11 2 3 IPPERWASH PUBLIC INQUIRY 4 5 6 7 ******************** 8 9 10 BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE SIDNEY LINDEN, 11 COMMISSIONER 12 13 14 15 16 Held at: Forest Community Centre 17 Kimball Hall 18 Forest, Ontario 19 20 21 ******************** 22 23 24 April 19th, 2006 25
21 Appearances 2 Derry Millar ) Commission Counsel 3 Susan Vella ) 4 Donald Worme, Q. C ) (np) 5 Katherine Hensel ) (np) 6 Megan Ferrier ) (np) 7 8 Murray Klippenstein ) (np) The Estate of Dudley 9 Vilko Zbogar ) (np) George and George 10 Andrew Orkin ) (np) Family Group 11 Basil Alexander ) 12 13 Peter Rosenthal ) Aazhoodena and George 14 Jackie Esmonde ) Family Group 15 16 Anthony Ross ) (np) Residents of 17 Cameron Neil ) (np) Aazhoodena (Army Camp) 18 Kevin Scullion ) 19 20 William Henderson ) (np) Kettle Point & Stony 21 Jonathon George ) Point First Nation 22 Colleen Johnson ) (np) 23 24 25
31 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 3 Kim Twohig ) (np) Government of Ontario 4 Walter Myrka ) (np) 5 Susan Freeborn ) (np) 6 Sheri Hebdon ) Student-at-law 7 8 Janet Clermont ) Municipality of 9 David Nash ) (np) Lambton Shores 10 Nora Simpson ) (np) Student-at-law 11 12 Peter Downard ) (np) The Honourable Michael 13 Bill Hourigan ) (np) Harris 14 Jennifer McAleer ) 15 16 Ian Smith ) (np) Robert Runciman 17 Alice Mrozek ) (np) 18 19 Harvey T. Strosberg, Q.C.) (np) Charles Harnick 20 Jacqueline Horvat ) (np) 21 22 23 24 25
41 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 3 Douglas Sulman, Q.C. ) Marcel Beaubien 4 Mary Jane Moynahan ) (np) 5 Dave Jacklin ) (np) 6 Trevor Hinnegan ) 7 8 Mark Sandler ) (np) Ontario Provincial 9 Andrea Tuck-Jackson ) Ontario Provincial Police 10 Leslie Kaufman ) (np) 11 12 Ian Roland ) (np) Ontario Provincial 13 Karen Jones ) Police Association & 14 Debra Newell ) (np) K. Deane 15 Ian McGilp ) (np) 16 Annie Leeks ) (np) 17 Jennifer Gleitman ) 18 Robyn Trask ) (np) 19 Caroline Swerdlyk ) 20 21 22 23 24 25
51 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 Julian Falconer ) Aboriginal Legal 3 Brian Eyolfson ) (np) Services of Toronto 4 Kimberly Murray ) (np) 5 Julian Roy ) 6 Clem Nabigon ) (np) 7 Linda Chen ) (np) 8 Chris Darnay ) (np) 9 Sunil Mathai ) (np) 10 Adriel Weaver ) (np) Student-at-Law 11 12 Al J.C. O'Marra ) (np) Office of the Chief 13 Robert Ash, Q.C. ) (np) Coroner 14 William Horton ) (np) Chiefs of Ontario 15 Matthew Horner ) (np) 16 Kathleen Lickers ) (np) 17 18 Mark Fredrick ) (np) Christopher Hodgson 19 Craig Mills ) (np) 20 Megan Mackey ) (np) 21 Peter Lauwers ) (np) 22 Erin Tully ) (np) 23 Michelle Fernando ) 24 Maanit Zemel ) (np) 25 Patrick Greco ) (np)
61 APPEARANCES (cont'd) 2 3 David Roebuck ) (np) Debbie Hutton 4 Anna Perschy ) 5 Melissa Panjer ) (np) 6 Adam Goodman ) (np) 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
71 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 PAGE NO. 3 List of Exhibits 8 4 5 KENT THOMAS SKINNER, Sworn 6 Examination-In-Chief by Ms. Susan Vella 13 7 Cross-Examination by Ms. Andrea Tuck-Jackson 281 8 Cross-Examination by Ms. Anna Perschy 305 9 Cross-Examination by Mr. Julian Falconer 308 10 11 12 13 Certificate of Transcript 387 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
81 EXHIBITS 2 No. Description Page 3 P-1334 Document Number 2005552. Curriculum 4 Vitae of Kent. T. Skinner. 14 5 P-1335 Document Number 2005581. Handwritten 6 notebook entries of Kent Skinner re. 7 Helicopter Incident, August 23, 1993. 49 8 P-1336 Document Number 2005580. Handwritten 9 notebook entries of Kent Skinner re. 10 Containment, February 26, 1995. 52 11 P-1337 Document Number 2005574. Handwritten 12 notebook entries of Ken Skinner, 13 September 05, 1995. 58 14 P-1338 Reserved. 77 15 P-1339 Transcript from Region 01, Kent Skinner, 16 Brian Deevy, September 05, 1995, 20:55 17 hrs, Mobile Command Unit, OPP Logger tape 18 number 2, Track 1, Disc 1 of 3. 78 19 P-1340 Document Number 1002027. OPP Emergency 20 Response Services Manual, 1994. 91 21 P-1341 Document Number 5000057. Handwritten 22 notebook entries of Kent Skinner from 23 September 06 to 07, 1995. 92 24 25
91 EXHIBITS (Con't) 2 No. Description Page 3 P-1342 Transcript of Region 2, Kent Skinner 4 and Cantel Paging recording, September 5 06, 1995. 07:16 hrs, Mobile Command 6 Unit, Logger tape number 2, Track 2, 7 Disc 1 of 3. 100 8 P-1343 Transcript of Region 3, Kent Skinner and 9 Ken Deane, September 06, 1995, 07:27 hrs. 10 Mobile Command Unit, Logger tape number 2, 11 Track 1, Disc 1 of 3. 107 12 P-1344 Transcript of Region 4, Kent Skinner/ 13 London Command Centre/ Neil, September 14 06, 1995, 07:33 hrs, Mobile Command Unit 15 Logger tape number 2, Track 2, Disc 1 16 of 3. 108 17 P-1345 Transcript of Region 5, Kent Skinner 18 Chatham Communications Centre/Unknown 19 Male. September 06, 1995, 07:36 hrs, 20 Mobile Command Unit, Logger tape 21 number 2, Track 2, Disc 1 of 3. 110 22 23 24 25
101 EXHIBITS (Con't) 2 No. Description Page 3 P-1346 Transcript of Region 4, Kent Skinner, 4 OPP Car Decals Ordering, September 06, 5 1995. 07:42 hrs, Mobile Command Unit, 6 Logger tape number 3, Track 2, disc 7 2 of 3. 111 8 P-1347 Transcript of Region 5, Kent Skinner, 9 London Command Centre, September 06, 10 1995, 07:47:58. London Communications 11 Centre, Logger tape number 086, Track 2, 12 Disc 2 of 20. 112 13 P-1348 Transcript of Region 9, Kent Skinner, 14 Ken Deane, September 06, 1995. 08:10 15 hrs. Mobile Communications Unit, Logger 16 tape number 3, Track 1, Disc 2 of 3. 123 17 P-1349 Transcript of Region 10, Kent Skinner, 18 Ken Deane, September 06, 1995. 11:04 hrs, 19 Mobile Command Unit, Logger tape number 3, 20 Track 2, Disc 2 of 3. 132 21 P-1350 Document Number 1000012. Transcript of 22 Logger tape, Command Centre, John Carson, 23 Ken Deane, 20:29 hrs, September 06, 24 1995. 147 25
111 EXHIBITS (Con't) 2 No. Description Page 3 P-1351 Document Number 001992. Transcript of 4 Logger tape Command Centre, 21:02 hrs, 5 September 06, 1995, Kent Skinner and 6 Rick Zupancic. 169 7 P-1352 Document Number 2003875. Duty Report 8 of K.T. Skinner including handwritten 9 version and Kent Skinner's handwritten 10 notebook entries September 06, 1995. 242 11 P-1353 Document Number 2005600. Handwritten 12 notebook entries of Kent Skinner, 13 September 07, 1995. 250 14 P-1354 Transcript of Region 21, Kent Skinner/ 15 Chatham Communications Centre, September 16 07, 1995, 01:05 hrs Chatham Communications 17 Centre, Logger tape number 0147, Track 2, 18 Disc 1 of 3 260 19 P-1355 Transcript of 22, Kent Skinner/Rob 20 Graham, September 07, 1995, 01:28 hrs. 21 Mobile Unit Logger tape number 4, Track 22 2, disc 2 of 3. 261 23 24 25
121 List of Exhibits (cont'd) 2 Exhibit No. Description Page No. 3 P-1356 Transcript of Region 23, Kent Skinner/ 4 Rick Zupancic/Rose Peterman, September 5 07, 1995.03:21 hrs, Mobile Command Unit, 6 Logger tape number 4, Track 1, Disc 2 7 of 3. 262 8 P-1357 Transcript of Region 24, Kent Skinner/Rich 9 Zupancic, September 07, 1995, 04:49 hrs, 10 Chatham Communications Unit, Logger tape 11 number 0147, Track 12, Disc 12 of 20. 263 12 P-1358 Document Number 1005752. Anticipated 13 Evidence of Sgt. Kent Skinner, June 25, 14 1996. 267 15 P-1359 Document Number 1005297. R. v. Deane: 16 Kent Skinner Examination- -In-Chief; 17 Cross-examination; Reexamination, April 18 1, 1997. 268 19 P-1360 Document Number 5000054. Interview of 20 Kent Skinner by Det. Armstrong (London 21 P.D. for Coroner's Investigation) March 22 10, 2003. 269 23 24 25
131 --- Upon commencing at 9:02 a.m. 2 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 4 now in session, the Honourable Mr. Justice Linden 5 presiding. Please be seated. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 7 morning, everybody. Good morning. 8 MR. KENT SKINNER: Good morning, sir. 9 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Good morning. The 10 Commission calls as its next witness Inspector Kent 11 Skinner. 12 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Mr. 13 Skinner. 14 MR. KENT SKINNER: Good morning. 15 16 KENT THOMAS SKINNER, Sworn 17 18 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 19 Q: Inspector Skinner, would you kindly 20 go to Tab 1 of the document brief. It's Inquiry Document 21 Number 2005552. It appears to be a copy of your 22 Curriculum Vitae. Can you confirm that that is what it 23 is? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And the information contained is
141 accurate? 2 A: Yes, it is. 3 Q: I'd like to make this the first 4 exhibit of the morning. 5 THE REGISTRAR: P-1334. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Okay. 7 8 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1334: Document Number 2005552. 9 Curriculum Vitae of Kent. T. 10 Skinner. 11 12 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 13 Q: I understand you became a provincial 14 constable with the Ontario Provincial Police in March of 15 1982 and were assigned to the South Porcupine Detachment? 16 A: That's correct. 17 Q: In October of 1984 you were assigned 18 to the Thunder Bay Tactics and Rescue Unit? 19 A: That's correct, yes. 20 Q: And that we may also refer to that as 21 TRU? 22 A: Yes, T-R-U. 23 Q: T-R-U. And July 1986 you were a 24 provincial constable with the Belleville Tactical -- 25 Tactics and Rescue Unit?
151 A: That's correct. 2 Q: From September 1990 to April 1993 you 3 were a Sergeant with the Sebring Detachment? 4 A: Sebringville Detachment. 5 Q: Thank you. You didn't have any 6 affiliation with the TRU team during that period of time? 7 A: No I didn't. 8 Q: All right. Then from April 1993 to 9 December 1996 you were a Sergeant with the London Tactics 10 and Rescue Unit. 11 A: That's correct. 12 Q: And amongst the various 13 responsibilities that you had in that position, you were 14 responsible for a tactical response to high risk 15 occurrences? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: Supervision of ten (10) team members? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Planning and participating in 20 operations such as barricaded persons, hostage rescue, 21 high risk prisoner escorts and court security? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: Instructor for numerous tactical 24 courses for the OPP as well as internationally? 25 A: Correct.
161 Q: Participated in the selection process 2 for TRU members. 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: And I wonder if we just might digress 5 for a moment and get a little bit of better understanding 6 of the TRU team. Now, I wonder if you would first of all 7 advise me how many TRU teams existed in Ontario in or 8 around the 1995 time period which is the timeframe we're 9 interested in. 10 A: There were three (3) teams in the 11 Province. There was a team in London, a team in Barrie 12 and a team in Belleville. 13 Q: All right. And the team for London 14 for which you were a member, what was the geographical 15 jurisdiction for that team? 16 A: Primarily southwestern Ontario. 17 However, with the absence of a team in the North, the 18 teams would take turns responding to calls for service in 19 Northern Ontario. 20 Q: All right. And for further 21 clarification, did your team have responsibility to 22 respond to appropriate situations or circumstances in the 23 Forest and Ipperwash area? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: Would you kindly describe the mandate
171 of -- of the TRU team? 2 A: The TRU team is responsible to 3 respond to high risk occurrences generally involving 4 firearms. Occurrences such as barricaded persons, 5 hostage rescue, high risk warrant service, witness 6 protection, high risk court security, VIP security and 7 other details at the discretion of the Regional Commander 8 that would be deemed high risk. 9 Q: All right. And perhaps you can just 10 give us some further clarification as to the minimum 11 criteria if you will, which would -- which would qualify 12 a situation as high risk. 13 A: Well, generally, you're dealing with 14 a threat to life. There are some occurrences where the 15 skill set that a TRU team member could learn as far as 16 invisible deployment may be utilized, but generally it 17 has to do with threat to life. 18 Q: And any situation short of threat to 19 life would engage other units of the OPP generally? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: For example, the Crowd Management 22 Unit? 23 A: Depending on the circumstances 24 certain specialties would be required for certain 25 circumstances, yes.
181 Q: All right. And who has the authority 2 to deploy a TRU team; in other words, to deploy them into 3 action? 4 A: Yes. To actually call the team out, 5 it's usually a regional signing officer or back in the 6 district days, the district signing officer; to actually 7 deploy the team to the ground requires the approval of a 8 Level 2 Incident Commander. 9 Q: And, generally, is that someone of 10 the ranking of Inspector or senior to that ranking? 11 A: Inspector or above, yes. 12 Q: And what -- what is in general terms 13 the main function and purpose of -- of the TRU team? 14 A: The function of the TRU team is to 15 primarily contain the scenario -- situation and to allow 16 for the setting up and safe negotiations to take place. 17 They are the tactical response to cover off the threat 18 aspect of the occurrence. 19 Q: All right. And so to be clear, one 20 of its purposes is to facilitate the -- the ability to 21 negotiate by others? 22 A: Absolutely. Absolutely. To gather 23 information of what's going on at the scene. They are 24 the eyes on the ground for the Incident Commander and to 25 pass information back and forth so the -- that could be
191 useful in negotiations in resolving the situation. 2 Q: And did that mandate and purpose 3 change in any material or substantial way after September 4 the 6th, 1995? 5 A: No. 6 Q: Now focussing on the London TRU team, 7 summer -- in the summer, in September of 1995 -- 8 A: Hmm hmm. 9 Q: -- can you tell me what your specific 10 position or title was in relation to that team? 11 A: At that time I was a sergeant filling 12 the role of the staff sergeant so I was an acting staff 13 sergeant. 14 Q: All right. And what was your 15 position within the TRU team? Did you have another 16 title? 17 A: Team Leader. 18 Q: All right. And what -- what is 19 entailed in being a team leader? 20 A: I was responsible for the -- the 21 overall administration, operational preparedness of the 22 team. 23 Q: What does that mean? 24 A: Making sure all the equipment is 25 ready to go, the members have their training up to
201 standard, being a -- a resource for incident commanders 2 prior to deployment if there are questions of would be -- 3 would be -- be of assistance at an occurrence -- 4 Q: Hmm hmm. 5 A: -- I would provide that options or 6 that resource. 7 Q: All right. So you might visit a -- a 8 site in advance of the TRU team being deployed to provide 9 assistance to the incident commander? 10 A: Absolutely, If -- if I could for 11 instance on a witness protection detail there would be 12 advance work done, reconnaissance to learn all your 13 routes in and out, the site survey of the actual building 14 you were in, access, egress, down rooms, et cetera. 15 Q: All right. 16 A: So there was a lot of pre-planning 17 going into most of the events. 18 Q: And I wonder if we might focus for a 19 few minutes on the composition of your TRU team in and 20 around the summer and into early September, through 21 September 7th of 1995? 22 First of all, did you have a second in 23 command during that time period? 24 A: Yes, I did. 25 Q: Who was that?
211 A: That was Ken Deane. 2 Q: And do you recall what his title was 3 or rank was at the time? 4 A: Ken was a provincial constable and 5 given the rank of Acting Sergeant. 6 Q: And as second in command what would 7 his duties be? 8 A: His duties would be to fulfill my 9 role in my absence and, again, to ensure the operational 10 preparedness of the team. 11 Q: All right. How many people were on 12 your TRU team in that timeframe? 13 A: I believe at that time we were short 14 personnel. The normal complement is -- is twelve (12); I 15 believe we were down to ten (10) at the time. 16 Q: All right. So ten (10) persons in 17 addition to yourself? 18 A: Yeah, ten (10) in total, I'm sorry. 19 Q: Ten (10) in total. All right. And 20 you -- can you tell us the identities of -- of the team? 21 We know there was yourself and there was Constable 22 Deane -- 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: -- and who else? 25 A: Constable Irvine, Constable
221 Beauchesne, Constable Klym, Constable O'Halloran, 2 Kamerman, McCormack, Irvine, and Strickler. 3 Q: All right. Now, can you tell us in a 4 general way what the qualification process is with 5 respect to candidates who wish to become members of a TRU 6 team in -- in this timeframe again? 7 A: Certainly. First if someone wants to 8 be on a TRU team they have to make applications through 9 to their Detachment commander, that would be required to 10 be footnoted in a favourable fashion by the Detachment 11 commander. 12 Upon receipt of the application we send 13 out a -- what we call a Detachment profile which is 14 essentially a question and answer sheet regarding the 15 person's performance. 16 What we're looking for is an individual 17 who has shown confidence as a police officer primarily. 18 We then review their personnel file. They're subject to 19 an interview by team leaders of the -- and the 20 Coordinator, Provincial Coordinator for the TRU team. 21 They're also subject to a psychological assessment and a 22 physical fitness assessment. 23 Q: What is the purpose of the -- the 24 psychological assessment? 25 A: Well, the assessment is -- is scored
231 to obtain an individual with the characteristics that we 2 were looking for. We were looking for someone who can 3 perform effectively under stressful conditions. We were 4 looking for someone who can perform in a team environment 5 cooperatively. 6 You're looking for someone who is a good 7 decision maker; someone who can maintain a cognitive 8 awareness and a spacial awareness of where they are. 9 You're looking for people who are well spoken and well -- 10 good thinkers. 11 You're not looking for someone who is an 12 automaton, if I can use that term. You're looking for 13 someone who can recognize a situation as it unfolds and 14 make adjustments if they have to. 15 Q: In other words someone who can 16 exercise independent judgment under stress? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: And was there also a -- a training 19 period, if you will, through the qualification process? 20 A: There's a two (2) week selection 21 process. If you're successful through the interview 22 phase, the psychological assessment, you're invited to 23 come to the two (2) week selection period. 24 And the selection period is, although it 25 appears to be primarily physical, it's goal is to put the
241 individuals, the candidates, under stressful conditions 2 to tire them out, to get them physically tired and then 3 to test them through different scenarios to see how they 4 perform under those conditions. 5 Q: Can you give me an example of a 6 scenario? 7 A: Well, there are many tasks put to the 8 candidates during their train -- this selection period 9 including scenarios of containment, including physical 10 exertion, and then seeing how they function as a team 11 during that time period. 12 Q: All right. Now, how many persons or 13 police officers typically apply to become members of the 14 TRU team in the course of a year or so? 15 A: Okay. Generally the selection course 16 runs every year and a half to two (2) years. On average 17 I would say there's between forty (40) to fifty (50) 18 candidates who apply. 19 Q: And how many are generally ultimately 20 successful? 21 A: Ultimately successful to get to a 22 team you may end up with ten (10) or eleven (11) if 23 you're lucky. 24 Q: I understand that there was also 25 three (3) levels of progression in TRU team training.
251 A: That's correct. 2 Q: Perhaps you can explain what that is 3 and what those levels were. 4 A: Sure. If you're successful to get 5 through the two (2) week selection course then you would 6 come to the actual training. At that time there were 7 three (3) levels. The first level was a five (5) week 8 session and it was called the 'Clearing Phase'. 9 In that you would learn the principles of 10 invisible deployment. One of the basic tenants for the 11 TRU team is invisible deployment which deals with 12 camouflage concealment, field movement, individual 13 movement. 14 And the purpose of that is to get to the 15 ground without being seen. The reason you don't want to 16 be seen is two-fold. It's for the protection of 17 yourself, obviously, but it's also for the protection of 18 the individual your -- the suspect, if I can use that 19 term. 20 By not being seen, you're not creating a - 21 - a thought process in the suspect's mind that they have 22 to act or react, so you're lessening the threat level by 23 maintaining that invisible deployment. So that's key 24 through many, many TRU team occurrences is skill set in - 25 - in invisible deployment.
261 They would also begin to learn containment 2 at that point in time. They learn about the diamond 3 containment, how the team deploys. They learn -- start 4 to learn about planning for containment. 5 As well, there's an aspect of now new 6 firearms. TRU team members carry a different firearm 7 than uniform members and there's a transition, a learning 8 phase. That's one of the things we look at as well in 9 selection to see if the person is teachable in that area. 10 Q: And do the three (3) levels that have 11 a particular heading just so we can break down what 12 you've just told us? 13 A: Sure. Yeah. There's a Clearing 14 Phase, Level 1 -- I'm sorry. 15 Q: That's all right. 16 A: Containment phase, Level 1; Clearing 17 phase, Level 2; and then Level 3 was Dynamic Entry at 18 that time. 19 Q: And I take it that all of your TRU 20 team members had obviously gone through the qualification 21 process and then the training, initial training process 22 successfully? 23 A: That's true, yes. 24 Q: And -- 25 A: Member --
271 Q: -- I'm sorry. 2 A: -- I'm sorry. Members are eligible 3 to be put on a team after a successful completion of 4 Level 2. 5 Q: Okay. Had any of your -- any of your 6 members completed Level 3 by September 1, 1995? 7 A: The majority of them had. 8 Q: Who -- do you recall who hadn't? 9 A: I'm afraid I don't. I'm sorry. 10 Q: Do you recall whether or not 11 Constable Deane had completed his third level? 12 A: Absolutely, yes, he had. 13 Q: He had? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: All right. And that would be one (1) 16 reason why he would be your second in command? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: All right. And who -- who chooses, 19 if you will, or selects which members will come onto 20 one's TRU team? 21 A: That would be the Provincial 22 Coordinator. 23 Q: Okay. Did you have any role to play 24 in the selection process? 25 A: Yes.
281 Q: What was your role? 2 A: Part of the role of a team leader was 3 to attend a selection course and the training courses to 4 apply their assessment of the candidates' abilities. 5 Q: Now going to your team members, did 6 any of your team members as of September 1st, '95 have 7 any particular roles or sub-specialties if you would that 8 -- that they would be most likely to perform during an 9 incident? 10 A: Many of the team members take extra 11 courses; some of those would be the -- the sniper course, 12 some of them would be explosive disposal. Another 13 example would be repel master. And they require further 14 training beyond the three (3) levels. 15 Q: All right. Do you recall what if any 16 such sub-specialties or additional training Constable 17 Deane had successfully completed by September 1st? 18 A: Ken Deane was a trained explosives 19 disposal technician. He was, I believe prior to my 20 coming back to the team, I believe, Ken had also attended 21 a sniper course. 22 Q: Finished...? 23 A: A sniper course. 24 Q: A sniper course? 25 A: Yes.
291 Q: Excuse me. Perhaps you can define 2 what a sniper is within this context? 3 A: Yes. The role of a -- the sniper on 4 the TRU team is primarily intelligence gathering. They 5 are the experts in invisible deployment. They take 6 further training in camouflage and concealment to get 7 themselves into positions where they can observe a 8 situation without being seen. Their role on most of the 9 calls is to report back the information because they are 10 the eyes that can see the occurrence. 11 Oftentimes other members of the TRU team 12 are not even in a position where they can see. They may 13 be hid behind a building or if they're in an a rest 14 element but the -- the snipers have to be in a position 15 where they can see. 16 They function in a pair as a 17 sniper/observer team. As you can imagine looking through 18 the scope of a rifle your field of vision is narrowed 19 considerably so the observer is there to have a wider 20 field of view and -- and to provide protection for the -- 21 the sniper himself. 22 Q: All right. 23 A: Now, they're usually cross-trained so 24 they will switch off as they go about that. 25 Q: Meaning that people within your team
301 can -- can occupy different positions at a given time? 2 A: Within -- within that sniper element. 3 You -- generally the sniper/observers, we would attempt 4 to have the observer also trained as a sniper. 5 Q: All right. 6 A: And, of course, their final role 7 which we hope would never have to happen is the use of 8 lethal force. 9 Q: Use of deadly force? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: With a firearm? 12 A: With a firearm and that's what 13 requires -- in a skill set of a -- of a sniper primarily 14 their training is for hostage scenarios and it's quite a 15 skill set to maintain that ability. 16 Q: Okay. Now, once the member 17 successfully completes the three (3) levels of training, 18 initial training if you will -- 19 A: Hmm hmm. 20 Q: -- are there any ongoing training 21 requirements for your team members? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: Can you describe those? 24 A: Each month the -- the members are 25 required to maintain a minimum standard in their firearms
311 standard. They're required to semi-annually maintain 2 their fitness standard. They also attend seminars 3 provincially, across Canada, and internationally. 4 We've also been responsible for a great 5 number of training details ourselves. So there's an 6 ongoing learning process once you're a full team member 7 maintaining knowledge of what's current in the -- in the 8 field, looking at new equipment, et cetera. So it's a 9 constant learning curve. 10 Q: All right. And are there additional 11 or ongoing, if you will, field training exercises? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: To -- 14 A: There would be scenario training on a 15 regular basis. All the training that a member would take 16 on a -- on a -- even on a weekly basis is scenario based. 17 It's not static in -- in what they do, so everything is 18 tried -- attempt to reference back to real world 19 scenarios; try to increase the stress level of the 20 individual, whether you do that by putting a clock on 21 them to time them or, again, to add some physical 22 exertion to it to raise the stress level in the training 23 to make it realistic. 24 Q: All right. So I take it from that 25 answer that there is an ongoing review of a person's
321 psychological suitability to the position? 2 A: There's an ongoing review of -- of -- 3 the members are constantly under scrutiny. On the TRU 4 team there's also a five (5) year review process, that 5 after five (5) years on a TRU team you have to have an 6 annual review of your ability to stay on the team and 7 that's conducted by a member of the Provincial Police 8 Academy responsible for specialized training, the -- an 9 incident commander, the Provincial Coordinator, and the 10 Team Leader. 11 Q: Now, is -- is being a member of the 12 TRU team a full-time policing responsibility? 13 A: Yes, it is. 14 Q: And so either one is deployed or one 15 is engaged in these types of training exercises, et 16 cetera? 17 A: Training or research or maintenance 18 of equipment, yes. 19 Q: Okay. Now, as of September the 1st, 20 1995, had you taken any Native sensitivity or cultural 21 training courses? 22 A: As of September the 1st, 1995? 23 Q: Correct. 24 A: No, I had not. 25 Q: All right. To the best of your
331 knowledge, had any of your team members taken any such 2 courses? 3 A: Not that I'm aware of. 4 Q: To the best of your knowledge, were 5 these courses available and provided by the OPP? 6 A: Not that I recall. 7 Q: Now, you -- you've already told us 8 what the role of a sniper was on the TRU team. Is there 9 also a position known as a 'scout'? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: And can you describe what role that - 12 - the scout assumed. 13 A: Yes. The scout or a reconnaissance 14 is usually a two (2) man element. They form part of the 15 immediate action team or the arrest element as well. 16 Often times if I could -- for example, a 17 containment scenario, their role would be in close 18 proximity to the building. They would scout the building 19 up close. They may deliver a -- a phone line or food or 20 whatever's required to be delivered. 21 So they're up right -- right up against 22 the building essentially. So again, their training in 23 field movement and intelligence gathering is very 24 important. 25 Q: All right. So the sniper observer
341 team is situated more in the distance from the incident-- 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: -- whereas the -- would you call it 4 the IAP, was it? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Maybe you could just say what that 7 stands for? 8 A: Yeah, I'm sorry. It's Immediate 9 Action Plan. 10 Q: Yes. 11 A: Often times the -- those -- that 12 element is referred to as IAP or Alpha and it's generally 13 responsible for hands-on, the arrest portion of the call. 14 Q: So they are by a necessity, closer to 15 the event than the others? 16 A: Yes, that's correct. 17 Q: And is it appropriate to des -- let 18 me ask this. Is there a field name, you said there was a 19 field name essentially for the immediate action team; is 20 Alpha, is that right? 21 A: Alpha, yes. 22 Q: And is there a similar field name for 23 the sniper observer team? 24 A: Sierra. 25 Q: Sierra, okay. And are these the two
351 (2) elements to a TRU team? 2 A: Well the -- the reconnaissance team 3 are Romeo could also be -- 4 Q: So there are three (3) elements in 5 total? 6 A: Essentially, yes. 7 Q: Code named -- 8 A: The team is divided into two (2) 9 elements; an 'A' element and a 'B' element. Generally 10 one (1) element function's looking after the Sierra 11 portion of the -- of the job and the other looks after 12 the Alpha portion. 13 Q: All right. 14 A: With -- with cross training as well. 15 Q: Okay. And typically when a Sierra 16 and immediate action team or Alpha team are deployed, how 17 many communicators are there on that team; in other 18 words, communicators back to you? 19 A: All the members carry portable 20 radios. In -- in general you would expect probably not 21 to hear from everybody although you'd hear from the 22 senior member on whichever element it is. 23 Q: All right. And you indicated that 24 one of the teams had a role in the gathering of 25 intelligence.
361 A: Well, all team members do but since 2 the Sierra teams generally have a visual on what the 3 incident is, they're the ones that you receive most of 4 your intelligence information from. 5 Q: All right. And perhaps you could 6 just explain in -- in plain language what you mean by 7 intelligence in this context. 8 A: Well, in the context of any TRU 9 operation what I'm referring to is movements of the 10 people that they are watching. What is actually going on 11 at the scene; has there been any visual sightings of. In 12 a containment call, have you seen the person in the 13 house? If you have, what are they doing? 14 They would also provide information about 15 the actual structure or the ground they're looking at; 16 you know, is it hilly, is it flat, what's there, is there 17 a ditch behind the house? 18 All that information would generally come 19 back from the Sierra teams. 20 Q: All right. And so basically they -- 21 the intelligence gathered by -- by TRU is -- is in the 22 form of direct observations. 23 A: That's correct. 24 Q: Is there any function in the TRU team 25 in the -- in the collation of such data? In the
371 collation of it? 2 A: Well, the interpretation of the data 3 on a containment call? 4 Q: Or an analysis of the data? 5 A: Of the information received -- that a 6 TRU member actually sees, that information is returned to 7 the -- the Command Post. It's then presented to the 8 Incident Commander. And then that is often used to -- 9 just make decisions on tactical options. 10 Q: All right. Now, I wonder if we could 11 just review for a moment a little more closely the 12 training requirements in both the initial and ongoing 13 training -- 14 A: Hmm hmm. 15 Q: -- requirements for the discharge of 16 firearms. And perhaps you can start by advising us as of 17 September 1, 1995, what firearms did the TRU team use? 18 A: The sidearm carried by TRU team 19 members in 1995 was a 9 millimetre semi-automatic pistol; 20 it's a Browning. They also carry a 9 millimetre short 21 rifle or carbine, it's a Heckler and Koch MP5; that was 22 the primary weapon. The handgun would be considered a 23 secondary weapon for a TRU team member. 24 Then certain specialists roles or terrain 25 would call for different weapons. You would have
381 assault-type weapons or longer -- longer rifle with more 2 calibre, in .223 and .308 calibre. And then you'd have 3 specialized weapons for the snipers; at that time it was 4 a .308 Remington, and to be honest they went through 5 several different manufacturers of scopes. I'm not sure 6 at that time which scope was on the weapon. 7 You would also have available a less 8 lethal weapon in the form of an Arwen which is an anti- - 9 - it's a Lee Enfield weapon; it's an anti-riot weapon; 10 Enfield is what it -- what it stands for. It's a 37 11 millimetre projectile. It's -- it's not a -- it's a 12 rubber bullet essentially is what it is. 13 Q: Okay. 14 A: And it's termed a long range impact 15 weapon. 16 Q: All right. And what -- what was 17 involved in the training of the TRU team members in the 18 discharge of these firearms? 19 And I -- I'd like to know from two (2) 20 perspectives, the mechanical discharge and also the 21 circumstances under which one is permitted to discharge. 22 A: Well, if I can answer your second 23 question first, TRU team members are police officers 24 first of all. They have no additional authority than any 25 other police officer does, so, the only time you're to
391 discharge your firearm is to -- when you fear for the 2 life or you fear grievous bodily harm against another 3 person or yourself or to dispatch a wounded animal or as 4 a signalling device. Those are the only times you're 5 supposed to discharge your firearm as a police officer 6 and that's no different for a uniformed member or a TRU 7 team member. 8 Q: All right. 9 A: The actual training for the 10 individual firearms, there were different course of fire 11 -- designed to test the person's ability to handle the 12 weapon, change magazines, that type of thing and to be 13 accurate -- accurately fire the weapon. 14 Q: And as of September the 1st was 15 Sergeant Deane or, sorry, Constable Deane -- had he 16 successfully completed all the training requirements for 17 these firearms, various firearms that you've indicated? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: And in terms of the training with 20 respect to the discharge of firearms are TRU members and 21 police officers for that matter trained to shoot to 22 incapacitate as opposed to shooting to kill? 23 A: Police officers are not trained 24 either to shoot to incapacitate nor are they trained to 25 shoot to kill, they're trained to shoot to stop the
401 threat. They're trained to shoot to the center of the 2 visible mass. 3 Q: All right. 4 A: So basically they're aiming for the 5 centre of what they see. 6 Q: All right. And so for example the -- 7 the chest -- the chest area of the individual or the back 8 area of an individual? 9 A: The chest area would be a good 10 example, yes. 11 Q: All right. So when we see in the 12 television shows police officers firing at the hand of 13 the shooter and the gun flying off, this is not something 14 that you're trained to do? 15 A: That's Hollywood; that's Hollywood. 16 Q: Okay. 17 A: That's Hollywood. It's -- it's not 18 realistic under a stressful scenario given the fact of 19 somebody potentially shooting at you as well to have that 20 kind of ability. There may be a few individuals who can 21 do that but, in general, it's beyond most people's 22 capability. 23 Q: All right. Now, perhaps you can -- 24 all right. Is there any -- other that what you've told 25 me, is there any other -- is there any specific protocol
411 in place which governs circumstances under which firearms 2 can be discharged? 3 A: Well, there's the use of force model 4 that applies to all police officers. It starts with an 5 officer's presence and progresses depended on the -- the 6 level of force required to deal with an individual all 7 the way through the -- from his -- from his presence, 8 through his voice, through his use of force tools, all 9 the way to lethal force or with -- or disengagement. 10 Q: Okay. And does the police officer 11 before or the TRU team member before discharging his 12 firearm, does he require any specific permission in 13 advance of discharging his firearm? 14 A: No, he does not. A police officer 15 who fears, as I said, fears death or a grievous bodily 16 harm to an individual or himself has that legal authority 17 to discharge their weapon. 18 Q: All right. And indeed, it might be 19 foolhardy to ask for permission in advance? 20 A: Time constraints may not permit that 21 type of scenario. 22 Q: All right. Ultimately, then, is it 23 an exercise of a police -- the individual police 24 officer's judgement as to whether or not to discharge his 25 firearm?
421 A: that is the ultimate end, yes. A 2 police officer -- you would -- the scenario which you 3 would order somebody to make that kind of a -- to engage 4 someone, you would have to provide that officer with the 5 grounds to do that. 6 He has to have that reasonable grounds in 7 his head that he's protecting or preserving a life. 8 Q: All right. So either -- either 9 provided to him by someone else or -- 10 A: Or he sees himself -- 11 Q: -- made under his own observations? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: All right, thank you. Now you've 14 indicated what weaponry, at least what firearms TRU team 15 had access to as of September 1st. 16 Can you tell us also what the standard 17 uniform and other equipment of the TRU team officers 18 were? 19 A: It varies slightly, based on what 20 role the individual's doing. When members were deployed 21 to the ground at that time, they were wearing an olive 22 drab uniform, two (2) piece uniform, top and bottom. 23 They'd be wearing body armour. Generally, 24 members would wear a yoke, because of the equipment 25 around their waist.
431 They would carry a full range of use of 2 force equipment; handcuffs, baton, OC spray, as well as 3 their firearms, observation equipment, binoculars, 4 scopes, radios, portable radio, extra batteries. 5 Generally, the members who are deployed to 6 the ground, they're out there for a considerable length 7 of time. I would say your average containment call would 8 run nine (9) hours or more, so you could be in a -- 9 laying in a damp ditch for a considerable length of time. 10 So, often they'd take extra clothing, 11 food, that type of thing, so. 12 Q: All right. And returning to your 13 curriculum vitae, at page 2. From December of 1996 to 14 March 2003, you were a staff sergeant still with the 15 London Tactics and Rescue Unit? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: March 2003 to October 2005, you were 18 promoted to Inspector at the Provincial Communications 19 Centre in London. 20 A: That's correct. 21 Q: And you became an active Level 2 22 incident commander within the London region and 23 provincially? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And an active public order unit
441 commander as well? 2 A: That's correct. 3 Q: Currently, you continue to be an 4 inspector, now with the regional -- as regional manager, 5 traffic and marine for the Western Region. 6 A: That's correct. 7 Q: All right. So I take it that you 8 have no current involvement with the -- with a TRU team? 9 A: Unless I'm deployed as an incident 10 commander, no. 11 Q: Right, okay, thank you. Now, I 12 understand that in April of 1996, you did attend at a 13 Native awareness seminar? 14 A: Yes, a one (1) day seminar at our 15 headquarters in Orillia. 16 Q: And who sponsored that? 17 A: Well, it was put on by our bureau, if 18 I remember correctly. I'm trying to remember who all was 19 there. I think Monty Kohoko was there. I think Glenn 20 Trivett was there instructing us. 21 Q: As instructor? 22 A: As instructors. 23 Q: These are Aboriginal OPP officers? 24 A: Yes, yes. 25 Q: And what was the general objective of
451 the course? 2 A: I think the objective of the day was 3 to give us a -- an awareness of the culture of the First 4 Nations people. 5 Q: And why? 6 A: Familiarization, so we'd have a 7 better understanding. 8 Q: And is this the first Native 9 awareness seminar, to your knowledge, that was put on by 10 the OPP? 11 A: To my knowledge, yes. 12 Q: And do you have understanding of 13 what, if anything, precipitated the creation of this 14 course? 15 A: No. 16 Q: Have you attended any further Native 17 awareness training seminars? 18 A: Not as yet. I am scheduled for one. 19 Q: Is it now a mandatory attendance? 20 A: It is for some, yeah. 21 Q: For who? 22 A: As Level 2 incident commander, it's 23 mandatory attendance, as a member of any of the 24 specialized unit it is also mandatory attendance. 25 Q: And that would include the TRU team?
461 A: TRU team, the ERT team, negotiators, 2 yes. 3 Q: And when did it become mandatory? 4 A: I'm afraid I -- I don't know. 5 Q: All right. Some time after 1995? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: All right. Now what was your first 8 involvement as a police officer with Ipperwash related 9 matters? 10 A: My first involvement would have been 11 in 1993. 12 Q: Do you recall the circumstances of 13 that involvement? 14 A: That's when the helicopter was shot 15 at from -- at the Army Camp. 16 Q: All right. Now what was -- what was 17 your capacity when you attended? 18 A: I attended as a member of the TRU 19 team. 20 Q: And what was -- were you briefed? 21 A: We would have been briefed, yes. 22 Q: Do you recall what you were briefed 23 about? 24 A: I -- I don't precisely recall. We 25 were briefed as to what had occurred and we were put on
471 standby up at Pinery Park. 2 Q: What were you told had occurred? 3 A: That a helicopter had been shot at 4 and had been hit by a firearm. 5 Q: From where? 6 A: Fired from the ground in the area of 7 the Camp. 8 Q: Were you advised that it was 9 suspected that an Aboriginal person had discharged the 10 firearm? 11 A: No. 12 Q: All right. You said that you were on 13 standby at the Pinery Park? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: Standby for what? 16 A: Standby in case we were needed in the 17 event of -- during the search if there was a potential 18 for violence or if there was other need the Incident 19 Commander required us for. 20 Q: All right. And were your services 21 required? In other words, were you deployed? 22 A: No, we were not. 23 Q: And did you make a note of this 24 attendance? 25 A: I believe I did.
