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1 2 3 IPPERWASH PUBLIC INQUIRY 4 5 6 7 ******************** 8 9 10 BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE SIDNEY LINDEN, 11 COMMISSIONER 12 13 14 15 16 Held at: Forest Community Centre 17 Kimball Hall 18 Forest, Ontario 19 20 21 ******************** 22 23 24 August 16th, 2005 25

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1 Appearances 2 Derry Millar ) Commission Counsel 3 Susan Vella ) (np) 4 Donald Worme, Q. C ) 5 Katherine Hensel ) 6 Megan Ferrier ) (np) 7 Murray Klippenstein ) (np) The Estate of Dudley 8 Vilko Zbogar ) George and George 9 Andrew Orkin ) (np) Family Group 10 Basil Alexander ) 11 12 Peter Rosenthal ) (np) Aazhoodena and George 13 Jackie Esmonde ) Family Group 14 15 Anthony Ross ) (np) Residents of 16 Cameron Neil ) (np) Aazhoodena (Army Camp) 17 Kevin Scullion ) 18 William Henderson ) (np) Kettle Point & Stony 19 Jonathon George ) Point First Nation 20 Colleen Johnson ) (np) 21 22 Kim Twohig ) Government of Ontario 23 Walter Myrka ) (np) 24 Susan Freeborn ) (np) 25 Michelle Pong ) (np)

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1 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 Janet Clermont ) Municipality of 3 David Nash ) (np) Lambton Shores 4 5 Peter Downard ) The Honourable Michael 6 Bill Hourigan ) (np) Harris 7 Jennifer McAleer ) 8 9 Ian Smith ) (np) Robert Runciman 10 Alice Mrozek ) 11 Harvey Stosberg ) (np) Charles Harnick 12 Jacqueline Horvat ) (np) 13 Douglas Sulman, Q.C. ) (np) Marcel Beaubien 14 Dave Jacklin ) (np) 15 Trevor Hinnegan ) 16 17 Mark Sandler ) Ontario Provincial 18 Andrea Tuck-Jackson ) Ontario Provincial Police 19 Leslie Kaufman ) (np) 20 Ian Roland ) Ontario Provincial 21 Karen Jones ) (np) Police Association & 22 Debra Newell ) (np) K. Deane 23 Ian McGilp ) (np) 24 Annie Leeks ) (np) 25 Jennifer Gleitman ) (np)

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1 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 Julian Falconer ) (np) Aboriginal Legal 3 Brian Eyolfson ) (np) Services of Toronto 4 Kimberly Murray ) 5 Julian Roy ) 6 Clem Nabigon ) (np) 7 Adriel Weaver ) (np) Student-at-Law 8 9 Al J.C. O'Marra ) Office of the Chief 10 Robert Ash, Q.C. ) (np) Coroner 11 12 William Horton ) (np) Chiefs of Ontario 13 Matthew Horner ) 14 Kathleen Lickers ) (np) 15 16 Mark Fredrick ) Christopher Hodgson 17 Craig Mills ) (np) 18 Megan Mackey ) (np) 19 Erin Tully ) (np) 20 21 David Roebuck ) (np) Debbie Hutton 22 Anna Perschy ) 23 Melissa Panjer ) 24 Danya Cohen-Nehemia ) (np) 25

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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 PAGE NO. 3 List of Exhibits 6 4 5 CHRISTOPHER JAMES ASH COLES, Resumed 6 7 Continued Examination-In-Chief by Mr. Donald Worme 9 8 Cross-Examination by Mr. Mark Fredrick 196 9 Cross-Examination by Mr. Ian Roland 226 10 Cross-Examination by Ms. Kim Twohig 239 11 Cross-Examination by Ms. Jennifer McAleer 250 12 Cross-Examination by Ms. Alice Mrozek 260 13 14 15 16 17 Certificate of Transcript 263 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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1 EXHIBITS 2 No. Description Page 3 P-564 Document number 3000769 MSGCS Issue 4 Note September 05/'95 Re: First Nations 5 occupation- Ipperwash Provincial Park. 44 6 P-565 Document number 2005116 Chief 7 Superintendent C.J. Coles handwritten 8 notes . September 05- October 12/95. 54 9 P-566 Document number 1009053 OPP News release 10 September 10/95 Update of situation, 11 Chris Coles statement of appreciation 12 for First Nations leader's cooperation. 157 13 P-567 Document number 2004488 OPP News 14 release, September 10/95, Update Re: 15 Meeting between First Nations leaders 16 and OPP continue. September 10/95. 159 17 P-568 Document number 2005399 C. J. Coles 18 handwritten notes September 11- 19 October 18/95. 164 20 P-569 Document number 1001269 Toronto Star 21 article "OPP Force ordered to 'confront' 22 Indians. Police admit big buildup before 23 September 06 Ipperwash shooting death." 24 March 31/96. 174 25

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1 LIST OF EXHIBITS (cont'd) 2 Exhibit No. Description Page No. 3 P-570 Document number 1001063 April 01/96, 4 Articles: 1) London Free Press" Top 5 OPP officer recants story" Article 6 about Coles previous statement found 7 in Toronto Star article of April 01/96. 8 2) Press advisory re: George Family 9 sues Premier, Ministers, OPP & 10 Federal Crown. 175 11 P-571: Document number 2002441 OPP letter to 12 Superintendent re: "Summary of incidents 13 Canadian Forces Base, Ipperwash , West 14 Ipperwash Beach" June 28/95 195 15 16 P-572: Document number 2000310 July 04/95, OPP 17 Management Committee- Minutes. 195 18 19 P-573: Document number 2005397 Chief 20 Superintendent C.J. Coles handwritten 21 journal entries. January 25 & November 22 16/94. 195 23 24 25

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1 LIST OF EXHIBITS (cont'd) 2 Exhibit No. Description Page No. 3 P-574: Document number 3000768 September 4 01/95 Email from Nancy Mansell to 5 Thomas O'Grady Re: "Ipperwash" 6 at 13:53. 196 7 8 P-575: CD Rom recording of conversation 9 between Chief Superintendent C. J. 10 Coles & Inspector J. Gordon. September 11 06 & 07/95. 196 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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1 --- Upon convening at 9:00 a.m. 2 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 4 now in session, the Honourable Mr. Justice Linden 5 presiding. Please be seated. 6 MR. DONALD WORME: Good morning, 7 Commissioner. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good morning 9 everybody. 10 MR. DONALD WORME: Good morning, Mr. 11 Coles. 12 THE WITNESS: Good morning. 13 14 CHRISTOPHER JAMES ASH COLES, Resumed; 15 16 CONTINUED EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR. DONALD WORME. 17 Q: Mr. Coles, we left off yesterday in 18 your examination on the -- looking at September 4th and 19 5th, 1995. And I believe that you had confirmed that you 20 had first learned that the Park had been occupied at 21 approximately 8:00 p.m. on the 4th of September, that is 22 to say, that's when you learned of it? 23 A: That's correct. 24 Q: In fact, you had been advised that 25 the natives had occupied the Park and that there had been

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1 some damage to some cruisers although no on was hurt -- 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: -- I think was the gist of the -- of 4 the evidence. 5 A: That's what my notes say, yes. 6 Q: And, part of that information came to 7 you through then-Inspector Carson who was incident 8 commander and he had briefed you on the situation and 9 advised of the experience at the gate and the fact, 10 again, of the damage and that there was some damage as 11 well to the maintenance shed within the Park boundaries? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: All right. I just wanted to spend, 14 perhaps, a moment in talking to you about the notes that 15 you have created and I'm wondering if you might tell us, 16 first of all, the practise of your note taking and 17 maintaining of your daily journal and, particularly, of 18 the period from September 4th until the 8th? 19 A: I will, but if I can go back a little 20 further I think it would help explain my note taking? 21 Q: Yes, certainly, please do. 22 A: Up to the rank of inspector and, in 23 my case I -- I remained operational, because I was an 24 inspector in the Criminal Investigation Branch, I would 25 take notes in the same fashion as most police officers

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1 take notes in -- in a notebook expecting that I would -- 2 might be utilized in Court in some way, shape, or form to 3 give -- give evidence. 4 As I went into the, we'll call it the more 5 administrative form of the policing when I was in the 6 Planning Branch, et cetera, the substance of my notes 7 really was a daily diary. You know, for thirty-one (31) 8 years I've always kept a daily diary. 9 It was when I -- when I joined the 10 organization you kept two (2); you kept your notebook and 11 you kept a daily diary and I -- I always continued that. 12 And so at the end of the day, I would make notes in a -- 13 in a diary, basically to give me brief recollection of 14 what had gone on, not expecting in the administrative 15 area that I would be sitting in this forum that I am 16 today, but that's exactly what I did. 17 Now, in relation to September the 4th on, 18 once it became apparent to me that there was a need for 19 my presence at what I chose to be the Grand Bend, not 20 wanting to put myself in the position of taking away the 21 authority from the incident commander, I moved my -- my 22 process to -- to Grand Bend to be close, but at arm's 23 length, if you will. 24 I then became involved in the incident in 25 the fact that I was dealing with people and I thought I

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1 might have to re-deal with those people, so I then 2 started a notebook specific to that occasion. 3 So, my -- if you ask me what I did, I 4 would go back to my -- my diary; that's a significant 5 area in my opinion that I would just make note that there 6 was a meeting of. The specifics of it, no I -- as you 7 can tell, there's not -- there's not a great detail. 8 Q: And -- and, that's the question I was 9 going to ask you. In terms of those details, had you, 10 prior to this event, prior to the 4th of September, 11 maintained your notebooks in a fashion that would have 12 detailed the specifics of your activities during the 13 course of a -- of a shift, perhaps? 14 A: No, sir, for the most part if I 15 attended a meeting, somebody else took the notes or 16 somebody was assigned to the -- if there was a need for 17 note taking. It will fast come -- become evident to this 18 Inquiry that when you look at my handwriting skills, 19 there's a reason for that, and I will apologize now 20 because I'm sure I'll apologize later on, but I do 21 apologize for my handwriting. 22 Q: And, I -- and I'm certain there's no 23 need to do that. As a matter of fact, we were able to 24 look at your notes and they're quite -- they're quite 25 decipherable, I should say.

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1 A: I don't know that I'll agree with you 2 necessarily on this. 3 Q: All right. And, that's -- and that's 4 fair enough. 5 Sir, before the -- before the shooting on 6 the 6th, on the evening of the 6th of September, did you 7 make any operational decisions? 8 A: Not that I would classify as 9 operational. Did I give orders? Did I give orders? No. 10 I was part of a participative venture, if 11 you will. There were discussions with John Carson, the 12 Incident Commander, Tony Parkin, et cetera, and if some 13 of those things became as you say, when I -- as I said 14 yesterday, I said a chronology and it appeared, then I 15 guess I was involved to a certain degree, but not really 16 in an operational mode. 17 The incident commander is charged with 18 that. I delegate my authority to him or her as the 19 incident commander to the event. But, I was also taught 20 that I can delegate my authority but not the 21 responsibility that goes along with that authority, so, I 22 take responsibility. 23 Q: Certainly the buck stops with you. 24 A: Yes, it did. 25 Q: The decision making you're saying on

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1 the ground operationally was done by the incident 2 commander according to the delegated authority. 3 A: Correct. 4 Q: All right. Your job then was to -- 5 to do what? 6 A: My job was to oversee from a -- from 7 a administrative and operational sense that the incident 8 commander had the resources available to him if he 9 needed. 10 I also know from my experience of incident 11 command that various pressures will be placed on that 12 incident commander, that in situations such as this, it 13 is prudent for somebody to act as interference, if you 14 will. 15 And I chose that role of interference. 16 And I don't mean that -- that in a negative sense but 17 there's lots of pressures. People will tend to call the 18 incident commander and I would just of soon had them call 19 myself or Tony Parkin to help that situation to try to 20 keep the conduit clear for the incident commander. 21 Q: And the information that you would 22 pass along as you are, to use your words, running 23 interference; where would you get that information? 24 A: From -- from various sources. As it 25 came up to me, basically, interference for -- to -- to

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1 get or to assist the incident commander to get the 2 resources required. Or if, in fact, in some cases the 3 organization itself, the Ontario Provincial Police is a 4 big organization and sometimes I ran interference between 5 my own organization to make sure that the lines of 6 command were clear and that they would come through to 7 me. 8 Q: And do you have any incidences or 9 examples of that that you might relay to us now? 10 And -- and I'm talking specifically about 11 where you might have had to ensure within the 12 organization proper lines of authority and chains of 13 command. 14 A: An organization such as the Ontario 15 Provincial Police being as diverse and as large as it is, 16 basically chooses at some times to set up their own 17 incident rooms at general headquarters which you can 18 focus activities, that there can be a focussed activity 19 for events such as this or Akwesasne or some of the 20 truckers demonstrations. 21 Sometimes there is a problem with that and 22 that is that you've sent up -- you set up a, if you will, 23 another parallel incident room and you seize these people 24 with a task of getting information. 25 Well in Ipperwash the place that they --

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1 the -- the fastest way to get information would be to 2 call the incident commander of that scene; that -- he in 3 this case had too many other things to handle. So the 4 issue was come to me. 5 You asked for an example. When they first 6 set up the incident room at JHQ Orillia, I found people 7 were contacting the incident command room to ask for 8 information. And I -- I stepped in to basically say, if 9 you want to call somebody from JHQ, call me. Because I'm 10 -- I'm your representative on the ground, you call me. 11 So that would be the example. 12 I have other experience in that area and 13 they're done for the right reasons but sometimes roles 14 get mixed up. 15 Q: And during that time you had 16 testified that there was a reorganization. In fact a 17 major reorganization that had been ongoing. 18 Did that reorganization as well add to 19 your need to have to run that interference both 20 externally as well as internally? 21 A: Not -- not per se, no, sir. I would 22 no, sir. Not -- I can't think of where it really 23 changed. I mentioned before that there were 24 personalities that were still in place that didn't have 25 as defined positions as they once had, but that was just

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1 personalities. 2 A superintendent who had identified that 3 he was -- be retiring in six (6) weeks, his position was 4 not to be replaced, it was to be removed. 5 There was not a problem within the 6 organization. I knew that a position was going to be 7 assigned to me, but that superintendent who was just 8 waiting to be retired was -- almost felt like he was 9 being put out to pasture six (6) weeks too early, if you 10 will. So, those kinds of things, if that answers your 11 question. 12 Q: I think it might. Sir, was -- is 13 there anything further that you can comment on in terms 14 of your involvement or information you might have 15 received on the 4th of September '95 before you went off 16 duty? 17 A: No, basically, that what intelligence 18 and our information had said might happen, did happen; 19 that I now had in my mind that the people who chose to 20 take those actions had chosen, in this particular case, 21 to use violence; that's -- that was a concern. 22 There's always the anticipated thought 23 that there might be violence, but you don't know for 24 sure. Many times people do not resort to violence, but 25 they had chosen some violence. I was -- I was relieved

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1 at the end of the 4th that we lost some metal, we lost 2 some cars, but nobody was hurt. 3 Q: I'm sorry, you lost...? 4 A: We lost some cars, some metal got 5 banged up and glass -- glass got smashed out of cruisers, 6 but nobody was hurt. 7 Q: Okay. All right. One (1) of the 8 operational plan goals, obviously, before negotiation was 9 containment, as I understand? 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: And, that was consistent again with 12 the overall philosophy that we started out your 13 examination-in-chief in -- in looking at? 14 A: Yes, sir. 15 Q: Did it bother you at all that 16 containment had, in fact, been lost; that is, that the -- 17 the Park was essentially evacuated by your officers? 18 A: No, sir. The person made the 19 decision, there had been a plan in place, events changed 20 some direction short-term, more people than officers were 21 there, and the decision was made to leave. It did not 22 concern me and I -- I understand some of the things and I 23 read some of the transcripts of this -- of this 24 Commission, but it did not concern me. 25 I think they made the right decision to

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1 move. No one was hurt on either side, and there was a 2 plan in place to go and seek an injunction. 3 And, as far as I was concerned, that was 4 the path that I wanted in any event because of the 5 ambiguities that surround some of these issues. 6 Q: And, just following that, the second 7 part of the plan, of course, aside from containment was 8 negotiation. Had you been advised up to that point as to 9 any attempts to negotiate? 10 A: I can't -- I can't recall. 11 Q: Fair enough. You -- you came back on 12 duty at 8:30 the next a.m., that is on the 5th of 13 September/95? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: And, I'd refer you just in that 16 respect to confirm that at Tab 62 of your handwritten 17 notes. 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: It simply says that you were on 20 office duty at 8:30 that day? 21 A: That's correct. 22 Q: Re: Western Region, that's the region 23 that you're in charge of? 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: And, preparation for Ipperwash and

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1 that continued throughout until 16:30 at 4:30 that 2 afternoon? 3 A: Yes, sir, I think previously we 4 discussed yesterday the fact that I was also involved in 5 the reviewing of the plan at that time in John Carson's 6 notes that he referred. 7 If I can, I'd like to clarify one (1) 8 issue if I can right now before we go? 9 Q: Yes, please. 10 A: I said yesterday that I attended at 11 the Ipperwash area on September the 5th. I was -- that 12 was incorrect, it's -- it's -- when I looked, it's 13 September the 6th that I attended. 14 Q: And, I was going to bring you to 15 that, sir. 16 A: I -- I apologize. 17 Q: Thank you for pointing that out. At 18 Tab 28, sir, there is a press release from the Ontario 19 Provincial Police; it is Inquiry Document 1009040. It's 20 a press release dated September the 5th of 1995, and it's 21 stamped at 2:00 a.m. 22 And, I gather when you came on duty later 23 that day on the 5th of September, that this may have been 24 brought to your attention. 25 Can you confirm that?

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1 A: As -- as part of the plan, there was 2 a -- a media contact, media person identified. The media 3 in this case, usually we try to keep people advised of 4 what's gone on and to me, it's obviously that John Carson 5 had a media -- a press release prepared and that's what 6 went out. 7 Q: You had testified earlier that you 8 were at least informed in -- in some fashion that there 9 were allegations of a burial ground within the Park 10 boundaries. 11 A: Yes, sir. 12 Q: And did it -- you note that there is 13 nothing within this press release that might refer to 14 that? 15 A: That's correct, sir. 16 Q: And did you have any comment about 17 that either within the force or to the media personnel or 18 to anybody? 19 A: No, sir. 20 Q: All right. You just mentioned again 21 that you had met that day with Superintendent Parkin to 22 discuss the situation at Ipperwash that was to, I think, 23 to -- to monitor and to your lend your ongoing support, I 24 think as you had earlier mentioned. 25 A: Yes, sir.

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1 Q: And you reviewed the operational plan 2 with the incident commander in charge. 3 A: And -- and with his superior, Tony 4 Parkin, yes. 5 Q: Was -- 6 A: I -- I don't necessarily think that I 7 reviewed the plan that date with John Carson. I don't 8 want to lead that we'd specifically went over it item to 9 item. As far as I'm concerned, there had been a plan, I 10 knew there was a plan in place, Tony Parkin had been part 11 of that plan. 12 He was my right hand man. We -- we 13 interacted. We were in a very small office. We would 14 take about these things from an operational sense. 15 Q: Okay. 16 A: And so that's -- that would have been 17 my involvement. 18 Q: Well let's turn to -- to his 19 handwritten notes at Tab 71. And these have been marked 20 as an exhibit; they are four nine nine (499). And if I 21 can refer you to pages 21 -- 21 and 22. I think they 're 22 stamped at the bottom zero zero three six one seven eight 23 (0036178). 24 A: Yes, sir. 25

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1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: Okay. The first notation that says 4 Inspector Carson. And I take it that that is Officer 5 Parkin's reference to a discussion with Inspector Carson? 6 A: I believe that to be true, yes. 7 Q: 10:10, you see that next notation, 8 then it says, "every two (2) hours"? 9 A: Yes, sir. 10 Q: Can you comment on that? 11 A: I think what Tony Parkin did was 12 basically says, Every two (2) hours, John, give us an 13 update. I recall that Superintendent Parkin is an 14 excellent operational officer. 15 He realizes also that if we're not 16 careful, we would fall into the trap of being this 17 executive incident room that kept asking the local people 18 what they -- what was going on, et cetera. And all he 19 did was set the press and to say, John, why don't we -- 20 you call me every two (2) hours when you can. 21 Because he knew that John would have had 22 the incident and he was just setting his own parameters. 23 I think that's what that two (2) hours refers to. 24 Q: All right. So, rather than reaching 25 out from the executive command centre, you wanted

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1 information fed in. 2 A: Well -- at every two (2) hours. Just 3 when he could give every two (2) -- about every two (2) 4 hours. I think that's what I read into that. 5 Q: And that's certainly something you 6 agreed with then -- 7 A: Oh, yes. 8 Q: -- and I take it agree with now. 9 A: Oh yes, sir. I'm sure if John -- I 10 mean that wasn't saying just call in two (2) hours. It 11 was if you have a need to call us, John, you call us 12 right away. That wouldn't have been a problem. 13 But, all else -- everything going as well 14 as you want as the incident, just give us a call -- an 15 update every two (2) hours if that's convenient to you. 16 Q: And I don't mean to go through every 17 of his notations with you, but there are a couple that 18 I'd like you to look at and comment on if you could. 19 The -- the next notation would seem to 20 indicate that at that point in time, Officer Parkin did 21 not have a copy of the operational plan and, I suspect, 22 neither did you. 23 Is that -- is that consistent with your 24 recall? 25 A: As I read those notes, I know that

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1 Superintendent Parkin was involved. It may have been 2 that there was revised -- a revised plan or he didn't 3 have -- he just wanted the -- the updated copy, I guess. 4 I shouldn't say 'updated', but, yes, it -- 5 it -- he says he's -- he wants a copy of the plan, so 6 maybe he didn't have one. 7 Q: All right. You see the comment just 8 a couple of points down where it says, "no demands"? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: And can you comment on that? 11 A: If I can, I think it's Superintendent 12 Parkin's analysis of the situation. When you have a 13 contained situation such as -- as Inspector Carson had at 14 that time, you're basically expect that on, and I'll use 15 the word on the other side, on the other side of the 16 fence, if you will, what are they asking for; are there 17 any demands? 18 Q: And I take it up to that point his 19 notations would suggest there were no demands made? 20 A: Up to that point, no, not 21 specifically to this incident. 22 Q: All right. The very next note -- 23 notation, 19:30 hours... 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 Q: "Went in, confronted OPP. Told to

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1 leave, that they were trespassing." 2 A: That's correct. 3 Q: Do you know who had made the decision 4 to stay and to find -- or end up in this situation of 5 confrontation, or how that came about? 6 A: The premise of the plan, in my 7 opinion, of project maple, was in fact that the Ministry 8 of Natural Resources were taking the position that they 9 owned that land, legally owned that land, and we had 10 asked them for -- to provide us evidence of that. 11 And, so at the time we were taking the 12 position that, yes, the Ministry of Natural Resources did 13 have legal ownership of that land. 14 If -- now -- people come in who are not 15 invited and are asked to leave, that's a trespass. And 16 it was a decision that if they chose to do that, that 17 they -- that the occupiers or the people who did that 18 would be told that they were trespassing. 19 It was almost something that should be 20 done to kind of set the -- the legal precedent. So, I 21 suggest that was what was in the minds of the planners of 22 the plan to say that we must tell these people, otherwise 23 we're just -- they're being given free access to the 24 Park. 25 But, the MNR were not doing that, and so

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1 the police were called when they went in, much the same 2 as any trespass situation and told them that they were 3 trespassers and to leave. 4 Q: Okay. As I understand it, and you'll 5 correct me if I'm wrong, though, the police were in the 6 Park when these individuals entered. 7 Is that -- is that -- 8 A: The police -- 9 Q: -- consistent with you, of what you 10 understand? 11 A: The -- well -- the police were in the 12 Park in an undercover capacity, not -- you don't now just 13 suddenly say, I'm a police officer. I mean, they were 14 there strictly for information gathering and the fact 15 that we -- we -- we thought we might have a problem and 16 we needed a presence in that Park. 17 The people that confronted were, in fact, 18 in uniform. 19 Q: All right. And if we just go on, it 20 would seem to suggest that MNR was doing certain things 21 to attempt to effect their legal claims. 22 Is that -- is that fair? 23 A: Yeah, I believe that, that the Park 24 was now closed. It wasn't open to the public. 25 Q: And MNR pursuing an injunction, that

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1 is along the same lines as you've just testified. 2 The very next comment, "fed back to Grand 3 Bend"; what is that about, sir? 4 Had you established the executive centre 5 in Grand Bend at that point? 6 A: No, sir. 7 Q: And I know you can't necessarily get 8 into Officer Parkin's mind, but do you know what that is 9 in relation to? Was there some reason for information to 10 be fed back to Grand Bend at that point? 11 A: No, sir. 12 MR. MARK SANDLER: It just might be of 13 some assistance to both My Friend and Commissioner Coles, 14 these notes are actually captured. These are capturing 15 the telephone conversation between Tony Parkin and John 16 Carson, which has been marked as an exhibit and so, for 17 example, actually specifically talked about what the feed 18 from Grand Bend is all about. 19 So -- so, rather than speculate, it might 20 be of some assistance if the -- if the -- if the logger 21 tape is put before Commissioner Coles. 22 MR. DONALD WORME: All right. 23 MR. MARK SANDLER: If that makes sense. 24 MR. DONALD WORME: All right. It seems 25 to me that, sir, if it is already an exhibit and that

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1 information is before and we can certainly ask 2 Superintendent Parkin about that and perhaps I'll simply 3 drop that line at this moment, then. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 5 MR. DONALD WORME: Thank you, Mr. 6 Sandler. 7 8 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 9 Q: If we go down a couple of -- well, 10 again, let's just -- let's just go to the next notation. 11 There's some update with respect to the current status, 12 that there are checkpoints that are indicated there? 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: And, the very next comment, we don't 15 have containment and I think that's what -- the question 16 that I'd asked you about earlier. 17 A: The -- as an incident commander, you 18 -- you usually address containment -- it -- it's one (1) 19 of the buzz words that you know that -- that you put your 20 mind to. You don't want your situation to become mobile, 21 you -- you want -- you want to have a set of facts that 22 you -- that you have contained. 23 And I think what Tony Parkin is basically 24 there -- he's just saying, do we have containment and 25 he's been advised that we don't have complete containment

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1 because of the geography of the Park; I think, is one (1) 2 of the reasons why they didn't have it, but it was not 3 contained. 4 I mean, containment works two (2) ways; 5 it's not just to, quote, "keep people in," it's to keep 6 the situation from becoming volatile on -- on other 7 situations to traffic, et cetera. 8 Q: And, to that extent, the latter that 9 is, you had suggested earlier that John Carson had some 10 kind of containment; is that what you're referring to? 11 A: He -- basically they had set up 12 roadblocks in -- in certain areas after the event, but 13 containment, the fact that you could positively say who 14 was coming and going, et cetera, no because of the 15 geography of the Park. 16 Q: And, that is the reference that 17 Superintendent Parkin is -- is making there; is that your 18 assessment of that? 19 A: I believe so, yes. 20 Q: Thank you. It then goes on to 21 itemize a number of what would appear to be operational 22 matters; is that fair? 23 A: Yes, sir. 24 Q: It talks about, for example, Marine 25 being put in and I think we've had some testimony and

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1 confirmation that there was a Police Marine Unit out on 2 the water? 3 A: Okay, sir. 4 Q: Six plus three (6 + 3) Dist ERT? 5 A: That's sis plus three (6 + 3) 6 District ERT teams. 7 Q: All right. 8 A: Each district used to have an ERT 9 team, and so at this time, although the district -- they 10 were still identified as the old district teams, ERT 11 teams. 12 Q: And, operationally, all your -- all 13 that is being recorded here is an inventory of the 14 resources available to the incident commander? 15 A: That's correct. 16 Q: All right. There's a notation that 17 says, "Confirmed taping of private lines." It's right at 18 the -- right at the bottom of that page on the right-hand 19 side. 20 And can you comment on that? 21 A: No, sir, I -- I don't know what that 22 refers to. 23 Q: And, the note just to the right side 24 of that? 25 "XXXXXX, MNR, spoke media Peter

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1 Sturdy." 2 A: Again, I can't -- I have no 3 knowledge. 4 Q: Sorry, I -- I notice that that was 5 redacted and I apologize. I just looked up at the screen 6 and that is -- that name has been redacted, and I'd ask 7 that the transcript similarly indicate that, please? 8 Okay. If we just continue on at 11:45, 9 which is the next page of that copy, sir, it now says, 10 "Carson". And I take it that this is a briefing that 11 Superintendent Parkin is receiving from Inspector Carson? 12 A: I'm assuming that -- that John Carson 13 took it upon himself to phone Superintendent Parkin back 14 to update him on some events. 15 Q: All right. And, the third entry on 16 that, Inter-Ministry meeting at 11:00 hours re. support 17 for injunction. 18 Can you tell us anything about that, sir? 19 A: I don't have direct evidence of what 20 that's about. 21 Q: Thank you. And just two (2) other 22 matters. The two (2) entries following that, limestone 23 out of Grand Bend? 24 A: I think the limestone refers to a 25 smaller boat that the Ontario Provincial Police utilizes.

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1 And the next item is the HH Graham and that's the name of 2 one of the larger boats that the Ontario Provincial 3 Police has. It says thirty-four (34) foot. 4 Basically, the larger boats can stay out 5 on the water if -- if required. 6 Q: Okay. And again, entries about 7 evidence that -- pardon me, entries of items that you've 8 already testified to that there were no weapons used up 9 to that point. 10 Although there was some reference to a 11 rifle in a trunk: 12 "Tried to take it out but was told not 13 to." 14 Do you see that? 15 A: Yes, I do. I believe that, you know, 16 it's significant. 17 Q: And last -- yes. And lastly just on 18 that line, sir, I'm sorry to -- interrupt you. 19 "Attempting to start negotiations." 20 Can you tell us what attempts were taken 21 and what -- what the results of those attempts were? 22 A: I -- I have an idea but I'd rather go 23 back to this tape. I -- I can't -- for sure I can't tell 24 you, sir. 25 Q: Fair enough, thank you. Just two (2)

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1 other items, sir. Pardon me, three (3) other items just 2 with respect to this matter. At the next entry at 3 14:35 -- 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 Q: -- the second entry on that. Pardon 8 me, the third line entry: 9 ˘Out and said burial ground.÷ 10 Pardon me, it probably continues from the 11 earlier line. 12 "No one went to the military camp. 13 Bert Manning came out and said burial 14 ground." 15 A: Yes, sir. Mark, I believe that to be 16 Mark -- Mark Wright. Brad Seltzer who as I mentioned I 17 have some knowledge that they were to be utilized -- 18 Q: I can -- I can tell you -- forgive me 19 for interrupting. I can tell you that those names have 20 also been redacted as -- as indicated on the screen and 21 not necessarily in our notes. 22 A: Yes I -- I apologize. I guess I 23 should be reading from the screen, I apologize. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Turn it on. 25

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1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 MR. MARK SANDLER: All right. I think 4 those were earlier redactions that -- that were done 5 because of the consents that were given and so on. 6 There's no problem with revealing the names of those 7 people. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I wouldn't 9 have thought so. 10 MR. MARK SANDLER: No. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Those names 12 are out in other transcripts. 13 MR. MARK SANDLER: And they are remnants. 14 This is some remnants of earlier redactions. It's not a 15 problem I can indicate. 16 MR. DONALD WORME: And I thank Mr. 17 Sandler for that. 18 19 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 20 Q: I'm sorry, sir, go -- go ahead. 21 A: I do know that Mark and Brad Seltzer 22 -- well Brad Seltzer for sure was to be used in a 23 negotiating role and basically was trying to establish 24 some kind of contact, so he was identified in the plan as 25 -- that there would be negotiators and Brad Seltzer was

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1 one of those people. 2 It indicates to me that they went to the 3 Park. That no one came out at the Park so then they went 4 to the military camp. 5 And a Mr. Bert Manning, who I understand 6 was a -- a sometimes spokesman for the people at the 7 Military Base, came out and obviously advised somebody of 8 the burial ground position. 9 Q: Okay. Now that isn't the first time 10 that you had heard of a burial ground position as you put 11 it? 12 A: Well I think I testified before that 13 I have a recollection of the burial ground being 14 addressed but at that time my thought was -- was where -- 15 I did not know where the burial ground was, like 16 geographically if it was exactly at -- in the Military 17 Base or the Provincial Park at this time in -- in the -- 18 in the situation. 19 Q: All right. But by this point at 20 least and perhaps even on the day earlier, there had been 21 some assertions which came to your knowledge of a burial 22 ground within the Park boundaries. 23 A: That -- it's -- it's now in my mind 24 that -- that it is part of the issue that the First 25 Nations occupiers are bringing to our attention.

