remember that was going on in that parking lot? 18 A: No, sir. 19 Q: It was fairly calm? 20 A: To the best of my recollection, yes. 21 Q: Okay. And you can't tell us today if 22 you actually saw anybody in that parking lot? 23 A: No, I can't. 24 Q: My last question or line of 25 questioning relates to this -- again, this information
2221 and the question of politicians and what's been made out 2 to be interference. 3 And from what I understood from your 4 examination-in-chief, that you, at some point in time, 5 and it's unclear to me as to the exact time that it was 6 set up, but you were going to be running interference on 7 behalf of the incident commander; is that fair? 8 A: Yeah. For the most part, post- 9 shooting. 10 Q: Right. Understood. Is it fair to 11 say that from your vantage point, it would be preferable 12 that people, including politicians, members of the media, 13 get that information from the person running interference 14 as opposed to going to the people on the ground or the 15 incident commander? 16 A: Optically, yes, sir. 17 Q: Well, optically and as a matter of 18 operations, it seems to me that you don't want the people 19 who are part of the operations to be answering questions 20 or telling information to outsiders? 21 A: I -- definitely post-shooting, I 22 would say I would have preferred it and pre-shooting, I 23 probably would have preferred it if they had chosen to 24 come to me. 25 Q: Right. That's something that you
2231 could then control, correct, from the OPP perspective? 2 A: It was an issue that the incident 3 commander would not have to address or meet with people 4 et cetera. 5 Q: Right. And, that's the preference, 6 is it not, from inside the OPP that the incident 7 commander not have to deal with a constant barrage of 8 questioning as to what's going on, what's going to go on, 9 and what's happened that you're going to do something 10 about? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: All right. Those are all my 13 questions, Mr. Commissioner. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 15 very much, Mr. Scullion. 16 Kettle and Stony Point Band is next, I 17 believe. 18 MS. COLLEEN JOHNSON: Yes, Mr. 19 Commissioner, Mr. George and I reviewed very carefully 20 last night the transcripts and it's our belief that any 21 questions at this point in time would simply be 22 repetitive and so, for that reason, we will not be 23 availing ourselves of the time that we requested. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 25 very much.
2241 Mr. Horner, on behalf of the Chiefs of 2 Ontario? 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think your 4 time estimate yesterday was a half hour; is that still 5 realistic? 6 MR. MATTHEW HORNER: I anticipate being 7 approximately a half an hour. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 9 10 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. MATTHEW HORNER: 11 Q: Good afternoon, Mr. Coles. 12 A: Good afternoon. 13 Q: My name is Matthew Horner and I 14 represent the Chiefs of Ontario, which is an association 15 of First Nation chiefs around the Province. 16 A: I'm aware of it. 17 Q: Not chiefs such as yourself. 18 A: We don't have one of those 19 associations. 20 Q: Mr. Coles, I wanted to talk to you a 21 little bit more about what you described as, I think, 22 participatory decision making. And I'm right that you 23 have described your management style as being one of 24 participatory decision making? 25 A: Hopefully.
2251 Q: And, by this style you mean that you 2 wouldn't just walk into an incident commander's office 3 and start giving orders? 4 A: That's not my style. 5 Q: It's not your style. You would 6 discuss the situation with -- with others, such as the 7 incident commander, and hash out a course of action? 8 A: That they may wish to take, or they 9 could take, yes. 10 Q: That they may wish to take? 11 A: Given the circumstances that I know 12 at the time. 13 Q: Right. And, you would give your 14 opinion and -- and the incident commander could do with 15 that as he saw fit -- he or she saw fit? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: And, this form of decision making is 18 -- is one that you find to be effective? 19 A: I have, yes. 20 Q: And, that -- that's why you follow it 21 as a -- 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: -- a course of action? 24 And, in fact, it's often a necessary 25 process, since by your evidence it would be somewhat
2261 inappropriate for you to give straight orders to an 2 incident commander regarding the operation that he or she 3 was conducting? 4 A: Definitely. 5 Q: So -- but, as we heard on -- on the 6 tape of your conversation with Inspector Gordon on 7 September 7th, this form of decision making can take 8 various forms? 9 A: It did. 10 Q: You can make your opinion quite 11 clear? 12 A: I ask you to judge that, so, yes, I 13 think I was at that time, based on the information that I 14 had and I believed that he didn't. 15 Q: For instance, from that tape it was 16 quite clear that you did not want them to stop the 17 marchers or even ask them to -- to stop? 18 A: Yeah, to -- to avoid any potential 19 confrontation, given that I believed that emotions were - 20 - or, I know emotions were very high following the 21 shooting. 22 Q: And as a superior officer, you can 23 make it emphatically clear what you want done, or what 24 you would prefer to have done? 25 A: I could.
2271 Q: But that's not an order, it's just a 2 very, very strong suggestion? 3 A: I've given very few orders in my -- 4 my life. It's a suggestion that... 5 Q: And in your experience as a chief 6 superintendent, and a police chief, do you find that a 7 strong suggestion is often followed by subordinate 8 officers? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: And that's an effect of human nature; 11 people aim to please? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And they respect your position? 14 A: Hopefully. 15 Q: And they respect your experience? 16 A: Hopefully. 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 Q: And so a person is especially likely 21 to follow your suggestion if -- if they seen -- if you 22 were seen as someone in a superior position of power? 23 A: Hopefully that I'd been open to their 24 -- to their thoughts also before given them, as you 25 suggest, strong suggestions that you're suggesting they
2281 will do. 2 Q: So, for instance, a Commissioner's 3 suggestion might carry more weight than a Chief 4 Superintendent? 5 A: To me maybe, but maybe not to 6 somebody else. The Commissioner is the ultimate 7 authority in -- from a policing perspective and if he was 8 to place an order then it's expected that the 9 organization, because everything from that person is 10 down, so to speak, so yes. 11 Q: So, for a person in a high position 12 of power, making a suggestion or simply letting your 13 strongly held opinion to be known, is a very effective 14 way to have your views followed? 15 Would you agree? 16 A: I -- that is possibly what happens. 17 I really -- I don't really thought of what you're saying 18 that people do it just because I say it. 19 I believe that I'm participative. I 20 believe that I try to convey that two (2) heads are 21 better than one (1) and four (4) heads are better than 22 two (2), et cetera, and that's the type of managing I 23 believe in. 24 Q: Certainly. There would be some back 25 and forth in an ideal situation, but a subordinate
2291 officer would put a lot of weight behind a very strongly 2 put suggestion? 3 A: Yes, sir, he would. 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 Q: Now, I don't want to go in -- get 8 into the two (2) hour meeting in too much depth; it has 9 been covered by -- by -- by several others and I'll just 10 make one short attempt at trying to jog your memory, 11 although I'm not convinced I will be successful in that. 12 During your meeting, you discussed all 13 aspects of the operation? 14 A: I believe we did. 15 Q: And before that meeting, you had 16 spoken to Marcel Beaubien, the local MPP? 17 A: I think my evidence is it's somewhere 18 in and around there that I think I had, yes. 19 Q: And you'd spoken to other local 20 politicians in and around that time? 21 A: Mr. Fred Thomas and subsequently, Ms. 22 Rosemarie Ur. 23 Q: And you were aware of the -- I'd 24 characterize them as strong opinions being pronounced by 25 these politicians at that time?
2301 A: No, not strong. My recollection and 2 memory of the interaction that I had with Mr. Beaubien, 3 Ms. Ur, or Fred Thomas was that they were merely seeking 4 information in order that they could best answer their 5 constituents' concern and -- and, no, they were gracious 6 to me as far as I -- I never felt any threat from any one 7 (1) of them. 8 And I think that's one (1) of the reasons 9 why I also chose post-shooting to make sure that I did 10 keep them in the loop because I did appreciate that they 11 were, in fact, responsible for that area and they did 12 have a need to know information as best I could give it 13 to them and they had treated me -- they had treated me in 14 a manner that deserved that I -- I keep them in the loop. 15 Q: And you paid attention to them 16 because they represented a constituency like the 17 politicians? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: And that's where elected politicians 20 get their -- their -- their power is from being elected 21 and representing a larger number of people? 22 A: Yes. I don't know if they get their 23 power, they get their position in any event. 24 Q: They get their position and they get 25 the respect.