481 Q: And if you would look at Tab 2 2 please, Inquiry Document Number 2005581. I wonder if 3 you might first of all, identify these two (2) pages 4 please. 5 A: That's a page from my notebook from 6 the 23rd of August 1993. It's on page 15 of my police 7 officer's journal. 8 Q: All right. And does it continue 9 through August 24, 1993 on page 16? 10 A: Yes, it does. 11 Q: Now I wonder if you can tell me, what 12 is your general practice with respect to taking of notes? 13 A: My general practice at that time was 14 to take notes that were -- to refresh my memory at a 15 later date. They were not a complete compilation of 16 every event that happened. 17 Q: Refresh memory for what purposes? 18 A: For the purpose of court attendance. 19 Q: And were you obliged as a police 20 officer to -- to create these notes? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: And obliged also to maintain your 23 notes? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And I take it that you created your
491 notes in discharge of that obligation. 2 A: I did. 3 Q: Did you make the notes at or close to 4 the time of the events reflected therein? 5 A: I did. 6 Q: And is that your general practice? 7 A: That would be my general practice. 8 Q: Are there any exceptions to that 9 general practice? 10 A: There are. There are circumstances 11 where there's too much going on. The location may not be 12 conducive to making notes. For any member of a team on - 13 - on ground at an occurrence. 14 By "on ground," I mean they're actually 15 deployed out into the field, around a building or 16 whatever it is they're doing, it's very difficult if next 17 to impossible to make notes as you're going along. Your 18 notes would be made at the end of the incident. 19 Q: Okay. At the end of the incident. 20 All right. I'd like to make these notes the next exhibit 21 please. 22 THE REGISTRAR: P-1335, Your Honour. 23 24 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1335: Document Number 2005581. 25 Handwritten notebook entries
501 of Kent Skinner re. 2 Helicopter Incident, August 3 23, 1993. 4 5 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 6 Q: And I take it that they accurately 7 reflect the circumstances of your attendance in or around 8 Ipperwash and Pinery Park. 9 A: In August of 1993, yes. 10 Q: And did you in fact have to attend at 11 Camp Ipperwash, or did you attend at Camp Ipperwash at 12 all during August 23rd or 24th? 13 A: No, I did not. 14 Q: All right. Now, I wonder if you 15 would next go to Tab 3, this is Inquiry Document Number 16 2005580. And again, are these your -- your notes with 17 respect to February 26th, 1995? 18 A: Yes, they are. 19 Q: And perhaps you can just briefly tell 20 us what -- what occurred on this day as reflected in 21 these notes. 22 A: These are the notes I took regarding 23 a TRU team call out for a barricaded person at Kettle 24 Point. 25 Q: All right. And what was the
511 conclusion of that? 2 A: Conclusion of the...? 3 Q: How did it conclude, that incident? 4 A: It resolved itself peacefully, if 5 that's what you're asking. 6 Q: That's what I'm asking. And were you 7 actually deployed to this scene? 8 A: Yes, we were. The TRU team was 9 deployed to the ground at that time. 10 Q: And do you recall who the other 11 members of your team were at this deployment? 12 A: I was present, Ken Deane was present, 13 Jim Irvine and I don't think I have it in my notes 14 exactly who all was there. 15 Beauchesne was present, Zupancic, Pat 16 Morrisey and I'm afraid I don't have the other members' 17 names though. 18 Q: All right. Is it likely that your 19 entire team was deployed; that is, the available members 20 of your team? 21 A: I'm sorry? 22 Q: Is it likely that the available 23 members of your team were all deployed? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: Is that the way it would work?
521 A: Yes. When a team the called out, in 2 this case on a containment call, the entire team would 3 respond, all available members. 4 Q: Okay. I'd like to make this the next 5 exhibit, please. 6 THE REGISTRAR: P-1336, Your Honour. 7 8 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1336: Document Number 2005580. 9 Handwritten notebook entries 10 of Kent Skinner re. 11 Containment, February 26, 12 1995. 13 14 MS. SUSAN VELLA: And that is the -- the 15 notes of February 26th, 1995 of Inspector Skinner. 16 17 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 18 Q: What was your next assignment, if you 19 will, relative to Ipperwash after the 1993 helicopter 20 incident? 21 A: Well, I next responded on the 5th of 22 September, 1995. 23 Q: And given your position as team 24 leader, why was your first active involvement on 25 September 5th, 1995?
531 A: For the weeks preceding that, I was 2 on annual leave. 3 Q: You were on vacation? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: All right. And who was your second 6 in command during that time? 7 A: Ken Deane was. 8 Q: And do you recall when your team -- 9 TRU team was actually -- actually received this 10 assignment as opposed to being deployed? 11 A: It wasn't -- as far as the team being 12 called out, was that the question? 13 Q: Not the team being called out, the 14 team being informed of this assignment? 15 A: It would have been sometime while I 16 was on hol -- on leave. 17 Q: Okay. And is it fair to say that 18 from September 1 to 4, 1995, that Ken Deane would have 19 acted on your behalf, if you will? 20 A: Yes. He was the team leader in my 21 absence. 22 Q: Were you aware that he attended at a 23 meeting on September the 1st, 1995, at the London 24 Detachment to review the OPP's plan with respect to the 25 potential occupation of Ipperwash Park?
541 A: I wasn't aware of that until I 2 returned on the 5th. 3 Q: Okay. And is it fair to say that he 4 represented the London TRU team at that meeting? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And he briefed you about that 7 meeting? 8 A: When I returned on the 5th, Ken 9 briefed me as to what was happening, yes. 10 Q: And what -- what did he advise you 11 was happening? 12 A: I don't recall the specifics of -- of 13 what he advised me other than it would have been what the 14 actual scenario was that had happened. 15 Q: All right. Did he advise you with 16 respect to any specific information regarding risk 17 assessment factors? 18 A: Not that I recall. 19 Q: So, for example, any concerns with 20 respect to weaponry? 21 A: Not that I recall. 22 Q: Did he advise you what the perceived 23 or the anticipated role of the TRU team was going to be 24 during this operation? 25 A: I don't recall at that time, but I
551 know once we got up, our role was to standby in case we 2 were needed. 3 Q: Did you become aware of the existence 4 of a plan called Project Maple? 5 A: I did, yes. 6 Q: And when did you first become aware 7 of this plan? 8 A: September the 5th. 9 Q: Okay. Were you briefed about the 10 plan? 11 A: I read the plan. 12 Q: You read it? 13 A: Yes. Our portion of it, at least. 14 Q: Okay. 15 A: The requirements for us. 16 Q: As relevant to you? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: And what was your understanding of 19 your requirements as defined by Project Maple? 20 A: We were -- again, as I said, we were 21 to stand by in case we were required by the Incident 22 Commander and some of the potential things we could have 23 done that he may have required us for like K-9 backup, 24 extrication, that type of thing. 25 Q: Now, do you recall generally what you
561 -- what -- what you did on September the 5th before we go 2 to your notes? 3 A: I have a general recollection, yes, 4 ma'am. 5 Q: Okay. Perhaps you can tell us what 6 your general recollection is? 7 A: That Ken and I that morning drove up 8 to Forest. We met with John Carson at Forest Detachment 9 and Ken showed me around the area; we drove around. 10 Q: Okay. What's the purpose of driving 11 around the area? 12 A: Just -- it was just for my 13 familiarization. I'm not familiar with the area at all, 14 never policed the area, and it's just -- it would be a 15 general practice of us again pre-planning of an event so 16 there's familiarity to the area and how to get to 17 different access points. 18 Q: Now, when you met with Incident 19 Commander Carson that morning did you receive a formal 20 briefing? 21 A: It wasn't a -- a formal briefing 22 other than he advised me what had happened and at that 23 point in time he requested that we bring the team up from 24 London to standby in the area. 25 Q: And did he tell you what his
571 expectations was, with respect to any deployment of the 2 TRU team at that time? 3 A: No. 4 Q: So as far as you knew you were just 5 to be on standby on an as needed basis? 6 A: That's correct. 7 Q: Were you given any profiles or 8 identities of the occupiers? 9 A: No, I wasn't. 10 Q: To your knowledge, did -- did Ken 11 Deane have -- have access to that information? 12 A: I don't believe he did. I'm not 13 aware of that. 14 Q: To your knowledge, had he any prior 15 or previous policing experience in or around the 16 Ipperwash area? 17 A: Not that I know of. 18 Q: I wonder if we might go to Tab 4. 19 This is Inquiry Document Number 2005574. And are these 20 your notes relative to Tuesday, September 5, 1995? 21 A: Yes, they are. 22 Q: I'd like to make these the next 23 exhibit please? 24 THE REGISTRAR: P-1337, Your Honour. 25
581 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1337: Document Number 2005574. 2 Handwritten notebook entries 3 of Ken Skinner, September 05, 4 1995. 5 6 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 7 Q: Again, were these notes made 8 contemporaneously with the events refle -- reflected? 9 A: These were. These notes were, yes. 10 Q: All right. And according to your 11 notes at 9:00 in the morning you had a 10-8 with Ken 12 Deane. What does that mean? 13 A: 10-8 means we're on our way, away 14 from London office towards Forest. 15 Q: Okay. And according to this at 13:00 16 hours you attended at -- I'm sorry, before we get to that 17 you attended at Forest in and around nine o'clock and 18 that's when you received your meeting with Inspector 19 Carson? 20 A: It would have been sometime after 21 that. It was nine o'clock when we left London so it 22 would have been closer to ten o'clock or so when I 23 arrived in Forest. 24 Q: All right. At 13:00 hours you 25 reviewed the Project Maple plan at the Command Post?
591 A: That's correct. 2 Q: And then at 13:30 you are en route to 3 London? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And what was that with respect to? 6 A: Again we were going back to get the 7 team to be prepared to leave to come up and standby as 8 requested by the Incident Commander. 9 Q: And it says: 10 "Standby at Pinery Provincial Park in 11 case of armed confrontation." 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: Now, what does that mean? 14 A: Well, again most deployments of a TRU 15 team are in relation to a firearms occurrence and so that 16 would be, in my mind, our role there would be in case 17 there was a firearms' event. 18 Q: Okay. That would be the basic 19 criteria for deployment of the TRU team in this 20 circumstance? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: All right. 23 A: Unless there were some other, as I 24 say, perhaps an intelligence gathering where our 25 invisible deployment may be of -- of use.
601 Q: And then your next entry is at 15:00 2 hours and you were -- attended -- I can't read that. 3 A: Attended my residence. It's "RES", 4 short for residence, to prepare to leave; I packed. 5 Q: And at 7:30 you're en route to 6 Ipperwash, 17:30? 7 A: 17:30, yes. 8 Q: And at 18:15 you attend a meeting at 9 the Command Post. 10 "Every unit reporting status." 11 Can you tell me your best recollection of 12 -- of what that was about? 13 A: That was just the various element 14 leaders. It would have been myself, a representative of 15 the Crime Unit, ERT members, just advising how many 16 people they have, where they are and what they're 17 currently doing. 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 Q: And just to back up for a moment, if 22 you would go to Tab 6, this is Exhibit P-426, excerpts 23 from the scribe notes of the OPP. 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And I note that -- that the notes
611 from September 4th, 1995, is there anyone there listed 2 who represented the TRU team, at the top of the page? 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 A: No, there isn't. 7 Q: All right. And then over on page 24 8 of this exhibit, which is the next page for you, a 9 meeting at 9:25 a.m. September 5, 1995. 10 Again, any TRU representation at this 11 meeting? 12 A: No, there isn't. 13 Q: And over the next page, which is page 14 34 of the exhibit, at 11:42 a.m. 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: Reflects that you had a discussion 17 with Inspector Carson regarding the TRU team's role -- 18 A: Right. 19 Q: Inspector Carson stated their role is 20 back up. 21 And what does that mean? 22 A: I think at that time we had numerous 23 checkpoints in place and if there was any kind of a 24 confrontation or the members required assistance at 25 those, it was within TRU team's role to provide that.
621 Q: All right. And in the meantime, 2 you're setting up bunking facilities at the Pinery Park 3 for your team; that's where they're going to stay? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And you advised there are ten (10) 6 members available. You're advised that you are to sit in 7 on briefing meetings. Is that normal protocol, in your 8 experience? 9 A: It would be for the team leader, yes. 10 Q: Okay. Inspector Skinner directed -- 11 sorry, I think that should say Inspector Carson -- 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: It's a typo. 14 A: Yes, I think it should. 15 Q: Directed Sergeant Skinner to keep the 16 gun vehicles out of sight. 17 Now, what's that about, gun vehicles? 18 A: TRU team has a lot of equipment when 19 it comes on the road and carried by three (3) cube -- 20 cube trucks. They're -- I'm not sure of the exact size; 21 eighteen (18), twenty (20) foot cube trucks. 22 Q: All right. 23 A: They're quite large; they're white 24 with police -- large police writing on them. They're -- 25 they're a billboard. I think the inspector didn't want
631 us driving through town and raising the awareness of our 2 presence and raising the presence of the police in -- 3 Q: All right. 4 A: -- the community. 5 Q: And how did you deal with that 6 concern? 7 A: We didn't take the main roads up to 8 Pinery, we took the back roads. 9 Q: Okay. And then they were housed at 10 the Pinery Park? 11 A: And they were kept at the Park. 12 Q: For the duration of this incident? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And you then asked about negotiations 15 and John Carson said he wanted to talk to them shortly. 16 Now, can you just tell me, why were you 17 asking or why did you raise the topic of negotiations? 18 A: Well, as we briefly discussed 19 earlier, one of the TRU team's primary roles is to 20 facilitate those negotiations. So I was making an 21 inquiry as to what was happening or was there contact, 22 was there any communication, was there negotiations 23 ongoing on at the time. 24 Q: And was -- what was his response, do 25 you recall?
641 A: Not specifically, I don't. I think 2 this is probably a fairly accurate representation. 3 Q: All right. In any event, do you 4 recall being deployed, if you will, or your team being 5 deployed to facilitate negotiations at any time between 6 the 5th and the 6th of '95? 7 A: No. 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 Q: Were you provided with any -- at any 12 time during the course of September the 5th, were you 13 provided with the identities of any of the occupiers? 14 A: No. 15 Q: Nor their backgrounds? 16 A: No. 17 Q: Is that information that you would 18 normally expect to be apprised of? 19 A: In general, at a -- a TRU team call 20 you have a pretty good idea who your suspect is or who 21 the individual is, who was the object of your concern. 22 I think in this case there was -- my 23 recollection, there was an uncertainty as to who all the 24 players were. 25 Q: All right. Now, were you advised as
651 to what the overall objective of Project Maple was? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: And what was your understanding of 4 that? 5 A: It was to peacefully negotiate a 6 surrender of the Park. 7 Q: And how did your team -- or what was 8 -- what was the anticipated role of TRU in relation to 9 that objective? 10 A: Again, to facilitate that peaceful 11 negotiation. 12 Q: The peaceful negotiation that -- the 13 negotiation that would re -- result in a surrender of the 14 Park? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And by that you mean vacating of the 17 Park by the occupiers? 18 A: At that point in time, yes. 19 Q: All right. Now did you have any 20 information or understanding of any attempts to pursue an 21 injunction at this point? 22 A: Yes, I believe that was one of the 23 objectives. 24 Q: All right. And in what respect? How 25 was that an objective?
661 A: I believe they were seeking an 2 injunction, a court injunction to be served on the 3 occupiers to -- requiring them to leave the Park. 4 Q: All right. Now did your team have 5 any role to play in that process? 6 A: No, we didn't. 7 Q: Now in reference to the notation that 8 you were on standby un -- until -- in case of an armed 9 confrontation, were you provided with any information on 10 the 5th with respect to the potential existence of 11 firearms? 12 A: On the 5th? 13 Q: On the 5th. 14 A: No. 15 Q: All right. Now if you go to -- I'm 16 sorry, I'm going to flip back and forth a little bit 17 here, but Tab 6 which is Exhibit P-426 which is an 18 excerpt from the scribe notes on page 39 which is the 19 fourth page in. 20 There's a notation at 16:42 hours at -- on 21 September the 5th: 22 "John Carson called Kent Skinner of the 23 TRU team." 24 Do you remember -- have any recollection 25 of that telephone conversation?
671 A: I -- I'm sorry, which page are you 2 on, I'm sorry? 3 Q: You'll see -- it's the fourth page in 4 but at the top it will say page 39 or 39 at least. 5 A: Yes. I'm sorry, yes. 6 Q: And the 16:42 notation. 7 A: "John Carson called Kent Skinner of 8 the TRU team." 9 Q: Right. Do you have any recollection 10 as to the -- what that telephone conversation was about? 11 A: No, I don't. 12 Q: All right. Now going back to your 13 notes at Tab 4, Exhibit P-1337. And the second page of 14 your notes, I'm looking at the 18:30 entry, it says: 15 "Setup TOC at MNR parking lot." 16 Can you tell me, first of all, what -- 17 what the TOC was? 18 A: TOC. T-O-C stands for Tactical 19 Operation Centre. One of the cube trucks is set up as a 20 communications vehicle; at any TRU occurrence it's 21 deployed. All the communications from the TRU members on 22 the ground would come through the TOC and then into the 23 Command Post. 24 The TRU team communications is separate 25 from uniform members communication. It's a shorter
681 range, self contained. The reason it's separate is 2 because you -- you don't want to all be on the same 3 frequency and when a suspect steps outside of a residence 4 at a barricaded person call with a rifle you don't want 5 somebody calling a coffee on the outer perimeter. 6 So it's kept separately, so for officer 7 safety purposes. 8 Q: All right. And perhaps you can just 9 describe a little more fully what the TRU team -- team 10 communication capabilities were and what equipment they 11 used during the course of this incident. 12 A: Okay, sure. It's a Motorola radio 13 system. Members are talking on portable to portable, 5 14 watt portables. The range is anywhere up to maybe 5 15 kilometres. However that's -- there's such a wide 16 variance in that given the terrain and the weather et 17 cetera and how the member is situated that we would only 18 rely on a 1 kilometre range. 19 So you would always want your TOC set up 20 within 1 kilometre of the scene of an occurrence. 21 Q: All right. So in this case, how far 22 away was the -- the communication centre and the -- what 23 did you call it? A cube truck? 24 A: Cube truck. 25 Q: Cube truck?
691 A: Yeah. 2 Q: How far was that from the Park? 3 A: The -- where it was setup in the MNR 4 parking lot, it was 800 metres from the intersections of 5 Army Camp and East Parkway. 6 Q: All right. And I understand that 7 there's also a -- a recording device that is specific to 8 the TRU communications? 9 A: There was. Since about October of 10 '94 there was a logger recorder device in the vehicle, 11 yes. 12 Q: All right. 13 A: And it recorded the TRU channel. It 14 could -- it was capable of recording the regular channels 15 as well if it was fed through the logger. 16 Q: Okay. And in this operation were 17 there one (1) or two (2) different recording devices for 18 the two (2) sets of communications? 19 A: Well, there would have been a logger 20 recorder in the commun -- Chatham Communications Centre 21 for the regular members and there was a logger recorder 22 in the -- in the TOC. 23 Q: Okay. Who was responsible for -- for 24 operating the TOC recording device? 25 A: The member that would be assigned to
701 work in the TOC would be responsible to set up the logger 2 recorder at any TRU occurrence. 3 Q: Okay. And who was that in this case? 4 A: In the case on the -- when we were 5 there at the 5th? 6 Q: On the 5th? 7 A: Well, on the 5th we wouldn't have 8 turned the logger recorder on. 9 Q: Okay. 10 A: You wouldn't turn the logger recorder 11 on until the team were actually deployed. 12 Q: Okay. I'm sorry, who -- who set it 13 up then to make sure it was operational? 14 A: Well, as far as setting it up here, 15 it wasn't the logger recorder. We were basically placing 16 the truck and providing -- making -- ascertaining if 17 there was power available for the truck. The truck 18 either is run on shore power or a generator or has to run 19 off the engine itself. 20 In this case the only available source of 21 energy we had was the -- the engine of the vehicle 22 itself. 23 Q: Okay. 24 A: So essentially we were parking the 25 vehicle, mounting the Victrix mast antenna which is an
711 expandable antenna attached to the vehicle; it goes up to 2 about forty (40) or fifty (50) feet to help them provide 3 the communications. 4 Q: Fair enough. 5 6 (BRIEF PAUSE) 7 8 Q: And was there -- how would the 9 communication to the TOC interface if you will or be 10 relayed up to the Command Post? Was that possible? 11 A: In -- in this scenario? 12 Q: Yes. 13 A: Because of the distance involved 14 there was no hardline phone connection. We were beyond 15 the TRU team radio capacity so communications between the 16 TOC and the Command Post were done by cellular telephone. 17 Q: And did that pose any challenges? 18 A: Yes, it did. 19 Q: Why? 20 A: Well, the reception in this area is - 21 - is poor at best so it did cause us some concern. 22 Q: Okay, fair enough. Do you recall 23 whether or not there was a St. John's Ambulance vehicle 24 at the TOC when you arrived on September 5th? 25 A: No, I don't.
721 Q: All right. 2 A: You -- you're asking about the MNR 3 parking lot? 4 Q: Yes, I am. 5 A: Yeah. No, I don't recall there being 6 one there. 7 Q: Okay, fair enough. Now, were you 8 assigned any other tasks by Inspector Carson aside from 9 setting up the -- the TOC and basically getting your team 10 in place at Pinery? 11 A: No, I wasn't. 12 Q: Do you recall being asked to -- to -- 13 making inquiries with respect to obtaining a light 14 armoured vehicle? 15 A: That was one (1) of the discussions 16 in our -- in our briefing meetings, yes. 17 Q: Okay. 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: And did you take any -- first of all 20 do you under -- have an understanding as to why the 21 Incident Commander wanted a light armoured vehicle 22 present? 23 A: Yes, I do. Ipperwash Park itself is 24 quite a rugged piece of property, sand dunes. TRU team 25 vehicles are not equipped for off-road capability
731 although we do have four (4) wheel drive Suburbans once 2 we left a hardened surface they pretty much get bogged 3 down. 4 So in the event we would have had to have 5 made some kind of extrication if a boater went on ground 6 or whatever or somebody needed to be extricated from the 7 Park there could be a need for that type of a vehicle and 8 the fact that it was armoured, if we were to reach the 9 point of deployment, obviously for us to be deployed 10 you're -- now the level of violence has escalated. 11 So it would be for officer safety and the 12 safety of those we were trying to extricate from the 13 Park; that's what the purpose of the light armoured 14 vehicle would have been. 15 Q: All right. And if you now return to 16 Tab 6 Exhibit P-426 the scribe notes and if you look at - 17 - to page 44 of those notes please. It's about five (5) 18 pages in? 19 It reflects a meeting with Inspector 20 Linton. It says: 21 "Inspector Linton meet with TRU leader 22 who questioned about K-9. Inspector 23 Linton will speak to Inspector Carson 24 in the morning." 25 Now, do you have any recollection of this
741 meeting with Inspector Linton? 2 A: Other than these notes, no, I don't. 3 Q: And it also says: 4 "Inspector Linton operational speaking. 5 TRU team will not be leaving. We will 6 have the Barrie team respond to other 7 TRU team calls." 8 Do you have any recollection about what 9 that was about? 10 A: Yes. We were deployed to remain at 11 this occurrence. Had there been another request for a 12 TRU team in the area, we would have stayed at this 13 occurrence and Barrie TRU team would have responded to 14 cover our other calls. 15 Q: And did you have any sense as to how 16 long this deployment was anticipated to be at this point 17 or -- 18 A: It -- 19 Q: -- this activation, I should say. 20 A: It was indefinite at this point. 21 Q: All right. All right. So in other 22 words, Inspector Linton is telling you that from an 23 operational standpoint, you're going to be there until 24 you're no longer needed? 25 A: That's correct.
751 Q: Okay. And as a result of receiving 2 that information, what if anything, did you do? 3 A: I contacted Brian Deevy who was then 4 team leader of the Barrie TRU team and advised him that 5 our calls were now his. 6 Q: Okay. Delivered him a present? 7 A: Essentially. 8 Q: And if you look at Tab 7, please, 9 this is a transcript or appears to be a transcript of a 10 conversation held on September 5th, 1995, at 20:55 11 between yourself and Staff Sergeant Brian Deevy. 12 I don't want to -- let me ask you first: 13 Did you have an opportunity in advance of today to listen 14 to the audio recording reflected by this transcript? 15 A: I have. 16 Q: And were you -- are you able to 17 advise as to whether or not the transcript in front of 18 you is a substantially accurate reflection of that audio? 19 A: It is. 20 Q: Okay. And what was the purpose of 21 this call? 22 A: Again, this was to advise Brian that 23 they were responsible for London TRU team occurrences. 24 Q: Okay. And I just wanted to ask you 25 one -- one particular question. Page 2 of this
761 transcript, 2 of 4, two-thirds (2/3's) of the way down, 2 Brian Deevy is saying -- he's obviously telling you about 3 the current situation that his men were involved in that 4 sounded somewhat challenging. 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And says: 7 "Not moving here, so it's clear to talk 8 about we had two (2) of them on the 9 ground. This guy's got four (4) 10 Rottweilers and, um, he's a real hinky 11 bastard." 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: Is "hinky" common parlance in police 14 speak? 15 A: It's not uncommon. 16 Q: Okay. What did you take that -- that 17 to mean, that comment? 18 A: To me it meant in this case the 19 individual was very paranoid, cautious, checking what was 20 happening on his property. 21 Q: All right. And did you gather the 22 racial identity of this person from this description? 23 A: No, I didn't. 24 Q: I'd like to, Commissioner -- what we 25 will be doing is reviewing a number of transcripts and in
771 some cases, actually, playing the audio but all of the 2 audio recordings are all located on one (1) CD just for 3 convenience. 4 I wonder if we might assign a -- an 5 exhibit number now for this CD which contains all of the 6 transcripts and all of the audio recordings which we'll 7 be reviewing today. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 9 THE REGISTRAR: P-1338, Your Honour. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 11 12 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1338: Reserved. 13 14 MS. SUSAN VELLA: That's fair enough, 15 okay. I'm advised that it would be prudent, in addition, 16 to advise the -- to mark the individual transcripts 17 separately, just to avoid any confusion. 18 So I would also ask that this transcript 19 of the conversation between Kent Skinner and Brian Deevy 20 dated September 5, 1995 at 20:55 hours, it's a mobile 21 command unit OPP logger tape number 2, track 1, disc 1 of 22 3, also identified as region 1 as the next exhibit, 23 please. 24 THE REGISTRAR: P-1339, Your Honour. 25 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thank you.
781 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1339: Transcript from Region 01, 2 Kent Skinner, Brian Deevy, 3 September 05, 1995, 20:55 4 hrs, Mobile Command Unit, OPP 5 Logger tape number 2, Track 6 1, Disc 1 of 3. 7 8 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 9 Q: Now I'm being too detailed so I will 10 -- less detailed, which is fine, okay. 11 Let's go to Tab -- just hang on here. 12 13 (BRIEF PAUSE) 14 15 Q: All right. By this time, 20:55, is 16 your team now stationed at the Pinery Park? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: And to your knowledge, did any 19 members from your team, were any members of your team 20 deployed to the Ipperwash Park area at any time during 21 the course of that day? 22 A: They did not. 23 Q: And if they had been, would you 24 expect to have been apprised of that fact? 25 A: Yes, I would have --
791 Q: And -- 2 A: The request, in all likelihood would 3 have come through the Incident Commander to me first. 4 Q: All right. So is that the way it 5 works? The Incident Commander basically makes the call 6 out, if you will, I want to deploy the TRU team or 'X' 7 member, he tells you and you then issue the command? 8 A: Well, more likely he would call with 9 a situation. 10 Q: Yes. 11 A: And we would discuss the situation 12 and I would offer him our -- what option we could provide 13 to help them resolve that situation. And he would 14 approve one of those options and then we would employ 15 that. 16 Q: Okay. All right. In any event, 17 there's no conceivable way that you can think of that one 18 of your officers would have been deployed down to the 19 sandy parking lot without you knowing about it? 20 A: No. 21 Q: All right. Did you receive any 22 information from Inspector Linton that night? I 23 understand he was the -- he would have been the night 24 shift Incident Commander; is that fair? 25 A: That's correct, yes.
801 Q: Did you receive any information from 2 him which alerted you to -- to any expectation that your 3 team would be deployed that night for any reason? 4 A: I did not, no. 5 Q: Okay. And that was consistent with 6 your understanding of Inspector Carson's assessment based 7 on your earlier meetings with him? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: To your knowledge were threat 10 assessments being conducted on September the 5th? 11 A: We had members from our Intelligence 12 Sections present and Crime Unit, yes. 13 Q: All right. And who were those 14 members? 15 A: Mark Dew, Trevor Richardson and I 16 believe Don Bell. 17 Q: All right. And Don Bell was from the 18 Intelligence Unit? 19 A: I -- I think that's where he's from, 20 yes. 21 Q: And Trevor Richardson was the leader 22 for the Crime Unit? 23 A: He was a member of the Crime Unit. 24 Q: And what about Mark Dew? 25 A: Mark was also a member of the Crime
811 Unit I think at that time. 2 Q: And was reporting to Trevor 3 Richardson, as you recall? 4 A: I think that is correct. 5 Q: Were you privy to any of the threat 6 assessments that were being conducted on the 5th? 7 A: No. 8 Q: And is that usual? 9 A: If there was nothing unusual to 10 report, it's not unusual. 11 Q: Okay. So you only become privy if 12 there's an elevated threat that may warrant the TRU team 13 activation? 14 A: That would be correct, yes. 15 Q: All right. Now it's reflected -- I 16 don't have the scribe note of this particular notation 17 but it was reflected in page 40 of the scribe notes that 18 I put to Mr. Korosec yesterday that he had the authority 19 to deploy the TRU if he thought he needed to do that. 20 Now, can you comment on that? 21 A: That would not be the case at all. 22 Stan was a Sergeant at the time and a Sergeant would not 23 have the authority to deploy or call out a TRU team. 24 He would -- if a Sergeant had a situation 25 that he felt the TRU team could be useful for, he would
821 make that request through the assigning officers. 2 Q: Now had you been asked to facilitate 3 negotiations, who on your team would you have assigned to 4 that? 5 A: Well by facilitating negotiations, 6 what that would refer to is that we would provide a safe 7 environment for those to take place or in some cases once 8 that environment is contained, we would provide 9 electronic hardware. 10 If I can example again, a barricaded 11 person call often people are very distraught, it's not 12 uncommon for them to destroy their phone and to 13 facilitate the communications, TRU team would supply a 14 land line to the building. 15 So that's TRU's role in facilitating 16 negotiations or utilize a loud hailer to try to attract 17 the person's attention or distraction device to get them 18 onto the phone to talk to negotiators. 19 Q: Okay. Or to provide cover for a 20 negotiator? 21 A: On the rare occasions that you can't 22 get electronic communication facilitated, there may be a 23 requirement to bring a negotiator onto the ground. 24 Not a desirable situation because you now 25 have to have TRU members escort the negotiator everywhere
831 to ensure their safety. So you've tied up some TRU 2 members doing that and you've also potentially exposed 3 the negotiator to danger. 4 So there are occasions though when the 5 negotiators are actually deployed out onto the ground and 6 inside the inner perimeter escorted by TRU members to 7 conduct their negotiations. 8 Q: Okay. And when you say 'inner 9 perimeter' what are you referring to? 10 A: Any containment call in general, you 11 would have two (2) perimeters set up. An inner and outer 12 perimeter. The inner perimeter is done by TRU team 13 members and inside the inner perimeter, should be nothing 14 except the suspect or person of interest or the actual 15 situation. 16 Outside the inner perimeter you have what 17 is known as the frozen zone and if you can imagine it's 18 like donut rings is what I'm referring to. The frozen 19 zone should have nobody in it. It should -- you -- 20 having said that you may have an individual, an elderly 21 individual, who can't leave a residence so you need to 22 have an awareness that that's there. 23 And then outside of that you have an outer 24 perimeter and this could be your ERT members or uniform 25 and that's to keep the general population of the
841 community away from this dangerous situation and you 2 would control your access and egress into the frozen zone 3 from the outer perimeter. 4 Q: So that's like a buffer zone? 5 A: It's a buffer zone, exactly, that's a 6 good -- good reference. 7 Q: Okay. All right. Do you have any 8 recollection of meeting a Military officer on the 5th or 9 6th by the name of Captain Smith? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: And do you recall what his role was? 12 A: I believe he's an -- an intelligence 13 officer with the Canadian Military. 14 Q: Did you -- were you also aware that 15 he was the designated liaison officer for the OPP? 16 A: I -- I believe, yes. 17 Q: In other words, between the Military 18 and the OPP? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And that he had had prior experience 21 at Camp Ipperwash during the course of the partial 22 occupation? 23 A: Yes, I'm aware of that. 24 Q: All right. Were you aware as to 25 whether or not he had any open lines of communication
851 with the people within the Army Camp on the 5th and 6th? 2 A: No. 3 Q: As a TRU team leader would you have 4 wanted to know if that line of communication existed? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Why? 7 A: I -- I would go back to the question 8 I asked Inspector Carson: Are negotiations going on; Are 9 we -- are we moving towards resolution and how are they 10 progressing; Are the negotiations going well or are they 11 not going well; What information is coming back and 12 forth? 13 Q: Hmm hmm. And do you have any 14 specific recollection as to Captain Smith indicating that 15 he had cell phone contact with people in the Army Camp? 16 A: No. 17 Q: Is that -- 18 A: I do not. 19 Q: If that was said in your presence is 20 it likely you would have remembered? 21 A: It's -- it's likely I would have 22 remembered. I have no recollection of that at all. 23 Q: All right. That would have been a 24 potentially important source to start negotiations? 25 A: Yes.
861 Q: Now, did you have any luck ultimately 2 with your request for a light armoured vehicle? 3 A: Not in -- not in those days I did 4 not, no. 5 Q: Okay. I wonder if you'd go to Tab 6 6 again, the scribe notes P- -- Exhibit P-426? 7 And if you'd go to page 44 of those scribe 8 notes please, still September the 5th, and I'm going to 9 ask you to look at the notation at 21:06. It indicates 10 there was a meeting with Sergeant Cousineau, Kent 11 Skinner, Wayde Jacklin, Inspector Linton, Mark Dew, and 12 Steve Reid. 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And at the bottom of that entry you - 15 - you were inquiring about light armoured vehicles. 16 A: Hmm hmm. 17 Q: "Inspector Linton advised one is 18 negotiated through London Police 19 Service. A short time and longer term 20 plan is to have Military is providing 21 two (2) LAV's and we have four (4) 22 drivers." 23 And I'm sorry, that's -- I'm reading it 24 verbatim; I know the grammar's a bit off. 25 A: Yeah.
871 Q: But does that refresh your memory at 2 all with respect to what transpired during the course of 3 this meeting? 4 A: Again the requirement was discussed 5 at that time. London Police Service have a relationship 6 with GM Diesel and I think that was part of the 7 discussion. 8 Q: Okay. And I understand that you 9 reported -- well, let me ask you this: Was there 10 anything else of significance which occurred over the 11 course of September the 5th of which you have direct 12 knowledge? 13 A: No. 14 Q: And did you report off-duty at or 15 around 23:00 hours on September the 5th? 16 A: I'd have to look at my notes. 17 Q: Certainly. Back at Tab 4 Exhibit P- 18 1337. 19 20 (BRIEF PAUSE) 21 22 A: Yes, 23:00. 23 Q: Second page. Okay. That -- that's 24 when you went off-duty, at 23:00 hours? 25 A: Yes.
881 Q: All right. And you stayed at the 2 Pinery when you were off duty? 3 A: Yes, I did. 4 Q: And in the event of any need to 5 contact the TRU team leader overnight if you will would 6 that contact be with -- with you or was there a -- a 7 night shift, if you will, team leader? 8 A: No, I was it. 9 Q: You were it, okay. Commissioner, 10 this would be an appropriate or at least a convenient 11 time to take the morning break. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, this 13 would be a good time. We'll take our morning break now. 14 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thank you. 15 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 16 for fifteen (15) minutes. 17 18 --- Upon recessing at 10:25 a.m. 19 --- Upon resuming at 10:47 a.m. 20 21 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 22 resumed. Please be seated. 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25
891 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 2 Q: Yes, thank you. Inspector, we've put 3 on your table a document entitled, Emergency Response 4 Services Manual, Ontario Provincial Police 1994. 5 It's exhibit -- or, sorry, it's Inquiry 6 Document Number 1002027 and it appears to provide the 7 qualifications and purposes and general outline of 8 various units within the OPP including, in the last 9 section, the tactics and rescue unit at pages 23 to 31. 10 And I wonder, first of all, have you -- 11 are you familiar with this manual? 12 A: Yes, ma'am. 13 Q: You would be. 14 A: Yes, ma'am. 15 Q: All right. And with respect to the - 16 - the sections relative to the TRU, was this appropriate 17 -- was it in place in 1995 or had there been any 18 significant changes in the guidelines? 19 A: Changes in this guideline? 20 Q: Yes. 21 A: No, ma'am. 22 Q: All right. So this -- if we look at 23 this, for example, the callout procedure at page 24, this 24 accurately reflected the callout procedure in place in 25 September of 1995?
901 A: That's correct. 2 Q: All right. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Do you want 4 to provide the number, Ms. Vella, so Counsel can find it? 5 MS. SUSAN VELLA: It's Inquiry document 6 Number 1002027. 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Yeah, just being 11 pointed out, this isn't in our binder, that's quite 12 correct. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No -- 14 MS. SUSAN VELLA: It's not in our binder 15 of documents. Nonetheless, I think it's a useful 16 document to have and... 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, it is. 18 19 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 20 Q: I'm sorry, and I missed your answer. 21 Is the process of the callout procedure, is that appro -- 22 was that in place -- 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: -- for September? 25 A: Yes, ma'am.
911 Q: And the response -- outline of the 2 responsibilities of the various members of the TRU team 3 on pages 25 through 20 -- I guess 28. 4 A: Yes, responsibilities for the team 5 leaders and the training coordinators. 6 Q: All right. And the assistant TRU 7 team leader? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: All right, and it also re -- deals 10 with reporting procedures, a selection criteria, 11 selection process and training requirements. 12 Again, all accurately reflect the 13 standards in place September of 1995? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: Thank you. I'd like to make this the 16 next exhibit, please. 17 THE REGISTRAR: P-1340, Your Honour. 18 19 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1340: Document Number 1002027. OPP 20 Emergency Response Services 21 Manual, 1994. 22 23 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 24 Q: Thank you for that, Inspector. Now, 25 I'd like to move on to September the 6th, 1995, please.
921 And perhaps you would go to -- yes, Tab 22 of your brief. 2 It's Inquiry Document Number 5000057. 3 These appear to be excerpts from your 4 police notes for the period from September the 6th right 5 through to September the 20th -- I'm sorry, September the 6 6th, excuse me, through the early hours of September 7th, 7 relative to Ipperwash; is that right? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: All right. I'd like to make this the 10 next exhibit, please. 11 THE REGISTRAR: P-1341, Your Honour. 12 13 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1341: Document Number 5000057. 14 Handwritten notebook entries 15 of Kent Skinner from 16 September 06 to 07, 1995. 17 18 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 19 Q: It's at Tab 22. All right, and if 20 you look at the bottom of your page 30 of your notes, it 21 indicates that you are on duty at 6:00 in the morning; is 22 that right? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And at 6:15 you attend at the Forest 25 Detachment Command Post and at seven o'clock in the
931 morning, you have a meeting. 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: All right. And do you have any 4 recollection of what transpired during your meeting at 5 7:00 in the morning at the Command Post? 6 A: I do have some independent 7 recollection of information that was passed along at that 8 meeting. 9 Q: Okay. Can you advise us? 10 A: That meeting was -- informed that 11 there was an incident the previous night; that there had 12 been some tables put around the roadway. 13 If I remember right, there was a fire and 14 officers went down to see what was going on. Their 15 vehicles were struck by rocks and an officer heard the 16 sound of automatic gunfire. 17 Q: All right. And these were things 18 that were relayed to you at the 7:00 a.m. meeting? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: All right. And the cars that were 21 damaged, were they police cruisers? 22 A: Yes, they were. 23 Q: And they were associated with 24 attending down at the sandy parking lot that evening? 25 A: I don't recall if it was in the
941 parking lot or on the roadway in that area. 2 Q: All right. And did these two (2) 3 incidents, that is the report of gunfire -- well, let me 4 ask you this first: What -- what further do you recall 5 with respect to the nature of the gunfire and where it 6 was heard? 7 A: I recall it was subsequent to the 8 officers going down, that it was -- I think it was fifty 9 (50) to a hundred (100) rounds that were heard. It was 10 believed by the officer to be automatic weapons fire and 11 it was heard from the direction of the camp or the Park. 12 Q: Okay. And what, if any significance, 13 did you as a TRU team leader attach to these two (2) 14 pieces of information? 15 A: Well, it -- it raised the threat 16 level in my estimation. One, we now had an example of 17 violence towards police officers, the throwing of rocks 18 and the sound of a weapons fire. 19 Again -- well, it was -- first of all, it 20 was confirmation that it was a good thing we were there 21 and it was confirmation to me that there was now a higher 22 potential for firearms present. 23 Q: Okay, for the -- so, for the use of 24 firearms -- 25 A: For the use of firearms.
951 Q: -- in an aggressive way? 2 A: Yes. This, to me, sounded like an 3 intimidation. 4 Q: All right. And did you relate any of 5 this information to your TRU team members? 6 A: I did. 7 Q: And why did you do that? 8 A: Well, any pertinent information of an 9 occurrence that I would receive that would be useful or 10 confirm why we're here and information of the threat, I 11 would pass on to team members. 12 Q: Okay. And you did so? 13 A: I did so. 14 Q: Do you recall when? 15 A: I believe subsequent to this meeting. 16 Q: All right. Would it have been, 17 though, in the morning or -- or later? 18 A: Yes. Shortly after the meeting. 19 Q: Okay. And was your team still, at 20 this time -- well, activated but on standby at the Pinery 21 Park? 22 A: Yes. I was the only member not at 23 the Pinery. 24 Q: Okay. Fair enough. 25
961 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: Now, during the course -- can you 4 just recall in a general way what your general duties and 5 course of conduct was during the course of the day; that 6 is, you know, prior to six o'clock at night? 7 A: Yeah. I would be responsible to 8 attend the meet -- the briefing meetings, apprise the 9 Incident Commander of our current status and, again, if 10 any incident were to arise, to offer my opinions or 11 possible resolutions or tactical options that could be 12 applied. 13 Q: And were you asked for your input 14 with respect to tactical solutions with respect to these 15 two (2) pieces of information from the incidents of the 16 night before? 17 A: That had happened the night before? 18 No, at that point in time we didn't have any plans to 19 act on that. 20 Q: No need to do that? 21 A: Not at that time. 22 Q: And during the course of the day was 23 any -- was there input sought with respect to any 24 tactical decisions or options? 25 A: No.
