

ELLIOT LAKE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

DAY 115

October 07, 2013



Neeson & Associates
COURT REPORTING AND CAPTIONING INC.

141 Adelaide Street West | Suite 1108
Toronto, Ontario M5H 3L5
1.888.525.6666 | Fax: 416.413.0230

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

ELLIOT LAKE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

--- This is Day 115 in the Inquiry proceedings held before the Honourable Justice P.R. Bélanger, Commissioner, taken at the White Mountain Academy of the Arts, 99 Spine Road, Elliot Lake, Ontario, on the 7th day of October, 2013, commencing at 9:00 a.m.

REPORTED BY: Deana Santedicola
CSR, CRR, RPR

1 A P P E A R A N C E S:
2 Bruce Carr-Harris, Esq., Commission Counsel
3 & Duncan Ault, Esq.,
4
5 Ernie Thorne, Esq., Ontario Professional
6 Fire Fighters
7
8 Richard Oliver, Esq., For the City of
9 Toronto/HUSAR
10
11 Paul Cassan, Esq., City of Elliot Lake
12
13 Norm Feaver, Esq., OPP
14
15 Shawn Richard, Esq., ELMAC
16
17 Kristin Smith, Esq., Government of Ontario
18
19 Keith Moyer, Esq., SAGE
20
21
22
23
24
25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

I N D E X

PAGES

WITNESS: ROB deBORTOLI

EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR.

CARR-HARRIS.....28371-28469

EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR. CASSAN.....28469-28470

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. SMITH.....28470-28487

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. MOYER.....28487-28490

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. RICHARD.....28490-28494

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. FEAVER.....28494-28497

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR. CASSAN.....28497-28499

WITNESS: RICK HAMILTON

EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR.

CARR-HARRIS.....28500-28565

EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR. CASSAN.....28565-28568

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. MOYER.....28569-28571

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. RICHARD.....28571-28576

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. FEAVER.....28576-28578

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SMITH.....28578-28583

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR. CASSAN.....28583-28584

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

INDEX OF EXHIBITS

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	PAGE NO.
NO. 9913	List of training received by Mayor Rick Hamilton.....	28501

1 -- Upon commencing at 9:00 a.m.

2

3 THE COMMISSIONER: Good morning,
4 everybody.

5 MR. CARR-HARRIS: Good morning,
6 Commissioner.

7 THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Carr-Harris.

8 MR. CARR-HARRIS: We are calling this
9 morning as our first witness Robert deBortoli.

10 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.

11 MR. CARR-HARRIS: Who, as you know, is
12 the Chief Administrative Officer for the City of
13 Elliot Lake.

14 THE COMMISSIONER: Come forward, sir.

15 MR. CARR-HARRIS: Would you come
16 forward?

17 THE COMMISSIONER: Good morning, Mr.
18 deBortoli.

19 THE WITNESS: Good morning,
20 Mr. Commissioner.

21 THE COMMISSIONER: I simply remind you,
22 sir, that you are still under oath.

23 THE WITNESS: Yes.

24 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

25 ROBERT deBORTOLI: UNDER PRIOR OATH.

1 EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR.

2 CARR-HARRIS:

3 Q. Good morning.

4 A. Good morning.

5 Q. Can we take it that your
6 background and qualifications and your position
7 with the City of Elliot Lake haven't changed since
8 you gave evidence earlier in this Inquiry?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. And you are still currently the
11 Chief Administrative Officer?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. If that is not true, we'll waste a
14 lot of time here today.

15 A. No, that is true.

16 Q. Now, we have heard the testimony
17 of Trudy Rheaume concerning the Emergency Response
18 Plan for the City, and as the CAO, could you
19 describe for us what you understand her role is?
20 As you know, she is the Community Emergency
21 Management Coordinator. So how do you see her role
22 in the emergency response scenario?

23 A. With respect to the plan?

24 Q. The plan.

25 A. With respect to the plan, Trudy is

1 basically the keeper of the plan. She is the one
2 who has been given the responsibility to ensure
3 that it remains up to date; that she schedules
4 training for the individuals who are part of the
5 CCG, and she makes any revisions as required to the
6 plan when required.

7 Q. So she is the key person in the
8 management and operation of the plan; is that
9 correct?

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. And did you yourself, Mr.
12 deBortoli, have any role in developing the plan?

13 A. Well, not per se in terms of --

14 THE COMMISSIONER: Just excuse me for a
15 moment. We are not getting the transcript and
16 neither are the interpreters and neither am I.

17 [REPORTER'S NOTE: Adjustments made to
18 audio-visual equipment in the Hearing
19 Room.]

20 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, now I see it.
21 Are you okay? Yes, they are okay back there.
22 Thank you. Go ahead, please.

23 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

24 Q. Thank you. So did you have any
25 role in the development of the Emergency Plan?

1 A. Not in actually the physical
2 drafting of the plan. That was Trudy's job, but,
3 of course, I was a contributor to the information
4 that was found in the document at the time that the
5 plan was conceived. I believe I was the Director
6 of Public Works, so we met on various occasions,
7 reviewing different scenarios that we may consider
8 to be different emergencies within this community,
9 and, you know, in terms of our roles and
10 responsibilities within the organization, how we
11 would make a contribution in the event that there
12 was an emergency.

13 And, you know, depending on where you
14 sit in the organization, you may or may not be
15 called to contribute.

16 Q. Okay. And under the plan, you are
17 a member of the Community Control Group? The CCG,
18 we have been calling it.

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. And were you required -- are you
21 required as a member to take annual training?

22 A. Yes. There is -- we have had
23 training exercises coordinated by Trudy on a
24 regular basis. I can't recall if it has been every
25 year, but there is certainly a list of the training

1 that has been conducted and who has received it.

2 Q. And at what point did you become a
3 member of the CCG?

4 A. Well, I have been a member of the
5 CCG, I think, since the implementation of the plan
6 as required under the Act.

7 Q. And have you met the training
8 requirements for a member annually, in each year?

9 A. I believe so.

10 Q. And can you tell us the kind of
11 training that you have had generally?

12 A. Well, we have had basic Emergency
13 Management training. We have had -- we have
14 participated in what we'll call desktop exercises,
15 for lack of a better term, in working through an
16 emergency. The last, I believe, that I
17 participated in prior to the collapse was the -- I
18 believe it was in the latter part of '11, or maybe
19 it was the early part of 2012, where we did -- in
20 conjunction with the hospital, we went through a
21 mock exercise relating to a bomb threat at the
22 hospital.

23 Q. Okay. And when you say "desktop",
24 you mean the exercise was really conducted in a
25 room as if there was a real emergency going on?

1 A. Correct. There is -- the group
2 gathers. The key players within the community that
3 would be involved in the emergency gather and run
4 through a table-top exercise.

5 Q. And how about IMS, we have heard a
6 lot about that. Have you taken any courses in IMS,
7 the Incident Management System?

8 A. I can't say -- I don't recall off
9 the top of my head if I have. I believe I have,
10 but I would have to check the list that has been --

11 Q. It didn't stick in your mind
12 overwhelmingly, I guess?

13 A. No. No.

14 Q. Can you tell us what it is,
15 generally describe it?

16 A. Sorry?

17 Q. The IMS system. Do you have any
18 general understanding of what the IMS system is and
19 how it works?

20 A. Well, basically, you know, it is a
21 function of our plan, and we attempt to be as
22 prepared as we can in the event that an emergency
23 should arise.

24 Q. And is that the extent of your
25 knowledge of the IMS?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Thank you. Now, can I just take
3 you to the plan itself. It is Exhibit No. 8090,
4 page 14. And if I have got that right, page 14
5 should be the list of members of the -- and really
6 the positions of the Community Control Group.

7 A. Sorry, what tab is that? 14?

8 Q. That is at tab -- it is at --

9 A. Yeah, I realize it is, but it is
10 easier for me to look at the book.

11 Q. It is harder for you to read on
12 that angle.

13 A. That is fine.

14 Q. Can you find --

15 A. No, that is fine. Go ahead.

16 Q. You are down for two jobs, Mr.
17 deBortoli, as I see it. You are the CAO, which
18 makes you the manager of the Emergency Operations
19 Centre under the plan; is that correct?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And you were also Director of
22 Operations on the CCG?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Can you break those down, tell us
25 what your responsibilities are generally in each of

1 those areas?

2 A. Okay. Well, normally this is sort
3 of an anomaly. You would have a separate
4 individual as a Director of Operations, but given
5 the challenges we have had in terms of acquiring a
6 qualified individual to take over the operations at
7 the Public Works sector, I have kind of remained in
8 place there for the time being as well.

9 So as a CAO, obviously, the EOC
10 manager, there are duties and responsibilities that
11 are outlined in the plan. You know, some of the
12 key ones are to ensure --

13 THE COMMISSIONER: Could I just ask you
14 to slow down a little bit?

15 THE WITNESS: Sorry.

16 THE COMMISSIONER: What you say has to
17 be translated. You are on a roll.

18 THE WITNESS: My apologies.

19 THE COMMISSIONER: It has to be
20 translated.

21 THE WITNESS: My apologies.

22 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

23 THE WITNESS: So basically as the EOC
24 manager, the responsibilities that are outlined in
25 the plan, basically some of the key duties would be

1 to ensure that the Community Control Group meets on
2 a regular basis. I would be responsible for
3 scheduling the meetings, ensuring that the people
4 are aware that the meetings are taking place, and
5 in the absence of either the Mayor or his
6 alternate, be the Chair of that particular meeting.