2311 A: Hopefully, yes. 2 Q: And we have heard evidence from 3 Deputy Commissioner Carson that he was aware of political 4 pressure or concern that the OPP -- concern about the way 5 the OPP had handled the operation at that time? He was 6 aware of the political concerns? 7 A: At what time? 8 Q: At the time of this meeting? He had 9 advised his officers under his command of these political 10 issues the day before? 11 A: Then there's every reason to believe 12 that that may have become part of the discussion in that 13 September 6th date, if we were discussing everything. 14 Q: So both you and Inspector Carson were 15 aware that politicians were -- were watching what you 16 were doing and were concerned? 17 A: Oh, I -- I think so. 18 Q: And so it is not a wild speculation 19 to -- to presume that, at this meeting, there was a 20 discussion of -- of the political aspect of the 21 operation? 22 A: I agreed with you that because John 23 Carson had talked to the troops before and made some 24 claims that there may have been some discussion about the 25 concerns that politicians -- local politicians had via
2321 their constituents, but that's about it as far as I think 2 it would have gone. 3 I have no recollection, I'm sorry, but I'm 4 trying to be fair, to say that it may have formed part of 5 the overall discussions when you're discussing in a two 6 (2) hour period what's going on. 7 And, if I can, if it helps you at all, the 8 fact that I had the conversation with Ron Fox or John 9 Carson had the conversation with -- with Ron Fox, that 10 might have also led to something, but I do not recall. 11 Q: Thank you. You had -- you had 12 mentioned that yesterday, I was going to ask you about 13 that -- that, but you -- you don't recall whether -- 14 whether John Carson discussed his phone call of the 15 previous day with Ron Fox -- 16 A: No. 17 Q: -- at the meeting. 18 A: I'm sorry. 19 20 (BRIEF PAUSE) 21 22 Q: You had presided over major police 23 operations before -- 24 A: I had. 25 Q: û- this? And you had experience
2331 working out of mobile command centres? 2 A: Yes, I have. 3 Q: In fact you didn't like them. 4 A: I don't like them. 5 Q: In this instance after the shooting 6 that you had moved things to the -- to a detachment? 7 A: I'm not saying that that was my -- my 8 participative management, but I know that my position 9 would be, if I can stay away from trailers, I do. 10 They're too noisy, they're too small, there's a whole 11 bunch of limitations to them and what you need in a major 12 incident is you need the largest place that you can have 13 so people can go away and do their thing without 14 interfering with everyone else. That's my belief of why 15 I don't like command. 16 They're okay for situations of inclement 17 weather in the middle of nowhere. But otherwise I'll try 18 to -- always try to run an incident out of a place where 19 I've got rooms to send people to talk, so it doesn't 20 become confusing. 21 Q: You haven't bought a motorhome for 22 your retirement? But we've heard that testimony that as 23 a matter of practice, in general, in detachments, 24 administrative phone calls are not taped. 25 A: No, they're not.
2341 Q: But we've also heard that in mobile 2 command centres there is the capacity for 911 calls. 3 They have the capacity for 911 calls and therefore there 4 is a taping process that occurs. 5 A: The OPP system allows for that 6 because of emergency -- emergency 911 of those types. It 7 does allow for it, yes. 8 Q: And so from your experience you -- 9 you knew that, that command centres taped their calls? 10 A: No, I didn't. No, no I didn't. I 11 know the capability has the ability to redirect a 12 telephone from a particular place back to a communication 13 centre where there are the logger tapes. But not 14 individually to the detachment. 15 If it's on the OPP, the then OPP telephone 16 system, I knew that capability existed. But as far as 17 I'm concerned, when -- when I had detachment telephone 18 lines, any detachment telephone line I spoke to, unless I 19 was speaking to the com centre, I had every reason to 20 expect that it would -- that it was not taped. 21 Q: When you were in a com centre -- 22 A: Or if I was calling a communication 23 centre, those lines are taped for -- to get back to 24 people in emergencies, et cetera. 25 Q: So if you were on the phone in a
2351 command centre -- 2 A: No, no. I said a com centre -- 3 Q: Comm centre. 4 A: û- a communication centre. 5 Q: Okay. 6 A: We used to have seventeen (17), I 7 can't tell you how many we have now. But if you called 8 an OPP telecommunication centre when you first pick up 9 the phone, you have every reason to believe that your 10 call will be taped. Because it might be an emergency 11 situation that they need to play back. 12 Q: But that wasn't the case in -- in 13 this mobile unit? 14 A: The need to û- I don't know. I did 15 not know that they were taped. 16 Q: Turning to the phone call that I know 17 you have discussed already but I will just touch on it. 18 It's at Tab 37 of Exhibit 444(a). Before we move to your 19 portion of the conversation, it's come up several times 20 and I just want to pin this down. 21 There appears to be nothing in the first 22 part of the conversation that indicates that Inspector 23 Carson said anything that would indicate that he was 24 talking about information close to the Interministerial 25 Committee or other government officials; is that correct?
2361 A: I think that's correct, yes. 2 Q: So you came onto the phone, you were 3 asked or Fox asked and -- and you expressed, immediately, 4 a concern that: 5 "We want to be careful what we're doing 6 here, that we don't give them, the 7 people that you talk to, that we don't 8 give them the information too fast." 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: That's correct? That's at page 269. 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: And -- and so this was something that 13 you were concerned about, perhaps even before Ron Fox 14 phoned? 15 A: Not specific necessarily to 16 Ipperwash, but yes, in my mind, just in incident command 17 as I advised before, talking to command centres above and 18 information going out, it -- you want to contain it as 19 best you can. 20 So, yes, that's in my mind. 21 Q: You say it later on, on page 270, 22 yes, whether you've had a conversation with someone else 23 about this and you say, quote: 24 "No, no, this is just off my head. The 25 last time I talked to you I heard the
2371 only thing I've talked -- the only 2 person I have talked to is on this is 3 Tony and I've talked to John as far as 4 Marcel Beaubien which got -- that's 5 really all I've got on this." 6 That -- that is a quote from the 7 transcripts I have. 8 A: Yes, it is. 9 Q: As I've read it out loud, I've 10 realized sometimes that these things sound different. 11 But -- so you had been talking to -- to 12 John Carson about Marcel Beaubien and about his 13 involvement or what he had to say? 14 A: I believe that to be so. 15 Q: And so is -- a fair assumption that - 16 - that -- or perhaps you recall, that that -- that your 17 discussion about Marcel Beaubien and of what Marcel 18 Beaubien had to say may have influenced your -- or may 19 have enhanced your concern that there was improper 20 information flow occurring? 21 A: No, I don't think I agree with your 22 last part of that. I believe that this indicates that, 23 yes, it appears that I -- that I've had a conversation, 24 talked to John as far as Marcel Beaubien but not about -- 25 you mentioned about information?