971 Q: Okay. Were you consulted in any -- 2 in any other respect over the course of the day? 3 A: Not that I recall specifically. I'm 4 sure there was numerous discussions throughout the day 5 but I have no specific recollection of them. 6 Q: Okay. Anything of particular 7 significance that stands out? 8 A: Not really. 9 Q: All right. I understand that an 10 issue arose -- not an issue, but that you were requested 11 to find decals. 12 A: Yes. Yes, Ma'am. 13 Q: And just for clarification what -- 14 what decals? 15 A: Police identifier decals that are on 16 the cruisers, the striping and the police markings. 17 Q: And what's the purpose of having these 18 decals? 19 A: Well the purpose is for 20 identification. To identify a vehicle as a police unit. 21 And the reason I was asked to get them was in case we 22 were able to get a light armoured vehicle, that the 23 vehicle would be marked so it was clear that it was a 24 police vehicle and not a military vehicle. 25 Q: And why would that be important?
981 A: Well, since there had been the 2 presence on the Army Camp and there had been 3 confrontations on the Army Camp, it was -- we wanted it 4 clear that if we were to deploy a vehicle like that, that 5 it was a police involvement, not military involvement. 6 Q: All right. So these are the -- the 7 light armoured vehicles that was being sought? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: Okay. And I understand you had a 10 number of -- I mean a number of inquiries by telephone 11 with -- with respect to trying to get these decals? 12 A: I -- to be honest I didn't remember 13 it until I reviewed this material. Yes, I did make a 14 number of inquiries. 15 Q: Fair enough. All right. Now I 16 wonder if we would go -- if you would go to Tab 8 please. 17 This is a trans -- 18 A: 8? 19 Q: Tab 8, sorry. It's a brief -- 20 transcript of a brief message dated September 6th, 1995 21 at 7:16 hundred hours. 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: I don't propose to play this but I'll 24 read it very -- it's very brief. 25 "Operator, Cantel Paging, thank you for
991 calling. Please leave a brief message 2 after tone or enter your number from a 3 touch tone phone." 4 And then you say: 5 "Tex, it's Kent, give me a call would 6 you at the CP here. Sorry, if I woke 7 you up. I'll punch in the number here 8 for you." 9 Now you already indicated that you had an 10 opportunity to review all of these transmissions, my 11 question is, who -- who is Tex? 12 A: Ken Deane. 13 Q: That was his nickname? 14 A: That was his nickname, yes. 15 Q: All right. Did you have a nickname 16 as well? 17 A: I do. 18 Q: And? 19 A: Skinny. 20 Q: Okay. And is this message in 21 relation to your effort to report back to him, if you 22 will, or relay back to him the information you had 23 received at your seven o'clock briefing? 24 A: Yes. Yes. 25 Q: That's in relation to the automatic
1001 gunfire and the damage to police cruisers? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: I'd like to make this the next 4 exhibit please. 5 THE REGISTRAR: P-1342, Your Honour. 6 7 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1342: Transcript of Region 2, Kent 8 Skinner and Cantel Paging 9 recording, September 06, 10 1995. 07:16 hrs, Mobile 11 Command Unit, Logger tape 12 number 2, Track 2, Disc 1 of 13 3. 14 15 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 16 Q: And then we move to Tab 9 please. 17 This is a call apparently held on September the 6th, 2995 18 at 7:27 a.m. And Commissioner, I -- I do propose to play 19 this very brief excerpt. It's Region 3. 20 And I'll ask you to just listen to it for 21 the moment and then I'll ask you some questions about it. 22 A: Sure. 23 24 (AUDIOTAPE PLAYED, TRANSCRIPT BELOW) 25
1011 KS= A/S/Sgt. Kent Skinner 2 KD= A/Sgt. Ken Deane 3 4 KS: Sergeant Skinner. 5 KD: How you doing? 6 KS: How you doing Tex. I just wanted to let 7 you know for one thing. I guess around 8 quarter after eleven there was a bonfire 9 out on the road. 10 KD: Which road? 11 KS: Army Camp Road. 12 KD: Right on the road? 13 KS: Yeah. So the guys drove down to have a 14 look. Proceeded to get four cruiser 15 windows broken by rocks. 16 KD: Oh yeah. 17 KS: Then about quarter to twelve, the one 18 check point heard distinctively automatic 19 weapons fire, about 50 to 100 rounds... 20 KD: Oh Yeah? 21 KS: ... go off. 22 KD: Okay. 23 KS: About one o'clock, they were working 24 inside. They were doing something with a 25 backhoe. We were going to send a chopper
1021 up to see what was going on overnight then 2 in that parking lot down at the end of 3 Army Camp Road, they dumped and piled a 4 whole bunch of picnic tables up in there 5 overnight. 6 KD: Okay. What, right where that roadblock was 7 for the dumpster? 8 KS: No, out into the parking lot, I guess. 9 KD: Oh really, yeah okay. 10 KS: Yeah, so uh before [inaudible] we were 11 going to back and get some more video film 12 today for the printer, right? Dale was 13 supposed to have some - or he is checking 14 to see if he has some police I.D. 15 markings, you know the ones you put on the 16 cruisers? 17 KD: Okay. 18 KS: We could put on the LAVS when they get 19 here 20 KD: Okay 21 KS: And we'll get him to pick them up too so 22 before he goes back, make sure he gets in 23 touch with me first. Uh, other than that, 24 I think the automatic weapons fire changes 25 things around here - probably.
1031 KD: No doubt. 2 KS: Uh, there's other people here who are 3 wanting to do things but I don't think 4 that will happen. 5 KD: Uh, Mark Wright? 6 KS: That'd be one of them. 7 KD: How about Carson? 8 KS: He's a little more steady. 9 KD: Okay. Good. You talk to him or what? 10 KS: No. I haven't spoken to him much. 11 KD: Oh yeah. 12 KS: A night's sleep does wonders. 13 KD: Imagine that, eh. 14 KS: Yeah. 15 KD: Okay brother. 16 KS: Okay? 17 KD: All right, bye. 18 End 19 20 (AUDIOTAPE CONCLUDED) 21 22 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 23 Q: Okay. That's -- that's the end of 24 this transmission. Now, did you recognize your voice? 25 A: Yes.
1041 Q: And it's connoted here by a K -- by 2 the initials "KAS" in the transcripts? 3 A: "KS," yes. 4 Q: And then there's another voice that 5 was on the -- the tape, whose was that? 6 A: Ken Deane. 7 Q: And his name is connoted as "KD" on 8 the transcript? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: All right. And you did report to him 11 the issue with respect to the four (4) cruisers, windows 12 having -- windows broken and also the automatic gunfire? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And was it your expectation that he 15 would, in turn ,would pass that on to the other TRU team 16 members? 17 A: Yes, that would be the normal course 18 of events. 19 Q: All right. And then you also have a 20 conversation about decals? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: And then I'd like to go to page 2 and 23 you say: 24 "Other than that I think the automatic 25 weapons fire changes things around here
1051 probably." 2 And Ken Deane responds: 3 "No doubt." 4 And what were you referring to with 5 respect to the significance of having heard automatic 6 weapons fire changing things? 7 A: Well, this is -- in -- in the short 8 timeframe that I've been there now this is the first 9 indication that we have a firearms issue as well. Prior 10 to that we were standing by in case of and now we've 11 heard this -- this report of weapons fire. 12 Q: All right. And then you indicate: 13 "There's other people here who are 14 wanting to do things that I don't think 15 will happen." 16 And Ken Deane says: 17 "Mark Wright?" 18 And you respond: 19 "That'd be one (1) of them." 20 Now, what were you referring to when you 21 said, There are people here wanting to do things but I 22 don't think that will happen? 23 A: My recollection would be that there 24 would have been individuals who like to investigate that 25 further, see if, you know, who -- where the gunfire came
1061 from, the potential to lay charges and make an arrest, 2 that type of thing. 3 Q: Well, okay, let's -- let's just back 4 up. Presumably having a further investigation would be a 5 prudent thing to do? 6 A: No. 7 Q: No? 8 A: It wouldn't be. 9 Q: Okay. 10 A: Going into the Park to investigate 11 the sound of the gunfire would not be considered prudent 12 at that point in time. 13 Q: Okay. So there -- there were people 14 in any event at the Command Post who wanted to take more 15 aggressive action than the Incident Commander? 16 A: No, I think what it is is there's 17 people who are offering different options as to whether 18 to deal with that as this point, deal with it later; 19 that's what goes on in a Command Post. You have 20 elements, Crime Unit, TRU and all offering different 21 options with their own expertise. 22 Q: All right. 23 A: And in this particular case I think 24 there were those that wanted, you know, further work done 25 in that area at that time.
1071 Q: Leading up to possible arrests? 2 A: Potentially. 3 Q: All right. And was it your 4 impression that Inspector Carson did not favour that 5 path? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: But was it your impression that Mark 8 Wright did favour that path? 9 A: Well, Mark was -- his background is a 10 criminal investigator so his inkling much like mine would 11 be to provide tactical options, his would be to 12 investigate and lay charges. 13 Q: Okay. Thank you. I'd like to make 14 this transcript please the next exhibit. 15 THE REGISTRAR: P-1343, Your Honour. 16 17 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1343: Transcript of Region 3, Kent 18 Skinner and Ken Deane, 19 September 06, 1995, 07:27 20 hrs. Mobile Command Unit, 21 Logger tape number 2, Track 22 1, Disc 1 of 3. 23 24 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 25 Q: All right. And if you go to Tab 6
1081 again, Exhibit P-426, this is the scribe notes and we're 2 now moving to September the 6th and if you would kindly 3 look at page 49 from that exhibit and the 7:30/8:00 4 hundred hours entry. 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And John Carson to Kent Skinner: 7 "Get every police decal we have here." 8 And so there's your direction to actually 9 go; that's one of your tasks for the day is it? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: All right. And if you now go to Tab 12 10, this is a transcript of a conversation dated 13 September 6th, 1995 at 7:36 a.m. I don't propose to play 14 this, but this appears to be one of your inquiries with 15 respect to getting the decals? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: And this is an accurate reflection of 18 the telephone call you had? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And if we can make this the next 21 exhibit, please? 22 THE REGISTRAR: P-1344, Your Honour. 23 24 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1344: Transcript of Region 4, Kent 25 Skinner/London Command
1091 Centre/ Neil, September 06, 2 1995, 07:33 hrs, Mobile 3 Command Unit Logger tape 4 number 2, Track 2, Disc 1 of 5 3. 6 7 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 8 Q: And, sorry, I skipped over one. If 9 you go to Tab 10, this is a slightly earlier 10 conversation, 7:33 in the morning; a further attempt to 11 obtain these decals. 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: All right. And that's an accurate 14 reflection of the -- the conversation? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: I'll make that the next exhibit, 17 please. 18 THE REGISTRAR: We have already made Tab 19 10 an exhibit. 20 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Oh, I did. 21 THE REGISTRAR: P-1344. 22 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Oh, I'm sorry. It was 23 my error, okay. 24 Then we are moving to 11. 25 THE WITNESS: Okay.
1101 2 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 3 Q: Jumping ahead. This is a 4 conversation that occurred at 7:36 a.m. 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And you are speaking with someone at 7 the Chatham Command Centre and making inquiries, again 8 with respect to getting decals. 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: I'll make that the next exhibit, 11 please. 12 THE REGISTRAR: P-1345, Your Honour. 13 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thank you. 14 15 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1345: Transcript of Region 5, Kent 16 Skinner/Chatham 17 Communications Centre/Unknown 18 Male. September 06, 1995, 19 07:36 hrs, Mobile Command 20 Unit, Logger tape number 2, 21 Track 2, Disc 1 of 3. 22 23 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 24 Q: All right. And if you move now to 25 Tab 12, this is a conversation recorded at 7:42 a.m.,
1111 still September 6th and again you're making inquiries 2 with respect to these -- these decals. 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: And if you could make this the next 5 exhibit, please? 6 THE REGISTRAR: P-1346, Your Honour. 7 8 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1346: Transcript of Region 4, Kent 9 Skinner, OPP Car Decals 10 Ordering, September 06, 1995. 11 07:42 hrs, Mobile Command 12 Unit, Logger tape number 3, 13 Track 2, disc 2 of 3. 14 15 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 16 Q: And we know that that Tab 13 appears 17 to be a duplicate of 12, so we'll skip over that and if 18 you go to Tab 14, this is another taped conversation. 19 This time it's 7:47 in the morning and you're making yet 20 a further inquiry with respect to decals; obviously an 21 elusive object in the OPP. 22 A: Very difficult, ma'am. 23 Q: And I'd like to make that the next 24 exhibit, please. 25 THE REGISTRAR: P-1347, Your Honour.
1121 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1347: Transcript of Region 5, Kent 2 Skinner, London Command 3 Centre, September 06, 1995, 4 07:47:58. London 5 Communications Centre, Logger 6 tape number 086, Track 2, 7 Disc 2 of 20. 8 9 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 10 Q: Now, if we could please move to Tab 11 15. This is a conversation recorded and it took place on 12 September the 6th, 1995 at 8:10 and I would like, please, 13 to have this played for the Witness. It's region -- 14 region 9, actually. 15 The -- the document in your binder says 16 region 6, but that's an error. It's region 9. Region 9. 17 18 (AUDIOTAPE PLAYED, TRANSCRIPT BELOW) 19 20 [CP = Command Post, Archibald] 21 [KS =Acting Staff Sergeant Kent Skinner] 22 [KD = Acting Sergeant Kenneth "Tex" Deane] 23 24 CP: Command Post, Archibald. 25 KD: How are you doing today?
1131 CP: Real good. How about yourself? 2 KD: Good. Is "Skinney" there? 3 CP: He just walked out with a whole bunch of 4 dirty dishes. 5 KD: Okay [laughs] 6 CP: Skinner from TRU right? 7 KD: Yes sir. 8 CP: Yeah. No, he just walked out into Forest 9 Detachment. 10 KD: Okay. 11 CP: Umm, do you want to hold? 12 KD: Yeah. Just put me on hold. That would be 13 great. 14 CP: Okay. Can I advise him who's calling? 15 KD: Its Tex. 16 CP: Tex. 17 KD: Yeah. 18 CP: Okay 19 KD: Thank you. [Pause - talking to someone 20 off telephone] Did you ever take Doc with 21 ya? Yeah, just for that bench and anything 22 else for company whatever. [inaudible] 23 That's not a bad idea. [inaudible] Yeah 24 you might as well get that too. 25 KS: Is this Tex?
1141 KD: Yeah. 2 KS: How you doing Bud? 3 KD: Listen, that touch tone phone that you - 4 did you just try to page me? 5 KS: Yeah. 6 KD: Okay. Those touch tone phones - ah, they 7 won't accept ah - numeric page. 8 KS: Which - these ones here? 9 KD: Yeah. 10 KS: Okay. Cool. 11 KD: So you just have to leave me a voicemail. 12 KS: Ahh - fogger. 13 KD: Yeah. 14 KS: You know the - pepper spray stuff? 15 KD: Yup. 16 KS: We got that on board eh? 17 KD: Taken care of already. 18 KS: Eh - oh - for what? 19 KD: You mean the big fogger? 20 KS: Yeah. 21 KD: Yeah, we've got that for IAP 22 KS: Okay. How many have we got? One or two of 23 them? 24 KD: Ah - stand by. Zup? Zup - how many foggers 25 do we have? Pepper spray foggers. Two or
1151 one. [inaudible]. We've got five total. 2 KS: Five? 3 KD: Yeah. 4 KS: 'kay. Can you ah - 5 KD: Yeah. 6 KS: ...give me one of them to give to the ERT 7 guys? 8 KD: Okay. 9 KS: They got ah - in case they get a 10 confrontation at a checkpoint? 11 KD: Okay. 12 KS: Ah, the other thing, they ah - You know 13 that little parking lot we were at 14 yesterday? 15 KD: Yeah. 16 KS: They loaded some ah - picnic tables into 17 there. 18 KD: Right. 19 KS: And the guys are going to go down and 20 remove those, just so you know. In case 21 something were to happen there... 22 KD: Okay. 23 KS: ...for a while there. 24 KD: Okay 25 KS: Other than that get Zup to bring that in
1161 when he comes in here... 2 KD: Okay 3 KS: ...before his trip down. 4 KD: Okay 5 KS: And as far as the stickers go, I'm going 6 to get them purolated from Orillia so he 7 doesn't have to worry about those. 8 KD: So Zup doesn't have to go back to London 9 now. Oh, he still does... 10 KS: [interrupting] Oh, he was going to get the 11 film, eh. 12 KD: Okay, good enough. Okay. 13 KS: So - Okay? 14 KD: Yup. Hold on. What do you want there umm - 15 what is the ambulance coverage? 16 KS: As far as? 17 KD: Umm - night time coverage. 18 KS: I don't know for sure. 19 KD: Okay. 20 KS: I'd be guess - 21 KD: [spoken simultaneously - inaudible] 22 KS: There's a St. John's ambulance sittin' 23 outside here when I got here this morning 24 though. 25 KD: There was a St. John's guy there this
1171 morning. Okay, that's all I want to know. 2 KS: 'kay. 3 KD: Okay. 4 KS: Okay? 5 KD: Good enough Bud. 6 KS: All right. 7 KD: Okay bye. 8 KS: Bye. 9 10 End of Conversation 11 12 (AUDIOTAPE CONCLUDED) 13 14 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 15 Q: All right. Now, that's the end of 16 that transmission. Again you -- you recognize your 17 voice? 18 A: Yes, I do. 19 Q: And the voice of the other party? 20 A: Well, primarily it's Ken Deane. 21 Q: Right. And there was some background 22 noise as well. 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: Okay. And going to page 1 at the 25 bottom Ken Deane says:
1181 "Thank you. Did you ever take Doc with 2 ya?" 3 And I'm just wondering what you're 4 reference to "Doc" was? 5 A: "Doc" is -- 6 Q: Or his reference I mean? 7 A: -- is again a nickname, that's Ted 8 Slomer, his nickname. Ted's a -- a medic and he was a 9 contract employee with the OPP; travelled with the team 10 when he was available to attend occurrences to provide us 11 with medical support inside the inner perimeter. 12 Most ambulances will not travel into an 13 unsecure environment and given the nature of the work we 14 do you could be presented with a -- a trauma incident 15 that requires medical attention ASAP and Ted was there to 16 cover that off for us. 17 Q: All right. So Ted Slomer was with 18 your unit specifically? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And do you know what his -- his 21 health background was, his qualifications? 22 A: I have a general knowledge of it. 23 Ted's a nurse with paramedic training. He also had 24 emergency medical tactical training from the -- that he 25 received in the United States.
1191 Q: And does he always accompany the TRU 2 team in these kinds of matters or -- or only on certain 3 ones? 4 A: Well, it's -- it's a part-time 5 employment for him. As I say he's a contract employee so 6 when he was available he would attend the occurrences 7 with us. 8 Q: Okay. And on page 2 there's a 9 reference to a fogger and the -- the big fogger. Is that 10 -- what is that in reference to? 11 A: Oleo Capsicum spray, pepper spray. 12 Normally an officer carries it; a very small cannister, a 13 limited amount, a limited range. We had in our 14 possession what were called foggers, they were somewhat 15 larger. They would be approximately the size of a water 16 bottle and have a handle on them. 17 Q: Hmm hmm. 18 A: And provide more volume and minimally 19 more range. 20 Q: All right. 21 A: And -- 22 Q: So about -- about a half litre 23 container? 24 A: It would be about that size, yes. 25 Q: Okay. And you were inquiring as to
1201 whether there were enough with your team that you could 2 give one (1) to the ERT? 3 A: That we could loan one (1) to them, 4 yes. 5 Q: All right. And did you do that? 6 A: We did. 7 Q: And the indication from Ken Deane is 8 that the big foggers were for the IAP or also known as 9 Alpha? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: All right. And on the next page, 12 page 3 you reference a few lines down: 13 "You know that little parking lot we 14 were at yesterday?" 15 Meaning you and Ken Deane. When you were 16 at the parking lot on the 5th? 17 A: That would have been the drive -- the 18 drive around, the familiarization tour that Ken took me 19 on. 20 Q: In the morn -- in the early morning? 21 A: In the morning of the 5th, yes. 22 Q: Okay. You're relaying to Ken Deane 23 that there's now picnic tables loaded into the parking 24 lot? 25 A: Yes.
1211 Q: And what was your understanding 2 about the positioning of those tables? 3 A: My only recollection is they were 4 piled up in the parking lot. 5 Q: Okay. And you're advising that some 6 of the police officers are going to go down to remove 7 them? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: But that didn't -- did that involve 10 any members of the TRU team? 11 A: No, it didn't. 12 Q: All right. And the reference to Zup 13 or Zup, Z-U-P, that Officer Zupancic? 14 A: That's correct. 15 Q: And you've secured the elusive 16 stickers, the decals? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: And then there's a request with 19 respect on the fourth page to the ambulance coverage for 20 night time. This is coming through Ken Deane? 21 A: Yeah. I think if listening I think 22 Doc's making that request in the background to Ken, yes. 23 Q: I was going to ask. You -- we did 24 hear Ted Slomer's name in the background. 25 A: Yeah. It would not be uncommon at
1221 any occurrence Ted would go to, one of the things he 2 would do as part of his preplanning would be to ascertain 3 where the local medical facility was, the quickest route 4 from where we were to the facility, whether there was 5 ambulances on patrol standby or whether there was one 6 there for us. 7 Q: All right. And that's because if 8 you're deployed, it's with respect to a high risk 9 situation where there's a threat of injury or loss of 10 life. 11 A: That's correct. 12 Q: And then you indicate that there's -- 13 in response -- there's a St. John's ambulance which was 14 there at least as of the morning of the 6th when you 15 arrived? 16 A: Yes, at the Command Post in Forest. 17 Q: And do -- does that refresh your 18 memory? 19 A: I remember seeing a St. John's 20 ambulance there. 21 Q: And what was your understanding with 22 respect to the capability of the St. John's ambulance as 23 opposed to the Ministry of Health ambulance? 24 A: I'm not aware that would be any 25 difference at that point in time.
1231 Q: Thank you. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 Q: Okay. Now if we can go back to Tab 6 6 please. These are the scribe note -- sorry, I would like 7 to make that transcript the next exhibit please. 8 THE REGISTRAR: P-1348, Your Honour. 9 MS. SUSAN VELLA: That's the 8:10 10 conversation at Tab 15. 11 12 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1348: Transcript of Region 9, Kent 13 Skinner, Ken Deane, September 14 06, 1995. 08:10 hrs. Mobile 15 Communications Unit, Logger 16 tape number 3, Track 1, Disc 17 2 of 3. 18 19 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 20 Q: Okay. But let's go back now to Tab 21 6, Exhibit P-426, the scribe notes. 22 A: Hmm hmm. 23 Q: And if you would go please to page 24 55. We're still on the 5th and I'm looking at the -- the 25 9:00 a.m. entry. And it reads:
1241 "Kent Skinner advises John Carson of 2 problems with cell phones in the metal 3 building. TRU if operational, only 4 thing to use is a cell phone which is 5 not the best. 6 We might have to get TSB in here. 7 KENT SKINNER: Reception is not the 8 greatest, should have hard lines to do 9 talks out there. 10 JOHN CARSON: Have Kent Skinner put it 11 on the back burner for now." 12 Can -- does that refresh your memory with 13 respect to what the point of this conversation was 14 between you and John Carson? 15 A: Yeah. This relates to the fact that 16 were a distance from the TOC to the Command Post and the 17 fact we only had cellular communication between the two. 18 And I was concerned that if we were 19 operational, that would be an unreliable piece of 20 communication. And my suggestion was that we were to put 21 a hard line in, ard -- hard wired phone lines in so it 22 would be more reliable. 23 Q: Is this to -- to facilitate 24 communication from TOC to the Command Post? 25 A: Yes, it is.
1251 Q: Okay. But not from TRU to the TOC or 2 TRU to the Command Post? 3 A: No. 4 Q: You still have those Motorola phones? 5 A: We'd have portable radios for that, 6 yes. 7 Q: Okay. And -- and where does the cell 8 phones come into play? 9 A: The cell phone would come from the 10 TOC to the Command Post or Command Post to TOC. 11 Q: Okay. And this put on the back 12 burner. Do you have sense as to why? 13 A: No, it was the decision he made at 14 the time. No, I don't. 15 Q: Okay. Thank you. And as I 16 understand your earlier evidence, hard lines were never 17 put in? 18 A: That's correct. 19 Q: All right. Now, if we go to Tab 16. 20 This is another transcript of a call at 11:04 and I would 21 like to have this played and then I'll ask you some 22 questions about it. It's 11:04 a.m. September 6th '95. 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25
1261 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 2 Q: It's -- it says in the book here 3 that's region 11 -- 7, but when I double checked, it 4 seems to be region 10, so we're just going to go to the 5 right recording. 6 7 (AUDIOTAPE PLAYED, TRANSCRIPT BELOW) 8 9 [CP = Command Post, Archibald] 10 [KS =Acting Staff Sergeant Kent Skinner] 11 [KD = Acting Sergeant Kenneth "Tex" Deane] 12 13 14 CP: Command Post, Archibald. 15 KD: JJ! 16 CP: JJ! 17 KD: Yeah, umm - looking for Sergeant Skinner 18 please. 19 CP: Sergeant Skinner. Yes! That would be him 20 standing behind me. 21 KD: Thank you. 22 CP: Hang on. 23 KS: Hello! 24 KD: Hey. 25 KS: How 're you doing?
1271 KD: Good! 2 KS: Are you busy? 3 KD: I was just reading. Some guys just went 4 for a quick workout here, that's it. 5 KS: Yeah? Did Zup go to London yet? 6 KD: Yeah, he's already gone. He left a while 7 ago. He should have been to your Command 8 Post. 9 KS: I haven't seen him here. 10 KD: I told him to leave here, take Doc down to 11 see the St. John Command Post... 12 KS: Yeah 13 KD: ...to see what he could do there. And I 14 said to drop the fogger off at the Command 15 Post and then head to London. 16 KS: Okay. When did he leave? 17 KD: Ah - at least an hour ago. 18 KS: Hah - well. 19 KD: He should have been there - likely he 20 fucked off to London. 21 KS: Yeah, he must have fucked off to London 22 then. 23 KD: Okay. I'll try him on the C-phone. 24 KS: Okay. Now - let him know that the ah - if 25 we do have to go anywhere that he has to
1281 take that cell phone to the TOC 2 KD: Okay. We actually thought about that and 3 ...[inaudible] 4 KS: [interrupting] And I'm trying to get him 5 to 6 get TSB to run hard lines in there for us. 7 KD: Okay. 8 KS: To both TOC's. 9 KD: Okay. 10 KS: So. 11 KD: Good. 12 KS: Umm... 13 KD: [simultaneous] I'm wondering - like 14 remember we said like that cell phone was 15 five hundred bucks to fix... 16 KS: Yeah 17 KD: ...like so I said I'd check with 18 [inaudible] to has no cash 19 KS: Yeah. 20 KD: Wondering if we could buy a cell phone 21 through - ah - this budget... 22 KS: Yeah 23 KD: ...If you get Carson in a good mood, or a 24 good state of mind... 25 KS: [laughs]
1291 KD: Just talk to him. 2 KS: I'll see. 3 KD: If not don't worry about it. 4 KS: I'll see. 5 KD: Okay brother. 6 KS: I'll give it a shot anyways I mean what - 7 what - what could he do? 8 KD: Yeah, exactly. 9 KS: Yeah, its tough to say no. Ah - There's - 10 there's hardly anything going on here. 11 They went and picked up those picnic 12 tables... 13 KD: Yeah 14 KS: ...and then a- about nine occupants came 15 down. They put - leaned picnic tables up 16 around the store... 17 KD: Right 18 KS: ...sort of barricaded it a bit... 19 KD: Oh yeah, great. 20 KS: ...but umm - where we're talking here is 21 ah - I'm startin' to doubt ah - the course 22 will go next week. 23 KD: Oh, okay 24 KS: Okay man? 25 KD: Okay. Thanks man.
1301 KS: Bye. 2 3 End of Conversation 4 5 (AUDIOTAPE CONCLUDED) 6 7 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 8 Q: Okay, and again, do you recognize the 9 two (2) voices on that -- predominant voices on that? 10 A: Mine and Ken Deane's. 11 Q: All right. And aside from officer 12 Zupancic perhaps being in a little bit of trouble here, 13 you indicated that he was to take Ted Slomer down to the 14 St. John's Command Post. 15 A: That's what Ken Deane says, yes. 16 Q: That's what Ken Deane says. And then 17 on the second page, one (1), two (2), three (3), four 18 (4), five (5), six (6) lines down, Ken Deane says he's 19 going to: 20 "try him on the C phone". 21 Is that the cell phone? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: And two (2) lines down you talk about 24 the -- getting TSB to run hard lines in there for us. 25 What's TSB?
1311 A: Technical support branch. 2 Q: Okay. And then on the last page, 3 you're reporting on an event with removing the picnic 4 tables? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And what's your recollection about 7 that event? 8 A: I recall it went without incident, 9 that's about all I recall about it. 10 Q: Okay. And TRU, of course, was not -- 11 was not involved in that? 12 A: No, we weren't. 13 Q: And you weren't down at the site? 14 A: No. 15 Q: And there was no incident that you 16 could -- that you can recall associated with that? 17 A: No. 18 Q: And then towards the end, you say: 19 "I'm starting to doubt, ah, the course 20 we'll go next week." 21 What was that a reference to? 22 A: I don't have an independent 23 recollection but I believe I -- in my conversation with 24 Brian Deevy we referenced about a meeting as well. I 25 think there was a course, a TRU team course coming up the
1321 next week, but since we were deployed, the course was not 2 going to go. 3 Q: Okay, fair enough. Thank you. I'll 4 make that the next exhibit, please, the transcript. 5 THE REGISTRAR: P-1349, and was that 6 change a Region 10 rather -- 7 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Yes, it's -- 8 THE REGISTRAR: -- than Region 7? 9 MS. SUSAN VELLA: It is region 10. 10 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. 11 12 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1349: Transcript of Region 10, Kent 13 Skinner, Ken Deane, September 14 06, 1995. 11:04 hrs, Mobile 15 Command Unit, Logger tape 16 number 3, Track 2, Disc 2 of 17 3. 18 19 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 20 Q: In any event, as of eleven o'clock in 21 the morning of September the 6th, what was the state of 22 affairs in and around Ipperwash from a policing 23 perspective? 24 A: Standing by still -- 25 Q: All right.
1331 A: -- with no specific assignment. 2 Q: And do you recall what you did 3 basically for the balance of the day up to approximately 4 four o'clock in the afternoon? 5 A: I would have stayed around the 6 Command Post. 7 Q: All right. Do you recall anything of 8 significance occurring up to approximately four o'clock? 9 A: No, I don't. 10 Q: All right, and your team continued to 11 be at the Pinery? 12 A: Some of them did go back to London to 13 retrieve some equipment. 14 Q: Okay. Except for the ones who went 15 to retrieve equipment? 16 A: Yeah. 17 Q: No one came down to Ipperwash? 18 A: No. 19 Q: Okay. All right. And if we go to 20 Tab 6 next please, page 69. These are the scribe notes 21 Exhibit P-426. 22 And there's an entry now at -- oh, I'm 23 sorry, go to 64, page 64 first, the page before. 24 25 (BRIEF PAUSE)
1341 Q: And there's an entry just above 2 16:02? 3 A: Hmm hmm. 4 Q: It says essentially -- you're talking 5 -- there's a meeting concerning barriers? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: "John Carson wonders from a tactical 8 point of view, would we want to come 9 here? Kent Skinner replies he doesn't 10 believe so. Stan Korosec suggests that 11 the blocks be dropped at the TOC 12 [that'd be T-O-C] --" 13 A: Right. 14 Q: "-- tomorrow. ERT report to TOC [T- 15 O-C] and keep the guys at the check." 16 A: Checkpoints. 17 Q: Do you know what -- what was being 18 discussed in relation to the blocks? 19 A: I believe they were concrete barrier 20 blocks. 21 Q: Hmm hmm. And who was -- who was 22 looking to bring those in? 23 A: I -- I don't recall whose specific 24 idea it was to bring them in. 25 Q: Okay. Do you recall what role if any
1351 they were going to play in any tactical decisions or 2 tactical movements? 3 A: Well, I think it was more as a -- a 4 barrier at the Command Post, is to keep people back, 5 yeah. 6 Q: At the Command Post or the TOC? 7 A: Well, I think there were both 8 thoughts in play at that time. 9 Q: Okay. 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: Do you know whether that ever 12 materialized? 13 A: I think subsequently there were some 14 blocks placed around the Command Post in Forest but I 15 don't -- 16 Q: Fair enough. 17 A: -- I don't recall any other ones. 18 Q: Okay. And if we go to page 69 now of 19 the same exhibit and the 18:37 entry and there's a 20 reference to you: 21 "Kent Skinner advised John Carson to 22 inform Inspector Linton to not page us 23 from these phones, page us from the 24 Detachment phone." 25 So do you recall having a conversation
1361 with John Carson just -- this is a communications issue. 2 If you were going to be called by the Incident Commander 3 at night they had to use the hard line Detachment phone? 4 Was that the idea? 5 A: Yeah. It wasn't so much the hard 6 lines as it was some phones are not -- I'm not going to 7 be up on my terminology but there's pulsed phones and 8 then there's the other type of phone. Only if you're 9 using the wrong type the numeric value wouldn't come 10 through on the pager so you had to use the -- the other 11 phones to -- 12 Q: Okay. 13 A: -- to have the pager activated 14 properly to reach us. 15 Q: Okay. Fair enough. Now, did you 16 understand -- did you attend at an ERT briefing at or 17 around 19:00 hours that night? 18 A: I think that's in my notes, yes. 19 Q: And what do you recall about that 20 meeting? 21 A: I don't recall very much about that 22 meeting, I'm sorry. 23 Q: Okay. Do you want to have a look at 24 your notes then? 25
1371 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 Q: You're at Tab 22 Exhibit P-1341, 4 19:00 hour entry on page 31 of your notes? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And you have an entry at 19:00? 7 A: Yeah. "Standby for a briefing." 8 Q: Right. Now, are there any notes 9 there reflecting the actual briefing? 10 A: No, there are none. 11 Q: And so do you have any recollection 12 of what occurred? 13 A: I think it was Stan Korosec who 14 conducted the briefing but other than that I don't really 15 have any recollection. 16 Q: All right. It would be standard 17 procedure for you to attend as the TRU team leader at an 18 ERT briefing? 19 A: I think in this -- at this point in 20 time we were -- one (1) of our roles was to be prepared 21 to assist at checkpoints and that's what the ERT members 22 were doing so that would have been my purpose to be 23 there, to see what was happening at the checkpoints. 24 Q: Okay. And did you then return to the 25 Pinery Park after this briefing?
1381 A: I did. 2 Q: And that's indicated at 19:30 entry 3 in your notes? 4 A: Yes, "10-8 to the Pinery." 5 Q: All right. So at this point all of 6 the -- are all of the TRU team members at the Pinery? 7 A: I believe so. 8 Q: All right. 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 Q: All right. If we would next go then 13 to Tab 17, please. And this is a transcript of a 14 transmission at 20:13 hours and I wonder if we could play 15 that. It should be Region 13. 16 17 (AUDIOTAPE PLAYED, TRANSCRIPT BELOW) 18 19 Archibald (inaudible) Archibald. 20 Skinner Yeah it's Kent Skinner. 21 Archibald Yes, ah we want the T.R.U. Team down here 22 at the Command Post. 23 Skinner The whole Team at the Command Post. 24 Archibald Yeah, hang on I'll let you talk to ah 25 Korosec.
1391 (BACKGROUND TALKING) 2 Korosec Yeah Kent. 3 Skinner Yeah. 4 Korosec Ah Inspector Linton wants the whole down. 5 Skinner Whole Team where Stan? 6 Korosec Do, down here to Forest. 7 Skinner The Team in Forest. 8 Korosec Yeah, well to get briefed to go up there, 9 we've got about twelve of ehm down at the 10 ah Army Camp Road where it turns ta, ah, 11 lp, East Ipperwash. 12 Skinner Yeah. 13 Korosec er to East Parkway, ah they got baseball 14 bats and they ah, a car came by and ah 15 they trashed it as it went by and ah 16 there's activity inside the Park there, 17 and the bus just, 18 (BACKGROUND CONVERSATION) 19 Korosec No the dump truck's back, going back into 20 the Camp I just heard. 21 Skinner Okay. 22 Korosec The, the big school bus is down there too. 23 Skinner All right. 24 Korosec And ah he wants ya down. 25 Skinner We'll come down to Forest then.
1401 Korosec Yeah. 2 Skinner Okay. 3 Korosec Okay we'll see ya. 4 Skinner Yeah, bye. 5 6 (AUDIOTAPE CONCLUDED) 7 8 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 9 Q: All right, now do you recognize the 10 voices on that transmission? 11 A: I do. 12 Q: And are they properly identified as 13 initially Archibald and yourself and then Korosec? 14 A: Yes, they are. 15 Q: All right. And based on this inform 16 -- is this the first indication that you received that 17 your TRU team may be deployed? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: And your understanding is that this 20 is on orders from Inspector Linton? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: And as the alternate Incident 23 Commander, he had the authority to call out the TRU team? 24 A: Yes, he was a level 2 Incident 25 Commander, as well as being the officer in charge that
1411 night. 2 Q: And what was your initial reaction to 3 the information that you say: 4 "The whole team at the Command Post." 5 What was your initial reaction to that? 6 A: Well, up until that point, it had 7 just been me coming down to the Command Post for 8 consultation or whatever required. And this to me -- now 9 we're talking about a team activation, they're looking to 10 deploy the team. 11 Q: All right. And is this the first 12 indication of -- concrete indication of -- of a possible 13 deployment of the TRU team? 14 A: Yes, it is. 15 Q: And indeed, by getting this call, 16 were you anticipating that you were likely to be 17 deployed? 18 A: Likely, yes. 19 Q: All right. And Stan Korosec provides 20 you with some information. he indicates that there are: 21 "Twelve (12) of them..." 22 Did you take that to be occupiers? 23 A: I did. 24 Q: "...down at the Army Camp Road, where 25 it turns into East Ipperwash, or East
1421 Parkway [he corrects himself]." 2 He says that: 3 "They got baseball bats and a car came 4 by there and they trashed it as it went 5 by and there's activity inside the 6 Park, namely the dump truck and the bus 7 is now located in the Park." 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: Is that what you took from that 10 conversation? 11 A: Yes, it was. 12 Q: And did you pass that inform -- that 13 information about the car being bashed with baseball bats 14 and the activity, increased activity in the Park, did you 15 pass that along to your members at that time? 16 A: When I would have woke them up, I'm 17 sure I passed that information along, yes. 18 Q: All right, that would be part of your 19 standard procedure? 20 A: Yes, it's why we're going out, what's 21 happening. 22 Q: Okay. And with respect to the issue 23 -- the report concerning the baseball bats and the car, 24 what level of reliability did you attach to this piece of 25 information when you received it from Stan Korosec?
1431 A: Well, is a report from Stan Korosec, 2 another police officer, I attached quite high reliability 3 to it. 4 Q: All right. And he doesn't qualify it 5 in any way. 6 A: No. 7 Q: So as far as you're concerned, this 8 is what's happened? 9 A: Yes, ma'am. 10 Q: All right. And as far as your TRU 11 team members are concerned, this is what has happened? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And you take that to be, probably, 14 the motivating factor for a consideration of deploying 15 the TRU team? 16 A: It was certainly one of them. 17 Q: I'd like to make that the next 18 exhibit, please. 19 THE REGISTRAR: It is an exhibit, P-1320. 20 MS. SUSAN VELLA: yes, it is. P-13 -- 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 1320 -- 22 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Quite right. Thank you 23 very much. 24 25 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA:
1441 Q: All right. And if we would next go 2 to Tab 18, please, which is also an exhibit, P-1155. 3 It's a conversation recorded on September 4 the 6th, 1995 at 20:25. So that's at 8:25 p.m. 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And I'm not going to play it here but 7 again, this is a conversation between yourself and 8 Sergeant Stan Korosec. Sorry, an attempt -- excuse me, 9 by Stan Korosec to reach you. 10 A: That's what it appears to be, yes. 11 Q: And on page 2, he does reach you it 12 would appear, S.K.? 13 A: Stan Korosec. 14 Q: Oh, I'm sorry, that's Stan Korosec. 15 Excuse me, okay. All right. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 Q: Yes, I'm just being reminded that 20 there's a seven (7) minute lag in real time on these 21 phone calls. So I'm reading the time on the transcript 22 but we should add seven (7) minutes to that for the 23 record. 24 A: Hmm hmm. 25 Q: All right. In any event, this is an
1451 attempt by Stan Korosec to reach you at 20:25. And then 2 if we go to Tab 19, this is a recording at 20:29 on 3 September the 5th -- 6th and I wonder if we could play 4 that please. It's Region 16. 5 6 (AUDIOTAPE PLAYED, TRANSCRIPT BELOW) 7 20:29 Hours 8 9 Deane Hello. 10 Carson Kent. 11 Deane Yeah. 12 Carson John Carson here. 13 Deane Yeah. 14 Carson Kent hold the Team down okay. 15 Deane Okay, hold on we're Inspector we just 16 pulled into Forest. 17 Carson Into where? 18 Deane Forest Detachment. 19 Carson Okay take, okay well take, take the gun 20 trucks back to the Park, but have Kent get 21 over here. 22 Deane Okay. 23 Carson Okay and fer, ah prepare to get an OSCAR 24 Team ready okay? 25 Deane Very good.
