

***OPP Intelligence Services:
A Comparison of 1995 to 2006***



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**OPP Intelligence Bureau
GHQ**

OPP INTELLIGENCE SERVICES:
A Comparison of 1995 to 2006

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Executive Summary

It is the intention of this document to provide commentary for a systemic review of the role of intelligence in the Ontario Provincial Police. It describes how the intelligence process works in the OPP – specifically how intelligence is collected, evaluated, analyzed and utilized. Using the issues identified during the Ipperwash Inquiry as a reference point, it articulates the significant differences between how the intelligence process worked in the past and how it works today.

This document addresses several key areas: The Intelligence Dilemma; The Fundamentals of Intelligence; Impediments to the Intelligence Process; OPP Intelligence in the Past and Intelligence in the OPP Today.

The Intelligence Dilemma

A necessary requirement for any organization to deal with the future is that of accurate information for decision-making. This need is heightened when the consequences revolve around public safety and security. In this realm, law enforcement scrambles to acquire information to allow for informed decision-making.

Intelligence is a complex, uncertain business. The information sought is closely guarded, the investigative techniques employed to gather are often covert, the analysis is predicated on fragmentary pieces, and the result is usually a less than focused picture. It is not surprising then that retrospection often passes a less than stellar judgment on the actions of police agencies or the military where decisions were based solely on intelligence.

The intelligence dilemma that has been in evidence in several recent global cataclysms can be a common occurrence as dramatically popularized in recent times by events as disparate as the surprise attack on the World Trade Center or the failure to locate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. In the vast majority of instances, intelligence will not provide the whole picture. Thus, actions based on intelligence are often criticized in retrospect. Commonly known as intelligence failures, they can more accurately be labeled organizational failures – in most instances, an organization (or several of them) was deterred from procuring the required information for decision-making – either by the inaccessibility of the information, or a failure to obtain it, process it, and utilize it properly.

The Fundamentals of Intelligence

The intelligence process is often viewed as an odd fit in policing models and thus in its criminal intelligence application. This is largely due to its attempts to be pro-active. It is a much more difficult tool to utilize successfully, and to measure in terms of its success, than the more traditional police role of responding to and investigating criminal activity after the fact. Intelligence must be a clearly focused, managed activity if it is to satisfy its clients. In order to understand the nature of an intelligence failure or success, one must be intimately acquainted with the vital and interdependent steps of the criminal intelligence cycle - the processing of information into actionable intelligence for police leaders.

Intelligence management initiates the process via a priority setting exercise that is rigorously monitored. This top-down prioritization, based upon organizational objectives, is followed by focused collection that simultaneously satisfies the prioritized gaps while informing the process on emerging priorities. All of the collected information is scrutinized and evaluated – it is then collated according to organizational principles to allow for retrieval and use. All information is then subjected to the analytical function whereby information is transformed into actionable intelligence to be disseminated in a useable and timely way. However, the product seldom offers the whole picture. In studying its application, several imperatives emerge, essential components that must exist if intelligence is to make a positive difference in an organization. Intelligence requires:

- A wide field of vision with a significant degree of agility and flexibility;
- A well-managed process with accountability assuring efficiency and focus;
- A constant imperative to broaden and deepen the sources of information;
- Subjecting all information to astute interpretation – leading to renewed collection; and
- The ability to translate intelligence into informed action.

Impediments to the Intelligence Process

For as long as it has been practiced, intelligence has often suffered from several fundamental flaws. The tremendous impact of alleged intelligence failures in the past four years have popularized these flaws in an effort to “fix intelligence” in the post-911 world. This section sets out the primary impediments to the intelligence process, experienced by all intelligence entities, and reveals the possible consequences.

The selection and training of intelligence officers and analysts has not always ensured the requisite skills, including cultural competencies or awareness. Consumers or clients of intelligence were not always knowledgeable about the intelligence process. Collection has been limited by failures to set intelligence priorities, and through accountability, ensuring that tasking leads to adequate collection. As well, training deficiencies have led to inaccurate analysis or no analysis at all. The intelligence process has suffered from a crisis orientation that does not concentrate on future problems, and from information management problems such as the compartmentalization of information. These and other impediments are later elaborated upon.

OPP Intelligence in the Past

These impediments to success did not go unnoticed in the past practice of OPP intelligence. On the contrary, these systemic problems were the subject of successive reviews that underscored the fundamental flaws in the system. The problems were recognized in two internal reviews on the intelligence function, the Hawke Report (1992) and the Goodall Report (1996-97). The findings of both reports indicated several problems with the utilization of the intelligence function – issues related to the focus of the intelligence section, the need for strategic intelligence and briefings to senior command, required changes in deployment and in the roles of Regional Intelligence Coordinators, as well as required improvements in analysis. The Intelligence Review

Committee, led by Detective Inspector Bob Goodall, released its report in January 1997, and was heavily critical of the intelligence function.

In the past then, it can be said that, by the OPP's own assessment, fulfilling the intelligence mandate within the OPP was a problematic endeavour with many obstacles impeding success. The general direction of intelligence entities in the OPP Intelligence Section was to establish "projects" – that is criminal investigations on prioritized variants of organized crime based upon opportunity as opposed to organizational need. The main problem, from a managerial perspective, was that priorities were seldom established and poorly communicated. The OPP failed to establish its intelligence requirements and communicate these to its field officers. Other deficiencies were prevalent as well, and can be summarized as follows:

- Collection related to emerging issues was minimal.
- Active tactical and strategic intelligence analysis was seldom applied to any of the collection by the OPP. When analysis was employed, it was in the form of establishing time-lines and crime analysis.
- Several other impediments affected performance, such as low personnel complement, failure to corroborate/confirm contradictory information, training issues, lack of diversity in human resources, etc.

Most of the impediments were organizational and systemic in nature and these must always take primacy over individual inadequacies. A correction of systemic flaws can be highly effective in precluding the individual factors that lead to failure. In the recent past, the OPP Intelligence Bureau has worked to correct many of these systemic flaws, the subject of discussion in the next section. The recent testimony of Detective Inspector Don Bell in the Ipperwash Inquiry cited several of the deficiencies that afflicted intelligence operations in relation to that incident. These have been articulated in a chart in the appendix to this paper, as have the changes that have occurred to rectify the shortcomings.

Intelligence in the OPP Today

Intelligence in the OPP has greatly evolved in all aspects of its operation from the recruitment of personnel to the utilization of analysis, the setting of priorities and the operational procedures and reporting structures. The catalyst of this change is multifaceted but can roughly be ascribed to a recognition that intelligence needed to evolve away from the execution of criminal investigations toward the strategic acquisition of information and the production of intelligence to assist in recognized organizational objectives. Further, it needed to be an area that was rigorously managed. This change has also been assisted by broad ranging stimuli such as alterations in administration and management to a global repositioning of intelligence theory and practice as a result of perceived intelligence failures. The popularization of intelligence theory and practice, stimulated by the events of 911, prodded the forces of change and improvement.