2381 Q: Well, is -- is -- yeah, I'm saying 2 that this -- this statement, it seems to indicate that -- 3 that that might have been what led you to -- to bring up 4 this topic with Inspector Fox? 5 A: I'll have to -- that I have no 6 recollection -- 7 Q: You have no recollection? 8 A: -- of that. 9 Q: All right. Now we went through this 10 yesterday and your on -- you're on the phone for -- for 11 some time with -- several minutes with Inspector Fox 12 discussing your concern about information flow -- 13 A: Too fast. 14 Q: û- and how the -- 15 A: Yeah. 16 Q: -- information was moving too quickly 17 and, in your view, this was dangerous? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: But -- but at that time you also say 20 that you don't have a problem with him phoning John 21 Carson? 22 A: No, I didn't. 23 Q: And that's -- and you weren't just 24 saying that, you -- you really believed that it was all 25 right for him to telephone --
2391 A: I respect Ron Fox's ability as a 2 police officer to discern what should be given out or not 3 given out. 4 Q: And now -- and then it's only right 5 at the end that Inspector Fox starts to discuss about 6 events at the Interministerial meeting; you note that? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: He only makes one (1) statement or 9 perhaps two (2) or three (3) and -- and immediately after 10 that, you say: 11 "Ron, give me your phone number there." 12 Is that correct? 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: But you didn't do this when you were 15 discussing information flow? It's was only at that time 16 when that issue came up that you chose to get off the 17 phone? 18 A: Well I chose to get off the phone, 19 but I -- I've given evidence I don't know why I chose to 20 get off the phone. 21 Q: Okay. But it appears that that whole 22 issue has been dealt with and is done, you're whole 23 concern about information moving too quickly? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And you've already said that -- that
2401 your statement that: 2 "Don't get involved in anything else, 3 I'm going to give you a call back." 4 That's -- that's a statement that would -- 5 that you wouldn't likely make if you didn't have the full 6 intention of calling that person back? 7 A: Oh, I believe I wanted to call him 8 back, yes. 9 Q: You wouldn't normally, in your own 10 experience, you wouldn't normally not call someone back 11 after making -- 12 A: Well, not when I've asked -- when 13 I've asked him not to get involved in anything, I -- I 14 would know that he would have an expectation of me 15 calling him back. 16 Q: Pretty definitive? 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 Q: You said that you don't recall that - 21 - that -- that subsequent conversation with Inspector 22 Fox? 23 A: I don't, sir. 24 Q: And, you -- you'll say that -- and 25 you've indicated that -- you -- you -- during that
2411 conversation, you're -- you told him that it was fine for 2 him to call -- to call John Carson? 3 A: Yes, sir, it's in the record. 4 Q: All right. I'm going to turn your 5 attention to a document, it's Exhibit P-515, it's Inquiry 6 Document Number 3001088. I have a copy here for the 7 Commissioner and I believe your Counsel has provided you 8 with a copy? It's -- I think it's just -- yes -- 9 A: Sorry? 10 Q: This is a document that was drafted 11 by -- or these are the notes of Julie Jai. And these 12 notes were put to -- to Inspector Fox during the course 13 of his examination and they're dated September 6th, 1995, 14 and they have Ron Fox's name at the top. 15 And, you'll note the second bullet, it 16 says, quote: 17 Now, OPP Commissioner is involved. 18 Decisions will be made at his level." 19 I don't know if you reviewed this part of 20 the transcripts so -- but I'll -- I'll take you to where 21 Inspector Fox -- this issue was raised to Inspector Fox. 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 Q: Inspector Fox, gave in his evidence,
2421 that this note reflects a conversation that he had with 2 Ms. Jai after he left the Legislative Building after his 3 -- his phone -- after his meeting with the Premier and 4 after telephoning you. Well, he doesn't indicate that 5 it's after telephoning you, but some of the information 6 only makes sense if it's after telephoning you. 7 And, he gave evidence that this note did 8 reflect the substance of his conversation with Ms. Jai, 9 except for one (1) point. He had a correction to make 10 and he said: 11 "Where she has a bullet in the 12 second..." 13 It's a line bullet in the second line, and 14 he quotes that line and then he says: 15 "I believe that would be the OPP field 16 commander who would have been Chris 17 Coles." 18 And, he was asked why -- why he believed 19 that and he said: 20 "Having an understanding of the way the 21 organization works, the Commissioner 22 would not ordinarily be involved in 23 that type of day-to-day work." 24 Oh, I'm sorry, yes, thank you. That's -- 25 that's quoting from July 12th page -- pages 134 and 135
2431 of the transcript. 2 So, Inspector Fox, in his testimony, 3 agreed with the -- the view that he told Ms. Jai that not 4 the OPP Commissioner but field commander, you Chris 5 Coles, is involved and decisions will be made at his 6 level. 7 Do you have an recollection of that 8 occurring; of you -- of informing Mr. Fox at that time? 9 A: No. I guess I don't have the time of 10 this but obviously it appears that it was sometime after 11 this note. But I don't know what time it is that Ron -- 12 I guess my answer is, I don't have any knowledge of this 13 -- of this document. 14 You're -- you're advising me that Ron is 15 now saying that in place of the OPP commissioner it 16 should have been me -- 17 Q: Yes. 18 A: -- the field chief is involved; 19 decisions will be made at his level. And I've given you 20 evidence that the decisions could be made at my level but 21 the majority of decisions that were made by an incident 22 commander are made at his or her level. 23 Q: You did not inform Mr. Fox of this 24 during the telephone conversation that -- that we went 25 through at Tab 37, correct?
2441 A: That from now on I would be making 2 the decisions? 3 Q: Right. 4 A: Definitely not. 5 Q: And we don't have a transcript of 6 your subsequent conversation which you -- which you don't 7 recall? 8 A: But I -- that's right, you don't, but 9 I wouldn't have said that. 10 Q: You would not have said that? 11 A: That I would be taking over the 12 decision making process, I would not have said that to 13 Ron Fox. That would have been taking all the command 14 decisions away from John Carson as the incident commander 15 or Tony Parkin as his level -- first level supervisor if 16 you will. 17 I wouldn't -- I wouldn't have done that. 18 There may have been some decisions as by example that my 19 -- my conversation with Jim Gordon that you're suggesting 20 that it was a little more than participative on my part. 21 But no, I would not have said that to Ron 22 Fox. That would have been against anything that I 23 believe in command. 24 Q: Is it possible that perhaps you got 25 off the phone with Inspector Fox when he brought up the
2451 issue of -- of what was occurring at the political level, 2 what decisions and statements were being made at the 3 political level? 4 Is it possible or does it ring any bells 5 that that would have been your concern was the 6 information flow down from Inspector -- from Inspector 7 Fox, and in your subsequent call you told him that you 8 wanted to be in charge of the political aspect? 9 A: I'm going to say I have no 10 recollection of that. 11 Q: You told us that you've had 12 experience with other First Nation policing incidents, 13 correct? 14 A: Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 15 Q: And one of those events -- one of 16 those were the events at Akwesasne Reserve where there 17 was a shooting at a -- towards a Mohawk police officer? 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: And your role in those -- in that 20 incident was that you were commander of 'E' Division? 21 A: Yes, sir. 22 Q: What level -- would that be -- you 23 were like an incident commander or -- 24 A: No, sir, I was just an executive, the 25 same as you are seeing here. I was a chief
2461 superintendent in charge of really -- eastern Ontario at 2 that time for a couple of years. 3 I was chief superintendent. There were 4 superintendents under me and there were incident 5 commanders under me at that time too. 6 Q: And you used your experience in the 7 Akwesasne incident to explain to us that some of your 8 concerns with -- there's improper information flow; is 9 that correct? 10 A: I think I referred to my experience 11 of Akwesasne of the pressures that the media can put on 12 various police departments who end up responding to 13 media; that's my recollection of my evidence. 14 Q: Information that was passed on too 15 freely would get out to the press and the press would 16 write stories with their own view -- 17 A: Right. 18 Q: -- of the facts, correct? 19 A: Yes, yes. 20 Q: And these stories in your view, could 21 and did, from my understanding of your testimony, 22 influence the -- the views or the -- the manner in which 23 police engaged in their operation. 24 A: No, I don't think I said that, sir. 25 I think what I said was that as that media came in, I
2471 noticed that each police department or police reporting 2 as we went around the tables, because it was a combined 3 incident command, if you will, would refer some -- more 4 possibly to what the media was reporting and it was 5 interesting as you could read -- as you could see the 6 media and see how that would affect. 7 The problem with that is, you've now got 8 six (6) police departments dealing with what six (6) 9 different media outlets are saying and not saying and the 10 issue is not to be -- you're not trying to deal with what 11 the media are saying, is you have the information first 12 hand and you're dealing as to what you know, not what the 13 media is choosing to -- to speak about or not speak 14 about. 15 So that's -- that's where I said -- that's 16 the pressures that hit that particular incident command. 17 Q: But it does have an influence on the 18 way that the police do their job; does it not? 19 A: It -- it's just something else that 20 has to be considered because you feel that the public is 21 being made aware of these -- this situation via media so, 22 yes, you address that, but I hope to think that the media 23 doesn't direct me as the politicians do not direct me. 24 Q: Clearly, that would be your hope, but 25 it -- what -- if -- if there is no influence, then what
2481 would the danger be? Is the danger not that it could 2 influence the way the police officers operate? 3 A: There's a danger if you have a 4 commander that would -- would succumb to that, but I 5 suggest that, in my particular case, and the -- and the 6 commanders under me, I never saw any evidence of that. 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 Q: At Tab 1 of your binder, which is the 11 OPP policy that we've discussed several times, we've gone 12 through it, but it clearly states that the initial 13 response of the OPP has traditionally been one of 14 negotiation in an effort to avoid the use of physical 15 force if at all possible; correct? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: And your -- in your recommendations 18 to -- earlier in your testimony, to the Commissioner, you 19 highlighted the importance of peaceful negotiations and 20 the need for a framework to ensure strong, healthy 21 negotiations? 22 A: Oh, I think what I suggested in my 23 first recommendation, the need for a conflict resolution 24 team made up of various parties that could possibly 25 assist in incidents such as this, I don't recall what you
2491 just said, sir, I don't. 2 Q: Okay. But you saw a need to enhance 3 the effectiveness of conflict resolution? 4 A: Oh, I think there's -- that should be 5 just a matter of course of -- of any incident that's 6 reviewed by any organization as to how you can assist 7 that to be a better process. 8 Q: And you agree with the OPP -- OPP's 9 general policy of negotiations and the -- and the mandate 10 of the Project Maple which stated that the objective was 11 to achieve a peaceful resolution? 12 A: I -- yes, sir, I tried. 13 Q: But at the end of the day, there were 14 no negotiations -- successful negotiations -- prior to 15 the shooting? 16 A: That's correct. 17 Q: And so the OPP's emphasis on peaceful 18 negotiation was not what resulted? 19 A: State that again, sir? 20 Q: The OPP's emphasis of peaceful 21 negotiation did not carry the day? 22 A: As I've given evidence before, we 23 were not able to talk to another side to even start 24 negotiations. 25 Q: And at the end of the day, the OPP
2501 moved more quickly than they had intended? 2 A: I don't think so. 3 Q: They moved without an injunction? 4 A: Yes, they did. But what was the move 5 for, would be my answer to you. 6 The move was basically to move a group of 7 people who may have been out into a parking lot, back 8 into a Park -- into a containment situation; that was the 9 move that the Ontario Provincial Police made. 10 And I suggest Inspector Carson still had 11 every intention of seeking the injunction or working on - 12 - on the injunction, if it was so provided. 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 Q: Thank you, those are all my 17 questions. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 19 Mr. Horner. Thank you very much. 20 MR. MATTHEW HORNER: Thank you. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: The last 22 cross-examiner before your own Counsel is now Mr. Roy 23 from the Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto. 24 Good afternoon, Mr. Roy. 25 MR. JULIAN ROY: Good afternoon, Mr.