1461 Carson Okay. 2 Deane Bye bye. 3 Carson All right. 4 5 (AUDIOTAPE CONCLUDED) 6 7 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 8 Q: All right. Now first of all, do you 9 recognize the two (2) voices on this tape? 10 A: I do. 11 Q: And who are they? 12 A: It's John Carson and Ken Deane. 13 Q: All right. And so where the 14 transcript reflects Skinner as the speaker, that should 15 be Ken Deane? 16 A: That's correct. 17 Q: All right. And obviously the 18 Inspector thought he had you initially and then realized 19 that he didn't. 20 A: Right. 21 Q: And at this point you have just -- 22 you and your team have just pulled into the Forest 23 Detachment? 24 A: That's what Ken says, yes. 25 Q: All right. And at this point how do
1471 you take Inspector Carson's instruction here with respect 2 to the deployment of the TRU team? 3 A: I'm sorry? Could I ask you to repeat 4 that? 5 Q: Certainly. How do you take Inspector 6 Carson's comments with respect to whether or not the TRU 7 team is going to be deployed? 8 A: Well at this point in time, he only 9 wants to see me at the Command Post. He wants the team 10 to go back. 11 Q: All right. So this is an apparent 12 reversal of Inspector Linton's direction? 13 A: It's -- it's a change from the 14 direction we received, yes. 15 Q: All right. And so by this time 16 Inspector Carson has resumed his position as Incident 17 Commander? 18 A: It would appear so. 19 Q: All right. And that's at 20:29 20 hundred hours. I'd like to make that the next exhibit 21 please. 22 THE REGISTRAR: P-1350, Your Honour. 23 24 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1350: Document Number 1000012. 25 Transcript of Logger tape,
1481 Command Centre, John Carson, 2 Ken Deane, 20:29 hrs, 3 September 06, 1995. 4 5 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 6 Q: All right. Now if we -- will you 7 please go to Tab 6 for the scribe notes, Exhibit P-426 8 and at page 76 please. 9 I'm going to -- 10 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Mr. Commissioner, I 11 just wanted to clarify something for the record because 12 My Friend raised, and I apologize for interrupting, but I 13 thought I should do it while it's fresh on the record. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes? 15 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: My Friend raised 16 the seven (7) minute lag and I thought if she could 17 clarify it for the record whether the seven (7) minute 18 lag applies to this time as well in terms of the 8:29 19 reference and in particular whether the seven (7) minute 20 lag is also an absolute lag. 21 In other words, as I understood it, it 22 could be a range of delay. And I know Mr. Millar's got 23 expertise in this area. So when he referred to 8:25 24 being 8:32, my understanding is it may be 8:32, it may be 25 8:31 et cetera, et cetera. If it could be clarified
1491 that's all. 2 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Yeah. It's the same 3 response as it's been to all of them. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 5 MR. DERRY MILLAR: This 20:29 needs 6 normally seven (7) minutes added to it so that's as I did 7 this actually with this very call, one (1) other day. 8 It's -- should be 20:36, but -- and it's not always -- 9 there's no -- 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Exactly 11 seven (7) minutes. 12 MR. DERRY MILLAR: This isn't a precise 13 science, as I understand it and it could be five and a 14 half (5 1/2) minutes or six and a half (6 1/2) minutes or 15 seven (7) minutes, but the standard deviation is, I'm 16 told, seven (7) minutes. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 18 very much, Mr. Millar. Thank you, Mr. Falconer. 19 MS. SUSAN VELLA: And that would have 20 been in relation to the -- to the transcripts of the 21 telephone, the radio telephone transmissions, not with 22 respect to the scribe notes. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 24 MS. SUSAN VELLA: And I have been reading 25 the time that's listed on --
1501 MR. DERRY MILLAR: It's got to be -- 2 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Okay -- 3 MR. DERRY MILLAR: The -- the seven (7) 4 minute time lag only deals with telephone calls. 5 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Right. 6 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Radio transmissions 7 from -- radio transmissions are, we're told, accurate 8 times. So this was a telephone conversation between Mr. 9 Skin -- Mr. Deane and Mr. Carson. 10 So, it's only telephone conversations with 11 the command post that suffers this problem. 12 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thank you for that 13 clarification. Hopefully that clarifies the record and 14 doesn't clutter it. I apologize for that. 15 In any event, I've been reading the time 16 straight off the transcript. I have not added on the 17 seven (7) minutes, so... 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I'm 19 aware of that. 20 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Okay, fair enough. 21 22 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 23 Q: In any event, we were at Tab 6, which 24 is the scribe notes, page 76 and the 20:49 entry and just 25 before we get to that, do you recall whether you -- you
1511 met with Inspector Carson prior to 20:49; in other words, 2 you got at the command post in or around 18:37. 3 So do you recall what you did for the 4 next, approximately, two (2) hours? 5 A: 18:37? I arrived at command post, I 6 think, my recollection is around twenty (20) to 9:00. 7 Q: Okay. 8 A: 8:00 -- 20:40. 9 Q: Okay, all right. 10 11 (BRIEF PAUSE) 12 13 Q: Okay, sorry about that. 14 A: That's okay. 15 Q: And do you recall what you did in the 16 interim prior to this briefing? 17 A: I think it was a matter of getting 18 out the trunk, walking across the parking lot and walking 19 into the command post. 20 Q: Okay, fair enough. And at 20:49 you 21 had a meeting with John Carson and there were others 22 present as well? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: Do you recall who all was present? 25 A: Inspector Linton was around the
1521 command post. I recall seeing Mark Wright off and on, I 2 believe Stan Korosec was around, and there was quite a 3 number of the ERT team were in the parking lot of the 4 command post, kitting up. 5 Q: All right. And what -- what were you 6 advised, if anything, during the course of this meeting? 7 A: There was a request made that TRU 8 would prepare Sierra teams to go down and see what was 9 happening at this -- at the intersection of the two (2) 10 roadways in the parking lot and also to -- there was a 11 concern over the kiosk or gate area to the Park, that 12 there was some activity there and one of the questions 13 was, can we get an eye on that to see what's happening 14 there as well. 15 Q: All right. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 Q: Yes, thank you very much. For some 20 reason this has been left out of my book, but Ms. Jones 21 points out that the scribe notes, page 75, shows that: 22 "At 20:37 Kent Skinner arrived, briefed 23 by John Carson. Potential of sniper in 24 kiosk. Evacuate cottages in area and 25 get a S team. Drop team off in
1531 trailer. Paper -- trailer park, work 2 their way in and use night vision 3 glasses and observe. What do you 4 think? 5 KENT SKINNER: We could drop off at 6 the talk [and that should be TOC]. 7 JOHN CARSON: Our primary concern is 8 evacuating the cottages and see what's 9 up with the kiosk. 10 Can we get the sniper team? 11 KENT SKINNER: Yeah, I'll take care of 12 it." 13 And I think that you -- you were, in fact, 14 perhaps talking about that briefing? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And perhaps you can expand on what 17 the concern with -- was, as relayed by John Carson and 18 what the Sierra team would do. 19 A: Concern as far as John was concerned, 20 as far as the kiosk goes or...? 21 Q: Yes. 22 A: Well, there had been some activity 23 around the kiosk and people were coming and going to the 24 kiosk, I understand. The blinds were put down in the 25 kiosk and there was a concern that they might have
1541 somebody with a firearm in the kiosk and they would have 2 a visual look across to the parking lot where the 3 activity was taking place and that that could be of 4 jeopardy to anybody who went down there. 5 Q: Okay. And this -- this was -- would 6 this be one (1) two (2) man or two (2) person Sierra 7 team? Is that what was -- 8 A: The Sierra team is always two (2) 9 people and it would be two (2) Sierra teams to go. 10 Q: Two (2) -- okay. All right. And 11 then -- so this is the first indication of what the 12 deployment might be? 13 A: Yes. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 Q: And then the second part I was going 18 to raise was, what was the issue with respect to the 19 evacuation of the cottagers? 20 A: Well, there was a concern for the 21 safety of the cottagers down there at the -- along that 22 road. There's cottages all along East Parkway and in 23 fact there's one (1) right up against the sandy parking 24 lot at the intersection there. It leans right over top 25 of the parking lot. So there was a concern for the
1551 safety of those people. 2 Q: And were you aware as to what risk 3 factors existed which -- which prompted the concern that 4 -- that the cottagers might be at risk and -- and 5 prompting a possible evacuation? 6 A: I think it was a combination of 7 events that would lead to that belief. The previous 8 night you'd had the rocks thrown at the police cruisers. 9 Now, we've had -- our information at that time that a 10 vehicle driven by a civilian not involved in the 11 occupation or a police officer had their vehicle trashed 12 by the baseball bats. 13 So there was a concern towards violence 14 to members of the community. 15 Q: All right. And also was the sound of 16 automatic gunfire part of that? 17 A: Yes, ma'am. 18 Q: And the -- the increased activity 19 with respect to the dump truck and the bus? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: And the other facts that you -- as 22 they were relayed to you? 23 A: There was other information passed on 24 about women and children leaving the Park area so there 25 was a concern that there was some build-up or potential
1561 for something to happen at that time. 2 Q: And how was your TRU team going to 3 assist with respect to an evacuation of cottages if at 4 all? 5 A: At -- at that point in time 6 evacuation of the cottages would be pretty difficult 7 without the area being secured. I think our primary role 8 at that point was to actually, as an intelligence 9 gathering tool, to go down and see exactly what was 10 happening in that parking lot. 11 Q: Okay. Fair enough. All right. And 12 just -- your use of the term, "civilian," when you use 13 that term over the course of this time period what was 14 that meant to connote? 15 A: Non police personnel. 16 Q: Okay. And had you been given any 17 information which would suggest that the incident which 18 was described to you as involving cars being beaten -- 19 the car being beaten by bats if you will, hit with bats 20 by -- 21 A: Hmm hmm. 22 Q: -- some of the occupiers, that that 23 might have been something different such as a -- a rock 24 being thrown at the -- the car? 25 A: I didn't hear that until sometime
1571 later. 2 Q: And when you say, "sometime later" 3 are you talking after the incident -- 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: -- later that evening? 6 A: Late -- beyond the evening. 7 Q: Okay. All right. So this is the 8 information that you were operating under -- 9 A: Yes, ma'am. 10 Q: -- when you were all -- your team was 11 ultimately deployed later that evening? 12 A: That's correct. 13 Q: Thank you. Okay. Now we'll go to 14 page 76 of Exhibit P-474 (sic). 15 A: Hmm hmm. 16 Q: And the 20:49 entry. So this is a 17 few minutes after the -- the last conversation and I'm... 18 "KENT SKINNER: I can get the sniper 19 team to search it out. 20 JOHN CARSON: Okay. You can take care 21 of this. 22 JOHN CARSON: All we are doing is 23 observation, we are not going tactical. 24 Let's get that straight." 25 And then later on in this entry:
1581 "JOHN CARSON: We are using TRU to go 2 in and get an eye. If they are just 3 having a campfire let's leave them. 4 Why go in the dark? 5 STAN KOROSEC: Five (5) times two (2) 6 man blue uniforms en route here for 7 checkpoints." 8 So, does this refresh your memory with 9 respect to what was -- what happened at the second 10 meeting? 11 A: I think it was a continuation of the 12 first. We hadn't really separated all at that point. It 13 was very clear that our role at that point was as I said 14 observation and intelligence gathering. 15 Q: All right. And were you -- so what 16 was your understanding precisely of what your TRU team 17 was -- intended to do as of 20:49? 18 A: To deploy two (2) Sierra teams to go 19 down and ascertain exactly what was happening in that 20 parking lot. 21 Q: All right. And what did you take 22 from Inspector Carson's comment that: 23 "We're using TRU to go in and get an 24 eye. If they are just having a 25 campfire, let's leave them. Why go in
1591 the dark?" 2 A: Well, for the first part of that -- his 3 -- his statement the campfire, if everything appears to 4 be peaceful down there, there doesn't appear to be any 5 buildup or anything like that, I assumed he would then 6 make the decision that that was fine with him. We 7 weren't going to do anything about it. 8 Q: In which case the -- the assessment 9 of the risk of harm or damage to the cottages was not 10 such as would have justified the direct intervention of 11 TRU and CMU? 12 A: I assume that's his thinking here, 13 yes. 14 Q: Okay. Thank you. And was it your 15 understanding that an injunction was still being pursued? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: All right. And if we go to then page 18 77 of the scribe notes at Tab 6, Exhibit P-426. The next 19 entry that's relevant is -- to you is 21:00. 20 "Dale Linton and Kent Skinner view new 21 map. Went over TRU plan. Kent Skinner 22 request roads entering from both 23 areas." 24 So what was the purpose of this 25 conversation with Inspector Linton?
1601 A: I -- I don't recall specifically. I 2 think we were just looking at the map to see the area. 3 Q: All right. So is this part of 4 figuring out where to deploy the Sierra teams? 5 A: Well, it was more -- I made a request 6 -- what that should say is, request to close off the 7 roadways going into the area. 8 Part of a tactical occurrence is isolation 9 of the incident and that's for the safety of the 10 community. And so that was I was attempting to do at 11 this point was to prevent more people from coming down 12 into the area. 13 Q: All right. And -- and it says from 14 both areas, are you referring to East Parkway and Army 15 Camp Drive? 16 A: That's correct, yes. 17 Q: Okay. And do you have the sense as 18 to where the Sierra teams were -- where -- where they 19 were to be physically deployed; what vantage point they 20 were going to take? 21 A: Initially the thought of the Incident 22 Commander was that they would be deployed from the 23 trailer park. Given the distance involved and the ease 24 of access, I suggested they be deployed from the TOC 25 site. So that's eventually what we did.
1611 Q: Okay. All right. And if we go to 2 Tab 22 which is your notes, Exhibit P-1341. If you go to 3 your 21:02 entry which is on page 31 of your notes, so 4 that's 9:14 p.m., September the 6th. 5 And perhaps you can just read that -- that 6 brief entry. 7 A: At 21:14? 8 Q: Yes. 9 A: "I advised via telephone to Zupancic 10 intelligence regarding possible weapons 11 at the scene. Four (4) AK-47 light 12 rifles, Ruger 14's, scoped hunting 13 rifles." 14 Q: And did you in fact have that 15 conversation with -- with Officer Zupancic? 16 A: Yes, I did. 17 Q: Okay. And what information had you 18 been provided with respect to weapons by that time? 19 A: Precisely what is in the -- the 20 notation here. 21 Q: Okay. 22 A: That's the information I was given 23 that evening as far as weapons go. 24 Q: And if you go to Tab -- back to Tab 25 6, I'm sorry to take you back and forth.
1621 A: That's all right. 2 Q: These are the scribe notes, and page 3 77 and the 21:06 entry. That confirms that you were 4 given a list of possible weapons; that was at that the 5 Command Post? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: All right. And if you go next to Tab 8 20, Exhibit P-347. In particular a recorded conversation 9 held at 21:02, September the -- the 6th and I wonder if 10 we could please play that. It should be Region 17. 11 12 (AUDIOTAPE PLAYED, TRANSCRIPT BELOW) 13 14 Trepanzic Hello. 15 Skinner Hello. 16 Trepanzic Yes. 17 Skinner Where are ya? 18 Trepanzic Ah we're at Northville right now. 19 Skinner Are you going to the, heading for the 20 T.O.C.? 21 Trepanzic Yes we're to meet ah. 22 Skinner Tex there. 23 Trepanzic Tex at Ravenswood 24 Skinner Okay I can't get a hold of Tex so I'll 25 pass this to you kay?
1631 Trepanzic Okay. 2 Skinner Weapons. 3 Trepanzic Yes. 4 Skinner Apparent, ah four imitation AK's. 5 Trepanzic Yes. 6 Skinner ah Ruger 14's. 7 Trepanzic Okay let me repeat this, four imitation 8 AK47's, how many Mini Rugers? 9 Skinner Ruger 14's don't know. 10 Trepanzic Ah Mini Rugers. 11 Skinner Scoped hunting rifles. 12 Trepanzic Scoped hunting rifles. 13 Skinner Molotov cocktails. 14 Trepanzic Molotov cocktails. 15 Skinner Yeah, okay. 16 Trepanzic Okay. 17 Skinner When you guys get there, Tex'll fill you 18 in on what ah we want to do. 19 Trepanzic Okay. 20 Skinner Okay. 21 Trepanzic Yeah. 22 Skinner So other than that, that's what I got to 23 pass on right at the moment. 24 Trepanzic Okay, I've logged uhm our three vehicles 25 on.
1641 Skinner Yeah, yeah, I know they were telling me 2 here. 3 Trepanzic Okay, oh you're there now with Cousineau 4 or you're 5 Skinner I'm in the C.P., yeap. 6 Trepanzic Okay. 7 Skinner And Tex will be you there at the T.O.C. 8 Trepanzic Okay. 9 Skinner Okay. 10 Trepanzic Yeap. 11 Skinner Okay. 12 Trepanzic Bye. 13 Skinner Bye. 14 15 (AUDIOTAPE CONCLUDED) 16 17 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 18 Q: All right. Now, can you tell us who 19 the voices on that transmission were? 20 A: Yes, it's Rick Zupancic. 21 Q: And so it's erroneously identified as 22 Trepanzic? 23 A: That's correct. 24 Q: All right. And yourself, you're 25 accurately identified?
1651 A: Yes. 2 Q: All right. And just for the record, 3 I've said 21:02, we have to add seven (7) minutes to 4 that, or approximately seven (7) minutes to that, for 5 real time. 6 And here you're passing along the 7 information that you have received with respect to the 8 existence of possible weapons in the -- in the -- in 9 where, from where? In the Park or the Camp? 10 A: In the -- in the -- well, it would be 11 in the Park -- 12 Q: In the Park. And do you recall who 13 provided you with this information? 14 A: I believe it was Inspector Linton. 15 Came from Linton. 16 Q: Inspector Linton? 17 A: Yeah. 18 Q: And did -- what -- what degree of 19 reliability did you attach to the accuracy of this 20 information? 21 A: Well, it was information that came 22 through us -- it was -- I would say it's a probability, 23 it's not a -- it's not confirmed until we've seen the 24 weapons or have evidence of the weapons, but it's a 25 fairly good probability.
1661 Q: All right. So it's now an 2 expectation? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: That there are likely these kinds of 5 weapons in the Park? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: And this is information you passed 8 along to Zupancic because you couldn't reach your second 9 in command, Ken Deane? 10 A: Yes. Again that reflects this 11 difficulty with cellular communication in the area. 12 Q: All right. But it was your 13 expectation that Officer Zupancic would pass it along to 14 Officer Deane and the other TRU team members? 15 A: That's correct. 16 Q: So -- and why would it be important 17 for them to have this information? 18 A: Well, again, it's an increase in the 19 potential of the threat, and make the members of the 20 potential for these weapons out there. 21 We're now -- you know, you're dealing with 22 an assault-type weapon, you're not dealing with, you 23 know, a .22 calibre rifle. You -- and you've got scoped 24 hunting rifles, which increases somebody's ability to 25 engage you at a longer range, so those are things that
1671 would be pertinent to the members. 2 Q: All right. And in the relative 3 scheme of things, amongst the -- the -- now the various 4 factors that you've been told about, the automatic 5 gunfire, the damage to the civilian car, all those 6 things. 7 Where does -- where does this information 8 concerning the probable existence of these types of 9 weapons, where does that rank in terms of your risk 10 assessment? 11 A: I think it all adds up to the risk 12 has increased substantially. 13 Q: The risk has increased substantially? 14 A: Yes, yes. 15 Q: Thereby making your deployment more 16 likely? 17 A: Absolutely. 18 Q: And justified. 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: In your view? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: Okay. Can we please make this -- 23 this transmission -- transcript the next exhibit? 24 THE REGISTRAR: Isn't that already an 25 exhibit?
1681 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's a part 2 of -- it's Exhibit P-347. 3 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Oh, yeah, it is part of 4 it. 5 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Well -- 6 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Well -- 7 MR. DERRY MILLAR: But it makes it a lot 8 easier -- 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: To have it-- 10 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Exhibit P-347 is 11 about -- 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: A large -- 13 MS. SUSAN VELLA: It's all of the -- it's 14 a series of transmissions. Just for the record, if we 15 could make this limited transmission the next exhibit, 16 please. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Fine. 18 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Frankly, just the 19 three (3) pages. 20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P-1351, Your 21 Honour. 22 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Sorry, I missed that. 23 1151? 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 1351. 25 THE REGISTRAR: P-1351, Your Honour.
1691 MS. SUSAN VELLA: All right. And it's a 2 three (3) -- it's a three (3) page transcript of the 3 conversation between Zupancic and Skinner. 4 All right, thank you. 5 6 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1351: Document Number 001992. 7 Transcript of Logger tape 8 Command Centre, 21:02 hrs, 9 September 06, 1995, Kent 10 Skinner and Rick Zupancic. 11 12 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 13 Q: All right, do you recall what happens 14 -- what the next significant incident is? 15 A: Well, I think it's -- at that point 16 in time there is a discussion between myself and Incident 17 Commander Carson regarding the lack of communications 18 ability between the TOC and the Command Post. And we 19 made a determination at that time that we would both go 20 down and operate from the TOC. 21 Q: Okay. And that, if you go to page 31 22 of your notes at Tab 22, Exhibit P-1341. And at the 23 bottom of that note you indicate: 24 "Determine Comm's link. CP to TOC not 25 good. Poor cell coverage. TRU radio
1701 out of range. Conclude with Inspector 2 Carson that he and I should go to TOC 3 for Command and Control." 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: All right. And do you know what time 6 you had this conversation? 7 A: Not specifically I don't, no. 8 Q: And do you have any recollection as 9 to why you didn't put a time to this conversation? 10 A: From this point through my notes I 11 made my notes the following day. I did not note or 12 record the call times. 13 Q: All right. And that for the record 14 is pages 31 to 34 of your notes with page 35 being the 15 next time entry 00:45 hundred hours at September 7th? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: All right. And can I ask you first 18 of all, you say you didn't make them until the next day, 19 why didn't you make them until the next day? 20 A: Well, there was a lot going on at the 21 time. I -- I didn't have -- take the time to make my 22 notes as we were going along. It was dark at the scene 23 and the night was just full of events. There was no 24 opportunity for me to sit down and make notes. 25 Q: And do you recall more specifically
1711 where you were when you wrote the notes from -- that 2 we've just identified? 3 A: Yeah. I began writing these notes at 4 --and I don't recall the name of the hotel but a hotel in 5 Grand Bend -- 6 Q: All right. 7 A: -- the following day. 8 Q: And what were the circumstances of 9 you being at that hotel? 10 A: We were there as a unit to meet with 11 a lawyer. 12 Q: All right. And is that Norm Peel? 13 A: That was Norm Peel. 14 Q: And in relation to what? 15 A: In relation to the shooting the night 16 before. 17 Q: All right. And was that meeting in 18 the afternoon? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: So you didn't start writing these 21 notes until the afternoon of the 7th? 22 A: Of the 7th, that's correct. 23 Q: And when did you start commencing 24 them -- writing them relative to your meeting with Mr. 25 Peel?
1721 A: Well, it was while I was waiting for 2 my turn to speak to Norm. 3 Q: And when did you finish writing those 4 notes? 5 A: They would have been finished later 6 at -- back at the Pinery. 7 Q: But that same day? 8 A: Same day. 9 Q: All right. Now, is this -- this 10 appears to be inconsistent with your standard practice, 11 can you -- is it? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And can you provide -- is -- is this 14 an acceptable note taking practice? 15 A: No, it's not. My notes at that time 16 in my career were made to assist with my memory for 17 purposes of court. In this case -- and at that time 18 there was a -- a thought that when an officer was 19 involved in a stressful, complex situation that you 20 should wait some timeframe to make your notes to get your 21 head straightened around and let yourself think things 22 out. 23 In retrospect I don't think that worked 24 well for me. 25 Q: All right. Why didn't it work well
1731 for you? 2 A: Well, the notes are -- again there's 3 no times on the notes, they're -- the notes are not a 4 complete rendition of things that occurred that night. 5 They're not a complete rendition of my memory of things 6 that happened that night. 7 Q: Okay. All right. Commissioner, I 8 note that it's just past the lunch hour. It would be a 9 convenient time to -- to break now. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We'll break 11 now for lunch. 12 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thank you. 13 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry stands 14 adjourned until 1:05. 15 16 --- Upon recessing at 12:05 p.m. 17 --- Upon resuming at 1:06 p.m. 18 19 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 20 resumed. Please be seated. 21 22 (BRIEF PAUSE) 23 24 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 25 Q: All right. Just before the lunch
1741 break, we were at the evening of September the 6th and it 2 was determined that you and Inspector Carson would go 3 down to the TOC, down at the MNR parking lot, in light of 4 the communication difficulties between the TOC and the 5 Command Post. 6 A: Correct. 7 Q: All right. And so did you attend 8 with Inspector Carson at the TOC? 9 A: I did. 10 Q: Do you recall approximately what time 11 you would have attended? I know your notes do not 12 specify. We know it's after 9:14 p.m. according to your 13 notes, but do you have a sense... 14 A: I would estimate in the area of 9:30 15 to 9:40. 16 Q: 9:30 to what -- 17 A: To 9:40. 18 Q: -- 9:40? Approximately? 19 A: Approximately, yeah. 20 Q: Okay. And I appreciate that this is 21 going from memory. 22 And did anyone else attend at the TOC with 23 you and Inspector Carson? 24 A: The members of the team were already 25 present at the TOC.
1751 Q: All right, so the TRU team was 2 already present at the TOC? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: All right. And do you know where 5 Inspector Linton was at this point? 6 A: Inspector Linton remained in Forest 7 in the trailer -- Command Post trailer. 8 Q: Okay, fair enough. And at this point 9 in time, was the TRU team already activated? 10 A: No. They were waiting to leave the 11 TOC area. They were kitted up, being -- getting prepared 12 to go. 13 Q: So they're on standby still? 14 A: Well, they're -- 15 Q: Or -- 16 A: -- being prepared to be deployed. 17 Q: Okay, fair enough. And was -- was 18 the CMU also at the TOC at this time? 19 A: In or around that time they arrived, 20 yes. 21 Q: Is it possible that they came a 22 little later? 23 A: It's possible, yes. 24 Q: All right, you just don't -- don't 25 recall?
1761 A: I don't recall exactly. 2 Q: Okay. Your focus would be the TRU 3 team? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: Did you have a further discussion 6 with Inspector Carson about what now at this point in 7 time, the specific plan was with respect to the 8 deployment of the TRU team? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: And what's your recollection? 11 A: Our first role there was, again, to 12 get the Sierra teams out, to provide some intelligence as 13 to what was happening in -- at the intersection or at the 14 sandy parking lot. 15 Our secondary role would be if the CMU was 16 deployed, was to provide cover for the CMU members as 17 they went down the roadway. 18 Q: All right. So to be clear, 19 initially, the plan as it stood at this time was to send 20 the two (2) Sierra teams to in and around -- outside, 21 obviously, but in and around the Park to have a look at 22 the kiosk to see if there was any activity there, have a 23 look at the sandy parking lot and depending on what they 24 reported back, would inform Inspector Carson's decision 25 as to whether or not to deploy the CMU?
1771 A: That's entirely accurate, yes. 2 Q: Okay. And who were -- who comprised 3 the Sierra teams? Who were you assigning to that task? 4 A: I'd have to check my notes here. 5 Q: Certainly. 6 A: If I may. Sierra 1 was Jim Irvine 7 and Dave Strickler, and Sierra 2 was Mike McCormack and 8 Glen Kamerman. 9 Q: All right. And you're look -- excuse 10 me, you're looking at page 32 of your notes? 11 A: I am. 12 Q: All right. And did you -- did you 13 instruct the Sierra teams as to what their task was? 14 A: I briefed the team when we arrived 15 down at the TOC, yes. 16 Q: All right. And what -- what did you 17 tell them? 18 A: I informed them about the information 19 that had occurred that night about the vehicle being 20 trashed, as we thought, by baseball bats, about the 21 weapon -- the information regarding the weapons and what 22 our specific role was, was to go down to get the 23 observation of the sandy parking lot and if CMU deployed, 24 to provide cover for them. 25 Q: All right. So at this point in time,
1781 Alpha was not being deployed. 2 A: That's correct. 3 Q: They were on stand -- they were being 4 positioned to deploy. 5 A: That's correct. They were -- we use 6 the term 'kitted up' and it essentially means getting 7 dressed. 8 Q: Okay. All right. And did you 9 instruct the Sierra teams as to what positions they ought 10 to be taking -- taking? 11 A: I instructed the Sierra teams to what 12 their objective was. 13 Q: Okay. 14 A: I assigned Sierra 1 to what would be 15 the lake side of the roadway and Sierra 2 to the inland 16 side of the roadway. It's difficult to determine from a 17 command perspective where a Sierra team should end up 18 because you're not on the ground and you don't know the 19 intricacies of terrain. 20 Generally you would give a -- I want you 21 to go to the red/black corner which is the right hand 22 back corner of a house, that's you're -- where you're 23 going to go. 24 Once they're out there they'll tell me I'm 25 90 metres off the corner of the building, so --
1791 Q: They obviously -- they're to be 2 undercover, invisible if you will. 3 A: Exactly. 4 Q: So they're going to tell you where 5 they've ended up. 6 A: Where they're able to do that from. 7 Yes. 8 Q: Okay. Fair enough. And who had you 9 assigned to comprise the Alpha team? 10 A: That was Ken Deane, Kieran 11 O'Halloran, Mark Beauchesne and Bill Klym. 12 Q: Okay. And the remaining two (2) 13 members, there's yourself of course and Rick Zupancic? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: He was to occupy what position? 16 A: Rick's role was to look after the 17 communications in the TOC. 18 Q: And the recording? 19 A: And the recording. 20 Q: Okay. Now amongst the -- the Sierra 21 teams, who would be designated to communicate their 22 observations to you? 23 A: Generally it would be the senior 24 member. In this case I would, again, things could happen 25 that one (1) individual may not be able to tell me
1801 something, but I would generally expect that Jim Irvine 2 from Sierra 1 and Mike McCormack from Sierra 2 would be 3 who I would hear from. 4 Q: All right. And who would be the 5 designated communicator for the Alpha team? 6 A: Ken Deane. 7 Q: All right. 8 A: It's usually the senior member as I 9 said. 10 Q: I appreciate that. Just for 11 clarification I'm just getting the names out. Thank you. 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And to be clear, who were the 14 designated snipers on these elements or units? 15 A: Well they -- is a two (2) man team 16 but the actual sniper here was Jim Irvine and Mike 17 McCormack. 18 Q: Okay. And the other two (2) members 19 of 20 Sierra would be strictly the observation people -- 21 A: Observers, yeah. Now they went out 22 in a role primarily as I said, as intelligence gatherers. 23 Q: Yes. 24 A: I don't believe, it was my 25 recollection, either of them carried a sniper rifle with
1811 them that night. They all carried assault weapons. 2 Q: All right. I was going -- that's my 3 next question. What equipment in total did the Sierra 4 team have? 5 A: Each team had one (1) piece of night 6 vision equipment as well as their normal weaponry. And 7 then they'd have their unif -- tactical uniform, use 8 force gear. 9 Q: Now when you say normal weaponry, can 10 you be more specific please? 11 A: I'm referring to their sidearm. It's 12 not uncommon as well for a sniper since he's carrying a 13 very long -- when I mean long I mean physically long 14 weapon. 15 When you're moving through brush and 16 terrain, when they're trying to get into position, they 17 will often sling or carry that weapon in a -- in a bag 18 and use a -- use one of their MP5's as a weapon to move 19 into position with. 20 So that's not uncommon. So they may have 21 that as well. I believe Jim Irvine would have done that 22 -- that night. 23 Q: All right. So he -- he had his 24 assault rifle? 25 A: He would have had an assault rifle,
1821 an MP5 and his sidearm. 2 Q: Okay. And what about McCormack? 3 A: I don't specifically recall. 4 Q: Okay, fair enough. You may have more 5 clarity later as we move through the notes. 6 A: Sure. 7 Q: All right. I know the Alpha team 8 wasn't being deployed at this point, but what equipment 9 did they have with them that night? 10 A: They would have been wearing their 11 tactical green uniforms, body armour, the use of force 12 equipment. There was a mix of weapons in there; some had 13 MP5's and I believe there was a H&K 33 on the ground as 14 well which is a .223 calibre assault rifle. 15 Q: Is that a big gun? 16 A: Big in what manner, ma'am? The 17 length of it? 18 Q: I don't know. Is it a powerful gun? 19 A: It's -- it's a high calibre than an 9 20 mil. A 9 millimetre is a -- essentially a handgun round. 21 It's not overly quick. A .223 calibre is a -- well, it's 22 adapted from a varmint rifle. It's a higher calibre -- 23 higher speed weapon. It's actually a smaller bullet, but 24 it is more effective at range. 25 Q: Okay. A longer range --
1831 A: Longer range -- 2 Q: -- capability? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Okay, fair enough. And did they have 5 any night vision equipment? 6 A: They had one (1) piece of night 7 vision equipment. 8 Q: As amongst the four (4) -- 9 A: As amongst the four (4) -- 10 Q: -- Alpha members? 11 A: And I believe it was Mark Beauchesne 12 carrying that. 13 Q: All right. And why would only one 14 (1) of them have night vision, given it was night time 15 and -- 16 A: Dollars and cents. It's all we had, 17 ma'am. 18 Q: Okay. 19 A: Not everybody at that time was 20 equipped with night vision. 21 Q: Okay. Did they have any aids, 22 lighting aids, that would assist them with surveying the 23 area in the event they had to discharge a firearm? 24 A: On the -- on the weapons on the H&K 25 MP-5's there is a SureFire Flashlight attachment and it
1841 was a switch that can be depressed to turn the flashlight 2 off -- off and on, so that can be used to identify in the 3 dark. 4 Q: And what kind of range does that 5 have? 6 A: In the neighbourhood -- if I could -- 7 for instance when we do training, on a 25 metre range, 8 lighting up a cardboard target, it provides some ambient 9 light at the end of the range. 10 Q: Okay. 11 A: It's not -- at that 25 metres, it's 12 not a brilliant light, although it's a very bright little 13 flashlight, it doesn't carry extremely -- a light beyond 14 10 to 15 metres. 15 16 (BRIEF PAUSE) 17 18 Q: All right. Now, did you play any 19 decision -- any role in the decision to deploy the Sierra 20 teams? 21 A: Any role? 22 Q: Well, any -- any role -- 23 A: We provide the option to the Incident 24 Commander; it was ultimately his decision to deploy. 25 Q: And what was the extent of your
1851 decision-making capacity regarding the actions of your 2 TRU team during the evening of September 6th at the point 3 of deployment to the point of return by TRU to the TOC 4 later that night? 5 A: I'm not quite sure I follow your 6 question. I -- the team operates in response to the 7 wishes of the Incident Commander. There are occurrences 8 that can happen on the ground that happen in -- because 9 of what they are in a rapid sequence, that may require 10 action prior to the Incident Commander being involved in 11 it. 12 Q: All right. 13 A: Those types of decisions may be 14 automatic. 15 Q: Okay. By the -- the officer in the 16 field? 17 A: By the officer on the ground or 18 hearing him on the radio, I have to make -- may have to 19 make a response immediately. 20 Q: Okay. And what was your specific 21 role or roles that evening at the TOC, at the outset of 22 deployment? 23 A: My role is to be in direct contact 24 with the Incident Commander, keep him appraised of what's 25 happening on the ground and to provide options as to the
1861 event would progress. 2 Q: And is that only with respect to the 3 TRU team operations, or does that extend to the CMU 4 operation? 5 A: At that point in time, I had no 6 expertise in CMU, ma'am. I was strictly for TRU team. 7 Q: Okay, thank you. And in the -- in 8 the TOC itself, who was present inside the TOC? 9 A: Inside the TOC after the team 10 deployed? 11 Q: Hmm hmm. 12 A: Was myself, Inspector Carson and Rick 13 Zupancic. 14 Q: Okay. Now, at the time that the 15 Sierra team -- well, let me ask you this: Was the Sierra 16 team deployed? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: In anti -- in discharge of the 19 initial plan? 20 A: That's correct. 21 Q: All right. And at the time of their 22 deployment, was your TRU team still operating on the 23 understanding that a civilian car had been beaten by 24 Native occupiers with bats? 25 A: Yes.
1871 Q: And that there were a number of 2 assault weapons, such as you've already discussed, 3 probably present in the Park? 4 A: There was that potential, yes. 5 Q: And that there had been fifty (50) to 6 a hundred (100) rounds of gunfire the night before? 7 A: Correct. 8 Q: And that there had been signs of 9 increased activity within the Park over the late 10 afternoon and evening of the 6th? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: All right. So these are the facts 13 that they, if you will, that they were op -- that they 14 were operating under when they deployed? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: All right. Now, did you attend at 17 any briefing of the CMU at the TOC site? 18 A: No, I did not. 19 Q: Was there any joint briefing as 20 between the CMU and TRU team at the TOC site? 21 A: No, there wasn't. 22 Q: Had -- to your knowledge, had there 23 ever been any joint deployment of the CMU and TRU team 24 before? 25 A: No. This is the first time CMU and
1881 TRU had ever deployed together. 2 Q: Okay. And just to be clear, of 3 course, that decision hadn't been made yet -- 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: -- as to whether they would be -- 6 A: That's correct. 7 Q: -- jointly deployed? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: Okay. And if you go to your notes, 10 you're there, I think, already, Exhibit P-1341 at page 11 32, would you just read into the record the middle 12 portion of your notes which deals with your -- from the 13 arrival at TOC to the point of the formation of the CMU 14 and Alpha teams? 15 A: Okay. 16 "Attended TOC, Carson and I. Assigned 17 Sierra 1; Irvine and Strickler, Sierra 18 2; McCormack, Kamerman, Alpha; Dean, 19 O'Halloran, Beauchesne, Klym. Plan to 20 have Sierra 1 and Sierra 2 to deploy to 21 provide our eyes on scene." 22 How far do you want me to go, ma'am? 23 Q: Right down to just before, "CMU Alpha 24 move forward". 25 A: Okay.
1891 "Sierra 1 and Sierra 2 report 2 difficulty getting into position due to 3 Natives moving close to their position 4 and spotlights being scanned. Plan for 5 CMU to move in to move occupiers back 6 onto the Park property. Plan for Alpha 7 to move with CMU in case they make 8 armed resistance. Sierras report; 9 still difficult to advance. Determined 10 to move CMU into position onto the 11 roadway about 400 metres from the scene 12 supported by Alpha. Perhaps CMU's 13 presence will distract the Natives from 14 the Sierras enabling them to move into 15 position for and eye." 16 Q: Okay. So, let's back up. Sierra 1 17 and Sierra 2 are deployed from the TOC site? 18 A: Yes, they are. 19 Q: And how are they transported? 20 A: They were transported in a white 21 suburban vehicle partly down the roadway from the TOC and 22 dropped off. 23 Q: All right. And when they were -- do 24 you know when they were -- okay. And -- and did they 25 encounter any difficulty upon being dropped off?