As has been stated, intelligence is a difficult business. The achievements cannot always be claimed, nor can successes be easily measured. Further, the acquisition of the complete picture is seldom a realistic option when targeting covert criminal activity. The OPP Intelligence Bureau has recognized the need for improvement, and much change has been initiated. From the late 1990s to the present, the Intelligence Bureau has implemented changes affecting all facets of its work – from its overall approach to the composition and training of its members. These changes to improve service delivery include:

- A switch to an emphasis on strategic intelligence;
- An increased emphasis on and improvement of intelligence analysis;
- An operational shift to more rigorously manage the intelligence process through industry standards such as an annual prioritization and tasking regime;
- An administrative re-alignment to establish strict protocols for the routing, dissemination, collation and storage of intelligence information;
- The development of core competencies specific to intelligence officers and analysts, and specifically, the recognition of diversity and cultural competence as major assets
- Radically altered selection processes, and dramatic increase of formal training for intelligence officers and analysts
- Training for intelligence clients
- Access to Native Awareness Training
- Creating a single filter of information subjected to the intelligence process

Introduction

It is the intention of this document to provide commentary for a systemic review of the role of intelligence in the Ontario Provincial Police. It describes how the intelligence process works in the OPP – specifically how intelligence is collected, evaluated, analyzed and utilized. Using the issues identified during the Ipperwash Inquiry as a reference point, it articulates the significant differences between how the intelligence process worked in the past and how it works today.

This document offers an analysis of the intelligence function in the OPP by studying the intelligence function in five different components. The first component, entitled *The Intelligence Dilemma*, will introduce the tradecraft of intelligence and provide a general context for the process and its application. It will provide the underlying premises for all intelligence dilemmas by posing the questions, which must direct the process for any organization that seeks to be intelligence-led.

Section 2 offers a brief academic and operational description of the *Fundamentals of Intelligence*. It illustrates all the steps that an organization must go through if it seeks to utilize intelligence properly. It provides a basic description of a process that targets knowledge and follows a rigorously managed process to acquire that knowledge and incorporate it into a decision-making process in a timely fashion. Among intelligence professionals, there is no controversy over these fundamental steps in the process, and all major reviews have only led to increased emphasis upon them. At the best of times, intelligence is a difficult business fraught with managerial, administrative and operational pitfalls. These problems must be understood if one aims to effectively judge the success or shortcomings of intelligence.

Section 3, *Impediments to the Intelligence Process*, provides an account of systemic impediments to the intelligence process that can occur in any intelligence entity.

The next section, entitled *OPP Intelligence in the Past*, provides an analysis of the use of intelligence throughout the 1990s. In this timeframe, intelligence was not utilized as it would be today for a variety of reasons – these organizational shortcomings are viewed in the context of the times and the contemporary practice of the Intelligence Section.

The final section highlights *Intelligence in the OPP Today*. Intelligence Bureau and its internal and external partners are analyzed in terms of the enhancements made to the practice of the criminal intelligence process – how intelligence has changed and improved. Many improvements have been made and have led to an organization better prepared to include intelligence as an input in its strategic and tactical planning and decision making. This section incorporates a chart articulating the primary difference in operational practice between 1995 and 2006.

**1. The Intelligence Dilemma:
*Ensuring Effective Intelligence in Law Enforcement***

A necessary requirement for any organization to deal with a future set of possibilities and/or probabilities is that of accurate information for the purposes of decision-making. All successful private companies recognize this necessity: *What will the future hold? How do I prepare? What actions should I take? How do I mitigate risk and exploit opportunity?* This need for precise information is heightened dramatically when the consequences under consideration revolve around issues of public safety and security. In this realm, law enforcement, the military and/or security agencies scramble to acquire information, or processed information, i.e. “intelligence”, to allow for informed decision-making. Indeed, the accepted definition of intelligence-led policing connotes the production of an intelligence product to allow police leaders to engage in informed decision-making at the tactical and strategic levels.

Intelligence is a complex, uncertain business. The information sought is closely guarded, the investigative techniques employed to gather are often covert, the analysis is predicated on fragmentary pieces, and the result is usually a less than focused picture. It is not surprising then that retrospection often passes a less than stellar judgment on the actions of police agencies or the military where decisions were based solely on intelligence.

The intelligence dilemma that has been in evidence in several recent global cataclysms can be a common occurrence as dramatically popularized in recent times by events as disparate as the surprise attack on the World Trade Center or the failure to locate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. In the vast majority of instances, intelligence will not provide the whole picture. Thus, actions based on intelligence are often criticized in retrospect. Commonly known as intelligence failures, they can more accurately be labeled organizational failures – in most instances, an organization (or several of them) was deterred from procuring the required information for decision-making – either by the inaccessibility of the information, or a failure to obtain it, process it, and utilize it properly. Expert commissions mandated to audit the intelligence function have closely scrutinized the cause and effect of these intelligence quagmires.¹ Success and failure in the intelligence business often boils down to the correct positing of a series of questions pertaining to issues that lie at the heart of the craft of intelligence – questions that must be posed both prior to and following a critical incident to assess the performance of intelligence and its utilization. Some of these questions are identified in Section 2: The Fundamentals of Intelligence.


¹ In Canada, several reviews have scrutinized the function: McKenzie Commission, McDonald Commission, and, most recently the Arar Inquiry. The 911 Commission in the United States and analogous reviews in the United Kingdom have recently highlighted these issues.

**2. The Fundamentals of Intelligence:
*Practicing Intelligence in an Ideal World***

The intelligence process, as depicted in the intelligence cycle, is often viewed as an odd fit in policing models and thus in its criminal intelligence application. This is true for several reasons but none more than its attempts to be pro-active by engaging future problems and thus exercising the police mandate of crime prevention and/or crime reduction. It is at once a much more difficult tool to utilize successfully, and to measure in term of its success, than the more traditional police role of responding to and investigating criminal activity after the fact. This pre-emptive endeavour, in the interest of public safety, is not an easy one, nor is it broadly understood.

To be successful in the intelligence business presupposes the timely integration of several factors and competencies within a broadly deployed organization, such as the OPP. This development has often

proved difficult for the law enforcement community as it requires stringent management of the process.



Of paramount importance in intelligence is a clear understanding of the process and the cycle. Intelligence must be a clearly focused, managed activity if it is to satisfy its clients. In order to understand the nature of an

intelligence failure, or an intelligence success, one must be intimately acquainted with the vital steps of the criminal intelligence cycle. Each is mutually interdependent, resulting in a continual processing of information into actionable intelligence for police leaders. In effect, the standard steps and the measures included in each serve as a typology to assess individual intelligence operations, or incidents that did, or should have, involved a significant intelligence component: *Did we follow the steps? Was the process managed in a rigorous fashion? Was collection focused? Did analysis occur in a meaningful way? Were the correct questions asked? Was it disseminated and utilized by clients? Where did we go right/wrong? Is the process held to account, subject to review, and amenable to positive change?* Following this descriptive, more academic component, the intelligence activity pertaining to OPP investigations/operations will be analyzed using this typology. The components, and requisite action, are as follows.

1. *Intelligence Management: Setting of Priorities*

- a. Exercised by corporate leaders within a police organization and the intelligence arm specifically.

- b. Utilizes known and unknown information and/or intelligence to determine intelligence priorities for a given period of time – usually *per annum*.
- c. Requires managerial investment into the process to understand prospective threats and consequent intelligence priorities, their impact upon public safety, the significance of current intelligence gaps, and the likelihood of success in any intelligence operation.
- d. It is imperative for fiscal and operational expediency that management (once aware of all known information from a variety of stakeholders) drives the process, ensuring that intelligence collection follows managerial direction and is not left to operate in an undirected manner.
- e. This direction should go to the level of selecting/approving intelligence requirements and/or priorities - success is measured by the achievement of these goals.
- f. The process must be flexible allowing rapid shifts to accommodate burgeoning issues.