2511 Commissioner. 2 MR. JULIAN ROY: I wouldn't sell Mr. 3 Sandler short with his cross-examinations, it's 4 definitely been a cross-examine. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, but he 6 gets to bat clean up. Is your estimate still within the 7 time range that you made? 8 MR. JULIAN ROY: My estimate is about two 9 (2) hours and it still stands and I -- I don't know, Mr. 10 Commissioner, what your intentions are in terms of how 11 long we go today. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I was hoping 13 that we would finish today. It's taken us a little 14 longer to get to this point. If it takes you two (2) 15 hours I don't think we'll finish today. 16 I thought your estimate was an hour to two 17 (2), it was two (2) hours? 18 MR. JULIAN ROY: It was one (1) to two 19 (2) hours and -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, so if 21 it's one (1) hour, we could finish today? 22 MR. JULIAN ROY: I would have to -- to be 23 honest, I think it's going to be closer to the two (2) 24 hours. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, then
2521 we'll go as long as we can and then we'll finish it 2 tomorrow. 3 MR. JULIAN ROY: All right. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well we 5 don't want to go too long, because I know it's a long day 6 and if you're feeling that you've had enough, Mr. Coles, 7 please tell us. 8 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 9 MR. JULIAN ROY: I won't be insulted if 10 you say you've had enough while I'm asking you questions, 11 so let me know. 12 I won't take it personally. 13 THE WITNESS: Can I reserve that right? 14 MR. JULIAN ROY: All right. 15 16 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 17 Q: I want to cover some of the same 18 facts, so there is, inevitably, a little bit of 19 repetition that's involved in all of these cross- 20 examinations as you can tell, but every party has their 21 own spin on those facts. 22 And my client, ALST, Aboriginal legal 23 Services Toronto is going to have their own spin and 24 their own interest in particular facts, and some of those 25 facts have been covered by other parties. And I
2531 apologize if some of this is a bit -- feels like a bit of 2 deja vu. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, every 4 party should make an effort not to repeat what has 5 already been covered. 6 MR. JULIAN ROY: I'm doing my best. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Even though 8 you may have another spin, you can do that in your 9 argument. 10 MR. JULIAN ROY: Yes. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: If you're 12 not eliciting new facts -- 13 MR. JULIAN ROY: Yes. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- or 15 bringing out new information. 16 MR. JULIAN ROY: I will -- I will do my 17 best to do that. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 19 20 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 21 Q: Now throughout your evidence, as I've 22 heard it over the last three (3) days, one of the big 23 themes that seems to come through is this issue about, in 24 effect, giving space to John Carson as the Incident 25 Commander, to make decisions on an operational level on
2541 the ground. 2 Am I right? 3 A: You're correct. 4 Q: Okay. And this is an issue that -- 5 that I can tell in the way that you've given your 6 evidence is an important issue for you in the sense that 7 you feel it's important in your role, to maintain that 8 distinction between the operational level that John 9 Carson is responsible for, and your different 10 responsibilities. 11 Is that correct? 12 A: That's correct. 13 Q: Now you'd agree with me that there's 14 a little bit of a dilemma any time a senior person 15 delegates authority to a more junior person in an 16 organization, and when I say "dilemma" what I mean is the 17 senior person is, in most cases, going to have more 18 experience and perhaps more training than a more junior 19 person, if they have to give way to that junior person. 20 Do you agree with me that there's a little 21 bit of a tension or a dilemma there? 22 A: Depending on the experience of the 23 superior and depending on what that situation is, I 24 guess, there might be a dilemma. 25 You do have some people of superior rank
2551 than have never been involved in operations and therefore 2 that would not apply in that particular case. 3 But in this particular case I believe that 4 John Carson was a very qualified Incident Command Officer 5 but I also believe I also have experience. 6 Q: Yes. And you were of course aware 7 that John Carson had not been incident commander in a 8 First Nations occupation or protest context? 9 A: I believe that. Yeah. 10 Q: Basically. And you had been though; 11 is that correct? 12 A: Yes, sir, at Akwesasne. 13 Q: So that tension that I just mentioned 14 before about the senior person maybe having more 15 experience or expertise than the junior person, is 16 potentially in play in your relationship with John 17 Carson? 18 A: Possibly, I'll answer that. 19 Q: Now you've told us that from time to 20 time you do become involved in operational matters. It's 21 not a situation where there's a complete firewall between 22 you and John Carson; is that correct? 23 A: No. I delegate my authority but I 24 can -- I can -- if it is my authority, then I can take 25 that authority back and I -- I can do that, yes.
2561 Q: Because ultimately the buck stops 2 with you when it comes to operational matters; right? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Okay. So with that responsibility 5 comes the right or the authority to take back that 6 delegated power; is that correct? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: But the approach, as I understand 9 your evidence, the approach that you prefer is a more, 10 what you've described, is a more participatory approach; 11 correct? 12 A: That's correct. 13 Q: Where you sort of act as a senior 14 resource person for your incident commander; correct? 15 A: Not in every occasion. In some 16 occasions in -- 17 Q: Yes. 18 A: -- this case I did have and I 19 suggest, yes. 20 Q: When -- when it comes to deciding 21 what caterer you're going to use, that's not something 22 that John Carson is going to potentially consult you on? 23 But on more significant matters, you're available to him 24 as a resource; is that correct? 25 A: ThatÆs -- that's correct.