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1 Q: And just reading on in those notes, 2 sir, aside from making this comment, the comment: 3 "Wanted OPP roadblocks taken, we 4 declined." 5 A: I think those notes indicated that 6 Mr. Manning wanted the road blocks taken down and that we 7 had declined to do so. 8 Q: And do you know why that -- that that 9 request or whatever it was, was declined at that time? 10 A: Because we had a situation that, as 11 far as we were concerned, we wanted to keep the situation 12 contained until such time as an injunction was -- was 13 sought. 14 Q: All right. And did you find that 15 that particular position of declining whatever this was, 16 whether it was a request was at odds with the stated goal 17 of negotiations? 18 A: Well, I think the stated goal is 19 negotiations and you see evidence of where we are trying 20 to negotiate. At the same time, the plan is in place and 21 the other part of the plan is basically that we needed to 22 contain the situation if it arose, and that's what we 23 did. 24 So there's two (2) part of the plans, the 25 negotiation part of the plan that is ongoing, as well as

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1 the containment of the situation. 2 Q: And that's, I think, something that I 3 might have asked you about yesterday, is whether or not 4 those two (2) goals might have run at odds with one 5 another. 6 Did it seem to you that that might be the 7 case or was the case? 8 A: Well, I think in many cases they run 9 hand in hand. Once you have containment you -- as 10 basically Parkin has indicated, you're now saying, what 11 are the demands. 12 So basically I think -- I think they run 13 hand in hand, sir. 14 Q: Okay. Just lastly, with respect to 15 those notes, sir, at the bottom of the -- at the bottom 16 of that entry of -- at 14:35 there's comments regarding: 17 "Elgin Austin, access to light armoured 18 vehicle from GM. Not comfortable with 19 getting involved." 20 A: Correct. Elgin Austin is -- 21 Q: Pardon me. 22 A: Elgin Austin was, at that time, was 23 the deputy Chief of the London City Police. 24 Q: Okay. 25 A: We became aware that the London City

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1 Police had a memorandum of understanding with, at that 2 time, General Motors division, who produced and 3 manufactured the armoured personnel carriers. 4 They had one for -- to utilize that 5 vehicle if needed. Not aggressively, it was not to be 6 used in any kind of aggressive, but if it was used to 7 save lives or compassionate reasons, it could be used. 8 When dealing with this situation, it had 9 come up to our attention is what kind of vehicles did we 10 have. If we needed an armoured personnel vehicle, where 11 could we get them? 12 I know that there was, either prior to 13 this or shortly thereafter, an attempt to seek them from 14 the military. 15 And this was a back up position if we -- 16 if we can't get from the military or if we can get them 17 from General Motors under the same memorandum of 18 understanding, which -- which was fine to me. 19 I'd like to go on record here a little bit 20 to say that I was adamant. It's not for me to tell John 21 Carson how to run the business, but it is to -- to tell 22 John Carson my thoughts when it comes to armoured 23 personnel carriers, which I had had some experience with 24 in the Akwesasne situation. 25 I was adamant that if an armoured

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1 personnel carrier was going to be used in any way, shape 2 or form by the Ontario Provincial Police, it would have 3 an Ontario Provincial Police sign on it. 4 I didn't care if it came from the 5 military, I would paint it and we would repaint it 6 whatever they wished, but it was an Ontario Provincial 7 Police resource vehicle. It was not a tank. 8 It was to be used in the occasion that we 9 needed a vehicle to extract somebody and in light of what 10 subsequently happened, it -- that situation could have 11 happened and we needed that -- John Carson wanted to know 12 that he had that vehicle. 13 So, they were pursuing that avenue, but I 14 can assure you that I was adamant, and John knew that I 15 was adamant, that it -- this was -- I was making sure 16 that I did not want to be seen to be assisted by the 17 military. 18 I was keeping that separation and that was 19 a separation that was very clear in my mind and I know 20 that I conveyed that to John Carson and Tony. They knew 21 my position. 22 So, that's a long answer, sir, and I 23 apologize. It is important to me that I say it. 24 Q: It isn't. And, it's an important 25 answer, I think as well, sir, and I believe consistent

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1 with what you had commented with respect to the use of 2 the RCMP helicopter; is that -- is that correct? 3 A: Our own -- our own helicopter was -- 4 was down. It was short on hours and I wanted to make it 5 clear that I was not calling for the RCMP. I was not 6 trying to escalate, I was trying to de-escalate. But we 7 were still trying to put the right resources at the hands 8 for John Carson. 9 Q: And, perhaps this is a question 10 better put to Superintendent Parkin, but do you know why 11 Superintendent Parkin would indicate, if I'm reading this 12 right, that Elgin Austin was not comfortable with getting 13 involved? 14 A: I think he's saying that GM is not 15 comfortable. I think it's GM, and -- and that's where -- 16 and later on we talked about the memorandum of 17 understanding and how it would have been we -- we were 18 willing to enter into the exactly the same agreement that 19 London City had. 20 Q: Thank you, sir, that -- that helps 21 me. 22 If I can refer you, then, to Tab Number 23 29, that is an e-mail from Tony Parkin to Nancy Mansell, 24 Phil Duffield, Ron Fox, dated September 5th of '95, at 25 12:03 p.m. we're now into the afternoon of the 5th of

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1 September? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: And, it essentially provides 4 information on the occupation of the Park, that there has 5 been a notice of trespass service. Then there's a 6 characterization there of the occupiers having consumed, 7 and I quote, "quite a bit of alcohol," and that was 8 somehow stalling the negotiations and -- and so on. 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 A: That is not -- that's not my e-mail, 13 but I believe that Tony Parkin is relaying information 14 that he was given. 15 Q: Okay. Was that information that you 16 had? And, I'm speaking just about the -- the comment 17 about, "quite a bit -- quite a bit of alcohol?" 18 A: It's just information that 19 Superintendent Parkin is -- is relaying; best asked of 20 Superintendent Parkin. Yeah. 21 Q: Certainly. Thank you for that. As a 22 result of the meeting on September the 5th in London, you 23 had testified earlier that oftentimes when information 24 became of such import that a message would be sent up the 25 ladder as it were?

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1 A: Yes, sir. 2 Q: Was there, in this instance, an issue 3 sheet provided to the Commissioner's office? 4 A: Somebody would have to provide me 5 with the issues sheets. I don't have them. 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE) 8 9 Q: I wonder if -- 10 A: I -- I can't tell you that. I have 11 every reason to believe that there was an issue sheet -- 12 Q: All right. 13 A: -- shortly thereafter as far as -- as 14 the entry into the Ministry of Natural Resources. It 15 would be a reason why you would send an issue sheet. 16 Q: Okay. If I can refer you to Tab 17 Number 30. 18 Pardon me, just before we -- just before 19 we move on, I would ask that the previous document be 20 marked as an exhibit, that is Inquiry Document 1001101, 21 the e-mail? 22 THE REGISTRAR: Is that already an 23 exhibit; P-429? 24 MR. DONALD WORME: Oh. Pardon me, it is 25 already an exhibit, that's at P-429? Thank you, Mr.

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1 Registrar. 2 3 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 4 Q: If I can refer you, then, to Tab 5 Number 30, Mr. Coles? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: It is an issue note from the Sol. 8 Gen. Office; it bears the date September the 5th of '95, 9 time 4:39 p.m. It's up on the screen now. 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: And, it simply provides some of the 12 information that you have, that we just went through, 13 correct? 14 A: It appears so. 15 16 (BRIEF PAUSE) 17 18 Q: Perhaps, I can have that marked as -- 19 as the next exhibit, please? 20 THE REGISTRAR: P-564, Your Honour. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 22 23 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-564: Document number 3000769 MSGCS 24 Issue Note September 05/'95 25 Re: First Nations occupation-

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1 Ipperwash Provincial Park. 2 3 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 4 Q: And, sir, your notes don't indicate 5 whether or not you had occasion to -- to speak to, 6 directly, the incident commander, Inspector Carson. 7 Can you tell us from your recollection 8 whether or not you did speak to him on that date? 9 A: I can't tell you, but I'm sure his 10 notes would indicate if you talked to me. 11 Q: And certainly at Tab 27, which are 12 the scribe notes of September the 5th, '95, they are an 13 Exhibit, 426. 14 At pages 40 and 41, at 16:45 hours, that 15 is 4:45 in the after -- p.m., Inspector Carson updated 16 yourself that Marcel Beaubien had contacted the Premier. 17 A: That's at 16:40 hours on the 5th. Is 18 that -- as I read that document to be, I -- I see some 19 handwritten... 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 Q: Okay. That would appear to be a 24 summary at the end of -- at the end of the shift or at 25 the end of a shift.

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1 A: I don't know what it is. 2 Q: All right. 3 A: If it's scribe notes or if it's -- I 4 don't know, sir. 5 Q: Yeah. I'm told that they are, in 6 fact, scribe notes; and you can't confirm that? 7 A: If it assists, I mean, I can see the 8 page number 40 and I see 41, so it's obviously a 9 continuing document of some kind. I believe that, yes. 10 Q: All right. 11 A: I don't know, I'm just -- my best 12 answer. 13 Q: And just at the -- at the bottom of 14 that, which is up on the screen right now, Inspector 15 Carson updated Chief Coles that Marcel Beaubien has 16 contacted the Premier and there's to be a press release 17 and that sort of thing. 18 You had indicated earlier that you were 19 aware that Marcel Beaubien was contacting the Premier. 20 Do you know where you had learned of this? 21 A: Not for sure. I know I had some 22 telephone -- I -- some -- I had quite a few telephone 23 conversations with Marcel Beaubien at different times; it 24 -- especially post. 25 So this I wouldn't, but I know that there

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1 was a possibility that I talked to him before. 2 Q: All right. And similarly I think you 3 testified that you had spoke to a number of individuals, 4 or at least some individuals from MNR -- 5 A: Yes, sir. 6 Q: -- from the Ministry of Natural 7 Resources on September 4th and 5th? 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 Q: I believe you had testified, and I 10 stand to be corrected, that the object of this discussion 11 was to review their intentions, their activities insofar 12 as obtaining an injunction? 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: All right. And beyond that, you -- 15 you cannot tell us about any particulars of those 16 conversations? 17 A: No, sir. 18 Q: Okay. In terms of the helicopter 19 that was requested, that request came from Inspector 20 Carson to yourself, did it? 21 A: Yes, sir. Not necessarily from 22 Inspector Carson directly to myself. As an incident 23 commander, Inspector Carson, would contact the field 24 coordination branch, and that is the branch that 25 coordinates the activities of the helicopters.

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1 So, he would have made that request then. 2 If there was a problem they might get back to me as to 3 why they couldn't get one. 4 Q: All right. And that in fact was the 5 case, was it not? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: That you -- 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: -- were contacted; that the OPP 10 helicopter, as you've just mentioned earlier, was 11 inactive? 12 A: Yes, sir. I'm not sure why but I'm 13 sure there -- there is an explanation. 14 Q: And you then took certain steps to -- 15 to obtain that resource. 16 A: That basically the incident commander 17 said he would like a helicopter. They -- they obtained 18 one and then basically it -- the people obtained a 19 helicopter -- the gracious efforts of the RCMP. 20 And then I basically declined because in 21 my opinion of optics and then they had to go back to the 22 MNR because they had a helicopter. So they chose to go 23 that way. 24 Q: All right. We've had some previous 25 testimony, sir, in these proceedings that spoke to a -- a

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1 technology known as FLIR, Forward Looking Infrared Radar. 2 A: Yes, sir. 3 Q: And you're familiar with that? 4 A: Yes, sir. 5 Q: And the OPP helicopter, the one that 6 was inactive for whatever reason, do you know whether or 7 not it had that particular technology? 8 A: I think at the time we had that 9 technology, yes. 10 Q: The resource helicopter that you 11 secured, did that have that technology? 12 A: I -- I don't know. I suspect not but 13 I don't know. 14 Q: Did you make any specific request as 15 part of your attempts to obtain this resource to ensure 16 that that type of technology was available? 17 A: No, that would have been the incident 18 commander that would have made it. I mean, he would -- 19 he would have made operational decisions based if it was 20 the only helicopter available then, in fact, then you 21 would probably have to put more observers in it or 22 observers with -- with binoculars, et cetera. 23 Q: Okay. And again, just to -- just to 24 recap. The reason that you declined the RCMP's offer was 25 that you did not want there to be an appearance or the

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1 optics of -- of some -- what, connection? 2 A: To me it was a local issue. It was 3 an issue where basically the -- a group of people had 4 chosen to take a course of action. We had then responded 5 to that course of action. 6 We were now in the situation of having the 7 landowner seek an injunction. And we were in the process 8 of executing a plan that we had previously prepared. 9 In that plan, outside resources were to 10 have been considered if -- if it needed. But in my 11 opinion, at this time, it was a local issue. And that to 12 now bring the RCMP as assisting the OPP into this 13 situation, to me brought a focus to the event that I 14 didn't -- I didn't think was helpful at this particular 15 time. 16 With all due respect to the people who 17 offered those, there is a spirit of co-operation between 18 police services but I thought at this time that it wasn't 19 needed. 20 I -- I didn't need that extra police and I 21 -- I was giving John my counsel and they -- they went 22 with it. 23 Q: Do you know whether or not the -- the 24 helicopter offered by the RCMP had the forward-looking 25 infrared radar technology?

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1 A: I believe there's a technology called 2 Wescam and I -- I don't know, is my answer to that. 3 There was a Wescam facility which was a -- which was a 4 suspended camera type system. 5 Q: And that suspended type camera 6 system, the Wescam, was that ever part of a request 7 either from the incident commander or from yourself as 8 you were seeking to use a helicopter? 9 A: I think later on it might have been. 10 But at this time I'm not sure that it was. No, I don't 11 know, sir. 12 Q: And just lastly on that point, did 13 Inspector Carson, as Incident Commander, make any 14 specific request for that kind of technology where he 15 could make observations from -- well, from the air? 16 A: Well not specifically to me. As I'm 17 showing you right now, I'm not really that conversant on 18 the intricacies of that technology. But I'm sure that if 19 John had that decision, John Carson, it would have been 20 with field co-ordination branch who would have known 21 about what capabilities and who had them. 22 Q: Okay. Thank you. I take it that the 23 decision to obtain and use a helicopter as you've 24 indicated would be up to the incident commander? 25 A: Yes.

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1 Q: And whatever use that helicopter was 2 put to similarly would be within his discretion? 3 A: Yes, sir. 4 Q: All right. Your job again would 5 simply be to run interference and, I think, to use your 6 words and to monitor the -- the operation? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: Would it be within your authority, 9 sir, that if you seen something, aside from offering your 10 counsel to Inspector Carson as you've indicated, to 11 actually step in if you'd seen something that didn't meet 12 with -- with what you wanted and there was some 13 resistance? 14 A: Yes, sir. As I mentioned previously, 15 I can delegate the authority, but not necessarily the 16 responsibilities. So if I'm also seized with the 17 responsibility and I thought an action was being taken 18 that I did not agree with, that I would intercede, but 19 I'd like to think that I would intercede in a 20 participative section, not one that, You won't do this. 21 It was, basically, you won't -- I don't think we should 22 do this because of these -- this logic. 23 Q: Okay. And just before we leave 24 September the 5th, we are told here of an incident that 25 involved Officers Whitehead and Dyke; you're -- you're

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1 familiar with that? 2 Evidently, these were two (2) officers 3 that were posing as members of the press? 4 A: I wasn't aware of that at this time 5 in any way; that came very late in -- as a result of 6 legal, et cetera. Many years later did I become aware of 7 that. 8 Q: Were you already retired when you 9 became aware of this? 10 A: Oh -- oh, for sure, sir, I was 11 retired. 12 Q: All right. And just on that note, 13 sir, as intelligence operatives, which I take it they 14 were? 15 A: Yes, sir. 16 Q: Are there any guidelines or 17 prescriptions or directives, policy, protocol, whatever 18 may be that might limit how an undercover operator might 19 -- might do their -- their jobs? 20 A: In my experience, the OPP at that 21 time, I have nothing in my mind other than the fact that 22 the reputation of the Ontario Provincial Police should 23 always be considered in any kind of activities that any 24 of your operatives undertake and whether or not orders 25 have been changed that -- post that, I don't know.

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1 Q: So a general guideline to preserve 2 the reputation? 3 A: Yes, sir. 4 Q: All right. Is there anything else of 5 -- of note that you might comment on with respect to 6 September the 5th and the events within your knowledge of 7 that date? 8 A: Specifically of September the 5th? I 9 see I leave at 16:30, so that's a regular leaving time 10 for me at that particular time and so nothing remarkable, 11 no sir. 12 Q: I'll take you, then, to Tab Number 13 62, again, which is your handwritten notes of September 14 5th and 6th? 15 A: Yes, sir? 16 Q: Perhaps for the record, I should 17 indicate that they commence on Tuesday, September the 18 5th, 1995, and they carry on right through to the 12th of 19 October, 1995 and -- and I'd ask that that be marked as 20 an exhibit right at the outset, please? 21 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P-565, Your 22 Honour. 23 24 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-565: Document number 2005116 Chief 25 Superintendent C.J. Coles

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1 handwritten notes . September 2 05- October 12/95. 3 4 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 5 Q: And your notes would indicate that 6 yourself and Superintendent Parkin attend at Grand Bend? 7 A: That's correct. 8 Q: And there is a further review of the 9 contingency plans? 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: You'd mentioned yesterday, sir, that 12 at some point in time, although you couldn't recall the 13 date, you had been provided a tour of the area? 14 A: Yes, sir. 15 Q: Was this the first time that you were 16 in the area or had you been there previous? 17 A: No, sir, I was provided -- I think my 18 recollection was, sometime during the occupation of the 19 Military Base. 20 Q: Pardon me, that's correct, yes. 21 Thank you for that. 22 But on the 6th, nonetheless, you attended 23 at the area and what did you do? 24 A: Our intention was to go up and, for 25 the use of a better word, I think Parkin used it, was to

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1 "show the flag," to show the participants in this 2 incident that we were involved, that we were concerned 3 and that we were participants in the exercise and that 4 John Carson was the incident commander and we were there 5 in support of John. 6 We went up there to have a conversation 7 with the incident commander, to basically go over the 8 previous day's events and, if you will, a strategy 9 planning session, if you will. 10 Q: And this meeting occurred where? 11 A: At the trailer at Forest Detachment 12 as I recall. 13 Q: And that was the OPP command post? 14 A: Yes, sir. 15 Q: All right. Did you become aware, 16 sir, that there was also a tactical operations centre? 17 A: I think we subsequently were advised 18 that that's what he had chosen to do. 19 Q: Okay. And you know the location of 20 that, being on East Parkway Drive at the MNR -- 21 A: Subsequently I became aware, but 22 anything I've read in Tony Parkin's notes that you 23 referred to me earlier, there's no mention really of TOC 24 that I can see. 25 So, I think it's basically -- that's

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1 something you would not get -- we would not get involved. 2 That's the incident commander's call as to where he is 3 putting his resources or her resources at that time. 4 Q: And not so much whether you made any 5 decisions with respect to where to place that, but simply 6 were you aware of the tactical operations centre? 7 A: I knew that there was a TOC as they 8 call it, yes. 9 Q: Did you have occasion to attend at 10 the TOC? 11 A: I think in the review, when we went 12 down the Army Camp Road, et cetera, to kind of 13 familiarize myself, at the time, I think it was on -- it 14 was in place at that time and it was a St. John ambul -- 15 it was a St. John's Ambulance support vehicle that I -- I 16 saw and should have paid more attention to. 17 Q: And as we reviewed your -- your 18 curriculum vitae yesterday morning, you have considerable 19 knowledge of St. John's Ambulance, being an active 20 volunteer and, indeed, a board member. 21 A: Well, a board member is not an active 22 volunteer. The real -- 23 Q: Okay. 24 A: -- people who do the work; I'm not 25 one of those. I was a person in a suit who sat around a

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1 board room, but I was aware of St. John's activities. 2 But I was not aware that John had utilised this resource; 3 that he went and asked for this vehicle. 4 So, I wasn't aware until I went up there 5 and I do recall that there was one there. I -- I know 6 what the vehicle is. I could go further, but I think you 7 have other questions. 8 Q: It was -- it was, in fact, a fixed 9 wheel type trailer that was used as the operations 10 centre? 11 A: It was a converted hostess potato 12 chip van that was given to the St. John London 13 organization and which they repainted and put some 14 communications. 15 It's a vehicle that they use as a incident 16 command vehicle when they go to support various 17 functions. 18 Q: Certainly, when we -- when we had 19 Peter Harding -- you know who Peter Harding is? 20 A: I know Peter Harding very well, yes, 21 sir. 22 Q: Peter Harding was here to testify and 23 he told us about those -- about that particular vehicle. 24 A: Exactly. 25 Q: And indeed, confirmed for us that

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1 there was another vehicle present, namely a St. John bus 2 of some nature or -- 3 A: Yes, sir. 4 Q: -- or a vehicle that was used to 5 service the -- the trailer. 6 Q: Yes, sir. 7 Q: You were aware of that as well? 8 A: A tow vehicle, if you will, for that 9 trailer. Yes, sir. 10 Q: Do you recall seeing that vehicle 11 there; that is the service vehicle, for lack of a better 12 word, at this moment? 13 A: No, I don't know if it was there then 14 or not. I don't know. 15 Q: Okay. Did you have a -- did you have 16 a view then or subsequently as to the propriety of 17 employing St. John's Ambulance vehicles? 18 A: I regret that we used it, but I take 19 the responsibility that, perhaps, it was not appropriate. 20 I was concerned about the optics of the RCMP helicopter, 21 some -- a short time before -- 22 Q: I was just going to come to that, 23 thank you. 24 A: -- and yet, having in -- being a 25 member of John, of St. John, I saw it as a support

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1 vehicle, probably in my mind. But, as the events turned 2 out, and as people took exception that that vehicle was 3 part of the OPP, I regret the use of it. 4 I mean, perhaps I should have paid more -- 5 paid more attention to putting an OPP sign on that 6 vehicle. I missed it. I should have picked it up. I 7 don't blame John Carson. If there's any blame it should 8 come to me, given my background with St. John's. 9 And it's since been rectified. I know 10 within the St. John's community, that if we're going to 11 assist, we have to make sure that we assist in such a way 12 that people do not confuse a mandate of St. John, which 13 is honourable and good. 14 Q: All right. 15 A: As was the Opp -- 16 Q: Right. Was -- sorry. 17 A: As is the OPP's. I'm sorry. 18 Q: Not at all, sir. With respect to 19 your meeting, then, with Inspector Carson at the command 20 post at Forest, did that occur before your attendance in 21 the area, as you put it, to familiarize yourself? 22 A: Yes, I think it did, given the 23 geography. We went there first and that's where -- we 24 went there specifically to see John Carson. 25 Q: And again, the purpose of that

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1 meeting was simply to ensure that the soundness of the 2 tactical operation, is that fair, or to monitor that? 3 A: Just a general working of the plan 4 and discussion of the plan and participative of people 5 involved in it, yes. 6 Q: And as we know from Inspector 7 Carson's testimony that this was a private meeting as 8 between the three (3) of you. 9 A: Yes, sir. 10 Q: The scribe was asked to leave -- 11 A: Yes, sir. 12 Q: -- the -- the operations centre, or 13 the command post, rather? 14 A: Yes, sir. 15 Q: I wonder if you'd just take a moment 16 to describe that and the reasoning behind that? 17 A: I understand that concerns had been 18 raised by this group about that. It -- it does not 19 offend me. This situation, and I refer you to, what is 20 the situation that we have right now? 21 We basically have a plan in pros -- in 22 place. We are seeking an injunction and we have officers 23 on the ground. 24 I now want to talk to the incident 25 commander, as did Superintendent Parkin, to see if he has

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1 any problems that he wants to convey. 2 Some of those problems, many times in 3 incidents, are personnel problems; not enough personnel, 4 somebody did something wrong and he's just kind of 5 enlightening me and for me to assist. You wouldn't make 6 that part of the -- the record. It was just a 7 conversation. 8 Q: Okay. Were any decisions made during 9 this, that in your mind as you think about it now, should 10 have been entered within the scribe notes? 11 A: I cannot give you the details. It's 12 too long as to what we spoke about. I wish I could, I 13 guess, I have a better recall but I don't have a recall 14 of -- of what specifically was said, other than I -- that 15 I do have a recall that it was an overall, tell us what 16 you've got, John, what's going on here with the 17 situation. 18 Q: Okay. And if the suggestion is 19 brought to you that, perhaps, the reason for removing the 20 scribe was so that you could get on with other 21 clandestine objectives, perhaps passing along information 22 from, I don't know, Government sources -- 23 A: That didn't -- 24 Q: What would your response be? 25 A: I didn't have any -- I did not -- do

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1 not have any recollection, specifically, but I do know 2 that I wasn't passing on any information from Government, 3 as you say. 4 Q: Or from anybody? 5 A: No. No, sir. 6 Q: All right. 7 A: Anything that was being passed on was 8 being passed on from my mind. 9 Q: All right. And there was certainly 10 some discussion about the obtaining of an injunction 11 during that -- during that meeting; that is an 12 injunction to be obtained by the Ministry of Natural 13 Resources, does that -- 14 A: As I've said, I don't have recall of 15 it, but I'm sure that it was discussed -- 16 Q: Okay. 17 A: -- given what we've talked about 18 previously of what I had been doing and what results John 19 would have been asking me of, yes. 20 Q: All right. And I take it you would 21 similarly have no recall of who, from the police 22 perspective, might best provide information for the 23 obtaining of that injunction? 24 A: Not specific to that meeting, no, 25 sir. I do recall a -- I do recall a conversation, but I

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1 don't know who with. I don't know if it was between Tony 2 and I, or I don't know, as to why we would have the 3 incident commander go and give the information. 4 Was there somebody else the incident 5 commander seized with the incident, and I do recall that. 6 I think at a later date, but I -- I don't say specific to 7 this -- maybe it was specific to this or a later meeting, 8 but shortly thereafter. 9 Q: Yeah. Could you just elaborate on 10 that point? Why would you have the incident commander -- 11 A: Well, the person who has been seized 12 with the -- with this incident, was John Carson. He was 13 the knowledgeable person. He had the background. He'd 14 done the -- he was instrumental in the planning, had made 15 some decisions, basically, and now we're taking him out 16 of the loop to go and give evidence at the injunction. 17 If he was the very best person to give it, 18 then I would have no problem with that, but if other 19 persons could do it, wouldn't that -- I would suggest 20 that would be a better person to send, to allow John to 21 stay. 22 Q: All right. Was there a decision made 23 as to who to send other than the incident commander, if 24 you recall? 25 A: Subsequently, but not by me. It

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1 wasn't made by me. 2 Q: Thank you for that. Your arrival at 3 the command post to meet with Inspector Carson together 4 with Superintendent Parkin that occurred, we are told, at 5 around 11:50 or ten to 12:00 in the afternoon? 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: It was anticipated that this might -- 8 well anticipated perhaps by some that this might be a 9 relatively short meeting and it was not; correct? 10 A: I think it's definitely on John 11 Carson's point of view. I think basically in the end he 12 was almost asking us to leave. Good for him. 13 Q: All right. 14 A: He had business to conduct. 15 Q: During the course of that meeting, 16 did you or did Mr. Carson, Inspector Carson at the time, 17 did he receive any phone calls from anybody? 18 A: My answer to that now is yes. I, at 19 a previous examination, I know I said no. I had no 20 recollection of telephone calls but I now, because of the 21 record and what's been provided, I know there was 22 telephone calls, yes. 23 Q: And do you have a record of that 24 telephone call within your own notes, sir? 25 A: No, sir. I -- no, sir.

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1 MR. DONALD WORME: Commissioner, I know 2 it's a little early for our morning break, but I -- what 3 I want to do now is to get into that recording and -- and 4 my preference would be is to start it at -- that is start 5 the recording at the moment when or just prior to the 6 discussion between Ron Fox and Mr. Coles. And it's going 7 to take us a bit of time just to set that up. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Are you 9 suggesting we have our break now? 10 MR. DONALD WORME: Please. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Okay. 12 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 13 for fifteen (15) minutes. 14 15 --- Upon recessing at 10:12 a.m. 16 --- Upon resuming at 10:32 a.m. 17 18 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 19 resumed. Please be seated. 20 MR. DONALD WORME: Thank you, 21 Commissioner. 22 Commissioner, we've put in front of you 23 Exhibit P-44A which is a transcript of the calls that 24 we're going to be referring to and in particular we will 25 find the call that we are going to be playing at this

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1 moment at Tab 37. 2 There is also a transcript before the 3 Witness of the same. And what I would suggest that we 4 will do at this moment then, sir, is simply to play that 5 tape in its entirety. 6 And then I'm going to ask Ms. Hensel, my 7 abled second here, to go back to that point and then 8 we'll replay it and I would stop at various points and 9 make inquiries of the Witness. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 11 12 (AUDIOTAPE PLAYED) 13 14 MR. DONALD WORME: I'm sorry, 15 Commissioner, we had this working just a moment ago and 16 it seems to be -- 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Blame Derry. 18 MR. DONALD WORME: I'm sure it was Mr. 19 Millar. 20 21 (AUDIOTAPE PLAYED) 22 23 MR. DONALD WORME: I just asked that that 24 be stopped just for the moment and I simply wanted to 25 advise that this is a conversation between John Carson

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1 and Ron Fox that just ended and he was saying -- that is, 2 Mr. Carson was saying, as I hope everyone will recall, 3 that the Chief is present and, of course, that is the 4 Witness on the stand. 5 6 (AUDIOTAPE PLAYED) 7 8 MR. DONALD WORME: Page 269, sorry. 9 10 (AUDIOTAPE PLAYED) 11 12 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 13 Q: You have the transcript in front of 14 you, being Exhibit 444(a) at Tab 37, Mr. Coles? 15 A: I do. 16 Q: And it commences at page 2 -- your 17 conversation commences at page 269 of that exhibit? 18 A: That's correct. 19 Q: You've been following it along as the 20 tape was playing? 21 A: Yes, sir. 22 Q: And I take it that you have no 23 disagreement with the transcript in relation to what you 24 heard? 25 A: No, I don't, I have an apology to the

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1 group here. I apologize for my language, you shouldn't 2 have to listen to that, I apologize. 3 Q: I think we also understand, sir, 4 that this was, if I can put it this way, perhaps, a 5 fairly stressful time? 6 A: Not really stressful, it was -- it 7 was operational talk, but you shouldn't have to listen to 8 that. 9 Q: I understand and thank you. 10 During that conversation, just generally 11 first of all, you are providing Inspector Fox with 12 certain advice and I wonder if you might just -- rather 13 than going back to the actual wording, which we certainly 14 can, if you can, perhaps, in general terms, what you 15 meant by some of those comments, that the concern that 16 you expressed? 17 A: I had listened to a conversation 18 where John was talking to John Carson -- I had listened 19 to the conversation, but I -- it was earshot. It was in 20 a small trailer as I recall, the -- the command post and 21 I now, as I say, in the initial part, I become concerned. 22 I'm concerned that I'm hearing that we're 23 talking to people in Queen's Park. That's all I know at 24 that time, I don't -- I did not receive information and 25 to me I'm hearing that we're talking about operational

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1 matters, we're talking about firearms and I get -- I'm 2 concerned. 3 You don't want that happening and as I go 4 on, I give Ron my reasons why. No doubt in my mind that 5 I want it to be run from that incident room and was 6 advice from myself or Tony Parkin. 7 And it was obviously going wider spread 8 and there was information there that -- that I did not 9 think would have assisted us at all. So I was cautioning 10 Ron that, Ron, you're pretty close here. And the danger 11 is is that if Ron -- and Ron is a very considerate 12 individual, just be careful. And I think he was. 13 Q: And in fact you say right out, sir, 14 that -- and I'll draw your attention to your first 15 comment right after saying, Hi Ron. You indicate, I've 16 got a concern that we want to be careful what we're doing 17 here that we don't give them, the people that you're 18 talking to and that is you just referred to them as 19 Queen's Park? 20 A: That I know at this time. I -- I 21 really don't know who he was talking to. And I am not 22 privy to that part of the conversation. I was just 23 listening when -- when John was talking. 24 Q: But you were aware that it was 25 government officials at Queen's Park?