7 Another key function -- well, I
8 consider to be a very important function -- is the
9 responsibility for myself as the EOC manager to
10 liaise with the remainder of Council who are not
11 participating in the Community Control Group, to
12 keep them apprised of the emergency and what we
13 were being -- what is being done in terms of
14 dealing with it.

15 You know, there is -- in terms of the
16 Director of Operations, that is sort of very
17 specific to a certain sector of the organization.
18 Normally, the Director of Operations -- and I can
19 give you an example. We had a, we'll call it, a
20 catastrophic failure of our transmission line, our
21 water transmission line which delivers potable
22 water out to the new subdivision in the community
23 here, and at that -- as the Director of Operations
24 at that point in time, I called the Community
25 Control Group together because of the nature of the

1 incident dealing with linear infrastructure, which
2 is, you know, the mandate of the Public Works
3 Department.

4 So at that time, we were looking at a
5 potential of a part of the community being without
6 a supply of fresh potable water, and as a result,
7 took the necessary steps to activate the group. We
8 were fortunate we did not have to declare an
9 emergency in this case, and we were able to work
10 through the issues as well.

11 But there was logistics in terms of
12 organizing the repair work that needed to be done
13 and ensuring that we had the adequate resources to
14 deal with that particular situation.

15 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

16 Q. And as a Director of Operations,
17 that would be your job as well, if there were these
18 issues in terms of water supply or whatever might
19 also happen in this emergency situation; you would
20 also, as Director of Operations, be in charge of
21 dealing with that?

22 A. Yeah. Correct. I would be, you
23 know, sourcing out individuals required through the
24 Public Works Department to assist in the emergency.

25 Q. I understand. Now, when I said

1 you had the two jobs, you had said that is normally
2 not the case, so I take it what you mean by that is
3 it is preferable to have independent individual
4 people in each of those roles; correct?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. And did you find that you were a
7 bit overbusy in this collapse because you held
8 those two roles?

9 A. Not really. Anything that
10 required any participation with the Public Works
11 Department, I had a very strong backup persons who
12 actually the alternate that is listed on the page
13 there, the Assistant Director of Public Works
14 operations, so if there was anything that we
15 required as a result of this particular instance,
16 he was there and provided me with the support I
17 required.

18 Q. Okay. Now, in terms of the CCG,
19 how would you characterize the role of the CCG in
20 the emergency response?

21 A. Well, basically we are a group of
22 people coming together to deal with the emergency
23 at hand, and as you can see by the list, there is,
24 you know, members from the municipality; in terms
25 of the City of Elliot Lake, we have the emergency

1 service people who are also at the table, being the
2 police, the fire, the EMS, public health, et
3 cetera.

4 And it is by gathering these folks who
5 have an incredible amount of expertise in certain
6 sectors that we can effectively deal with
7 situations as they arise. And I think that is why
8 we have got that mix of people sitting on that
9 Control Group.

10 Q. But the CCG would not typically be
11 involved, for example, in this case the search and
12 rescue aspect of the response?

13 A. You are speaking --

14 Q. Technically?

15 A. -- members of the CCG?

16 Q. Members of the CCG would not be
17 typically -- the role of the CCG would not be to
18 run the HUSAR aspect of the emergency response?

19 A. No. We are there to assess the
20 information that is being provided to us as a
21 result of the on-the-ground folks who are actually
22 on the scene. I mean, if you look at, like, by
23 nature of the composure, we have the Fire Chief.
24 Now, he was very active and on the ground at the
25 scene, and he was also a member of the Community

1 Control Group. He was also the Incident Commander,
2 and so, you know, from that perspective, he played
3 a very active role not only in the CCG, but in
4 coordinating the rescue/recovery as well.

5 Q. But in the CCG, for example, the
6 Fire Chief and the OPP officer, they are there to
7 give you updates on what is going on?

8 A. As a member of the CCG, yes.

9 Q. Yes. But in terms of supplying
10 you, for example, if the emergency response needed
11 some specific logistics, you would be the ones or
12 one of your people there in that zone would make
13 sure they had the proper support?

14 A. Correct. And I can use an
15 example. Again, I'll just go back to the Director
16 of Operations, and if we have a situation that
17 would require, for instance, people to be
18 transported for whatever reason, evacuation, et
19 cetera, that needed to be moved to another location
20 in the community or outside, because the Director
21 of Operations is responsible for transit
22 management, he would have the contacts with the
23 transit local -- transit contractor whereby that
24 individual would source out or delegate the
25 sourcing out of transportation for that

1 particular --

2 Q. So to sort of summarize it, the
3 CCG is there to support the search and rescue
4 mission with whatever they need.

5 A. Well, the CCG is there to assess
6 and gather information with respect to the
7 emergency and to hopefully, through the input of
8 the experts that are on the ground, provide an
9 effective solution to the problem.

10 Q. I'm not sure you answered my
11 question, but --

12 A. All right. Maybe if you want
13 to --

14 Q. I'm trying to draw a line here
15 between the actual work in the collapse and what
16 sometimes these rescue people and recovery people
17 need; for example, transit, hotels, these kinds of
18 things. They are done by others from the City --

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. -- and from the CCG; correct?

21 A. To answer your question, that
22 would be yes. If somebody from HUSAR came to us
23 and said they needed something, it would be upon
24 one of us to find out the source of what they are
25 requesting. Lumber, we would send somebody to a

1 hardware store, et cetera.

2 Q. And your other big role is to keep
3 the public informed of what is going on; correct?

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. Now, these CCG meetings,
6 Mr. deBortoli, what was the format for them?

7 A. Are you -- with respect to the
8 emergency?

9 Q. Yeah. When you have a CCG
10 meeting, and is there a format? We have heard
11 roundtable approach.

12 A. Yes, that would be a fair
13 assessment. Of course, as I mentioned earlier, the
14 Mayor is the Chair of the CCG, and basically the
15 format would be that once the meeting has been
16 called to order, he would basically do a roundtable
17 in terms of the positions you see on that list
18 there and any others who may have been invited into
19 the room. And we would do -- you know, each of the
20 members would provide an update based on their area
21 of responsibility with regard to the emergency.

22 Q. And this is why you would have
23 regular CCG meetings, to be updated on what is
24 going on; correct?

25 A. Correct.

1 Q. And you did have a number of
2 meetings certainly in the early days, regular
3 meetings through the day?

4 A. We had several meetings during the
5 course of the emergency, yes.

6 Q. Now, how did you first learn of
7 the collapse, Mr. deBortoli? How did it --

8 A. Well, I was at home on Saturday
9 afternoon preparing for -- we were having a family
10 get-together at the house, and I was just, you
11 know, going about doing the regular things that
12 dads do for that kind of thing. And I got a phone
13 call from the fellow who was left in charge or was
14 left with the phone for Public Works that day to
15 respond to any, you know, emergency that may come
16 up.

17 Normally, you know, we do get the odd
18 call on a weekend, you know, if there is a pothole
19 or a water main break or somebody needs to have the
20 water turned off at their house because they
21 attempted some plumbing and burst a line, whatever.
22 But anyway, he called me, and it was shortly after,
23 I believe, around 2:20 or so that he called to ask
24 a favour of me to get somebody to go to the mall to
25 turn the water off because he had been called with

1 that request.

2 And he was a little inconvenienced at
3 the time and just was asking me to do him a favour.
4 I obliged. Obviously, it wasn't a big ask, and all
5 I needed to do was really get a directory of phone
6 numbers to give the appropriate person a call to go
7 and turn off the water.

8 I went down to the -- I decided to go
9 down to the office, the Public Works office to --
10 because that is where the list is kept, so I went
11 down there to make the call, and on my way down
12 there, I decided to stop at the mall just to
13 investigate what was going on, and obviously when I
14 pulled up, I saw the police cruiser was parked at
15 the entranceway from the municipal parking lot into
16 the mall. I looked around and, yes, there was
17 water on the ground, but it didn't seem to be --
18 you know, what I was normally -- what I was
19 anticipating to see in terms of water. I was
20 thinking of a water main break. That is why people
21 usually call you to have the water turned off.

22 So I went up to the officer and I just
23 asked him about the -- you know, the nature of the
24 call, and he then described to me that the roof in
25 the mall had collapsed. And I was, again, not

1 thinking in terms of a structural failure. I was
2 assuming that something had gone wrong with the
3 sprinkler system, and perhaps the ceiling tiles
4 were all over the upper deck of the mall. But he
5 readily -- when I offered that as my assessment, he
6 said "No, no. That is not correct at all. It is
7 the rooftop parking lot has fallen down into the
8 lower level."

9 Of course, that was shocking to hear
10 that, but I immediately left the scene and went to
11 get the appropriate personnel to come out and deal
12 with having the water turned off at the mall.

13 Q. And so the water was turned off?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. And did you, at some point, go to
16 the collapse site yourself?

17 A. I did. Once I got the individual
18 lined up to come and turn the water off, I returned
19 to the mall site and actually ventured onto the
20 property in terms of going around to the drive-up
21 area that comes to the front door, basically, I
22 guess you would describe it, to the hotel and the
23 mall.