2571 Q: In the more important the type of 2 decision that John Carson is facing, the more likely it 3 is that a) he's going to require you as a resource and b) 4 that you're going to be responsive to that type of 5 request; is that correct? 6 A: If he asked questions of me, I would 7 have answered them, yes. 8 Q: Yes. And -- and sometimes you take a 9 little bit more of a bullish position like when it came 10 to the armoured personnel carrier and how it was going to 11 be marked. 12 A: Yes, sir, that -- that was my -- that 13 was my feeling that that's what I wanted. 14 Q: Because that whole issue about how 15 that vehicle was going to be marked, it raised bigger 16 issues about how the Ontario Provincial Police, how it's 17 going to be perceived in this very serious incident; is 18 that correct? 19 A: That's correct. In Akwesasne and Oka 20 I think served to that, that you want to make sure that 21 it wasn't a Military assistance program that was going 22 on. It was an Ontario Provincial Police program that was 23 going on. 24 Q: So whenever issues about the 25 perception of the whole organization and when I say
2581 organization I mean the OPP. When issues that get at 2 that whole, the way the OPP is going to be perceived and 3 its reputation, those are the kinds of decisions or 4 matters that you're more likely to become involved in; is 5 that correct? 6 A: Possibly. 7 Q: Okay. Now I want to go backwards and 8 forwards a little bit in terms of the facts. And the 9 first thing I want to start with is -- is the -- an event 10 that occurred after the shooting, all right? 11 A: Okay. 12 Q: And I will be going back to before 13 the shooting and then I'll probably go back to after the 14 shooting again. 15 A: You're asking the questions, sir. 16 Q: All right. It -- it's the issue of - 17 - of the discussion between you and Jim Gordon or James 18 Gordon about that hundred and fifty (150) protesters or a 19 hundred and fifty (150) marchers. 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: You -- you remember that tape that 22 was played? 23 A: Yes, I do. 24 Q: And I understand we don't have a 25 transcript of it and I'm not going to ask for it to be
2591 played again. I think it -- 2 A: I remember it. 3 Q: Yeah. And I remember it well too, I 4 was listening very carefully to it. And I would suggest 5 to you that this is an example of how you, as a resource 6 person, could become involved at an operational level. 7 It's a pretty good example of that; is that correct? 8 A: Well I think it's a better example of 9 how information sometimes has to be passed very quickly 10 to an incident commander. 11 Q: Yes. 12 A: And, I -- I allude to the fact about 13 my -- having been on the conversation with Ovide 14 Mercredi, getting one-half of the situation and relaying 15 it to an incident commander who didn't have that part and 16 -- and I believe that was needed. 17 Q: Yes, so there -- there is at least 18 two (2) aspects to that interchange that you're having 19 with James Gordon who's the incident commander. One (1) 20 is, you're providing him information like any other 21 police -- police officer might be doing; is that 22 correct? 23 A: Right. 24 Q: But then, the conversation evolves 25 into something different where he's consulting you as a
2601 resource person in terms of weighing the options about 2 what to do in the situation; is that correct? 3 A: Well, he called Tony Parkin, his 4 first level supervisor -- 5 Q: Yes. 6 A: -- first -- first of all and -- to 7 advise him of the breach of the -- of -- of the 8 roadblock. 9 Q: Yes. 10 A: And then, Tony advised him that I was 11 talking to Ovide Mercredi on the phone, Ovide Mercredi, 12 we're talking about exactly the same situation, if you 13 will -- 14 Q: Yes. 15 A: -- and then I was the best source of 16 information, talking about the analysis -- 17 Q: Sure. 18 A: -- that I'm the best source to speak 19 to -- to James Gordon. 20 Q: Yes. 21 A: And then, we had a discussion. 22 Q: Yes. So, you would agree with me 23 that the situation that James Gordon was facing as an 24 indicate commander was an extremely volatile situation? 25 A: It was an extremely difficult one,
2611 especially given that he had just recently been brought 2 in to relieve the other incident commanders after -- 3 after the -- the tragic events -- 4 Q: Yes. 5 A: -- yes sir. 6 Q: But, it's not only that, you've had a 7 shooting and the feelings are high on both sides; is that 8 correct? 9 A: That's what I'm saying, yeah, after 10 the tragic event, yes. 11 Q: Yes. And, when I say, "both sides of 12 the table," you would have been conscious at that time 13 about your own police officers and the emotions that they 14 would have been experiencing at the time, correct? 15 A: Very much so, sir. 16 Q: People like lawyers often forget that 17 police officers are not robots, they're human beings, 18 correct? 19 A: My saying is, they're just folks in 20 those uniforms. 21 Q: Yeah. And, they experience the same 22 frailties that everybody else does; is that correct? 23 A: Yes. Yes, they do. 24 Q: Yeah. And, you have to be conscious 25 of those very real human frailties if you're going to
2621 provide meaningful leadership and guidance to those 2 people; isn't that correct? 3 A: That's correct. 4 Q: And, you have a lot of experience 5 doing that as a leader in your organization, formerly? 6 A: Hopefully. 7 Q: Yes. 8 A: I also had frailties. 9 Q: Yes, of course. And, when emotions 10 are running high on both sides, on the police side and on 11 the occupiers' side, you're in a danger period because 12 there's more chance that people are going to make 13 mistakes; is that correct? 14 A: I think that's a pretty good 15 assumption. 16 Q: Now, your conversation with James 17 Gordon, your first reaction to it after it was played 18 was, you were concerned that you -- you may have been a 19 little bit too directive in terms of that decision that 20 the incident commander was going to be making about 21 whether or not the hundred and fifty (150) people were 22 going to march by that checkpoint or whether or not there 23 was going to be a confrontation? 24 A: I was pushing him to make a decision 25 and to -- based on the information that I had from Ovide
2631 Mercredi, I believe that I -- if you go back to that 2 tape, you will see that I was giving my reasoning for 3 Jim. We wanted them out of the Park; this is why we did 4 it. I believed I was -- and -- and Jim was saying, Yes, 5 Chief, we're -- we're doing that, yes, doing that. 6 The part that is wrong is the very part 7 where under my breath you hear me saying to Jim, Jim, let 8 them through. 9 Q: Yeah. 10 A: And, I suggest even though it was 11 under my breath, it was me basically breaking the rules 12 of participative management and basically saying, Jimmy, 13 let them through. And that was unfair to Jimmy and 14 that's my frailty. 15 I should not have -- I -- I should have 16 discussed it a little more, but there was an emergent 17 circumstance; he had people marking -- marching through 18 the blockade. 19 Q: See, I -- I didn't pick up -- I 20 didn't see that as significant as obviously you do, and - 21 - and maybe Jim Gordon might have felt, but from what I 22 could tell, at the end of the day it was Jim Gordon's 23 decision that he was making. 24 A: He made the decision, yes. 25 Q: And, there are degrees to which you,
2641 as his superior, can participate in how that decision is 2 made, right? 3 A: Yes, sir. 4 Q: And, this was -- what you're telling 5 me is this is on the -- on one (1) end of the spectrum, 6 it's -- you're participating in a more directed fashion 7 than in other types of decisions, correct? 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: And, that's appropriate for the 10 circumstances that you were facing, correct? 11 A: I thought it was with a little 12 unfairness to Jim. 13 Q: Now, one of the things, keeping in 14 mind that you've already told me that at the end of the 15 day, it's Jim Gordon's decision, one of the things as I 16 hear that tape and you as his superior officer, what I 17 see that you're doing, and you can tell me if this is 18 what you're trying to do, is that you appreciate he has 19 this very difficult decision to make, and you're trying 20 to help him consider the various pros and cons that 21 attend to each side of that decision. 22 Is that what you're doing? 23 A: Trying to, yes. 24 Q: Yeah, on one hand he can stop the 25 marchers and there's a number of consequences, pros and
2651 cons, that flow from that; correct? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: And you were helping him identify 4 those and weigh those, correct? 5 A: Correct. 6 Q: And then there's the other half of 7 the decision which is let the people pass -- 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: And you're helping him weigh those 10 consequences as well? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And then you do a cost benefit 13 analysis; you sum it all together? And then you -- from 14 that you decide what is -- which way am I going to go, 15 correct? 16 A: Why I would like him to go that way, 17 yes. 18 Q: Yeah. Now, the downside of letting 19 the people go in your mind was fairly significant at the 20 time, was it? 21 A: Yes, it was. 22 Q: Because you don't have the people. 23 You understood that a bus -- people driving a bus had 24 attempted to murder your officers. That was your 25 understanding, that's what you were told?
2661 A: Yes. Yes, sir. 2 Q: And allowing a hundred and fifty 3 (150) people to march through that crime scene and escort 4 the people in that Park out meant that, potentially, some 5 very -- suspects in a very serious offence could be 6 assisted in evading responsibility, correct? 7 A: Possibly, and a crime scene was 8 destroyed. 9 Q: And that's a -- in your mind, that 10 was a very serious consequence; correct? 11 A: I would like to think I was astute 12 enough to think of that at the time. I'm not so sure 13 that I necessarily was. I was looking more in my -- my 14 words to Jim was, I wanted people in that Park. I wanted 15 those -- I -- my thought is that I wanted reasonable 16 people in those Park to assist those occupiers; that's 17 what was in my mind. 18 Q: That's on the pro side of -- 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: -- the issue of allowing the people 21 to go, correct? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: But as I recall the conversation, the 24 issue of -- of crime scene and have we identified the -- 25 A: Yeah.