2. Collection:

- a. Collection goals follow directly from the establishment of intelligence priorities except in the exigency/immediacy of emerging issues.
- b. Involves the devising and execution of investigative techniques on established targets (e.g. surveillance, undercover work, source recruitment) with the satisfaction of specific requirements in mind.
- c. Requires not only the “collection” of the information but the accurate and timely reporting of the information, via a supervisor for the purposes of quality control, to an intelligence analyst.
- d. It should be noted that some steps must occur contemporaneously – this is the case with collection, collation and evaluation.
- e. All subsequent steps in the process presuppose adequate collection.

3. Evaluation

- a. Relies upon the judgment/knowledge/skills of the individual intelligence officers and their appraisal of received information.
- b. This step ascribes a value to two separate components: the validity of the information itself and the reliability of the source of that information. It affixes this value to all pieces of intelligence provided to the analyst according to accepted scales of evaluation. It is a “value-added” component wherein the officer has the opportunity to comment on the credibility/usefulness of covertly acquired information.
- c. Where this step is not completed, information is provided in a contextual vacuum without consideration of validity and reliability factors.

4. Collation

- a. The process whereby information and/or intelligence is stored and maintained in a logical manner for rapid retrieval. In the law enforcement and security realms, this step must be done in compliance with legal and regulatory norms.

- b. The primary benchmarks of this system include the guarantee that all information (in hard and/or electronic copy) is securely stored and readily retrievable via query by intelligence consumers.

5. *Analysis*

- a. Analysis is generally accepted to be the heart of the intelligence process wherein information of varying degrees of accuracy and/or credibility is transformed into intelligence. There are two forms of intelligence analysis: tactical and strategic. Tactical intelligence is an investigative tool, which provides support to investigators or operational units during the course of an investigation. It is designed to give a clear picture of the current situation and help investigators focus their direction and make real time decisions. Strategic analysis is a forward-looking long-term management tool that provides an overview of the scope and trends of criminal activity. It is designed to help the recipient make critical decisions, which can effect the future deployment of resources in an effort to deter or disrupt criminal activity.
- b. Analysis requires subject specific expertise, time, specific analytical tools and an organizational structure and culture to support its use. This last point may appear elusive but illustrates one of the greatest pitfalls of criminal intelligence applications – it will be discussed in the next section: Impediments to the Intelligence Process.
- c. The intelligence product is processed information that has been subjected to the scrutiny of the intelligence cycle. This cycle does not ensure accuracy, nor is it scientific. It involves the guarantee that the product being provided is actually “intelligence”. An intelligence client (e.g. an incident commander) will be the recipient of a great deal of information from a variety of sources. This information may be termed ‘intelligence’, although more accurately described as rumour, hearsay, or innuendo. An official intelligence document obviates this credibility gap by differentiating between a piece of information of unknown reliability and an established fact. An unofficial conversation which passes on information of unknown reliability may not make this distinction. These two commodities should not be dealt with in a similar way.

6. *Dissemination*

- a. Requires an awareness and willingness by intelligence officials to: recognize the prospective clients of their products; disseminate usable products to these clients in a timely manner; and work with the client to further refine intelligence requirements at all levels.
- b. There has been much criticism of intelligence officials regarding an apparent unwillingness to disseminate intelligence for a variety of reasons revolving around restriction or classification levels and the right to access. One underlying principle has evolved – that intelligence officials unofficially have promoted the principle of “need to know” which

restricts access to information from the end-user. The “need to share” is a much more relevant maxim that is now more regularly practiced.

7. *Action Taken*

- a. Requires that intelligence products are prepared with a client/consumer in mind and that the intelligence is provided to the recipient in a timely fashion so that it maintains value in use.
- b. A necessity exists that the intelligence has been scrutinized / evaluated and deemed usable. If intelligence is continually provided to a recipient with the proviso that it cannot be utilized, the client will quickly neglect to keep intelligence in the proverbial loop as there is no value-added from its inclusion.
- c. It is imperative that a culture of cooperation and collaboration exist in a law enforcement organization between those who produce intelligence and those who act on it – if not, this relationship cannot be forged/relied upon in time of need (e.g. in response to a major incident).

8. *Management*

- a. Requires constant, rigorous supervision of the process from the setting of priorities to quality assurance of intelligence reporting (quantity, quality, timeliness, relevance to mandate, dissemination to partners, value of products, utilization, etc.).
- b. Necessitates periodic reviews of intelligence operations to discern accuracy of priority setting, capability of collection, adeptness/veracity of analysis, etc.

To conclude the discussion of the intelligence process, it should be noted that the trade, as it is known, is a dynamic, cyclical process. The obvious goal is to correctly note the burgeoning threats of tomorrow, to discern the nature of those threats via covert collection, to subject multifarious pieces of information to expert analysis and create an intelligence product that allows decision-makers to make the right, or best available, decisions. Intelligence is a difficult business that requires the timely juxtaposition of several factors. The product seldom offers the whole picture. In studying its application, several imperatives emerge, essential fundamentals that must occur if intelligence is to make a positive difference in an organization. Intelligence requires:

- A wide field of vision with a significant degree of agility and flexibility;
- A well-managed process with accountability assuring efficiency and focus;
- A constant imperative to broaden and deepen the sources of information;
- Subjecting all information to astute interpretation – leading to renewed collection; and
- The ability/willingness to translate intelligence into informed action.

**3. Impediments to the Intelligence Process:
*How does Intelligence Fail?***

For as long as it has been practiced, intelligence has succumbed to several fundamental flaws related to the execution of its mandate. At times, these inadequacies have been the function of inordinate expectations from intelligence consumers, but often they have resulted from a less than rigorous managing of the intelligence process, leading to deficiencies in all steps of the process. While these systemic and organizational obstacles were once only the focus of intelligence specialists in western universities, the tremendous impact of alleged intelligence failures in the past four years have popularized the perennial flaws in the process in an effort to “fix intelligence” in the post-911 world. It is the intention of this section to set out the primary impediments to the intelligence process and reveal the consequences of these flaws. The list below is not exhaustive. It begins by citing the impediments that are more ‘micro’ in effect (e.g. selection of personnel) and moves to the macro level flaws that afflict entire organizations (e.g. compartmentalization).

Choosing Intelligence Officers & Analysts

- The choosing of intelligence officers/analysts/managers presupposes an awareness of the core competencies relating to intelligence, however selection has often been limited to a field of adept criminal investigators.
- Selection interviews have not always been specifically designed to select those most adept at intelligence, nor included practical assessments of how individuals would perform in the intelligence field or their possession of potential transferable skills.
- In intelligence work, perhaps more than any other, a variety of ethno-cultural and linguistic skills are required given the mandate of criminal intelligence officers. Concern arises when individual intelligence officers/analysts do not possess the historical knowledge, cultural awareness, linguistic ability and/or ethnicity to perform their function. Management, given the compromise to the intelligence collection mandate, must recognize these barriers and address them.