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1 A: I knew that -- that Ron Fox would be 2 talking to government people. He was a liaison person 3 for First Nations issues. 4 Q: That we don't give them the 5 information too fast. I wonder if you just might speak 6 to just that point? 7 A: You've talked many times about 8 intelligence and about the analysis of that intelligence. 9 I know that is something that you are concerned with. 10 And it's very similar that if you're not 11 careful Ron would be given information and that 12 information could have been given to people and they 13 would act upon that. 14 And there would be, now, different 15 ministries involved, talking about operational matters 16 that had come from one of our -- my operational centres 17 and I was warning Ron, I don't want that to happen Ron. 18 Q: The operational matters that you were 19 talking about and specifically, if we can use the example 20 of the gunfire that was reported, the "automatic gunfire" 21 I think is -- we'll come to in a moment; is that what 22 you're referring to, sir? 23 A: That and just the general warning 24 about the questions that I anticipated Ron might have 25 been asked. Because he was the fastest source of

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1 information. And Ron would have to walk a delicate line. 2 Q: And you go on in terms of outlining 3 your concern. You indicate and I quote: 4 "The problem with that, Ron, is that if 5 you're not careful, you're going to run 6 the issue there. So we've got to be 7 careful." 8 That's -- 9 A: That's right. 10 Q: Okay. 11 A: And I was telling him that wasn't 12 going to happen. 13 Q: Okay. And when you say, "We don't 14 give them the information too fast." You've referred to 15 earlier the intelligence -- well comments that I had -- 16 or a line of questioning that I'd taken you on earlier. 17 A: Well the -- the fact of the matter is 18 is that if you give somebody information and will use the 19 automatic gunfire, people talk about automatic weaponry 20 as opposed to somebody either shooting a rifle up in the 21 air rapidly or hunting deer in that area. 22 Whose -- who makes the decision what that 23 is? And I think that that -- the decision whether or not 24 those -- that automatic gunfire was either established or 25 not, was in the purview of that incident commander, John

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1 Carson. 2 Q: The fact that there was gunfire, 3 would you agree that that was -- could be characterized 4 as raw data as part of the intelligence gathering? 5 A: It -- it was information. Not 6 necessarily raw data. It was just information that we 7 had and that we had to consider. I felt that it was only 8 right that it was a mandate of the police to consider 9 that, not some government think tank. 10 I didn't need them at that time to be 11 thinking. I wanted to make sure that we were acting 12 accordingly. 13 Q: Okay. Your indication to him in the 14 -- in the very next line, you have -- you had no 15 objections to him phoning John. And you go on: 16 ˘But the only trouble, if not, you're 17 going to be the fastest information 18 they've got.÷ 19 Now -- 20 A: I apologize for my -- 21 Q: "Now with them we're going to end up 22 in it. We're going to end up running 23 it politically." 24 A: Yeah. If I can break that down. I'd 25 like to --

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1 Q: Please. 2 A: When I say: 3 ˘I have -- I have no objection to you 4 phoning John." 5 If we can go back into my history. When I 6 took over for the Division then -- Ron Fox was then an 7 acting inspector in -- in the Burlington area. 8 They -- my first interaction with Ron was 9 that he was an acting inspector and we had some dealings. 10 I came to fast appreciate his abilities. 11 I sat on the strategic planning committee 12 for the Ontario Provincial Police for some -- some years, 13 and Ron was also on that planning committee as -- as a 14 younger officer. 15 And I characterize him as an astute 16 individual, a -- sound operationally. Based on my 17 conversation with Ron, if I talked about Ron, I'm not 18 going to say to Ron, Ron I don't want you phoning John 19 Carson. 20 I'm going to say I have no problem with 21 you Ron. I've just warned him and so it's in his mind as 22 to how he would conduct himself. But with -- with Ron 23 Fox, I had no problem. 24 I'm saying I had great faith in Ron Fox 25 from an operational standpoint. That's -- I hope that's

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1 your point -- point. 2 Q: Was it your preference, then, do I 3 take from that your preference would have been that 4 Inspector Fox contacted you directly as you were trying 5 to, I think you mentioned earlier, run interference -- 6 A: Well -- 7 Q: -- even internally? 8 A: Yes and no. But I saw Ron as part of 9 -- it might have been profitable, I guess, in hindsight 10 to say, Ron, I think you should call me directly on this. 11 But I chose not to do that and, as I tried 12 to tell you, it's because I had faith in Ron. 13 The issue was what Ron portrayed to any 14 group. And that was what the substance of this telephone 15 conversation was for me telling him to be careful. 16 When he asked me, basically, well, how do 17 I get around it? You can hear me kind of hesitate 18 saying, well, you know, I mean basically in my mind is, 19 I'm not instructing an officer to lie. 20 What I'm doing is I'm asking him to delay. 21 I'm asking him that he has to -- he has to use his 22 discretion as to what is disclosed. 23 Q: And slow down the kind of information 24 or the -- 25 A: Exactly. I'm sat -- yes, you know --

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1 Q: Okay. 2 A: I'm satisfied with this conversation 3 and I know that other things have been made of it, but 4 I'm satisfied with this conversation, that is myself as 5 an operational police officer warning Ron as an 6 operational police officer, given his mandate as a 7 liaison, I just wanted to make sure that the information 8 was -- was kept to ourselves unless needed to be 9 explained. 10 That's what I take as the gist of this 11 telephone call. 12 Q: Okay. Was it the nature of the 13 information that was getting out there or was it simply 14 information, generally, that you didn't want getting out 15 there in the fashion that it had been? 16 In other words, to get it out there but in 17 a slower -- 18 A: Well, I think what I'm saying is, I 19 visualize, like, debate about automatic weapons at 20 ministry levels, when it was our job to handle this 21 situation. 22 Q: And was part of your concern, sir, as 23 you mentioned, the intelligence line that I had taken you 24 on yesterday that, in fact, there had been no analysis of 25 that particular piece of data?

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1 A: It's what I'm saying, be careful 2 because of the information. I'm saying be careful, Ron, 3 we don't know because of the automatic weaponry or not 4 automatic weaponry, but I guess what I'm saying is, 5 behind this -- Ron, this is not there business. 6 I say that at this time, it's not their 7 business, it's our business, okay, and I'm concerned. 8 Ron has a mandate and supported by the Ontario Provincial 9 Police that there should be a liaison function on -- on 10 First Nations issues and that's what Ron was assigned to 11 do. 12 So I respect that, but in a operational 13 matter, the issue as far as I'm concerned, the operation 14 to keep control of it stays at the local area. 15 Q: And similarly with respect to the 16 reports of the weapons issue, you had advised Mr. Fox, 17 Inspector Fox, that in speak -- in your speaking with 18 Detective Sergeant Wright you had told him to downplay 19 the weapons issue? 20 A: That's correct, and it's because, and 21 I -- I go on to explain about it in Akwesasne. If you're 22 not careful, and you have to be very careful with raw 23 information, raw data, as you call it, that just because 24 I say there's automatic weapons and now somebody repeats 25 that I said there was automatic weapons, and if you're

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1 not careful everybody's talking about automatic weapons 2 and you don't want that to happen. 3 You want to try to keep the information 4 sources as clean as you can. That's one of the incident 5 commander's responsibility, one of the intelligence 6 person -- person assigned to the intelligence, that's 7 also his or her responsibility in the operational plan. 8 Q: To make sure that this kind of 9 information is confirmed? 10 A: Not necessarily confirmed. You 11 can't always confirm intelligence information, but to 12 make sure that it is as -- as factual as you can keep it. 13 People talk about an AK-47. I would 14 suggest most people when they think of an AK-47, most 15 people who don't know firearms don't have a clue. Other 16 people think that they're those ones with the banana 17 clips that you -- that you see. I really -- I really 18 don't know. I've never held an AK-47, but the next thing 19 you know, people are talking about AK-47's. I see no 20 difference in an AK-47 than a single shot Cooey; they can 21 go -- they can kill a man. 22 Q: Your comments about that kind of 23 information getting out and creating a situation for 24 yourself, rather than playing that portion, I wonder if 25 you just might speak to that?

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1 A: The... 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 A: Could you repeat your request -- your 6 -- your question if you can, please? I'm sorry. 7 Q: I'm glad you -- you put the caveat, 8 if I can, I'm not sure -- I'm not sure I can. 9 A: I apologize. 10 Q: Perhaps -- perhaps, before I get back 11 to that, I just want to finish up with the line about 12 your comments about Akwesasne and your experience there, 13 how that influenced the advice that you were giving to 14 Inspector Fox here. 15 What happened in Akwesasne? 16 A: I think there's a chance I'm going to 17 take to -- to give you a little bit of my education that 18 I received at Akwesasne. I think it's appropriate and I 19 apologize if I'm long-winded. 20 At Akwesasne, as I mentioned before, you 21 had multi-jurisdictions. You had the jurisdictions of 22 the Ontario Provincial Police, the Surete, the RCMP and 23 the New York State Police plus the Mohawk Police Service 24 in themselves. 25 And we kept a -- an incident room going.

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1 Part of that incident room that we kept going was a media 2 room and we would seek the media that were reporting. It 3 became a real education to me that you would see that the 4 Albany newspapers would take a spin on something, and the 5 New York State Police would come in and say, You know we 6 -- what about this? 7 The Ottawa paper would take a position and 8 the RCMP would come and say, What about this? 9 And, the Toronto papers would -- media 10 would take some position on Akwesasne and I would find 11 myself saying, well, the media in Toronto. And what you 12 got, then, after -- and what I received from that, is 13 that it was almost the media was creating the pressure 14 that we were addressing, not necessarily responding to, 15 but that we were addressing. 16 And so, that was clear in my mind and 17 those pressures come from different places and the media 18 as they are wont to be, will ask questions of different 19 ministry officials and that will create pressure, I 20 guess, politically, but from my point of view, just media 21 pressure that had to be responded to. 22 So, that was clear and has always been 23 clear in my mind as far as the media pressure. So, when 24 I talk about pressures in here, I'm not -- it's not the 25 political pressure of a politician somehow influencing my

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1 decision, it was that the media was taking a spin on 2 something that -- that now the public was aware of and I 3 had to address. 4 Q: Okay. 5 A: I'm sorry for being long-winded. 6 Q: Not at all. I think that -- I think 7 that that is helpful. 8 The reports of gunfire, you had indicated 9 to Detective -- to Inspector Fox that you had earlier 10 advised Detective Sergeant Wright to downplay the weapons 11 issue. 12 Who was -- who was Detective Sergeant 13 Wright to downplay the issue to? 14 A: Mark Wright was the Assistant 15 Incident Commander at various times to -- to John, but 16 was really the operational -- the -- the criminal person 17 that was involved and was also reporting to -- to John. 18 As I understand it, Mark was -- his, kind of, right-hand 19 man when he was operational. 20 And information was being -- obviously had 21 been given to me that day. And what you're -- I think, 22 what I said was the same as I have said in the telephone 23 conversation; Let's play this now, let's make sure that 24 we know what we have et cetera, et cetera. Trying to de- 25 escalate; make sure that you're -- you're going on fact.

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1 Q: In terms of making sure about what 2 you have before the -- before it goes is factual, that 3 would include, again, the comments of -- I'm going to 4 continue to use this as an example, the reports of weapon 5 fire which were interpreted to be automatic weapon fire 6 the night before. 7 A: If you hear weapons fire on the Base, 8 which we did, or in the vicinity of the Base, we had two 9 (2) officers who reported that they heard gunfire, how do 10 you verify that? 11 Basic officer tells you, I hear gunfire. 12 That's information. Not necessarily intelligence 13 information, it's just information. And how do you act? 14 I think any incident commander is going to say, do I have 15 gunfire? Do I have a situation that I have to respond 16 to? Can we verify it? Anybody else hear about it? 17 But, it's some information you can't 18 confirm. Couldn't go on the Base. At that time we 19 couldn't go on. So it's a matter of you keep that in 20 your mind in the intelligence. 21 A lot of gunfire was heard. That probably 22 describes it better. A lot of gunfire was heard. 23 Whether or not it's an automatic gunfire or semi- 24 automatic, it's a bit of a red herring. 25 My concern is that it's gunfire that was

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1 heard. And that's what I'm trying to do. You talk about 2 AK-47's. That suggests that an AK-47 is just a foreign 3 military weapon. It's a weapon. 4 Q: And I think the question that I'd 5 asked you earlier was: What impact, if any, did those 6 reports of gunfire have with respect to the police 7 operations. 8 A: Just information that was in his data 9 -- in John Carson's data bank and my data bank as far as 10 how we should act in the future. If we were -- if those 11 automatic weapons that were suggested were there, whether 12 or not they were automatic or semi-automatic, if those 13 weapons had been turned on to somebody -- if they had 14 been turned on somebody, I think the further -- the 15 previous discussion that we had about armoured personnel 16 carriers, et cetera, is -- is relative. 17 If you think you have weaponry, and if you 18 think somebody might get hurt, probably to have a vehicle 19 that you could go into extricate somebody, probably would 20 be a good future plan. And that's what John Carson was 21 thinking about, I'm sure. 22 Q: Is that something that you advised 23 him on? 24 A: No. I think it was something he was 25 -- it was clear in John Carson's mind and Tony Parkin's

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1 mind and my mind that they're contingencies. And that's 2 what it is. It's contingency planning; planning for 3 possible contingencies that you may encounter. 4 Q: All right. And would it be fair to 5 say that, just given your earlier comments, that you were 6 concerned about what reactions might be taken from these 7 reports from civilians? 8 A: From whoever. It was out of my 9 control but it was -- it was basically as I understood, 10 information that may have been coming from my incident 11 room. And if it was, I was trying to caution Ron that I 12 didn't want that to happen. 13 Q: You go on to talk about the 14 injunction aspect at page 272 of the transcript. 15 A: And -- and that was basically me 16 reiterating to Ron the policies that we first talked 17 about in Tab 1, basically the method that the Ontario 18 Provincial Police would use to -- in these situations. 19 Q: If we just go up a couple of lines 20 previous on that. 21 "Well, stall them to the amount -- I 22 mean right now I know that the 23 Commissioner is resurrecting the old, 24 what has always been our approach 25 because he feels he's now going to

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1 start getting some pressure." 2 And the reply on that, two (2) lines down 3 is: 4 "Well he's already got it, Chris." 5 And I just want to -- want to ask you 6 first of all with respect to your comment that the 7 Commissioner was "resurrecting the old ways". 8 A: I don't have first-hand knowledge 9 that I spoke -- that I spoke to the Commissioner. I 10 believe I'm taking a certain amount of license there with 11 my relationship with Tom O'Grady. Tom O'Grady, 12 Commissioner Tom O'Grady, is a -- I'm sure he will 13 display that he is a very logical man. 14 He likes to do things logically and if he 15 has something in process, if we had that -- the method of 16 dealing with issues such as this, we would keep to that 17 plan. 18 And so to me, my use of the word 19 "resurrecting" is that in O'Grady's mind, in my opinion, 20 he's saying, well how do we handle situations such as 21 this? We seek injunctions, et cetera. And his mind 22 would have gone back to that. 23 And I'm suggesting there, in my opinion 24 that that's what he's resurrecting in his mind, not -- 25 Q: I see.

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1 A: -- that it is some new initiative to 2 resurrect something that was old, it's just the way we 3 did business. 4 Q: And you understand how if some people 5 were to read that particular passage, resurrecting the 6 old ways might suggest that perhaps there's a new way or 7 an interim way that -- 8 A: Well, sir, it's -- I think you gave 9 me that document being -- I think it was dated '91 and 10 this is in '96, so I guess is -- in '95, so there's a 11 certain amount of age to it. 12 But it's because really we hadn't utilised 13 it a lot, so maybe that was my use of the word 14 "resurrecting", but it was not the, Oh, we're doing this 15 because of this, it was just the approach that I was 16 taking. 17 Q: Okay. And -- but within your 18 knowledge there was no new way or interim way -- 19 A: No. It was -- 20 Q: -- of handling these kinds of 21 matters? 22 A: -- it was the way of handling the 23 situation, yes, sir. 24 Q: Did you, in fact, contact the 25 Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner Boose's office to --

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1 to say you'd better be careful because we're going to 2 lose control of it? 3 A: I don't know if -- if I called them. 4 I do -- I do recall a conversation at some time, I think 5 with Gerry Boose, basically suggesting that it was going 6 to be -- we were running it -- would be run there. But 7 I don't recall specifically that -- calling him and 8 saying I've had a conversation with Ron Fox, et cetera. 9 I don't recall that. 10 Q: All right. And just getting back to 11 the -- to the earlier response from Ron Fox when he said, 12 "He's already getting it, Chris." 13 I take it that that was in response to the 14 -- the matter that you raised that the Commissioner will 15 be getting some pressure to do something? 16 A: I don't know who Ron else -- Ron had 17 been talking to that day. Maybe he had -- 18 Q: That's what I was -- 19 A: -- information -- 20 Q: -- going to ask. 21 A: -- no, sir, I don't. 22 Q: All right. Thank you. 23 A: I do know he was perfectly capable of 24 handling it, sir. 25 Q: At page 270 of that transcript, Ron

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1 Fox tells you that the majority of the information that's 2 provided to the political masters is coming from MNR and 3 his impression that he was not -- let's just read it. 4 "I'll tell you I've not been too 5 impressed with it." End quote. 6 You see that? 7 A: Yes, sir. 8 Q: And your response to that is, your 9 previous dealings with that, I want to give you an 10 opportunity to speak to that. 11 A: Thank you, I asked for that. Again, 12 I have an apology to the MNR in this particular situation 13 I had involved -- I was involved in two (2) incidents 14 with the MNR, this being one, and one (1) involving the 15 MNR in the north. 16 And what I -- what I'm alluding to in this 17 case is that in my dealings with MNR at that time, the 18 previous case when I handled the -- it was a logging 19 situation, a lumber dispute in the north including First 20 Nations protesters. 21 I -- it came into my mind that we operated 22 a little differently. I feel no obligation, when I'm 23 given information to go up the chain. If it's my 24 responsibility, I accept the responsibility and I'll 25 handle the situation; that's the way policing occurs.

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1 Only one (1) level above the incident commander actually 2 approves the plan. 3 In the Ministry of Natural Resources, 4 things seemed to go to the higher echelons a lot faster. 5 And as they go faster, the decisions, when you're looking 6 for decisions, my experience in the -- in the time I'm 7 talking about, forced me to basically -- people I thought 8 could make decisions were not making decisions, because 9 in their organization they didn't make those decisions, 10 necessarily. 11 And that's what I'm alluding to, but when 12 I said "three (3)", there are other Ministries that I'm 13 referring to that operate in exactly the same manner. 14 And -- and so, I'm saying twice for the MNR, the one (1) 15 with another agency; with the Ontario Government. 16 But, my apologies, I'm not trying to bad 17 mouth the MNR. I'm just -- it's an operational concern 18 that I'm talking to Ron, saying, Don't be Ron. But my 19 mind was they operate differently than we, the police, 20 operate in these matters. 21 Q: And when you say "operate 22 differently" and on operational matters that you were not 23 impressed, I take it from that, with their chain of 24 command of decision making? Is that -- perhaps that's 25 too cumbersome?

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1 A: No. Well, but you're right, I should 2 have been saying -- I should have said, I'm not impressed 3 with the way that their reporting relationship causes 4 decisions not to be made, in my opinion. 5 I guess that's what I should have said, 6 but I didn't and I don't want to take away from the MNR - 7 - this is an operational comment between two (2) police 8 officers. 9 Q: And just following that, again, Ron 10 Fox advises you that this issue about the automatic 11 gunfire came out. They're doing damage, there's heavy 12 equipment rolling around at night. You interrupt him at 13 that particular point, at least as -- as we've heard, you 14 -- you confirm that that's problematic as far as you're 15 concerned? 16 A: Yes, sir, it is. 17 Q: And you -- you go on to indicate that 18 because I'll have -- and I'll omit that safety and backup 19 issue myself here? 20 A: That's correct. 21 Q: Tell us about that? 22 A: I'm trying to make sure that if I 23 address the safety and backup issue within the Ontario 24 Provincial Police, I would like to think that we are only 25 sending our officers out to situations that some person

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1 in leadership has considered. 2 Policing, by its very nature, can be 3 dangerous, but you -- you hope that your leadership acts 4 prudently to make sure that if you're sending people into 5 a situation, that you're sending them either well- 6 equipped or with the best information that you have; that 7 is the responsibility of police command when it's dealing 8 with their -- their people. 9 Just because you have people suggesting 10 that there's automatic gunfire doesn't mean to say that 11 your officers are going to come under automatic gunfire. 12 When they talk about heavy equipment roaring around, I 13 don't know where that came from, but so what. It could 14 have been a bulldozer from the township for all I know. 15 You would hope that that information was considered. 16 But Ron was being given is that they were 17 talking about this type of dialogue in an 18 Interministerial think tank or something and to be frank, 19 from my point, it didn't concern me as a police officer; 20 that wasn't my responsibility to report to them. 21 My responsibility was to keep my liaison 22 officer in the know. I -- I felt that was -- that was 23 responsible because the organization had seen fit to put 24 somebody in that position. But what that information is 25 and to what level of that information that he or she has

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1 to give, is up to the discretion of that individual and I 2 guess that's -- that's where I'm coming from. 3 I'm under no obligation to -- as a police 4 officer, to report to that Interministerial Committee. 5 If it's going to go to an Interministerial Committee, I 6 would suggest that my superior might decide that, but I 7 wouldn't. 8 Q: And was it clear to you, from Ron 9 Fox's reports to you, that the information that was 10 provided at this Interministerial Committee came not from 11 him -- 12 A: That's right. 13 Q: -- but operational information was 14 coming from others? 15 A: It came from somebody -- Les 16 Kobayashi -- who was in the incident command that John 17 Carson had seen fit to include the MNR in the incident 18 command. 19 I support that, that John did that, 20 because when you're handling an incident with the MNR, 21 you don't want to be handling it with -- via telephone 22 calls. Les Kobayashi had direct knowledge of the 23 resources, he had direct knowledge of the Ministry of 24 Natural Resources. 25 I believe Les Kobayashi is a peace officer

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1 for the Ministry of Natural Resources. We had worked 2 with him at other times and I think the decision to 3 include him was the right one. 4 It backfired, I guess, in some instances 5 in this case. I think it was handled later on that we 6 kind of cautioned Les -- that we cautioned Les that this 7 is what was happening, placed him in a difficult 8 position, Mr. Les Kobayashi, possibly. However, I still 9 support that it was -- it's good to have that knowledge. 10 I can give you another example of the same 11 as the Ministry of Transport when the truckers blockaded 12 bridges. We had the same situation where we included 13 their people in our operational centre, because they had 14 a working knowledge of who owned the bridge, who didn't 15 own the bridge, the access to the bridge, all those 16 things that as -- in an incident, as an incident 17 commander, you consider. 18 So maybe some information got up and I was 19 trying to address that information, but I think overall, 20 I think to include people in your incident room is good. 21 And remember at this time, what do we have 22 at this time? All we have is a group of people that 23 decided to occupy a parcel of land. There's been a bit 24 of a confrontation and we've heard some weaponry going 25 off. But that's all we have and we've included the

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1 person, the landowner, if you will, as part of the 2 incident command. 3 So, I think it was prudent for John to do 4 it. 5 Q: Given your long experience as a 6 police officer, did you have any concern that this 7 operational information might be interpreted differently 8 or might have a different reaction or obtain a different 9 reaction from a civilian as opposed to a police officer? 10 A: Oh yes, I think that's the substance 11 of what I'm saying. You know, in my mind is that, yeah, 12 that's right, they're going to -- they're going to react 13 an awful lot different to the threat of automatic gunfire 14 than I should act as a police officer. 15 Q: Okay. At page 274, Ron Fox is then 16 telling you about his meeting with the deputy Solicitor 17 General at the legislature. 18 He tells you who all was there. 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: Advises that the Premier was there 21 and -- 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: -- the Premier's comments on that. 24 And you report, and I'm going to quote here: 25 "I walked in at the tail end of Chris

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1 of him saying something like, well, I 2 think the OPP made mistakes in this. 3 They should have just gone in." 4 I'm just want to stop there for a moment. 5 Did you have -- first of all, do you have a particular 6 comment on that? 7 A: If those were the Premier's words and 8 I have every reason -- 9 Q: Do you have reason to doubt Mr. Fox's 10 report to you on that matter? 11 A: No, I don't. I donĂt and I believe 12 the Premier was wrong. 13 Q: Did you have, beyond that, reaction? 14 You're providing us now, did you have an immediate 15 reaction or a gut reaction at that point in time that you 16 might not have spoken about, if you can recall? 17 A: No, sir. I didn't even remember the 18 conversation as I alluded to before. 19 Q: Okay. And exactly at that moment, as 20 he's beginning to tell you about the dealings with the -- 21 what I'm going to describe at this moment, anyway, as 22 more senior officials at Queen's Park. 23 You decide you're going to call him back 24 on a different line? 25 A: Yes, sir, and this had been brought

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1 to my attention and I've racked my brain trying to give 2 you an explanation and I can't. I did not remember the - 3 - this original conversation when I was asked in 4 examination and discovery -- 5 Q: You were asked in June of 2006 -- 6 pardon me, June 26th of 2001 in the examinations for 7 discovery when Mr. Klippenstein -- 8 A: And I -- that's right, and I answered 9 that I did not remember a conversation with Ron Fox and I 10 didn't. And then it was brought to my attention that 11 there was a conversation later on and we disclosed that I 12 was in error, that there was a conversation, but I was 13 right that I did not remember the conversation. 14 I don't to this day and I don't remember 15 why. I can give some thoughts but I don't know why. 16 Q: I'd rather you didn't speculate, if 17 you don't have -- 18 A: Thank you. 19 Q: -- that within your direct knowledge. 20 But as you can appreciate that that might not be a wholly 21 acceptable answer to some. 22 A: Okay. You're asking me to speculate. 23 Q: And -- and if the suggestion is put 24 to you that the reason you went to another line is so 25 that you could communicate, perhaps, other information or

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1 advice, perhaps direction from government officials, what 2 is your response going to be? 3 A: I didn't know until years later that 4 my conversation was being recorded in this particular 5 conversation. 6 You see what I have to say. What is it 7 that I could have said any differently? I can understand 8 people maybe would like to suggest that because it ended 9 on this note that I was trying to go away. 10 I'm going to suggest to you, if you're 11 asking me to speculate, that we were in a small trailer. 12 When I went into the trailer and talked to you, 13 previously, when we were going through my evidence, I 14 said, What do you think of trailers? 15 And it's pretty hard in a small trailer to 16 have a conversation that other people don't overhear. 17 Not only do they overhear, as you talk on the telephone, 18 you're interrupting their business of running an 19 incident. 20 I suggest it might have been for that 21 reason. It might have been, and I think by this time 22 we're around twelve o'clock or so, I can guarantee you 23 that I've had a lot of cups of coffee at that time. 24 That's the nature of me, I drink a lot of coffee. 25 Maybe I wanted to go to the washroom, I

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1 don't know. I maybe wanted to go to the -- another 2 telephone aside from the trailer and I might have been 3 told that it was taped and didn't want to talk on a line 4 that was taped just because I don't -- I wouldn't want to 5 do that. 6 All of that is speculation and I don't 7 know, sir. 8 Q: Perhaps I can just get a moment 9 please? 10 11 (BRIEF PAUSE) 12 13 Q: You do accept though that you had a 14 subsequent conversation with Ron Fox? 15 A: I don't know, sir. 16 Q: All right. Aside from the one (1) 17 conversation that you were going to have with Deputy 18 Commissioner Boose or -- or with Commissioner O'Grady, I 19 think you've already testified that you're not certain 20 whether or not that occurred? 21 A: Not certain that it happened right 22 after the -- 23 Q: Do you have any recollection of 24 having any conversations in or -- in and around this time 25 with anybody else?