2671 Q: -- the potential perpetrators, that 2 was raised in that discussion and adverted to. 3 A: I don't recall the crime scene. What 4 I -- I do recall to Jim do we know who -- who we shot 5 at, basically -- 6 Q: Yeah. 7 A: --- do we have that? Yes. So that 8 crime site, yes, sir, we did. 9 Q: Now, was Jim Gordon wrong to receive 10 your advice about that decision about letting the people 11 pass or stopping them? 12 A: No, he wasn't. 13 Q: Okay. Was that a sign of weakness 14 for Jim Gordon to consult you on that issue? 15 A: He -- he didn't consult me on that 16 issue. He consulted us to tell us that a hundred and 17 fifty (150) people went by. 18 Q: Yes. 19 A: He didn't have the information that I 20 just had that Ovide Mercredi was sending the Elijah's to 21 basically to get ahead of them or Bressette to get ahead 22 of them. 23 So, he didn't consult for that -- he -- 24 his first point was, Tony, they've breached a hundred and 25 fifty (150) of -- breached -- as I recall it.
2681 And then the second part was, Tony said I 2 was on the -- I was on the phone with Mr. Mercredi and 3 then I came on. 4 No, sir, it was not a sign of weakness on 5 Jim Gordon's part. 6 Q: It's not just the information that 7 you're providing from about the status of negotiations, 8 though, you're helping him on this decision, correct? 9 Going through the process of decision 10 making, correct? 11 A: I'm presenting other logic to him -- 12 Q: Yeah. 13 A: -- for him to consider, yes. 14 Q: And what I'm asking, really, and you 15 may have answered it already, it's not a sign of weakness 16 as a leader, for him to accept consultation from you 17 about that decision that he has to make as incident 18 commander, correct? 19 A: That's correct. 20 Q: In fact, it's a sign of strength as a 21 leader, correct? 22 A: I would like to think so. 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25
2691 Q: Now, as you look at that decision 2 that James Gordon made, to let the people pass, and I'm 3 using this as a bit of a microcosm for how an incident 4 commander makes decisions using a resource like yourself 5 in a very volatile situation. 6 As you look at Jim Gordon's decision 7 making to let the people pass, you don't have the 8 slightest doubt ten (10) years later that that was the 9 right decision to make do you? 10 A: Not in hindsight I don't, no, sir. 11 Q: And what helps you in having no doubt 12 about that being the right decision is that everybody 13 walked away unharmed, correct? 14 A: That's correct. Nobody got hurt 15 afterwards. 16 Q: And you view police officers as 17 peacemakers so that always has to be. At the end of the 18 day that's the most important goal, correct? 19 A: Yes, it is. 20 Q: And that's on both sides. That's 21 your officers and also with members of the public that 22 they're interacting, correct? 23 A: Explain that again. Definitely -- 24 Q: Everybody gets to go home at the end 25 of the day.
2701 A: Yes, sir. 2 Q: That goes for your officers and it 3 also goes for the members of the public, correct? 4 A: That's correct. 5 Q: Now John Carson, you probably know 6 now that -- that -- where I'm going to be taking you in 7 terms of my questioning -- 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 Q: -- and now that I've mentioned John 10 Carson, you can probably tell that my questioning is 11 going to be implicitly critical of John Carson. You 12 might be thinking that. 13 I'm sympathetic to the dilemma of a -- of 14 a senior person in an organization. You never want to 15 blame subordinates for any failings, is that correct? 16 A: If I delegate their authority I take 17 the responsibility because of their actions. 18 Q: That's right. And that's the 19 instinct that's bred into you as somebody who's been with 20 the OPP for -- since you were 19 years old, right? 21 A: Yes, sir. 22 Q: Good leaders do not blame their 23 subordinates, right? 24 A: I prefer not to. 25 Q: Yeah.
2711 A: I don't believe I did. 2 Q: And that's why this type of forum can 3 be very awkward for a senior officer like yourself, 4 correct? 5 A: I -- I'll hear your questions I guess 6 before I say how difficult it is. 7 Q: Well, hopefully it's not too 8 difficult so far. 9 A: I hope so. No, sir, no. 10 Q: But you'd agree with me that it is a 11 bit awkward. Because what -- what this process is about, 12 it's about using hindsight which police officers always 13 don't like or think is unfair, it's using hindsight that 14 consider the conduct of police officers and others. 15 In this case, people who are your 16 subordinates. And that can be awkward for you when 17 you're being asked to pass judgment or give evidence 18 about their conduct. Am I right? 19 A: You're going to ask me questions and 20 I'm going to provide you with my logic why John Carson 21 did or did not do the right thing in my opinion. I think 22 that's what we're talking about. 23 Q: All right. But would you agree with 24 me at least that it's not comfortable to do that? That's 25 there's a tension --
2721 A: I'll try my best. I -- I don't know 2 what you're going to ask. 3 Q: I'm being sympathetic to you, sir. 4 A: Well I appreciate that, thank you. 5 Q: And I'm not trying -- I'm not trying 6 to give -- 7 A: No, no -- 8 Q: -- you trick questions. 9 A: -- I understand. 10 Q: Okay. Now John Carson before the CMU 11 team marched down that road, he didn't have the kind of 12 discussion that Jim Gordon had with you about the 13 decision that Jim Gordon had to make, correct? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: You left -- you were in John Carson's 16 company around 4:00 on September 6th after that several 17 hour discussion that you had with him and I have to be 18 honest with you, I think I'm probably going to try and 19 jog your memory about that discussion too. 20 You're not going to believe that another 21 lawyer's going to take another run at it. But I have to 22 be honest. I'll try but I'll -- I'll try and get it over 23 with as quickly as possible. 24 But in any event, you leave John Carson's 25 company around 4:00 and the next you hear John Carson's
2731 voice it's after the shooting, correct? 2 A: When I go up to the command centre, 3 yes. 4 Q: Yeah. Would you agree with me that 5 having the CMU team march down that road towards the Park 6 regardless of what the purpose of it was whether it was 7 containment to keep the people in the Park or whether it 8 was to extract people from the Park and arrest them, 9 regardless of where you stand on that issue, having the 10 CMU team march down that road in these circumstances was 11 a very grave decision to take; do you agree? 12 A: Ultimately, that's how it turned out. 13 At the time, it wasn't, I suggest -- 14 Q: No. 15 A: -- as grave a decision as -- it was 16 definitely grave after the fact, definitely, but at the 17 time that he did it, I will suggest to you that it was 18 the decision of an Incident Commander to utilize some 19 resources. 20 Q: Yes, but that resource involves 21 thirty (30) to forty (40) people -- 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: -- marching towards another thirty 24 (30) to forty (40) people who may not be happy to be 25 marched at; correct?