Training Intelligence Personnel

- Past training has been inadequate in addressing the needs of the criminal intelligence community. Intelligence personnel have not been provided with timely training and the knowledge to perform their function and duties to the highest standards.
- A connected problem has been the lack of capacity to address training issues. In other fields, such as sexual assault and domestic violence investigations, there is an absolute need for new personnel to undergo accredited training prior to beginning their duties. In intelligence, it was once commonplace for members to go years without having received the requisite training.
- The most important factor in intelligence training is instruction on the intelligence process itself to ensure, for example:
 - Priorities are set, not assuming that day-to-day opportunities will serve their mandate entirely;

- Priorities are not selected in a vacuum without a dialogue with/between intelligence clients;
- Analysis is not neglected in the process resulting in the fact that raw information is forwarded as a finished product.
- Intelligence products are disseminated with an understanding and commitment to the “need to share” philosophy.
- There are training issues within intelligence that affect areas outside of the intelligence entity itself. A consumer/client of intelligence must be knowledgeable in the uses of intelligence products and understand the difference between raw data and intelligence. Of note, in the past, intelligence has not been included in incident commander training courses and was generally not a part of the reporting structure of a major incident.

Stunted Intelligence Collection

- Collection is initiated by proper prioritization at the outset of the intelligence process. Thus it responds primarily to a directional statement from management both within the intelligence entity itself and the broader management team responsible for delineating their intelligence requirement. The first failure of collection (and therefore of subsequent analysis) is a failure to task intelligence officers in the correct direction.
- If intelligence priorities have been set, and properly communicated to the field, collection is still prone to failure due to a number of micro and macro phenomena.
 - *Accountability*, or a lack thereof, has plagued the efficiency of the intelligence process. While management may communicate its priorities to the field, secondary and tertiary levels of supervision do not ensure that this tasking actually leads to adequate collection. Actual collection may be swayed by more local and reactive investigative events. At the end of a given time period management will discover that its intelligence requirements have not been fulfilled – a chronic outcome.
 - An endemic *skill deficiency*, on an individual basis, has precluded adequate collection. This is a problem that has afflicted intelligence regimes from the CIA to the KGB, but also organizations such as the OPP. As stated previously, the ability to acquire covert information on sophisticated public security threats, and translate that information into meaningful intelligence that can be utilized for action, demands skills. This skill deficiency, and specifically the inability to recognize, locate, fine-hone, and utilize these skills, can be problematic for collection in all intelligence applications.
 - A lack of *innovation and/or creativity* has stunted the collection required for intelligence. At times this creativity is merely a careful consideration of how one might acquire the easiest access to required information and therefore be utilized as a conduit. This action might be as simple as utilizing an officer of the Ministry of Transportation to ascertain the contents of truck loads. That Ministry can access this information safely and inconspicuously without raising awareness among the targeted group. Conversely, the innovation may call for action that is more complex such

as the penetration of a long-term undercover officer and/or agent or the establishment of storefront operations to gain awareness of the targeted activity.

Atrophy of Analysis

- In most reviews of the intelligence process, the quality of analysis has been heavily criticized. In criminal intelligence the constant criticism is not that the analysis is/was wrong, the criticism lies in the fact that it did not exist, was improperly utilized or was directed at a problem after the fact. There is also concern that police managers have not always understood and valued the analysis process and therefore continued to rely upon raw data, at times resulting in the failure of criminal intelligence.
- Analysis can also fail on its own merits. While the analytical function is at the heart of the intelligence process, transforming raw data into intelligence, highlighting intelligence gaps and shedding light on options, it must rely upon its expertise to do so. In law enforcement entities, the individuals chosen for analytical duties have not always been chosen for their analytical acumen or other associated skill sets. This has, in the past, resulted in a lack of expertise, a lack of quality product and a self-perpetuating cycle of lack of influence in intelligence circles. This situation is now changing in law enforcement.

Conflicting Intelligence Priorities

- An intelligence entity must set clearly established priorities according to its strategic and tactical needs. In the absence of this priority setting, there is no established intelligence requirement and no guarantee that the system will satisfy the demands placed on it.
- The setting of priorities must reflect the organization's needs. This step can be problematic when the organization participates in a Joint Forces Operation, reporting to a Joint Management Team where the priorities have been set by the lead agency and are not reflective of all participating agencies.

Crisis Orientation

- Properly applied, the field of intelligence allows decision-makers to choose between various courses of action. As a general rule, the corporate decision-makers and intelligence professionals should have a general understanding of what the burgeoning intelligence issues are. Strategically speaking, intelligence should posture its organization to envision the looming threats and take pre-emptive action to understand them more thoroughly and mitigate and/or eliminate their effect.
- Too often, intelligence has not been properly postured, or utilized, to perform this function. As a result, management can be surprised by what is occurring and assigns intelligence personnel to events that have already occurred. While unfolding events will always hold surprises, and there is some value to intelligence personnel being attached to monitor and ascribe meaning to ongoing events, this is the effective result of an intelligence failure. At this point,

intelligence is reacting to events, and has lost the capacity to prevent and deter criminal acts.

Compartmentalization

- This is a perennial problem of intelligence – known as stove piping. Sharing must occur on a horizontal and vertical basis.
- The problem revolves around the storage of intelligence information in several disparate locations with no guarantee of access – worse still when this access is deliberately blocked resulting in organizational behavior that discourages sharing.
- This obstacle to success is best exemplified by the pre-911 norm of limited interaction between the CIA and the FBI. Thus, the prevention of compartmentalization became one of the dominant themes of the 911 Commission.

Utilizing Intelligence and/or Affecting Policy

- Requires a close connection between intelligence and operations (operational response based on intelligence) and/or management (in relation to affecting policy).
- In terms of utilization, past police operations rarely relied/acted on the intelligence products of the Intelligence Bureau. This is due, in part, to the distance between the two entities. This distance can lead to a lack of understanding on the role each of the entities plays, or worse, the development of systemic lack of confidence in the product of the intelligence arm.
- To believe in the utilization of intelligence is to believe in its relevance and its value. Intelligence deals with future probabilities and/or possibilities while operational individuals deem themselves to be dealing with the present – a set of realities that many hold to be more important than the near or distant future.
- Requires an early involvement and lasting commitment to identified intelligence priorities or emerging public security concerns, including ongoing collection and analysis. Intelligence and intelligence officers/analysts are integral from the onset of a project or major incident, and not after the fact when their basic utility, as intelligence officers, will be spent.

Pressures for Conformity

- There are various problems associated with the inherent desire for conformity. At times one organization, or part thereof, may produce information/intelligence indicating something of note. As a result of that received information, at whatever level of reliability/validity, other sources of information can begin to mimic the contents. The important thing is accuracy and confirmation of the accurate information from as many sources as possible.

Expectations of Intelligence

- One of the most significant obstacles to utilizing intelligence properly is the lack of a clear understanding of what intelligence can achieve for an organization and what it cannot, that is, a comprehension of the uses and limits of intelligence.

- Properly deployed and resourced, intelligence can be tasked with gaining a comprehensive snapshot of a potentially explosive situation, and the intentions of the participants. If an incident has been set as an intelligence priority by the organization, and if the intelligence requirements have been clearly delineated, there is every reason to believe that the information can be acquired in a timely fashion. Trained individuals, capable of delivering strong recommendations to managers, would then subject this information to intelligence analysis.