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1 A: Not specifically in and around this 2 time. 3 Q: Okay. 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 As I understand it, there was yourself, 8 Inspector Carson and Superintendent Parkin in the -- in 9 the command centre when this conversation was taking 10 place. 11 A: And I can't remember that. I have 12 reason to believe that. I mean, I elude to the fact that 13 I've already talked to a Mark Wright so I don't know if 14 there was somebody that was -- that Mark came in and we 15 spoke to him or if I spoke to him a half an hour -- like 16 I would have gone to Forest Detachment and then would 17 have dropped into the Detachment and then gone back to 18 the trailer. And did I talk to Mark? I don't know 19 where. 20 Q: But certainly you'll agree with me 21 that you had asked, as you testified earlier, you had 22 asked the scribe to leave the command centre. 23 A: I -- I don't think I did. I think 24 John did. I -- I -- 25 Q: Pardon me. Okay. But, in any event

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1 the scribe was out of the room? 2 A: Yes, sir. 3 Q: Does it assist you at all, sir, to 4 know that when then-Inspector Carson testified here, he 5 indicated that you had left the command post and went 6 into the Detachment, presumably for the purposes of 7 making this other phone call. 8 Does that help you at all? 9 A: No, sir. As I speculated there's no 10 washroom in the trailer so I may have gone in to use -- 11 to use the toilet. 12 I do know from what I have read of John 13 Carson's thinking, I disagree with his thinking. 14 Q: And insofar as your earlier advice to 15 Ron Fox that you had no problem with him calling John 16 Carson directly -- 17 A: No. 18 Q: -- I can tell you that when Mr. 19 Carson testified here, he believed that you had indicated 20 to Ron Fox that he should make calls only through your 21 office; that is Ron Fox should only call through your 22 office, or through Superintendent Parkin. 23 MR. MARK SANDLER: I just wanted to make 24 clear that that was also speculation on Deputy 25 Commissioner Carson's part. He had no specific

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1 recollection of that. He was asked to speculate and that 2 was his answer. 3 MR. DONALD WORME: Pardon me. And I 4 thank Mr. Sandler for that. 5 I'm not sure where that would take us to - 6 - to get an answer to that in any event, Mr. 7 Commissioner. So, I think I'll leave that. 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 12 Q: Did you, sir, provide or did 13 Superintendent Parkin in your presence, provide Inspector 14 Carson the Incident Commander, with any operational 15 direction at that point, either from yourself or from any 16 external source be it the Premier's office or anybody? 17 A: No, sir. Any direction that 18 Superintendent -- that -- that Inspector Carson at that 19 time would have taken, would have come as a result of a 20 participated management; Chris Coles saying, Well have we 21 done this or Tony Parkin saying, Well perhaps we should 22 call so-and-so, or John Carson says, I've done this. But 23 for me to say, You will do that; that wasn't the style of 24 -- of our management in that operation. 25 It was a participative exercise. John was

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1 seized with the ultimate decision, but if he needed 2 assistance or to say, I'm thinking about doing this, I'm 3 sure if we said, Yeah, we kind of concur to that, I'm 4 sure that probably would form part of his decision 5 perhaps. But no, not direct -- that -- that -- not the 6 style of Chris Coles or Tony Parkin. 7 Q: As you left that meeting, sir, did 8 you have any particular opinion as to the degree of 9 urgency, for -- for lack of a better term at this moment 10 as to the overall situation and particularly with respect 11 to the operational plans as were set out? 12 What -- what did you view it as? 13 A: I don't have specific recollection. 14 I'm only going by the compilation of material here. I 15 mean, I'm sure I've talked about -- I'm sure in my mind 16 was -- would be were they automatic weapons? What were 17 they? I'm sure that was in my mind. 18 Was I -- I was -- I was -- I mean, we 19 left, probably not as fast as John Carson would have 20 liked us to, but -- but we -- we did leave. There was no 21 sense of urgency, in my opinion, immediate to that time. 22 Then we went down the -- the road to take 23 a -- a view of things and I thought that we had 24 containment as best we could. And we were -- and 25 hopefully MNR was working behind the lines to get us the

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1 -- the injunction that we needed. 2 Q: And, I take it you had no sense that 3 there was any impending action that would be occurring? 4 A: No, it -- it was contained as best we 5 could. And, there would have been discussions again as a 6 plan, the negotiations, intelligence, all that side. 7 Q: All right. At any point prior to or 8 during the period of September 4th through the 6th, in 9 spite of what the operational plan, which we've reviewed 10 and entered as exhibits, was there any element to that 11 plan as part of -- as part of that plan, for the police 12 to move in and forcibly remove occupiers from the Park? 13 A: The plan -- the main part is to 14 negotiate and our feeling was to try to negotiate. We'd 15 already been in one (1) altercation with them, so from 16 September the 4th on as far as I'm concerned, no, it was 17 to -- the plan as usual -- the -- the -- an injunction 18 and then based upon whatever that injunction said we, the 19 police, would have considered that injunction as to how 20 we would enforce it. 21 Q: And, I -- I appreciate your 22 testimony, that you did not pass along any directions, 23 operationally, to the incident commander. 24 Are you aware of the incident commander 25 receiving any such directions from any other source --

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1 from any source, let's leave it at that? 2 A: He never apprised myself or Tony 3 Parkin to the best of my knowledge and I'm sure he would 4 have. And, if I had received information, I would have 5 acted on it and I have no recollection of acting on any 6 that stuff. 7 Q: You mentioned that as you -- as you 8 left the area, after the drive around the immediate 9 vicinity of East Parkway and Army Camp Road, I take it -- 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: -- you didn't have any sense of 12 urgency at that moment, was your testimony? 13 A: No, sir. 14 Q: You knew that as part of the 15 contingency plans that there was a TRU team -- 16 A: Yes, sir. 17 Q: -- available as -- as a resource? 18 A: Available, yes, sir. 19 Q: That CMU was available as a resource? 20 A: That the ERT teams were available, 21 which compile a -- a CMU later on, but I knew that the 22 ERT teams were -- were to be utilized. 23 Q: And, as I understand it, you had left 24 the area at approximately four o'clock; is that fair? 25 A: I think so, sir. Yes, sir.

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1 Q: All right. And, I anticipate that 2 we'll receive information that the TRU team, or the ERT 3 team as well, or ERT, was summoned to the area at 4 approximately 8:00 p.m.? 5 Were you given that advice? 6 A: Not -- no, not at that time. 7 Q: Okay. Had you any indication 8 whatsoever that there would be a march by CMU towards the 9 Park? 10 A: No, sir. 11 Q: And, again, whose decision would that 12 be? 13 A: The incident commander. 14 Q: All right. I take from -- from your 15 notes, it would appear that you then went -- I'm looking 16 at P-565. 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 Q: After contingency planning, in the 21 middle of the page, on Wednesday, September the 6th, on 22 that page of the copy of your notes. 23 A: Yes, sir. 24 Q: Contingency planning and then 25 reoccupation of Park. The next entry, 12:30, this would

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1 now be into the 7th of September? 2 A: Yes, sir. 3 Q: And the entry reads: 4 "Advised of shooting occurrence at 5 Ipperwash" 6 I wonder if you would just tell us about 7 the events surrounding that advice, sir? 8 A: You can see at the 12:30 that I've -- 9 I've overwritten the 2. You've got to remember that 10 these notes would have been made after the fact. They 11 weren't -- they weren't notes taken in the normal course. 12 They were notes that were made some time 13 later and I'm trying to put in my mind exactly, so I'm 14 not swearing to 12:30. All I know is I -- I was in bed. 15 I don't recall that I was in a sound sleep in any event. 16 And I was advised of the situation around 17 12:30, because I know I hadn't got -- I -- virtually I 18 had not had any sleep, because it -- it came to play 19 because the day's events afterwards went very long and 20 I'd already been up the day before. 21 So, that's how come I -- I know I hadn't 22 had that much -- I wasn't in a deep sleep. 23 So, 12:30, yes, I was advised of the 24 occurrence at Ipperwash. 25 Q: Yeah, perhaps you can just continue

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1 on in -- in reference to your notes there and tell us 2 what happened? 3 A: Superintendent Parkin advised me that 4 he was going to attend as Superintendent Parkin would do 5 and I said, I'm going to go too, Tony. So Tony came by; 6 Tony's in the Strathroy area and he came by and picked me 7 up. 8 Q: If I can just interrupt briefly. I 9 take it that when you note at -- advised of shooting, I 10 take it that was from Superintendent Parkin? 11 A: I can recall a conversation with 12 Parkin, yes. 13 Q: All right. So he agrees to pick you 14 up, I'm sorry to have interrupted. 15 A: We -- we make arrangements. I'm 16 saying you -- you -- you pick me up. 17 Q: Okay. What did you do after that? 18 A: We then left and went to the Forest 19 Detachment and I see that in my notes at 2:15 I speak to 20 Trevor Richardson, an officer that I know that was 21 involved in the criminal investigation and co-ordination. 22 John Carson and Dale Linton, that's all my 23 notes say. But I know that at this time I can't tell you 24 when I was advised of the shooting, if there was 25 tragically a death.

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1 I can't tell you that. I just know that 2 there had been a shooting. 3 Q: Given your reporting requirements, 4 did you take any steps to satisfy that? 5 A: I'm almost sure that I called the 6 Commissioner. 7 Q: I'm sorry? 8 A: I'm sure -- I'm almost sure. I can't 9 -- ten (10) years ago is very tough but -- 10 Q: Of course. 11 A: I'm -- I believe I called the 12 Commissioner and said, Tom, we've had a shooting up in 13 there and I'm going. Basically that's what I would have 14 said, because at the time I would have left we didn't -- 15 I didn't have that information. 16 But sometime between then, we got it -- 17 whether or not we got it on Superintendent Parkin's cell 18 phone or what, I don't know. I can't be specific, but 19 all I know is that when I arrived there, that we were 20 aware that there had tragically been a death. 21 Q: Okay. You arrived at Forest, by that 22 indication, at 2:15? 23 A: Yes, sir. 24 Q: Okay. 25 A: I now have a situation that I have to

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1 deal with. I have incident commanders who are stressed, 2 been under great stress. We have a situation where 3 there's been a shooting. We have a situation where I had 4 officers that have been -- attempted murder of my 5 officers by a school bus, et cetera. 6 I have reports of shootings and I have a 7 situation of partial containment in the Park. So all of 8 those things, as we arrive, again with Superintendent 9 Parkin's able assistance, we had to decide how we were 10 going to handle bringing in other incident commanders to 11 relieve the incident commanders that have been there and 12 the normal policing of how do we go from this issue? We 13 still have exactly the issues now; we have a very tragic 14 issue and we also have a more serious issue. 15 We have officers who have been run -- 16 attempted to be run down, we have officers who are 17 alarmed, we have officers who are concerned and there's 18 all the health and safety issues and the normal things 19 that go with a police unit. 20 Q: Okay. You'd mentioned earlier that 21 the entries on your daily journal, those were made after 22 the fact? 23 A: Yes, sir. 24 Q: Is that fair? 25 A: Some -- sometime after.

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1 Q: Would it be fair as well to say that 2 those are then -- in terms of those times -- that those 3 are approximations? 4 A: Oh, yes, sir, I would say that. 5 That's what I tried to say. 6 Q: And the only reason that I ask you 7 that, sir, and I'm glad you clarified that is that we 8 have the scribe notes which are Exhibit 426 at page 85 of 9 that. There's a suggestion that, at 1:40, that Inspector 10 Carson was in the parking lot at Forest Detachment 11 speaking with yourself? 12 A: That -- well, one o'clock, Parkin 13 picked me up; that's quite possible, quite possible. 14 Q: And I just wanted to give you an 15 opportunity to speak to that, what might be perceived as 16 an inconsistency. 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: All right. Do you recall, at all, 19 your conversations with Trevor Richardson, John Carson 20 and Dale Linton that you've noted in your daily journal? 21 A: After ten (10) years, not 22 specifically, but -- 23 Q: All right. 24 A: -- I'm sure that they gave me the 25 update of what they knew at that time for us to -- to act

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1 upon. 2 Q: Had they known at that time, sir, 3 that Dudley George had, in fact, now died? 4 A: What time was that, sir? 5 Q: At the time that you're meeting and 6 being briefed by Trevor Richardson, John Carson and Dale 7 Linton? 8 A: Yes, sir, I think by the time we 9 arrived, be it -- I have 2:15 or be it when the scribe 10 says at 1:45, I believe that when I arrived there I -- I 11 am told of the tragic death of Dudley George had 12 occurred. 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 Q: Mr. Sandler has correctly pointed out 17 that on their analysis of the scribe notes that, in fact, 18 they have Mr. Coles and Superintendent Parkin arriving at 19 2:15, so I want the record to reflect that as well. 20 All right. And what I was referring to, 21 incidently, Mr. Commissioner and Mr. Coles, was portions 22 of John Carson's testimony and I apologize if that has 23 caused some confusion or alarm. 24 25 (BRIEF PAUSE)

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1 Q: At some point in time, sir, you then 2 receive a phone call from -- from one (1) Ovide Mercredi, 3 or you make a call to Ovide Mercredi. 4 A: I made -- 5 Q: How did that -- how did that happen? 6 A: As you said, what did I recall? The 7 -- the one (1) thing that I did -- that I do recall is 8 that I was advised that Ovide Mercredi had called the 9 previous evening and suggested that he might come down. 10 That, to me, rang quite loud in my head 11 because as far as I'm concerned, I know now at 2:15 or I 12 believe that I know at this time that Mr. George is now 13 deceased and I know that this -- this situation is now 14 going to escalate. From my experience and just knowledge 15 of what was going on, we were in for a -- a tough time. 16 Part of the situation that always became a 17 problem up to this point, was getting people to talk to 18 us. People in there would not talk to us, so we now have 19 an extremely volatile situation or tense situation. We 20 have officers on roadblock who believe that fellow 21 officers have been shot at. They know we have officers 22 who have been I'm sure told that people were run down, 23 that the -- that there were shootings, et cetera. 24 And so now we have the situation of I can 25 control as best I can, the resources of the Ontario

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1 Provincial Police, but I have people on the inside of 2 that Park that don't know what I'm doing. 3 I -- I recall Tom Bressette, Chief Tom 4 Bressette, also being at Forest in or around that time. 5 It was the first time I can remember who he was. And the 6 discussion was how do we basically communicate with the 7 people inside. 8 And Mr. Mercredi offered. I -- I made the 9 decision to phone him at 5:30 in the morning and I said - 10 - I advised him that I understand he had offered his 11 services and I would truly appreciate it if he would come 12 down and perhaps he would assist. And he graciously did 13 and I'm very pleased that he came. 14 Q: All right. Will you have any comment 15 if I told you that Ovide Mercredi testified that, in 16 fact, he was invited or asked to come out and help with 17 negotiations? Does -- does anything turn on that in your 18 mind? 19 A: That -- that -- I don't recall 20 specifically. I know what I called him for and I wanted 21 him to come and he said he was going to come and that 22 suited me just -- just fine. 23 I -- I do have knowledge now, post, that 24 maybe the community itself had asked Mr. Mercredi to come 25 down, et cetera. And if that was his intention, all I

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1 know is that I called him at 4:30 asking him, would he 2 come. 3 Q: Sir, you'd mentioned that much goes 4 on after a police shooting. And, in fact, there are 5 certain legal obligations that are triggered as a 6 consequence of that. 7 A: ThatĂs right. 8 Q: Do you know what steps were taken to 9 satisfy those legal obligations? 10 A: Yes, I -- the Special Investigation 11 Unit in the Province of Ontario has to be contacted and 12 my -- and as a result of that weapons have to be seized 13 from the officers if we have reasons to believe who -- 14 who the officers who are doing the shootings, that those 15 weapons are -- are taken from those officers. 16 What we do is kind of fill in the breach 17 until SIU arrive with the protocol that has -- was -- was 18 set down. So yes, we were involved in -- in that aspect 19 of notifying SIU and assigning a Criminal Investigation 20 Branch member to assist, who became Detective Inspector 21 Bob Goodall at that time. 22 Q: I'm -- I'm not sure if you mentioned 23 with respect to the -- to the weapons involved. What 24 happened or what became of those? 25 A: What happens is that the officer in

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1 charge of the TRU team or any officer who has shot a 2 weapon, basically that weapon is taken for evidence and 3 another weapon supplied if they -- if they still are 4 operational. 5 So it's -- it's a thing that we supply 6 another weapon to him. But we contain that -- those 7 weapons. 8 Q: And who is that -- that seizes the 9 weapons? 10 A: In this case it would probably come 11 under the direction of Inspector Carson. He probably 12 asked that it be done. 13 Q: So the incident commander would carry 14 out those obligations? 15 A: Usually, yes. I'm not -- I don't 16 know if that was done. But I do know that the weapons 17 were obtained. 18 Q: Just going back to the conversation 19 that you had with Ovide Mercredi and I -- I appreciate 20 that given the time lapse between then and now, that it's 21 -- it's not at all clear, did you have any negotiations 22 with him at that time? 23 A: Oh, no. 24 Q: As to whether or not anybody else 25 might be coming in or -- or any such things?

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1 A: No I don't recall that. I just knew 2 that he was coming. 3 Q: Are you familiar with an individual 4 by the name of Bruce Elijah? 5 A: Yes, sir, I am. 6 Q: Do you recall having any 7 conversations with respect to Bruce Elijah with Ovide 8 Mercredi? Again, just in that initial phone call? If 9 that assists you at all. 10 A: No I don't recall having that. 11 Q: I understand, sir, that you then took 12 certain steps to relieve Inspector Carson and Inspector 13 Linton. I wonder if you would tell us about the 14 circumstances of that? 15 A: Those officers, well especially John, 16 I had every reason to believe they'd been up since 17 probably six or seven o'clock in the -- the previous 18 morning, we're now talking some five or -- five o'clock 19 in the morning, I believe, Tony Parkin and I. 20 Now, Dale Linton was John's replacement. 21 Actually, it went -- as you are aware, Dale Linton 22 replaced John. John was to go home and get some sleep. 23 John came back but, in any event, it seemed prudent for 24 John -- for Tony Parkin and I to say, Let's have another 25 -- another group of Incident Commanders be put on because

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1 of the -- the stress of the situation that took place. 2 Q: All right. And the reason for that 3 was simply for the officers' ability to get some rest; 4 does that -- 5 A: Oh sure, exactly. 6 Q: And there's no suggestion there, I 7 take it, that it was for any other reason, for any kind 8 of critical reasons in particular? 9 A: No. None whatsoever. In fact, they 10 probably didn't want to leave, but none whatsoever. 11 Q: Did you have any concern at -- at 12 that -- or a continuing concern, if you had a concern 13 earlier, about weapons in the Park? 14 A: Oh yes, much so. The information 15 that I had received at that time is that weapons have 16 been fired, my -- my officers have responded to fire. I 17 was advised that there were shots fired from, I'm not 18 sure, either the school bus or the car. I have reason to 19 believe that my officers had been run down or attempted 20 to run down. We were asking about injuries to them. 21 We had all the previous days' events 22 there, the fact that, WeĂll do our talking with guns. Oh 23 yes, at that time the automatic weaponry which Ron Fox 24 and I had talked about before, I have nothing definite 25 but in my mind is, What do we have.

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1 So, yes, the -- the tension is -- is very 2 high and the roadblocks are still in place. There's been 3 a confusing issue, as any shooting, there's certain 4 confusions around those issues not confusing to the issue 5 but what's happened. 6 You have a -- a body of people who are on 7 the periphery, they need to be updated to -- to know the 8 situation that they may or may not be looking out for. 9 And so all those things had to be put in place. 10 And, as I recall, John Carson had done 11 much of that. It wasn't something that we just get -- 12 ran through the checklist to say, What do we know, What's 13 the communication, Who's hurt, Do we have the guns, SIU 14 is coming, Who's the liaison; those types of questions, 15 but John had handled most of those, as he wanted to do. 16 Q: All right. And insofar as your 17 receipt of a briefing, what did they tell you about the 18 actual incident insofar as weapons or the use of weapons? 19 A: My recollection of that, again, I'm 20 going to say I don't have definite recollection, but I 21 can tell you that as of that night, that -- exactly what 22 I've said -- that there was fire -- gunfire between 23 occupiers and -- and the Ontario Provincial Police. 24 A school bus had run down our -- our 25 officers. Members of our TRU Team had shot, members of

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1 our -- of our regular force had -- had shot. I didn't 2 know at that time who, what, where of the particular 3 incident, but we were in a -- an escalated mode to try to 4 address those situations, still in -- well, when I got 5 there, still in darkness but, by this time, 5:30, six 6 o'clock, as I recall, she was starting to get light. 7 And then we brought in Incident Commanders 8 and would have briefed -- I -- as I recall it, that we 9 briefed those basically as to what the situation was. 10 And then Tony Parkin and I made the decision to go to 11 Grand Bend. And that decision was made in order that we 12 get out of the -- again, out of the process of the 13 Incident Command, trying to isolate the Incident Command 14 from myself. 15 Another reason that I went to Grand Bend, 16 again, this is just a -- it's an operational thing. The 17 trouble with keeping all your resources is one -- one 18 place is that you burn up your telephone systems. People 19 say, I'll get back to you, and after a while the press 20 start calling, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, and your 21 telephone systems get overwhelmed. 22 And by going to Grand Bend I had another 23 bank of telephones, if you will, that you could operate 24 from. And then technically they come down and increase 25 that capacity. But I don't like -- I don't like those

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1 incidents being run out of trailers. 2 And I think then there was also the 3 decision shortly thereafter that we would utilize the 4 Force Detachment as the incident room, as opposed to the 5 trailer. 6 Q: Do you recall at what time those 7 decisions were made, that is the decision to open an 8 executive operation centre? 9 A: Oh, I would have -- that would have 10 been in my mind that that's what I was doing when I went 11 up at two o'clock. I -- I knew and Tony Parkin knew that 12 I was going to stay, but I knew that I wasn't going to 13 stay in the vicinity of the Incident Commander, otherwise 14 I would have run it, and that's not the process that we 15 took. 16 Q: Commissioner, it's now ten (10) to 17 12:00 and I'm wondering if this might be an appropriate 18 place to break for the lunch hour. It seems to me that, 19 given where we are at this point in time, that I should 20 have, at a maximum, maybe a couple of hours left. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Fine. 22 MR. DONALD WORME: Thanks. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We'll 24 adjourn for lunch now. 25 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry stands

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1 adjourned until 1:05. 2 3 --- Upon recessing at 11:51 a.m. 4 --- Upon resuming at 1:07 p.m. 5 6 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 7 resumed. Please be seated. 8 MR. DONALD WORME: Good afternoon, 9 Commissioner. 10 Good afternoon, Mr. Coles. 11 12 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 13 Q: Prior to the lunch break, Mr. Coles, 14 you were describing for us your arrival at the command 15 centre in Forest, a briefing that had occurred at that 16 point in time. 17 And you had received numerous reports 18 about what had occurred the evening before? 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: And one of the things that is -- that 21 is mentioned is that there was an upcoming meeting with - 22 - with MPP Marcel Beaubien. 23 Do you know if that meeting in fact 24 occurred between yourself, that is, and Mr. Beaubien? 25 A: There was a meeting, I think I could

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1 find in my notes, there was a meeting several days later 2 at the Grand Bend Detachment. 3 Q: Not -- not on the morning of the 7th 4 though? Is that -- 5 A: No. Not that I recall, sir. 6 Q: And can you recall, sir, whether in 7 any meeting you might have had with Mr. Beaubien 8 operational matters were discussed by yourself with him? 9 A: I don't have a direct recollection. 10 I -- I would suggest that any discussion that I would 11 have had was if there was a need for a police 12 enforcement, or if -- if -- that we had increased our -- 13 the numbers of people that we had in the area that we 14 were engaged in checkpoints; that type of information. 15 It is operational to a certain degree, but 16 it was just kind of a -- an education process to -- to 17 the -- the -- Mr. Beaubien. 18 Q: You had by that point in time had 19 some contact with then-National Chief Ovide Mercredi? 20 A: Not with -- at 5:30 I made the 21 telephone call. He was in Ottawa; he had to fly down. 22 There was a delay and then he had to meet with people -- 23 I know that he had meetings with the First Nations; a 24 meeting that we subsequently set up was delayed a couple 25 of hours.

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1 But, I subsequently did have a meeting on 2 the night of the 7th. 3 Q: And I believe when we left off, you 4 had testified that yourself and Superintendent Parkin had 5 elected to set up an executive operation centre in Grand 6 Bend in order to -- well not crowd, the command centre in 7 Forest. 8 A: Yes. Truly, not an executive 9 operation centre. It wasn't an operation centre. It was 10 an operational office that -- that Superintendent Parkin 11 and I worked out of. 12 I mean, there was no direct reporting 13 relationship. If you set -- if you have a multi-area 14 with several incidents going at the same time, then you 15 will have an executive operation to coordinate. 16 But this one really doesn't fit that 17 category. It was basically myself being in the area and 18 removed but in my own location. 19 Q: All right. You had mentioned the 20 word 'war room' earlier. Was this -- was this what it 21 had been referred to as. 22 A: I don't think I ever mentioned the 23 word 'war room,' sir. I stand to be corrected but I 24 don't think I mentioned the word 'war room'. 25 Q: Pardon me. Perhaps I should ask.

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1 Had you heard the term in relation to any of the 2 operation centres -- 3 A: The -- there was an operation centre 4 -- possibly what we want to call it, an executive 5 operation centre that was subsequently set up at the 6 Orillia GHQ. And yes, I do know that people wrongly 7 called that a 'war room'. 8 Q: Do you know what people might have 9 wrongly called it a 'war room'? 10 A: I'm going to blame the people at GHQ. 11 I really can't -- I really can't put it on -- 12 Q: And by GHQ you mean the General 13 Headquarters? 14 A: That's right. And that's -- that's 15 not an appropriate use of it. 16 Q: And in terms of that particular 17 facility that was established then, it was meant to 18 coordinate regional activities; would that be fair? 19 A: It was meant to coordinate the OPP 20 response following the -- the tragic shooting. We had 21 expectation that there would be an escalation of not only 22 First Nations, but other peoples concerned about the 23 activities at Ipperwash. 24 There would be media events that would be 25 -- there was a -- a great increase in -- in media and

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1 that media would be -- come from, as I've mentioned 2 before, different areas and so it was seen fit by the 3 Commissioner to set this room up and I had dealings with 4 it. 5 Q: Can you tell us the extent of your 6 dealings with that without -- 7 A: Just conversations. There were -- 8 the -- the initial set-up of that room, because of the 9 headquarters of Orillia, it was a brand new building and 10 the initial set-up of that room, the telephone numbers, 11 et cetera, had to be exchanged and those kinds of things 12 had to be dealt with. 13 Again, I do recall that they had made some 14 cone -- phone calls through to the incident rooms, to the 15 incident command post-shooting. And you basically had me 16 now phoning up then, I think, Chief Superintendent Hutton 17 saying, Why are you calling back to the incident room? 18 If you want to call, call me. 19 And that was my reference to how I said I 20 also ran interference within my own -- own organization. 21 And, it -- it goes to the flow of information, but it 22 goes for me trying to keep the people in charge of 23 incident command free of any encumbrances by whatever 24 that -- that -- that weren't warranted. 25 Q: Thank you for that. At 10:62, your

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1 handwritten notes of September the 7th at 8:00 a.m., I 2 take it you would have come on duty at that particular 3 time, and the notation just below that is that: 4 "Mercredi to arrive at 1:00 p.m." 5 That is Exhibit P-565. 6 A: Yes, it's a command -- I didn't come 7 on duty. All I'd done is continued -- if you look 08:00, 8 I'm at Grand Bend detachment, I haven't -- there's been 9 no sleep that night and now it's -- it's just a continue 10 -- I'm continuing the September 7th day. 11 You can see that I -- I went over on 12 September 7th knowing full well that there would probably 13 be more material required and more pages. And, yes, 14 Mercredi too -- I was advised to arrive at 1:00 p.m. and 15 then subsequently delayed at the airport. 16 So, what I'm telling you is, these notes 17 are written after the fact. 18 Q: All right. 19 A: There not notes written at the time. 20 Q: Okay. If I can just ask you to 21 direct your attention to the entry just after: 22 "Mercredi to arrive 1:00 p.m. Delayed 23 at airport." 24 And, the next word behind that? 25 A: I have it, "conversation." I don't

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1 know... 2 Q: You don't recall if you might have 3 had a conversation at that point with Mr. Mercredi? 4 A: I might well have, that I did, in 5 fact, speak to him and it's just my inadequacy of saying 6 conversation. 7 Q: All right. At approximately 9:49 -- 8 ten to 10:00 in the morning, do you recall having a 9 conversation with Jim Gordon, the now-acting incident 10 commander? 11 And, perhaps -- we have a recording of 12 that and, perhaps, what I can do at this point, Mr. 13 Commissioner, is simply play that in order to allow this 14 Witness to refresh his memory and, perhaps, offer us some 15 comments beyond that? 16 17 (VIDEOTAPE PLAYED) 18 19 MR. DONALD WORME: I think we have every 20 indication that nobody can make out what's being said at 21 this point, sir. What -- what I'm going to sug -- this 22 may correct itself I'm told. 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25

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1 MR. DONALD WORME: Perhaps what we ought 2 to do is simply terminate this recording at this point 3 and see if we can... 4 5 (VIDEOTAPE PLAYED) 6 7 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME. 8 Q: Mr. Coles, you recognized the voices 9 on -- on that recording? 10 A: Yes, I do. 11 Q: And regrettably we don't have a 12 transcript of that, Mr. Commissioner. 13 Perhaps you can just describe then the -- 14 the individuals that are talking? 15 A: Okay. I'll try the best I can. The 16 initial call is from Tony Parkin to Jim Gordon. And Tony 17 Parkin and I are at Grand Bend and we are obviously in 18 telephone conversation with Ovide Mercredi and the group. 19 Tony -- as Tony Parkin has called, it 20 appears that at that time that Checkpoint 1 has been 21 breached by a hundred and fifty (150) odd marchers. And 22 that information is now being relayed to Tony. 23 Jim Gordon is the incident commander who 24 has been brought in -- excuse me, to relieve John Carson. 25 And also Dale Linton because he had had more sleep, is

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1 still there in a support role. 2 But Jim Gordon is the incident commander; 3 that's an extremely difficult role for Mr. Gordon. He -- 4 he has retired, he was an extremely capable officer, a 5 true gentleman. 6 He is trying to bring himself up to speed 7 at that time and wouldn't necessarily have known of some 8 of the other information that was going on, i.e., Mr. 9 Mercredi, et cetera. 10 After the breach I then come onto the 11 telephone because I'm the person who's been in contact 12 with Ovide Mercredi. Now I hope that you're sympathetic 13 to my previous conversation where I said that I believed 14 in a participative management style in the incident. 15 I hope that what you're hearing that you 16 don't think I'm not too -- being too directive. I'm not 17 being directive. I believe that I had the information 18 that Ovide Mercredi had sent negotiators and the Elijah's 19 and they were going to go in, Bob Antone. 20 That pleased me greatly. The fact that we 21 had a hundred and fifty (150) people that were moving 22 down, in my mind, was they would just good folks going 23 down to try to remedy the situation. It wasn't in my 24 mind that they were going down to beat people up. I 25 think they were just being in support of people that they

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1 felt were isolated. So, that was in my mind. 2 That, in my opinion, strategically worked 3 very well in our favour and I was trying to convey that 4 to Jim Gordon saying what was the objectives here. We 5 want to get those people out but more so, I was more 6 interested in getting good folks in there to resolve the 7 issue. 8 And out of a hundred and fifty (150) 9 people, I believe that the majority of those people would 10 have been good people that were there for what they saw 11 as the welfare of those people that were inside. 12 So, I -- I had no problem. In review I 13 might be criticized, justly so, that I was perhaps taking 14 a bit of the command away from Jim Gordon in the fact is 15 that you could hear that I was pretty adamant that I 16 wanted him to move back. 17 I think I gave him the reasons why. But, 18 in a command situation such as that, if I am the superior 19 officer that's okay. I see that as okay for me to do. I 20 believe I did it in a manner that was respectful of Jim's 21 position. He had a -- he had a tough role. 22 I was satisfied that my concern -- I guess 23 my concern was at the next checkpoints that all of a 24 sudden the -- the uniform would have incensed something, 25 and there was no need for that.