24 Q. You are talking about the --

25 A. Right where, yeah, in the picture

1 here where that yellow truck is parked.

2 Q. You are indicating on the exhibit
3 -- sorry -- Exhibit No. 2115, the main entrance
4 where the yellow fire truck is parked in that
5 picture?

6 A. Yeah, that's correct. That is
7 actually a Public Works vehicle. And that is -- I
8 made my way around there, and that is when I spoke
9 with Chief Officer. He was on the scene, and, you
10 know, I got a little bit more of the detail as to
11 what was going on and --

12 Q. And what did he tell you at that
13 point?

14 A. Well, obviously, you know, it was
15 fairly obvious what had happened and that -- you
16 know, he had mentioned that there were people.
17 They suspected there were people trapped under the
18 rubble. The numbers were uncertain at that point
19 in time, but definitely they were aware of that
20 circumstance.

21 And immediately we -- you know, in
22 talking with the Chief and some of the others, we
23 thought that perhaps they would be able to better
24 assess the consequences of the collapse or the
25 impact of the collapse by getting a camera that is

1 used to probe sewer pipes. So they were trying to
2 get it into the rubble pile to see if they could
3 find anything in the voids or get a better view of
4 what was beneath the rubble --

5 Q. Forgive me for interrupting, but
6 what time of the day is that now that you were
7 having this explanation from Chief Officer?

8 A. Yeah. This was shortly after I
9 returned to the site, so I would say, you know, it
10 was probably 2:35, 2:40, maybe quarter to 3:00,
11 something like that.

12 Q. Okay. And so what happened next?
13 Had the CCG been activated by this point?

14 A. Well, I believe that -- yes, by
15 the time I received the first call at home, I
16 departed. Other calls had come in, and the CCG had
17 been activated by the Fire Department themselves.

18 So the calls had been made, and people
19 were starting to come to the control centre.

20 Q. Now, going to the community
21 operations centre, I understand that notes were
22 taken by various scribes at the meeting, CCG?

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. And am I correct that Natalie Bray
25 was the scribe for the CCG?

1 A. She was what we would call the
2 Duty Officer, and as part of her role as Duty
3 Officer, she is to keep notes of -- or records of
4 the, you know, the undertakings and the
5 conversations that are happening in the Community
6 Control Group.

7 Q. And you had an opportunity to
8 review her notes and have you, obviously, since the
9 day?

10 A. Yes. Well, we have gone through
11 several sets of notes, yes.

12 Q. Yes. And have you found them to
13 be generally accurate?

14 A. I find there is a general
15 consistency that relates between all the notes that
16 were taken at that particular point in time.

17 Q. But in terms of her notes, she is
18 part of that --

19 A. I'm very confident that they
20 accurately reflect what transpired.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 THE COURT REPORTER: Mr. deBortoli, I
23 will just remind you to please wait for the
24 question to be completed before you answer. Thank
25 you.

1 THE WITNESS: My apologies.

2 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

3 Q. We'll get better at this.

4 So the first, I understand it, CCG
5 meeting was at 3 o'clock that day, June 23rd. Is
6 that correct, to your knowledge?

7 A. That's -- yes.

8 Q. And we have heard evidence, and
9 would you agree that the City declared an emergency
10 at 13:55 or 1:55? I'm sorry. 15:55 that day,
11 which would be 3:55 p.m., was the time of the
12 declaration of the emergency?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Does that accord with your memory?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And then if we go to Exhibit No.
17 1 or, sorry, Exhibit No. 8114, this should be a
18 chronology, yes, of events on that day. If you
19 start at the top at 15:09 -- or not at the top, but
20 one below, it indicates -- and I just want you to
21 -- whether you take any issue with the timeline
22 indicated in this chronology. 15:09, it is
23 recorded that:

24 "Provincial Emergency Operations
25 Centre receives call from Elliot

1 Lake Fire requesting Office of the
2 Fire Marshal/Heavy Urban Search and
3 Rescue assistance following the roof
4 collapse [...]"

5 And reports -- and I am paraphrasing --
6 at least one person believed to be trapped, no fire
7 or explosion.

8 Do you accept that time frame as the
9 first contact they had at the PEOC?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And then at 15:18, dropping down:

12 "DOC advises community to submit
13 declaration of emergency, along with
14 HUSAR request in order to facilitate
15 [...]"

16 Et cetera.

17 And then it says that at 16:03:

18 "Declaration of Emergency received
19 from Elliot Lake by fax."

20 Which would be eight minutes after,
21 roughly, the declaration at the CCG that day.

22 So do all those numbers concur with
23 your recollection, sir?

24 A. Yes. That is an accurate
25 chronologically series of events, chronological

1 order of events, yes.

2 Q. And this document, I believe, is
3 prepared by one of the government, if not the PEOC,
4 then someone else, but in any event, you are
5 satisfied with the timeline?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now, could we go, then, to Ms.
8 Bray's notes, which is Exhibit No. 3743. It is at
9 tab 201-B. It begins on June 23rd, again, at the
10 3:00 p.m. meeting. At about two-thirds of the way
11 down, it says:

12 "Not necessary to declare an
13 emergency right now."

14 You were present during that exchange,
15 Mr. deBortoli?

16 A. Yes, I was.

17 Q. And what is the meaning of that,
18 that they weren't going to declare the emergency?
19 At this point, you had seen the collapse, and it
20 was obviously a major issue. Why was there not an
21 immediate declaration of an emergency?

22 A. Well, first of all, we wanted to
23 ensure that we were following the correct procedure
24 and protocol in order to establish and declare an
25 emergency. Obviously, this isn't something we had

1 been involved with before, and I believe at this
2 time, we were just continuing our assessment
3 before -- you know, I think there was a strong
4 indication that an emergency would be declared, but
5 at 3 p.m., at that particular point in time, we
6 were still sorting through the process of doing the
7 declaration.

8 Q. You wanted to make sure you
9 touched all the bases?

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. And had you received specific
12 training on how to initiate the process of
13 declaring an emergency prior to the collapse?

14 A. Well, in general terms, yes. I
15 mean, I knew we had to -- there was documentation
16 that had to be filled out and submitted to the
17 Province, and we knew, obviously, that the CCG had
18 to be called together, and that it is the Mayor,
19 and the Mayor himself, who will declare the
20 emergency once we have a group discussion and the
21 decision is made.

22 So, yeah, the basics were there. We
23 had to, you know, go through and obtain the proper
24 forms, so talk to some of the people at Emergency
25 Management Ontario to ensure that we were doing

1 things properly, because we wanted to ensure that
2 we were, you know, placing ourselves in the best
3 possible position that we could be in this
4 situation.

5 Q. Had you ever actually gone through
6 the exercise of it is an emergency, give me the
7 forms, walk through and so on, that sort of steps?

8 A. Personally myself? No.

9 Q. No, okay. Now, I take it that,
10 and it certainly appears from the notes, that you
11 got regular reports on June 23rd about what was
12 happening on the site, on the collapse scene; is
13 that correct?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. And if you go to page 1 of Exhibit
16 No. 3743, tab 201-B, we will refer to some
17 references in this document. At page 1, about
18 two-thirds of the way down, this is now very early
19 on in the part of the CCG meeting. It says:

20 "Rob to talk to Chief and report
21 back."

22 What was that in reference to?

23 A. That was in reference to one of
24 the many times I would talk to the Fire Chief on
25 particulars that were going on at the scene and

1 bring information back to the group.

2 Q. And that was just, then again,
3 your general role to get information and bring it
4 back?

5 A. I spent a lot of time -- because I
6 wasn't actively involved in the rescue operation
7 itself, I did spend a lot of time trying to ensure
8 that I was aware of what was transpiring on the
9 ground and making sure that the people in the room,
10 not necessarily at meeting times, but on a regular
11 basis, were kept up to speed with what was going on
12 out in the field as well.

13 Q. Okay. And now the next to speak
14 is at 4:20 on the same page, next down. It says --
15 it has "OPP Percy Jollymore".

16 I take it he is now speaking, and the
17 notes under that part are referable to him. Is it?
18 Are they?

19 A. Yeah, that is Percy Jollymore.

20 Q. Right. And he was there on behalf
21 of the OPP?

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. As their representative. And he
24 says, going over to page 2:

25 "2 trapped people in kiosk area.

1 One female talking".

2 And then it looks like:

3 "[Shuffed or stuffed] concrete --
4 can't hear her anymore".

5 We have another reference, which may
6 help to clarify that, but to get your memory first,
7 you recall what that was a reference to? For
8 example, does it say "shuffed concrete", which
9 would be meaningless, or does it say "shifted
10 concrete"?

11 A. I would assume that may be
12 referencing "shuffed concrete", or I think that
13 was making reference to perhaps the concrete had
14 been -- portions of concrete had been moved, and
15 once that happened, there was obviously -- the next
16 part of the note says that there was no longer any
17 sound coming from that area.

18 Q. In other words, it was being
19 suggested that the shuffling or shifting of the
20 concrete may have resulted in no further contact
21 from the victim?

22 A. I don't think it suggests that. I
23 think it just suggests that an action took place
24 after hearing a voice, and after that action, the
25 voice was no longer heard.