1901 A: Almost right away. Yes. 2 Q: And what -- what was that difficulty? 3 A: There were occupiers out scanning -- 4 looking for individuals all along the sides of the 5 roadway. So they were having a difficult time moving 6 into position. 7 Q: They were kind of visible? 8 A: Not so much visible, but if they 9 moved they would become visible, yes. 10 Q: Okay. Fair enough. Certainly the 11 white van would be possibly visible? 12 A: The white van, yes. 13 Q: And in retrospect was that a wise way 14 to deploy them? 15 A: In retrospect that was a tactical 16 error. They should have deployed on foot from the TOC. 17 Q: Now, did this compromise their 18 ability then to take up the appropriate positions to be 19 the eyes, if you will, of Inspector Carson? 20 A: Absolutely. 21 Q: All right. And -- and they reported 22 that back to you? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And as a result of their inability to 25 get into position to have a look at the kiosk and the
1911 sandy parking lot was there a modification to the plan? 2 A: There was; that was the point where 3 we determined that if we moved the CMU out on the roadway 4 there would be -- the occupiers' attention would be drawn 5 to the CMU thereby enabling the Sierra teams to move into 6 a position where they could see exactly what's going on 7 in the parking lot. 8 Q: So the -- then the plan became to 9 deploy the CMU with a view to the CMU basically causing a 10 distraction to the occupiers to allow the Sierra teams to 11 then move, hopefully undetected, so they could accomplish 12 their objective of -- of -- of looking at the -- you 13 know, into the kiosk or at least at the kiosk in the 14 sandy parking lot? 15 A: Yes. In conjunction with the plan 16 just prior to that was dependent on what the Sierra team 17 saw, the CMU may have to deploy to move people back into 18 the park as well. 19 Q: Right. 20 A: And Alpha's role at that point would 21 be to provide cover. But when Sierra couldn't get into 22 position then, yes, the determination was made to use the 23 CMU as a distraction tool for Sierra. 24 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Mr. Commissioner, I 25 apologize for interrupting. My sole concern is in terms
1921 of the evidence, this Witness has testified that he was 2 not responsible for the decision to deploy CMU. He's now 3 giving evidence how -- and the intention in deploying 4 CMU. 5 My sole concern is what -- is that either 6 he was making this decision or involved in it or he 7 wasn't and he's guessing or speculating; that's my 8 concern because he testified before he wasn't involved in 9 deploying CMU. 10 I'm just concern -- concerned about the 11 record in terms of what he's telling us now. 12 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Well, there's a third 13 possibility but I was allowing the Witness to -- 14 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: No, no, that's 15 fine. 16 MS. SUSAN VELLA: -- answer and I can -- 17 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I'm not being 18 critical of My Friend. I just -- 19 MS. SUSAN VELLA: I didn't take it as a 20 criticism, that's okay. 21 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Good, good. 22 23 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 24 Q: Yeah. Were you privy to any 25 discussions with Inspector Carson surrounding the
1931 possible uses of the CMU? 2 A: Yes. The decision to deploy the CMU 3 and how they were used were ultimately made by Inspector 4 Carson. 5 Q: All right. You didn't play any role 6 in -- in that decision but you were privy to the 7 discussions? 8 A: I was part of the discussion leading 9 to his discussion, yes. 10 Q: All right. Thank you. All right. 11 So to back up then, the decision is made by Inspector 12 Carson to deploy the CMU at this point but as a -- as a 13 distraction to try to assist Sierra 1 and 2 into getting 14 into their position? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: And with the CMU was there a decision 17 to also deploy Alpha? 18 A: Yes, ma'am. 19 Q: And what was the role of Alpha in -- 20 at this stage in the plan? 21 A: Alpha was to provide cover for the 22 CMU should they run into an armed confrontation. 23 Q: All right. 24 A: Because of the equipment CMU members 25 are carrying it's difficult to respond to an armed
1941 threat. 2 Q: Okay. And at this stage in the game 3 given the information you had and that you passed on to 4 your TRU team members there was a -- a risk of firearm 5 conflict from your perspective -- 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: -- that warranted the deployment of 8 TRU? 9 A: Yes, ma'am. 10 Q: All right. All right. Perhaps then 11 continuing did you provide further instructions then at 12 this point to the Alpha team advising them as to now what 13 their role is to be? 14 A: Yes, they would have been advised of 15 what their role was to provide cover, yes. 16 Q: Okay. And providing cover means what 17 specifically? 18 A: Basically to cover from the threat of 19 an armed confrontation. They are the ones who would 20 respond if that became apparent. 21 Q: And are they also looking to see -- 22 to see if there is a threat? 23 A: They are scanning, looking for those 24 threats, yes, ma'am. 25 Q: And would they be, in relation to the
1951 path of the CMU, would they be concurrent -- parallel 2 with them or in advance or behind? 3 A: Moving down the road. They would 4 lead the CMU down the roadway. 5 Q: Okay. And would they actually be on 6 the road? 7 A: Probably off to the sides of the 8 road. I wasn't there to see them but it would be 9 standard that they wouldn't walk down the middle of the 10 road. 11 Q: Because they're to be invisible? 12 A: Yes, they wanted to remain close to 13 cover and hidden. 14 Q: All right. And so then the CMU and 15 Alpha is now deployed, Sierra is already deployed. And 16 can you tell me to the best of your recollection what 17 transpires over the next thirty (30) to forty (40) 18 minutes just in a general way? 19 A: Well, once out on the roadway it was 20 a short time later that a report was received from Alpha 21 that they saw somebody on the roadway with what could be 22 a weapon in their hands. 23 At that point I ordered the CMU to take 24 cover, to stop their progress down the road and then the 25 -- through radio communications I could hear that Mark
1961 Beauchesne checked and made a visual check with night 2 vision, scanned it and realized the person did not have a 3 weapon and the CMU progressed -- started again down the 4 roadway. 5 Q: All right. 6 A: Sierra teams were still having a 7 difficult time getting into position. At one point in 8 time it was determined to change Sierra 2's focus from 9 the kiosk to the parking lot as well to see if they could 10 get to see a view. Sierra 1 was still having a difficult 11 time and CMU continued to progress down the road. 12 Q: All right. So the -- the Sierra 13 team, did it actually change physical positions? 14 A: Actually just changed their focus. 15 Q: Okay. 16 A: They were heading towards the gate, 17 now they're going to turn to their -- what would be their 18 left and focus more towards the parking lot. 19 Q: So towards the lake side? 20 A: Yes, they would have been sort of 21 parallelling the road; in their focus, parallelling the 22 road -- 23 Q: Okay. 24 A: -- because that would line them up 25 with the gate but now they had to focus more in towards
1971 the parking lot. 2 Q: Okay. I understand. Okay. 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Carry on. Sorry. 5 A: The team progressed down the road. 6 My recollection is that I then heard the team was 7 advancing. Over the radio I could hear communications 8 from the CMU that they were -- they were moving forward. 9 I could hear that from Wade Lacroix who was running the 10 team. I'm fairly familiar with Wade's voice. 11 They advanced towards the lot, the parking 12 lot. I then heard that there was a punch-out. The CMU 13 moved forward rapidly. I could hear a confrontation on 14 the radio, like, a lot of noise, a lot of yelling. 15 I then heard somebody on the radio say, 16 They're shooting at us. There was then -- I could hear 17 them trying to determine where everybody was. 18 Then there was a report of a bus coming 19 out from the -- from the Park and driving through the 20 Crowd Management Unit followed by a car. 21 At that point I thought I had a -- 22 probably a number of badly injured if not dead police 23 officers that had been run over. Ken Deane requested an 24 ambulance. At that point I asked Rick Zupancic to go 25 with Ted Slomer, a medic, to get a -- Ted had prepared a
1981 -- one of the suburbans as a makeshift ambulance. 2 I set them out to the roadway and I made a 3 request on the radio to try to ascertain where the 4 ambulance was needed and for what purpose. 5 After having made a couple of requests for 6 that, I received a reply from Ken to disregard. That the 7 individual who was injured had been returned into the -- 8 had returned into the Park. At this point in time, the 9 teams were beginning to retreat back. 10 I -- I should back up a little bit. 11 Before the team advanced into the Park, there was clear 12 direction given to them by Inspector Carson that they 13 were not to progress into the Park and I relayed that 14 over the radio. 15 The team then retreated back to the TOC. 16 On the way back, Ken Deane was giving a radio report over 17 what happened. I listened to the first part of it and 18 then my thoughts turned to we have a still unsecured 19 situation, uncontained. 20 We need to get more logistical support. I 21 need another TRu team. I'm going to need more ERT. 22 We've been up all day, obviously we're going to need 23 relief. And my attention turned to that. 24 When they -- the elements returned to the 25 TOC, the ERT members funnelled past the TOC and since the
1991 situation was still uncontained, I assigned the Sierra 2 teams and some ERT members to maintain observation points 3 out on the roadway. 4 Once back at the TOC I received a report 5 from the members who had fired their weapons. I remained 6 at the TOC. I advised -- I advised the Incident 7 Commander what had happened. Some time after that, John 8 Carson left the scene and he returned to the Command 9 Post. 10 I remained on scene in case we needed to 11 evacuate or be prepared for whatever could happen at that 12 point. Some time during -- little -- excuse me, some 13 time later on, I was requested to return to the Command 14 Post and I accompanied Wade Lacroix back to the Command 15 Post. 16 At that point I received a request from 17 Inspector Linton and Inspector Carson to return to the 18 scene to retrieve the weapons that had been discharged in 19 light of the -- what is likely to be an SIU investigation 20 at that point. 21 I expressed my concern over that at the 22 time because we were still in my opinion, operational at 23 the time and the members needed their primary weapons 24 that they were used to using. 25 It was determined that we would go and get
2001 the weapons. So Inspector Linton and I left the Command 2 Post, returned to the Pinery to get replacement weapons, 3 went back out to the TOC site where he secured weapons 4 from the individuals who discharged them. 5 Then returned to the Command Post with 6 him, waited for the arrival of the Barrie TRU team. When 7 they arrived I briefed them on what had happened. I 8 escorted them out of the TOC where they deployed. I 9 returned back with my members. 10 Q: All right. Thank you. Now just a 11 couple of -- of questions and then we'll go through some 12 of the documents. 13 You indicated there was an initial report 14 of the sighting of a possible weapon on the road as the 15 CMU and Alpha deployed down the road, that is down East 16 Parkway. 17 Do you recall who made that initial 18 report? 19 A: It was Ken Deane over the radio that 20 reported it to me, yes. 21 Q: Okay. Meaning what? That -- that -- 22 A: Meaning that he's the one that did 23 the radio transmission report. I don't know who 24 initially saw -- the individual. 25 Q: Okay. All right. That's because he
2011 was the communicator and his TRU team members or Alpha 2 members would report to him and he would report to you. 3 A: That's correct. 4 Q: All right. Okay. And you indicated 5 that you ordered the CMU to stand down at that point. 6 What was your authority to issue any order to the CMU? 7 A: It was strictly an officer safety 8 issue at that point in time. It was one of the times 9 when it didn't make sense to turn and ask and explain 10 things. My concern was that they were potentially in 11 jeopardy and they should take cover. 12 Q: All right. And at some point over 13 the course of the deployment of Alpha and the CMU, it 14 appears that the CMU is no longer performing a 15 distraction function but are now engaging in a punch out, 16 you know, in a direct engagement, if you will, with the 17 occupiers. 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Are you aware as to what 20 circumstances caused that transition in the plan to take 21 place? 22 A: No, I am not. 23 Q: All right. And at any point over the 24 course of this deployment, did the Sierra teams did get 25 into the positions that they were supposed to be in, in
2021 terms of getting a good look on -- on the sandy parking 2 lot? 3 A: No, they did not. 4 Q: All right. So this Incident 5 Commander did not have the benefit of their surveillance 6 or intelligence in that respect? 7 A: That's correct, ma'am. 8 Q: Do you -- are you aware as -- as who 9 gave the instruction to -- to punch out? 10 A: On the radio it was Wade Lacroix's 11 voice I heard. 12 Q: Okay. Do you know whether or not, 13 and I know you weren't part of that briefing, is that 14 right -- 15 A: Right. 16 Q: -- of the CMU? 17 A: That's correct. 18 Q: All right. Was Inspector Carson in 19 the -- the TOC vehicle during the entirety of this time? 20 A: I believe there was occasions when he 21 stepped away to use his phone, stepped away from the side 22 of the vehicle but for the most part he was in proximity 23 to the TOC. 24 Q: And did you hear Inspector Carson 25 give any order to Wade Lacroix to do a punch out?
2031 A: No. 2 Q: Okay. And then you indicated that 3 the next afternoon you -- you made notes of the 4 deployment? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And what transpired. I wonder if you 7 would read into the record, commencing at page 32 at the 8 bottom of your notes, Exhibit P-1341, starting with CMU 9 Alpha move forward and read up -- up to page 34, please. 10 A: To the start of page -- 11 Q: Half way. 12 A: -- 34? 13 Q: Hmm. 14 A: Or to the end of page 34? 15 Q: I would suggest half way down. I'll 16 tell you when to stop. 17 A: Okay. 18 Q: Where it says "CMU retreats to TOC", 19 start there. 20 A: CMU retreats to TOC. 21 Q: Yeah. 22 A: Okay. 23 "CMU Alpha move forward. I monitor CMU 24 on TAC channel and Zup handles TRU 25 radio. Alpha (Deane) radio seen person
2041 on roadway. Something seen in 2 individual's hands which could be a 3 long gun or a bow. 4 I advised CMU that subject on the 5 roadway appears armed, CMU takes cover. 6 Bow with night vision determines item 7 is not a weapon. 8 I advised CMU and they form up again. 9 Sierra still having difficulty moving. 10 Sierra 2 requested to move attention 11 from the gate area to the parking lot. 12 A radio conversation that Sierra 1 is 13 [I overhear a radio conversation is 14 what that means, ma'am]." 15 Q: All right. 16 A: "Radio conversation that Sierra 1 and 17 Sierra 2 can provide cover for CMU." 18 Q: Sorry, it's Sierra 1 and Alpha? 19 A: I'm sorry. 20 "Sierra 1 and Alpha can provide cover 21 for CMU. Radio [on the radio] CMU 22 advances, radio. Natives retreat into 23 Park. I advised the CMU not to go into 24 the Park. 25 [Radio] CMU backs up. I hear CMU
2051 advance. [on the radio, that's in 2 paragraphs (sic) I have radioed 3 Lacroix]. 4 I hear Lacroix giving commands on the 5 radio. Report of one (1) 1092. CMU 6 backs up. [Again, that's on the radio]. 7 I hear a commotion on the radio. I 8 hear someone on the radio say they're 9 shooting at us. 10 I hear Lacroix giving [there's a 11 missing word there, it should say 12 'orders'] in the background. I clearly 13 hear numerous rounds fired. 14 [on the radio] CMU calls retreat. 15 Deane asks for an ambulance. I send 16 Zup and Slomer forward in Suburban. 17 Deane advises Natives drove bus through 18 the CMU and fired on the CMU. Asked 19 for clarification re: ambulance. 20 Determined Natives are injured not 21 officers and Natives retreated into the 22 Park. Ambulance..." 23 I have started to write ambulance but I 24 spelled it wrong, it's crossed out there. 25 "Ambulance recalled. The CMU retreats
2061 to TOC covered by Alpha and Sierra." 2 Q: Okay. I wonder if we could next go 3 then to Tab 21. This is Exhibit P-438. I don't propose 4 to play this transmission but it is approximately forty 5 (40) to forty-one (41) minutes in length. 6 I understand that you had an opportunity 7 to listen to the entire transmission prior to today? 8 A: I have. 9 Q: And you have also reviewed this 10 transcript prior to today? 11 A: I have. 12 Q: All right. And just to be clear, 13 what -- this indicates that this is a recording of the -- 14 from the -- of the TAC channel for September 6th, 1995, 15 from 10:27 p.m. to 11:10 p.m. And the TAC channel is one 16 (1) of the channels you were monitoring in the TOC? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: And it is the channel that was open 19 for communication with the CMU? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: And this is distinct from the TRU 22 channel which was a separate line of communication? 23 A: Right. 24 Q: And therefore none of the 25 communications from any of the TRU team members would be
2071 reflected in this transcript? 2 A: That's correct, ma'am. 3 Q: All right. And you were obviously 4 privy to these transmissions as they were occurring? 5 A: I was listening to the radio. I may 6 not have heard everything on the radio because my 7 attention would be drawn to discussions with this 8 Incident Commander. 9 Q: Okay. 10 A: And -- 11 Q: And also you're monitoring the TRU 12 communications? 13 A: And monitoring the TRU communications 14 as well, yes. 15 Q: All right. And certain names are 16 identified here: Lacroix, Hebblethwaite. Sorry, 17 Hebbleweth. 18 A: Hebblethwaite. 19 Q: Okay. I'll take your translation, 20 Skinner, of course yourself is on here. And -- and were 21 you able to identify these voices on the tape? 22 A: For the most part yes, ma'am. 23 Q: Okay. All right. 24 A: I -- I should also point out that 25 other ERT members were also on this channel other than
2081 the ones who were designated as CMU and that -- that 2 shows even on your page 1 where is says, "Alpha"? 3 Q: Yes. 4 A: It should be one (1) of the 5 checkpoints. 6 Q: Alpha checkpoint as distinct from 7 Alpha TRU team? 8 A: Exactly. 9 Q: Okay. That's helpful. And who is 10 Lima 2? 11 A: Lima 2 would be the second in command 12 of ERT. 13 Q: Who was? 14 A: I'm not sure, ma'am. 15 Q: And who was Lima 1? 16 A: Lima 1 would be in charge -- who was 17 in charge of the ERT members. 18 Q: All right. 19 A: And again I'm not sure who exactly it 20 was time. 21 Q: Okay. And over on page 4 of the 22 transcript there's a -- a line attributed to Ken Deane. 23 Now, how is that possible? 24 A: It's not. It's -- that's actually my 25 voice. I've got both radios on the go at that time and
2091 this is an error on my part of having the wrong radio in 2 my hand saying, TAC's and I'm trying to call Alpha but 3 I'm actually on the CMU radio so... 4 Q: Okay. Thank you. So we'll make that 5 correction to the transcript please? 6 All right. Now, going back to then page 1 7 of this transcript it appears to commence after the CMU 8 and Alpha have -- have been deployed, is that fair? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: And Lacroix is indicating: 11 "CMU advance slow pace. Should be 12 tenth of a K." 13 Does that reflect the -- the pace of the 14 -- the march? 15 A: No, I think what they're looking to 16 advance one-tenth of a kilometre, a hundred (100) metres 17 down the road. 18 Q: Okay. All right. And then the next 19 line attributed to Lacroix is: 20 "TOC to CMU. We're advancing to within 21 three hundred (300)." 22 Now, that would be three hundred (300) 23 metres -- 24 A: Metres. 25 Q: -- from where?
2101 A: I assume he's referring to the sandy 2 parking lot at that point. 3 Q: Yeah. Thank you. And then Lacroix 4 indicates: 5 "Good news, they've got rocks and 6 sticks piled up and we all know that we 7 can beat that. Rocks and sticks, 8 that's in our bailiwick all we have to 9 worry about is little brown stocks and 10 black barrels. Okay, we're going to -- 11 we going to advancing in a moment." 12 Advance. Now, what did you understand 13 that to -- to relate to, that observation? 14 A: Well, what he's saying when he's 15 talking about "all we have to worry about is little brown 16 stocks and black barrels" is worry about firearms. 17 The rocks and sticks, that's what ERT 18 prepare for when they train as CMU. In -- in their 19 training, they will stand and take people throwing rocks 20 and sticks at them and their equipment, so they're used 21 to that. 22 Q: Yes, all right. Whereas the -- the 23 Alpha team is there to deal with -- 24 A: They're there to deal with the -- 25 Q: -- firearms?
2111 A: -- firearms, yes. 2 Q: If any. 3 A: If. 4 Q: All right. 5 6 (BRIEF PAUSE) 7 8 Q: And then on the second page, and 9 there -- just past half way down there's a comment 10 attributed to you. 11 "CMU, ah, TOC 1 be advised you've been 12 spotted by the forward observers and 13 their forward observers are 14 retreating." 15 Is this information you would have 16 received from the Alpha members, do you remember, or from 17 the Sierra? 18 A: I don't recall which one, but it 19 would have come from one of the TRU members on the 20 ground. 21 Q: All right. And so you're relaying 22 that to the CMU? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And that is approximately seven (7) 25 minutes into this -- this transcript for what -- what
2121 that's worth, so at 10:27 p.m.; the time is right, we're 2 now at 10:34 p.m.? 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 Q: All right. And then a little bit 7 later there's a comment on the same page, 2: 8 "Officer, that's TRU in the vehicle." 9 What -- do you know what that's relating 10 to? 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 A: No, I don't, specifically. 15 Q: Okay. And Lacroix's command or 16 statement: 17 "Dressing shields down." 18 A: Dressing is basically the formation 19 call for the -- 'check your dressing' means are you lined 20 up in the proper formation and shields down. 21 Q: Okay. 22 A: It means not holding them up. 23 Q: Okay. All right. And then on [age 3 24 you say: 25 "TAC 1 go ahead."
2131 And Lacroix says: 2 "CMU, 2 to 300 metres out. Awaiting 3 instructions." 4 You say: 5 "Standby." 6 You later say: 7 "Sierra 1, what's going on with the 8 spotlights?" 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: And you're -- you're advised that the 11 spotlights are from the occupants and that they're 12 roaming wildly. 13 And is this information you got from the 14 TRU team or from Sierra 1 in particular? 15 A: It would have been from one of the 16 Sierra teams. I'm not sure if it was 1 or 2, ma'am. 17 Q: Okay. The above indicates it might 18 be: 19 "Anything to report from Sierra 1?" 20 Does that refresh your memory? 21 A: No. 22 Q: Okay. 23 A: It doesn't. 24 Q: All right. And then you're noted at 25 the bottom of page 3 to say:
2141 "CMU to TAC 1. Advising Sierra 1 and 2 Sierra 2 are not, repeat not, in 3 position." 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: And this is based on information you 6 got from those teams? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And assuming that the time -- start 9 time is right, this would be at about 10:24 p.m.? 10 Sorry, 10:37 p.m., excuse me. And what 11 was the significance of the fact that neither Sierra 1 12 nor Sierra 2 were in position as at this stage in the 13 deployment? 14 A: Well, they were still unable to 15 ascertain what was happening in the actual parking lot 16 itself. 17 Q: All right. 18 A: And since they were still moving, 19 they were not in position, they'd have difficulty 20 providing cover. 21 Q: Okay. At this point in time, is the 22 CMU still on a distraction -- 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: -- mission? 25 A: Yes.
2151 Q: All right. So you haven't given up 2 on -- on the possibility that the Sierra teams will get 3 into position? 4 A: Correct. 5 Q: All right. And then on page 4, your 6 first transmission: 7 "CMU be advised party on the road may 8 have a weapon in his hands." 9 And that's about fifteen (15) minutes into 10 this transmission, which would make it about 10:42 p.m. 11 assuming the start time is right? 12 A: Hmm hmm. 13 Q: And you've indicated you got that 14 information relayed through Ken Deane? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: All right. And you relay this to the 17 CMU. And the CMU holds its position as a result and at 18 the bottom of 4, you say: 19 "Subject is believed to be armed." 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: And over on page 5 under current time 22 10:46 you -- you're noted as saying: 23 "CMU confirmed the subject has a stick 24 that has been confirmed by Romeo, 25 stick."
2161 And who is -- who's Romeo? 2 A: Romeo would be a designation commonly 3 used for Mark Beauchesne. He was part of our 4 reconnaissance or recci (phonetic) team. 5 Q: Okay. And then you're asked whether 6 Sierra is in position and you say "standby". And 7 presumably you then have a conversation with the -- the 8 Sierra team members? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: And what are you advised? Are they 11 in position or not? That is the position that was 12 originally planned. 13 A: I believe I was eventually advised 14 they were in a position that they could provide cover. 15 Q: All right. Now -- 16 A: But I'm not saying we could see the 17 parking lot. I -- I don't know at that point. 18 Q: All right at this point there appears 19 to be a -- is there a shift in the plan that now Sierra 2 20 is -- is going to provide cover to the CMU along with 21 Alpha? 22 A: Yes. In a way there is but it says 23 Sierra 2 but my recollection is that, that should be 24 Sierra 1. 25 Q: Okay. All right. That's your
2171 recollection? 2 A: I think that was my -- probably my 3 error in saying Sierra 2 at that point. 4 Q: All right. So it's not a correction 5 to the transcript but to what -- 6 A: No. 7 Q: -- you actually said at the time. 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: -- at the top of page 6? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: All right. And what's your 12 understanding with respect to the need for Alpha and 13 Sierra 1 to -- to provide coverage for the CMU? 14 A: Again is to respond to any potential 15 of a firearms threat. 16 Q: And the next transmission at 17 approximately 10:48 p.m. according to -- to this 18 transcript is Hebblethwaite saying: 19 "Copy that, copy that, we're engaging." 20 And what did you -- 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: -- take from the comment that the CMU 23 is now engaging? 24 A: That they were going to be moving to 25 the parking lot to engage the occupiers who were present
2181 there. 2 Q: All right. And then you indicate to 3 CMU: 4 "If you read, Sierra One is on your 5 left flank." 6 So you're telling them when Sierra One is 7 relation to the CMU? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: And then towards the bottom of this 10 page 6, Lacroix says: 11 "They're on the Provincial -- 12 Provincial property." 13 And you say: 14 "10-4. Take up a defensive position." 15 And Lacroix responds: 16 "Contact squad. Back up slowly." 17 So what was your recollection with respect 18 to the comment from Lacroix that they're on Provincial 19 property which caused you to say: 20 "Take up a defensive position."? 21 A: I think I took that to mean they were 22 back onto the -- into the Park itself, yes. 23 Q: Okay. And what -- what does -- what 24 did you intend to imply when you told the CMU to take up 25 a defensive position?
2191 A: To pull back and hold their -- hold 2 their position. 3 Q: All right. And just prior to this 4 event, had there been a punch out? 5 A: I believe it says they're engaging 6 that they were ad -- they advanced towards the people who 7 were at the parking lot. 8 Q: Okay. Then according to the 9 transcript at about 10:54 p.m., Lacroix says "shield 10 chatter". 11 Not did you hear any shield chatter? 12 A: No. 13 Q: All right. And what does shield 14 chatter connote? 15 A: Shield chatter to my understanding is 16 the CMU members rattling their batons on the shield. 17 Q: And at page 7 and it reads: 18 "Current time 10:55 p.m. Comment from 19 Hebblethwaite. TOC from CMU. Be 20 advised that we're at the perimeter 21 that badgers are within the bounds of 22 the park. The badgers are in the Park. 23 Over." 24 First of all do you have any understanding 25 as to what he was trying to convey to you as to who the
2201 badgers are? 2 A: It's a bit of a -- the term badger is 3 used in hostage rescue. It is a code term for the actual 4 suspects. And it has drifted to become suspect in 5 general. Not necessarily in a hostage situation. 6 So my understanding was that the occupiers 7 have moved back into the Park. 8 Q: All right. And then you request CMU 9 to hold their position? 10 A: Yes. At this point Inspector Carson 11 would have been beside me directing that. 12 Q: All right. So he's relaying 13 instructions to you and you're relaying them in turn to 14 the CMU? 15 A: That's correct. 16 Q: All right. And a little bit down 17 beside TAC 1: 18 "CMU, TAC 1 take cover and maintain 19 your position." 20 Is this is an instruction relayed from 21 Inspector Carson through you? 22 A: I believe so, yes. 23 Q: And the intention is for the CMU to 24 vacate the sandy parking lot and retreat to the -- the 25 edge of it if you will, the road side of it?
2211 A: I -- I took that to be where they 2 were. They were back at the edge of the parking lot from 3 what he has said at the top of that page. 4 Q: Hmm hmm. 5 A: I believe at that time my concern was 6 there's just -- they're standing out in the open. We 7 wanted them to move to where they were closer to a 8 position of cover, whether that was off the roadway or 9 amongst the trees or whatever. 10 Q: All right. And then at the top of 11 page 8 and the -- the current time according to the 12 transcript would be 10:58 p.m. 13 "LACROIX: Get ready for it. Get 14 ready. Ready, ready, go, go, back, 15 back, back." 16 Now, what was your understanding as to 17 what was happening at this point in time? 18 A: I -- I couldn't see what was 19 happening. It was -- he was responding to something he 20 saw. I don't know what that was. 21 Q: Okay. Had there been any instruction 22 from Inspector Carson for a second punch-out? 23 A: No, there had not. 24 Q: All right. And shortly thereafter 25 still on page 8:
2221 "LACROIX: Contact squad back up. Clear 2 to the road." 3 Prisoner van then says: 4 "Lima 2, this is the prisoner van. 5 LIMA 2: Confirm, do you want an 6 ambulance? 7 PRISONER VAN: Confirmed." 8 Now, do you know what this was in relation 9 to? 10 A: No, I don't. I don't recall hearing 11 that request. 12 Q: All right. Then according to the 13 time of the transcript at approximately 11:03 Lacroix is 14 attributed with saying: 15 "Shots fired. Shots fired." 16 Did you hear that -- 17 A: I -- I could hear, yes. 18 Q: -- statement? Did you hear the 19 statement? 20 A: I could hear the statement, yes. 21 Q: And did you know who was uttering it? 22 A: I -- it -- in my mind it was Wade 23 Lacroix. 24 Q: Okay. And then there is identified 25 on page 9 as:
2231 "MALE: yelling (sound of gunfire and 2 revving engine.) " 3 What if anything were you hearing in the 4 background during this period of time? 5 A: It was a large commotion on the 6 radio. There was a lot of noise coming back over the 7 radio. I could hear the -- hear the gunfire. There was 8 a lot of voices but again not too much that I could 9 discern what was going on but I knew there was -- it 10 wasn't good. 11 Q: All right. And can you recollect now 12 approximately how many -- how -- over what period of time 13 there -- was the sound of gunfire in terms of seconds, 14 minutes? 15 A: The -- the confrontation in my 16 recollection was very brief, it was a minute or two (2) 17 at the most. 18 Q: All right. And could you ascertain 19 the number of gunshots? 20 A: No. 21 Q: Could you ascertain the -- the type 22 of weapon that would have been shooting -- making the -- 23 the -- responsible for the gunshot noises? 24 A: I -- I couldn't make that 25 determination over the radio like that, no.
2241 Q: All right. You couldn't tell if it 2 was automatic, semi-automatic, or manual? 3 A: It wasn't automatic fire I was 4 hearing, it was individual rounds I could hear. 5 Q: What do you mean by individual 6 rounds? 7 A: If I was listening to automatic 8 weapons fire they come in such close proximity that they 9 sound like one begins right after the other. It's -- 10 Q: Okay. 11 A: Whereas semi-automatic fire is 12 single, distinct individual rounds being fired. 13 Q: All right. Thank you. And then -- 14 and the male is attributed with saying: 15 "Hold your fire." 16 Do you recall hearing that? 17 A: No, ma'am. 18 Q: All right. And towards the end of 19 the page Hebblethwaite saying: 20 "10-4, bring it [with respect to the 21 ambulance] bring it here up behind the 22 prisoner van. Tell it to stay about 23 two hundred (200) yards back." 24 Do you know what this is in relation to? 25 A: No, ma'am.
2251 Q: Okay. Going over to page 10. At the 2 top: 3 "LACROIX: (yelling) Back behind the 4 van. I want a count back behind the 5 van. I want a count." 6 Did you have any understanding as to what 7 the purpose of a count was? 8 A: He was trying to ascertain if he had 9 all his members, is what I took that to mean. 10 Q: All right. And then he's attributed 11 with saying: 12 "Form up, form them up in two (2) 13 lines." 14 Is he referring to his CMU unit? 15 A: I assume so, yes. 16 Q: All right. And then: 17 "Alpha, Lima 2, this is Alpha. We'll 18 escort the van, the ambulance down 19 there from our position." 20 This is -- happens at about thirty-seven 21 (37) minutes into this recording. What was that about? 22 A: Again, I'm not certain. It's the 23 Alpha checkpoint which would been to -- away from the 24 Park side on the opposite side of the parking lot the TOC 25 was parked in, if you would consider the lake to be
2261 north, it would be to our west. 2 I don't recall hearing this transmission. 3 Q: Okay. This is isn't relation to the 4 request by Ken Deane for an ambulance? 5 A: No, it is not. 6 Q: All right. 7 A: No. 8 Q: And then towards the bottom of this 9 page, Lacroix: 10 "We took gunfire from a car. A bus 11 tried to run us over. We returned 12 fire. We have no casualties that I can 13 count for. Everybody seems to be 14 accounted for." 15 Do you recall receiving this transmission 16 from Lacroix? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: And then John Carson: 19 "CMU: TOC back off, if you can, back 20 off and then come back to the TOC 21 site." 22 So, did Inspector Carson actually make 23 this direct transmission? 24 A: I believe so. 25 Q: Okay, because you had said earlier
2271 that you were conveying the instructions, but at this 2 point the inspector gets on the phone -- 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: -- the radio himself? 5 A: Yeah. As I say, sometimes my 6 attention would go away from the radio to do something 7 else, to talk to, you know, the inspector himself or to 8 prepare for something else. 9 So he was standing right beside me, I 10 believe. He picked up the handset at that point. 11 Q: All right. And at this point in 12 time, then, what is the role of Sierra and Alpha? 13 A: They're backing out with -- along 14 with the CMU so they provide cover as they return to the 15 TOC site. 16 Q: Okay. Now you indicated that you 17 were also receiving transmissions from time to time, from 18 your TRU team, over the course of the events that we've 19 just reviewed. 20 A: That's correct. 21 Q: And one of the communications that 22 you received was a request for an ambulance and that 23 initial request was made by Ken Deane? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: And can you recall, in relation to
2281 the events we've just reviewed, when this request 2 approximately would have been made, perhaps in relation 3 to the -- 4 A: After the -- 5 Q: -- gunfire? 6 A: -- sound of the gunfire. 7 Q: All right. And did he inform you as 8 to why an ambulance was required? 9 A: Not at that time, no. 10 Q: All right. Did you make inquiries of 11 him? 12 A: I asked -- I think my question was, 13 who is it needed for? Like, where does it need to go is 14 what I wanted to find out. 15 Q: Okay. And -- and why were you 16 concerned about that? 17 A: At that point, I didn't know if 18 officers had been shot or who had been shot and my 19 wanting to know where it had to go had to do with the 20 safety and ability to provide an ambulance down at the 21 scene. 22 Q: All right. And did you, on that 23 request, did you have Ted Slomer on standby to go down 24 towards the sandy parking lot? 25 A: Yes.
2291 Q: And did you have someone assigned to 2 go with him? 3 A: That would be Rick Zupancic. 4 Q: All right. And that was to provide 5 protection for him? 6 A: Protection, yes. 7 Q: And you'd indicated -- well, what 8 kind of vehicle were they going to go in? 9 A: It was in a Suburban. 10 Q: Okay, that was the makeshift -- 11 A: That was the makeshift -- 12 Q: -- ambulance? 13 A: -- ambulance, it's -- 14 Q: Why -- why a makeshift ambulance and 15 not the real thing? 16 A: Well, an ambulance won't generally go 17 into an insecure area. They won't travel into an inner 18 perimeter TRU team occurrence, because it's just not safe 19 for them to do so. 20 And that again is the purpose we have the 21 medic with us to provide medical support inside the 22 perimeter. Having said that, when he moves, he has to be 23 covered, he has to be in a secure environment. 24 Q: All right. And did you ultimately 25 deploy Ted Slomer and Officer Zupancic to the sandy
2301 parking lot area? 2 A: I did not. 3 Q: Why not? 4 A: When I received information back from 5 Ken that the person who was injured had been taken back 6 into the Park, at that point the teams are going to be 7 coming back to the TOC. I didn't think it was prudent to 8 send Rick Zupancic and Ted Slomer past the CMU and Alpha 9 and Sierra teams returning to the TOC, unescorted down 10 into a now -- an unsecure and unknown environment. 11 Q: All right. So by this point in time, 12 you were advised by Mr. Deane that -- or Officer Deane 13 that the the injured party was a First Nations person? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: And were you advised by him over the 16 course of these transmissions what -- what had given rise 17 to there being a -- an injured First Nations person? 18 A: Not right at that time, no. 19 Q: All right. And did that -- what is 20 an officer's obligation to report -- the TRU team 21 officer's obligation to report to a superior when he has 22 discharged his firearm and -- and hit a civilian or a non 23 police officer? 24 A: He would have duty to report that to 25 his supervisor.
2311 Q: All right. And what about the 2 timeliness of that order, of that duty? 3 A: Well, you would do it as soon as it 4 was prudent or safe to do so. 5 Q: All right. And did the fact that 6 Officer Deane did not report to you about this incident 7 prior to returning to the TOC cause you any concerns? 8 A: No, it did not. 9 Q: Why not? 10 A: At that point his -- his attention 11 and mine were still focussed on the actual events that 12 were happening. This was not a -- an event where a 13 shooting had taken place and everything was done. 14 This shooting had taken place, it was 15 still ongoing, it was unsecured. They had a role in 16 providing cover for the team coming back to the TOC and 17 it wouldn't surprise me at all that the wouldn't make 18 that report until he returned to the TOC. 19 Q: All right. 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 Q: All right. And you were at the TOC 24 site still when the TRU team and CMU arrived? 25 A: Yes.
2321 Q: And was -- was Inspector Carson at 2 the TOC at that time? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: All right. Did the TRU team report 5 back to you at the TOC site? 6 A: Yes, members of the Alpha team did. 7 Q: All right. And can you tell me 8 person by person which of the members reported and what 9 they told you? 10 A: Mark Beauchesne reported to me that 11 he fired rounds at the car that had come out. Billy Klym 12 reported the same to me, that he -- he also had fired 13 rounds at the car. 14 Q: And, sorry, did either of them tell 15 you how many arms -- or how many rounds they discharged? 16 A: I don't recall at that time if they 17 did or they didn't to be honest. 18 Q: And did they give you an explanation 19 as to why they -- they discharged their firearms at the 20 car? 21 A: The car to my understanding had been 22 driven into the CMU members; it was being utilized as a 23 weapon. I also understand there -- there was some 24 indication that there had been a firearm in the car 25 itself.
2331 Q: All right. Did this come from 2 Officers Beauchesne and Klym? 3 A: To be honest I can't recall if that's 4 something I learned at that point or later -- 5 Q: All right. 6 A: -- that part. 7 Q: All right. And did they tell you 8 anything else about the circumstances of the firearms? 9 A: Not at that point, no. 10 Q: All right. 11 A: And Ken Deane told me he had seen an 12 individual come out from the sandy berms behind the 13 parking lot, cross the roadway by the intersection, and 14 that the person had scanned the CMU with a long gun. 15 And seeing this he fired three (3) rounds, 16 he saw the individual stagger, at that point is when he 17 said his initial inkling was to go forward to assist; 18 that's when he called for the ambulance apparently. And 19 then he saw the individual being carried by two (2) 20 people back into the Park. 21 Q: All right. Now, did you -- did you 22 report to Inspector Carson that -- that there had been an 23 occupier who was wounded by -- by virtue of gunshot? 24 A: I reported to Inspector Carson the 25 members who had fired their rounds and I believe I
2341 reported what they had fired at. 2 Q: All right. 3 A: What or whom, pardon me. 4 Q: And did Officer Deane give you any 5 other details with respect to the circumstances which 6 caused him to discharge his firearm at that time? 7 A: No. 8 Q: You don't recall any mention of 9 muzzle flashes? 10 A: No, I do not. 11 Q: You don't recall any mention of -- of 12 the -- of a -- of the long gone -- gun being thrown into 13 the bushes? 14 A: I have a recollection of that but I 15 don't know if I learned -- didn't learn that sometime 16 later or if I learned that then. 17 Q: All right. 18 A: I'm not sure if my memory's mixed on 19 that. 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 Q: All right. And if you go to your 24 notes at Tab 22, Exhibit P-1341 at page 34, and perhaps 25 you could read the balance of page 34. You left off at:
2351 "the CMU retreats to TOC, covered by 2 Alpha and Sierra." 3 Could you just continue with the rest of 4 that page? 5 A: Sure. 6 "I request more logistical support, ERT 7 and TRU, through Inspector Carson. The 8 CMU arrives at the TOC. No apparent 9 injuries. Sierra 1 and Sierra 2 and 10 Oscar ERT set up observations to 11 protect the TOC. Alpha arrives at the 12 TOC. 13 Deane advises as to what occurred. 14 Deane, Klym, Beauchesne advise they 15 fired rounds during the confrontation. 16 Carson leaves to CP. I stayed to 17 assist with possible evac. Transport 18 Lacroix to CP." 19 Q: All right. Now, did any of the TRU 20 team members report to you back at the TOC site that -- 21 that they had seen an armed occupier in the sandy parking 22 lot? 23 A: Other than Ken Deane? 24 Q: Yes. 25 A: No.
2361 Q: Did any of the other TRU team members 2 report that they had seen muzzle flash -- flashes, during 3 the course of the -- the gunshots? 4 A: No. 5 Q: Did any of the other TRU team members 6 report that they had seen an individual, an occupier, 7 toss a -- or throw a firearm or a stick, even, into the 8 bushes? 9 A: Not that I know of, no. No, I have 10 no recollection of that. 11 Q: Okay. Did you -- did you question 12 Officer Deane any further with respect to the 13 circumstances which led him to discharge his firearm? 14 A: No, I didn't. 15 Q: All right. And why didn't you? 16 A: At that time, that's not my role. 17 The occurrence is going to be investigated, obviously. 18 My role at that time is to continue to provide tactical 19 support; again, try to maintain security of the TOC site. 20 Q: All right. But you did relay the 21 information from Officers Beauchesne, Klym and Deane to 22 Inspector Carson -- 23 A: I believe I did, yes. 24 Q: -- while he was at the TOC site? 25 A: While he was at the TOC site.
2371 Q: All right. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 Q: All right. Did you have any further 6 conversations with Officer Deane over the course of that 7 evening or September the 7th in relation to the 8 circumstances of him discharging his firearm? 9 A: No. 10 Q: Or with either of Officers Beauchesne 11 or Klym? 12 A: No. There was some discussion later 13 that evening when we heard someone had been injured. We 14 didn't know who had been -- who's firearm had caused 15 that. 16 Q: Okay. 17 A: So there was some discussion over who 18 it may be, but other than that, no. 19 Q: All right. And were you part of any 20 discussions or privy to any information involving the 21 discharge of firearms by any of the CMU members that 22 evening? 23 A: No, I wasn't. 24 Q: Was anyone else present when Officer 25 Deane told you the circumstances which led to the
2381 discharge of his firearm? 2 A: I believe Constable Klym and 3 Beauchesne were standing nearby. I'm not sure that they 4 were right there, but they were all right in the area. 5 Q: And at that time, did you take the 6 discharged firearms from those three (3) officers? 7 A: No, I didn't. 8 Q: Why not? 9 A: They were still operational at that 10 point in time. I had no weapons there to replace them 11 with. 12 Q: All right. And do you recall what 13 weapons they were that had been -- had been discharged? 14 A: Tex's was the -- an MP-5. Bill 15 Klym's was an MP-5. It was a suppressed version of an 16 MP-5, and Mark Beauchesne's was a .223, H&K 33 I believe. 17 Q: And were you required to complete a 18 duty report in relation to this incident? 19 A: Yes, ma'am. 20 Q: Do you recall, first of all, did you? 21 A: I did. 22 Q: And approximately when did you 23 complete that? 24 A: It was not too many days after the 25 incident. I don't recall exactly what day it was.