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1 And so I was basically saying, now is the 2 time to -- to pull back. So, as best I can, I think 3 that's the logic that I presented at the time and what I 4 was trying to do. 5 Q: And did I hear correctly in the 6 recording, that you were asked to show good faith in -- 7 in your discussions with Mr. Mercredi and was this your 8 attempt to demonstrate that? 9 A: Yes. I think it was Mr. Merc -- Mr. 10 Mercredi and I had not met at that time, we -- we had 11 talked on the telephone. I think it was his words, he 12 was asking me, Would you show good faith. I mean, 13 basically, it's a start of negotiation; somewhere, you -- 14 you have to start. And he's basically coming to me, 15 saying, Would you -- the circumstances as I saw them at 16 that time, yes, it was time to show good faith. 17 I still had -- had concern about the 18 cottages, that I have a responsibility as a police 19 officer for those cottages. I think also significant to 20 me in that conversation is the fact of what I felt that I 21 had at the time when I got into the issue with Dale 22 Linton. 23 Afterwards Dale Linton came on, as to the 24 shootings involved. A little bit of confusion, I guess, 25 between Dale and mine, probably my communication, but

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1 what I'm saying is the person who was in the bus, we knew 2 who they were and that we had them at that time. 3 That's as best as I can recall that 4 conversation. 5 Q: And thank you for that. There were 6 some comment made that this group of a hundred (100), 7 hundred fifty (150) people breached, that, We asked them 8 to stay back but they went through anyway; did I hear the 9 words "bullhorn"? Did -- 10 A: Yes. I think Jim -- there was a 11 mention of bullhorn, whether or not it was a separate 12 bullhorn or they were using the speakers on the cruisers, 13 I don't know. 14 Q: All right. 15 A: I don't know what equipment they had. 16 Q: And the other thing that -- that drew 17 at least my notice was a comment with respect to the 18 original objective, and you asked, What was the original 19 objective. I believe -- 20 A: To -- 21 Q: -- and I believe, rhetorically, the - 22 - the answer came back as, Well, it was to get them out? 23 A: To negotiate, basically, a peaceful 24 solution and to negotiate those people out. And so with 25 negotiations, albeit that with Ovide Mercredi and there

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1 coming from the other way, I was still achieving what I 2 thought to be the objective. 3 But, the scenario at that time had 4 changed. I suggest to you now that it was not the same 5 situation of a group of people being in there. It was -- 6 it was we had a First Nation community and other people 7 that were upset at a series of events. I knew that was 8 going to escalate. We now had media on the ground as -- 9 as we're hearing, and that situation was going to change. 10 And so to have -- I'll use the word -- 11 cooler heads as far as inside, I needed other people 12 inside. Because the thing with containment, there is a - 13 - you do isolate people, and those people who were in 14 that Park had been isolated for some time. I think they 15 -- probably they had fears just the same as my officers 16 had fears, and we were trying to work that out on an 17 ongoing situation. 18 Q: And it seemed to me that I detected 19 some concern about the loss over a crime scene, in your 20 voice. However, that seemed to be overridden by the 21 other matters before you? 22 A: Yes, it was. And in -- at that time 23 I don't think there's a great concern in my mind about 24 the crime scene. And my -- my concern more is I have 25 attempted murder charges that were potential but we would

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1 work that -- we would work that out. We -- I use the 2 word -- I think we had them, but I was satisfied that we 3 had them. 4 I mean, later on, that crime scene is what 5 I negotiated and I -- I had some personal concerns about 6 that. But -- but that's what we had at the time and 7 that's what we worked on. 8 Q: At Tab 34, sir, there are scribe 9 notes dated September 7th, 1995, that is Inquiry Exhibit 10 P-426. And if you turn to page 112 of -- of that 11 document, at 13:42 hours -- it's at the top of page 112. 12 It would appear that you had a 13 conversation then with Jim Gordon at -- at that time? 14 A: Yes. Yes, sir. 15 Q: And now you're being updated on -- on 16 the fact that equipment has been lost? 17 A: Yes, sir. 18 Q: And more -- and, more specifically, 19 that Jim Gordon had rerouted -- the name there appears as 20 Don French, to Grand Bend Detachment to speak with 21 yourself. 22 Now, did you know who that was at that -- 23 at that point? 24 A: No. No, I didn't. I came to 25 understand that Mr. French was involved in the First

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1 Nations issues with the Federal Government. And I think 2 he had -- I don't know if because of Mercredi or 3 whatever, but he arrived and I had some conversation with 4 him. I'm vague as to what that was, but I -- I have a 5 recollection that he had some intention of going to the 6 Camp, but we already had people in the Camp now. 7 Q: All right. Did he -- 8 A: Also -- 9 Q: -- I'm sorry? 10 A: Yeah. No. 11 Q: I'm going to suggest to you that his 12 proper name is Ron French, does that -- does that help 13 you at all? 14 A: I -- I stand -- I don't know, sir. 15 Q: And that you -- 16 A: That's -- those are not my notes, so 17 I don't know. 18 Q: And I appreciate that. And that he 19 was, in fact, the Special Assistant to the Minister of 20 Indian Affairs Ron Irwin, of the day? Does that help you 21 at all? 22 A: I don't think he identified himself 23 to me as that, but maybe he was. 24 Q: All right. Do you know, sir, whether 25 or not, with respect to Mr. French, there was any

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1 arrangements as between he and the OPP that -- of him 2 supplying information? 3 A: I don't know. 4 Q: All right. At Tab 35 of -- of the 5 book of documents in front of you, that is Inquiry 6 Document 1001088, it is an OPP news release from General 7 Headquarters, release date of September 7th, 1995 and 8 it's entitled, Clarification of Events? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: Had you seen this before, sir? 11 A: Had I seen this before...? 12 Q: This particular press release? 13 A: Yes. My answer's specific to all the 14 details. If not itĂs a -- it's a press release from 15 General Headquarters, which would have come from the 16 Media Relations Branch and a copy of that would have been 17 sent to Tony Parkin or myself. 18 Q: All right. But the information 19 contained within that would have emanated, well, from -- 20 from the ground, one would think. 21 A: Basically, it would have either been 22 composed initially by Tony Parkin or, because of the 23 gravity of this situation, I would expect that Tony 24 Parkin would have called in Marilyn Murray, the head of 25 Media Relations for the Ontario Provincial Police and

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1 between them it was agreed that this would be the one 2 that would be put out. 3 If Marilyn Murray gets involved -- was to 4 get involved in Media Relations, they usually consult 5 with either the press offices on the ground and/or the 6 incident commanders. In this case, I'm sure that 7 probably it was Tony and Marilyn Murray -- 8 Q: And the -- 9 A: -- that agreed. 10 Q: -- the information in there to the 11 effect, and I quote: 12 "It was at this time that OPP personnel 13 were fired upon from the vehicles. The 14 officers felt their safety was in 15 danger and returned fire, fatally 16 injuring one (1) man." 17 That was the -- end quote. That was the 18 information that was available at that time and that's 19 the information that you were working with? 20 A: I think on the last tape that we 21 heard that you can -- that is the information that I 22 believe that I was acting on at that time, yes, sir. 23 Q: All right. And, to your knowledge, 24 sir, had that particular portion I just referred you to, 25 that is that the OPP personnel were fired upon from

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1 vehicles that had exited the Park, had that ever been, to 2 your knowledge, verified? 3 A: The use of your word, "verified," I 4 would suggest that no, it has not been verified. 5 Q: Is there another word? 6 A: The issue -- what's in my mind is, as 7 a result of the -- when the crime scene was obtained, 8 numerous shell casings of different calibres were found, 9 I am led to believe. You've got to remember I retired 10 after -- a relatively short time afterwards and so not 11 verified. 12 I don't know, sir, where it's gone from 13 there, but to the best of my knowledge, I was of the 14 belief that -- that my officers, at least one (1), 15 returned fire as a result of seeing a vehicle -- a -- a 16 firearm in a vehicle. 17 Q: All right. And if we go back to your 18 -- to your handwritten notes where we just came from, at 19 Tab 62, sir, it would appear that at 20:00 hours or 8:00 20 p.m. you had attended a meeting with various chiefs, 21 including Ovide Mercredi? 22 A: Yes, sir. 23 Q: All right. Can you tell us about 24 that; who might have been in attendance; the purpose for 25 this; the duration of the meeting?

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1 A: I was asked to attend at this meeting 2 that Mr. Mercredi and I -- Mercredi and I had -- had 3 agreed to meet. 4 There were many First Nations chiefs and 5 Elders that were there. They identified themselves, I 6 remember some from were Walpole, some from -- was from 7 Six Nations, some were -- and they were from the Oneida, 8 some from Muncie. 9 They were from all over, plus there was 10 family. There was, I remember, a female family member of 11 Dudley George's family that was there. 12 I've heard it described as a talking 13 circle. I know that James Potts was also -- James Potts, 14 the -- our First Nation liaison officer was also there 15 and, I believe, Glen Trivett. 16 It had a ceremonial aspect at the first 17 part of it, if I recall right, and I was basically asked 18 to sit and the -- as it went around the circle, I would 19 be the second last person to speak and it was just an 20 honest exchange. 21 People got up and without interruption, 22 spoke about what they felt and what should happen. And 23 we went partially around the circle and then it was 24 decided that they would, again, have some more to say and 25 myself and Mercredi did not speak and so it went around

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1 again. 2 Then eventually it came to -- for my turn 3 to speak and then Mr. Mercredi and then, following that, 4 we spoke about the more nitty gritty of how we would 5 resolve it. 6 Q: Okay. Your notes would indicate that 7 there was some agreement reached and was that agreement 8 reached during the course of that meeting? 9 A: Not during the circle, after I had 10 spoken and after Mr. Mercredi had spoken and it was 11 agreed, I guess, that basically what we had -- it had 12 been the start of dialogue, if you will. 13 I remember my -- my words, what I said 14 there, but it was important. It was an important part of 15 the process to start. 16 Q: Okay. 17 A: And, yes, the Elijah's basically 18 after that meeting, it was agreed that the -- Bruce 19 Elijah and the gentlemen I believe that I came to know as 20 Marvin Connor, would in fact go to the Park and be with 21 the occupiers at the Park and that we would have 22 communication if we had to, with them, and they would 23 also -- Bruce Elijah was guaranteeing that there would be 24 nothing going wrong with the cottages, and then we were 25 to have another subsequent meeting.

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1 And that's how I agreed, as a step of 2 faith, that we would act and that's how it happened. 3 Q: And aside from Mr. Mercredi's 4 apparent, pardon me, endorsement of Bruce Elijah, had -- 5 did you know Bruce Elijah from before? 6 A: Just by -- just by reputation. 7 Q: And that reputation was? 8 A: Bruce Elijah had been a -- a 9 negotiator at Oka, is my understanding. I knew him to be 10 a strong personality which became evidenced in our 11 negotiations. 12 But I truly appreciated his efforts there 13 that night and I appreciated the efforts of Marvin Connor 14 who I think was one of the heros. 15 Q: All right. There's a comment further 16 on that note under 20:00 hours: 17 "First Nation patrol to be 18 implemented." 19 A: The -- the issue that came, of 20 course, was although Bruce Elijah had agreed that he 21 would -- he would -- he would be there with the members 22 of the -- the occupiers of the Park and he would make 23 sure that nothing happened. 24 We, as the police force of jurisdiction, 25 also had a responsibility to provide -- to make sure that

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1 we had a patrol in the area should any occurrences 2 require. And we saw it as a position that the First 3 Nations police officers from Kettle Point would also act 4 as a patrol and we would identify that vehicle so there 5 was no confusion that, quote, "the OPP was making some 6 other war." 7 It -- it was a tentative situation so we 8 were trying to -- to come up with the -- the solution 9 that -- that fitted that particular scenario. 10 Q: All right. I note that you were then 11 off duty at 03:30; that would be now the 8th of September 12 at 3:30 in the morning? 13 A: Not on duty, sir, off duty. I was -- 14 Q: You -- you were off duty, pardon me. 15 A: I was tired, I was tired, yes, sir. 16 Q: How long did that meeting go until? 17 A: Quite a long time, especially when we 18 went around the -- the second time, but it was a very 19 valid meeting, it -- it started the relationship, I 20 think, with Ovide Mercredi et. al. and Bruce Elijah. So, 21 I -- I put it at, probably about 12:30, one oĂclock that 22 that meeting actually concluded. 23 And then we had some other -- we had to 24 come back and fill in the incident commander about what 25 had gone on and then Tony Parkin and I then left -- left

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1 for home. 2 Q: Okay. Just as an aside on that point 3 or a bit of an aside, in any event, had you been involved 4 in such a process before, that is to say to the engaging 5 discussions of obviously a very serious matter and to 6 follow that particular protocol? 7 A: I was involved in Akwesasne with 8 meetings with, I will use the term, "the Warrior 9 Society," at Akwesasne. They'd ask if I would attend 10 some meetings. I was told not to and I suggested it was 11 a good move and I never regretted it and -- and so, I had 12 been involved in that particular meeting with First 13 Nations. I'd been involved with the Bear Island up north 14 at different times, but not -- not under these type of 15 circumstances. 16 Q: And I was thinking, more 17 specifically, the -- the configuration of the meeting 18 room and the manner in which people spoke. 19 A: I mean -- no, at that time, although 20 Jim Potts later explained to me why and -- and it made 21 all kinds of sense to me. It's difficult what -- what 22 you say in those -- those meetings. I -- I know what I 23 said, but it's difficult. 24 Q: Why is it difficult? 25 A: I had First Nations people all asking

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1 questions of why and -- and what had gone on and now I am 2 a police officer of jurisdiction in a meeting and 3 basically what I'm trying to do is to say I think we did 4 the right thing, but I can't tell you and you've got 5 people that are -- emotionally charged atmosphere. 6 And my words were that my father said that 7 when you pray, pray for a contented mind and I hoped I 8 would have a contented mind when it was done. 9 Q: All right, sir. On September the 10 8th, sir, the scribe notes at Tab 36, being Exhibit P-426 11 at page 139, at 09:41 hours, it would appear that you had 12 called Inspector Jim Gordon at that point and were 13 updated on the removal of the debris from roads, that 14 sort of thing? 15 A: I don't have it in mine if you have-- 16 Q: Perhaps if we can -- it's up on 17 the... 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 Q: 09:41 hours, initially. 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 A: Can you give me a tab where this is

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1 that I might -- maybe? 2 Q: Tab 36. 3 A: Sorry. And the page number? 4 Q: 139. 5 A: I have it. 6 Q: And the entry at 09:41 hours? 7 A: And the date of this if you can -- is 8 it the 8th of the -- September -- 9 Q: The 8th of September, 1995. 10 A: Okay. My notes show that I started 11 at 9:00 o'clock and would have gone back up to Ipperwash. 12 And so, yes, I would have called the command centre to 13 find out what was going on. 14 Q: And if we go to 9:49 hours to the 15 middle of that entry I quote: 16 "Jim Gordon states Chief Coles wants 17 level of tension to lower. Would like 18 to wait until discussion with Chief 19 Coles. Best we can do for now is just 20 make rescues. Request for unmarked both 21 denied." 22 I take it that's consistent with the 23 advice that you had been providing to your subordinates 24 up to that point? 25 A: Yes. I think it's consistent with

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1 the conversation that Jim and I had previously. That I 2 was trying to level it and Jim was doing his best to make 3 sure that we didn't incite anything if we could help it. 4 Q: And at this point in time, sir, did 5 you consider yourself to be actively engaged in the 6 negotiation process? 7 A: Yes, sir, I was. And that always 8 creates a bit of a -- a dilemma for any incident 9 commander. In any incident command, you try to keep your 10 negotiations separate from the incident commander. As 11 usual you try to put a buffer between those people. It's 12 best that you don't operate otherwise you operate out of 13 one (1) mind as is proposed to letting the negotiators do 14 what they want. 15 This was a little unusual circumstance in 16 that because of my position and because Grand Chief Ovide 17 Mercredi had decided to come down and he had agreed to 18 talk to me and we started the negotiations. 19 I was very content to continue that so now 20 it kind of takes me out of the role of the -- the 21 position that I was in. I -- I want to be able to be 22 open and honest with Mr. Mercredi as I know he was with 23 me. 24 And so I needed the knowledge of what was 25 going on but I didn't know where the negotiations would

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1 go. So, basically, how we handled that is that from then 2 on I basically, very seldom would I ever go to the 3 incident rooms. Tony Parkin would do that. And that way 4 it kept a slight separation from it. 5 So that's how we chose because it's a -- 6 it's a kind of a unwritten rule in incident command that 7 you don't negotiate and run the command at the same time. 8 But sometimes those things don't always work out quite 9 that well. You -- you -- you handle it as you see fit 10 that it needed to be handled. And that's what I did. 11 Q: And so it's your position that you 12 step back as far as you could in the circumstances? 13 Would that be fair? 14 A: I like to think and I'll let you 15 judge. But I -- I'd like to think that I did that, I was 16 a participated type manager and I let the incident 17 commanders run it, knowing full well that, given my rank, 18 that they might -- that I had to be careful of -- of how 19 I -- I phrased things. 20 But I wasn't in the nitty gritty. We 21 weren't negotiating people. It wasn't a hostage 22 situation, et cetera. Thank you to the Bruce ElijahĂs of 23 the world that went in the -- I -- I was -- I was happy 24 that I had people in the camp that, basically, had cool 25 minds.

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1 Q: And in looking back at your personal 2 -- of your own handwritten notes, sir, at Tab 62, it 3 would appear that you had another meeting with Ovide 4 Mercredi that day? 5 A: Yes, sir, at 21:00 hours as I show. 6 Q: And can you recall what the agenda of 7 that might have been? 8 A: No. I think -- I -- the last time I 9 talked about the first meeting is, did we set up -- I 10 said that it had some ceremony -- it may have been this 11 meeting that had the ceremony. 12 I know that at this time that Mr. Mercredi 13 had met with members of the community and had a better 14 knowledge of what was going on. And this was kind of a 15 followup meeting where we negotiated the fact is that I 16 think other First Nations police officers were going to 17 be brought in to assist the police department -- the -- 18 the First Nations police department of Kettle. 19 And so they were receiving assistance. 20 Q: Okay. If I can just get one moment. 21 22 (BRIEF PAUSE) 23 24 Q: During the -- during the course of a 25 -- of that meeting, did you make a commitment to Mr.

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1 Mercredi with respect to reducing the size of the forces 2 that you had there or were there, I should -- should say? 3 A: No. Never of reducing the size of 4 the forces. I would suggest it was more that I agreed 5 that I would try to de-escalate the presence of police 6 officers. And I know that we had police officers, 7 basically we moved them back to places where they were 8 not in and around Forest. 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 Q: Did you say anything, sir, to the 13 incident commanders with respect to the attire of the 14 members that were present in the area? 15 A: Can you point me to a conversation 16 that I might have had, because I don't recall, I guess, 17 would be my answer to that. 18 Q: And it's not so much that I have a 19 record of your conversation but rather simply reports, 20 for example, if you look up on the screen at page 148, 21 that is, I can assure you, the third full paragraph of 22 that page. 23 And Dale Linton, concern of camouflage 24 people walking around. Chief Coles does not want people 25 seeing us in camouflage. He wants us for response and so

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1 on. 2 A: The -- my concern has always been one 3 of optics. When you start having media such that we had, 4 involved here, six (6) times out of ten (10) I would 5 suggest the picture that is taken is of an officer in 6 either camouflage or an officer in an ERT uniform or an 7 officer in a TRU uniform. 8 That's what they like to take pictures of. 9 And that, to me, does not paint a good picture of what is 10 actually going on. 11 I mean, there are only so many ERT team 12 members, there's only so many TRU team members and the 13 majority of your force is made up of just the -- the 14 regular police officers, and ERT teams are just regular 15 police officers with a little bit of training. 16 But their uniforms sometimes give you an 17 image that I was trying to downplay. And so the 18 camouflage and that, I didn't want those officers in the 19 public view. If they were needed operationally for check 20 points, et cetera, or -- that's fine, I didn't mind 21 having that, but I -- my instructions are, let's play 22 this down. 23 It's what I had done, that was my 24 commitment to Mr. Mercredi and that's what I was trying 25 to do. But, in fairness to the situation that I had at

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1 the -- I -- I still had a situation. I had a funeral now 2 that I knew was coming up. 3 We had a situation where we could 4 potentially have an awful lot more people involved and so 5 to -- to say I was going to downsize my -- downsize the 6 optics, that's what I would have done. 7 Q: All right. I just want to direct -- 8 direct your attention to the screen, that is from the 9 scribe notes again, P-426 and that is at page -- I 10 believe it to be 147 at 15:59 hours in the second 11 paragraph there. 12 You'll note, 15:39 hours Dale Linton 13 advising members that the Chief made a commitment to 14 downsize our presence during a meeting with Ovide 15 Mercredi. 16 A: Well, I -- that's -- I mean, that's a 17 third hand. That's a scribe that's writing what Dale 18 Linton has said and that he either would have got it from 19 me or from Jim Gordon or whatever. So I'm not going hang 20 my hat on that every individual word that was there. 21 In my mind, for me, I would gladly have 22 said to Mr. Mercredi that, yes, I will de-escalate. I 23 will move people back. 24 But at this time, would I have said I'm 25 going to send people home? No, because that -- I still -

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1 - we still had an ongoing situation so, no. But to 2 rehouse them in different places, yes. So, I disagree. 3 Q: And, as Mr. Sandler points out, the 4 very next line on there indicates that people will be out 5 of view, particularly ERT members -- should be out of 6 view; still want them for support. And that's 7 consistent, I think, with what you've just told us. 8 A: It's consistent with what I said and 9 I'm sorry, I -- I should have read further. 10 Q: Okay. And, if we turn to September 11 the 9th, at -- again of these scribe notes at Tab 36 page 12 155 at 00:25 hours, and just -- you can start with the 13 first line? 14 "Gerry Thompson received a call from 15 Chief Coles, updated, little action, 16 lots of intelligence completed, 17 negatives going well." 18 Can you tell us -- and again, I appreciate 19 that this is not your writing, can you tell us what that 20 might be in relation to? 21 A: I believe that should read, if I can 22 say: 23 "Gerry Thompson received a call from 24 Chief Coles and updated [period.]" 25 And then, it goes on to say:

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1 "Little action." 2 I wouldn't have known necessarily what the 3 action. 4 "Lots of intelligence." 5 I wouldn't have known; that's why I'm 6 attributing to what -- what Thompson is saying. 7 Completed negotiations; I don't think 8 that's, "negatives,". I think it's: 9 "Negotiations going well." 10 "Police presence on the Park will be 11 patrolled by First Nations." 12 Which I've already said. "They have" -- I 13 don't understand the second: 14 "They have a for the people who attend 15 the funeral." 16 I don't understand that. 17 Q: And, you'll see the -- the second 18 full sentence in the second paragraph under the 00:25 19 hours entry 20 "What appears to outsider with fires 21 and party is only morning." 22 What does that -- what does that tell us? 23 A: I think that -- I don't know if -- 24 James Potts was the person who informed me that it is in 25 the First Nations culture and I -- I hope I'm -- I'm

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1 paraphrasing what he said right, that fires are symbolic. 2 And that when people see fires, we take them -- my 3 culture takes them to be just bonfires, but Jim put a -- 4 a First Nations cultural point to them and said that 5 there's, I believe if I'm quoting right, he said they're 6 releasing spirits. 7 And so, I think that was a certain part of 8 the cultural awareness coming down from Jim Potts to our 9 members to try to impart to the incident commanders; 10 that's how I read that, sir. 11 Q: And, to ensure that, I suppose, that 12 if they had seen those kinds of fires, they might be 13 ceremonial as opposed to -- for offensive purposes? 14 A: Well, I guess, like, we had had fires 15 before the -- the information that was on the OPP files 16 that when there were fires we sent people down on 17 September 5th and we -- we lost a few cruisers. 18 But in this particular case because of the 19 -- the tragic death of Dudley that, in fact, there was a 20 different significance to the fires and I think we were 21 trying to portray that and it shows in the notes. 22 Q: There is some reference at the end of 23 the first full paragraph: 24 "They have a for the people attend 25 funeral."

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1 A: Again, that's somebody else's notes 2 written from it, but all I know is that in the 3 negotiations and -- and -- and whether or not it was in 4 the -- the meeting with Overdon (phonetic) on the 21st, 5 who -- I was aware that there was going to be a funeral. 6 We -- we -- we knew that there would be a 7 large contingent of people and given the facts and 8 circumstances of what had happened, I think that it was 9 my resolve that we were going, and I know we gave 10 directions that were going to honour the -- the solemness 11 of the occasion, and that we were going to do everything 12 within our power to not become a part of that issue. 13 Q: And, at Tab 41, sir, of the book of 14 documents in front of you, there is Inquiry Document 15 1009053, which is an OPP press release dated September 16 the 10th, '95. 17 A: Do you have a tab number for me? 18 Q: At Tab 41. 19 A: Thank you. 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 A: Yes, sir. 24 Q: It is reporting the fact that 25 negotiations have occurred, that things perhaps have

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1 stabilized. Would you agree with that so far? 2 A: Somewhat, yes, sir. 3 Q: There were some results insofar as 4 those negotiations with respect to certain items of 5 property of the OPP? 6 A: Yes, sir. 7 Q: All right. And the very next 8 paragraph there's some recognition there, and perhaps 9 that can simply be read: 10 "The Ontario Provincial Police wish to 11 recognize the dignity of the funeral 12 ceremony scheduled for Monday September 13 11th. First Nation desire for privacy 14 during this solemn period will be 15 honoured." 16 And then it goes on to provide a comment, 17 an expression of appreciation from yourself to the First 18 Nations chiefs and elders during those negotiations. 19 A: I definitely did appreciate the 20 efforts of the people involved. 21 Q: All right. You would have had a 22 hand, I gather, then, in this particular press release? 23 A: Bob -- Mr. Martin -- Martin Brown, 24 the sergeant, he wouldn't have quoted me unless he -- he 25 would have talked to me.

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1 Q: But, those were your sentiments then 2 and they certainly would appear to be now -- 3 A: They are my sentiments then and they 4 are my sentiments now. 5 Q: If we could mark that as the next 6 exhibit, please? 7 THE REGISTRAR: P-566, Your Honour. 8 9 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-566: Document number 1009053 OPP 10 News release September 10/95 11 Update of situation, Chris 12 Coles statement of 13 appreciation for First 14 Nations leader's cooperation. 15 16 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 17 Q: At the next tab, Mr. Coles -- 18 A: If I can, just before you go -- 19 Q: Go ahead. 20 A: I mean, the last sentence is also 21 important to me, that we were still trying to reach a 22 peaceful conclusion through negotiations, because the 23 situation was still ongoing -- 24 Q: All right. 25 A: -- at that time. I still had the

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1 position was, they going to have to face an injunction. 2 Was -- those things were still going on with MNR getting 3 injunctions, and I was still trying to face those things. 4 So, it was still to try to do it as 5 peacefully as we could. 6 Q: Yes, thank you for that. The next 7 tab, sir, under Tab 42 is a further press release dated 8 the 10th of September as well. 9 A: Yes, sir. 10 Q: And it's Inquiry Document Number 11 2004488. And it essentially has described the 12 negotiations that you had -- were quoted on in the 13 earlier press release; is that fair? 14 A: Yes, sir. 15 Q: And it would appear to be a direct 16 quote here. Do you recall providing that quote? 17 At the second paragraph it reads, and I 18 quote: 19 "These meetings have served as a good 20 foundation for future meetings to 21 come." End quote. 22 A: No, again I'm going back to Martin 23 Brown. I just know how Martin Brown operates. He -- 24 basically, if he's going to paraphrase something I say, 25 he was -- he would usually approach me to ask me.

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1 But, they did serve as a good foundation 2 for the future meetings thanks to Mr. Mercredi and the 3 other people. 4 Q: Perhaps we can mark that as the next 5 exhibit? 6 THE REGISTRAR: P-567, Your Honour. 7 8 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-567: Document number 2004488 OPP 9 News release, September 10 10/95, Update Re: Meeting 11 between First Nations leaders 12 and OPP continue. September 13 10/95. 14 15 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 16 Q: Is there anything of -- of note, Mr. 17 Coles, that you could further comment on with respect to 18 any events that occurred on the 9th or 10th of September? 19 A: No, it -- just as I alluded to, we 20 had a gentlemen by the name of Marvin Connor who, I 21 understand, is a First Nations person. But if there were 22 not people like that that were willing to spend nights 23 down in the Park with the occupiers of the Park, those 24 were truly appreciated by me and they're still 25 appreciated by me.

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1 Q: Thank you. Turning to September 11th 2 of '95 and, Mr. Commissioner, I should say I don't -- I 3 don't intend to go much beyond these particular dates. 4 There are a number of items that I -- I 5 will touch on with respect to this Witness, because I 6 think that it is crucial that his evidence be provided. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: The press 8 release of that is dated September the 7th. I think it's 9 at Tab 35. Is that already an exhibit? 10 I don't think we've made it an exhibit. 11 MR. DONALD WORME: I'm told it is, 12 Commissioner. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Is it 14 already an exhibit? 15 MR. DONALD WORME: I'm told it is an 16 exhibit, and what we can do is double check that. If it 17 is not, then we'll attend to that. 18 19 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 20 Q: On September 11th, 1995, sir, you had 21 received certain information from Ron Fox; can you tell 22 us about that? 23 A: That -- my notes said, 2:45 advised 24 by Ron -- Inspector Fox that the injunction had been 25 withdrawn. The background that I can give you to that is

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1 that the injunction process was still ongoing by the MNR. 2 They had received an injunction and the service of that 3 injunction was basically to be done by air. 4 That we could drop the injunction on given 5 the facts. I did not like that. I didn't see that it 6 was quote, "needed". And it was at the time when the 7 funeral on that -- those -- in the morning and that was 8 still going on. 9 And my position was, I don't think it's 10 necessary and I really don't want to handle it at this 11 time and now -- and all the efforts that people put in to 12 get that injunction, I'm now asking you basically, I 13 don't want the injunction. 14 But cooler heads saw fit that the 15 injunction would be withdrawn and I appreciated that. I 16 didn't want to -- to have a court director during a 17 funeral or shortly after a funeral and for me to now take 18 some kind of court action. So I -- I truly appreciated 19 whoever put that in place so that I didn't have to 20 enforce it. 21 Q: And I think we can all understand 22 your reluctance in wanting to pursue your duty as it 23 would be your duty, if there was, in fact, that 24 injunction in such circumstances, but did you have any 25 role in the withdrawal of that injunction?