1 Q. And what do you draw from that,
2 that statement as a possibility?

3 A. Well, there was no more verbal
4 communication with the person in the rubble pile.

5 Q. And can I just take you to what is
6 Exhibit No. 7965, which are I believe -- and before
7 I ask you any questions, we have had evidence on
8 this previously, but there was a flip chart kept in
9 the EOC as well as whatever notes the scribes were
10 taking; is that correct?

11 A. Yeah. For a certain point in
12 time, there was somebody scribing onto a flip
13 chart, yes.

14 Q. Do you know whose handwriting is
15 in the document that is in front of you, Exhibit
16 No. 7965?

17 A. No, I do not.

18 Q. It is not the regular scribe's
19 handwriting?

20 A. It is not Natalie's handwriting.

21 Q. No?

22 A. I don't believe it is. There were
23 -- Elizabeth Lewis did some and made some entries
24 onto the flip chart as I --

25 MR. CASSAN: I'm not sure if it

1 matters, Mr. Commissioner, but those are Elizabeth
2 Lewis's notes.

3 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

4 Q. And thank you. Who else made
5 notes beside Elizabeth and Natalie?

6 A. I believe Leslie Sprague also may
7 have been involved.

8 Q. So if you go down, these are
9 photographs taken by the OPP at the time, after the
10 collapse of what was on the flip chart, but you
11 will see this page, the bottom page, matches fairly
12 precisely at the bottom of the page, which is page
13 1 in Natalie's notes, that you have just been
14 referred to; do you see where I'm saying? That if
15 you look at Exhibit No. 3743, page 1, it says:

16 "4:20 [...]"

17 Are you with me?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. (Reading):

20 "OPP Percy Jollymore [...]"

21 And then it goes over to the top page,
22 the next page. And could you put us back on
23 Exhibit No. 7965, please, Ms. Kuka?

24 And you will see it pretty much follows
25 the same "4:20, Percy Jollymore", and even in the

1 language:

2 "2 trapped people kiosk area. 1
3 was talking but concrete shifted and
4 cannot hear them anymore."

5 So does that make sense that was what
6 was attempted to be recorded in Ms. Bray's notes as
7 well?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Now, you also knew from this note,
10 obviously, that there were two people trapped in
11 the rubble, according to Inspector Jollymore's
12 report; correct?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. Then could I take you to page 3?

15 MS. KUKA: On this exhibit?

16 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

17 Q. This is Exhibit No. 3743. And at
18 the bottom left, you will see 4:40, which it says:

19 "4:40 -- confirmed death?

20 Code 5 [...]"

21 What does "Code 5" mean?

22 A. I'm not aware what Code 5 is in
23 reference to. I know what was told to us that day
24 in the room is that they had located the arm or
25 hand of the victim, and there were -- the vital

1 signs were absent.

2 Q. Thank you. And it says in the
3 note:

4 "Not confirmed".

5 Do you know what that means?

6 A. Sorry, I am not following you.

7 Where are you?

8 Q. As you said, the same place, 4:40,
9 that you had a person there --

10 A. Oh --

11 Q. -- vital signs absent, and there's
12 a foot and so on, and from evidence we have heard
13 Code 5 means deceased.

14 A. Okay. Well --

15 Q. And presumably at the time, you
16 had, whether you knew that or not, but when you:

17 "Located an arm [...] not
18 confirmed".

19 What is that in reference to?

20 A. I believe that was a reference to
21 whether or not the victim was still alive.

22 Q. And who was the EMS?

23 A. The EMS was represented by Henry
24 Allamanchuk, I believe.

25 Q. And do you know who the EMS, the

1 one that actually took the pulse at the time?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Ron Hamlin, does that ring any
4 bells?

5 A. Yes. He was -- I remember him
6 being present.

7 Q. And if he had pronounced a person
8 deceased, in light of his experience, would you
9 have accepted that as confirmation that the person
10 was deceased?

11 A. Well, I don't think he -- his
12 intention was to confirm that the victim was, in
13 fact, deceased. I think that the vital signs
14 absent were given to us as a reference to that,
15 what they had to work with at that particular point
16 in time, which was just an arm. There was no pulse
17 in that particular appendage. It doesn't
18 necessarily mean that the person would be deceased
19 at that particular point in time.

20 Q. You would expect that that person
21 could get up out of the rubble and walk away?

22 A. No.

23 Q. So what are you --

24 A. I'm just saying that there could
25 be circumstances where a pulse may not be present

1 in an appendage due to the appendage being crushed,
2 perhaps. And I am no expert on this, but I'm just,
3 you know, trying to use common sense in this
4 approach and say that perhaps the pulse in that
5 particular appendage was not present, but it
6 doesn't necessarily mean that the person whose arm
7 that was deceased at that particular point in time.

8 Q. Well, is it not a pretty far reach
9 to suspect that somebody with vital signs absent
10 are going to get up and walk away?

11 MR. CASSAN: Mr. Commissioner, I have
12 an objection to this line of questioning. We
13 haven't established that Mr. deBortoli has any
14 medical training at all. We have established that
15 he was not one of the emergency responders. He is
16 the CAO. We have heard his role in the CCG. And
17 these questions, frankly, are more appropriately
18 put to the first responders or to Inspector
19 Jollymore being asked. For this witness to
20 interpret what Inspector Jollymore said, we don't
21 know where he got that information, and I'm just
22 concerned of the weight and value of this evidence
23 and, frankly, putting this witness in a position
24 where he is trying to assist the Commission, but,
25 frankly, it is beyond his experience.

1 THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Carr-Harris?

2 MR. CARR-HARRIS: Your Honour, I think
3 as the head of the EOC and the person present to
4 hear this conversation, I'm asking him why the
5 death was not confirmed based on the facts that are
6 contained here and in the record. And I am looking
7 for his opinion.

8 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

9 Q. Are you able to make such an
10 opinion?

11 MR. CASSAN: If that is the question, I
12 have no objection to that question, but getting
13 into the technicalities of the rescue and where --

14 THE COMMISSIONER: You are not giving
15 me much of an opportunity, Mr. Carr-Harris, to make
16 a ruling, but I gather that Mr. Cassan does not
17 object to that general question. And perhaps we
18 ought to limit it to that at this point.

19 MR. CASSAN: Thank you,
20 Mr. Commissioner.

21 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

22 Q. And so in terms of this, what you
23 knew on that day, what you have told us, that it is
24 a Code 5, located an arm with no vital signs, and I
25 have asked you why it was not confirmed, and I take

1 it your answer is that the person may still be
2 alive; that is your view?

3 A. Well, that is my view, and also
4 the fact that I think we were relying on the input
5 of a coroner to actually make the official
6 announcement of a deceased individual once they
7 were found.

8 Q. You mean eventually, not --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- right there?

11 A. No, correct.

12 Q. And I am not talking and asking
13 you about the official statement of the coroner,
14 which is a different matter.

15 A. Uhm-hmm.

16 Q. I'm just asking you from the
17 standpoint of an intelligent person sitting on the
18 CCG. When you received this information, do you
19 not believe that this person is deceased?

20 A. Well, it does provide an
21 indication that could lead you to believe that that
22 is the case. However --

23 Q. Is that a yes or no in your case?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Which? Do you believe that when

1 you got this report, there was a deceased person in
2 the rubble?

3 A. Given the evidence, it was my
4 interpretation that we were probably dealing with a
5 deceased individual; yet we had not yet confirmed
6 that that was the case.

7 Q. And when you say that, you mean in
8 the official coroner sense, that the coroner had
9 seen the body and declared them deceased?

10 A. No. I mean it in the sense that
11 we weren't -- given what we have seen here before
12 us, we were not -- I was not, anyway, yet prepared
13 to jump to that conclusion.

14 Q. That she was deceased?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. You just told me that you thought
17 she was, but it hadn't been confirmed.

18 A. Okay. That --

19 Q. Is that the right answer?

20 A. That the person was not confirmed
21 deceased.

22 Q. Now, can I take you to page 4 of
23 Exhibit No. 3743. And you will see just at the
24 top, this is now at the 5:05 meeting; correct?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And the OPP, again, is this
2 Inspector Jollymore under "OPP"?

3 A. I would assume that he would be
4 giving that report, yes.

5 Q. And he says at the bottom of the
6 first paragraph:

7 "2 trapped locations are known".

8 So did you understand that to mean they
9 knew where these two persons were?

10 A. At that point in time, it sounded
11 like they had pinpointed the areas where these
12 individuals were, yes.

13 Q. And they say:

14 "No confirmed fatalities as of
15 yet."

16 This is Mr. Jollymore speaking.

17 And then we understand from other
18 evidence that there was a discussion either late on
19 June 23rd or early on June 24th about what
20 information the CCG should release about these two
21 victims that have been located or identified.

22 And do you recall such a discussion?

23 A. There was a discussion about
24 whether or not, yeah, any information should be
25 released. Yes, you are correct on that.

1 Q. And what was the discussion?

2 A. Well, the discussion was basically
3 surrounding whether or not it was an appropriate
4 time to release information regarding the potential
5 for a casualty, and given that the OPP are more
6 adept with dealing with this type of circumstance
7 than we are, we went on the advice of Inspector
8 Jollymore that we would not really make any
9 confirmations until we were absolutely certain that
10 there indeed was a deceased person.

11 Q. And as far as Inspector Jollymore
12 was concerned, that meant uncovering them in the
13 rubble pit to be able to actually physically
14 identify them; is that what he meant?