The foregoing section has documented the systemic impediments to success in the field of intelligence. They cover obstacles premised on an antiquated selection process for intelligence officers, a lack of understanding of the role of intelligence analysis, and a failure to emphasize that intelligence must be strategically poised and rigorously managed if it is to achieve success in its ability to inform decision-makers.

**4. OPP Intelligence in the Past:
*An Assessment of Organizational Performance***

As has been stated, criminal intelligence has oftentimes been an awkward fit in law enforcement models. Throughout the forty years since its creation, the OPP Intelligence Branch/Section/Bureau has been symptomatic of that odd partnership. While intelligence has always described a discipline that is to be focused on the pro-active collection of covert information for tactical or strategic use, law enforcement has often viewed intelligence as merely one more avenue to initiate and carry out criminal investigations. Further, when intelligence priorities have been established for collection, there has been no assurance that the information thus collected would be subjected to the intelligence process resulting in the sporadic provision of raw information. These recurrences were not simply a function of individual failures, nor of disparate, prevailing mindsets in the intelligence branch. They are indicative of an organization at large struggling with the implementation of one of its core functions – one vital to crime prevention, crime reduction and so instrumental in any strategy to counter sophisticated threats to public safety and security.

These impediments to success did not go unnoticed in the past, on the contrary these systemic problems were the subject of successive reviews that underscored the fundamental flaws in the system – flaws that undermined the proficiency of intelligence. It is the intention here to look at the positioning of intelligence, as it existed in the early 1990s. The first steps will be to offer a brief synopsis of two internal reviews on the intelligence function.

The Hawke Report

In April 1992, Detective Superintendent Gerry Hawke was selected to chair an Intelligence Review Committee with the stated goal of creating an effective and efficient intelligence service, responsive to the needs of the OPP and the communities it served. In addition to an internal review of current operational practices, many external agencies were consulted for input and ideas, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

In March 1994 the Committee released its report and recommendations. The findings of the report indicated several problems with the utilization of the intelligence function. In the end, the Hawke Report arrived at several essential recommendations to effectively deliver an adequate intelligence function in the OPP. They included:

1. Implement a stand alone “Intelligence Services” to create a pure intelligence component within the OPP with a clear and definite focus.
2. Redefine mission statement, mandates, goals and objectives to re-focus the newly implemented “Intelligence Services”.
3. Prepare an annual “strategic intelligence report” and provide regular briefings focused on recent crime trends to keep management informed and facilitate resource deployment.

4. Create a divisional intelligence function comprised of a Divisional Intelligence Officer (DIO) and strategic analyst to improve field level linkages.
5. Implement policy and procedures to ensure formal information flow is established.
6. Eliminate two intelligence units in North Bay & Kingston and establish joint forces where another force has primary jurisdiction.
7. Refocus the District Intelligence Coordinator (DIC) program away from being a district resource for tactical operations and toward a DIO that facilitates the workings of the DICs and improves their intelligence collection and dissemination function and addresses training requirements.
8. Upgrade computer technology to improve search capabilities and file transfer.
9. Have an "Intelligence Services" member sit on the GHQ Investigative Division Crime Management Committee and divisional and district crime management committees to provide them with a clear direction on where intelligence can support criminal operations.
10. Reduce provincial duplication by relocating the Outlaw Motorcycle Gang repository to CISO.
11. Audit the files section and purge duplicitous and redundant files to enhance integrity and utility of OPP intelligence files.
12. Introduction of two civilian analysts with ongoing evaluation and assessment to determine the benefits of this civilianisation of positions and enhance future hiring strategies.

The overriding conclusion of the report insisted that organizational change was required if the OPP were to create and maintain an efficient and effective Intelligence Service. This organizational change would only be successful, however, if senior management provided clear direction and allocated resources devoted to that mandate.

In 1993, the OPP began an Organizational Review project. This project, in effect, put all decisions and direction in regards to intelligence services (and other services) on hold while new deployments and structures were considered for the broader organization. The Organizational Review incorporated some aspects of intelligence, but in June 1996 a specific proposal was put forth from Management Committee to conduct a thorough examination of the entire intelligence process.

1997 Intelligence Review

The new Intelligence Review Committee, led by Detective Inspector Bob Goodall, released its report in January 1997. Again, the reviewing committee was heavily critical of the delivery of the intelligence function. Two of the most critical findings central to all of the issues uncovered during the review were: (1) That our own people generally do not know what intelligence is or what it does, and (2) That we tend to focus ourselves on issues surrounding regional boundaries, whereas criminals do not follow jurisdictional lines.

To resolve or address the issues uncovered during its review, the committee submitted 14 recommendations. They are as follows, by order of priority assessed at that time:

1. To ensure the timeliness of decisions and approvals, the Manager of Intelligence Section must address the Provincial Operations Committee on a semi-annual or as needed basis.
2. Strategic intelligence must be more appropriately linked with the Intelligence Section and report to that Section Manager, while at the same time retaining a distinct identity from tactical applications of intelligence.
3. GHQ tactical analysts should be deployed at each RHQ location to coordinate intelligence information from regional and deployed field services units.
4. Enhance provincial intelligence capabilities by establishing more units and mandating responsibility to gather intelligence on organized crime to field services units.
5. Creation of a CIB analytical component to eliminate the draw on the intelligence analytical function.
6. Establish better OPP and CISO liaison to ensure accuracy and continuity when strategic intelligence reports on a provincial or national perspective.
7. Improve information sharing by applying a more realistic approach to affixing restriction levels to intelligence reports.
8. When intelligence staff works within regional boundaries, they must involve regional command staff and Regional Intelligence Coordinators (RICs).
9. Establish protocol set out in Provincial Operations Strategy (March 1996) to ensure the Intelligence and Field reporting relationship is clearly defined.
10. Assign a full time intelligence analyst to CIB to gather intelligence information from investigative sections within the Bureau
11. Two regions were suggested to review the number and deployment of their RICs. Further, all regions were advised to ensure that RICs were not subject to operational re-deployment, that they were dedicated to the intelligence mandate full time.
12. Establish an in-house intelligence computer system linking all intelligence section units, investigation support bureaus, CIB units and detachments for intelligence information purposes.
13. Standards must be developed for the selection and training of intelligence personnel. As well, formal awareness of the intelligence gathering requirements for police work should be taught to OPP recruits as part of orientation.
14. Witness Protection and Informant Control Unit maintain control of numbering OPP informants with further recommendations related to policy and procedure.

By our own assessment, fulfilling the intelligence mandate within the OPP in the past was a problematic endeavour with many obstacles impeding success. The general goal of intelligence entities in the OPP Intelligence Section was to establish “projects” – that is criminal investigations on prioritized variants of organized crime. These priorities were only loosely defined and emanated from the Criminal Intelligence Services of Canada (CISC) via its provincial bureau, the Criminal Intelligence Service of Ontario (CISO). It was typical for the priorities to be established in a very general way (i.e. Traditional Organized Crime, Asian Organized Crime, etc.) and not specify the distinct criminal

organization, or the rationale for its prioritization. By virtue of a priority being established at CISO, they *ipso facto* became OPP priorities.