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1 A: Well I -- I do recall bringing it up 2 to, I think, Inspector Fox, and saying now's not the 3 time. What have we got -- and then when the -- when it 4 came as to how possibly it should be served, as I recall 5 it was dropping it from a helicopter as I recall. 6 I didn't want to do that. And my 7 understanding of an injunction and many legal people may 8 tell me something different is that I'm instructed to do 9 something, but how I do it is left at my discretion as a 10 police officer. And I didn't think that was the best 11 idea, so I put that -- those things in motion and 12 thankfully people -- people understood. 13 Q: You're aware that the funeral of 14 Dudley George was conducted on that day, I think you've 15 indicated? 16 A: Yes, sir. 17 Q: Do you have any comment on that or 18 were you aware of anything else that might have been 19 going on at the same time? 20 A: Well there may have been other things 21 going on the same time. I just hoped that -- that the -- 22 it is appreciated that the Ontario Provincial Police 23 tried to -- to recognize the solemness of Dudley's 24 funeral. 25 Q: Sir, from September 12th onwards, you

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1 had attended -- well, on September the 12th you had 2 attended another meeting with National Chief Mercredi. 3 Do you recall that, sir, even from a 4 review of your notes? 5 A: On September the 12th I don't have a 6 meeting. It says, "call for Tom Bressette." I know that 7 Mr. Mercredi's -- some people had saw fit to trash his 8 office for some reason, but I think they -- they had the 9 wrong reasons for doing it I guess. 10 But, I don't believe I met with him that 11 day. But there was some concern about Mr. Mercredi's 12 safety, expressed by then-Chief Bressette. 13 Q: Sir, at Tab 63, it's Inquiry Document 14 2005399. 15 A: Yes, sir. 16 Q: First of all, do you recognize that 17 writing? 18 A: Regretfully I do, sir. That is my 19 writing. 20 Q: That is your writing? 21 A: That is my writing, sir. 22 Q: And can I suggest to you, sir, that 23 in fact the note taking has changed from previous? 24 A: As I -- as I intimated before -- that 25 gave evidence before, I now am having to deal with people

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1 repeatedly, and so it's -- it's -- I'm making notes so 2 that it will assist me. You can see that I'm writing 3 down telephone numbers of people that I'm going to return 4 the calls to, et cetera, so it becomes notes. 5 Again, not notes taken in the normal case 6 of police notes that I expected to be here today, but it 7 was just an assistance to me. 8 Q: Was that, in part, that assistance 9 required because of the role of negotiations that you had 10 assumed? 11 A: Not really, they -- the -- the -- the 12 diary doesn't suffice. It's one (1) page, it doesn't 13 suffice. It's a notebook, is, basically, what -- what 14 I'm doing. 15 Q: Perhaps, I could have these notes 16 made the next exhibit? 17 THE REGISTRAR: P-568, Your Honour. 18 19 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-568: Document number 2005399 C. J. 20 Coles handwritten notes 21 September 11- October 18/95. 22 23 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 24 Q: There's an indication that the screen 25 -- pardon me, the page that's up on the screen, the

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1 notation I think is: 2 ˘9:20, Ovide Mercredi -- 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: -- meeting?÷ 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Kettle Point First Nations Territory? 7 Does that...? 8 A: What page do you have? What page is 9 that? 10 Q: Page 13. 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 A: Do you have the page number at the 15 front, 205 -- what's that number? 16 Q: I'm going to just see if I can find 17 that... 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 Q: Sorry, yeah, 270043 is the front 22 number. 23 A: 27003 -- 43? Okay. Yes, sir, I do 24 remember that meeting. 25 Q: All right. And I take it this is

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1 notes of that meeting? 2 A: Yes, sir. 3 Q: The next entry after Kettle Point 4 First Nations Territory, something, is that -- could be, 5 "injunction?" 6 A: Kettle point, it's -- it's a meeting 7 -- we talked about the injunction and Bob Goodall. And I 8 believe that is the -- the reason for Bob Goodall was 9 that we wanted -- First Nations people had asked for a 10 meeting where Bob Goodall -- where some indication where 11 we could, could be -- they could be advised what had 12 happened and at one (1) of the meetings, it may have been 13 the second one I had with Ovide, that Bob Goodall 14 attended. 15 Bob Goodall was the criminal investigation 16 officer assigned to the shooting. He had some knowledge 17 of what went on down at the Park. He wasn't -- but we 18 brought him there as a resource person to possibly assist 19 to tell people where it was and where we were going. 20 Q: All right. And under the number 2? 21 A: I -- I believe that those notes -- 22 scribble -- are made and that -- that Ovide Mercredi is 23 talking and I'm just kind of scribbling notes and that he 24 talked about the premier and Harnick and then goes on to 25 give what he -- what I -- what he advised was a -- a

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1 meeting or a telephone conversation that he had with the 2 premier. 3 I believe Ovide Mercredi went down to 4 Toronto. I'm not sure that he had then come back, but I 5 believe that's what it was about. 6 Q: Okay. Do you have any recollection 7 of Mr. Mercredi's comments insofar as his meetings or 8 whatever it might have been with the premier as far as 9 success or otherwise? 10 A: I -- I recall a certain amount of 11 dissatisfaction that Mr. Mercredi expressed and -- and I 12 think it's indicated in my notes: 13 "Wouldn't talk about issue, needs of 14 Indians, et cetera." 15 I believe that's paraphrasing what Mr. 16 Mercredi said at a meeting and that's where I came up 17 with, I think he was -- he was dissatisfied for whatever 18 reason. 19 Q: All right. As I understand it, sir, 20 you were involved in the capacity, as you -- as you've 21 taken on, of negotiator, essentially for the next six (6) 22 weeks after September the 7th? 23 A: Yes, sir. Not six (6) -- not six (6) 24 weeks every day, just basically the main negotiations 25 took place prior to us signing the agreement of September

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1 the -- the agreement that we signed, and that was for -- 2 to -- to do an identification process of the scene. 3 And, but of course, we had the funeral in 4 the meantime. 5 Q: And as a consequence of these 6 negotiations, we -- we've already seen some of the 7 results of that, I think, and you've commented on that. 8 There were further results, including a 9 memorandum of understanding. Do you recall that? 10 A: Yes, sir. I was negotiating -- I was 11 negotiating for -- to get access to the crime scene. I 12 chose a path of negotiations. In all honesty, I wish now 13 that I had negotiated harder to get the crime scene back 14 faster. 15 Maybe evidence that was lost would have 16 been there; I don't know. 17 But at least people were talking to me and 18 we had a good rapport started with First Nations people. 19 We had the situation was -- was easing off. We had First 20 Nations police officer presence. 21 Q: The memorandum of understanding which 22 is up on the -- up on the board and a copy of which we'll 23 put in front of you, it has been marked as Exhibit P-47 24 in this Inquiry. 25 A: Yes.

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1 Q: And we have been through this in some 2 detail with prior witnesses. I just want to turn to the 3 signature page, if we could. 4 And there's a signature on behalf of the 5 Ontario Provincial Police. 6 A: That's my signature. 7 Q: All right. That's all I was going to 8 ask you, you can confirm that? 9 A: The other's a signature of Mr. Marvin 10 Connor underneath Bonnie Bressette. 11 Q: And as it indicates, it was signed on 12 the 17th of September, 1995? 13 A: Yes, sir. It was revised a couple of 14 times. 15 Q: And I believe we've had evidence in 16 this Inquiry that access to the scene what has been 17 described at the sandy parking lot, was effected the next 18 day? 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: All right. Sir, on the 21st of 21 September of 1995, you attended to the Kettle Point -- 22 Kettle and Stony Point First Nation? 23 A: Yes, sir. 24 Q: Can you tell us what happened; who 25 you might have been with?

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1 A: I believe I was with Jim Potts and I 2 believe Ron George. I asked if it would be appropriate 3 for me to offer some condolences to the George family. 4 That was facilitated by Ron George and the 5 graciousness of Sam George. I attended at their home and 6 was graciously received and offered my condolences. 7 Q: All right. And again, sir, 8 throughout the subsequent period of time you had, of 9 course, much to do with the ongoing negotiations, but you 10 also had media interactions? 11 A: I beg your pardon? 12 Q: Do you recall having media inter -- 13 or interactions with various individuals from the media? 14 A: Oh yes, sir, they kept calling. 15 Q: A person by the name of Joan Goldie 16 do you recall doing an interview with that individual? 17 A: Yes, I do. 18 Q: Okay. Can you recall today, sir, the 19 context of that interview? 20 A: No, sir, not really. There was a 21 subsequent meeting at Thetford and I believe the Goldie's 22 were also there, I'm not sure. 23 Q: That meeting at Thetford was a 24 negotiation meeting and they were present for that? 25 A: No, sir -- oh, oh, no. That was

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1 another time. 2 Q: I see. 3 A: The Goldie's appeared at one of our 4 negotiation -- at one of the negotiations later on with 5 Bruce Elijah. I forget who was there, I'd have to look 6 in my notes. 7 They -- they appeared and I took exception 8 that I was going to negotiate in front of the media and I 9 told the people that. 10 And I think, subsequently, then they were 11 asked to leave. That was not the spirit that I was 12 entering into negotiations and I wasn't going to do it in 13 front of a -- a camera. 14 Q: I want to deal with a report that you 15 had commissioned but before I do that, as I was asking 16 you about media involvement, at Tab 67 there is a new 17 article dated March 31st of 1996. 18 It bears Inquiry Document Number 1001269, 19 and you'll find that again at Tab 67. 20 A: Yes, sir. 21 Q: And I'll suggest to you it's a fairly 22 lengthy article that was published in the Toronto Star on 23 that date noted. 24 A: That's correct. 25 Q: You are quoted as -- as saying and I

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1 quote here: 2 "OPP Chief Superintendent Chris Coles 3 candidly admitted a decision was made 4 to confront people. Coles' comments 5 were the first public statement 6 indicating there was a major police 7 buildup in the area at least twenty- 8 four (24) hours before the shooting, 9 now under investigation by the 10 Provincial Special Investigations 11 Unit." 12 Do you want to comment on that, sir? 13 A: It occurred on almost my last day in 14 March that I worked. A member of the Toronto Star called 15 me up, my secretary, I believe, was on job action at that 16 time. I think it was a strike. 17 And I picked my own phone and I was asked 18 a series of questions of which I -- I answered and then 19 we got into a situation talking about confrontations. My 20 recollection and I later clarified it for the London Free 21 Press, was I asked what confrontation. 22 As I read it, I am not -- I think that it 23 was a skilful use of words but, in my opinion, it did not 24 speak in the context that I spoke. The confrontation I 25 spoke about, I tried to clarify with the reporter that

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1 the confrontation that was planned was if the First 2 Nations people went into the Park, they were to be 3 confronted to basically say that they were trespassing. 4 As I read that article, it would suggest 5 that it was a planned -- the planned confrontation -- it 6 was a planned confrontation which resulted in the tragic 7 death of Dudley that -- that those and I think there was 8 a confusion. 9 I'm not taking issue with all the content. 10 I'm just saying it -- to me it -- it was not what I said. 11 I tried to clarify that with the London Free Press and if 12 you read the London Free Press article, I am satisfied 13 that they clarified what I believe was my position only 14 to have an editor suggest that I recanted my statement. 15 I had to look up the word 'recant' but I 16 don't think I recanted. I just tried to explain the 17 difference but I -- I got a little bit of satisfaction 18 from it. It was unfortunate and the reason, it's a 19 little sensitive to me but the reason it's unfortunate 20 because that particular quote was used time and time and 21 time again and I think it brought a wrong image of what 22 had happened. 23 And that's why I take exception to it, 24 that's all. 25 Q: I'd ask that article, the Toronto

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1 Star article be marked as the next exhibit. 2 THE REGISTRAR: P-569, Your Honour. 3 4 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-569: Document number 1001269 5 Toronto Star article "OPP 6 Force ordered to 'confront' 7 Indians. Police admit big 8 buildup before September 06 9 Ipperwash shooting death." 10 March 31/96. 11 12 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 13 Q: At the very next tab, Mr. Coles, 14 Inquiry Document Number 1001269. Pardon me, 1063. 15 A: What tab are we on? 16 Q: We're at Tab -- 17 A: Oh. 18 Q: -- 68. 19 A: Okay. 20 Q: And I take it that's the headline that 21 draws your exception? 22 A: I was -- I was retired March 29th, I 23 guess or March 31st was the article. It was my intention 24 not to come back to the Ontario Provincial Police at that 25 time. March 21st being my anniversary and that's why I

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1 chose that date to retire. 2 And then I was forced to come back because 3 it was decided along with our media that perhaps I could 4 try to clarify that situation. And that's where you get 5 that I recant the story and I don't believe it's a 6 recantation but, in fact, it was my attempt at 7 clarification. 8 Q: Okay. And we can mark that as the 9 next exhibit please. 10 THE REGISTRAR: P-570, Your Honour. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: P-570. 12 MR. DONALD WORME: 570? 13 THE REGISTRAR: P-570. 14 MR. DONALD WORME: Thank you, Mr. 15 Registrar. 16 17 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-570: Document number 1001063 April 18 01/96, Articles: 1) London 19 Free Press" Top OPP officer 20 recants story" Article about 21 Coles previous statement found 22 in Toronto Star article of 23 April 01/96. 2) Press 24 advisory re: George Family 25 sues Premier, Ministers, OPP &

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1 Federal Crown. 2 3 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 4 Q: If I can just take you back, sir, you 5 had commissioned a review of events at -- that had 6 occurred at Ipperwash in February of 1996 and I'll refer 7 you to Tab 72. It's Inquiry Document 2000556. It's 8 dated, as I said, February 21st, 1996, and a time stamp of 9 08:30 hours. 10 And what I'm particularly interested in, 11 sir, it's up on the screen as well, if you look at the 12 fourth full paragraph, the last sentence in there. 13 A: Yes, sir? 14 Q: Chris Coles stated his contentment 15 with the overall operation at Ipperwash. 16 A: If I'm allowed a little bit of 17 explanation, I would appreciate it. 18 Basically, given that I was going to 19 retire, you had many things going on in February. There 20 were still investigations, there was charges, there was 21 SIU investigations, et cetera. I was leaving the 22 organization and I felt that I would -- that I wanted a 23 review of the situation. I thought that I was the person 24 that -- that should -- should do it. 25 The problem with -- with all the ongoing

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1 investigations that were going on, there were things that, 2 really, we couldn't talk about or shouldn't have talked 3 about and I didn't want to get into -- to those 4 situations, but I did want a chance for the officers who 5 had served under me to basically tell me what we did wrong 6 or didn't do wrong, et cetera, a normal -- after most 7 incidents, you always have debriefings, but this was 8 something that -- that I pushed a little bit. 9 These are notes that were taken by somebody 10 at the time and I know that somewhere in this Inquiry as I 11 watched the transcripts, there's some evidence or words to 12 that contentment and I take a little exception to it. 13 I mentioned about my father saying about 14 when you pray, pray for a contented mind. I think when I 15 opened that scenario, I probably was a little choked with 16 emotion and, basically, I would have mentioned that that 17 was the first thing that I spoke to the First Nations 18 people about that night and that's where I believe the 19 word, "contented" came from. 20 And overall -- overall, I was contented, 21 not just of the Pinery -- of the -- of the Park situation, 22 but how my offices had acted all around basically starting 23 from the buildup to basically after the events and the 24 funerals, et cetera and how people had conducted 25 themselves.

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1 I'm not saying we were a perfect agency, 2 I'm just saying I was somewhat overall contented. I take 3 exception to a gentleman who said that I was contented of 4 death; I was not. But that's what the notes are. Again, 5 they're just -- as I read them, they are scribe notes, 6 they are basically somebody who is trying to paraphrase 7 sometimes my mumblings, but that's what happened and I 8 appreciate the -- 9 Q: Thank you for that, sir. 10 I think we're -- we're essentially at the 11 end of the questioning and one (1) of the things that 12 we've done, sir, with virtually every witness is we've 13 asked them at some point in time during their examination, 14 if... 15 16 (BRIEF PAUSE) 17 18 Q: ...if -- I think I need to consult a 19 little further with Mr. Millar. It's not about a --a 20 technical device so I think we're in good shape in that 21 way, but I wonder if it might be appropriate simply to 22 take our afternoon break at this point. I think we can 23 finish in-chief very shortly. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We'll take an 25 afternoon break.

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1 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 2 for fifteen (15) minutes. 3 4 --- Upon recessing at 2:36 p.m. 5 --- Upon resuming at 2:55 p.m. 6 7 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 8 resumed. Please be seated. 9 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Commissioner, before we 10 begin there's one administrative matter that I need to 11 deal with. 12 Mr. Elijah cannot come on Thursday and -- 13 but he can be here on Monday. Mr. Roland cannot be here 14 on Monday, so we will not be dealing with Mr. Elijah until 15 -- now it'll be into -- sometime in September. 16 So, I wanted to let everybody know that. 17 After we're finished with Mr. Coles, we'll be moving to 18 Mr. O'Grady. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 20 Yes, Mr. Worme...? 21 22 (BRIEF PAUSE) 23 24 CONTINUED BY MR. DONALD WORME: 25 Q: Sir, I've put before you what has been

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1 marked in these proceedings as Exhibit 482. It is a 2 collection of documents. The initial part of that would 3 appear to be an executive summary of some description. 4 It bears your name at the -- at the end of 5 that. It's approximately eleven (11) or twelve (12) 6 pages, I believe. 7 Accompanying that are numerous documents, 8 and I wonder if you just might be able to tell us about 9 that, whether or not that is a document of your creation 10 or any part of that is? 11 And secondly, if any part of that is your 12 document, what was it based upon? 13 A: The first document is an executive 14 summary. I was asked to prepare an executive summary by 15 Deputy Commissioner Boose and -- or Chris -- Commissioner 16 O'Grady for a meeting that was to be held on September the 17 27th, in which there would be representation of three (3) 18 deputy ministers. 19 And it was for me to present the situation 20 at that time, an executive summary of what had gone on and 21 what I thought, and it ended with a -- with some options, 22 possible options. 23 It was just a kind of a think tank. The 24 initial report went to Commissioner O'Grady and Deputy 25 Commissioner Boose and then subsequently I attended at a

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1 meeting where I made a presentation. 2 I'm not sure how much of that executive 3 summary went to that meeting, but I would have spoken off 4 of it at that time. 5 Q: And there is no time indicated on that 6 document, sir. Do you know when that was prepared? 7 A: Just -- on September the 26th was the 8 final preparation. 9 Q: 1995? 10 A: Yes, September the 26th, 19 -- no, no. 11 Yes, September the -- no, September the 26th, 1996. 12 Q: All right. 13 A: No, excuse me. September the 26th, 14 1995. I'm reading the wrong -- 15 Q: All right. Thank you for that. 16 A: -- thing, sorry. 17 Q: The material that that was based upon 18 would have came from where, sir? 19 A: It was a compilation that I put 20 together when I was asked, basically from the chronologies 21 that I had asked for throughout the investigation, 22 materials that I had. 23 I also asked then-Inspector Goodall for a 24 chronology from his side, from the crime management -- 25 from the investigations side.

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1 So, he presented it to me and then I kind 2 of compiled them. My executive assistance put them in 3 these form and I presented them to the Deputy Commissioner 4 -- Commissioner and then the content to the Deputy 5 Ministers. 6 There were three (3) Deputy Ministers; MNR, 7 Sol Gen and Attorney General. 8 Q: All right. Had you an opportunity to 9 review that document for accuracy since your preparation 10 and submission of that? 11 A: Yes. This particular document, I 12 believe to -- my document having composed it myself, yes, 13 sir. 14 Q: And the items that you referred to, 15 some of which was based, as I understand your answer, on 16 information supplied to you from others? 17 A: Yes, sir. 18 Q: Had you looked at each of those items 19 to determine if, in fact, they were accurate as I take it 20 you believed they were accurate when you prepared that? 21 A: I definitely believed they were 22 accurate, sir. I believed -- if I seize Bob Goodall to 23 give me something, I know he will do the best to present 24 it accurately, and I did, and from the chronology. 25 Q: And I'm sure it's appreciated that

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1 people will -- your colleagues would try to give you 2 accurate information. I guess the only thing I'm getting 3 at is if, in fact, you examined each item that was 4 reported on and satisfied that -- yourself that, in fact, 5 it is accurate. 6 And -- and of course I'm referring to 7 subsequent to the date of your -- of you submitting that. 8 A: I believe that the information was the 9 best information that I had as of September the 26th from 10 the -- that the Ontario Provincial Police had and then I 11 reported it as accurately as I -- as I could. 12 Q: Is page 12 part of your document? 13 Right, following the signature page. 14 A: No. I believe that that is another 15 chronology that was -- that a fellow by the name of 16 Inspector George Marshall put together. And that was done 17 -- again trying to track some of the incidents involved in 18 -- at Ipperwash but involved how many were supployed (sic) 19 and support. And I believe it was done George Marshall, 20 Inspector George Marshall. 21 Q: And the hundred and seventeen (117) 22 pages following at -- your report, do you know who 23 prepared those? 24 A: No. I'm going to say no, sir. 25 Q: And I take it you wouldn't know the

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1 purpose for which the balance of those documents were 2 prepared? 3 A: And I'm not saying there's a hundred 4 and eighteen (118) documents and my name doesn't appear on 5 those documents. But as far as I'm concerned I -- I can 6 speak of the executive summary, but the other ones I -- I 7 really can't speak of. 8 Q: Thank you for that. Sir, the one (1) 9 comment that I just -- or one (1) question I just wanted 10 to ask you, with respect to CMU's march on the Park, on 11 the evening of September the 6th, we've had suggestion 12 here that perhaps a bullhorn might have been employed at 13 that instance in order to communicate the message to those 14 in occupation of the Park that if they remained that there 15 would be no physical confrontation. 16 You're aware of that criticism? 17 A: I'm aware that that issue arose here. 18 Q: And do you have any comment at all? 19 A: No, sir. I -- I have no comment other 20 than to say that incident commander -- they make the best 21 decisions that they can. 22 Q: We've also heard something, sir, in 23 this -- in these proceedings about some hats and t-shirts 24 that had evidently been prepared by members of the OPP 25 which bore certain insignias including the crest with

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1 other items. I believe one of which to be an arrow 2 through the crest; the words 'Team Ipperwash' something to 3 that affect, perhaps a feather or some such thing or item, 4 or depiction of? 5 A: I recall that there was a t-shirt and 6 I believe mugs that somebody had chosen to have made up 7 relative to the time period at Ipperwash. It was found to 8 be -- my understanding offensive to some people of the 9 First Nations and there was an investigation that was 10 conducted into those matters. 11 I beli -- I don't know when that started. 12 I did have -- I had knowledge that there was an -- that it 13 was assigned through the regular process to investigate 14 the matter. And I believe I had left -- I can't tell you 15 outcome because I -- I believe I had left. 16 Q: Did you have any role in terms of 17 identifying any individuals that might have been 18 responsible? 19 A: No, sir. I was -- 20 Q: Or instigating any process as against 21 those actions? 22 A: I have a recollection that there was - 23 - the incident was reported. It was reported up to 24 Superintendent Parkin and it was decided that an 25 investigation would be done and that's -- and I was

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1 notified to that and that's all. 2 Q: Yeah. And lastly, sir, we've afforded 3 virtually every witness that has sat in -- in the chair 4 you are now in, with an opportunity to provide this 5 Commission and Mr. Commissioner, with any recommendations 6 that might assist in the execution of his mandate. 7 A: I have three (3) points but I'd like 8 to preface the points if I can by stating that I retired 9 from the Ontario Provincial Police in 1996 and I'm not 10 aware of -- truly as to what depth they have gone and I'm 11 sure lots of things have been done at that time. 12 So, I am speaking of my recommendations to 13 this Inquiry based upon my knowledge of some ten (10) 14 years ago and you have had my background as far as my 15 involvement in -- in some issues of incident command. 16 My first recommendation, Your Honour, that 17 I would ask that you might consider is that in this 18 situation and others, there is a need for some type of 19 conflict resolution teams, in my words, that are on-call, 20 represented by both native and non-native, in the -- in 21 the situations of First Nations, who would be willing to 22 offer their services to both the community, be it native 23 or other, and/or the police. 24 Make the point that they must be on call. 25 I do not see this conflict resolution team as a think tank

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1 that doesn't hit the ground. I see it as being a team 2 that will be willing to go much the same as the -- the 3 Elijah's, and the Potts, and the Marvin Connors, that -- 4 and the Mike Hudsons, the people that I said were the 5 heroes of Ipperwash, willing to go to the community. 6 I would -- I would hope that the policing 7 community itself would embrace a mandate that it would 8 have. And my position is that a mandate would be just to 9 stop people from being hurt; that's what their mandate 10 would be. My worry is that somebody would turn it into 11 some kind of political exercise, I see it just to be an 12 interim measure that when violence is threatened that the 13 team would move. 14 And, that goes to my second point. My 15 second point is that when you have violence, or threats of 16 violence, or displays of firearms utilized by any group, 17 but I'm going to use the word, "protestors" just in the 18 First Nations because I'm not sure that what has happened 19 is the media has presented an image, if I suggest Oka 20 where people held firearms at different times on both 21 sides, Akwesasne where there were firearms shot at the 22 Mohawk police. 23 When you get that type of incident, I 24 believe that that should be the catalyst to mobilize the 25 conflict resolution team because it is in that standoff

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1 period that danger has occurred in the past, if we look at 2 our history. It is in the danger of Oka when the two (2) 3 standoffs and people looked across barricades and when you 4 had that. 5 So, I'm suggesting if you have a group of - 6 - of honourable people that would go and talk, but I 7 believe that if the -- if the police departments would 8 support the mandate, it would also assist because if 9 there's threats of violence, the incident commander that's 10 assigned, wherever, is going to be on the ground as a 11 police officer and now all of a sudden, he's got this 12 other group coming in. 13 So, I believe that group should have a 14 mandate that is at least supported, well, I suggest, by 15 the Canadian Association Chiefs of Police or whatever. I 16 think it should have some credentials to it. 17 The other concern that I have is that in 18 the Ontario Provincial Police in my history, starting in 19 1973 there was, in my -- there was an attempt to introduce 20 First Nations policing programs. At first they were white 21 police officers sent to northern territories, et cetera; 22 that didn't work out. Gradually, smarter people decided 23 that maybe the First Nations were most able to conduct 24 their own policing and that's what happened. 25 And, I -- I fully have always supported

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1 that and do support that. There is a danger in that and 2 one (1) of the dangers that you face is that as they 3 become isolated as any small police department, and I 4 speak as an ex-small town chief when I retired, that in 5 fact, it creates a boundary that now -- I'll use the word, 6 "non-natives" don't want to go onto the -- the native 7 territory because there is a police force of jurisdiction. 8 The trouble with that is the First Nation 9 police force operates in isolation and there's a body of 10 good men and women out there in other police services that 11 I'm sure would be an asset to the group. 12 And I think of officers such as Dennis 13 Atkin (phonetic), Mike Hudson, George Speck, Vince George, 14 Luke George who -- who -- who were the people we turn to 15 in this situation, people that liked the community. 16 They trust the community as well as the 17 community trusts them. And my worry is that you get 18 isolated police departments that you don't have that -- 19 those good, well-meaning police officers. 20 In Ontario, in my experience in the past, 21 it took us a long time in the policing community to even 22 co-operate with ourselves. 23 Somebody said it wasn't so much as 24 organized crime as disorganized policemen and I'm not so 25 sure that that wasn't valid at one time.

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1 But what I'm saying is there is a spirit of 2 co-operation that I have seen grown over the years and I 3 would like to think that the First Nations community would 4 become part of that cooperation so that those police 5 officers policing the First Nations communities also had 6 the resource and the co-operation of other people. 7 And I don't know what has been done, but 8 that is my suggestion. You've heard incident command here 9 and the problems of incident command. 10 I listen to John Carson's evidence. I've 11 given my evidence and you get a certain space and time in 12 what an incident commander's had and, if that helps you, I 13 hope it does. 14 Those are my -- 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It does, 16 thank you very much. 17 MR. DONALD WORME: Thank you for those 18 recommendations, Mr. Coles. You will, of course, stick 19 around to answer some questions from some of My Friends 20 and perhaps, Commissioner, if we could canvass the parties 21 as to the time that they anticipate they might be in 22 cross-examination. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Can we do the 24 usual canvassing now? 25 Is everybody ready to give me a reasonable

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1 estimate? 2 Then we'll start with, I think -- well, 3 let's get an indication of, first of all, who wishes to 4 cross-examine. 5 6 (BRIEF PAUSE) 7 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Okay, let's 9 see what we have in terms of an estimate. You can 10 remaining standing, if you wouldn't mind, so I can ask you 11 a question until you've answered. 12 I think, Mr. Roland, you start. Would 13 you... 14 MR. IAN ROLAND: Fifteen (15) minutes. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Fifteen (15) 16 minutes. 17 And I think, Ms. Twohig, you'd be next. 18 MS. KIM TWOHIG: Twenty (20) minutes. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Twenty (20) 20 minutes. 21 Mr. Downard or Ms. McAleer...? 22 MS. JENNIFER MCALEER: Twenty (20) to 23 thirty (30) minutes. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Counsel on 25 behalf of Mr. Harnick? Is anybody here --

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1 MS. ALICE MROZEK: Mr. Runciman, ten (10) 2 minutes. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm sorry, on 4 behalf of Mr. Runciman? 5 MS. ALICE MROZEK: Yes. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Is anybody 7 here on behalf of Mr. Harnick? No, there was the other 8 day but there isn't now. 9 Okay, twenty (20) minutes for... 10 And Mr. Hodgson...? 11 MR. MARK FREDRICK: Twenty (20) minutes, 12 sir. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And Mr. 14 Beaubien? 15 MR. TREVOR HINNEGAN: Five (5) minutes. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Counsel on 17 behalf of Deb Hutton...? 18 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: Approximately twenty 19 (20) minutes. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: The 21 municipality -- no? Yes...? 22 MR. VILKO ZBOGAR: No more than half an 23 hour. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Half an hour 25 on behalf of the family of the estate of Dudley George.

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1 Ms. Esmonde...? 2 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: One (1) to two (2) 3 hours. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 5 Scullion...? 6 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: Half an hour. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 8 George...? 9 MR. JONATHON GEORGE: Fifteen (15) 10 minutes. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Mr. 12 Horner...? 13 MR. MATTHEW HORNER: Approximately half an 14 hour. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Counsel on 16 behalf of ALST? 17 MR. JULIAN ROY: One (1) to two (2) hours, 18 sir. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And Mr. 20 Sandler, you can't estimate at this point, I presume? 21 MR. MARK SANDLER: Well, it's dependent on 22 cross-examination. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I don't know, 24 somebody add that up for me. 25 MR. DONALD WORME: Approximately eight (8)

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1 -- eight (8) hours or some. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: So if we 3 begin -- 4 MR. DONALD WORME: It should consume the 5 balance of today and certainly the majority of tomorrow, 6 if not all of tomorrow. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We should 8 finish at the latest, some time on Thursday? 9 MR. DONALD WORME: At the outside, if we-- 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: At the 11 outside. 12 MR. DONALD WORME: And perhaps just before 13 we move into that cross-examination, I would ask to make 14 certain items exhibits. 15 The document at Tab 6, Inquiry document 16 2002441. I think I had mistakenly referred to that as 17 Exhibit P-402. It was not and so I'd ask that that be 18 made an exhibit. I can certainly -- 19 THE REGISTRAR: P-571, Your Honour. 20 MR. DONALD WORME: The document at Tab 18, 21 the OPP Management Committee Meet -- Management Committee 22 Minutes of July 14th '95, Inquiry Document 200310. That's 23 at Tab 18. 24 THE REGISTRAR: P-572, Your Honour. 25 MR. DONALD WORME: The document at Tab 12

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1 bearing Inquiry Document Number 2005397 being the '94 2 journal of Mr. Coles. 3 THE REGISTRAR: P-573, Your Honour. 4 MR. DONALD WORME: At Tab 25 an e-mail 5 from Nancy Mansell dated September 1st of 1995, Inquiry 6 Document 3000768. 7 THE REGISTRAR: P-574, Your Honour. 8 MR. DONALD WORME: And lastly CD Rom, the 9 conversation between Mr. Coles and Mr. Gordon. 10 THE REGISTRAR: P-575, Your Honour. 11 12 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-571: Document number 2002441 OPP 13 letter to Superintendent re: 14 "Summary of incidents 15 Canadian Forces Base, 16 Ipperwash , West Ipperwash 17 Beach" June 28/95 18 19 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-572: Document number 2000310 July 20 04/95, OPP Management 21 Committee- Minutes. 22 23 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-573: Document number 2005397 Chief 24 Superintendent C.J. Coles 25 handwritten journal entries.