2391 Q: Were the events in question still 2 fresh in your memory when you prepared your duty report? 3 A: They were. 4 Q: All right. If you go to Tab 23, 5 please. This is the duty report of K. T. Skinner. It's 6 Inquiry Document Number 2003875. 7 First of all, can you confirm that this 8 was your duty report relating to that evening? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: I don't propose to review all of this 11 but when you made the statements in this document, were 12 they true and accurate to the best of your ability? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And do you adopt these statements as 15 being true and accurate today? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: All right. If you would go please to 18 page 4 of the Duty Report, you indicate in the second 19 paragraph as follows: 20 "I hear Deane report that First Nations 21 people are attacking the Crowd 22 Management Unit with rocks and sticks." 23 Now does that refresh your memory at all 24 with respect to a communication that Officer Deane made 25 during the course of the -- the deployment?
2401 A: It refreshes my memory to that 2 specific -- 3 Q: All right. Okay. 4 A: -- item, yes. 5 Q: Yes. And I note that Officer Deane 6 is -- is referred to as an Acting Sergeant. Was that his 7 title at the time? 8 A: Yes, it was. 9 Q: And the second last paragraph of that 10 page: 11 "Deane reports via radio that the First 12 Nations people drove a bus through the 13 Crowd Management Unit and were shooting 14 at the Crowd Management Unit." 15 Now, do you recall Acting Sergeant Deane 16 reporting during the course of these events that -- this 17 information? 18 A: I -- I don't recall it right today 19 but obviously I did then. 20 Q: Your memory was fresher back then -- 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: -- in '95? 23 A: Yes. Yes. 24 Q: Okay. And in the last paragraph: 25 "I inquired as to where to send the
2411 medic. Deane replied the injured were 2 First Nations persons and that they 3 retreated to the Park." 4 Was it your recollection that Acting 5 Sergeant Deane had indicated to you that there was more 6 than one (1) injured First Nations persons? 7 A: No, I don't think he indicated to me 8 there were more than one (1). 9 Q: Can you account for this statement 10 then? 11 A: No. 12 Q: All right. All right. Then the 13 second last paragraph of the -- page 5, at 00:45 -- sorry 14 -- yeah, hours at the Command Post: 15 "Inspector Carson and Inspector Linton 16 requested weapons fired by TRU 17 personnel be seized for investigating 18 purposes." 19 You've already indicated that you raised a 20 concern -- 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: -- because they were still 23 operational. You got replacement weapons and you -- did 24 you physically see the weapons turned over by these 25 officers to Inspector Linton?
2421 A: I -- I saw them turn them over to 2 Inspector Linton, yes. 3 Q: And these be in Officers Klym, 4 Beauchesne and Deane? 5 A: That's correct. 6 Q: All right. And to the best of your 7 knowledge, those were the weapons that were discharged? 8 A: To the best of my knowledge they 9 were, yes. 10 Q: All right. Okay. I'd like to make 11 the Duty Report the next exhibit please. 12 THE REGISTRAR: P-1352, Your Honour. 13 14 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1352: Document Number 2003875. 15 Duty Report of K.T. Skinner 16 including handwritten version 17 and Kent Skinner's 18 handwritten notebook entries 19 September 06, 1995. 20 21 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 22 Q: Now... 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25
2431 Q: I intended to make the entire Inquiry 2 Document Number 2003875 as the next exhibit. Just for 3 clarification that includes the -- your handwrit -- or 4 the handwritten report which immediately follows the 5 typed report. If that your handwriting? 6 A: That is my handwriting. 7 Q: All right. So you -- you hand wrote 8 this report and then it was typed? 9 A: That's correct. 10 Q: And that's your signature on the last 11 page of the handwritten report? 12 A: Yes, it is. 13 Q: And attached to this report are your 14 notes of September the 6th, 1995, through to the early 15 hour morning of September the 7th; is that fair? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: Thank you. Now, as I understand it 18 three (3) of the four (4) members of the Alpha team 19 discharged firearms? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: And the one (1) person who did not 22 discharge a firearm on -- on the Alpha team was Officer 23 O'Halloran? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: And was -- did you speak to him about
2441 why he didn't shoot or didn't discharge his firearm. 2 A: No, I didn't. No, I did not. 3 Q: Or about his observations with 4 respect to his partner? Who was his partner that night? 5 A: Well, the four (4) members were 6 working as a unit but he would have been close probably 7 to Ken Deane -- 8 Q: All right. 9 A: -- when they started out I would 10 assume. Their movement may have changed, that I don't 11 know. 12 Q: Did you ask him with respect to his 13 observations in relation to Officer Deane's discharge of 14 the firearm? 15 A: No, I did not. Since this was 16 obviously moving to an SIU investigation there was never 17 a debrief of this call. From the day to this day there 18 has not been a debrief of this call. 19 Q: And is it normal course to have a 20 debriefing? 21 A: Absolutely. It's an essential tool 22 for team members to learn and experience what happened on 23 the ground, to have an understanding of what happened and 24 to learn what worked, what -- what didn't work. 25 Q: And, to your knowledge, why has there
2451 never been a debriefing with respect to this incident 2 amongst the TRU team? 3 A: Well, part of the -- initially, since 4 it's an SIU investigation we're mandated not to discuss 5 the occurrence amongst each other. And then we've had 6 criminal litigation after that, again reason not discuss 7 it amongst each other. 8 And the litigation has progressed from the 9 criminal trial through the appeals through the civil 10 litigation and there has still as I say to this day not 11 been a formal debrief of the occurrence. 12 Q: And I guess the civil lawsuit ended 13 the day this Inquiry was called or promised to be called? 14 A: Correct. That's -- this is the only 15 occurrence in my sixteen (16) years of tactical 16 experience that that is the case. 17 Q: That there hasn't been a debriefing-- 18 A: Correct. 19 Q: -- of an incident like this? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: And had you ever been part of an 22 incident whereby a member of your TRU team had to 23 discharge a firearm? 24 A: As a team leader this is the only 25 occurrence I've been at where lethal force was employed.
2461 I had previous experience when I was a member of TRU 2 being on an occurrence where one (1) of the members 3 discharged his firearm. 4 Q: All right. Do you feel as a member 5 of the TRU team that -- that you've been disadvantaged in 6 any way by not having the ability to participate in the 7 debriefing? 8 A: I think the learning experiences have 9 been missed from that, yes. 10 Q: All right. If we can return next -- 11 sorry. If we can turn next to your notes please, at Tab 12 22. And I'm now moving -- sorry, let's go to Tab 24. 13 This is Inquiry Document Number 2005600. 14 These appear to be your notes relating to 15 the Ipperwash matter from September 7 to 20, 1995; is 16 that correct? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: And were those notes made 19 contemporaneously with the events reported in them? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: And so by 00:45 hundred hours you -- 22 you were making entries into your notebook? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: But -- 25 A: I was back at the Command Post at
2471 that time. 2 Q: All right. But the prior entry -- 3 entries relating to the deployment you did not make until 4 the -- 5 A: Well, I -- 6 Q: -- next afternoon? 7 A: No, I'm sorry. Let's make that 8 straight. I was aware of time frames from there on -- 9 Q: Okay. 10 A: -- but no, I -- I didn't make my 11 notes at all for any of the 6th from the time we left the 12 Command Post shortly after 9:00 p.m. until the next day. 13 Q: Now, are you including the -- the 14 entries for -- the September the 7th 00:45 to 8:00 in the 15 morning? 16 A: September the 7th? 17 Q: Yes, I want to know when you made 18 those entries. 19 20 (BRIEF PAUSE) 21 22 A: Are you talking about -- I'm sorry, 23 the 14:00 hours, from there on? 24 Q: No. The first page of your September 25 7, 1995 notes at page 35 of your notebook.
2481 A: Yes. 2 Q: Top entry is 00:45 through to 08:00. 3 I want to know when you made those notes. 4 A: 00:45. I'm sorry, I'm having a hard 5 time seeing where 00:45 is on there, ma'am. I see 14:00 6 under the 7th of September, 14:00 then 18:30, 20:30. 7 Q: You're not seeing the dates? Okay, 8 let me take you -- 9 A: I'm sorry. 10 Q: These are your -- above that -- 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: You see 00:45? 13 A: Yes. Those also from the -- are 14 notes about the 6th. They were not made until the 7th. 15 16 (BRIEF PAUSE) 17 18 Q: All right. Let's just back up. When 19 I read your note, it indicates at 00:45, that's quarter - 20 - that's forty-five (45) minutes past midnight -- 21 A: Hmm hmm. 22 Q: -- on September the 7th: 23 "Carson and Linton required weapons 24 seized. I expressed concerns over 25 timing as members still operational."
2491 A: Right. 2 Q: Did you make that -- sorry, did that 3 event occur at approximately quarter to 1:00 in the 4 morning on September the 7th? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Okay. But these notes were not 7 physically made until later in the day of September the 8 7th? 9 A: That's correct. 10 Q: Okay, got it. Thank you. 11 A: I'm sorry for -- 12 Q: No, no, not at all. 13 A: -- confusing you. 14 Q: No, no, not at all. I just want to 15 me -- it's probably me. I just want to make sure that 16 I'm clear. 17 All right. And then your next entry: 18 "Travel with Linton to Pinery to get 19 replacement weapons." 20 And perhaps you could just read the 21 balance of the -- the entries up to 8:00 in the morning, 22 please. 23 A: "Travelled with Linton to Pinery to 24 get replacement weapons. 01:30 standby 25 while Deane, Beauchesne, and Klym give
2501 weapons to Inspector Linton. 2 02:30, back at Forest. 04:30, Barrie 3 TRU arrives and I brief them, then 4 transport them to TOC. 5 06:30 away to the Pinery and 08:00 off- 6 duty." 7 Q: All right. I'd like to make these 8 notes, September 7 through 20, 1995, the next exhibit. 9 THE REGISTRAR: P-1353, Your Honour. 10 11 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1353: Document Number 2005600. 12 Handwritten notebook entries 13 of Kent Skinner, September 14 07, 1995. 15 16 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 17 Q: How long did you stay at the TOC that 18 night, or more appropriately, when did you leave? 19 A: When I left the TOC, prior to being 20 requested to go back to the Command Post, or -- 21 Q: I just want to -- well, when did you 22 return to the Command Post? 23 A: When I was requested to come back by 24 -- I assume the request came through Inspector Linton, 25 Inspector Carson.
2511 Q: Approximately what time? 2 A: Well, I returned back to the Command 3 Post around 00:45, so approximately 12:30. 4 Q: Okay, fair enough. And who was left 5 behind at the TOC to secure it? 6 A: The Sierra teams and the Alpha team 7 are still down at the TOC. 8 Q: All right. And after leaving the 9 TOC, did you learn anything else about what had 10 transpired at the sandy parking lot that night? 11 A: No. 12 Q: All right. When did you first learn 13 that there had been a fatality? 14 A: I learned that, that night, yes. 15 Q: All right. Do you recall, was it 16 after midnight that you learned of it? 17 A: It was while I was still at the TOC. 18 Q: While you were still at the TOC? 19 A: Yeah, I believe so. 20 Q: Okay. And what was your reaction to 21 that information? 22 A: That the goal of going out to any TRU 23 occurrence is to protect and preserve life. As I say, 24 this is the first time lethal force had been applied in 25 any occurrence I'd been to.
2521 It was sad. It goes against the objective 2 of a TRU team and it -- it's not what we wanted to have 3 happen that night. 4 Q: Now, I understand that the tape 5 recording device which was to have recorded the TRU 6 communications that night did not function. 7 A: That's correct. 8 Q: And it was Officer Zupancic who was 9 responsible for operating that device? 10 11 (BRIEF PAUSE) 12 13 A: Yes, he was. 14 Q: Okay. And when did you first learn 15 that it had not functioned? 16 A: I learned that at approximately 17 twenty (20) minutes after the teams returned to the TOC. 18 Q: And did you make any inquiries of 19 Officer Zupancic as to what had happened? 20 A: We had a discussion over why it 21 hadn't worked, yes. 22 Q: And what was his explanation as he 23 provided it to you that night? 24 A: Well there were -- there's two (2) 25 buttons on the recording device, play and record.
2531 Unfortunately he pushed just the record button and not 2 the play button as well. So the unit was never 3 functioning. 4 Q: Was there -- did he advise you that 5 there had been an event which precipitated the -- this 6 having to push the record button and the play button? 7 A: Yes. Prior to my getting down to 8 TOC, the truck had stalled I guess. When it stalled all 9 the electronic shut down again then once they got the 10 truck started again and fired the logger recorder up he 11 failed to push both buttons. 12 Q: Now given that -- once you learned 13 that you didn't have the benefit of the tape recording, 14 why didn't you take -- make your notes at that time 15 reflecting the events of the incident? 16 A: Well at that point my focus was still 17 on the events that were occurring and I -- my attention 18 did not turn to my notes at that time. 19 Q: And did you examine the tape yourself 20 to verify that it hadn't been operating? 21 A: No, I did not. 22 Q: Do you know what happened to the tape 23 that night? 24 A: I believe Constable Zupancic took 25 control of the tape.
2541 Q: Did you advise Inspector Carson that 2 -- that there had been an error with respect to the tape? 3 A: I did. 4 Q: And do you have any knowledge as to 5 whether the tape was then subsequently examined by 6 anyone? 7 A: I believe it was listened to by 8 Constable Zupancic and there was nothing on the tape. 9 Q: He told you that? 10 A: That's my recollection, yes. 11 Q: And do you recall how long after the 12 event he listened to the tape and told you that? 13 A: No, I'm afraid I don't, sorry. 14 Q: Okay. Thank you. I wonder if we 15 might take the afternoon break at this time? 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes we'll 17 take our break now. 18 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 19 for fifteen (15) minutes. 20 21 --- Upon recessing at 2:32 p.m. 22 --- Upon resuming at 2:49 p.m. 23 24 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 25 resumed. Please be seated.
2551 2 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 3 Q: Now, if I provided you with a diagram 4 of the sandy parking lot area, would you be able to 5 indicate on that diagram the -- the relative location of 6 the Alpha -- the four (4) member Alpha team and the two 7 (2) Sierra teams at the time of the engagement with the 8 occupiers? 9 A: No, I wouldn't. 10 Q: Why not? 11 A: As I said there's never been a 12 debrief of the occurrence. Normal course of events at a 13 TRU team event, I -- I would learn those things. 14 Q: Hmm hmm. 15 A: In this case since it never -- never 16 really gone into a position that they would report to me 17 over the radio, I'm 'X' number of metres from this 18 parking lot or whatever, I never received that 19 information so. 20 Q: All right. And you indicated earlier 21 that in terms of the planned original positions of the 22 Sierra teams, what you did was provided them with the 23 objective and it would be up to them to then find the 24 appropriate location to allow them to carry out that 25 objective.
2561 A: That's correct. 2 Q: All right. And just so I understand 3 your evidence, your evidence that with respect to the 4 deployment initially the Sierra teams were deployed with 5 the view to having a look at the sandy parking lot and 6 kiosk to then provide information back to Inspector 7 Carson so he could determine the level of risk and 8 whether or not there should be a further deployment? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: When that was incapable of happening 11 because in part of the tactical error in sending the 12 Sierra teams down in a white van the CMU and Alpha were 13 then deployed initially to be a distraction to allow 14 Sierra to hopefully move into their positions? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: And at your duty report Tab 30 17 Inquiry Document 1002829 and have I neglected to -- 18 A: Oh, I'm sorry. 19 Q: -- make that an exhibit? 20 A: Tab 30? 21 THE REGISTRAR: Tab 30 hasn't been made 22 an exhibit. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, it's 24 not an exhibit. 25 MS. SUSAN VELLA: 29. Excuse me, Tab 29.
2571 THE REGISTRAR: It hasn't either. 2 MS. SUSAN VELLA: All right. I'd ask for 3 it to be made the next exhibit please? 4 THE REGISTRAR: It is an exhibit. 5 MS. SUSAN VELLA: No, I don't think it is 6 either. I didn't make a note. 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 11 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Oh, right. It's just 12 pointed out to me that it's in two (2) places. At Tab 23 13 we have made it an exhibit, it's Exhibit 1352. Thank 14 you. So let's go to Tab -- I don't know why it was 15 repeated -- Tab 23. 16 THE REGISTRAR: It's under two (2) 17 different document numbers, perhaps that's why. 18 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Yes, thank you. Let me 19 just check something now. 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Sorry, just give me a 24 second. Yes. 25
2581 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 2 Q: At page 2 of that report the bottom 3 paragraph: 4 "We plan to move the Crowd Management 5 Unit covered by a four (4) man IAP team 6 [bracket](TRU) on East Parkway Drive 7 towards Army Camp Road. It was felt 8 this would divert attention away from 9 the Sierra teams and would allow -- and 10 allow them to move into position." 11 So this reflects your recollection -- 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: -- that they would be a distraction 14 and then at some point during the course of the 15 deployment for reasons that you're not clear about the -- 16 this Crowd Management Unit decided to engage as opposed 17 to being a distraction? 18 A: That's correct. 19 Q: Okay. Thank you. 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 Q: Also go to Tab 22 please? 24 A: 22? 25 Q: These are your notes, Exhibit P-341
2591 and at page 32 about two-thirds down: 2 "Determine to move CMU into position 3 onto roadway about four hundred (400) 4 metres from scene. Supported by Alpha. 5 Perhaps CMU. A presence [sorry] CMU's 6 presence will distract Natives from 7 Sierra's enabling them to move into 8 position for eye." 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: And this is a -- a note you made the 11 following day? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: Okay. Thank you. All right. Now, 14 just to fill in the rest of your shift over September 6th 15 and into the early morning hours of September the 7th I 16 wonder if you would go to Tab 25. 17 This is a radio communication at 1:05 18 a.m. September 7, 1995, and this appears to be a 19 conversation that you have with the Chatham 20 Communications Centre? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: Is that an accurate transcription of 23 your conversation? 24 A: Yup. 25 Q: I'd like to make that the next
2601 exhibit please? 2 THE REGISTRAR: P-1354, Your Honour. 3 4 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1354: Transcript of Region 21, Kent 5 Skinner/Chatham 6 Communications Centre, 7 September 07, 1995, 01:05 hrs 8 Chatham Communications 9 Centre, Logger tape number 10 0147, Track 2, Disc 1 of 3. 11 12 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 13 Q: And then over at Tab 27 -- oh, 26, 14 excuse me, communication at 1:28 a.m. between yourself 15 and Rob Graham relaying -- where -- where Mr. -- Officer 16 Graham is relaying a message from Lacroix indicating: 17 "That he's got that Norm Peel's going 18 to be at your barracks tomorrow at 19 eight o'clock/8:30." 20 And was -- did Mr. Peel arrive at the 21 Pinery barracks that -- 22 A: No. 23 Q: -- morning? No. 24 The plan said was to go to the hotel in 25 Grand Bend in the afternoon?
2611 A: That's correct. 2 Q: Okay. 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: I'd like to make this the next 5 exhibit. 6 THE REGISTRAR: P-1355, Your Honour. 7 8 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1355: Transcript of 22, Kent 9 Skinner/Rob Graham, September 10 07, 1995, 01:28 hrs. Mobile 11 Unit Logger tape number 4, 12 Track 2, disc 2 of 3. 13 14 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 15 Q: And if we go next to tab 27, please. 16 This is a further communication, it's dated 3:21 a.m. 17 September 7th. 18 It appears to be -- involve yourself and 19 Rick Zupancic and Rose Peterman being at the Command 20 Post. And you're asking Rick Zupancic to get your black 21 binder and to put it in an -- and that it would be put 22 into a soft spot. 23 What's the black binder that's being 24 referred to there? 25 A: At that time I had a black -- a small
2621 black binder that had all my contact numbers, my schedule 2 et cetera. Today's equivalent would be a Blackberry. 3 Q: Okay. And that had been left at the 4 TOC? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And you want that secured? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: Okay, make that the next exhibit, 9 please. 10 THE REGISTRAR: P-1356, Your Honour. 11 12 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1356: Transcript of Region 23, Kent 13 Skinner/Rick Zupancic/Rose 14 Peterman, September 07, 15 1995.03:21 hrs, Mobile 16 Command Unit, Logger tape 17 number 4, Track 1, Disc 2 of 18 3. 19 20 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 21 Q: And at Tab 28, a radio communication 22 of 4:49 a.m., September 7th. Very, very brief 23 communication. 24 Did you -- do you recognize that? 25 A: Yes.
2631 Q: And it's simply indicating that 2 you're advising that you'll be leaving shortly with your 3 relief. 4 You're referring to the Barrie TRU team 5 coming in? 6 A: Yeah, leaving Forest Command Post 7 with the Barrie TRU team. 8 Q: Okay. Make that the next exhibit, 9 please. 10 THE REGISTRAR: P-1357, Your Honour. 11 12 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1357: Transcript of Region 24, Kent 13 Skinner/Rich Zupancic, 14 September 07, 1995, 04:49 15 hrs, Chatham Communications 16 Unit, Logger tape number 17 0147, Track 12 , Disc 12 of 18 20. 19 20 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 21 Q: All right. And your shift ended at 22 8:00 in the morning. 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And was there any further discussion 25 over the course of those hours with respect to the need
2641 or feasibility of evacuating the cottagers in light of 2 the -- the incident? 3 A: There was a discussion about 4 evacuation. I think I suggested it might be prudent to 5 let the fresh team do the evacuations. 6 Q: So the fresh -- the Barrie TRU team? 7 A: I'm sorry, yes. The Barrie team. 8 Q: All right. And so your team played 9 no role in that respect? 10 A: True. 11 Q: Okay. 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: Thank you. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 Q: All right. Now, if you go back to 18 Tab 24, your notes from September 7th to the 20th, 19 Exhibit P-1353, can you advise me what your main 20 activities were on September the 7th, 1995? 21 It appears that you went on duty at 14:00 22 hours? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And what did you do for the balance 25 of the afternoon?
2651 A: We met at the hotel and everybody had 2 a discussion with Norm Peel, on an individual basis. I 3 went to the Command Post at 18:30 hours where I was again 4 on duty as tactical team leader and worked with Inspector 5 Thompson at that point, as this Incident Commander. 6 Q: All right. What was your circum -- 7 your understanding with respect to the appearance of 8 Inspector Thompson as this Incident Commander? 9 A: I'm sorry? 10 Q: Why did that occur? 11 A: Relief. 12 Q: Relief. 13 A: Essentially. 14 Q: Okay. 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: For Inspector Carson? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: All right. And when you say, "We all 19 met at Norm Peel's office" and then had one on one 20 meetings, who is "we all"? 21 A: It was at the hotel we met. It was 22 the team members. 23 Q: The TRU team members? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: Okay. Any other -- were the Crowd
2661 Management Unit members there as well? 2 A: Not that I recall. 3 Q: All right. All right, and what were 4 the -- what were the -- what was your main role at 5 Ipperwash from September the 8th to the 20th? 6 A: Basically we were there in support of 7 the checkpoints at that point. 8 Q: And when you say in support of the 9 checkpoints, what kind of support were you providing? 10 A: Again, in case they ran into an armed 11 confrontation or if they needed support at any of the 12 checkpoints, we would respond to assist them there. 13 Q: And were you, in fact, was your team 14 deployed at any point between the 8th and the 20th? 15 A: No. 16 Q: All right. 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 Q: Now, were you interviewed by the 21 Special Investigations Unit? 22 A: I was. 23 Q: And would you go to then Tab 36, 24 please. And there appears to be a transcription of a 25 interview that was held on June 25th, 1996 conducted by
2671 Wayne Allen, Investigator with the Special Investigations 2 Unit. 3 Do you recall attending at this interview? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And at the time, did you provide 6 truthful and accurate answers to best of your 7 recollection as at the date of the interview? 8 A: I did. 9 Q: And do you adopt these answers as 10 correct today? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: I'd like to make this the next 13 exhibit please. 14 THE REGISTRAR: P-1358, Your Honour. 15 16 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1358: Document Number 1005752. 17 Anticipated Evidence of Sgt. 18 Kent Skinner, June 25, 1996. 19 20 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 21 Q: I also understand that you provided 22 testimony at the trial -- criminal trial of R versus 23 Deane on April the 10th, 1997? 24 A: Yes, I did. 25 Q: And if you would look then at Tab 39.
2681 This is Inquiry Document Number 1005297. 2 And do you recognize this as the -- 3 starting on page 172 as your -- your testimony given at 4 that trial? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And at the time did you give truthful 7 and accurate answers to the best of your recollection? 8 A: I did. 9 Q: And do you adopt those answers today? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: I'd like to make that the next 12 exhibit please. 13 THE REGISTRAR: P-1359, Your Honour. 14 15 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1359: Document Number 1005297. R. 16 v. Deane: Kent Skinner 17 Examination- -In-Chief; 18 Cross-examination; 19 Reexamination, April 1, 1997. 20 21 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 22 Q: I further understand that you were 23 interviewed on behalf of the Office of the Chief Coroner? 24 A: Yes, I was. 25 Q: And if you look at Tab 43 and there
2691 is a transcript of the interview conducted on March 10th, 2 2003 by Detective Mark Armstrong. 3 A: It's Tab 42 in my binder. I don't 4 have a 43. 5 Q: Okay. It's Inquiry Document 5000054. 6 A: That's at my Tab 42. 7 Q: Okay, thank you. And again did you 8 answer those questions accurately and truthfully to the 9 best of your recollection as at March the 10th, 2003? 10 A: I did. 11 Q: And do you adopt those answers as 12 correct today? 13 A: I do. 14 Q: I'd like to make that the next 15 exhibit please. 16 THE REGISTRAR: P-1360, Your Honour. 17 18 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1360: Document Number 5000054. 19 Interview of Kent Skinner by 20 Det. Armstrong (London P.D. 21 for Coroner's Investigation) 22 March 10, 2003. 23 24 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 25 Q: Now, were you present at any
2701 conversation or briefing at the Command Post at which the 2 local MPP Marcel Beaubien was present? 3 A: No. 4 Q: All right. Were you apprised of Mr. 5 Beaubien's attendance at the Command Post at any time 6 during the September 4th to 6th? 7 A: I -- I have some recollection that 8 there was something but I -- I don't have any specific 9 recall as to somebody telling me that. 10 Q: All right. Do you recall whether you 11 were apprised of his views as expressed at the Command 12 Post? 13 A: No. 14 Q: Or his level of contact with the 15 Premier or the Premier's office? 16 A: No. 17 Q: All right. Would information to the 18 affect that a local MPP had the ear of the Premier have 19 impacted your decisions as TRU team leader? 20 A: It would not have. 21 Q: Why not? 22 A: My role as a police officer is not 23 dependent upon a politician's viewpoint. My role is to 24 as I said, provide options to the Incident Commander and 25 follow his direction.
2711 Q: All right. Now you were at -- were 2 you situated at the Pinery Park right through to 3 September the 20th, 1995? 4 A: I'd have to go back and go through 5 those notes individually to see if I returned home at any 6 time during that. 7 Q: Okay well were you resident there 8 from time to time during -- after September the 6th? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: Okay. And during the course of your 11 stay at the Pinery Park, did you ever see any -- any mugs 12 or T-shirts that were produced after the incident in the 13 -- in the sandy parking lot? 14 A: I saw mugs and t-shirts, yes. 15 Q: And did you buy any? 16 A: No. 17 Q: When you saw them, what was your 18 reaction to them? 19 A: I -- I didn't really have any 20 reaction to them. 21 Q: All right. Did you form any opinion 22 with respect to the appropriateness of the designs and 23 comments on the mugs and T-shirts? 24 A: I did not. 25 Q: Did you express any approval or
2721 disapproval to any of your colleagues at the Pinery? 2 A: No. 3 Q: And why didn't you? 4 A: I -- I didn't reflect it on it being 5 -- them being bad, good, or indifferent so... 6 Q: All right. Did you see at any time 7 during you stay at the Pinery Park a beer can with a hole 8 and a feather stuck into -- sand into it and yellow OPP 9 tape wrapped around it? 10 A: No. 11 Q: Did you hear about that? 12 A: Sometime later I heard about it. 13 Q: All right. Did you see any OPP 14 cruiser with a bull's eye and arrow applied or affixed to 15 the side door? 16 A: No. 17 Q: Did you see any cartoons which made 18 reference to First Nation's people posted at the Pinery? 19 A: No, I did not. 20 Q: Were you involved at all in the 21 disciplinary investigation which inquired into these -- 22 these alleged occurrences? 23 A: I was interviewed by Dennis Atkins. 24 Q: Okay. And do you recall what you -- 25 you were interviewed about?
2731 A: About the mugs and T-shirts; that's 2 about all I recall. 3 Q: Perhaps you would look at Exhibit P- 4 1051. This is document 17. This is the -- the Atkin 5 report. I think you have it in -- I hope the front of 6 your -- the very front of your book as a loose leaf? 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 A: Number 17 at the top of the page? 11 Q: Yes, it's dated January 8, 1996? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And if you go to page 8 and under 14 Offensive Items on Blackboard? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And in the second paragraph it reads: 17 "Investigation..." 18 Well, I should maybe start with the first 19 paragraph. 20 "During interview Cloud, he stated 21 [sorry] During interviewing Cloud he 22 stated that one (1) day he entered the 23 maintenance shed and observed chalk 24 drawings on the blackboard. There was 25 weight equipment in there for the use
2741 of the TRU -- of TRU team personnel. 2 When he entered there was no one in the 3 maintenance shed. He observed the 4 arrows and bombs on the board and 5 simply erased them. Mr. Cloud did not 6 supply me with a date or time that the 7 event had occurred. 8 Investigation revealed that the weights 9 were the property of the Number 2 10 District TRU team. 11 I interviewed Sergeant Skinner, London 12 TRU and he was not aware of comments on 13 the chalk board. He in turn 14 interviewed his personnel. No one saw 15 or has knowledge of the incident. The 16 equipment was in place for the duration 17 of the event and was accessible to all 18 personnel." 19 Does that refresh your memory about the 20 scope of your participation? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: And was it with respect to these 23 chalk drawings on the chalk board? 24 A: Yes, obviously, I was asked about 25 that.
2751 Q: And did you, in fact, interview each 2 member of your team? 3 A: I don't have a recollection of that 4 but obviously I must have -- 5 Q: All right. 6 A: -- made inquiries on Dennis' behalf. 7 Q: All right. And did anyone report to 8 you that they had witnessed these drawings? 9 A: No. 10 Q: And did you also -- were you also 11 interviewed with respect to the mugs and T-shirts? 12 A: I believe so. 13 Q: And what were you asked about that? 14 A: I think essentially the same as 15 you've asked me -- 16 Q: Okay. 17 A: -- did I see them? Did I buy them? 18 Q: All right. And your view of the 19 appropriateness of them? 20 A: I don't know that that was one (1) of 21 the questions. 22 Q: Okay. Thank you. Inspector Skinner, 23 did the... 24 25 (BRIEF PAUSE)
2761 2 Q: Now, Inspector, do you have -- sorry, 3 what impact, if any, did the events of the evening of 4 September the 6th have on you? 5 A: On me personally? Well, as I said, 6 the -- it's the only occurrence in sixteen (16) years as 7 a TRU member that lethal force was used. 8 When -- it's the only occurrence as a TRU 9 member that was not settled at the end of the shift. We 10 left the ground down there. It was uncontained, 11 insecure. The potential risk to all members of the 12 community at that point was extremely high. 13 After hearing the reports over the radio, 14 hearing the confrontation, hearing the fact of a vehicle 15 being driven through the Crowd Management Unit and used 16 as a weapon, it -- I was grateful at the time that nobody 17 was killed, that no officers were killed. 18 But at the same time, someone did lose 19 their life that night. As I said, that goes against the 20 objectives of a tactical unit. 21 Any police officer his role is to protect 22 and preserve life; that includes not only the police 23 officers, not only members of the community, but it 24 includes the people who are involved in the occurrence. 25 We've never -- as I said, we've never
2771 debriefed this call. 2 There's never been, in that way, a 3 resolution, an understanding of what happened. I know 4 the professional approach of the members I worked with. 5 I know Ken Deane as well was dedicated to a safe 6 resolution to these occurrences. 7 And I know that the death would have 8 impacted him tremendously. None of us would willingly 9 take on the role of ending a life. 10 It's frustrating that this happened. In 11 my view, this -- this occurrence is something that should 12 have been settled before it ever got to where it was. 13 This is a dispute that is essentially a 14 civil process that should have been settled by the 15 Federal Government. It wasn't and eventually led to 16 frustration on peoples' parts and it eventually put the 17 police into the position to have to preserve the peace. 18 I think it's a shame that that happened. 19 I hope something like this never happens again. 20 It's been ten (10) years or more and it 21 still has impact. 22 Q: Thank you, Inspector. 23 MS. SUSAN VELLA: That concludes my 24 examination-in-chief and at this time perhaps we could 25 canvass the parties with respect to anticipated cross-
2781 examination? 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Does anybody 3 have any questions for this Witness? 4 Ms. Tuck-Jackson...? 5 MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: 30 thirty (30) 6 to forty-five (45) minutes, but it could be less. 7 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thirty (30) to forty- 8 five (45) minutes. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Ms. 10 Perschy...? 11 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: Five (5) to ten (10) 12 minutes, probably less. 13 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Five (5) to ten (10) 14 minutes. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 16 Alexander...? 17 MR. BASIL ALEXANDER: Mr. Commissioner, I 18 will be switching places with Mr. Falconer for this 19 Witness. I will reserve fifteen (15) to thirty (30) 20 minutes, although I expect to be less. 21 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Fifteen (15) to thirty 22 (30) minutes for the Dudley George Estate and Family 23 Group. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 25 Rosenthal...?
2791 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: One (1) to two (2) 2 hours, perhaps less. 3 MS. SUSAN VELLA: One (1) to two (2) 4 hours for the Aazhoodena and George Family Group. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 6 Scullion...? 7 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: Forty-five (45) 8 minutes. 9 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Forty-five (45) minutes 10 for the residents of Aazhoodena. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 12 George...? 13 MR. JONATHON GEORGE: Fifteen (15) 14 minutes. 15 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Fifteen (15) minutes 16 for Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point First Nation. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 18 Falconer...? 19 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Four (4) to four 20 and a half (4 1/2) hours. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm sorry? 22 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Four (4) to four 23 and a half (4 1/2) hours. 24 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Four (4) to four and a 25 half (4 1/2) hours for Aboriginal Legal Services.
2801 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, I'm 2 hoping that we'll finish with this Witness by the end of 3 tomorrow. I think we should be able to. 4 MS. SUSAN VELLA: And I take it that Ms. 5 Jones will reserve -- 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I 7 assume -- 8 MS. SUSAN VELLA: -- if needed. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- that 10 we'll hear that subsequently. 11 I suppose we should just get right into 12 it, if we're going to make sure that we finish by the end 13 of tomorrow. 14 You got an idea of what to expect? 15 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Ms. Tuck- 17 Jackson...? 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: Good afternoon, 22 Mr. Commissioner. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 24 afternoon. 25
2811 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: 2 Q: And good afternoon, Inspector 3 Skinner. 4 A: Good afternoon. 5 Q: As you know, my name is Andrea Tuck- 6 Jackson and I'm going to ask you some questions on behalf 7 of the OPP. 8 You've told us that you were aware as an 9 element of Project Maple that there was going to be an 10 injunction applied for, correct? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And I trust, sir, -- sorry I should 13 add one (1) point. 14 You've also told us that on the evening of 15 September the 6th in particular you were aware that that 16 process was still ongoing even though you and your team 17 didn't play a specific role in it, you were aware that 18 the process was still ongoing? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: All right. Fair to say then, sir, 21 that when you left the Forest Detachment at 19:30 -- 22 A: Hmm hmm. 23 Q: -- on the evening of September the 24 6th, you had every expectation that that night the 25 officers were going to continue to contain the situation
2821 at the Park, maintain peace and allow the court process 2 that appeared to be unfolding to continue to unfold? 3 A: Yes. That's correct. 4 Q: All right. Towards the end of your 5 examination-in-chief, My Friend, Ms. Vella asked you some 6 questions about what if any impact views of certain 7 politicians may have had on the exercise of your 8 discretion as a police officer. 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: I'm going to ask you a similar type 11 of question in respect of your observations of John 12 Carson -- 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: -- and Mark Wright during the period 15 of September the 5th to the early morning hours of the 16 7th. And it's quite from your evidence, sir, that 17 between the 5th and the 7th you had a great deal of time 18 to spend in the company of both those individuals. 19 Would that be fair? 20 A: I was around the Command Post and so 21 were they so, yes. 22 Q: And so were they. And I trust, sir, 23 that there was nothing from the words or the actions of 24 then Inspector John Carson that suggested to you that his 25 decisions as a police officer were in any way being
2831 influenced by the views of politicians. 2 Is that fair? 3 A: That's fair. Absolutely there was 4 none. 5 Q: Absolutely not. Thank you. And -- 6 and indeed you've made it clear that particularly on the 7 night of September the 6th when the ERT is being 8 deployed, you understood that it was his direction to 9 those officers that they were not to go into the Park. 10 A: That was repeated numerous times. It 11 was very clear. 12 Q: And would it be fair to say that it 13 was an understanding as well on your part in relation to 14 your team of TRU officers that they too were not to go 15 into that Park? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: With respect to Mark Wright, again as 18 you've already observed, you were in the Command Post as 19 was he. 20 Again, from his words and actions would it 21 be fair for us to conclude that from what you could 22 observe, his decisions as a police officer were in no way 23 influenced by political views? 24 A: I don't believe they were. 25 Q: Thank you. You were asked some
2841 questions in relation to a telephone call between 2 yourself and Ken Deane on the morning of September the 3 6th. 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And there was a reference in that 6 telephone call to Mark Wright. 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And you've explained the context of 9 it and I -- I don't want to go into anymore of the 10 specifics in that regard. 11 Fair to say you worked with Mark Wright 12 apart from the Ipperwash incident; is that correct? 13 A: I don't recall any specific events I 14 worked with Mark prior to this. 15 Q: All right. 16 A: There may have been some but I -- I 17 don't have any clear in my recollection. 18 Q: The two (2) of you were together I 19 believe at the incident, the Daryl George incident, in 20 February of 1995? 21 A: Yes, that's correct. Yes, I'm sorry, 22 yes. He was at that occurrence, yes. 23 Q: All right. Fair to say, sir, then 24 with your experience that you've had working together 25 with Mark Wright that you observed him to be quite
2851 passionate in his work? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: Energetic in his work? 4 A: He's an outspoken individual. 5 Q: He's an outspoken individual, yes. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Mr. 7 Falconer...? 8 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I was going to make 9 an objection and I'm withdrawing. I just assume that we 10 can cross-examine the same way that My Friend's 11 examining. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: He's 13 outspoken? Yes, what was the last thing you said, I 14 missed it? He was outspoken? 15 MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: We were 16 speaking of being passionate, being energetic. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: All right. 18 Yeah. All right. 19 20 CONTINUED BY MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: 21 Q: That he was prepared to express his 22 views? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: Would it also be fair to say, sir, 25 that you always found him to be professional in the
2861 conduct of his duties? 2 A: I would say Mark was a professional; 3 that his -- his actions -- 4 Q: Yes. 5 A: -- were consistent with the objective 6 of the occurrence. 7 Q: And from your experience working with 8 him it would be fair to say that he would do nothing to 9 undermine the authority of his superior officers? 10 A: That is absolutely true. 11 Q: Thank you. Now, you were asked a 12 series of questions about the reason underlying the 13 deployment of the Crowd Management Unit on the evening of 14 September the 6th so I want to ask you a series of 15 questions about that just so that I'm perfectly clear. I 16 suspect that we're on the same page but I just want to 17 make sure that we -- we are indeed on the same page. 18 And as you have told us -- 19 OBJ MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I'm sorry, Mr. 20 Commissioner, that question I do object to. One (1) of 21 the concerns and it's -- Ms. Tuck-Jackson has a very 22 admirable, very impressive style and -- but letting a 23 witness know that her and him or I don't know him and the 24 OPP are on the same page, I don't think that's a proper-- 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It --
2871 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- I have a problem 2 with that because, first of all, I don't even know what 3 it means but maybe this officer does but I -- 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: All right. 5 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- it just seems 6 you should ask your question, you shouldn't be talking 7 about -- 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's good 9 advice, Mr. Falconer, I'll take it. 10 You don't need to introduce the question 11 with that prelude. 12 MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: It wasn't 13 intended in any way as a cue, Mr. Commissioner. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, I 15 understand but it's not necessary either. 16 17 CONTINUED BY MS. TUCK-JACKSON: 18 Q: As I understand it TRU was there that 19 night to support the Crowd Management Unit, fair enough? 20 A: That was one (1) of our roles. 21 Q: Yes. And they were there to support 22 the Crowd Management Unit (1) by going forward, 23 positioning themselves in such a way that they could 24 gather information that would be passed back to the 25 Incident Commander and that may very well serve as a
2881 foundation of a decision to actually engage and deploy 2 the Crowd Management Unit; is that fair? 3 A: That's true I -- I think I -- I may 4 not term that the -- the role that we had to go forward 5 as a -- forward observation was necessarily in support of 6 the CMU; that was a separate role for the Incident 7 Commander to gather intelligence. 8 Q: That -- that's a very good point. 9 Thank you. I'm sorry. That initial stage, you're quite 10 right was a supportive role more of the Incident 11 Commander than of the Crowd Management Unit? 12 A: That's correct, yes. 13 Q: That's fair. All right. I take your 14 point. 15 Once the Crowd Management Unit however has 16 been deployed you'd agree that the Sierra teams who 17 remain in the field, they in part continue to serve a 18 role not just to inform the Incident Commander but also 19 to provide intelligence back to assist the Crowd 20 Management Unit? 21 A: Certainly -- 22 Q: Right. 23 A: -- the information they bring back 24 would be of value for them. 25 Q: Okay. And the other supportive role
2891 that they fulfilled was if necessary to provide cover? 2 A: Correct. 3 Q: All right. And it's not as if the 4 Crowd Management Unit was serving any supportive role of 5 the TRU team? 6 A: No, they were not. 7 Q: No, that wouldn't make sense would 8 it? 9 A: No. 10 Q: No. Okay. Now, I want to take you 11 to your notes, Tab 22. They've been marked as Exhibit P- 12 1341 in these proceedings. 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 Q: And I'm interested in page 32 of your 17 notes. 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 Q: And as you've been very fair and 22 candid, you indicated that you wrote these notes more 23 than twelve (12) hours after the events that are captured 24 in the notes; is that fair? 25 A: Yes.