2741 A: Correct. Correct. 2 Q: And any time you have that many 3 bodies who are going to come in close quarters, there are 4 risks that are involved; correct? 5 A: Yes, there are. 6 Q: The risk that force is going to be 7 used by somebody against somebody is magnified when you - 8 - when you send thirty (30) to forty (40) bodies down the 9 road to face another thirty (30) to forty (40) bodies; 10 correct? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: And, in that sense, would you agree 13 with me that it's a grave decision? 14 A: It's a serious decision yes. 15 Q: Yes. Calling out the TRU team is a 16 very grave decision? 17 A: Calling out the TRU team in policing 18 is -- is not a grave decision, it's -- it's done many, 19 many times, so they're a team that -- that you call on, 20 it's a resource. But because the CMU was utilized the -- 21 the -- at night, you would have to have a TRU team in 22 backup. 23 Q: Okay. So the really critical 24 decision, then, is having the CMU team being marched down 25 the road at night, correct, because along with that comes
2751 the TRU team? 2 A: It was a -- it was an escalated 3 decision, a serious decision that he made, yes. 4 Q: And -- and what -- what -- the point 5 I'm trying to make is from your point of view. The 6 minute we have the CMU team at night, the TRU team comes 7 along; correct? 8 A: That's required, yes. 9 Q: Okay. Now in addition to John Carson 10 not calling you as a resource with that decision, Mr. 11 Parkin never called you about that decision either; did 12 he? 13 A: No. 14 Q: And you were available by phone 15 during that period of time; correct? 16 A: I have every reason to believe I was, 17 yes. 18 Q: And you hadn't told anybody not to 19 phone you; correct? 20 A: No. 21 Q: In fact, you'd -- you'd done the -- 22 you'd conveyed the message to the opposite effect that 23 you were available to be contacted and consulted if 24 needed; correct? 25 A: I wouldn't expect, at my level, that
2761 an incident commander, given the situation of what John 2 faced when the -- when -- when that decision was made, I 3 wouldn't have expected a phone call to say, Chief, I'm 4 sending the CMU, I would have expected if he wanted to 5 make a consultation or advise somebody, that call would 6 have gone to Tony Parkin. 7 Q: Tony Parkin? 8 A: Yeah. 9 Q: Okay. And you're not aware that -- 10 that John Carson called Tony Parkin about that decision? 11 A: I'd have to look at Tony Parkin's 12 notes. 13 Q: Okay. Now your -- from your test -- 14 from your testimony, from that tape of the conversation 15 with Jim Gordon, it's evident from that that you have 16 considerable experience in dealing with First Nations 17 occupations and protests; is that correct? 18 A: I think I had been involved with them 19 from Akwesasne on and I had considered and been involved 20 in -- in and have knowledge of -- of other incidents that 21 went on pertaining to First Nations. 22 Q: All right. 23 A: You mentioned Curve Lake, et cetera. 24 Q: And you've already agreed with me 25 that John Carson doesn't share that experience; correct?
2771 A: Yes. 2 Q: And what about Tony Parkin, does he 3 have any experience in that regard? 4 A: Tony Parkin has excellent 5 credentials, in my opinion, when it comes to First 6 Nations, not only as an actual -- credentials as a man, 7 as a person, but he also has -- Tony Parkin was the 8 detachment commander on Six Nations -- Six Nations 9 Brantford area when the Ontario Provincial Police had a 10 detachment there. 11 Tony Parkin was also the detachment 12 commander of Long Sault which entailed a -- which 13 involves the -- the borders of Akwesasne. 14 And Tony Parkin had been the 15 Superintendent in Sault St. Marie dealing with First 16 Nations people in those areas, so Tony Parkin has a very 17 good working knowledge, I suggest, of First Nations 18 issues, and is -- is -- and is conscious of the issues. 19 Q: And in terms of -- of experience as 20 an Incident Commander in these types of situations? 21 A: He has excellent credentials as an 22 Incident Commander. I can't allude -- I don't know how 23 many -- what type of First Nations issues that -- 24 Q: Okay. 25 A: -- Tony Parkin handled. But I do
2781 know as an Incident Commander he was extremely well 2 respected. 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 Q: Now I've described you earlier as a 7 resource that was available to John Carson and also Tony 8 Parkin in terms of assisting them with very grave 9 decisions that have to be made, in dealing with this 10 situation. 11 You'd agree with me that it wouldn't have 12 been a bad thing for John Carson to consult you about 13 sending the CMU team down the road in those 14 circumstances? 15 A: But John was -- if John Carson had 16 phoned me, I would have picked up the phone and I would 17 have talked to him, yes. 18 Q: Yes. 19 A: But as an incident commander, I had 20 delegated my authority to him to basically take what 21 actions he deemed necessary. 22 Q: Yes. 23 A: And so would no parameter that he had 24 to call me or -- 25 Q: I understand.
2791 A: -- call his supervisor. 2 Q: I understand. 3 A: Correct, okay. 4 Q: I understand that he has the 5 technical authority to send that team down that road, I 6 understand that. 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: Okay. But what I'm asking you is a 9 little bit different than that, and probably my question 10 wasn't clear. What I'm suggesting to you, that even 11 though he had technically the authority to do what he 12 did, according to the way OPP does its business, would it 13 have been a bad thing for him to call on your 14 considerable expertise in making that decision? 15 A: I'm going to say that I wouldn't have 16 considered it a bad thing if he had called me, but I did 17 not -- I do not consider it was a bad thing that he 18 didn't call me. 19 Q: Okay. Now you used the expression 20 about half an hour ago, two (2) heads are better than one 21 (1)? 22 A: And four (4) are better than two (2), 23 yes, sir. 24 Q: That's right. So two (2) heads being 25 better than one (1), you assisting John Carson with that
2801 decision, it's quite possible that a better decision or a 2 different decision could have been made? 3 A: You said a better decision or a 4 different decision. I guess what I'm thinking about is 5 if a person had called me with that scenario, I would 6 have been asking him why he was going to do it and he 7 would have given me the background which we should 8 discuss if -- 9 Q: Yes. 10 A: û- whether or not it was a bad 11 decision and that's my -- my position. John knew what 12 was going on, on the ground at that time, as best he 13 could. 14 Q: Yes. 15 A: Part of the problem was, he didn't 16 know what was going on because of the cover of darkness 17 and because we didn't have containment that close. 18 Q: Okay. Let's look at that a little 19 closer, because you -- you actually -- your answer 20 anticipates a number of questions that I had in mind. 21 A: I'm sorry? 22 Q: Because -- no, it's not a problem at 23 all. You should just answer -- 24 A: I will try. 25 Q: -- as you see fit. Now, what you've
2811 just told me is that what you -- had John Carson called 2 you, what you would have done is you would have -- the 3 first thing that you would have done is you would have 4 spoken to him about what are his reasons for sending the 5 CMU team down that road, what is the precipitating 6 events; correct? 7 A: What's the situation? 8 Q: Yeah. And you would get into the 9 issues about -- you might get into the issues in terms of 10 the reliability of the information that he's receiving? 11 That would be part of that analysis? 12 A: I think that would have been further 13 down the line. I'd be saying what -- what's the 14 situation that you have now, what have you got? 15 Q: Okay. And then you would do a sort 16 of pros and cons analysis that you did with Jim Gordon; 17 correct? 18 A: Hopefully. 19 Q: Yeah. What if we do send the team 20 down there? What could happen, correct? 21 A: Yeah. 22 Q: What if we don't send the team down 23 there, what could happen? 24 A: Yeah. 25 Q: And you would assist John Carson in
2821 taking a little bit of a step back and looking at those 2 pros and cons and balancing them, correct? 3 A: The difference between my -- my 4 conversation with Jim Gordon and my conversation with 5 John Carson is we -- we've been in reverse roles. John 6 Carson would have had the information just as I had the 7 information to give Jim Gordon about Ovide Mercredi. 8 Q: Yes. 9 A: I'd be asking him all the specifics 10 of that. 11 Q: Yeah. But then the second half of 12 the conversation with Jim Gordon would unfold almost in 13 the same fashion, correct? 14 A: Possibly, yes. 15 Q: And I've kind of artificially divided 16 it into two (2) halves. 17 A: Right. 18 Q: If you remember in the Jim Gordon 19 conversation you were providing info, correct? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: And then the second part was the 22 decision making process, right? 23 A: Well I think he was providing info 24 that there was a breach. I was providing information 25 that there were other people being sent to -- that made
2831 that breach not as bad. 2 Q: Yes. 3 A: Because I knew there -- 4 Q: That's right. 5 A: -- was cooler heads -- negotiators 6 going down. 7 Q: That's right. You're right. With -- 8 in -- in the Carson scenario, had you had a John Carson 9 scenario, had you had that discussion you would have been 10 reliant to some extent on John Carson reporting to you 11 the facts as he understood them, correct? 12 A: Completely. 13 Q: And what you're telling me is that 14 you would not have had a discussion with him about issues 15 of reliability concerning the information he was 16 receiving. 17 A: No. I -- I might have. It depends 18 if there was a key part of it. 19 Q: Okay. 20 A: We're under a hypothetical -- 21 Q: Yeah. 22 A: -- other than the real. But if -- it 23 depends what he told me. 24 Q: Okay. And in any event that second 25 part where you do the pros and cons and the weighing
2841 analysis, that would unfold in a very similar fashion, 2 correct? As the Gordon conversation? 3 A: Possibly, yes. 4 Q: Now Ms. Esmonde asked you flat out, 5 do you have a problem with that decision to send the CMU 6 team down the road in the dark and you said, no, you 7 don't have concerns, correct? 8 A: That's right. That's right. 9 Q: And I already asked you the trick 10 questions about how it's difficult to criticize a 11 subordinate in an organization like the OPP. 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: What I want to take you to though, is 14 -- is what John Carson had to say when he was asked about 15 that decision -- 16 A: Okay. 17 Q: -- in his evidence. And I know 18 you've read John Carson's evidence. 19 A: Yes I have. 20 Q: Okay. 21 A: A long time ago. 22 Q: Yeah. Right at the beginning of your 23 -- of your examination perhaps? 24 A: No. I -- 25 Q: A long time ago?