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1 January 25 & November 16/94. 2 3 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-574: Document number 3000768 4 September 01/95 Email from 5 Nancy Mansell to Thomas 6 O'Grady Re: "Ipperwash" at 7 13:53. 8 9 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-575: CD Rom recording of 10 conversation between Chief 11 Superintendent C. J. Coles & 12 Inspector J. Gordon. 13 September 06 & 07/95. 14 15 MR. DONALD WORME: Thank you. 16 MR. MARK FREDRICK: Mr. Commissioner, 17 I've, with permission of My Friend Ms. Twohig and talked 18 to some of my colleagues, I have to be out of here today. 19 So they've let me jump the queue if that's all right with 20 you. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's all 22 right with me if it's all right with people ahead of you 23 in the queue. Okay. 24 25 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. MARK FREDRICK:

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1 Q: Hello, Chief Coles. The only document 2 you're going to need when I take you through some 3 questions, is copies of the P-44A which is the September 4 6th telephone conference that telephone call you had with 5 Mr. Fox. So if you have that note handy? We wonĂt get to 6 it right away but will save looking for it later. 7 A: Is that the one Ipperwash and Grand 8 Chief Superintendent audio logger? Is that -- 9 Q: Yes. That's the one. 10 A: Thank you, I have it. 11 Q: Mr. Coles, I represent Chris Hodgson 12 who is the Minister of Natural Resources at the time of 13 the Ipperwash incident. It's fair to say you don't know 14 my client Mr. Hodgson; is that correct? 15 A: That's correct. 16 Q: And you've never met him. 17 A: I have never met him. 18 Q: You know him only as a Minister of the 19 Department that was responsible for the Park, the 20 Ipperwash Park? 21 A: Yes, sir. 22 Q: And did Mr. Hodgson ever contact you 23 in relation to the Ipperwash Park of this incident? 24 A: No, sir. 25 Q: And I take it you never contacted him

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1 either; correct? 2 A: No, sir. 3 Q: Now you were the Chief Superintendent 4 of the Field Division of the OPP and as I understand it in 5 that position you had control over all operations 6 pertaining to the OPP in Southwestern Ontario? 7 A: Basically, yes, sir. 8 Q: And people reported to you? 9 A: Yes, sir. 10 Q: And you assign duties and delegated 11 authority from time to time to various individuals? 12 A: Yes, sir. 13 Q: For example, at Ipperwash you 14 assigned, I believe you assigned Superintendent Carson 15 whom you knew to be a very able and fine police officer to 16 be the front line incident commander? 17 A: Yes, sir. 18 Q: And it was expected that you would be 19 available to provide direction both when you were 20 requested to provide that direction whether on your own 21 initiative or when you thought that providing such a 22 direction would be necessary. 23 A: Correct, sir. 24 Q: And Chief, you had the authority at 25 any time to re-assign Superintendent Carson if you thought

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1 it was necessary; correct? 2 A: I could have, yes, sir. 3 Q: And throughout the course of this 4 incident, this unfortunate incident, you never did think 5 that was necessary; correct? 6 A: Not once. 7 Q: You had the authority to step in and 8 take over the command if you thought the command had 9 somehow been compromised; is that correct? 10 A: I could have. 11 Q: And, again, the circumstances never 12 rose where you believed that was necessary; correct? 13 A: That's correct. 14 Q: Now Project Maple, as I understand it, 15 was the OPP's plan on handling this particular 16 confrontation; correct? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: And you were thoroughly familiar with 19 that plan? 20 A: Subsequently. But yes I was. 21 Q: You had the authority to step in and 22 modify or cancel plans like Project Maple if you thought 23 it best to do that; correct? 24 A: In a participative manner, yes, sir, I 25 could have.

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1 Q: That's right. And you never had 2 reason to do that at any time prior to the incident 3 involving the death of Mr. George; correct? 4 A: That's correct. 5 Q: You also had the authority to express 6 any concerns about any operational direction from 7 unauthorized sources such as government officials; 8 correct? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: And you had authority to take whatever 11 steps you thought were necessary to counter any direction 12 from unauthorized sources if you thought that was 13 necessary; correct? 14 A: I would have. Indeed I would have. 15 Q: Of course. And you never did that at 16 Ipperwash; did you? 17 A: No, sir, I didn't. 18 Q: The circumstances were not such that 19 that was required, in your view? 20 A: That's correct. 21 Q: It was also your job to see that the 22 incident commander did not get diverted from his 23 responsibilities when an incident was underway, correct? 24 A: Hmm hmm. 25 Q: It was your job to see that the

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1 incident commander Mr. Carson didn't get diverted from his 2 responsibilities when an incident was underway? 3 A: We tried, yes. 4 Q: Now I want to turn your attention to 5 September 6th, 1995. As I understand, you went up to the 6 command post at Forest on that day and I think the police 7 scribe notes -- I don't think we have to go to them, but 8 they -- they indicate that you and Superintendent Parkin 9 came up to see how things were going? 10 A: Correct. 11 Q: You met with Superintendent Carson for 12 some time on September 6th, 1995, and I take it it was 13 known between you and -- and Superintendent Carson that if 14 he needed your input or advice, he could contact you and 15 you would make yourself available to him; correct? 16 A: Yes, sir. 17 Q: And you had known Superintendent 18 Carson for some period of time; how long? 19 A: Three (3) years, I believe. 20 Q: Okay. And had the two (2) of you 21 worked together on other occasions, prior to Ipperwash? 22 A: He had -- not specifically together, 23 but he had worked for two of my superintendents who 24 reported to me and at each time he was identified very 25 positively and he was acting inspector very early.

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1 Q: And you know of no reason why he 2 wouldn't seek your advice if, in fact, he required your 3 advice? 4 A: I think the record shows that he did. 5 Q: Now, Superintendent Carson didn't 6 contact you or request your assistance with respect to any 7 alleged interference with his command on or prior to 8 September 6th, 1995; did he? 9 A: No, sir, he did not. 10 Q: Nor did he contact you with respect to 11 seeking assistance with his engagement of Operation Maple; 12 correct? 13 A: No, sir. 14 Q: Did Superintendent Carson ever 15 complain to you that he was being pressured to do 16 something he did not wish to do at command of this 17 particular incident by any third party? 18 A: No, sir. 19 Q: The transcript, and I think it's 20 identified as Document P-444(a), indicates that at about 21 two o'clock on the afternoon of September 6th, 1995 a 22 telephone conversation took place between Superintendent 23 Carson and Inspector Fox. Do you have that tab, sir? If 24 you could -- it's between Parkin and -- 25 A: What tab is that?

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1 Q: 37, I believe, sir. 2 A: 37? 3 Q: It should say on the top, September 4 6th, 1995, 14:00 hours; do you see that? 5 A: I have it, sir. 6 Q: Now, if I have it right, Inspector Fox 7 was on secondment to the Solicitor General's office as a 8 policy advisor; do you recall that? 9 A: As a liaison officer and First Nations 10 Issuing Policy Advisor, I guess, yes, sir. 11 Q: He had no policing duties in that 12 role? 13 A: I don't specifically know. They were 14 liaison duties of a police officer, so I guess there are 15 duties, but not operative-type duties. 16 Q: They didn't expect him to go around 17 arresting anybody or things of that nature? 18 A: No. 19 Q: No. Did Mr. Fox give you any 20 briefings on Ipperwash, prior to September 6th? 21 A: Did he give me any...? 22 Q: Briefings? 23 A: No. There may have been some 24 conversations, but not -- not briefings. 25 Q: He wasn't under your command; is that

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1 correct? 2 A: No, sir, he -- no, he was not. 3 Q: And he certainly didn't have any 4 authority over you; correct? 5 A: No, sir. 6 Q: And there was no reason for Mr. Fox to 7 report to you or for you to seek any information from him; 8 correct? 9 A: Not mandated authority to do that. We 10 did -- we -- we talked as a matter of course of liaison, 11 but no, he -- he didn't have to talk to me. 12 Q: Now the protestors had taken over the 13 adjacent Military Base in, I believe, some time in July 14 1995; is that right? 15 A: The Military Base, when he went back-- 16 Q: Maybe '93. 17 A: Yeah 18 Q: Maybe I've got that wrong. 19 A: Yeah. 20 Q: Did you understand that -- that these 21 protestors had long-standing claims to the Base? 22 A: I did. 23 Q: And did you understand the Federal 24 Government had not resolved their claims over a lengthy 25 period of time?

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1 A: That became apparent to me, yes, sir. 2 Q: Did you understand the protestors were 3 frustrated as a result of the lack of action on the part 4 of the Federal Government? 5 A: Yes, sir. 6 Q: Was it your understanding that this 7 frustration, the frustration with the total in-action of 8 the Federal Government which led to the occupation of the 9 Provincial Park by the same group that had occupied the 10 Military -- that occupied the Military Base? 11 A: I can't say they were all the same 12 people but -- but yes, I believe that they were -- they -- 13 they were closely connected. 14 Q: Now the record shows that there were 15 some meetings that took place at Queen's Park involving a 16 group known as the Ontario Native Affairs Secretariat, 17 part of the Ministry of the Attorney General on or about 18 the 5th and 6th of 1990 -- September 5th and 6th, 1995. 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: I take it you, in fact, did not attend 21 those meetings? 22 A: No, sir. 23 Q: Those meetings were, in part, as I 24 understand it, about getting an injunction to get the 25 occupiers out of the Park.

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1 Would that have been your understanding? 2 A: I think they were just -- there was a 3 discussion about that, yes, sir. 4 Q: It would probably canvass other 5 things, but -- 6 A: Yes -- 7 Q: -- one of the -- one of the purposes 8 was to talk about getting this injunction. 9 A: Yes, sir. 10 Q: Now we've heard from Superintendent 11 Carson that the OPP approach, all along, was to get an 12 injunction to be part of the process to get the occupiers 13 out of the Park? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: And that was your understanding 16 throughout? 17 A: Yes, sir. 18 Q: Now Inspector Fox did attend those 19 meetings at ONAS and I take it you did not ask Inspector 20 Fox to give a report to you or to Inspector Carson on the 21 meetings, verbal or written? 22 A: No, sir. 23 Q: In fact, the only thing you would have 24 expected Inspector -- you would have expected Inspector 25 Fox to do is to support the OPP plan to get an injunction

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1 and to co-ordinate any necessary details, such as 2 identifying possible witnesses or whatever other 3 assistance was required to get the injunction? 4 A: And advise us in a liaison capacity of 5 any developments that we might want to consider that would 6 effect the -- the incident. 7 Q: Now, I want to take you back to 8 September 6th, in the afternoon, roughly two o'clock or 9 so, and you are in the command post for a meeting with 10 Superintendent Carson, and he gets a telephone call from 11 Inspector Fox; do you recall that? 12 A: Correct. Yes, sir. 13 Q: Now where are you in relation to 14 Superintendent Carson? Can you describe the set up? 15 A: No, I can't, other than it's a small 16 trailer; it's not a large trailer. I would say it's a 17 trailer of about forty (40) feet length and probably six 18 (6) or so of that feet is used up for telecommunications, 19 et cetera, et cetera, and the rest is open. 20 So, it's fairly close quarters. 21 Q: Okay. Were you able to hear the call 22 between Superintendent Carson and Inspector Fox? 23 A: I think I did suggest that I did hear. 24 I didn't, of course, hear Fox's side of the call but I 25 heard John Carson's comment. I think I -- I think that's

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1 in the record. 2 Q: Now at some point you took over the 3 call. It's in here, I think, it starts at page 270. 4 A: I didn't take over. Basically, I 5 think John Carson asked Ron Fox if he wanted to talk to me 6 and Ron said yes and then I -- I -- I spoke and then I did 7 outline some concerns I had, yes. 8 Q: Okay. Now did anything prompt you to 9 get involved in that telephone call, specifically? 10 A: The fact that I was hearing what I 11 will regard -- what I will speak as operational matters 12 that were being discussed and I was led to believe that 13 that was occurring at the ministry level and I was 14 concerned of what -- why they would have been talking 15 about automatic weapons, et cetera. 16 Q: Now was there any signal from 17 Superintendent Carson that you become involved? 18 A: No. No, sir. 19 Q: You did it on your own initiative? 20 A: I -- I definitely did. 21 Q: Had you had any discussion with 22 Superintendent Carson about Inspector Fox's activities 23 before this call came in? 24 A: I don't recall that I had, other than 25 maybe keeping Ron advised at -- I think there was a

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1 conversation that John had said he had -- he had advised 2 Ron Fox prior to this, and that was fine. 3 Q: No discussion about the concern that 4 maybe Inspector Fox was getting too close -- 5 A: No, no. 6 Q: -- to the fray. 7 A: Not to that context, sir, no. 8 Q: I want to make reference to this 9 logger tape transcript and I'll take you to page 269, and 10 you say, about midway through the page, and it says: 11 "Yes, I guess just sitting here 12 listening." 13 Which leads me to believe that you'd heard 14 enough at that point of the operational concerns that you 15 were concerned; correct? 16 A: That's correct. 17 Q: You say you've got a concern that you 18 want to be: 19 "We want to be careful in what we are 20 doing here that we don't give them, the 21 people that you're talking to, we don't 22 give them the information too fast." 23 What gave rise to your concern at that 24 point? 25

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1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: That reference is made in page 269. 4 A: Yes, I realize that. I'm trying to 5 reflect on what I might have heard John Carson saying; 6 that's what I'm -- that's what I was trying to reflect. 7 I think the concern -- I'm trying to read 8 John Carson's because that's what I would have heard. 9 Q: Sure. Please take -- take your time. 10 A: Yeah. 11 Q: Look, I'll -- I'll tell you where I'm 12 going with this. This may help you as well. I'm just 13 concerned about whether or not there was any prior 14 indication up to that point where you had believed that 15 the -- there had been discussion of operational matters at 16 a governmental level or -- 17 A: No. 18 Q: -- or at a ministerial level, I should 19 say. 20 A: No, there wasn't. I -- I think Ron 21 Fox indicates maybe I had received some other information 22 and that's why we were having this -- information and I 23 said, No, it's basically right now, what I'm hearing right 24 now, Ron. 25 I just -- when -- when I -- when I was

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1 concerned about talking about weapons, et cetera, that's 2 what concerned me and I got on the phone. 3 Q: So, prior to that point there had been 4 no concern whatsoever that operational matters were being 5 discussed at a the government level -- 6 A: No. 7 Q: -- as far as you were concerned? 8 A: As far as I was concerned. 9 Q: And, if there had been, do you believe 10 you would have heard of such? 11 A: I hoped I would have, I guess, is my 12 point. If I thought it -- if it was detrimental, but I 13 think, as you mentioned before, if it was detrimental to 14 the -- to John Carson's management of the -- the incident 15 he would have notified Tony Parkin or myself. 16 Q: And, of course he didn't do that? 17 A: No, sir, he did not. 18 Q: Now, you start elaborating your 19 concern a little bit down the page at 269, you say, 20 speaking with Inspector Fox: 21 "The problem with that, Ron, is if 22 you're not careful, you're going to run 23 the issue there as opposed to myself and 24 the Commissioner running it here. So, 25 we better be careful. I have no

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1 objections to you phoning John with 2 trouble, if not you're going to end up 3 being the fastest source of information 4 they've got. And now, with them, you're 5 going to end up running it politically. 6 I don't want that, it's dangerous if you 7 think about it." 8 Would you agree with me you're giving 9 Inspector Fox a bit of a warning about the situation he's 10 in and what he's saying? 11 A: Yes, I think I am, a caution if not -- 12 Q: Okay. And, you're telling him, in 13 effect, to be careful? 14 A: Yes, sir, I am. I think I state that 15 we have to careful. 16 Q: And, that would have been the first 17 warning you ever had to give to Inspector Fox about that 18 sort of thing, correct? 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: Now, Mr. -- Inspector Fox, in response 21 to that I believe says, Yeah, well. 22 I'm just thinking that, would you agree 23 with me in the sense that Inspector Fox was maybe caught 24 up a little bit, that he may not have appreciated 25 receiving that warning from you at first?

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1 Do you get that sense from him? 2 A: No, sir, I do not. 3 Q: Okay. 4 A: I -- I explained to you before to Mr. 5 Worme, about Ron Fox and I being on the Strategic Planning 6 Committee together at different times, so our dialogue was 7 straight and straightforward. 8 Q: Sure. I mean, if he -- if he was 9 doing something right, you can tell him; if he was doing 10 something wrong, you'd tell him right away? 11 A: Yeah, and he would me, too, I think. 12 Q: Sure. So, what I get here is from 269 13 to 270 you say: 14 "We don't -- we don't -- we're going to 15 end up with it, we're going to end up 16 running it politically. I don't want 17 that. It's dangerous if you think about 18 it [on to page 270]. 19 And, Mr. Fox says, "Yeah, well." 20 And, you continue. You say: 21 "Because they're going to ask you 22 questions. You're going to find 23 answers and the quickest way for you to 24 do it is to come here to John. John's 25 going to give you an honest answer. The

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1 trouble now is, all our -- all we're 2 doing here; sometimes too much 3 information is a dangerous thing." 4 And then, Mr. Fox says back to you: 5 "Clearly it is, Chris, and you know, I 6 don't know if you've heard from somebody 7 else and maybe you have, and that's why 8 you and I are having this conversation." 9 Now, it was true, as Fox put it, that you 10 had heard from somebody else and that was, I think you 11 said earlier in your testimony, Mr. -- Mr. Beaubien had 12 come through Mr. Parkin and Inspector Carson. You'd heard 13 that other interested people were, in fact, asking 14 questions about what was going on? 15 A: No, sir, I don't recollect that. I 16 said I'd talked to John as far as Marcel Beaubien -- 17 Q: Okay. 18 A: -- sooner on. 19 Q: That was the only person you ever 20 heard from, you ever heard that, who's been making 21 inquiries in the background; is that correct? 22 A: That was interested -- interested. 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25

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1 Q: Is it fair to say, having given this 2 warning to Inspector Fox that you appreciated that 3 Inspector Fox was in a delicate position, being a liaison 4 with the government people? 5 A: Yes, sir. 6 Q: And that he really ran some risk by 7 providing too much information too fast, of getting 8 everyone in Toronto potentially all worked up with the 9 situation? 10 Would that have been your concern? 11 A: My concern -- that was my initial 12 concern, but he straightened me out as far as I was 13 concerned that the information wasn't coming from him. It 14 had come up from -- from the MNR source. 15 And -- but I'm sure, having had that 16 conversation, I didn't -- when he told me that it came 17 from somebody else, I kind of -- as far as I'm concerned 18 it -- it was not Ron and -- but I was just -- we -- we 19 were operationally talking and saying, I don't want this 20 information going there too fast. 21 Q: And so -- 22 A: It's just another area that I wouldn't 23 have been able to control. 24 Q: Okay. 25

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1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: Your concern, ultimately, was this 4 information being circulated whether advertently or 5 inadvertently, whether through MNR staff on the ground or 6 through Inspector Fox could comprise Inspector -- or 7 Superintendent Carson's control of the situation as 8 incident commander? 9 A: And create other pressures that I 10 would have had to have dealt with because people would be 11 asking other questions from other Ministries, 12 legitimately, don't get me wrong, that I would have had to 13 have deal with, but it would -- the source would have 14 indicated the command centre and I didn't want that. 15 Q: Now, at page 271 there's a discussion 16 about gunfire and Inspector Fox says: 17 "It came up at the meeting about the 18 automatic weapon fire. You know, 19 they're doing damage, there's heavy 20 equipment roaring around at night and 21 they're..." 22 And I suggest you cut him off and you say: 23 "That's the trouble. And they're going 24 to react to that kind of stuff. It's 25 just the same thing I told them there."

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1 You see that? 2 A: Yes, sir. 3 Q: And I take it you've had a similar 4 conversation with others at the command post about the 5 provision of information by that point? 6 A: As I said, I don't specifically recall 7 at this time what that conversation was, but I had -- if 8 it was part of that operation, which I suggest it was, 9 yes, then probably -- possibly could have been a 10 conversation. 11 Q: Sure. 12 A: I don't know for sure. 13 Q: But you wanted the inform -- the flow 14 of information to be controlled until it could be assessed 15 and determined of it's validity, correct? 16 A: Correct. As best you can. 17 Q: And you say, quite deliberately I 18 suggest, you say to Mr. Fox -- to Inspector Fox: 19 "You play down all the heavy weaponry." 20 You said this to somebody else, I think -- 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: But you say it to -- you repeat it for 23 Inspector Fox's benefit: 24 "You play down the heavy weaponry, 25 because I'll have a safety and backup

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1 issue myself here, et cetera." 2 So this, I would suggest to you, is a 3 second warning to Inspector Fox really about the dangerous 4 possibility of politically -- political interference could 5 be provoked by news about heav -- heavy weaponry and 6 things of that nature? 7 Would that be a fair characterization? 8 A: I don't see it as a second warning. I 9 think it's a -- it's a second point that I'm -- that I'm 10 making, not a warning, not a caution. It's just a -- it's 11 a separate -- a second example, if you will. 12 Q: Well, it may be, but then you say -- 13 but you repeat that notion about backing-up the issue 14 myself here, which tends -- it's sort of on the stronger 15 side of making your point, then, as opposed to -- you 16 don't call it a warning, but it's -- 17 A: Oh, no -- 18 Q: -- making the point very strongly to 19 Inspector Fox. 20 A: Well, I'm making the point, no doubt 21 about that. 22 Q: And Inspector Fox continues on after 23 you said that, he says: 24 "Certainly there was the sound of 25 gunfire and that's a qualified

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1 observation, but it could be semi- 2 automatic but, no, there's no indication 3 were weapons pointed at anybody." 4 And you come in and make the point after 5 that: 6 "Yeah, but you see there's conversation. 7 As far as I'm concerned, there's 8 conversation going there that's 9 operational." 10 A: That's correct. 11 Q: So, really Inspector Fox may not have 12 got your point entirely, so you come out the third time 13 and said to him, Look this is the point, we don't want to 14 talk about operationally entity -- operational things with 15 people in the Government. 16 Would that be fair? 17 A: It's -- I guess what you're saying, 18 it's a third point. There was a -- he talked about the -- 19 it could be a semi-automatic and then I'm saying, okay, 20 now that's the semi -- and it's another -- yeah -- 21 Q: Well, that's not the point. Whether 22 it's automatic or semi automatic -- 23 A: That's right. 24 Q: -- it's operational. 25 A: Yes.

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1 Q: We don't want discussion of 2 operational matters going on right now. And that's the 3 point you're making, and you make it on at least -- I've 4 got three (3) counts of that point being made with 5 Inspector Fox by this point. 6 A: Yes, sir. 7 Q: And then Inspector Fox continues on 8 and he says: 9 "You're right. But you see then what do 10 I do with it, Chris?" 11 This is over at page 272. 12 "Sit there and say, Well I don't know." 13 And suggest even at that point Inspector 14 Fox was still having difficulty as far as you could 15 appreciate it with the notion that these operational 16 matters were things that he shouldn't get drawn into 17 discussion about regardless of where the source of that 18 information come from. 19 Would that be fair? 20 A: It might be fair, yes. 21 Q: And shortly after that exchange, you 22 tell him you're going to call him back from another line. 23 And you say: 24 "Don't get involved in anything else. 25 I'm going to give you a call back."

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1 Do you recall that? 2 A: That's what it says there. 3 Q: Okay. Now, I think you told My 4 Friend, Mr. Worme, that you didn't understand that this 5 line necessarily was being taped. You didn't know if it 6 was or it wasn't. 7 Is that -- is that correct? 8 A: That's correct. 9 Q: This was the main line into the 10 incident headquarters? 11 A: Oh no. There would be several lines, 12 sir. There will be several lines in -- 13 Q: Would it -- would it be your 14 experience that lines would typically be taped for 15 discussions with the incident commander? 16 A: No. They're -- they're usually not. 17 Q: Now, you called him -- you called him 18 back I take it. You can't recall that? 19 A: I can't recall, sir. 20 Q: But, you believe that you would have 21 called him back? 22 A: I have to say, I don't know. But if 23 I'm that specific that I said, Ron, I will call you back, 24 I -- I would have no reason not to call him back, in my 25 opinion. But I have no recollection of that.

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1 Q: If you did call him back, judging from 2 the conversation that you just read here, and giving these 3 -- making these strong points, a warning -- in other 4 strong points about what Inspector Fox should be doing 5 and/or saying, is it likely that your intention was to 6 call him back to sort of reinforce what you'd been saying 7 to him on this particular line? 8 A: I don't think so, sir. I -- I don't 9 know is -- has to be my answer. I don't know. 10 Q: Did you have any other reason to call 11 him? 12 Would there have been any other reason to 13 telephone him that you can think of? 14 A: Well he -- I -- I kind of cut him off 15 and I guess there was still the injunction process. I -- 16 I don't know, sir. Ten (10) years ago, I don't know. 17 Q: What -- what is curios, Chief Coles, 18 is that by the time Inspector Fox was having this 19 discussion with Superintendent Carson, the decision had 20 already -- already been made to forward with an 21 injunction, correct? 22 A: I believe it had. Well I was led to 23 believe that. I was always wondering. Nobody actually 24 said, yes, we've actually got one. So I -- 25 Q: No, I don't think -- I think the

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1 decision had been made that -- certainly the OPP's 2 decision was always to go and get an injunction. 3 A: That's right, but it wasn't our 4 decision to make. 5 Q: The Queen's -- Queen's Park -- the 6 Ministries involved, had to make the decision to be the 7 property, the stakeholder in going forward. 8 A: Correct. 9 Q: And that was your understanding of it? 10 A: Yes, sir. 11 Q: By this time it had been made and this 12 is the approach that the OPP had been advocating 13 throughout? 14 A: Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 15 Q: So, the issues involving Inspector Fox 16 that he'd been discussing with -- with Superintendent 17 Carson had already largely been resolved, that an 18 injunction was to go forward, correct? 19 A: As far as the injunction I gather, 20 yes. 21 Q: Okay. And that's why Inspector Fox's 22 discussions or discussions of Queen's Park about 23 operational matters was particularly unhelpful; is that 24 fair? 25 The goal had already been accomplished,

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1 right? 2 A: I don't think I can categorize it as 3 unhelpful. 4 Q: Now, let's -- 5 A: Ron -- Super -- Inspector Fox saw fit 6 to make the call and to speak to the incident commander 7 about what had happened. As I noticed John's reply super 8 -- it's basically yes, okay. It's going on -- basically 9 it was just an information process that he had received. 10 So, whether or not it was helpful or not, 11 John would have -- could have answered that question. I 12 don't know if -- I found it -- I found it helpful enough 13 that I -- I knew now that information was going to the 14 Ministry that I didn't particularly want to know. 15 And it didn't come through Ron Fox as I was 16 -- but it sure came through somebody else. So, it was 17 helpful enough that we would have at least cautioned the 18 other people that we really don't want it going this way. 19 Q: Right. Because you told Inspector 20 Fox, essentially, don't do this, you don't have to do 21 this. You found out where the information was coming from 22 and you've got the incident commander right there who's 23 clearly hearing you say operational concerns don't belong 24 in the Government, you know, don't talk about that. 25 Certainly if -- if anything, it buoys up

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1 Inspector -- Superintendent Carson in his ability to 2 continue forward and not worry about any pressure; 3 correct? 4 A: I... 5 Q: He's sitting right beside you, he's 6 hearing this. 7 A: Yes? 8 Q: He's hearing you reiterate again and 9 again the fact that, don't worry about operational 10 concerns at a governmental level; correct? 11 A: Yeah. I'm saying I don't want to hear 12 that at that level. I don't say it didn't serve us a 13 purpose as, in my opinion, for the operational matters to 14 be discussed at that level. 15 Q: So, you're -- you're giving support to 16 Superintendent Carson not to be worried about any 17 pressure, effectively, is that not -- 18 A: Oh, well, he's not hearing both sides 19 of the conversation, so I'm -- I'm having a little 20 trouble. He's not hearing -- he had been part of the 21 previous conversation. 22 Q: But he's hearing from you what you 23 have to say; fair? 24 A: He's hearing my words, yes. 25 Q: And what your words are supportive of

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1 Superintendent Carson not being interfered with; correct? 2 A: Correct. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You're way 4 past your estimate, if you're interested. 5 MR. MARK FREDRICK: Yeah, I'm done. Thank 6 you very much, sir. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 8 very much. 9 MR. MARK FREDRICK: Thank you. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 11 MR. MARK FREDRICK: Thank you, My Friends. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 13 Mr. Roland...? 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 18 Q: Good afternoon, Chief Coles. 19 A: Good afternoon. 20 Q: My name's Ian Roland, I represent the 21 Ontario Provincial Police Association and its members. 22 I've -- I've just got a series of questions 23 to ask you with respect to your notes found at Tab 63, 24 which have been marked as Exhibit P-568 and I'd ask you to 25 turn to page 2700079; it's your notes of September 28,

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1 1995. 2 A: 0009? 3 Q: 79. 4 A: 79. Yes, sir? 5 Q: Chief Coles, I'd like to -- you to 6 help us decipher these notes. I have a difficult time 7 reading them. 8 A: I've already given one (1) apology. 9 Q: If you could help us. At the top it 10 appears to say, September 28/'95, is that Thursday? I 11 assume that's the day of the week? 12 A: Yes, sir. 13 Q: And under it, 08:00 Tony Parkin picked 14 me up at...? 15 A: Residence. 16 Q: Residence? 17 A: Yes, sir. 18 Q: 08:45 Grand Bend...? 19 A: Re preparation for meeting at 10:00 20 a.m. 21 Q: Okay. And then, is that, Clifford 22 George? 23 A: Yes, sir. 24 Q: And after that? 25 A: I don't know.

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1 Q: So some -- something undecipherable 2 and then at the end of that line? 3 A: Tom Bressette. 4 Q: Tom Bressette? The next line? 5 A: Oh, I think I know, it's Clifford 6 George, I think that's, "lives in trailer?" 7 Q: Lives in trailer? 8 A: I think that's what that says. 9 Q: Okay. And is that information from 10 Tom Bressette? 11 A: Possibly. 12 Q: All right. And then, under that, Liz 13 Thunder? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: And on that line -- at the end of that 16 line, Cloud is it? 17 A: Cloud, yes. 18 Q: All right. Under that, Debra 19 Bressette? 20 A: Yes. Cheryl Cloud Thomas. 21 Q: And -- and, what's -- what are the 22 words to the left of Cheryl Cloud? 23 A: Surprised I was willing to go. 24 Q: Willing to go -- this is go to the 25 meeting that you were preparing for?