2901 Q: Okay. And if we stop -- start, 2 excuse me, around the top third of the page, you write: 3 "Plan to have S-1 and S-2 to deploy to 4 provide our eyes on scene." 5 The next entry in the sequence is that you 6 receive information or feedback from your Sierra teams 7 that they're having difficulty positioning themselves, 8 correct? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: All right. Your next entry is that 11 there is a plan for the CMU to move, what's the next 12 word? 13 A: Occupiers. 14 Q: Occupier -- to move -- no, sorry. 15 Plan for CMU to move... 16 A: In. 17 Q: Thank you. 18 A: Sorry, I'm sorry. 19 Q: It's okay. To move in, to move 20 occupiers back on to Park property. 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: Now, is it fair to say that shortly 23 after your arrival at the Command Post at twenty (20) to 24 9:00, you began to learn that that was indeed a plan that 25 was formulating?
2911 A: Yes, that plan was in place from the 2 Command Post in Forest before we left. 3 Q: All right, okay. So if that was 4 indeed the plan and that was the purpose for deploying 5 the Crowd Management Unit? 6 A: Yes, ma'am. 7 Q: Okay, that's what I thought. Now, it 8 then goes on: 9 "Plan for Alpha to move with the Crowd 10 Management Unit in case they meet armed 11 resistance." 12 And so here you're referring to the fact 13 that we spoke about earlier which is Alpha's going to be 14 there to provide cover to the Crowd Management Unit as 15 necessary? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: All right. And we know that still 18 that Sierra's in place to the extent that they can 19 position themselves to provide whatever information they 20 can back to the TOC? 21 A: Right. 22 Q: Which in turn can be fed to the Crowd 23 Management Unit? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: Okay. Now, acknowledging the desire
2921 of the Sierra team to be in place so that they could 2 provide the best information possible, and also 3 acknowledging the difficulties that the Sierra team is 4 having in doing that, is it fair to say that one of the 5 secondary benefits of the Crowd Management Unit going 6 down the road when it actually was deployed for the 7 purpose of starting to move the occupiers back in the 8 Park, is that it would serve as a diversion to allow the 9 Sierra teams to get into position? 10 OBJ MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I object, Mr. 11 Commissioner. 12 MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: And what -- 13 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: There is a number 14 of difficulties with the question. Number 1, it's two 15 (2) and three (3) barrelled. It developed a whole series 16 of propositions the Witness himself hasn't adopted and so 17 the question itself is problematic. 18 Number 2, the Witness testified after 19 repeated questioning by Ms. Vella, as to the purpose of 20 CMU. I got up and said, well, wait a minute, that 21 decision wasn't something he was party to and he went on 22 to explain how he was. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 24 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: And now, My Friend, 25 she didn't ask him about that evidence.
2931 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No. 2 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: She ignored that 3 evidence and created a new supposition -- 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I -- 5 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- inconsistent 6 with the evidence. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think 8 you've made your point, Mr. Falconer. 9 I think you could break the question down, 10 Ms. Jackson, so that it's a more appropriate question for 11 the Witness to answer. 12 MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: I'll break it 13 down, Mr. Commissioner. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 15 MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: That's -- 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Each part 17 should be manageable. I was finding it a little 18 difficult -- 19 MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: Fair enough. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- to follow 21 as you went along. 22 MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: Not a problem, 23 all right. 24 25 CONTINUED BY MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON:
2941 Q: You told us that the understanding 2 from the moment that you arrived at that Command Post was 3 that the team, the Crowd Management Unit was to be moved 4 down the roadway in order to move the occupiers back into 5 the Park. 6 A: If that was required, yes. 7 Q: If it was required. 8 A: If -- 9 Q: Fair enough. 10 A: -- the information came back from 11 Sierra that -- 12 Q: Pardon? 13 A: If the information came back from the 14 Sierra teams that that was required, they would then be 15 deployed. 16 Q: All right. You've told us that you 17 arrived at the TOC, somewhere between 9:30 and 9:40? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Fair enough that you arrived with 20 John Carson? Did the two (2) of you go together? 21 A: No, John was at -- I'm sorry, at the 22 TOC, yes. 23 Q: At the TOC? 24 A: We travelled together, separately. 25 Q: I understand. You were in tandem, in
2951 separate vehicles? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: All right. You can take it from me 4 that he has a notebook entry that he arrived at the TOC 5 at 9:45 p.m., okay? 6 A: Okay. 7 Q: We've also heard considerable 8 evidence that between 9:30 and about 10:10 or 10:15 that 9 night, there are ongoing radio transmissions of 10 information being fed back from officers who were down by 11 the parking lot as to what they are observing. 12 Were you in a position to hear those radio 13 transmissions coming in? 14 A: Prior to arriving at the TOC I would 15 not have been. 16 Q: I understand. I'm actually speaking 17 about the period when you were at the TOC. And it may be 18 that you don't have a recollection one way or the other. 19 A: I don't have a recollection and I 20 would have been briefing the team at the time so my 21 intention -- 22 Q: So you may not have had -- 23 A: -- was not to be listening to the 24 radio. 25 Q: All right. So you may not have had
2961 the benefit of the same information that John Carson had 2 which was coming over the radio as to what was being 3 observed by the ERT people down by the sandy parking lot. 4 Is that fair? 5 A: That's fair. 6 Q: Okay. And I gather that you don't 7 want to leave us with the impression that the key to 8 making the decision about whether or not to send down the 9 Crowd Management Unit depended upon what the Sierra team 10 reported back? 11 They weren't the exclusive source of 12 information as to what was going on down at the sandy 13 parking lot. 14 A: There could have been more sources of 15 information that I'm not aware of. 16 Q: All right. All right. So you 17 weren't aware of the other sources that were coming in, 18 in other words. 19 A: I was not. 20 Q: Fair enough. Okay. I understand. 21 Now -- 22 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Commissioner, My 23 Friend has very skilfully glossed over -- there is no 24 evidence of something going to CMU in the nature My 25 Friend just described. All that there is, is Mr. Sandler
2971 asked a number of questions about things that might have 2 been heard by somebody in -- in the Command Post over a 3 radio. 4 There was never a time when that 5 information that might have been heard by somebody in a 6 Command Post being Mark Wright, ever got communicated to 7 CMU in the fashion My Friend just glossed. 8 So -- so then she takes that fact that has 9 never been proven and she says, so you wouldn't know that 10 CMU got all this information. Well, frankly that's 11 because there's no evidence that CMU did get that 12 information. 13 We only know that Mark Wright heard some 14 of it. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 16 Mr. Falconer. Do you want to speak to this, Ms. Vella 17 or -- 18 MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: I could 19 actually ask a follow up-question that might clarify. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 21 22 CONTINUED BY MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: 23 Q: The TOC that was set up in which you 24 and Officer Carson and Officer Zupancic, there were two 25 (2) radios coming in?
2981 A: True. 2 Q: One was conveying information that 3 was coming from -- the radio transmissions and what we've 4 heard are called Track 12 and one -- are you aware of 5 that? 6 A: I wasn't aware of the numbers of the 7 TAC but I knew it was a TAC channel. 8 Q: All right it was a TAC channel all 9 right? Is it fair to say that you knew that it was the 10 TAC channel that the ERT officers were using? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: Right, okay. And at the same time 13 there was the TRU channel that was being monitored. 14 A: That's correct. 15 Q: All right. So there were the two (2) 16 radio transmissions or two (2) sources of radio 17 transmissions that were coming into that TOC cube van 18 simultaneously. 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: Right, okay. So what I gather then 21 that you're saying to us is that you, because of various 22 duties you had, you would not necessarily be privy to the 23 same information that Inspector Carson would have had an 24 opportunity to hear to the extent that he -- he was in a 25 position to hear it obviously.
2991 But you had other -- other things to do at 2 the TOC. 3 A: I had other things to do upon arrival 4 at TOC than listen to the radio, yes, ma'am. 5 Q: I understand, thank you. All right. 6 When the decision was actually made to 7 send out the Crowd Management Unit, again you can't tell 8 us obviously what was in Inspector Carson's mind at the 9 time that that decision was made. 10 A: No, I can't. 11 Q: And what you can tell us, I gather, 12 is that one benefit of sending the Crowd Management Unit 13 down the road was that it would act as a distraction 14 which would in turn help your Sierra teams to be able to 15 position themselves. 16 A: That was what we anticipated would 17 happen. 18 Q: Okay. I understand. But as far as 19 you were aware, the plan to move the CMU down the road 20 for the purpose of pushing the occupiers back into the 21 Park and opening up that roadway was still the plan that 22 was to be executed? 23 A: I'm sorry, can you repeat that? 24 Q: Sure. It was your understanding that 25 the plan as you have articulated it in your notes --
3001 A: Yes. 2 Q: -- for the CMU to move the occupiers 3 back into the Park; that was still the plan at the time 4 that the CMU was deployed? 5 A: Based on information that would come 6 back. 7 Q: Right. 8 A: If the -- if the information from the 9 Sierra units was that it wasn't necessary to move the CMU 10 down there then they would have been returned to the TOC 11 was my assumption. 12 Q: That was your assumption? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And again you weren't privy to all of 15 the information that John Carson had. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You've 17 already said that. You don't need to repeat that. 18 MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: Then I won't 19 make a point of it. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You're 21 making argument now. 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 MS. TUCK-JACKSON: I wonder if Inspector
3011 Skinner could be provided with a document please? 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: For the benefit 6 of My Friends it's an answer to undertaking June 19th, 7 2003. 8 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 9 10 CONTINUED BY MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: 11 Q: It's Document Number 3000408 and I'll 12 be focussing on Item 528. And, Inspector Skinner, just 13 for your benefit that's on the second page. 14 A: Thank you. 15 16 (BRIEF PAUSE) 17 18 Q: When you were asked earlier about 19 debriefings you mentioned that a number of things 20 intervened which made it impossible for you to debrief 21 this -- this incident with your fellow officers? 22 A: Correct. 23 Q: You mentioned an SIU investigation. 24 You mentioned a criminal litigation and there was also 25 civil litigation?
3021 A: Yes. 2 Q: All right. And I trust, sir, that 3 during the course of that civil litigation you were 4 called upon at some point by a lawyer to answer certain 5 questions in relation to the incident and that they were 6 called -- you were to provide answers to -- to 7 undertakings that lawyers had made during the course of 8 examinations for discovery. 9 Does any of this ring a bell? 10 A: Vaguely. 11 Q: Vaguely? Okay. One (1) of the -- 12 the documents provided to us by way of disclosure early 13 on in this piece is one (1) where you have provided, as 14 represented in this document, a particular answer to an 15 undertaking and I just want to take you to it. 16 A: Okay. 17 Q: Itemize 528 page 2, Mr. Commissioner. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 19 20 CONTINUED BY MS. ANDREA TUCK-JACKSON: 21 Q: The date is 04/07/03 and regrettably 22 I can't tell you what the next two (2) columns represent 23 and I'm not going to speculate. 24 The question is as follows -- or the 25 undertaking I suppose is as follows:
3031 "To inquire of Parkin, Lacroix, 2 Skinner, and Richardson if they have 3 any knowledge, information, or belief 4 as to who made the decision to send the 5 Crowd Management Unit towards to the 6 Park." 7 And your answer appears to be captured on 8 the next page and it reads as follows: 9 "Skinner advises that Inspector Carson 10 directed the movement of the CMU to 11 disperse the..." 12 It should say I think crowd. It says 13 crown but it must mean crowd. 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: "...gathering outside the Park." 16 Now, pausing there for a moment, as best 17 as you can recall does this accurately capture the 18 information that you would have conveyed in response to 19 this undertaking? 20 A: I -- I believe it does. The decision 21 to deploy both TRU or ERT or as the CMU rests with the 22 Incident Commander. 23 Q: Of course and I understand that. And 24 I'm interested however in the additional piece of 25 information that you include in the answer.
3041 And you'd agree with me that you specified 2 that the decision made was that the purpose of moving the 3 CMU was to disperse the crowd gathering outside the Park? 4 A: That was the initial plan for CMU, 5 yes. 6 Q: You'd agree with me that you don't 7 qualify the answer in any way to suggest that the purpose 8 of any type of deployment related to a diversionary 9 tactic? You'd agree that's not included here? 10 A: That's correct. 11 Q: Thank you. 12 13 (BRIEF PAUSE) 14 15 Q: Thank you, Inspector Skinner. Those 16 are my questions. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 18 Ms. Tuck-Jackson. 19 Ms. Perschy...? 20 21 (BRIEF PAUSE) 22 23 MS. ANNA PERSCHY: Good afternoon, 24 Commissioner. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good
3051 afternoon. 2 3 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. ANNA PERSCHY: 4 Q: Good afternoon, sir. 5 A: Good afternoon. 6 Q: My name is Anna Perschy. I'm one of 7 the Counsel for Deb Hutton, who at ... 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 Q: Sorry, I'll start over. My name is 12 Anna Perschy. I'm one of the Counsel on behalf of Deb 13 Hutton, who at the time was the executive assistant to 14 the Premier. 15 I just literally have a couple of 16 questions for you today. 17 You testified that you were on annual 18 leave, just before September 5th and that Ken Deane was 19 acting on your behalf in your absence and then he briefed 20 you on your return? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: And I just had some -- a couple of 23 questions in regards to that. Inspector Carson testified 24 that he and Ken Deane and some other officers met at 25 London District Headquarters on August the 29th, 1995 to
3061 discuss the possible occupation of Ipperwash Provincial 2 Park. 3 And for the benefit of My Friends, I'm 4 referring to Inspector Carson's testimony on May 12th, 5 page 187 and pages 191 and 192. 6 And Inspector Carson testified that he 7 regarded any occupation of the Park, this is Ipperwash 8 Provincial Park, as different from the issues at West 9 Ipperwash beach, where the Kettle and Stony Point band 10 had initiated a land claim and that he regarded a 11 potential occupation of Ipperwash Provincial Park as an 12 illegal occupation, and that he communicated these views 13 at this meeting on August the 29th. 14 A: Hmm hmm. 15 Q: And my question to you was simply, do 16 you recall being made aware that -- upon your return, 17 that Inspector Carson regarded any occupation of 18 Ipperwash Provincial Park as an illegal occupation? 19 A: My understanding is that was the 20 stance, yes. 21 Q: And we've heard evidence from a 22 number of officers that they understood that the Park 23 belonged to the provincial Crown, Provincial Government. 24 Was that your understanding? 25 A: Yes.
3071 Q: And we've heard evidence that at the 2 planning meeting on September 1st, 1995, it was discussed 3 that in the event of an occupation of the Park, the 4 police wanted MNR to seek an injunction quickly, 5 hopefully within twenty-four (24) hours. 6 And do you recall if you were made aware 7 of that? 8 A: I was aware that there was an 9 injunction being sought. I'm not aware of that 10 discussion. 11 Q: You weren't aware of the time frame? 12 A: No. 13 Q: Those are all of my questions, thank 14 you very much. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 16 Ms. Perschy. 17 I suppose we're up to Mr. Falconer now 18 then. 19 20 (BRIEF PAUSE) 21 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Barring 23 unforeseen circumstances, Mr. Falconer, acts of God and 24 so on, we'll go to approximately five o'clock and then 25 quit for the day.
3081 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Thank you. I just 2 need a brief minute to set up, Mr. Commissioner. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Sure. 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 8 Q: Inspector Skinner my name is Julian 9 Falconer and I represent Aboriginal Legal Services of 10 Toronto. 11 A: Yes, sir. 12 Q: I'd like to first ask you about your 13 authority in terms of a team leader immediately after the 14 shooting. 15 In other words, in the moments after the 16 shooting of Dudley George, can you assist me, did you 17 authority change at all in terms of the -- the men and I 18 guess in some cases, but not this one, women that you 19 would run as a TRU team? 20 Did your authority change? 21 A: No, sir. 22 Q: All right. And you were on duty the 23 entire evening of September 6th and the early morning 24 hours of September 7th, 1995? 25 A: Yes, sir.
3091 Q: And you would have gone off duty in 2 and around -- am I right by saying 5:00, 6:00 in the 3 morning type of thing? 4 A: I think it was about 6:30 before we 5 left that -- 6 Q: And during that entire time, you 7 would have been in -- in charge as team leader of TRU? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: And the people in your charge would 10 include the TRU members and we're talking about Deane, 11 Beauchesne and the rest of the TRU members you've already 12 named? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And during the day of September 7th, 15 1995, would there be someone other than you that the TRU 16 members for London would report to on the events of -- of 17 -- of the night of September 6th, 1995 in terms of their 18 duties as TRU members? Were you still in authority on 19 September 7th? 20 A: I was still team leader, sir. 21 Q: Right. 22 A: I'm not sure what you mean by report 23 to me on their actions of the night. 24 Q: Well, you were still their team 25 leader?
3101 A: I was. 2 Q: And you were responsible for their 3 conduct to the extent that they were discharging their 4 functions as TRU team members, correct? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: All right. Now your second in 7 command was Ken Deane? 8 A: Yes, he was. 9 Q: You -- you testified that as you 10 recall, Officer Deane attended a sniper course and being 11 a lawyer and picayune words, you didn't actually use the 12 word 'completed' you just said attended, and it could be 13 me but did he actually complete and get certified in the 14 sniper course? 15 A: I believe he did, sir. 16 Q: He did? 17 A: But also that was prior to my arrival 18 on the -- on the team so you would probably have to check 19 with the Academy on that, but I'm pretty certain he had. 20 Q: Okay fair enough. And I -- I'm sorry 21 it's just I heard the word 'attended' and I don't have a 22 perfect university career so I was just -- in terms of -- 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I hope you 24 did more than attend a law school. 25 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Sorry? Here comes
3111 the confession. 2 3 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 4 Q: In terms of independent thinkers you 5 talked about one of the qualities of -- of -- that is 6 sought when recruiting TRU team individuals is an ability 7 to think independently. 8 Do you recall testifying to that? 9 A: Yes, sir. 10 Q: You'd agree with me that there's 11 somewhat of a paradox between the sort of paramilitary 12 hierarchy that's set up within TRU or the police 13 generally and this notion of a value being place on 14 independent thinking. 15 You'd agree that they're somewhat 16 inconsistent in a way, would you agree? 17 A: Well I -- I think it could be, sir, 18 but I think in the sense of it being a paramilitary unit 19 is that we're dealing with the OPP or we're dealing with 20 the TRU team, that is more in terms of chain of command 21 processes. 22 You certainly want a police officer be it 23 a TRU team member or a uniform member to be an 24 independent thinker. Because he is on his own on the 25 road. You want to be able to be a -- you know,
3121 observant, you want him to be able to take in all the 2 aspects of what he's seeing and to make calculated 3 decisions based on that. 4 Q: But when it comes to the chain of 5 command and it's different; he shouldn't question his 6 leaders, he shouldn't think independently if he doesn't 7 agree with their decisions. 8 I'm trying to understand that. Or do you 9 want your people that you're the team leader for to 10 question your decisions if they are decisions they have a 11 problem with legitimately? 12 A: Yes, I would expect they would speak 13 up. If -- if during a briefing I am, for instance if I 14 can example, sir, unclear or something I say is perhaps 15 not tactically sound, I would expect the members to speak 16 up, yes. 17 Q: And that's part of the quality you 18 look for in TRU team members? 19 A: Absolutely. 20 Q: And it's a quality you have as a 21 leader. 22 A: I hope I have that, sir, yes, sir. 23 Q: So when you and John Carson discussed 24 using CMU as a diversion, it wasn't that it was something 25 that you had to do, I mean, you could have said to John
3131 Carson, sending forty (40) officers down with K-9 units 2 in the dark in order to create a diversion, if you didn't 3 that was tactically sound, you were free and indeed duty 4 bound to speak up and say this isn't a good idea. 5 Right? If you thought it wasn't a good 6 idea. 7 A: That's part of my role as a TRU team 8 commander, sir, to express my opinion on tactical options 9 whether they're good, bad, or inappropriate. 10 Q: And it's fair to say if we go to 11 Exhibit P-1340 -- 12 A: I -- 13 Q: Do you recall the document, the 14 Emergency Response Services Manual, the document that Ms. 15 Vella would have given you a loose leaf copy of? I think 16 you have a loose version? 17 A: Yes, sir, I believe I have the copy 18 in front of me. 19 Q: She'd asked you about the Tactics and 20 Rescue Unit portion of the report. 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: If you go to page 27 it actually sets 23 out a TRU team leader's responsibilities, correct, page 24 27? 25 A: Yes, it does.
3141 Q: And paragraph 6, quote: 2 "Selection of operational deployment 3 methods utilized by the team in an 4 occurrence as approved by the Level 2 5 Incident Commander." 6 Correct? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: So you're the one who selects 9 tactics? 10 A: I select options. There may be more 11 than one (1) tactic that would be appropriate, sir. 12 Q: Fair enough. Paragraph 12, quote: 13 "Reporting to and working in close 14 cooperation with the Incident Commander 15 responsible for resolution of an 16 incident." 17 Right? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: So there's -- it's not just reporting 20 to you, you're supposed to cooperate with one another? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: All right. And paragraph 13: 23 "In instances where a TRU team responds 24 to an occurrence to which the District 25 ERT has been deployed, coordinating
3151 with the ERT leader the relief of ERT 2 members from the inner perimeter 3 locations and in consultation with the 4 Incident Commander controlling the 5 tactical response within the inner 6 perimeter." 7 Correct? 8 A: Yes, sir. 9 Q: So you were to control the tactical 10 response within the inner perimeter? 11 A: To the best of my ability, yes. 12 Q: But again -- 13 A: It's -- 14 Q: -- it reflects your level of 15 authority at the time, correct? 16 A: I am in charge of the team, yes, sir. 17 Q: And you're in charge of the tactical 18 response at the time involving the team, correct? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And then paragraph 16: 21 "Judging the ability of the team to 22 perform in various high risk situations 23 and when the team is not considered 24 proficient in the required task, to 25 inform the Incident Commander and
3161 provide the Incident Commander with any 2 known viable options for completing the 3 task." 4 Right? 5 A: Yes, if a task is beyond the 6 capability of the team I would be duty-bound to express 7 that. 8 Q: And it's fair to say for example if 9 Sierra team is tasked to become the eyes and they can't 10 perform that function, you're duty-bound to let the 11 Incident Commander know? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And you're equally duty-bound to 14 provide options to the Incident Commander to the problem? 15 A: If I'm aware of them, yes, sir, 16 certainly. 17 Q: And -- and in this case the option 18 you offered up when you couldn't get eyes for Sierra was 19 to use the forty (40) men in the depth of night in full 20 riot regalia as a diversionary tactic so you could gain 21 an observation position for Sierra, is that right? 22 A: That was the option we discussed and 23 that's what we employed, yes. 24 Q: Well, when you said, "discussed," 25 let's be fair, that's the option you came up with?
3171 A: To be honest, sir, I don't recall if 2 it was my -- my idea or Inspector Carson's idea. I -- I 3 honestly don't recall. 4 Q: Well, this Inquiry has been going for 5 well over a year and would it surprise you to hear that 6 you represent the first witness that's testified before 7 these proceedings about this option even existing using 8 CMU, using the thirty (30) to forty (40) men in riot gear 9 with K-9 unit as a diversion? Would that surprise you? 10 A: I'm the first member of the tactical 11 -- Tactics Rescue Unit to testify, sir, so -- 12 Q: Well -- 13 A: -- perhaps not. 14 Q: -- well, so I take it what you're 15 saying is that Ken Deane was involved in the discussions 16 with John Carson about deploying CMU that night at TOC? 17 A: No, sir. 18 Q: Was Beauchesne involved in the 19 discussions? 20 A: No, sir. 21 Q: All right. None of those TRU members 22 were there with you and Carson to discuss deploying CMU 23 as a diversion, right? 24 A: That's correct. 25 Q: Right. So we're not going to hear
3181 from the others about that decision-making process, it 2 would be you and Carson, right? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: And Carson never gave one (1) 5 whisper, sir, with respect, never gave one (1) whisper of 6 using these people in this fashion. Does that surprise 7 you? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: And would you agree with this that 10 there are numerous options on how to create diversion to 11 get eyes for Sierra, right? There's a number of 12 different ways you could do it? 13 A: Depending on the circumstances. 14 Q: All right. And so we're clear 15 because sometimes we launch right into this vernacular, 16 when we're talking about getting eyes and Sierra what 17 we're basically saying is a number of TRU team officers 18 were deployed strictly for the purposes of gathering 19 intelligence through their observations, through their 20 eyes and ears, right? 21 A: That's what they were deployed for, 22 yes, and -- 23 Q: Yes. 24 A: -- and to report back -- what they 25 observed back to the Command Post.
3191 Q: And the idea was and John Carson 2 reflects it in the scribe notes, they weren't being 3 deployed, quote "tactical," close quotes they were being 4 deployed to gather some intel for us, right? 5 A: Correct, yes. 6 Q: And the idea was, it's dark, right? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: Hard to tell what the occupiers have 9 in their hands, for example? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: Right. Hard to tell what's by the 12 fence line? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: So you send people with special 15 skills in operating, quote/unquote, "invisibly", right? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: To go gather that information? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: Before you deploy CMU? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: And that's what you kind of -- and I 22 only -- I shouldn't use the word stubbornly. That's how 23 -- why you kind of solidly kept responding to Ms. Tuck- 24 Jackson, yes, the CMU was to be deployed once we heard 25 back from Sierra, right?
3201 A: Yes. 2 Q: Right. The idea was John Carson, 3 incident commander, was not prepared to send CMU out 4 without having some eyes, right? 5 A: That was my understanding. 6 Q: Okay. Now something happens, because 7 instead of -- and you determine, you can't get eyes, 8 right? 9 A: They're having a difficult time, yes. 10 Q: Well, to be fair, sir, the difficult 11 time equals the problem, the difficulty is you can't get 12 eyes, correct? 13 A: We're having a difficult -- they're 14 having a difficult time getting into position where they 15 can make those observations, yes, sir. 16 Q: So they can't get eyes? 17 A: At the present moment, during that 18 time, no, they couldn't. 19 Q: They're blind? 20 A: No, they're not blind. They can't 21 see the objective they were sent out to see. 22 Q: Okay. If one were to define "eyes" 23 as seeing the objective and the location where you're 24 going to march on, would you agree with me they can't get 25 eyes?
3211 A: I would agree they can't see the 2 objective they went out to. There may be other things 3 they can observe that would provide intelligence 4 information back to an incident commander. 5 Q: Do you remember any? 6 A: That the First Nations people were 7 out scanning with spotlights; that they were out 8 preventing them from getting into position. That's 9 information back -- valuable to an incident commander. 10 Q: Anything else? 11 A: Not that I recall, sir. 12 Q: All right. So they couldn't get eyes 13 to make the observations they wanted to and they told you 14 why. 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: That people were out there and they 17 had spotlights? 18 A: Yes. And they were close to their 19 positions. 20 Q: Okay. And so the purpose of 21 deploying Sierra in a non-tactical sense, to make 22 observations had been frustrated. 23 A: Well, I -- this -- it would still be 24 a tactical deployment, sir -- 25 Q: I --
3221 A: They're still -- 2 Q: I apologize. 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: It's because John Carson kept saying 5 don't go tactical. 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: And for -- for someone not versed the 8 way you are, that meant please don't use weapons, right? 9 That's what he was saying; I don't want 10 snipers. I just want you there for observation purposes. 11 Wasn't that what he's trying to tell you? 12 A: I don't -- I don't -- I don't take it 13 that way, sir. 14 Q: Okay, fair enough. Let me re-track. 15 The idea was to gain information through the observation? 16 A: Yes, we were being -- the Sierra 17 teams were being deployed as an intelligence gathering 18 tool. 19 Q: Through their observations? 20 A: Yes, sir. 21 Q: And that had been frustrated? 22 A: It was being frustrated. 23 Q: And so the plan of having thirty (30) 24 to forty (40) men march down in riot gear, with the 25 benefit of advance information, was no longer viable;
3231 correct? 2 A: It was being thwarted, yes. 3 Q: Okay. 4 A: I'd agree. 5 Q: It was no longer viable. They were 6 going to march -- 7 A: They were -- 8 Q: -- without the advance information or 9 not? You just didn't have it any more, right? 10 A: I don't know that they were going to 11 march without the information, sir. They -- the 12 information was -- wasn't coming back -- 13 Q: Okay. 14 A: A decision was made to put the CMU 15 team onto the roadway, hopefully to distract the 16 individuals who were preventing the Sierra teams from 17 getting into position. 18 Q: Now, putting them on the roadway, 19 they're not going to tiptoe there, are they? 20 A: No. 21 Q: They marched there? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: Well, 'cause I'm asking you that 24 'cause you said, I don't know if they're going to march. 25 They marched, yes? And the idea of the
3241 march was to create a distraction, you said? 2 A: They would move in formation out onto 3 the roadway, yes. 4 Q: With shield chatter? 5 A: I don't know that shield chatter was 6 part of our discussion at all. 7 Q: But it would help, wouldn't it, to 8 create that distraction? 9 A: It could. 10 Q: Yeah. The dogs barking, if you can 11 get them to bark loud, that would help to create a 12 distraction, yes? 13 A: It may attract attention. 14 Q: Sure. And so the plan, if I get this 15 correctly from you, is that you're going to send forty 16 (40) thirty (30) to forty (40) men -- or along with this 17 Incident Commander, the two of you, are going to send 18 thirty (30) to forty (40) men marching in the dark 19 without advance information on what they're marching 20 towards? 21 Is that correct? 22 A: They're going to march out onto the 23 roadway, move part way down to the parking lot, yes, sir. 24 Q: Without knowing what they're going to 25 march towards?
3251 A: Yes. I suppose not -- not -- this 2 Incident Commander not having all the information that he 3 could have had if the Sierra teams had got out to where 4 they hopefully were. 5 Q: Well, you told me the information 6 they had, you said that the information that you'd gotten 7 was that there were First Nations persons near Sierra's 8 position and they were using spotlights; that's the 9 information -- that's it, right? 10 A: That's what they had at the time, 11 yes. 12 Q: Nothing else? 13 A: Correct. 14 Q: Right. So that's what these people 15 were sent down the road to face in the dark without 16 knowing, right? 17 A: They were sent partway down the road, 18 yes. 19 Q: Now, help me on this. Would you 20 agree with me that short of sending forty (40) people in 21 riot regalia down the road with K-9's in order to create 22 a distraction there would be other ways of Sierra, the 23 observation team, gaining a position to see what was 24 going on; there would have been other ways? 25 A: Given the fact that the people were
3261 near their positions, sir, I'm not sure I follow what 2 other ways you're talking about. 3 Q: All right. Let's try the first one. 4 What if Sierra team simply withdrew and started over 5 again? 6 A: Well, I'm not sure that would have 7 accomplished the goal either, sir, that -- the 8 individuals may still have been out. Could it have been 9 done? It's possible. It would have been an option. 10 Q: All right. And in withdrawing and 11 starting over again this time they may not opt to deploy 12 from a white SUV in front of the occupiers, right? 13 A: I suppose that's possible, sir, it's 14 conjecture at this point. 15 Q: Well, to be fair, sir, one (1) of the 16 things that you talked about the advantages of debriefing 17 was that it allows an analysis of the soundness of the 18 decisions made, right? 19 A: True. 20 Q: All right. So would you agree with 21 me that part of this process, your understanding of part 22 of this process is to analyse to some extent the 23 soundness of some of the decisions that may have cost 24 someone's life? You know that that's part of the 25 process, right?
3271 A: Yes. 2 Q: Okay. So that's what we're doing and 3 you can call it conjecture but I'm simply asking for -- 4 not wild guesses, an option was to withdraw your Sierra 5 team and this time have them deploy not in a white SUV in 6 front of the occupiers, right? 7 A: Yes, it was an option. It would have 8 taken some time. 9 Q: Yes, and that option would not have 10 involved in any way imperiling the CMU people marching 11 down the road who don't know what's in front of them; it 12 wouldn't have endangered them, right? 13 A: They wouldn't have been involved if 14 that was the option taken, sir. 15 Q: Right. And you knew of no hostage 16 that the occupiers were holding where every second 17 counted, did you? 18 A: I did not. 19 Q: No. And you knew of no every second 20 counts scenario that was going on right now. There was 21 nothing that you knew of at the time that told you that 22 minutes could cost lives. 23 Did you know of any such scenario? 24 A: There was a concern for the cottagers 25 in the area, sir.
3281 Q: All right. So the -- the safety of 2 the cottagers was the only concern you knew of? 3 A: It was one (1) of the concerns, yes. 4 Q: Any others? 5 A: Other people coming into the area. 6 Q: Okay. But would you agree we're not 7 talking seconds here? You could have withdrawn the team 8 and you could have redeployed, agreed? 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, -- 10 THE WITNESS: It may have taken 11 considerable time for the team to -- 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm not sure 13 how much more you want to keep going over this. 14 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: No, that's fair. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 16 17 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 18 Q: Now, I simply want to follow through 19 with it though. In redeploying you'd agree with me the 20 very expertise, the training the TRU members have is to 21 act in a fashion that makes them invisible? 22 A: That's the objective when they deploy 23 in that scenario, yes, sir. 24 Q: Right. And so if they redeployed in 25 that different manner they would use their training and
3291 the cover of darkness, right? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: And field vision glasses to gain 4 access to the Park or various areas without the 5 disadvantage of the visible deployment in the white 6 truck, right? 7 A: They weren't gaining access to the 8 Park, sir, but yes, had they come back and gone again 9 they would use their training and their equipment to 10 obtain a position. 11 Q: Right. And all of those things are 12 things that could be done but were never tried? 13 A: That was not tried. 14 Q: Instead the option was to simply 15 march CMU down as a diversion? 16 A: Partway down the roadway, yes. 17 Q: Okay. Now, you said you discussed 18 this option with John Carson? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And that you can't remember whether 21 it was you that made the decision or -- or -- I'm sorry, 22 you can't remember whether it was you that made the 23 suggestion or John Carson that made the suggestion, 24 right? 25 A: That's correct.
3301 Q: But you're quite certain that that 2 was the thinking? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: Okay. The reason I ask you that is 5 because I think back to what you've told us. You have a 6 Sierra team that didn't accomplish its objective, it 7 didn't get its eyes, right? 8 A: And you know that after the incident, 9 right? You know that. 10 Right after the incident when you're 11 sitting thinking about what might have gone wrong you 12 know in your own mind they didn't get their eyes, right? 13 A: I -- I knew that during the incident, 14 sir. 15 Q: Okay. 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: And so one (1) of the things I'm sure 18 you're concerned to be clear about is that you did make 19 efforts to cure that deficiency; that is in your own mind 20 after the incident when reflecting back on the problems 21 with the incident, the tactical problems, you'd want to 22 be confident that you must have taken some steps to cure 23 the deficiency, right? You'd want to be confident of 24 that. 25 You'd want to be confident that if you
3311 didn't get eyes initially you must have done something to 2 get you eyes? 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You asked 4 the question, give him a chance to answer. 5 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Fair enough. I was 6 trying to explain to him. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 8 That's fine. 9 10 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 11 Q: Do -- do you understand my question? 12 13 A: I'm having a little bit of a 14 difficult time following it, sir, but -- 15 Q: That's what I got a sense. That's 16 why I'm trying to re-explain. I wasn't trying to talk 17 over you. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, no. 19 Okay. 20 THE WITNESS: I'm -- I mean, that was -- 21 to me that was the purpose of the team moving onto the 22 roadway was to correct that deficiency. 23 24 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 25 Q: And in your own mind that's the
3321 corrective action you took? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: Because if that didn't happen, that 4 CMU wasn't deployed as that diversion then really you 5 took no corrective action to get eyes, isn't that true? 6 A: I suppose that's true, sir. 7 Q: Now, could you look at your notes 8 because your notes don't talk about a decision. If you 9 look at Exhibit P-1341 which is at your Tab 22? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: If you look at page 32 of those 12 notes? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: Ms. Tuck-Jackson took you through it, 15 right? Do you remember she took you through these notes 16 so I won't repeat every line with you? 17 A: Hmm hmm. 18 Q: But on this decision making process, 19 do you remember? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: And I'm talking about the events of 22 September 6th, 1995, in and around 9:00 -- 10:00 p.m. 23 when you're deploying TRU and CMU all right? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: You put the plan and then you say:
3331 "Plan for Alpha to move with CMU in 2 case they meet armed resistance." 3 Do you see that? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And then you use this: 6 "Sierra reports still difficult. 7 Determined to move CMU into position 8 onto roadway about 400 metres from 9 scene. Support by Alpha. Perhaps 10 CMU's presence will distract Natives 11 from Sierra, enabling them to move." 12 I just ask you about that word, "perhaps". 13 That's -- that's not much of a decision, that's almost 14 like a musing. You'll forgive me but you said you were 15 sitting in a lawyer's reception area taking -- when you 16 made these notes, yes? 17 A: No, sir. 18 Q: Oh, I apologize. I thought you said 19 that you were waiting to see Mr. Peel. 20 A: I was -- I was waiting to see Mr. 21 Peel in a hotel in Grand Bend -- 22 Q: Oh, I apologize. 23 A: -- and I started the notes there. 24 Q: You're quite right. 25 A: Yes.
3341 Q: You're waiting to see your lawyer -- 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: -- in the hotel and you sort of wrote 4 what I'm going to suggest, and you can disagree, almost 5 seems like a musing. Perhaps CMU's presence will 6 distract. Is -- is that a musing? 7 A: I'm not sure what you mean by "a 8 musing," sir, it was our hope that by moving CMU onto the 9 roadway that it would distract them. 10 Q: And "our" hope is you and John 11 Carson? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And you have no explanation for why 14 this Incident Commander, now a Deputy Commissioner, made 15 absolutely no mention of this hope during his evidence 16 when he testified for many, many days before this 17 Commission? You have no explanation for that? 18 A: No, sir. 19 Q: All right. Do you know anybody else 20 that would be privy to this hope, this expectation? 21 A: It was possible that Constable 22 Zupancic may have heard it, sir. 23 Q: One (1) of the people you'd hope 24 would know something about it would be Wade Lacroix, the 25 Staff Sergeant who led CMU. You -- You'd want him to
3351 know about that, wouldn't you? 2 A: I supposed he would know why he was 3 being deployed when he was being deployed, sir. 4 Q: Sure, because it would be odd in the 5 extreme wouldn't it if -- if CMU was being deployed in 6 this diversionary fashion and Wade Lacroix, the leader of 7 CMU, knew nothing about it? 8 A: I suppose that's -- yes, sir. He 9 would -- he would know as he was being deployed and 10 probably should know if it was a diversion. 11 Q: When you say, "probably should know," 12 it's something you'd expect of him? 13 A: Yes, I would expect that. 14 Q: He's the one leading the officers? 15 A: He's in charge of the movement of the 16 CMU team, yeah. 17 Q: And -- and you'd want him to know why 18 they're moving and where they're moving? 19 A: And why they're going on the roadway. 20 Q: Right. Well, in Wade Lacroix's 21 statement to the SIU there is no mention of using CMU as 22 a diversion, none at all. 23 Do you have any explanation for that? 24 A: No, sir. 25 Q: Now, what I can do is direct you to
3361 the statement because I gave notice on it when I heard 2 your evidence today and I'd be happy to have you review 3 it tonight because the cross-examination's going to 4 continue tomorrow. 5 A: Hmm hmm. 6 Q: Out of fairness to you rather than 7 taking you through each line I'll -- I'll ask on the 8 record for your counsel to make it available to you and 9 you can look at it and you can correct me if I'm wrong, 10 all right -- 11 A: Okay. 12 Q: -- because I do want to be -- be fair 13 about this. I just don't want to line by line with you. 14 I've looked at it; I can find nothing. 15 A: Okay. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 Q: Brian Deevy, the -- his name came up. 20 It's Brian Deevy? 21 A: Brian, yes, sir. 22 Q: His name came up because he actually 23 is in charge, he's the team leader for the Barrie team? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: The Barrie TRU team?