15 A. I'm not sure if that is exactly
16 what he meant, but we were trusting and relying on
17 his expertise in these situations, so I am not sure
18 what the OPP protocol is in terms of what evidence
19 they require before they bring that news forward.

20 Q. Okay. And just according to your
21 understanding, does that mean that they cannot be
22 identified without actually identifying and giving
23 their names? In other words, you know, for
24 example, somebody is injured or perhaps deceased.
25 You can't release that information even without a

1 name; is that correct?

2 A. Well, that was my understanding at
3 the time, yes.

4 Q. And that is what Inspector
5 Jollymore wanted?

6 A. Correct. He was advising that the
7 group follow that particular course of action.

8 Q. And was everybody on-side with
9 that?

10 A. Well, there were no serious
11 objections. I mean, and that was the course of
12 action that the Community Control Group took.

13 Q. Okay. And did Chief Officer at
14 any point disagree with the Inspector on this
15 issue?

16 A. I believe Chief Officer was
17 looking to provide some information with regards to
18 what he had seen on-site, but again, once the group
19 had the discussion, we chose to follow the advice
20 of the OPP.

21 Q. Okay, in other words, Chief
22 Officer had a different view as to whether
23 information should be given or not.

24 A. Not so much that information
25 should be given. I believe the detail of the

1 information was what was in question.

2 THE COMMISSIONER: I'm sorry. I can't
3 hear you. He what?

4 THE WITNESS: Sorry, not so much that
5 information should be given or provided, but the
6 detail of the information was what, I believe, was
7 the subject of discussion.

8 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

9 Q. Well, you can either say nothing
10 as a group to the media, or you can say, "We have
11 potential casualties or a potential deceased,
12 unnamed," or I presume there are other examples, or
13 you can say the same thing and identify them if you
14 are comfortable doing that. Clearly, you are not
15 comfortable doing, what I gather from what you are
16 telling us, naming them, but why can't you release
17 to the public the fact that you have casualties and
18 injuries? You know that for a fact; correct?

19 MR. CASSAN: Mr. Commissioner, this has
20 already been answered. He has indicated already
21 that he was advised by the OPP the policy of the
22 OPP, and they followed that advice, and that is
23 what took place. And asking questions --

24 THE COMMISSIONER: Well, that may be
25 what advice was given, but that was just the advice

1 given. That doesn't explain the fundamentals of
2 the decision. I think the question is appropriate.

3 MR. CASSAN: Okay. Thank you.

4 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

5 Q. Are you going to answer, or do you
6 want me to give you the question again?

7 A. If you could repeat the question,
8 please.

9 Q. Okay. So your choices are just
10 say nothing about anything, which is one option.
11 Number two is you can say, "We have injuries and/or
12 deceased persons," both without ID'ing the person.
13 Or you can say that, "We have these injured and
14 deceased persons, and their names are so and so."
15 There was a debate in the CCG. You have told us
16 that Inspector Jollymore didn't want to give any
17 information at this early stage, and then Chief
18 Officer disagreed with him. In the end, the day
19 was carried by Inspector Jollymore. Is that
20 correct so far?

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. And so, in this circumstance, what
23 was Chief Officer's position? What did he want to
24 release?

25 A. I think he wanted to make a

1 statement that there was a potential casualty in
2 the area.

3 Q. Now, can I ask you to go to page 5
4 now of the notes. In the middle of the page at
5 5:10, this is in the same meeting, just a little
6 later, and Inspector Jollymore is speaking again,
7 and it says:

8 "Evacuated scene [because] it is
9 insecure large pieces of concrete
10 hanging."

11 Now, who ordered that evacuation?

12 A. As far as I can recall from the
13 evidence here, it was the police.

14 Q. The OPP?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Inspector Jollymore?

17 A. Yeah, the OPP.

18 Q. And was it Inspector Jollymore
19 personally?

20 A. That I don't know.

21 Q. He was the IC for the police, was
22 he not?

23 A. I believe so, but at this point in
24 time, I don't know if he had personally, himself,
25 given that evacuation order.

1 Q. And can I take you to Exhibit No.
2 6657, which is tab 44 in the brief. You should be
3 looking at an e-mail to you yourself from Paul
4 Officer?

5 A. Uhm-hmm.

6 Q. It is dated the 24th of June,
7 2012, 4:25 in the morning, and he says to you:

8 "The MOL who are not on scene
9 advised us to stop the rescue until
10 the MOL engineer gives the go ahead.
11 OPP rescue and I have agreed to not
12 have any personnel in the area.
13 They will lower equipment and do
14 what they can. Paul."

15 Who at the MOL are they talking about,
16 do you know?

17 A. I do not know.

18 Q. And do you recall this e-mail?

19 A. Yes, I recall the e-mail and --

20 Q. And what was the issue?

21 MR. FEAVER: Mr. Commissioner, I don't
22 see that e-mail here.

23 THE COMMISSIONER: I don't think we
24 have the right document, Mr. Carr-Harris. I can't
25 -- this is not what that document says. That is

1 Exhibit No. 6657, you said?

2 MR. CARR-HARRIS: That is what I have.

3 THE COMMISSIONER: That is the one on
4 screen?

5 MS. KUKA: Yes.

6 MR. CARR-HARRIS: The document number
7 is CELE 51961. Exhibit No. 6658.

8 THE COMMISSIONER: 58.

9 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

10 Q. So you have that? So what was the
11 issue here that Chief Officer was communicating
12 with you bright and early in the morning about the
13 removal, the evacuation, I presume; is that
14 correct?

15 A. Yes. And as I had mentioned to
16 you during the will-say, that I probably didn't see
17 this e-mail until sometime after it was sent
18 because I don't have a BlackBerry, or I wasn't
19 carrying a BlackBerry at that particular point in
20 time, and I wasn't spending a whole lot of time in
21 my office and looking, reviewing e-mails. Most of
22 my correspondence during the course of the
23 emergency was either through direct contact or via
24 cell phone.

25 Q. So did you have any discussion

1 about this issue, the evacuation, apart from what
2 we see in that e-mail?

3 A. No.

4 Q. And why would you not have a cell
5 phone, in light of the fact that you are the head
6 of the EOC during --

7 A. I just clearly stated I had a cell
8 phone, and that is how I was communicating --

9 Q. Oh, I thought you said you didn't.

10 A. No. I said I didn't have a
11 BlackBerry.

12 Q. You had a cell phone but not a
13 BlackBerry?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. So you weren't receiving any
16 e-mails?

17 A. Not unless I was physically in the
18 office; correct.

19 Q. And why would you not have an
20 e-mail connection if you are out of the office?

21 A. Because I choose not to have one.

22 Q. Even as the head of the EOC?

23 A. I was quite adamant at that point
24 in time that if people needed to get a hold of me,
25 that I was available by phone and cell phone and

1 they knew where to find me when I wasn't around.

2 Q. Can we then go to page 6 of the
3 notes.

4 A. We are going back --

5 Q. Perhaps just before I do, can I
6 ask you one more question about the MOL. At this
7 time, at the beginning of the collapse and the
8 emergency, what was your understanding of the MOL's
9 authority in this kind of a scene, of an emergency
10 scene?

11 A. My experience with the MOL up
12 until that point in time was strictly with regards
13 to occupational health and safety. I was -- you
14 know, I'm very aware of their involvement in
15 certain instances that take place in a work area as
16 a result of a critical injury, per se, on a job
17 site. I wasn't really versed in terms of what
18 their role would be in an emergency situation like
19 that.

20 Q. So you had no knowledge at that
21 time, anyway, of whether they could stop, evacuate,
22 or otherwise remove people from the collapse or the
23 emergency site themselves?

24 A. I wasn't aware of it at that time;
25 correct.

1 Q. Okay. Then at, again, back to
2 Exhibit No. 3743, at page 6, yeah, there is a
3 meeting starting at 6:30 p.m. of the CCG, and at
4 present, there appear to be now at least a presence
5 of the OFM, Bob Thorpe. Do you see that in the
6 list of attendees?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And were there other provincial
9 officials at your CCG meetings apart from
10 Mr. Thorpe, I mean, consistently?

11 A. At that particular time, I believe
12 Mr. Thorpe was the first of provincial attendees.
13 Later, we had Bill Neadles. I believe at one of
14 the meetings we may have had Commissioner -- sorry,
15 Dan Hefkey present as well, but, no, but Bob Thorpe
16 was there on a regular basis once he arrived.

17 Q. And was part of your role as the
18 CCG to keep the provincial officials and relevant
19 departments informed?

20 A. That falls more under the Mayor's
21 mandate, but people who were coming into the room
22 were well briefed. I know Chief Officer spent a
23 lot of time with Bob Thorpe, bringing him up to
24 speed with what had transpired.

25 Q. And at that meeting, you will see

1 at the bottom it starts with an update, and, again,
2 it is OPP, which I take it to mean Inspector
3 Jollymore is speaking; is that correct, sir?

4 A. I'm looking here at the list. I
5 would -- yes, I would assume so. I don't see his
6 name on the attendance list here, though.

7 Q. It says second --

8 A. Oh, there it is, sorry.

9 Q. Second from the bottom?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And he says:

12 "Lead from Ryan Cox Urban Rescue
13 asked for equipment structural
14 engineer on-site.

15 Ministry of Labour."

16 And then he says:

17 "Bruce to find:

18 One heavy hydraulic crane.

19 Wedge anchors.

20 6 x 6 and 4 x 4 for bracing."