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1 A: I believe that, yes. 2 Q: And then, under that, Diane Thomas? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: In brackets, ECO officer? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: What does that refer to? 7 A: I believe that's the emergency -- I'm 8 -- I'm not sure I should say, ICO officer. Oh I think 9 that's -- I think she's the Economic Officer. 10 Q: Right. 11 A: SheĂs the economic officer. 12 Q: All right. And is -- are these notes 13 made in preparation for the meeting of -- at 10:00 a.m.? 14 A: I believe that to be so, yes, sir. 15 Q: All right. And then let's go to the 16 next line, can you help us with that? 17 A: Oh -- 18 Q: Chief on the plane on way back. 19 A: On the way back. 20 Q: Okay. Who's that? 21 A: I donĂt know. 22 Q: Is that Tom Bressette? 23 A: I -- possibly. 24 Q: All right, then it says "Clifford 25 George --"

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1 A: Clifford George put the meeting off or 2 my meeting off, I believe, should have been double f. 3 Q: All right, and under that? 4 A: People want time to organize. If I 5 want a meeting on Sunday. Oh, there was a -- that's 6 right. There -- three-quarters (3/4) of the people were 7 going to a -- going to the Canada Wonderland for a -- the 8 group was -- I have a recollection of it. 9 The -- that this pertained to the fact is 10 that it wasn't the best time for a meeting because a lot 11 of the community was going to Canada Wonderland. 12 Q: Okay. And at the bottom, sort of four 13 (4) lines from the bottom, it looks like a number. Is 14 that number 1 Band Council? 15 A: Band Council. 16 Q: And that -- 17 A: Russell -- Russell Riggs (phonetic). 18 I believe it says a stay and John McNare (phonetic). I 19 believe he was a lawyer representing First Nations people. 20 Q: All right. And under that? When I 21 can be briefed by the Federal Government I -- I don't know 22 the significance of those words. 23 Q: All right. And are those notes that 24 appear to have been made before a ten o'clock meeting? 25 A: What I don't have is where I'm getting

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1 the information from. We're preparing for a meeting, been 2 told that these people would attend the meeting but it 3 would be better if it was done on Sunday. 4 I don't know where the information's coming 5 from. 6 Q: All right. So then we go to the next 7 page which is 2700080. At the top you have written -- 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 Q: At 10:15 a.m. 10 A: Yes, September the 28th. That's a 11 meeting. 12 Q: This appears to be the meeting -- 13 A: It was -- 14 Q: Presumably there's a meeting that was 15 scheduled for ten o'clock -- 16 A: Yeah, correct. It was one -- 17 Q: And -- and are those the people that 18 attended the meeting? 19 A: Some of them that I have, yes, sir. 20 Q: Sorry, some of them attended or -- 21 A: I'm not swearing to the fact that 22 that's everyone there. There's Tobias, Elijah, Bressette, 23 Ben and Potts and Hudson. 24 Q: Right, okay. And then help us with 25 the next word underneath the --

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1 A: I think all that it is concerns re the 2 last meeting. Power line being taken care of -- being 3 taken care of. 4 There was a power line to the pump house 5 that they -- there was some concerns about. There was 6 concerns about the pump house. 7 As I recall, it had something to do with 8 the water level in the pump house that can cause problems. 9 Q: All right. Now this -- this is -- 10 this is -- we know, Thursday, and you've already indicated 11 that. Then at the next notation is 9:30 Monday morning -- 12 A: Three (3) people assigned -- 13 Q: Three (3) people assigned; do you know 14 what that refers to? 15 A: Yeah, I think that's got to do with 16 the pump house. 17 Q: All right. And then, under that? 18 A: They know what is to be done. 19 Q: Yes, next -- next line? 20 A: Security of building -- of -- no, 21 security of road army base. 22 Q: Yes. 23 A: Friday, Glen Bannon (phonetic) that 24 involved that Glen Bannon -- Glen Bannon was the chief of 25 the Anishnaabeg and his officers were assisting in

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1 providing support to us at the base. And we were talking 2 about the security at the army base road and his people 3 were to attend. 4 Q: Right. And then the point -- 5 A: He would have a team working there. 6 Q: And last -- final notation; is that 7 team working? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: And that's referring to the -- what 10 you've just told us? 11 A: I believe so, sir, yes. 12 Q: All right. And then the next page, 13 2700081, can you help us with what's at the top of that 14 page? 15 A: Mike -- that's Mike Hudson to set up 16 the protocol of the OPP and that was involved in if there 17 was a situation that the First Nations constable 18 patrolling Army Camp Road had a problem with, then there 19 would be a protocol as to how we would approach the 20 occupiers and that would have been Mike Hudson. 21 So, Mike Hudson was -- he was one (1) of 22 the people that we could have deal with it. He -- he 23 would have set the protocol as to how he -- he would have 24 handled it. 25 Q: All right. Stopping there, I take it

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1 these are notes you're making during this meeting? 2 A: They're scribe notes I'm just making 3 as we're basically going through what's going on, yes. 4 Q: All right. The next notation, you 5 have, Monday -- 6 A: Yeah. Charges to -- 7 Q: -- charges to be -- 8 A: And -- and, at 2:00 a.m., the -- some 9 of the charges were to be dealt with. 10 Q: And which charges are these? 11 A: I -- I don't know. This information 12 I'm pretty sure would have come from Mike Hudson. 13 Q: All right. 14 A: Yes, it would have come from Mike 15 Hudson because he was reporting and it may have been 16 simply that people were either -- we had allowed them to 17 come into receive information or to be processed. 18 Q: All right. Then, the next line, it 19 looks like, "investigation?" 20 A: Investigative. 21 Q: Investigative? 22 A: That I read it, yeah. 23 Q: And then under that, 12 gauge shotgun? 24 A: Yes. Single shot .22 and peace pipe. 25 Q: All right. What does that refer to?

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1 A: My recollection of this event is that 2 I believe it was Bruce Elijah, I believe it was Bruce 3 Elijah, that presented information that a 12 gauge shotgun 4 and a single shot .22 and a peace pipe -- I don't know the 5 -- my point about the funeral on Monday, whether or not he 6 was -- this took place when he was there. 7 Q: Hmm hmm. 8 A: But he may -- that there was a blue 9 van, he thought a Chev, red/grey -- I can't read the 10 second line, with a rack on it and it's a rack with 11 ladders. I recall -- 12 Q: What does the 10th refer to? 13 A: Pardon? 14 Q: It says, "blue -- blue van, Chev," and TH 15 it looks like an arrow 10th. What does the 10 refer to? 16 A: The 10th, I believe -- maybe we're 17 trying to find out when that date was? 18 Q: Okay. The 10th of September? 19 A: Well, I think if the -- if somebody 20 could help me when the funeral -- I think it was the 11th, 21 but I'm -- I'm trying to think of when the funeral was. 22 Q: Yeah, the 11th of September, I'm 23 informed. 24 A: Is the -- is the funeral, so 25 therefore, I think what Bruce is advising me is that this

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1 blue van was seen in the neighbourhood on the 10th. 2 Q: Right. 3 A: And then he's also talking about the 4 13th of September, there was a blue -- blue van and it was 5 held onto it. 6 Q: Held onto what? 7 A: I don't know. 8 Q: All right. 9 A: The 14th the van was brought out. 10 Now -- 11 Q: Sorry, that's on the next page? 12 A: Yes, it was. 13 Q: And that first line is, "14th van 14 brought out?" 15 A: 14th the van was brought out. 16 Q: And help -- help us there, what did 17 you mean or understand that to be, brought out from where? 18 A: My -- my understanding is, what -- 19 this was all completely new information and really it was 20 -- it was by way of conversation that Mr. Elijah was 21 giving it to me. It wasn't -- it wasn't part of the 22 negotiations, it was just, basically, he was telling me 23 that he had -- he was involved and had knowledge of this 24 van with ladder racks on it. 25 My concern was we're talking about firearms

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1 here and I recall that he said at midnight that these were 2 put in a garbage bin at Bruce George's house. 3 Q: Was that midnight on the 14th? 4 A: I don't know, sir. 5 Q: All right. And -- 6 A: And -- 7 Q: -- when you say, "these," are you 8 referring back to the 12 gauge shotgun, the single shot 9 .22 and the peace pipe? 10 A: That's what I -- that's -- that's my 11 recollection. 12 Q: Okay. And do you recall what Bruce 13 Elijah told you at this meeting about his knowledge of 14 this? 15 A: No. That -- that's about what it is, 16 I'm just trying to write as Bruce is speaking. I know 17 what I did afterwards with it. 18 Q: Yes. Well before we get to that -- 19 A: That's about the contents of what he 20 said. 21 Q: All right. What's the last line, it 22 says, 16th September. What is that word? 23 A: It talks about Miles and Miles 24 Bressette. I -- I don't know that it has anything to do 25 with the information above.

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1 Q: All right. All right. You were about 2 to tell us, then, having received this information, what 3 did you do with it? 4 A: My recollection was because it was new 5 to me and involved firearms, that I said to Mike Hudson, 6 Constable Mike Hudson, Do we know about this? 7 Q: Hmm hmm. 8 A: And I think at first I said that to 9 Tony Parkin, Do we know about this, and then it was 10 brought to Mike Hudson and I was advised that the weapons 11 were known about and they did know about them. 12 Q: Did you have any other conversation 13 with Bruce Elijah about this matter, about these weapons, 14 apart from the one you've recorded? 15 A: Not that I can recall, sir. 16 Q: Thank you, those are my questions. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 18 very much. 19 Ms. Twohig...? 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 MS. KIM TWOHIG: Thank you, Mr. 24 Commissioner. 25

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1 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. KIM TWOHIG: 2 Q: Well Mr. Coles, my name is Kim Twohig. 3 I represent the Province of Ontario. I have some 4 questions related to communications and information flow 5 as well. 6 I take it that immediately before the 7 occupation of the Park and certainly after the occupation 8 of the Park, you knew that the MNR was concerned about the 9 Park? 10 A: Yes, sir. Yes, Ma'am, sorry. I 11 apologize. 12 Q: No problem. And that's why you talked 13 to Peter Sturdy so that you could exchange information and 14 provide some assurance? 15 A: That's correct. 16 Q: And you knew that there would likely 17 be discussions within the MNR and possibly within other 18 ministries or offices of government regarding an 19 injunction and the possibility of an application for an 20 injunction? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: And you were familiar, I take it, with 23 injunction applications in a general way because of your 24 experience with similar incidents? 25 A: Just in a general way.

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1 Q: But you knew that, I take it, that the 2 ability of -- of a party to obtain an injunction depended 3 on the circumstances of the case including issues of 4 public safety and urgency? 5 A: Correct. 6 Q: Would that be fair? 7 So you would agree with me that it would be 8 important to have accurate and up to date information 9 about the circumstances as they were unfolding so that the 10 individuals could decide whether or not to apply for an 11 injunction and if so, whether on an urgent basis or less 12 urgent basis? 13 A: I agree. 14 Q: So it -- it was logical then that the 15 MNR needed information about what was happening on an 16 ongoing basis. And I understand from your evidence that 17 you supported Inspector Carson's decision to invite the 18 MNR to the command post meetings where information was 19 exchanged. 20 A: Yes, I did. 21 Q: So as far as you were aware, the MNR 22 staff were not told to keep this information confidential 23 and not to share it with anybody, were they? 24 A: No. 25 Q: No. And you certainly never told

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1 Peter Sturdy that or anyone else at the MNR? 2 A: No. I -- I can remember a 3 conversation with Les Kobayashi that we should possibly 4 exercise some constraint. I had no direction over Les 5 Kobayashi and I think a lot of him and I wouldn't have, 6 you know, I wasn't chastising, it was just kind of a, you 7 know, it really doesn't help if we have people, too many 8 people talking about these operational things. 9 I do recall a conversation with Les 10 Kobayashi about that. I think actually if I remember, Les 11 Kobayashi came to me concerned that -- that I might be 12 concerned that he had been the source. But it was -- it 13 was honest. It was just honest people trying to, you 14 know, to present facts, that's all. 15 I just didn't want those particular facts-- 16 Q: Okay. 17 A: -- that I had to deal with. 18 Q: Did you ever have a discussion with 19 him about what was operational and what wasn't? What 20 could be shared and what couldn't? 21 A: No. Not -- not in those specifics. 22 Q: All right. 23 A: Just that the fact of the information 24 that had gone out. 25 Q: All right. So you would expect though

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1 that if -- if he or Peter Sturdy were attending a meeting 2 and they were asked what's happening out at Ipperwash, 3 that they would give the latest information that they had 4 available to them. 5 A: Yes. I expected that. Yes. 6 Q: So -- so as I understand your 7 evidence, you're not really attributing any fault to them 8 for sharing information with their superiors at a meeting? 9 A: No, I'm not. Just that it happened. 10 Q: Yeah. And on what basis do you think 11 that they shared information at any meetings as opposed to 12 Ron Fox? 13 A: I only have the one indication where 14 Ron Fox is telling me that that information came from the 15 MNR. 16 Q: Okay. 17 A: It's the only real reference that I 18 have. 19 Q: Okay. I'd just like to go to the 20 transcript of that conversation again, if I may. That's 21 Exhibit 444(a), Tab 37. 22 A: Page -- what number? 40 -- 23 Q: It's Tab 37 in the exhibit I have. 24 A: Okay. 25 Q: And it would be, as I see it, your

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1 conversation begins on page 269. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 A: I apologize. 6 Q: Yeah. You mentioned that you were -- 7 that you became involved in the conversation because of a 8 concern that operational matters were being discussed and 9 that you had only heard Inspector Carson's side of the 10 conversation; is that correct? 11 A: I'd like -- yeah. I -- it's a small 12 point but I know that -- that John Carson asked Ron Fox if 13 he wanted to speak to me, the chief -- 14 Q: Yes. 15 A: -- and then I got on the conversation 16 and said, Ron, I've got concerns. 17 So, it wasn't me -- 18 Q: Yes. 19 A: -- saying I want to necessarily talk. 20 I just -- I did talk when Ron said he wanted to talk to 21 me. 22 Q: And your concerns, as I understand it, 23 arose as a result of the Carson half of the conversation 24 that you heard; is that right? 25 A: That's what I -- that's right.

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1 Q: Yes. So I'm just looking at the 2 Carson part of the conversation and apart from his giving 3 various indications of assent or understanding in the form 4 of words, "yeah, right, ah ha, good," the only thing of 5 substance that I see he's talked about is on page 267 6 where he says: 7 "Well, there was eight (8) ERT guys, but 8 they were just overwhelmed." 9 Do you see that? 10 A: Yes, I do. 11 Q: And then on the next page where he 12 says: 13 "And -- and you know I'm prepared to -- 14 to appear and give that evidence if, you 15 know, if the chief and the commissioner 16 feels that's the direction we should be 17 going, and I don't see any reason why we 18 can support that." 19 I haven't seen any other references to 20 operational matters, including gunfire or references to 21 the MNR at that point. 22 So, I'm wondering if it's possible that you 23 might have overheard part of the Fox conversation? 24 And please take a minute, because I may 25 have missed the reference. If you'd like to go over it,

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1 feel free. 2 A: Page 264. 3 Q: Yes. 4 A: Bottom of the -- three-quarters (3/4) 5 of the page down, "Fox" -- 6 Q: Yes. 7 A: "Confirmed that there was shots," oh, 8 that -- I wouldn't have heard that; that's actually Fox 9 saying that. 10 11 (BRIEF PAUSE) 12 13 Q: I'm really just wondering if it's 14 possible that you were concerned about the two (2) 15 comments made by Carson that I mentioned earlier, on pages 16 267 and 268 being of an operational nature, and that's 17 what triggered your concern? 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 A: When I get on the phone, I up -- I 22 say, Ron, I have some concerns. 23 Q: Yes. 24 A: So obviously I had some concerns that 25 I didn't -- I didn't ask to speak to Ron, Ron asked to

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1 speak to me so. I'm trying to think what my first point 2 is, it should now be my first point, is after -- when I 3 say, Ron, I have some concerns. 4 Q: I take it you know that Inspector Fox 5 was the liaison officer at that time -- 6 A: Yes -- 7 Q: -- and that he was likely in touch 8 with people within government. 9 A: Oh, I knew that for sure. 10 Q: Yeah. Is it possible that your 11 concern was that he was having a rather extended 12 conversation with the incident commander and there might 13 be information exchanged that caused you concern, as 14 opposed to something specific? 15 A: My initial concern is that we don't 16 give the people that you're talking to the information too 17 fast. That's the initial conversation that I was saying 18 that. 19 Q: Right. And when you said that, If 20 you're not careful, you're going to be running it there, 21 as opposed to here; you meant off-site in Toronto as 22 opposed to in Forest? 23 A: I'm -- I'm giving him my reasons why 24 I'm saying I've got concerns and that -- that -- that's 25 correct, that I want to keep control.

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1 Q: And was any of that based on your 2 experience at Akwesasne? 3 A: Part of my education, I guess, yes. 4 It probably would have been because in Akwesasne we were 5 dealing with so many police services that were all 6 reporting up in some way, shape, or form and it was 7 interesting to see the degree that some people were 8 providing information when I considered that we were the 9 incident commanders as we were. So some of that 10 education, yes. 11 In Akwesasne, as I recall, there was -- not 12 really that would apply in this -- but in my overall -- I 13 know when I dealt with the trucker situation also that 14 there were instances there when, basically, I realized 15 that the information that was going up -- the -- the 16 detail of information that was being asked, all the people 17 who were responsible for moving trucks, et cetera, to me 18 seemed a little untoward. 19 Q: All right. 20 A: So some of my education, I guess. 21 Q: All right. So would you agree as a 22 result of that experience that it's important that there 23 be, if possible, a single source of information and that, 24 at least, the information that's being circulated is 25 consistent?

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1 A: That probably would be best practices, 2 but I guess if you have a meeting of an Interministerial 3 Committee, everybody comes to the table with what they've 4 got. 5 Q: And part of the reason for the meeting 6 might be to ensure that everyone has the same information 7 so that the messaging can be consistent? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: And that -- that everyone is making 10 decisions or recommendations based on the same 11 information? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: So I take it, also, that when you said 14 that there was a concern that the incident would be run 15 from there, you did not mean that the government would 16 take over and give operational direction to the OPP, but 17 rather that you were concerned that information might be 18 blown out of proportion by people who did not have a 19 police perspective and that might cause unnecessary 20 anxiety or concern on the part of the public; is that 21 fair? 22 A: I -- I agree with your second point 23 that that's -- that's what I was concerned about, not that 24 Thomas O'Grady or myself would have been politically 25 directed to do anything.

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1 Q: All right. So, if you just turn, 2 then, to page 272 of the transcript, the third entry down 3 from you: 4 "Well, I stalled them as to the amount, 5 I mean, right now. I know that the 6 Commissioner is resurrecting the old -- 7 what has always been our approach 8 because he feels he's now going to start 9 getting some pressure." 10 Was that pressure that you were concerned 11 about pressure to act quickly as seems to be indicated by 12 your next entry: 13 "People saying, Why aren't you acting 14 and why aren't you acting on this 15 stuff?" 16 A: As I explained before, Commissioner 17 O'Grady is -- is a man who tends, once he gives you his 18 logic or once he gave you his logic for doing something, 19 you can bet your life that three (3) days later he has 20 still got that logic in his mind. 21 He is a very clear thinker that way and 22 because it was always our process, that's how we handled 23 incidents like this, I'm taking a little license, probably 24 for the use of the word, "resurrecting÷ -- 25 Q: Yes?

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1 A: -- et cetera, but in my opinion, 2 that's what O'Grady was doing. 3 Q: But the concern was that you didn't 4 want the OPP to be in the position of responding to 5 pressure to take quick action as opposed to following your 6 usual procedure of moving slowly and logically? 7 A: Yes, just other pressures that -- 8 Q: Yes? 9 A: -- might -- might come. 10 Q: Thank you, those are my questions. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 12 Ms. Twohig. 13 Ms. McAleer...? Ms. McAleer...? 14 MS. JENNIFER MCALEER: Thank you, Mr. 15 Commissioner. 16 17 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. JENNIFER MCALEER: 18 Q: Good afternoon, Chief Coles. 19 A: Good afternoon. 20 Q: My name's Jennifer McAleer and I'm one 21 (1) of the lawyers who's acting for the former premier, 22 Mike Harris. I just have a couple of questions for you 23 this afternoon. You've been asked some questions about 24 Project Maple. 25 Did Premier Harris or anyone acting on his

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1 behalf ever direct or even request that you prepare an 2 operational plan with respect to the potential occupation 3 of Ipperwash Provincial Park? 4 A: Not that I'm aware of. 5 Q: And did Premier Harris or anyone 6 acting on his behalf ever instruct you as to what should 7 be contained in the OPP's operational plan with respect to 8 the potential occupation of the Park? 9 A: No. 10 Q: And did Premier Harris or anyone 11 acting on his behalf, participate in drafting Project 12 Maple as far as you're aware? 13 A: No. They did not. 14 Q: And as I understand your evidence 15 today, the first time you had the opportunity to review 16 Project Maple was on September 5th, 1995? 17 A: In document form? 18 Q: Yeah, in document form. 19 A: In document form, yes. 20 Q: And when you had the opportunity to 21 review Project Maple, did you find that it was consistent 22 with the OPP's general policy regarding protests and 23 blockades? 24 A: Yes, it was. 25 Q: And in particular with the November

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1 26, 1991 briefing note that Mr. Worme had taken you to 2 earlier today? I believe that's at Tab 1 of the 3 production. 4 A: Yes. I know the document. Yes, it 5 was consistent with that, yes. 6 Q: And following your review of Project 7 Maple on September 5th, did you ever direct Inspector 8 Carson to make any changes or alter Project Maple? 9 A: Not that I'm aware of. 10 Q: And as far as you're aware, did 11 Inspector Carson ever deviate from the objectives that are 12 encompassed in Project Maple or in the brief that's at Tab 13 1 of the productions? 14 A: I don't think that he digressed from 15 the plan. 16 Q: Now in response to questions that were 17 asked to you by Mr. Worme, about your prior interaction 18 with Premier Harris, you had indicated that you had only 19 seen him in the flesh I think on one (1) occasion and that 20 was during the campaign of 1995? 21 A: As an information gathering exercise. 22 I don't even know it was a campaign. But a group of 23 people were coming through -- it may have been pre- 24 campaign, I don't know. 25 Q: Okay.

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1 A: But that was the only time I saw him, 2 yes. 3 Q: And prior to the takeover of the Park 4 on September 4th, had you had any contact with Premier 5 Harris about the potential of a takeover of Ipperwash 6 Provincial Park? 7 A: No. 8 Q: Had you had any contact with any of 9 Premier Harris' staff about the potential takeover of the 10 Park? 11 A: No. 12 Q: Had you any contact with any of the 13 Ministers in Premier Harris' government about the 14 potential takeover of the Park? 15 A: On September 4th, Ministers, no. 16 Q: And in September of 1995, Ron Fox was 17 a special advisor to the solicitor general's office on 18 Native affairs. 19 A: Correct. 20 Q: And as a special advisor to the 21 solicitor general's office, am I correct in understanding 22 that he no longer had an operational role within the OPP? 23 A: I would suggest not. 24 Q: And as a special advisor to the 25 Solicitor General it was not his function to participate

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1 in operational decision making of the OPP? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: And he is not what one would refer to 4 as an operational officer in September of 1995? 5 A: Not in September of '95. 6 Q: Because in your -- your evidence 7 earlier today when you were discussing your phone 8 conversation with Inspector Fox on September 6th, at one 9 point you indicated that it was a conversation between you 10 as the operational officer speaking to Ron Fox as an 11 operational officer. 12 A: About the specifics of automatic 13 weapons and whether or not the rifle -- the repeated semi- 14 automatic, it was Ron being an ex-operational officer I -- 15 yes I should have if you're saying. 16 But to me I was talking to a policeman 17 about automatic weapon fire. 18 Q: One who had operational experience but 19 who was not acting as the OPP operational officer at the 20 time? 21 A: That's correct. 22 Q: Now you had been asked by Mr. 23 Fredricks whether or not you expected that Ron Fox would 24 report to you about the ongoings of the Interministerial 25 Committee meetings and you indicated that you did not

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1 expect him to report to you. 2 A: I -- I think I said I -- he didn't 3 have to report to me. 4 Q: Right. I want to take it one step 5 further. Did you, at any point, ask Inspector Fox to 6 report to you or Inspector Carson or Superintendent Parkin 7 on the views held by the Premier, members of his Cabinet 8 or their political staff regarding the OPP operations at 9 Ipperwash? 10 A: I did not ask him that question. 11 Q: And prior to speaking to Ron Fox on 12 September 6th, had anyone else informed you as to what 13 Premier Harris' views might have been with respect to the 14 OPP operations at Ipperwash? 15 A: No. 16 Q: Now, as -- 17 A: That was prior to September 6th? 18 Q: Yes. 19 A: No. 20 Q: Now as a result of what had been 21 conveyed to you on the phone by Inspector Fox, did you 22 instruct Inspector Carson to alter his operational plans 23 in any way? 24 A: No, I did not. 25 Q: And did you even suggest to Inspector

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1 Carson that he should alter his operational plans in any 2 way following your conversation with Inspector Fox? 3 A: No, I did not. 4 Q: And did you and Inspector Carson even 5 discuss your respective conversations with Inspector Fox 6 with each other? 7 A: I have no recollection of that. I 8 have no recollection of having a discussion about that. 9 Q: Now, you indicated that you have 10 reviewed some of the transcripts from the previous 11 testimony at this Inquiry, and in particular, previous 12 cross-examination of John Carson. 13 And I take it that you are aware that it 14 has been suggested that you and Superintendent Parkin may 15 have criticized Inspector Carson with respect to having 16 failed to prevent the occupation at the Park. 17 A: That did not happen and that was not 18 in my thoughts. 19 Q: Did you at any point over the course 20 of the events from September the 4th to 6th, do or say 21 anything that, in your view, could have reasonably been 22 interpreted by Inspector Carson as a criticism or a form 23 of criticism as to how he was handling the Ipperwash 24 occupation? 25 A: No, I did not.

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1 Q: Was you visit to the command centre on 2 September 6th in any way prompted by a concern that John 3 Carson was not handling the matter effectively? 4 A: No, he was handling the matter. I -- 5 I missed your -- the question. I -- I believed he was 6 handling it correct. 7 Q: And your visit to the command centre 8 wasn't in any way prompted by a desire to seek out some 9 explanation to be provided to Premier Harris, his 10 ministers or any of their staff as to why it was that the 11 Park had been lost to the occupiers? 12 A: I did not go for that reason. 13 Q: And at any point throughout the events 14 of September 4th to 6th, were your actions or any of your 15 discussions influenced by a concern as to what Premier 16 Harris would think about the fact that the OPP had not 17 been able to prevent the occupation of the Park? 18 A: No. 19 20 (BRIEF PAUSE) 21 22 Q: Now, at any point during your visit to 23 the command centre on September 6th, did either you or 24 Superintendent Parkin instruct or even suggest to John 25 Carson that the occupiers should be removed from the

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1 Provincial Park? 2 A: I can't -- I can't recall, but I would 3 suggest that if we were going over plans and contingency 4 plans, what if -- if we decide, whatever to do, there may 5 have been some discussions of how we might possibly 6 consider removing them from the Park. 7 But the -- the course of action was to seek 8 an injunction and based on the injunction, to then take 9 the action of the Court or whatever the injunction led us 10 -- what action it led us to take. 11 Q: So, when you and Superintendent Parkin 12 left John Carson on September 6th, you did not leave him 13 with any standing orders to get those people out of the 14 Park? 15 A: Definitely not. 16 Q: Now, at any point during your visit to 17 the command post, was a decision made by you, 18 Superintendent Parkin or Inspector Carson to deploy the 19 CMU that evening? 20 A: None on my behalf, no. 21 Q: You didn't overhear Inspector -- or 22 Superintendent Parkin suggest that to Inspector Carson? 23 A: No, I did not. 24 Q: And after you and Superintendent 25 Parkin left the command post on September 6th, am I

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1 correct that you did not have any further contact with 2 Inspector Carson or Inspector Linton or any of the other 3 officers involved in the Ipperwash occupation prior to the 4 shooting death of Dudley George on September 6th? 5 A: That's correct, I did not have any. 6 Q: Now, Chief, you're -- you're aware 7 that there have been many allegations with respect to 8 political interference, at any point following the 9 occupation of the Provincial Park, but prior to the death 10 of Dudley George, did Premier Harris, any of his ministers 11 or their staff attempt to direct you regarding the OPP's 12 operations at Ipperwash? 13 A: No. 14 Q: And as far as you are aware, at any 15 point following the occupation of the Provincial Park, but 16 prior to the death of Dudley George, did Premier Harris or 17 any of his ministers or their staff attempt to direct any 18 OPP officers with respect to the operations at the 19 Provincial Park? 20 A: Not to my knowledge, no. 21 Q: Thank you, those are all my questions. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 23 very much. Are you tired? Have you had enough for the 24 day -- 25 THE WITNESS: No, no.

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1 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- or can you 2 take one (1) more? 3 THE WITNESS: I definitely can. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Can you? All 5 right then, we'll continue with cross-examination on 6 behalf of Mr. Runciman and this will be the last of the 7 day. 8 MS. ALICE MROZEK: Good afternoon, 9 Commissioner. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 11 afternoon. 12 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon. 13 14 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. ALICE MROZEK: 15 Q: My name's Alice Mrozek and I represent 16 Robert Runciman who was the Solicitor General at the time. 17 A: Yes? 18 Q: You testified on Monday that you did 19 not meet with Mr. Runciman except for one (1) instance, 20 which occurred prior to the election in June of 1995? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: And so, just for the sake of clarity, 23 except for that meeting, you had no other meetings with 24 Mr. Runciman in the time period prior to September 4th, 25 1995?

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1 A: To the best of my knowledge, no. The 2 only reason I'm qualifying that is there's a commissioned 3 officer's mess dinner and sometimes Mr. Runciman would 4 have attended that meeting, but I did not talk to him if 5 he was there. 6 Q: Okay, Thank you. And you had no 7 meetings with Mr. Runciman in the time period September 8 4th to September 6th, 1995? 9 A: No, I did not. 10 Q: And you had no conversations with Mr. 11 Runciman in the time period September 4th to 6th, 1995? 12 A: No, I did not. 13 Q: You testified today that 14 Superintendent Parkin did not provide John Carson with any 15 operational direction? 16 A: Not -- not specifically orders. 17 Superintendent Parkin? 18 Q: Yes. 19 A: No, as I've explained, any direction 20 that we gave would have been participative in approach and 21 John Carson would have made decisions from there -- 22 Q: Right. 23 A: -- but not that I recall. 24 Q: And you also testified that John 25 Carson accepted no operational direction from any other

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1 source? 2 A: Not that I'm aware of. 3 Q: So, this would also mean he did not 4 accept any order, direction by Mr. Runciman by any means, 5 direct or indirect, to the OPP regarding Ipperwash? 6 A: Not to my knowledge. 7 Q: Thank you, those are my questions. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 9 very much. 10 It's 4:30, we do start at nine o'clock. We 11 could go longer, do you think we should continue a little 12 longer tonight? No? I'm getting a strong sense. 13 MR. DONALD WORME: It would -- it would 14 appear that there are others that, perhaps -- 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think -- 16 MR. DONALD WORME: -- get through today if 17 that -- certainly we're in your hands and the Witness' 18 hands. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I have a 20 feeling that the Witness has had enough for one (1) day 21 and I think -- 22 MR. MARK SANDLER: You know what I always 23 say about these matters, you've got very willing 24 witnesses. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, I know,

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1 they never say they're tired. 2 MR. MARK SANDLER: They never say they 3 won't -- 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I realize 5 that. I think we've had enough for one (1) day. We start 6 at nine o'clock in the morning and it's a long day, so 7 we're going to adjourn now until nine o'clock tomorrow 8 morning. 9 MR. DONALD WORME: Thank you, 10 Commissioner. 11 12 (WITNESS RETIRES) 13 14 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 15 adjourned until tomorrow, Wednesday, August 17th, at 9:00 16 a.m. 17 18 --- Upon adjourning at 4:30 p.m. 19 20 Certified Correct, 21 22 23 _________________ 24 Carol Geehan 25