The main problem, from a managerial perspective, was that priorities were only set in a very informal manner if at all, and these very general priorities were poorly communicated to the field collectors. Further, the OPP did not establish local intelligence priorities, although as a leader in every intelligence JFO in which it participated save one, it was very much in a position to do so via the various Joint Management Teams (JMTs). The general systemic obstacles can be summarized as follows:

- ***Direction of the Intelligence Process:*** Failure to rigorously manage the intelligence process ensuring the establishment of intelligence priorities, suitable to the organizational direction and jurisdiction of the OPP. This initial fault pre-ordained additional difficulties including a lack of focused collection, a lack of intelligence analysis, and the subsequent lack of intelligent products that can be illustrated to have served the interests of the organization.
- ***Deployed Collection:*** The problem of collection emanates from the original managerial impediment. There are other problems related to collection such as an overwhelming concentration on tactical affairs – a concentration that robbed the organization of an ability to focus on strategic priorities. At times, this tactical concentration could be described as not intelligence work at all but merely criminal investigations being carried out by another arm of the organization.
- ***Analysis:*** Analysis was a major dysfunction, noted in all reviews. Until the establishment of the Strategic Intelligence Unit in 1995, strategic intelligence analysis simply did not exist in the OPP. Tactical intelligence analysis almost never occurred either since the nominal tactical intelligence analysts were occupied with data entry, crime analysis and the creation of visual aids for the Criminal Investigation Branch.
- ***Dissemination:*** Both reviews noted problems in dissemination from Intelligence Section to the field and then back. This is a serious issue that all intelligence entities face in that their inherent restrictions prohibit the sharing of their information with their actual clients. The intelligence then is self-contained according to the “need-to-know” rationale.

From the perspective of 2006, the most glaring intelligence failure of the past was systemic in nature. OPP management failed to set intelligence priorities appropriate to its mandate and jurisdictional responsibilities, collection was unfocused and analysis was virtually non-existent.

Several of these impediments to intelligence in the 1990s have recently been underscored in the testimony of OPP officers before the Ipperwash Inquiry. Specifically, the testimony of Detective Inspector Don Bell, in June 2006, articulated many of the failings he perceived at the time and in retrospect. They included: The lack of formal

prioritization, a paucity of confidential informants, a lack of centralized analysis, insufficient training and a willingness to view raw information on the same footing as processed intelligence. In the recent past, the OPP Intelligence Bureau has worked to correct many of these systemic impediments. These flaws (and how they have since been addressed) are noted in chart form in the appendix to this document.

5. Intelligence in the OPP Today

Intelligence in the OPP has changed a great deal in all aspects of its operation from the recruitment of personnel to the utilization of analysis, the setting of priorities and the operational procedures and reporting structures. The catalyst of this change is multifaceted but can roughly be ascribed to a recognition that intelligence needed to evolve away from the execution of criminal investigations toward the strategic acquisition of information and the production of intelligence to assist in recognized organizational objectives pertaining to the reduction and prevention of sophisticated criminal activity. Further, it needed to be an area that was rigorously managed and focused on organizational goals. This change has also been assisted by broad ranging stimuli such as alterations in administration and management to a global repositioning of intelligence theory and practice as a result of perceived intelligence failures. The popularization of intelligence theory and practice, stimulated by the events of 911, prodded the forces of change and improvement.

As has been stated, intelligence is a difficult business. The achievements cannot always be claimed, nor can successes be easily measured. Further, the acquisition of the complete picture is seldom a realistic option when targeting covert criminal activity. The OPP Intelligence Bureau has recognized the need for improvement, and much change has been initiated. From the late 1990s to the present, the Intelligence Bureau has implemented changes affecting all facets of its work including the overall approach, the composition and training of its members, its cooperation with the field, etc. These changes to improve service delivery have been articulated in chart form in the appendix but have been described in a more in-depth fashion as follows:

- **The Strategic Approach to Intelligence:** In 1999, the OPP recognized the need to implement a more strategic approach to organized crime and other significant public safety and security threats as part of a comprehensive crime strategy. The basic model accepted by the OPP involved the ongoing collection of all information and/or intelligence (whether from intelligence units, front-line officers, or specialized investigative units) and the forwarding of that information for intelligence analysis and the establishment of strategic and tactical intelligence priorities for enforcement and intelligence operations. By way of example, in relation to First Nations' issues, the Intelligence Bureau has a recognized intelligence analyst focusing on First Nations' issues that show a propensity to raise security concerns. At present, the analyst works closely with intelligence officers and Regional Intelligence Coordinators and is involved in the monitoring of various issues related to public security to determine threat levels, future ramifications and appropriate responses for law enforcement.
- **Intelligence Training:** Intelligence training provided by CISO in the 1990s was deficient. It consisted of an intelligence officer course and other basic courses that were more theory than practice based. CISO acknowledged the need to realign human and fiscal resources to address this training deficiency. In recent

years formal, accredited training and other venues wherein best practices are shared have increased tremendously. From the late 1990s to the present, intelligence training has dramatically improved with more training focusing on the analytical function of the intelligence process and the strategic application of the process. Courses now include a new intelligence officer course, an improved crime analysis course, a tactical intelligence analysis course and an enhanced strategic intelligence analysis course, as well as significant up-dates to the informant development course. A foundations course related to the recruitment of sources and agents is also under development. Intelligence Bureau has struggled with the availability and timeliness of training to new intelligence officers and is addressing this issue by hosting courses and outreach workshops that meet the training standards of CISO. These events also include invitations to other CISO/OPP partners and will occur with full CISO support in 2006.

Intelligence components have been added to courses such as the OPP Incident Command Course in relation to utilizing intelligence. Two presentations were made in 2005. Specifically, Incident Commanders were provided information related to available intelligence resources, the uses of these resources prior to and during an incident, and instruction on the differences between information and intelligence and the classifications of intelligence products.

All of these steps represent significant, measurable improvements in intelligence training and practice. The events of September 11, 2001 have further instigated a change in the quantity and quality of intelligence training. While these courses are often specific to terrorism, this new training stressed the importance of recognizing future threats and the importance of cultural awareness and sensitivity as well as the need for ethnic and linguistic diversity in the ranks of intelligence.

In terms of First Nations training and awareness, as of 2005 approximately 20% of Intelligence Bureau members had attended Native Awareness Training with more members slated to attend. It is a current organizational and bureau priority to increase this number.

It is a goal of the Bureau to improve awareness and communication with Aboriginal communities and work effectively with First Nations police services in order to create a better system of relationships with First Nations institutions and a better intelligence capacity. Although not directly related to training, but in support of the Mission Critical Issue of "Relationships with Aboriginal Communities", the Bureau's current Business Plan also outlines measurable goals for improvement and success in the near and distant future.

Of note, the Intelligence Bureau has initiated some of its own training and awareness sessions consistent with the OPP's Mission Critical Issues of "Relationships With Aboriginal Communities" and "Meeting the Needs of Diverse Communities". The Bureau has also authored an OPP study on the

establishment of intelligence priorities, and has initiated an orientation program and Standard Operational Manual for new members.

- **Composition of Intelligence Bureau:**

Intelligence Bureau has changed a great deal. This change is consistent with the Bureau's enhanced mandate to combat the sophisticated public security threats that exist in Ontario. In order to do this, the Bureau has established new job descriptions for all of its positions, re-articulated core responsibilities and provided a more accurate description of the intelligence process through amendments to OPP Police Orders.