21 Now, the evidence shows, at this date,
22 that this note is made at 6:30, which is a matter
23 of minutes after the last phone call Mr. Cox had
24 with Inspector Jollymore about his requirements.
25 And he had indicated this en route, that he

1 required this equipment; were you aware of that at
2 the time?

3 A. I knew they were looking into
4 having a crane being brought in.

5 Q. And that he had been asked by the
6 UCRT or the OPP specialist Ryan Cox to get certain
7 equipment while he was en route; were you aware of
8 that?

9 A. I was aware they had discussions.
10 I wasn't aware of the detail of those discussions,
11 though, other than the fact that they had made
12 reference to here that Ryan Cox was requesting.

13 Q. The evidence shows that the OPP
14 UCRT unit arrived around 9:30 that evening, three
15 hours after this meeting started. Were you aware
16 that they were not on-site as yet?

17 A. At that particular point in time
18 during the meeting?

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. Yeah. I believe we were informed
21 that they were on their way.

22 Q. Okay. So this is a note from --
23 this is Inspector Jollymore talking about what Ryan
24 Cox said he needed from him.

25 A. Correct.

1 Q. And then there is a note on the
2 next page, page 7:

3 "Bruce to find:

4 One heavy hydraulic crane.

5 Wedge anchors.

6 [...] and bracing".

7 And can you tell me what happened? I
8 take it is Bruce Ewald that is being referred to?

9 A. I really can't confirm that.

10 Q. Who else could it be?

11 A. I don't know.

12 Q. There is only one Bruce on your
13 list, isn't there?

14 A. You are right. Okay.

15 Q. And what was Bruce's role?

16 A. Well, Bruce was assisting us in
17 the CCG, and he was often requested to source
18 materials that we were requiring.

19 Q. So this would be typical, that he
20 would be asked to get equipment requested?

21 A. Yeah. I'm not -- I can't recall
22 the specifics of what Bruce was actually expected
23 to produce out of this request, but definitely he
24 was, you know, key and instrumental in ensuring
25 lumber and other devices were arriving on the site

1 or he was taking care of that, anyway.

2 Q. And do you know if he got it?

3 A. If he got that --

4 Q. What he was asked to get, the
5 hydraulic crane, and did he try to get it? Do you
6 know?

7 A. I believe he made an attempt, and
8 then there was some --

9 Q. Well, you say you believe that.
10 Were you told that?

11 A. No, I wasn't told.

12 Q. All right. So as you sit there
13 today, Bruce having been given that instruction, do
14 you know if he did anything about it?

15 A. I don't recall.

16 Q. You understood that the
17 crane-related equipment was an important aspect of
18 the emergency response, did you not, at that time?

19 A. Yeah. I was led to believe that
20 the crane was going to be required to lift the
21 concrete slabs.

22 Q. And you had actually visited the
23 site yourself and looked into the rubble pit?

24 A. Correct.

25 Q. And you knew that it was going to

1 take something like a crane to get those things up?

2 A. Well, again, I'm not an expert in
3 engineering and --

4 Q. I'm talking common sense here.

5 A. Common sense would indicate that
6 some machinery would be required, yes.

7 Q. And then on page 7, there is one
8 other reference at the top, following the piece I
9 read to you, that says:

10 "Suggests let them do assessment."

11 Do you recall Inspector Jollymore
12 saying that?

13 A. No.

14 Q. And do you know or do you recall
15 now what it meant?

16 A. No.

17 Q. And did Inspector Jollymore imply
18 that he was going to wait until they arrived so
19 they could make an assessment themselves?

20 A. I don't recall what that comment
21 is about.

22 Q. And so there was no suggestion at
23 that point by him that, "Let's delay the order
24 until they get here and they can make some
25 assessment"?

1 A. I wasn't led to believe there was
2 any delay in the order.

3 Q. And you don't have any
4 recollection of that?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Then could I take you to page 9.
7 Okay. Can I take you to Exhibit No. 6609, tab 24
8 in the book. And that is a press release. And
9 just before I get to it, one of the roles of the
10 CCG, you have already told me, is to keep the
11 public informed, properly and accurately informed
12 of what is going on; correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And this is an example of a press
15 release. There is a press release that was
16 released on June 24th, 2012, as it was released
17 after 9:00 a.m. because the 9:00 a.m. meeting had
18 already been conducted, as it says in the first
19 paragraph.

20 A. Uhm-hmm.

21 Q. And if you drop down to the third
22 from the bottom, as part of the press release, it
23 says:

24 "At this time no casualties have
25 been reported or confirmed".

1 Do you see that?

2 And is that --

3 MR. FEAVER: Mr. Commissioner, I think
4 we are on the wrong document again.

5 THE COMMISSIONER: I can't -- I don't
6 see that particular line.

7 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

8 Q. I'm sorry. It should be Exhibit
9 No. 2120.

10 Exhibit No. 6610, try that. So July
11 24th, 2012, a 9 o'clock press conference had been
12 held, as we all know, and so this was released
13 after 9 o'clock in the morning. And then if you
14 drop down about three from the bottom, you will
15 see:

16 "At this time no casualties have
17 been reported or confirmed."

18 And that is just untrue, is it not, Mr.
19 deBortoli? You have already heard that there is a
20 lady with no pulse in the rubble; you have heard
21 that there are people in the rubble. So to say,
22 "At this time no casualties have been reported
23 [...]" is just untrue.

24 A. Well, we weren't able to confirm
25 that there were any casualties at this point in

1 time, so I believe we are putting the information
2 out, again, as suggested by our OPP advisers to
3 not, at this particular point in time indicate that
4 there was casualties because we hadn't been able to
5 confirm such.

6 THE COMMISSIONER: What is your
7 understanding of the expression "casualties", Mr.
8 deBortoli?

9 THE WITNESS: That there would be
10 somebody who is without -- somebody that would be
11 dead in the -- deceased in the rubble pile.

12 THE COMMISSIONER: Somebody dead?

13 THE WITNESS: Deceased.

14 THE COMMISSIONER: All right.

15 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

16 Q. Casualties also includes or can
17 include deceased, but they also include injured
18 persons; you know that, Mr. deBortoli, don't you?

19 A. That's correct, yes.

20 Q. And so are you not going to agree
21 with us to say at this time with all the
22 information you had from the June 23rd reports we
23 have talked about:

24 "At this time no casualties have
25 been reported [...]"

1 That is just not accurate, is it?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. And did you approve this before it
4 went out?

5 A. We would have all looked at it and
6 approved it, yes.

7 Q. And then can I get you to go to
8 tab 25, and this is a report, again, June 24th.
9 Can you pull that one up? I'm hoping --

10 A. Sorry, tab 25?

11 Q. Tab 25. It is the next tab over.
12 And I'm hoping that is Exhibit No. 9299, Exhibit
13 No. 9299. This one is, again, June 24th. It is a
14 press conference. It was published after the 1:00
15 p.m. press conference on the 24th, and if you look
16 at that halfway down, you will see:

17 "There is no confirmation on any
18 loss of life. This is still a
19 rescue effort."

20 And that is, to say the least,
21 misleading too, isn't it?

22 A. No. I would disagree with you on
23 that. We still hadn't confirmed that there was a
24 loss of life at that particular point in time, and
25 we were still treating it as a rescue effort.

1 Q. And hadn't the EMS confirmed in
2 his notes or confirmed to you that there was no
3 vital signs present and had declared the person
4 deceased, Code 5? With that knowledge to say --

5 MR. CASSAN: Mr. Commissioner --

6 MR. CARR-HARRIS: Excuse me, let me
7 finish.

8 THE COMMISSIONER: Let's hear the
9 question. Don't answer. I'll hear the objection.

10 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

11 Q. You have had the information of
12 the EMS and read it as Code 5, which I have told
13 you means deceased, and he has provided you with
14 information that he has no vital signs present as a
15 result of that. Is that to say that there is no
16 confirmation on any loss of life? The EMS
17 confirmed death, did he not?

18 THE COMMISSIONER: That is the
19 question. And the objection?

20 MR. CASSAN: The objection that I have,
21 Mr. Commissioner, is two parts.

22 First of all, my friend keeps referring
23 to Code 5, as if Code 5 is a confirmation of death,
24 and that is not the evidence of the EMS people.
25 Code 5 is a way that they can declare that a person

1 is dead, and we have heard evidence indicating that
2 that would result only if the person was showing
3 obvious signs of decomposition or decapitation,
4 neither of which we have here. So the Code 5 issue
5 is incorrect.

6 Secondly --

7 THE COMMISSIONER: Well, it is noted.
8 There is Code 5 noted in the minutes. Somebody
9 said it, said something.

10 MR. CASSAN: Yeah. They said that is
11 when the EMS is entitled to declare death, but we
12 have got no Code 5 symptoms here.

13 Secondly, my friend is asking about
14 whether or not the EMS declared the person dead,
15 and the evidence has already been that the EMS
16 checked the hand and the foot and found no pulse.

17 With respect to that, Mr. deBortoli has
18 already answered that he believed that was an
19 indication that the person was deceased, but
20 followed the OPP's recommendation that until it is
21 confirmed by a doctor or a coroner, that they
22 cannot confirm death.