3371 A: Barrie TRU team. 2 Q: And his name's come up a couple of 3 times and the first time it's come up is, among others, 4 is when you were telephoning him to say, Barrie TRU team 5 is going to have to take London's calls, because we're 6 stuck in Ipperwash for the duration, correct? 7 A: I did make that call, yeah. 8 Q: Okay. And then his name's also come 9 up in another context that I wanted to ask you about. If 10 copies of the transcript that is September 7th, 1994, 11 (sic) 18:45 hours, it's Region 4, Logger tape number 7. 12 It's not an exhibit yet. I have a copy for the Witness 13 and a copy for the Witness (sic). 14 It's the conversation -- 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 16 17 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 18 Q: -- between Wade Lacroix and Staff 19 Sergeant Brian Deevy of September 7th, 1995, 18:45 hours. 20 First referred to on the record during my questioning of 21 Mark Wright. 22 Now, I just want to clarify something. As 23 of September 7th, 1995, it's fair to say that Staff 24 Sergeant Brian Deevy has -- Staff Sergeant Brian Deevy as 25 head of Barrie TRU would have actually been taking over
3381 for you, is that fair, at the incident? 2 A: He took over that night at the TOC, 3 yes, sir. 4 Q: All right. So Staff Sergeant Brian 5 Deevy would now be a TRU team leader managing Ipperwash 6 just as you were? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: Did you authorise your second in 9 command to participate in discussions with Staff Sergeant 10 Brian Levy (sic) on September 7th, 1995? 11 A: No. 12 Q: Do you recall being party to 13 discussions that your second in command, Officer Ken 14 Deane with Wade Lacroix about the autopsy results, the 15 autopsy of Dudley George? 16 A: No. I'm not aware of that at all, 17 sir. 18 Q: I'm going to ask you something. 19 We're going to go back to this transcript in one (1) 20 second, but I just want to understand something. 21 You said something to the SIU in Tab 36. 22 If you just keep that transcript with you for a minute, 23 but flip to Tab 36. 24 You said something to SIU that interested 25 me. Page 16, it's Exhibit P-1358, it's at Tab 36 of the
3391 Commission Counsel's binder. It's the June 1996 2 statement that you provided to SIU. 3 It's entitled, "Anticipated evidence 4 of..." but, in fact, it's a -- it's a taped interview, 5 it's a transcribed interview, correct? 6 A: I'm not sure that it was taped, sir. 7 I think it was handwritten. 8 Q: Well, it looks like it's a 9 transcript. 10 A: I don't recall exactly. 11 Q: All right, fair enough. No problem. 12 Could you flip to page 16, please? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: You recall telling Ms. Vella that 15 this was an accurate reflection of what you told SIU -- 16 A: Yeah. 17 Q: -- earlier today? 18 A: Yes, sir. 19 Q: And it still is? 20 A: I believe so. 21 Q: All right. Could you turn to page 22 16? And this isn't particularly contentious given your 23 evidence, but I want to make sure that you and I are 24 agreed on this. 25 You said that the reason you didn't
3401 debrief, in part, was the SIU investigation. That's what 2 you've said, that the debriefing doesn't happen with your 3 members of your team because of the SIU investigation, 4 right? 5 A: Yes. That was the initial reason. 6 Q: Okay. And it says -- you see where 7 it says just -- just short of half way down the page, it 8 says: 9 "SKINNER: The only thing we had that 10 night..." 11 A: Yeah. 12 Q: Okay. You're asked by Allen, who's 13 Wayne Allen, is a SIU investigator? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: Right. You're asked by Wayne Allen 16 about a debriefing and your answer is, quote: 17 "The only thing we had that night was 18 when we came back we just went over 19 again this is what happened. Normal 20 procedure in the debriefing for us is 21 that it would probably start with me 22 and I would go through th sequence of 23 how the entire call came to our 24 attention. 25 Our arrival, what we've done first and
3411 the sequence of events through the call 2 and then we would go to the individuals 3 who would go, quote, 'I did this, I did 4 that, I was located here.' 5 That's never been done for this 6 incident and the reason it's never been 7 done is because it's under 8 investigation. In order to keep our 9 statements independent or whatever, 10 that has not been done." 11 A: Right. 12 Q: You said that? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And I take it the -- your point 15 you're trying to make is that one of the things that's 16 standard protocol in any investigation, especially a 17 homicide investigation -- this was a homicide 18 investigation, yes? 19 A: It was. 20 Q: Yes. Any investigation is -- is you 21 try to maintain the integrity of the various witness 22 statements, yes? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And so that's an investigator's 25 ability one tends to try to segregate the various
3421 witnesses so they give independent accounts, yes? 2 A: It's one of the tactics employed by 3 an investigator, yes. 4 Q: Well, it isn't just a tactic, it's 5 sound practice isn't it? 6 A: Certainly. 7 Q: And the reason it's sound practice is 8 you want to make sure one person's account or 9 recollection doesn't consciously or unconsciously 10 influence another person's account, right? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: If you and I see the same event, I 13 might remember a yellow car but you might remember a blue 14 car. 15 A: Absolutely. 16 Q: And if you say you remember a blue 17 car first, I might start thinking it was blue, right? 18 A: That's possible. 19 Q: Okay. So you want that independence 20 of recollection? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: And that's what you meant at page 16 23 where I just quoted you. 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And so you recognized early on that
3431 that was important in this homicide investigation. 2 A: And the fact that it was an SIU 3 investigation and we were not discuss it with each other, 4 yes, sir. 5 Q: And so you -- and when I say homicide 6 investigation, to be fair to you, all homicide means is 7 that a person died. It doesn't mean -- 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: -- it's a murder, all right? 10 A: I know that. I know that, sir. 11 Q: But to the people, the public might 12 think otherwise so I want to be fair. Homicide simply 13 means one human being causes the death of another, right? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: It could be non culpable, not murder 16 or anything like that or to be culpable, right? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: And someone investigating doesn't 19 know until they've investigated, right? 20 A: Correct. 21 Q: Now in respect of this homicide 22 investigation, you'd agree with me that standard protocol 23 is to make sure for example, statements are provided by 24 witnesses and that those witnesses are not briefed on for 25 example, autopsy results; that wouldn't be good.
3441 A: That would not be appropriate. 2 Q: No. And a senior officer such as 3 yourself knows that that wouldn't be appropriate, right? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: You -- you went on at length about 6 the professionalism of -- of now deceased and my 7 condolences because I suspect he was a friend of yours, 8 so now deceased Mr. Deane, you -- you went on at length 9 about him. You'd agree with me he was a senior officer. 10 A: I guess I'd -- generally senior 11 officer usually includes commissioned officer but he -- 12 he was an experienced officer if you could use that term. 13 Q: I apologize. You're quite right. 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: He was an experienced officer. 16 A: Yes, sir. 17 Q: And in being an experienced officer, 18 when you confidently said I know that wouldn't be 19 appropriate, you -- you wouldn't think you're second in 20 command would think it was appropriate either, would you? 21 A: I would not think you -- I would 22 agree with that statement. He would not think it would 23 be appropriate. 24 Q: All right. I -- I want to turn if we 25 can to this transcript of September 7th, 1995. It's a --
3451 do you have it in front of you, sir? 2 A: I do. 3 Q: All right. I apologize, I only -- I 4 have two (2) -- I made two (2) additional copies. I can 5 have -- Ms. Vella can follow me over my shoulder if she 6 wants. I apologize, I don't have any further copies. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It might be 8 a good idea for you to -- 9 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: No, absolutely. 10 She can just feel free to follow. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 12 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Is this mic okay, 13 Madam Recorder? Can I -- yes, thank you. 14 15 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 16 Q: So the individual identified as B.D. 17 is Staff Sergeant Brian Deevy, do you see that at the top 18 of the page? Yes? 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: What page 20 are you one? 21 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: On page one. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Right. 23 24 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 25 Q: And the individuals W.L. is Staff
3461 Sergeant Wade Lacroix and you also Andrew Archibald, 2 Communications Operator. 3 A: Yes. Yes. 4 Q: All right. So B.D. hello. W.L. being 5 Wade Lacroix, it's the Inquiry voice talking. Can you 6 see the date of this -- 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You have an 8 observation, Ms. Jones? 9 MS. KAREN JONES: I -- I do have an 10 observation. There is nothing that indicates that 11 Inspector Skinner knew about this call, heard this call, 12 had anything to do with this call. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 14 MS. KAREN JONES: So I, you know, if 15 questions want to be asked of him about his view about 16 whether or not in his view something might be 17 appropriate, I guess can he can be asked that. 18 But in terms of asking him things about 19 this call, I'm not sure he can be of any assistance at 20 all, Mr. Commissioner. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: All right. 22 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well My Friend -- 23 My Friend quite rightly just pointed out that it's 24 appropriate to ask him of certain conduct is appropriate 25 or not appropriate and it's particularly relevant given
3471 it's people in his charge. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just ask the 3 question then. 4 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well, I need the 5 factual underpinning and -- 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You can do 7 that. 8 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- and that's -- 9 that's why I'm doing it with the transcript. And in my 10 respectful submission there's no downside. The 11 transcript's already been read onto the record once 12 before and I'm not planning on reading the whole thing. 13 There are some portions I want to put to 14 him that I want to ask him about whether he knew that 15 this being discussed, not just on this date but on any 16 other date in that time period. 17 In other words there are facts here that I 18 want to put in front of him. And there's -- it's not as 19 if this is -- I don't have obviously Mr. Deane because of 20 obvi -- his unfortunate passing. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I 22 understand. 23 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: And I have his 24 superior officer and I want to ask him about it. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well,
3481 obviously just keep in mind, I mean you know that he 2 wasn't party to this and -- 3 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Fair enough and 4 that's why I'm trying to be fair to him. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: So let's see 6 what you can -- 7 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Thank you. 8 9 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 10 Q: "It's the Inquiry voice talking. 11 B.D. Me [That's Brian Deevy]. 12 W.L. Yeah. [That's Lacroix] 13 D.V. Okay. Listen buddy. 14 Yeah. 15 D.V. I'm here with Tex and the boys." 16 Did you hear Lacroix saying that? 17 A: I see it, sir. 18 Q: All right, I apologize. Do you see - 19 - and Tex of course is Ken Deane. 20 A: Ken Deane. That's his nickname. 21 Q: "Yeah Waddy. [And Waddy is Wade 22 Lacroix]" 23 A: Wade Lacrcoix, yes. 24 Q: So you now have the second in command 25 of TRU and you have the head of CMU, correct? Yes?
3491 Second in command of TRU that night, the night of 2 September 6th and the head of CMU -- 3 MS. KAREN JONES: Mr. Commissioner, I 4 object. This witness can't interpret what's on this 5 page. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's what 7 the problem is. 8 MS. KAREN JONES: He can't say anything 9 about who's there -- 10 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Fair enough. 11 MS. KAREN JONES: -- what they're doing 12 or anything and this is why -- 13 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well I can ask 14 about -- 15 MS. KAREN JONES: -- I am objecting -- 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just would 17 you let her make the objection please? 18 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I apologize. 19 MS. KAREN JONES: That's why I'm 20 objecting to Mr. Falconer using this as though there is 21 something that Inspector Skinner can do to assist in 22 understanding the circumstances of this. He's not 23 involved in this call. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, you're 25 right, Ms. Jones. And that's what I was hoping Mr.
3501 Falconer would not do with this transcript but he seems 2 to be. 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You can't 7 cross-examine this Witness on this. 8 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: No, I don't plan 9 to. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, but that 11 seems to be what you're doing. 12 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I'm asking him 13 about whether -- 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, it 15 seems to be that you're cross-examining on the basis of a 16 transcript that he's not involved in. 17 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Okay. I'll -- I'll 18 try to simply put it to him and ask him about it. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Is there 20 some way that you can get to the factual questions -- 21 MS. KAREN JONES: Sure. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- that you 23 need in order to ask this Witness a question that he can 24 be helpful? 25 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Yes. I can -- I
3511 can figure out -- 2 3 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 4 Q: If you could look four (4) lines from 5 the bottom of the first page, what we want to know what 6 the injuries are from the autopsy. 7 Do you see that question? 8 A: I see that. 9 Q: Right. And -- and then you see Brian 10 Deevy: 11 "I don't know. One guy got shot in the 12 ass I understand. 13 Yeah. 14 Do we know specifically what the 15 injuries were on the three (3) target 16 suspects?" 17 See the question? Right? And there's 18 background. And then there's a discussion. If you go 19 through it. Now this is what I want to ask you. 20 If, and this is hypothetical because you 21 weren't there, if Tex and the boys refers to Ken Deane, 22 would it be appropriate for Ken Deane to be, along with 23 Wade Lacroix, making inquiries the following day about 24 what was in the autopsy results? 25 A: No, sir.
3521 Q: And why would that be inappropriate? 2 A: Clearly that could taint what their 3 statements would be. 4 Q: And -- and explain that please. 5 A: If there was -- again, I'm surmising 6 but if there was information from an autopsy report that 7 may be different or confirmed, either/or, their 8 statements would be 9 -- it could possibly taint their statements. 10 Q: And would you agree with me that 11 given that Ken Deane was the shooter as in the subject 12 officer who discharges his weapon against Dudley George 13 and Wade Lacroix led the CMU team that night, it would be 14 tainting the statements of key witnesses, yes? 15 A: Certainly they would be a key to the 16 -- yes. 17 Q: It would be tainting the statements 18 of a subject officer, yes? 19 A: Ken was the subject officer, yes, 20 sir. 21 Q: And you'd agree with me that tainting 22 the statement of a subject officer and tainting the 23 statement of a leader of CMU, could taint the 24 investigation? It could? 25 A: It certainly could.
3531 Q: All right. And that's why it's 2 inappropriate? 3 A: It's inappropriate. 4 Q: Unprofessional? 5 A: Yes, sir. 6 Q: And you don't know -- you didn't know 7 about this 'til today? 8 A: No, sir. 9 Q: So would you agree with me that in 10 terms of how you measure people, often you have to 11 measure them by their conduct after an incident as much 12 as by before. 13 Would you agree with that? 14 A: I -- I think if you're going to judge 15 an individual, you have to take in all the information 16 you have, sir. 17 Q: That's right. And when you're 18 investigating criminal matters generally, you often look 19 to what a person's done after the incident to determine 20 if there's any consciousness of guilt, don't you? 21 A: I -- I -- I'm not specifically an 22 investigator, sir, but I would assume you would, yes. 23 Q: Yes. And that's because people who 24 tend to cover up or try to taint the investigation appear 25 to have something to hide.
3541 A: Yes, they would. 2 Q: And that's why what was done here 3 could be and would be inappropriate, correct? 4 A: It is inappropriate. 5 Q: To your knowledge, has the OPP taken 6 any steps in respect of the inquiries made by Lacroix in 7 the presence of Tex and the boys? 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just a 9 minute. Yes, Ms. Jones? 10 MS. KAREN JONES: Mr. Commissioner, 11 again, this is really objectionable. This witness can't 12 say who's there, who is listening in, who is doing what. 13 Inspector Lacroix has already said that he knew nothing 14 about this -- 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 16 MS. KAREN JONES: -- and found out today. 17 So now we're going down the road of -- 18 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: No, that's -- 19 MS. KAREN JONES: -- does he know -- 20 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- that's circular, 21 you're right. 22 MS. KAREN JONES: -- about investigations 23 that were done. This is an improper use and this is not 24 the Witness to be discussing it with. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes.
3551 OBJ MS. KAREN JONES: I really object to 2 this, Mr. Commissioner. 3 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: I get My Friend's 4 point about Ms. Vella, she's -- My Friend's right. Since 5 he said he didn't know anything about it, he wouldn't 6 know about what -- 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, then 8 move on. 9 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Thank you. 10 11 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 12 Q: The hotel that you were at on 13 September 7th, 1995, was a hotel -- which hotel was it? 14 A: I don't recall the name of the hotel. 15 It was one in Grand Bend, sir. 16 Q: Grand Bend's establishments. And 17 Normal Peel was meeting with more than just you? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: He was meeting with a number of 20 officers? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: From TRU and outside of TRU? 23 A: I only recall the TRU team members 24 being there, sir. 25 Q: The reason I ask you about outside of
3561 TRU is you will recall Ms. Vella put a transcript to you 2 and I can take -- draw your attention to it if you'd 3 like. I'm about to lose the binder that would cost us 4 all a great deal of time; I apologize. 5 6 (BRIEF PAUSE) 7 8 Q: It's Tab 26 of your binder. It's 9 Exhibit P-1355 and it's simply reflects the fact that Rob 10 Graham's relaying a message on to yo from Wade Lacroix 11 about Norm Peel's visit, right? 12 A: Yes, yes. 13 Q: It -- am I wrong in inferring that 14 Wade Lacroix would also have been seeking legal advice 15 from Mr. Peel? 16 I'm asking you, am I wrong in inferring 17 that? I can ask the question and I can be told yes or 18 no. 19 MS. KAREN JONES: Mr. Commissioner, "am I 20 wrong in inferring", assumes that Inspector Skinner has 21 some knowledge of this, about what Wade Lacroix was doing 22 and before you put a question to him, it seems to me a 23 fair foundation is, do you have any knowledge at all? 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: This is 25 cross-examination. He can ask the question the way he
3571 likes. If he doesn't know, he'll say so. Carry on. 2 3 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 4 Q: Do you recall my question? 5 A: Could you please repeat it, sir? 6 Q: No problem. Am I wrong in inferring 7 from this that Wade Lacroix would also have been 8 consulting with Mr. Peel, to your knowledge? 9 A: I don't know if he did or he didn't, 10 sir. 11 Q: Okay. Do you recall being at the 12 hotel? 13 A: I was at the hotel. 14 Q: And there were other officers there? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And do you recall if Wade Lacroix was 17 one of them? 18 A: Not that I recall. 19 Q: All right. Do you recall who the 20 other officers who were there? 21 A: My recollection, sir, is that it was 22 members of my team that were present. 23 Q: All right. All of them? 24 A: I believe so. 25 Q: Okay. And do you recall -- I
3581 mistakenly referred to a reception area of a law firm, so 2 you're at a hotel. Do you recall what the surroundings 3 were in which you waited to see Mr. Peel? 4 Were you in a -- in a isolated room by 5 yourself with each officer in their own room, or were you 6 waiting somewhere where people went into see Mr. Peel? 7 A: We were waiting in a larger room. 8 Q: All right. And Mr. Peel had privacy 9 with whoever he was seeing in another room? 10 A: That's correct. 11 Q: And so you, as a group, you can't 12 remember everyone, but in your mind it was most of the 13 TRU officers? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: Sat there, waiting. 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: Did anybody come to you and say, 18 while you're waiting here, I don't want you to discuss 19 the facts of this case? 20 Did anybody come to that room and say 21 that? 22 A: No. 23 Q: Do you recall instructing the TRU 24 members in that room at that time, I don't want anybody 25 in this room talking about the facts of the case?
3591 A: Not at that time, no, sir. 2 Q: All right. And you actually started 3 take -- making your notes in that room? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: In the presence of the other TRU 6 officers? 7 A: Well, it was a fairly large room, 8 sir. I was sitting off by myself. 9 Q: You were sitting by yourself, so you 10 were entirely out of earshot of any of the other 11 officers? 12 A: No. I wasn't out of earshot. 13 Q: You were capable of engaging them 14 conversationally, if you so chose? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And so in the presence of other 17 witnesses to the homicide, you made your notes? 18 A: I commenced making my notes, yes. 19 Q: See any problems with that? 20 A: No, sir. 21 Q: Okay. 22 A: I wasn't discussing my notes with the 23 people at the time. 24 Q: When do you recall telling the 25 officers they weren't to discuss the facts of the case
3601 amongst themselves? 2 A: I don't have a recollection of saying 3 that, sir. My recollection is we agreed we were not 4 debriefing the call due to the SIU investigation and with 5 that, again we're not -- we're not going to discuss the 6 call. 7 So, as to whether I made a specific 8 announcement that that was not to be -- we were not to 9 discuss it, I don't recall doing that. 10 Q: And it's safe to say that you are the 11 team leader with the authority to make such an order. 12 You can say to your members, I don't want you discussing 13 this call until you give a statement to SIU? 14 A: That's correct. 15 Q: And you didn't do that? 16 A: I don't recall doing that. 17 Q: Fair enough. And when you say, "we 18 weren't going to debrief," you're saying you assumed your 19 fellow officers would take from the fact that you weren't 20 going to debrief, that they shouldn't talk about it to 21 anybody, right? 22 A: I believe all the members were 23 familiar with the policy, sir. 24 Q: Well, you thought Ken Deane was. 25 A: Pardon me?
3611 Q: You thought Ken Deane was familiar 2 with the policy? 3 A: I've -- my belief would be that all 4 the members would be of the understanding that with a 5 pending SIU investigation they would not be discussing 6 the occurrence. 7 Q: Right. And that would include not 8 being in the company of someone inquiring about autopsy 9 results, right? Right? 10 A: If that's the case, yes, sir. 11 Q: Right. So my point you'd agree with 12 me is well taken that you may assume they know but 13 telling them directly is different isn't it? 14 A: Yes, correct. 15 Q: And the reason I ask you this is if 16 the leader, if the senior officer in charge of TRU 17 chooses to wait until the next day in a room where the 18 other witnesses are to make his notes, why would his 19 subordinates do differently? 20 A: Notes are taken on an individual 21 basis, sir. If someone decided to make their notes the 22 night -- the -- when they came back to the barracks that 23 would have been their decision. 24 Q: You lead by example? 25 A: I try to, sir.
3621 Q: And your example in respect of the -- 2 the only shooting death you've only been involved in -- 3 A: Yes, sir. 4 Q: -- was to create your notes in the 5 waiting room waiting for the lawyer in the company of the 6 other witnesses, right? 7 A: That was when I commenced my note 8 taking, sir. 9 Q: Now, you mentioned that's when you 10 commenced, did you finish your note taking in the 11 presence of the lawyer? 12 A: I wasn't making my notes in the 13 presence of the lawyer, sir. 14 Q: I'm asking you this. I don't want to 15 go into privileged communications; that's not the point 16 of it and to be fair to you I, as member of the Bar, have 17 to warn you you're allowed to keep your communications 18 with your lawyer to the extent they're privileged and 19 confidential so I'm not trying to get you to open that 20 can of worms. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Just ask the 22 question. 23 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well, no, I have 24 that responsibility. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yeah, that's
3631 fine. Okay. Just ask the question. 2 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: If I don't -- if I 3 don't discharge the responsibility I'm criticized because 4 he blurts something out. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No one has 6 said anything about him making notes. 7 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: No, I know, but 8 that's just the way I ask questions about lawyer meetings 9 is all. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 11 Ask the question. 12 13 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 14 Q: Now, accepting what -- the caution 15 I've tried to give you, you said you commenced your notes 16 there. 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: Where did you finish them? 19 A: Back at the Command Post. 20 Q: So your notes would have been before 21 the lawyer's meeting and after? 22 A: Yes. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You don't 24 have to make a face. He -- he made that point in his 25 evidence in chief; that's nothing new. We've heard that
3641 but you don't have to be theatric about it, ask the 2 question. Carry on. 3 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Mr. Commissioner, I 4 -- I must say for the record I -- saying -- using the 5 word, "theatrical," to describe a simple -- 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I -- 7 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- acknowledgement 8 on an answer is a little bit unfair to me. I must say I 9 wasn't theatrical. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You were 11 theatrical, Mr. Falconer. 12 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well, I understand 13 that. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I don't wish 15 to engage -- 16 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: But I just want 17 to -- 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You made a 19 face -- 20 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well, that's true-- 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- and it is 22 not necessary. 23 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: But it wasn't 24 theatrical. I'm just -- for the record -- 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: In my view
3651 it was. 2 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: All right. I 3 understand. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And you 5 don't need to make a face when a witness answers a 6 question, just ask the questions. 7 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well -- 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Carry on. 9 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Thank you, Mr. 10 Commissioner. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 12 13 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 14 Q: How soon after did you finish the 15 notes after meeting with the lawyer? 16 A: Well, sir, we went back on shift. I 17 know we looked at that note today, I think it was 18 sometime after 18:00 hours that day. 19 Q: So you don't know other than it would 20 have been during the shift? 21 A: Yes, sir, it was the commencement of 22 that shift. 23 Q: Now, you said to Ms. Vella that as 24 far as you were concerned that it didn't work for you to 25 do the notes that way because the notes didn't reflect
3661 your memory. Do you remember saying that -- 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: -- candidly to -- 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: I just need to understand that. Does 6 that -- and I understand first of all that you're 7 expressing remorse in doing it that way, correct? 8 A: In -- in retrospect, sir, it was the 9 wrong way to do my notes. 10 Q: Okay. And I got that and I'm not 11 trying to be facetious about that but what I am asking 12 you, does that -- do I take -- does that mean that the 13 notes aren't accurate; that's why I'm saying it doesn't 14 work for me because it doesn't reflect my views and on 15 and on. 16 A: Yeah. 17 Q: You did say things like that so 18 that's why I'm going back and asking you -- 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: - are you saying the notes aren't 21 accurate or are you saying -- what are you saying? 22 A: The notes are not as complete as they 23 should be, sir, and they're -- they're not as timely as 24 they should be. 25 Q: I got the timeliness but is there an
3671 inaccuracy that I don't know about? 2 A: There's not an inaccuracy. 3 Q: Okay. 4 A: There's an incompleteness. 5 Q: All right. 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE) 8 9 Q: I want to ask you some other 10 questions about the issue of a task that TRU team carries 11 out in providing this observation function for -- for 12 incidents. 13 This is a task you would have been 14 familiar that you had when you came onto the scene on 15 September 5th, 1995, yes? You knew that part of your -- 16 A: I'm not sure I follow your question. 17 Q: Fair enough. 18 A: It's -- it's one (1) of -- TRU team 19 arrives with many tactical options, sir. One (1) of them 20 is as an observation team. 21 Q: It's -- it's a standard part of your 22 functions? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And you do a drive around the way you 25 did with Officer Deane because you're trying to determine
3681 the physical layout in order to perform many of your 2 tasks including that one, correct? 3 A: In the case when I drove around with 4 Ken it was a familiarization for myself. And it in no 5 way would equate to what we would normally do on a pre- 6 planning exercise. It was much more in depth in that 7 case -- 8 Q: Right. 9 A: -- but this was a drive by for me to 10 get familiar. 11 Q: And part of the familiarity involves 12 getting ready to do that pre-planning exercise, yes? In 13 other words you're getting familiar with your 14 surroundings so you can do the pre-planning. 15 A: So I'm aware of where the situa -- 16 where the occurrence is taking place in relation to where 17 the Command Post is and the roadways, that type of thing. 18 That was the purpose for our drive by. 19 Q: And what I'm curious about is what 20 kind of planning or pre-planning, I find the words -- 21 aren't they the same, pre-planning and planning? Am I 22 wrong? 23 A: I guess it depends how far in 24 advance -- 25 Q: Okay.
3691 A: -- you may get weeks -- week's 2 knowledge -- or weeks of knowledge advance knowledge. 3 Q: In this case it's September 5th and 4 6th that I want to concentrate on, all right? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Prior to the deployment of TRU. What 7 kind of steps from a planning perspective did the TRU 8 team take when it came to developing its intelligence 9 functions and developing its observation functions in 10 respect of the Park? 11 A: From the time we arrived on the 5th, 12 sir? 13 Q: Yes. 14 A: We had no on ground pre-planning 15 exercise. 16 Q: And you'd agree with me that there 17 are many different steps that could be taken by way of 18 pre-planning if you chose to? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: Yes? 21 A: Actually on ground, sir? 22 Q: Yes. 23 A: Well I believe at the time we weren't 24 looking to raise our profile in the area at the time. So 25 that's why we didn't go out on ground to do that thing.
3701 I mean certainly we could look at the maps that type of 2 thing. If that's what you're referring to. 3 Q: And when you talk about raising your 4 profile, you don't actually have to dress up in 5 camouflage or be in a gun truck. 6 A: That's not the way we would normally 7 do reconnaissance or pre-planning exercises. 8 Q: So you don't have to raise your 9 profile. You can just have a jacket on and -- and walk 10 in and around the fence line? Yes? 11 A: Yes and no, sir. 12 Q: Okay. 13 A: We're not old clothes officers. The 14 members are all pretty clean cut. They look like police 15 officers. 16 Q: Fair enough. Now what I'm asking you 17 and what I'm trying to focus my questioning of you on is 18 the options for examining and determining what would be 19 the best methods for engaging an observation by Sierra 20 teams? 21 In other words in particular what pre- 22 planning would make sense with a scene like that? 23 I mean, I assume that there are some 24 options for pre-planning, right? 25 A: Well, if you had a -- a given
3711 scenario, sir, you may attend on ground to ascertain 2 points of observation. If there were, if you knew 3 precisely where an incident was going to take place, you 4 could pre-plan your observation points. 5 Q: And if you had for example a 6 helicopter at your disposal, you could use that as well, 7 yes? 8 A: A helicopter could give you an aerial 9 view. It may not give you an observation point because 10 again you can't see the terrain per se. 11 Q: If there's videos, you could take 12 advantage of those too. 13 A: Again, it may or may not provide that 14 information based on who took the video. 15 Q: So -- but you'd agree with me that 16 those are all potential pre-planning steps? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: Were any of them taken? 19 A: No, sir. Post -- post the drive by 20 that Ken and I did through to the evening of the 6th, we 21 did not pre-plan. 22 Q: Now at the same time though, most of 23 the members of TRU were at the Pinery simply waiting. 24 A: Yes. They were aware of what the -- 25 what the potential exercise was. We were there in
3721 support of the checkpoints, we were there to provide K-9 2 backup if that was required, that type of thing. 3 Q: And you were there to provide 4 potential support if the situation escalated? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And potential support could include 7 the unfortunate discharge of lethal force? 8 A: When the team deploys, that is a 9 potential, yes, sir. 10 Q: And it could simply include 11 intelligence gathering? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And so these would be things you 14 know, while they're waiting at Pinery, you may have to 15 do? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: Okay. Now, what I notice is that you 18 did spend a fairly significant amount of time trying to 19 hunt down decals; am I right? 20 A: I -- while I was at the Command Post 21 on on the morning of the 6th, yes. I spent a fair bit 22 of time on the phone doing that. 23 Q: And when I say, for the record, 24 hunting down decals, what I'm talking about is there -- 25 there was a notion of getting access to a light armoured
3731 personnel carrier but there was a requirement by the 2 military that police decals be placed on it, right? 3 A: I don't know that there's a 4 requirement by the military, sir. It was -- our thought 5 that if we had one (1), whether we got it from -- on loan 6 from GM diesel or the military, that we would want it 7 clearly identified. 8 Q: And -- and so you set about, in your 9 spare time, making inquiries for decals? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: And am I right, that if I look at Tab 12 10, tab 11, tab 12, tab 13, tab I think, 14, though I've 13 got the wrong 14, that all of these calls represent your 14 efforts to hunt down decals? 15 A: Yeah. Yes, they do. 16 Q: Would you agree with me that in terms 17 of the optimality of allocation of skills, using the 18 leader of the TRU team to look for decals may not be 19 optimum? 20 A: Well -- 21 Q: I'm not being personally critical of 22 you as much as I'm trying to understand the allocation of 23 -- of skill sets. 24 A: I believe at that time I -- the 25 Incident Commander asked me to do that. I didn't have
3741 any other taskings at the time. We were simply there on 2 standby. 3 Q: But you are an independent thinker? 4 A: I like to think so. 5 Q: And you know that one of the things 6 you can do is preplan for discharging your functions? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And your people tell you, Ken Deane 9 tells you on the phone, well, some of the guys are here. 10 They're some of them are working out, right? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: They're getting exercise? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And everybody's on standby? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And I'm going to suggest to you that 17 on reflection, one (1) of the things that -- on 18 reflection, with the benefit of hindsight that might have 19 been done, was preplanning with respect to how to gather 20 intelligence in case the situation became more serious. 21 That's one (1) of the things that might 22 have been done? 23 A: I suppose that's possible, sir, but 24 there's -- there's any number of tactical options that 25 the team brings. We could have preplanned for each and
3751 every one of those. 2 But I wouldn't have had the knowledge of 3 where the point of interest was, so the preplanning 4 exercise may not have been of any value, other than to 5 keep the team busy. 6 Q: So the gate of the Park, front gate 7 of the Park at the sandy parking lot -- 8 A: Could be, so could the beach, sir. 9 Q: I understand. 10 A: I'm not trying to be argumentative 11 with you at all, sir. I'm just saying without the 12 knowledge of specifics of what it was, your preplanning 13 exercise may not be of any value. 14 Q: May I suggest, though, may argue with 15 you a little bit and suggest to you that's exactly the 16 job is to plan for eventualities that may not happen or 17 that may happen, but that's the best course if you have 18 the time, isn't it? 19 A: It's not a bad idea, sir. 20 Q: And it's probably a better use of 21 your time than hunting for decals? 22 A: Well, that was the role the Incident 23 Commander assigned me at that time, sir, and that's what 24 I was doing. 25 Q: And I'm going to ask you this. In
3761 circumstances where Sierra does go down to be the eyes 2 for the Incident Commander and can't fulfill the task -- 3 A: Hmm hmm. 4 Q: -- you have to ask yourself, what if 5 my people had known the area better? Maybe they could 6 have fulfilled the task of being the eyes. 7 Wouldn't you agree with that? 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 A: I suppose that's a possibility. If 12 they had known the terrain, but I don't think the 13 opportunity was down there for the members to totally 14 familiarize themselves with the terrain that they could 15 have been sent to. 16 Q: I notice that you use the word 17 totality, because you and I agree there was an 18 opportunity to somewhat familiarize themselves? 19 A: Perhaps with a drive by. I don't 20 believe it would have been prudent for them to get out 21 and walk the terrain. 22 Q: Sure, but they might have had an 23 opportunity to familiarize themselves, yes? 24 A: To some extent? 25 Q: And you don't know of that
3771 opportunity being taken advantage of, do you? 2 A: It was not. 3 Q: No. 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 Q: You were called out in and around 8 8:30 to 8:45 to leave the Pinery with the full TRU team 9 by then alternate Inspector or alternate Incident 10 Commander Linton, correct? 11 A: Looking at the logger here, sir, it 12 was Stan Korosec who called and advised me that Inspector 13 Linton wanted the team. 14 Q: And you were subsequently called off 15 as a TRU team by Carson minutes later? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: Now, since it's you as a senior 18 officer being called out, then stood down, it would have 19 entered your mind that there seems to be a little bit of 20 confusion, agreed? 21 A: Not necessarily, sir. It wasn't -- 22 it's not uncommon for a TRU team to be called out and 23 then cancelled moments later. 24 Q: All right. 25 A: Based on any number of possible
3781 events, a suspect giving up or whatever it's not uncommon 2 for us to be called and called off. 3 Q: And so what was the explanation this 4 time? 5 A: I don't particularly recall other 6 than I don't think he wanted the trucks coming through 7 Forest. 8 Q: And at the time that they were stood 9 down he didn't say for all the TRU members to come to 10 Forest did he? 11 A: No, they wanted me to come to Forest. 12 Q: Just you? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: So it wasn't just the trucks, it was 15 the entire TRU team, right? Am I right? 16 A: Yes, it was the rest of the team. 17 Q: Did you find out at any time what 18 would have caused the change in direction? 19 You said it's not unusual when a hostage 20 for example is released et cetera but do you have a 21 tangible reason for the change in direction? 22 A: The only reason I can think of, sir, 23 is that he didn't want the trucks coming down through 24 town. 25 Q: Is that pure speculation?
3791 A: I -- I'm not sure it's speculation as 2 much as I'm trying to surmise why he -- 3 Q: Okay. 4 A: --I -- I -- 5 Q: You don't know? 6 A: I don't know. 7 Q: And the reason I ask you is because 8 we've heard some evidence obviously with great respect to 9 his family, Mr. Linton is deceased -- 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: -- but we've had evidence that 12 Inspector Linton from the point of view of John Carson, 13 Carson's evidence, was going to deploy TRU in a fashion 14 that was not appropriate to the function of TRU; that is 15 he was going to deploy TRU as a lead and therefore there 16 would be no one to help extricate if there was a problem; 17 that was the gist of the evidence? 18 A: I -- I understand from reading it 19 myself, sir, that his initial thought was to have the 20 team go down to arrest the people in the parking lot. 21 Q: And when you say, "his," you're 22 talking about Linton? 23 A: I'm sorry, Inspector Linton's. 24 Q: Yes. 25 A: Yes.
3801 Q: And that Incident Commander Carson 2 when he got there called that off? 3 A: Right. 4 Q: And would you agree with Incident 5 Commander Carson's assessment that that's not an 6 appropriate usage of TRU? 7 A: We certainly could be better used 8 than that, yes. 9 Q: All right. And when you say, "We 10 could be better used than that," that's because you're 11 exercising some of that diplomatic judgment you have that 12 you don't want to be critical, right? 13 A: Well, sir, there are certain times 14 that we may be used as an arrest process but in this case 15 it wouldn't be -- it wouldn't be the best use of a 16 resource because you have ERT teams available to do that. 17 Q: It wouldn't be an appropriate use 18 would it? 19 A: Given the scenario it wouldn't be 20 your best choice, no. 21 Q: No. And had you had experience with 22 Inspector Linton before in terms of his use of TRU teams? 23 A: Yes, sir, he was the Incident 24 Commander at the occurrence we discussed earlier today on 25 Kettle Point.
3811 Q: All right. Let me ask you this, Mark 2 Wright testified that basically he was frustrated with 3 Inspector Linton's as he put it, "waffling" in terms of 4 making decisions. 5 Do you share Mark Wright's experience with 6 Inspector Linton? 7 A: I would not use the term 'waffling' 8 sir, I would say Inspector Linton had his own personality 9 much like anybody else does. He was a -- excuse me, I 10 lost the word -- methodical. Let me put it that way. 11 Q: I take it knowing Mark Wright as you 12 do you would know why that might frustrate Mark Wright? 13 A: Mark is a very dynamic individual, 14 yes. 15 Q: You're familiar with the nickname, 16 Popcorn? 17 A: I've heard it, yes. 18 Q: And it was your understanding that 19 the -- the name Popcorn relates somewhat to his dynamic 20 character? 21 A: Honestly, sir, I don't know how he 22 got the name Popcorn. 23 Q: And would you agree with me that you 24 heard that night that there was some frustration with 25 Inspector Linton's as you put it quote/unquote
3821 "methodical" ways? 2 A: Not at that time, sir, I -- I had no 3 idea. 4 Q: Later? 5 A: Much later -- 6 Q: All right. 7 A: -- when we were dealing with evidence 8 given. 9 Q: Now, in terms of the usage of TRU is 10 it fair to say that the deployment of TRU while being a 11 final decision of the Incident Commander is a decision 12 that you would need to agree with to some extent before 13 it happened? It would be very unusual for you to 14 disagree with the deployment of TRU? 15 A: As a team leader, sir? 16 Q: Yes. 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: And so it may be as you told Ms. 19 Tuck-Jackson, the ultimate decision of this Incident 20 Commander, but it's got to be done with your co-operation 21 and agreement, right? 22 A: Well, certainly the options I present 23 to him are all ones that I would -- I would agree with. 24 Q: Right. And so -- 25 A: And I would make a recommendation
3831 that of the -- of the X number of options I've presented, 2 I think this is the best way for us to go, so. 3 Q: And if -- and if deployment of TRU 4 isn't the way to go, you say it? That's your 5 responsibility? 6 A: Yes, yes. 7 Q: Now you've testified that this is the 8 first time TRU and CMU were deployed together in this 9 fashion? 10 A: That's correct. 11 Q: This is also the first time you've 12 ever experienced the use of lethal force by one (1) of 13 your team members against the subject of the deployment? 14 A: Yes, sir. It was in my experience as 15 a TRU team leader, it was the only time. 16 Q: And it would be the only time you 17 ever used the CMU team as a diversion, to get eyes for 18 Sierra? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: Those would all be firsts? 21 A: Yes. 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's not
3841 quite five o'clock. Would this be a good time to break? 2 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: We're -- almost. 3 About a minute away. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Oh, okay, 5 because I couldn't tell. 6 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Yeah. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I thought 8 you might be going to a whole new area. 9 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Would you -- would 10 -- I was trying to think of how to frame the question 11 without -- 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 13 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: -- making a face. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, that's 15 fine. 16 17 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 18 Q: Would you -- would you agree with 19 me -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Oh, I'm -- 21 22 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 23 Q: -- that -- 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm sorry, I 25 didn't pick up on that, but again, that was unnecessary,
3851 too. 2 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Well, I'm sorry. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You don't 4 have to make a face. 5 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: All right. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You don't 7 have to make reference to it, either. 8 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: Thank you. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Carry on. 10 11 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN FALCONER: 12 Q: Would you agree with me that if you 13 hadn't worked with CMU before, that you may not have been 14 optimally qualified to decide if CMU can appropriately be 15 used as a diversion, the way you did that night, with 16 Carson? 17 Would you agree with me that you probably 18 weren't the most experienced in how to use CMU? 19 A: I would agree with you that I did not 20 have experience -- CMU was a fairly new unit at that 21 time, sir. 22 Prior to that we had crowd control teams, 23 and then there was a change in the approach. I'm not 24 sure that my knowledge of CMU would have had anything to 25 do with my decision to have them as a diversion.
3861 Q: You're saying to -- Mr. Commissioner, 2 I'm just wrapping up, you're saying that you wouldn't 3 need to know about how CMU is deployed and how it works-- 4 A: Well -- 5 Q: -- in terms of deciding whether 6 they'd be appropriate to use as a diversion? 7 A: I do have a basic understanding of 8 how they deploy, sir. 9 Q: Well -- 10 A: And what, you know, their -- their 11 attire is and their function and their formation. 12 Q: Would you agree with me that that 13 decision to use them as a diversion was a decision you 14 made without the qualifications to run a CMU team; yes? 15 A: I did not have the qualifications to 16 run a CMU team at that time. 17 Q: All right. 18 MR. JULIAN FALCONER: This is a good 19 time, Mr. Commissioner. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 21 We'll adjourn now until tomorrow morning. 22 23 (WITNESS RETIRES) 24 25 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is
3871 adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday April the 20th, at 2 9:00 a.m. 3 4 --- Upon adjourning at 4:55 p.m. 5 6 7 8 Certified Correct, 9 10 11 12 13 _________________ 14 Carol Geehan, Ms. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25