- **Selection:** In recognition of the skill sets and core competencies required for work as an intelligence analyst/officer new selection techniques have been utilized. This often involves pre-interview research projects, assessment of intelligence quotients, tests geared to inductive reasoning and analytical ability, as well as the ability to assimilate large quantities of information and convey the salient points in an articulate manner, both orally and in writing.
- **Bureau Structure:** The Intelligence Bureau has been restructured to better meet its mandate and combat public security threats. While the analytical capacity had already been increased in the late 1990s, the new Analytical Section maintains a Strategic Analysis Unit of eleven members designated for strategic intelligence analysis. Further, new entities such as the Provincial Anti-Terrorism Section and the enhanced Hate Crime/Criminal Extremist Unit have engaged in considerable efforts to develop an integrated work environment that reflects Ontario's cultural standard and is more inclusive and tolerant of diversity. This OPP-led joint force initiative currently incorporates members from 11 different law enforcement and intelligence services; these members represent a wide-range of ethno-cultural backgrounds, language skill sets and diverse individual experiences/viewpoints. The Section is devoted to examining and understanding evolving patterns of terrorism and criminal extremism from both an international and domestic perspective and within a culturally diverse framework. By doing so, the Section has aligned itself with the Bureau's approach to intelligence collection and analysis in accordance with Ontario's changing demographic landscape.

- **Diversity:**

In recognition of the environment in which we work, the Intelligence Bureau has taken seriously its commitment to the OPP Mission Critical Issue of Diversity to complement the skills of its workforce and deliver effective policing services with respect and professionalism. In an effort to better understand the diverse communities we work alongside, Intelligence Bureau remains cognizant of recruiting members of a variety of ethnic backgrounds, heritages and skills bases to provide a more effective link and knowledge base to our policing inventory skills. To this end, the Bureau retains individuals from a number of culturally, racially, ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse backgrounds.

It is a priority for the Intelligence Bureau to ensure that its members possess a broad cultural understanding of Ontario's diverse population and to create a dialogue with ethnic communities that will seek to fulfill two important functions: strengthening public safety and security and creating a forum for the transfer of information. In addition, the Bureau is committed to integrating cultural competencies into its current practices and operations. Cultural competencies have been identified and supported through a variety of means including, but not limited to: encouraging cultural understanding through open dialogue, supporting mentoring initiatives and personal development, providing access to internal and external awareness programs (cultural/racial/gender/religious), recruiting officers with language assets and diverse skill sets and life experiences/perspectives and offering a strong leadership structure which values different opinions and insight.

- **Project 2017:** The Bureau is nearing completion of a strategic analysis project to understand how changes in Ontario's ethno-cultural composition will challenge the current practices of intelligence collection and investigation. More specifically, this project seeks to provide a future portrait of the OPP Intelligence Bureau; that is, the ways in which the Bureau will bridge cultural divides, communicate with a larger number of ethnically diverse communities, embrace initiatives to promote cultural awareness and recruit officers with diverse backgrounds and skill sets that will address business requirements.
- **The Role of Intelligence Analysis & the Development of Expertise:** Intelligence analysis lies at the heart of the intelligence process and converts reams of information, from countless sources, into actionable intelligence. As has been said, analysis has been undervalued and underutilized within criminal intelligence and the OPP has been no exception. In January of 1996, analysis in intelligence section occurred in two different units. The Strategic Intelligence Unit consisted of three members. The tactical unit, however, was almost completely engaged in reactive crime analysis and had no expertise in the specific targets of intelligence. This situation has dramatically improved.

The Strategic Analysis Unit is now comprised of nine Detective Constables, one civilian analyst and one Detective Sergeant. These individuals are chosen in a selection process designed to assess the core competencies of an intelligence analyst. As a result, following the receipt of their resume, they undergo tests related to their ability to assimilate information, their knowledge of the intelligence process and current criminal intelligence priorities. Further, they are required to provide examples of their writing ability and oral communicative abilities. Following selection, each member is directed into a specialized stream and area of geographic responsibility. In this way, analysts gain a level of expertise pertaining to a specific intelligence priority area as well as a responsibility to monitor burgeoning intelligence issues in a given area. Members of the unit carry on close liaison with all investigative entities within the OPP to

maintain an awareness of activity that could have an impact on intelligence priorities although not occurring in intelligence itself.

The Strategic Analytical Unit does not operate in a vacuum. It shares its responsibility for priority setting across the province with the members of CISO. The analysts are major players in the setting of province-wide priorities through the Provincial Threat Assessment. The analytical process ensures the appropriate, prioritized listing of criminal organizations and burgeoning public security issues in Ontario. The OPP Intelligence Bureau is represented by one member on each Joint Analytical Working Group to assess current and future-oriented security concerns. Further, the unit commander sits on the Joint Analytical Steering Committee approving intelligence priorities. These steps ensure a thorough approach to assessing intelligence priorities, and the advantage of having direct OPP influence and impact.

One of the fundamental results of the renewed emphasis on intelligence analysis is the fact that training and procedure ensure that all intelligence products are a result of the intelligence process – that is they are a processed commodity. No longer is raw information, that has not been subjected to the intelligence process, disseminated to intelligence consumers.

- **Prioritization & Tasking:** In every intelligence cycle, formal, institutional and accurate priority setting is the key to operational success: Success, in this case, is defined by the production of an intelligence product to inform police decision-makers on key intelligence issues at a tactical and strategic level. This first step has previously been lacking in criminal intelligence circles. It has now, however, been corrected in the OPP. In 2003, the Provincial Commander of Investigations and Organized Crime accepted the practice of Prioritization and Tasking. As a result of this decision, the Intelligence Bureau drafted an action plan for implementation – a plan that was presented to the Provincial Commander and intelligence stakeholders in January 2005. This new operational procedure has set a direction and annualized schedule for the establishment of intelligence priorities and the implementation of intelligence probes to act on these priorities.

External, Bureau & Region interaction and consultations:

- In 2005, following a request by OPP Intelligence Bureau as a partner in the London JFO Intelligence Unit, JMT members unanimously agreed to annually participate in a prioritization and tasking exercise. The first exercise occurred in February 2006.
- OPP Intelligence Bureau is currently in negotiation with National Capital Region police agencies to participate in a joint forces intelligence unit initiative. Ottawa Police Service has been identified to be the lead agency. All potential JMT members have agreed to the request from OPP Intelligence Bureau that an annual prioritization and tasking exercise occur to ensure each agency's priorities will be considered.

- Intelligence Bureau priorities are currently set via a process that relies upon input from all areas of the OPP including the six regions and external partners.
 - In the prioritization process, the Intelligence Bureau has undertaken to engage in self-critical reviews of all intelligence operations. This step ensures that all intelligence operations have an element of quality assurance and each is an improvement upon the last. The first such review occurred in May 2005.
 - Associated with the initiative of Prioritization and Tasking are new notions of accountability. Specifically, this requires the Intelligence Bureau to consider the measurements of success in any intelligence operation. These measuring sticks are not easy to quantify/qualify in the field of intelligence, but generally include disruption of criminal activity or initiation of a criminal investigation.
- **The Files Room Review:** In May 2004 a Files Room Review Committee was tasked with addressing issues relating to the collection, collation, analysis and dissemination of intelligence by members of the Intelligence Bureau. The committee was formed to respond to identified discrepancies regarding internal policies pertaining to the management of intelligence. Reporting templates and procedures being used by deployed intelligence units across the province varied widely culminating in inconsistencies that could have serious operational/legal ramifications. The four main issues which needed to be rectified included: production of a standardized Intelligence Report, production of a standardized File Control Register, a standardized procedure for routing and disseminating intelligence, a standardized method for tracking and retrieving intelligence reports. The Files Room Review Committee produced an intelligence issue paper entitled the Files Room Review Implementation Plan. The recommendations were implemented in Intelligence Bureau and put into practice in April 2005, and later shared with regional intelligence partners.