23 So this is rehashing the same ground
24 again, trying to get Mr. deBortoli to change his
25 evidence, and it is not a fair question.

1 THE COMMISSIONER: Response?

2 MR. CARR-HARRIS: With respect, I'm
3 cross-examining this witness on his opinion of the
4 information that he has provided to the public
5 based on the information that he has, and what my
6 friend has been raising with you, really, is just
7 an argument and has nothing to do with the
8 relevance of the question.

9 The question is very relevant because
10 the statement says, "There is no confirmation on
11 any loss of life". That is, at least, misleading,
12 Your Honour, because, I am suggesting to the
13 witness, because there was a person who works for
14 the City, the Fire Department, in fact, and
15 confirmed this person deceased, Code 5.

16 And so there are two versions of
17 confirmation here apparently, and one is
18 Mr. Jollymore's view of it, and the other is the
19 EMS who has made this finding in the field.

20 But in any event, whoever wins that
21 argument, to say that there has been no
22 confirmation of any loss of life is at least
23 misleading in this kind of circumstance. You may
24 make no mention at all because of the fact that
25 there is a fact in the reports and in the notes to

1 the contrary.

2 THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I think the
3 best Mr. deBortoli can do is to repeat what he has
4 said already, Mr. Carr-Harris, that while he
5 received information, that information was not
6 absolutely confirmatory of death, was an indication
7 of death, but was not an official confirmation that
8 that is so.

9 I don't know that he can tell us any
10 more than that at this point.

11 I agree with you that the press release
12 could have been more specific, and perhaps that is
13 the question to be put to Mr. deBortoli. While it
14 only states that there is no confirmation of any
15 loss of life, would it not have been appropriate to
16 have indicated that there were strong indications
17 in the direction that one of the bodies, to be
18 specific, was showing what you have described;
19 would that not have been appropriate? In other
20 words, this is a very general statement. It lacks
21 particulars.

22 MR. CARR-HARRIS: Yes, thank you.

23 THE COMMISSIONER: Do you not agree,
24 Mr. deBortoli?

25 THE WITNESS: I would suggest that this

1 comment, Your Honour, is reflective of the message
2 we were trying to deliver based on what we were
3 provided in terms of guidance by the OPP in the
4 circumstance --

5 THE COMMISSIONER: Well, could you not
6 have said more specifically, "There is one person
7 who sounds very much alive and one where the
8 indications are that there may be loss of life, but
9 we can't say yet?" Could you not have made a
10 statement of that nature?

11 THE WITNESS: Yes, that is fair.

12 THE COMMISSIONER: I think we can move
13 on from there, Mr. Carr-Harris.

14 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

15 Q. Thank you, Your Honour.

16 Can we then go to page 12 of the
17 Exhibit No. 3743. And at the top of that page you
18 will see it is a 10:00 p.m. -- 10:05 shows there,
19 but it has been referred to as the 10:00 p.m.
20 meeting on June 23rd, and it says just above that
21 in the box:

22 "Press conference needed for
23 tomorrow."

24 Which I take would be June 24th;
25 correct?

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. And why was it needed, Mr.
3 deBortoli?

4 A. Well, we wanted to get information
5 out to the public in terms of where we were at with
6 the operation, and we felt it was necessary to have
7 the key players around the table provide the
8 community with an update as to what had transpired
9 over the course of the evening from the afternoon
10 in terms of the onset of the event.

11 Q. Okay. Now, just speaking for
12 yourself, Mr. deBortoli, prior to the collapse, did
13 you have any experience or training with
14 interaction with the media?

15 A. To a degree, yes. I have taken
16 some courses with respect to municipal
17 administration and municipal management, and there
18 has been a component of media relations in terms of
19 those undertakings.

20 Q. And would you describe yourself
21 then, based on that, as an experienced person with
22 the media?

23 A. Not -- to a degree, I think. In
24 terms of the normal course of action over the
25 day-to-day activities within the community, we have

1 -- I have dealt with the media on several
2 occasions, but not to anything of this nature.

3 Q. And in the case of the press
4 conferences that were held here -- and there were
5 several, as you know -- was it the practice to
6 prepare your statements before you went into the
7 press meeting, press conference?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. And what did that entail?

10 A. Well, we would -- generally prior
11 to the meeting, we would have a statement that the
12 Mayor would deliver. Also prior to the press
13 conference, the group or the panel that was going
14 to be delivering messages or providing updates, we
15 would meet basically just to ensure that we were
16 all on the same page, and we wanted to make sure
17 that the information we were providing was
18 accurate.

19 Q. And typically your preparation
20 meetings would last how long?

21 A. It was usually about -- well, the
22 messages were drafted as we went over the course of
23 action over the days or the time that elapsed
24 between press conferences, but normally the
25 meetings prior to the press conferences would be in

1 the area of probably 10 minutes, 15 minutes prior
2 to.

3 Q. Thank you. Now, can I take you to
4 page 13 of Exhibit No. 3743. And you will see a
5 section there where the OPP is recognized, and I
6 gather, again, since Inspector Jollymore is present
7 at the meeting, that this will be him speaking?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And he says:

10 "Ryan Cox on scene".

11 This, again, is 10:00 p.m.:

12 "Ryan Cox on scene.

13 1st part of 13 rescue unit teams,
14 structural engineer en route.

15 Ministry of Labour and reps in
16 Blind River wanting for instruction
17 from Ministry of Labour.

18 Lumber coming from 'Hirsh' unit?

19 Will need a lot of material, they
20 are bringing a tractor trailer load
21 with them.

22 1. Review scene.

23 2. Analyze stability.

24 3. Plan for stabilization

25 hundred percent.

1 4. Stable building."

2 So what is being referred to there, Mr.
3 deBortoli?

4 A. My recollection is we were, at
5 this point in time, having a discussion with
6 regards to how the rescue effort would unfold and
7 those were the four key components of the plan to
8 get into the area where the victims were.

9 Q. And so this was the plan at the
10 point, up to that point?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. And there is no mention in the
13 plan of a crane. It is now after 10 o'clock or 10
14 o'clock on the first night, June 23rd. If you go
15 over to page 14, the next page, halfway down, it
16 says:

17 "Inquiries [...]"

18 Again, this is Mr. Jollymore, and it
19 says:

20 "Inquiries about a crane. Wants
21 confirmation first before ordering."

22 Now, first of all, do you recall this
23 part of the conversation? You remembered the plan?

24 A. Uhm-hmm.

25 Q. And in terms of the inquiries

1 about a crane, what inquiries about the crane?

2 A. Yeah, that I don't -- I don't
3 recall that specific information.

4 Q. Okay. And it says:

5 "Wants confirmation first before
6 ordering."

7 Do you recall that?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Was there any suggestion from
10 Inspector Jollymore that before he orders the
11 crane, which we now know is at -- it actually
12 happened at 11:15, later that night, before he
13 orders the crane. He wants to have a confirmation
14 first; that he wanted to delay that crane until he
15 got that confirmation.

16 A. Yeah, I wasn't aware of that.

17 Q. Okay. If you then go to June 24th
18 and page 17, I think. Yes, it starts at the bottom
19 of page 16 of Exhibit No. 3743. An 8:00 a.m.
20 meeting is held on Saturday morning, the 24th, and
21 the OPP is at the top, if you go to page 17, at the
22 top left corner "OPP". Now is -- not CAA. Sorry,
23 Inspector Jollymore is there, so we can presume it
24 is him speaking?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And it says:

2 "Both extraction units on-site and
3 working.

4 Engineer has examined the site
5 and given ok".

6 What engineer was that?

7 A. I wasn't aware of who the engineer
8 was. I mean, I'm assuming it was the MOL, but...

9 Q. And they say:

10 "Developed plan to go in."

11 Is that the same plan we just talked
12 about as far as you know?

13 A. Yes. As far as I know, yes.

14 Q. And then down below under "Media",
15 it says:

16 "Gaps developing -- need to work
17 it out. Need better coordination
18 and strategy."

19 Do you recall this discussion?

20 A. Vaguely. There was -- yeah, there
21 was a discussion about having to -- there were gaps
22 in terms of information being disseminated into the
23 community, and we wanted to ensure that we closed
24 those up.

25 Q. And so was the product of that,

1 for example, the two press releases I just referred
2 to you a little while ago?

3 A. Yeah. That was part of it.

4 Q. Okay. And then what sort of gaps
5 were you referring to, what kind of information?

6 A. Well, it was just basically the
7 information as to the ongoing developments within
8 the site itself and the plans of what was to be
9 done. Obviously, there was -- you know, there was
10 lots of anxiety within the community. People
11 wanted -- people had all kinds of questions that
12 they wanted to have answered, and obviously, I
13 mean, we can't instantaneously answer everything,
14 but we felt that we needed to improve our
15 communications in order to keep people abreast as
16 to what was going on.

17 And through the releases, through our
18 press conferences, those were the ways we attempted
19 to keep the public informed.

20 Q. Okay. And all press releases and
21 statements made at press conferences thereafter,
22 after this meeting, were all done with the approval
23 of the CCG; correct?

24 A. They were, yes. That's correct.

25 THE COMMISSIONER: Perhaps this would

1 be a good time to take our morning break,
2 Mr. Carr-Harris.

3 MR. CARR-HARRIS: Yes. Thank you,
4 Commissioner.

5 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

6 -- RECESSED AT 10:30 A.M.