2851 A: No, I believe as he was giving it. 2 Q: All right. 3 A: I was reviewing. 4 Q: Okay. Now for counsel and I've 5 provided -- I've provided My -- your counsel or your 6 brother, it's actually the reverse. Your counsel was 7 kind enough to print off an excerpt of the evidence from 8 -- it's June 28th and it's right at the end of the day. 9 And it's on these four (4) -- the copy you 10 have, sir, is four (4) pages per page and I've given you 11 from 300 -- the relevant parts are from page 305 all the 12 way to the end of 311. I've given you all that for 13 context but there really is a narrower part that I'd like 14 to read to you in terms of question and answer because I 15 think it gets really to the bottom line. 16 And that's at page 310 which is the last 17 page you have. At the bottom of that page 310. I think 18 it's the next page, sir. 19 A: Yes. 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 Q: I'm just discussing with Mr. Sandler 24 inviting him to read over my shoulder. I don't have a 25 copy for him. I'm inviting him to do that if he'd like.
2861 A: I've read a few of the previous 2 what's been provided and I would like the opportunity to 3 read it before I as -- answer the questions of 310 if you 4 don't mind. I would like to read it. 5 Q: That's why it's there. That's why 6 it's there. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Would you 8 just take a minute -- take as long as you need to read 9 it. 10 THE WITNESS: It's quite a bit, 11 Commissioner. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, do you 13 want us to take a little break. Why don't we take a 14 short break and give you a chance to read it. 15 THE WITNESS: No. I'll read it right 16 now. You're telling me that 305 is the -- 17 MR. JULIAN ROY: The very bottom -- 18 THE WITNESS: The bottom. 19 MR. JULIAN ROY: The very bottom of 305. 20 THE WITNESS: Okay. 21 MR. JULIAN ROY: And I apologize, Mr. 22 Commissioner, this could be a little less clumsy, but... 23 24 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 25 Q: The very bottom of page 305 where it
2871 starts: Mr. Ros asked you. 2 A: Okay. 3 Q: With what you know today, would you 4 have marshalled the ERT and True Teams with the 5 information that you have today about what really 6 happened on September 6th, 1995? 7 Do you see that? It starts there. 8 A: Yeah. 9 Q: And there's quite a lot of debate 10 with -- between Counsel at some point about the 11 questions. 12 A: Yeah. 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I have read it. 17 Yes, sir, I have read it, thank you. 18 19 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 20 Q: All right. And the part that I want 21 to direct you to is at the bottom of page 310, and -- and 22 there's a little heading there, it says "Continued by Mr. 23 Julian Falconer"; do you see that? 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: Line 15?
2881 A: Yes, sir. 2 Q: And the question is, "Deputy Carson, 3 with that correction," and the correction is -- is a 4 correction of the Commission Counsel Mr. Millar. 5 A: Yeah. 6 Q: In his usual meticulous fashion has 7 corrected one of the assumptions in the questions. 8 A: Okay. 9 Q: "Deputy Carson, with that correction 10 I appreciate thirty (30) to forty (40) 11 police officers marching on these 12 people with shields, riot regalia, plus 13 six (6) to eight (8) snipers, that's a 14 very serious decision to make, isn't 15 it? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. You'd want to know ten (10) years 18 later that you could be confident that 19 you would do it again, right? 20 A. Sure. 21 Q. But based on the evidence you've 22 just given us, you aren't confident, 23 are you? 24 A. I don't know if I would or not." 25 Do you see that?
2891 A: Yes, sir. 2 Q: It's a little bit -- the questions 3 are a little bit familiar to the ones that -- that you've 4 been asked. 5 A: Yes, sir. 6 Q: And I'm wondering, now that you hear 7 what John Carson has to say about looking at his decision 8 in hindsight, can you tell me: Does it give you some 9 concern that had you not been -- had you been accessed as 10 a resource that night with that particular decision, that 11 maybe we wouldn't all be here today? 12 A: Would that, that it was so? I -- I 13 would like that that we weren't here today because of the 14 death, but I think, in fairness as you say, to the 15 Command and -- and my -- and my position of trying to 16 support a Commander if I can -- 17 Q: Yes. 18 A: -- the issue was not -- was John 19 Carson sending that CMU down to get in a fight, or was he 20 sending down that CMU because he needed to have 21 information as to what was going on down there and he 22 couldn't send regular police officers, because of the 23 fight the night -- when they had been -- when the 24 vehicles -- suddenly rocks came from everywhere, the 25 threat of violence, which would have -- which
2901 necessitated that he would had to have mobilized the two 2 in support of that. 3 I like to believe that John was sending 4 that CMU down because he needed to know what was going on 5 about the cottages because we did not, we, the Ontario 6 Provincial Police, did not have containment. 7 Q: Okay. 8 A: So I believe that was the catalyst 9 that sent them down. I understand the -- the bit about 10 people out with axe handles, et cetera. But what you 11 have is John really didn't know what was going on in his 12 incident. And he was choosing to send a resource down to 13 find out, with tragic results. 14 Q: Now, we're -- we're going to get to 15 that issue. I don't think we're going to get to it 16 today, we're going to get to that issue about the problem 17 of information and not understanding what's going on on 18 the other side of the table. 19 We're going to get to that and what you 20 might assist this Commission with on measures that could 21 be used to be better at getting that kine of information 22 so we're not sending thirty (30) to forty (40) people in 23 riot gear on a reconnaissance mission. 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: We're going to get there.
2911 A: Okay. 2 Q: And I'm going to return to this issue 3 as well -- 4 A: Certainly. 5 Q: -- what we've just gone to, but what 6 I -- what I want to ask, and we're getting close to the 7 end of the day, Mr. Commissioner? 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We are. 9 MR. JULIAN ROY: And this is a very good 10 time to break with one (1) two (2) more questions. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: All right. 12 13 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 14 Q: There was evidence in your evidence- 15 in-chief to a suggestion from Tony Parkin to John Carson 16 that he call Tony Parkin every two (2) hours with an 17 update; do you remember that? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Do you know if that admonition was 20 still operative on the evening of September 6th? 21 A: I think Tony issued those or -- or 22 suggested that might be the course of action, I think, as 23 of about nine o'clock in the morning of the 6th or eight 24 o'clock of the morning of the 6th, but after the meeting 25 that we would have had, then we were now brought up with
2921 the information up until, we'll say four o'clock. I 2 don't know if Tony had asked John to continue calling him 3 or -- I don't -- I don't know. 4 Q: Okay. 5 A: I don't have Tony's notes to say 6 whether or not he was called or not. 7 Q: Okay. That's fair. I have more 8 questions, Mr. Commissioner, but -- 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I understand 10 you do, but -- 11 MR. JULIAN ROY: It's a convenient -- 12 it's a convenient time to stop. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You've 14 almost gone an hour, not quite, but this would be a good 15 time to break? 16 MR. JULIAN ROY: Yes. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 18 We'll break now. 19 MR. JULIAN ROY: Well, almost an hour. I 20 think I have... 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, you 22 haven't gone an hour yet, you've gone about three- 23 quarters of an hour but, I mean, if this is a good time 24 to break -- 25 MR. JULIAN ROY: It is.
2931 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- it's 4:30 2 and we'll stop now and reconvene tomorrow morning at nine 3 o'clock. 4 MR. JULIAN ROY: Thank you, Mr. 5 Commissioner. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 7 very much. 8 9 (WITNESS RETIRES) 10 11 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 12 adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, August 18th at 9:00 13 a.m. 14 15 --- Upon adjourning at 4:27 p.m. 16 17 Certified Correct, 18 19 20 21 _________________ 22 Carol Geehan 23 24 25