The implementation of the Files Room Review addressed all of the major administrative concerns previously identified. A standard memo style intelligence report was developed and is currently being used by all members of the Intelligence Bureau. As well, a standard file control register was developed for each deployed field location allowing units to track their occurrences in a centralized location accessible by the Reader, Intelligence Bureau Files Room. Central posting allows the Reader the ability to audit all registers on an ongoing basis and enables easier access to intelligence reports by analysts. A routing procedure for the submission of Intelligence Reports was also established. The current procedure ensures that all intelligence reports are routed, stored and entered on applicable intelligence databases in a timely and consistent manner. A requirement for tracking the dissemination of all Intelligence Reports has also been established. A final component pertaining to the coding or classification of information contained within an intelligence report has also been established and was implemented by January 2006. Information will be coded, where applicable,

at three levels: by Intelligence Priority, by Organized Crime Group and by Criminal Activity. This process will aid in the retrieval of massive amounts of intelligence that are currently being entered into intelligence database systems for use by both investigators and analysts. The mandatory procedures, which resulted from the Files Room Review, have been outlined in the Intelligence Bureau Manual to ensure a standard application by all Bureau members.

- **Intelligence Communication with the Frontline:** Intelligence Bureau has often been correctly criticized for failing in its mandate by neglecting to provide a tangible service to the uniform members of the organization. This downfall has been noted since the early 1990s. The reason offered for this neglect is the fact that intelligence information is subject to a variety of restrictions and classifications that inhibit sharing. These shortcomings have been acknowledged with a commitment to improvement. To accomplish this, the Bureau undertook to deliver numerous lectures on the Bureau and its activity, and other internal and external communication initiatives, including:
 - Business Planning goal of marketing intelligence not just within its usual clientele, but also within the organization at large.
 - Inclusion of Intelligence Bureau in Investigations/Organized Crime Command Bi-weekly Report received by all Managers within the Command. (Previously the Bureau's administrative and intelligence matters were only presented and discussed in the Command's weekly Bureau Commanders Meetings.)
 - Establishment of monthly Intelligence Bureau Managers Meetings with minutes distributed to all Bureau members and Regional Intelligence Coordinators.
 - Establishment of two intelligence-based web-sites on the OPP intra-net site providing front-line officers with information on intelligence issues and information specific to terrorism;
 - Enabling direct distribution of all Integrated National Security Enforcement Team unclassified bulletins to all OPP locations;
 - Initiation of Strategic Intelligence Bulletins, sent to all uniform members to educate individuals on matters pertaining to intelligence.

APPENDIX “A”
Summary of Changes to INTELLIGENCE 1995 – 2006

	1995	2006
<p>Management of Intelligence Process:</p> <p><i>Intelligence Priorities</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligence operations under local direction with no central focus – operations driven by opportunity; • No intelligence prioritization; • No central intelligence tasking; • No intelligence report backs to measure success or account for shortcomings; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annual Intelligence requirements established by rigid consultation including all aspects of the organization; • Intelligence priorities are approved by Bureau Command and tasked for collection and analysis; • Appropriate resources are shifted within the Bureau to allow appropriate operational response to target selection; • Establishment of Intelligence Priorities also occurs within a JFO environment to reduce duplicity, exploit partnerships and alleviate resource concerns; • Report backs to ensure accountability;
<p>Management of Intelligence Process:</p> <p><i>Strategic Orientation</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligence operations resembled criminal investigations; • They were project-based and very tactical; • They were unsuccessful in strategic application given tactical focus; • This was most evident in relation to predictable public security dilemmas; • The lack of a focused analytical 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The OPP pursues a strategic approach to intelligence operations, with prevention and mitigation as major objectives of intelligence operations; • Strategic priorities are chosen, approved and acted upon on an annual basis; • Measures of success have been selected and are monitored in relation to report backs; • Emerging issues not articulated in prioritization plans are recognized via analytical working groups on “emerging issues” and

	1995	2006
	function contributed to this shortcoming.	acted on by the Bureau;
Personnel Recruitment, Core Competencies & Intelligence Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligence officers were largely chosen from investigative crime units based upon their skill sets and performance in criminal investigations; • Intelligence training was not well developed, consisting of an intelligence officers' course and an analytical course that concentrated on crime analysis; • Difficulty getting training in a reasonable amount of time; • Diversity, cultural intelligence and competencies were not as highly prized as currently; • No training provided to intelligence clients as to the use of intelligence. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligence has developed core competencies specific to intelligence officers and intelligence analysts; • Intelligence attempts to promote and market its core function to increase interest among OPP personnel and recruit individuals with the requisite skill sets; • Intelligence has radically altered its selection processes for new Bureau members – they now often include aptitude tests, analytical tests, impromptu essays on areas of expertise, communications skills and practical exercises; • The formal training for intelligence officers and analysts has been dramatically expanded with increased access to training; • Diversity and cultural competence in the ranks of intelligence personnel is recognized as a major asset. • Intelligence training has also been enhanced in relation to intelligence clients. Key consumers of intelligence, including Incident Commanders, now receive training on the utilization of intelligence – including the evaluation techniques and the difference between intelligence and information. • OPP frontline officers

	1995	2006
		<p>receive intelligence training at annual In-Service Training sessions. Further the Bureau provides regular Strategic Intelligence Briefs including instruction on the intelligence process and how it is utilized in the OPP. The Bureau has also proposed the delivery of intelligence training to OPP recruits although this has not occurred as yet.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Bureau has now dramatically improved its relations with intelligence personnel in the regions via liaison protocols with the Regional Intelligence Coordinators. • Diversity and cultural awareness is now a prized asset in intelligence personnel. In 2005, 22% of Bureau members had specialized Native Awareness Training. It is a priority to increase this number.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligence Analysis was not recognized as an integral component in the intelligence process; • Analytical resources were sparse and not immediately assigned to intelligence operations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligence Analysis is seen as the heart of the intelligence process – the transformation point from information to intelligence; • Analytical resources have been increased dramatically in line with recognized best practices; and • Intelligence analysis (both strategic and tactical) is a primary component of all intelligence operations.
Intelligence Process:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligence products

	1995	2006
<i>Single Filter of Intelligence</i>	<p>products referred to intelligence reports that often consisted of “raw information”.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • These reports from Intelligence Section often competed with information from other sources; • Seldom was any of this information subjected to intelligence analysis; • There was no procedure for establishing an analytical focal point for dissemination of raw information and its translation into intelligence. 	<p>disseminated now have been subjected to the intelligence process – the information has been evaluated and analyzed.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When intelligence becomes an integral partner to a critical incident (at any point in its evolution) an analyst is attached to act as the filter/advisor to the Incident Command. • Attempts are being made to ensure that all intelligence operations are “led” by analysis.