7 -- RESUMED AT 10:50 P.M.

8 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

9 Q. Thank you, Commissioner.

10 Can we go to page 18 of the Exhibit No.
11 3743, which is part of the 8:00 a.m. meeting on
12 June 24th. And at the top of that page under the
13 chief, Chief Officer is speaking. He says in the
14 second bullet down:

15 "Done assessment -- Ministry of
16 Labour in agreement with plan."

17 And, again, is that the same plan we
18 talked about before with the four elements?

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. And then later down, he says:

21 "Confusion on crane. HUSAR has
22 not ordered crane. The other group
23 ordered the crane and it is on
24 site."

25 And what was this about? Do you

1 recall, Mr. deBortoli?

2 A. Not really. This all transpired,
3 I think, over the course of the evening, but I
4 think there was some confusion as to who was
5 actually placing the order for the crane, and, as a
6 result, the crane didn't get ordered until I
7 believe it was around midnight that night as far as
8 the information suggests.

9 Q. So somebody dropped the ball on
10 the delivery of the crane?

11 A. Somebody -- there was an
12 assumption made that obviously -- yes, the crane
13 didn't get ordered in the time frame that it was
14 anticipated it would be.

15 THE COMMISSIONER: I'm sorry. What
16 time does this meeting purport to have occurred at,
17 Mr. Carr-Harris?

18 MR. CARR-HARRIS: This is an 8:00 a.m.
19 meeting on the 24th, the second day.

20 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

21 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

22 Q. And the next morning you had your
23 first press conference, if I'm not mistaken, at
24 9:00 a.m. that morning, Sunday; is that correct?

25 A. Yes, that's correct.

1 Q. And you and Inspector Jollymore
2 and Chief Officer -- sorry, the Mayor, Inspector
3 Jollymore and Chief Officer were the panel, and you
4 were the moderator, I gather?

5 A. That is -- yeah, we determined
6 that that would be the best way to try and bring
7 some order and structure to the conference, and
8 that I would sort of come out, do an introduction,
9 set some, you know, basic ground rules, and then
10 have the reports, beginning with the Mayor
11 delivering his message, and then the other members
12 of the panel to provide those present with the
13 updates in terms of their, you know, activity in
14 the participation in the operation.

15 THE COMMISSIONER: Can we just come
16 back? I'm sorry to go back and forth, but come
17 back to the crane issue and the page that is up on
18 screen. You say:

19 "Confusion on crane. HUSAR has
20 not ordered crane. The other group
21 ordered the crane and it is on
22 site".

23 Is the crane on site at 8 o'clock on
24 the morning on the 24th?

25 THE WITNESS: No. I don't believe it

1 arrived until later that day.

2 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

3 Q. Later, in fact --

4 A. About noon or later.

5 THE COMMISSIONER: Yeah, that was my
6 understanding. Do you know why it is -- who was
7 saying that? Was this Chief Officer saying that
8 the crane had arrived and was on-site?

9 THE WITNESS: I don't think that
10 information was being -- there might have been some
11 confusion with respect to the note-taking here, but
12 the crane definitely wasn't on-site at that time of
13 the day.

14 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

15 Q. Yeah. I think the evidence is
16 that the crane, the big crane showed up at about
17 11:15 that morning.

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. Had still to be set up and wasn't
20 operational until 6:00 that evening, the 24th.

21 So you, yourself, hadn't seen a crane
22 on the site at that point, at 8 o'clock in the
23 morning?

24 A. No.

25 Q. And just back at the press

1 conference, again, it was the Mayor and Inspector
2 Jollymore and Chief Officer, you as moderator. Can
3 we summarize it by saying the press conference went
4 as well as it could in the circumstances? The work
5 was going to be ongoing at this point. As has been
6 pointed out, there were no cranes operating this
7 early on June 24th; correct?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. And if there was anything going
10 on, it was the shoring of the building for
11 stability.

12 A. It may have well been. I don't
13 recall what was happening at the time of the press
14 conference, but --

15 Q. Okay. But basically, it finished
16 in an overall positive note, your press conference,
17 given the circumstances you were dealing with.

18 A. Yeah, actually, I think it was
19 well received. We had -- you know, there was
20 information being provided now to the media that
21 they were -- you know, they were wanting to hear
22 and they were after, and we had minor attendance at
23 this particular press conference. There were a few
24 media groups there. We had our local radio station
25 and newspaper along with the French CBC. I believe

1 MCTV News was there from Sudbury as well as a
2 representative from Global.

3 Q. And your next press conference,
4 you had another one at 1:00 p.m. on the same day?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And, again, this was updating the
7 status of the rescue still at this point; is that
8 true?

9 A. Correct.

10 Q. And there were no cranes still
11 operating as yet, being 1:00 p.m.

12 A. Not to my knowledge.

13 Q. And again, the press conference
14 ended on a relatively positive note on that
15 occasion.

16 A. Well, there was -- yeah, again,
17 information was disseminated. At that particular
18 press conference, there was a statement read by the
19 Nazarians. They were there and their -- Levon read
20 a statement to the people in attendance.

21 Q. And just so I'm clear on this, did
22 they actually participate in the press conference,
23 or was this a separate meeting?

24 A. No. This was -- this took place
25 -- they read the statement during the press

1 conference. They waited until the conference had
2 concluded, and then he asked through his solicitor
3 if they could read a statement that they had
4 prepared, which they did.

5 Q. And who was present during that,
6 that reading by the Nazarians?

7 A. There was Levon, who read the
8 statement, and his father Bob was there, along with
9 their solicitor, Mr. Fabris.

10 Q. And who else on the City side?
11 You and I take it --

12 A. Well, it was during the press
13 conference, so the entire Council Chambers at that
14 point -- this is where we were -- was -- nobody had
15 left at that particular point in time.

16 Q. And were there reporters still
17 present?

18 A. I believe so.

19 Q. And did they take notes and so on
20 of that statement?

21 A. I can't say if they did or not.

22 Q. Is there any reporting on this
23 statement by Mr. Nazarian in the newspapers, in the
24 media?

25 A. I don't know.

1 Q. And what did Mr. Nazarian say?

2 A. Well, they had just -- you know,
3 basically they were expressing their condolences
4 with respect to what had happened. You know, it
5 was a tragic event; that they were devastated by
6 it; and that they were, you know, prepared to help
7 in any way they could to see that the rescue
8 operation went ahead as planned. And they were
9 there to offer their assistance.

10 Q. Anything else you remember at this
11 point?

12 A. No, that is about it.

13 Q. Then there was a 4:00 p.m.
14 meeting.

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. On that same day of the CCG. And
17 this was the first meeting that Mr. Neadles was
18 present; am I correct? You can find it at page 023
19 of the Exhibit No. 3743.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And again, there was a 4:00 p.m.
22 press conference on the 24th, the last one of the
23 day.

24 A. Sorry, I think the meeting was at
25 4:00 p.m.

1 Q. Yeah. And then a press conference
2 at 5:00 p.m.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And, again, that press conference,
5 as of the end of the 24th, it went reasonably well,
6 all circumstances considered.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And that was the night that the
9 work began with the cranes in the rubble pile; is
10 that correct?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. Now, going over to the June 25th,
13 there was a press conference. The first press
14 conference on the 25th was at noon.

15 A. Yeah. That sounds about right,
16 yeah.

17 Q. And at that press conference,
18 there was no mention of any -- of the rescue being
19 stopped.

20 A. That is the first one -- where --
21 sorry, what date were we on now?

22 Q. We are on the 25th, the first
23 press conference on the 25th at my notes indicate
24 it was 12:00 p.m.

25 A. Correct.

1 Q. And then can you tell us what
2 happened? How did you learn about this stoppage?

3 A. I was -- I actually came -- the
4 information came to me through Chief Officer. We
5 -- I had made my way over to the scene from City
6 Hall.

7 Q. What time was that, roughly?

8 A. If my memory serves me correctly,
9 it was mid-afternoon. It might have been 2:00.
10 I'm just --

11 Q. Before the 3:00 p.m. meeting?

12 A. Oh, yes. It was definitely before
13 the meeting, and we had -- I had gone over there,
14 and at that point in time, Chief Officer made
15 mention to me that they had to pull out, given that
16 the structural integrity of the building was now in
17 question with regards to the escalator and the slab
18 sitting on it, and they weren't comfortable with
19 having workers in the -- on-site.

20 Q. And did you -- I'm sorry to
21 interrupt. Did you finish?

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. Did Chief Officer say anything to
24 you as to whether he was pleased or not with this
25 decision?

1 A. Well, he didn't have to say
2 anything. I could tell by the look on his face,
3 and I think if you were there and saw the look on
4 my face, you would have known that we were not
5 happy to hear this news. It certainly, you know,
6 is something that we didn't want to, you know, to
7 hear at the time. All our efforts and our hopes
8 and our concentration was on getting to the victims
9 that were in the rubble pile, and then to have this
10 bombshell, for lack of a better term, dropped on
11 you, it was devastating because, you know, now we
12 were, in essence, being ordered out of the
13 operation that we were there to perform.

14 Q. And was that decision made without
15 any input or even knowledge of the CCG or yourself
16 and other members of the community?

17 A. Well, the order or the decision to
18 pull people off the site had been made prior to a
19 meeting where it was then relayed to the group that
20 this, in fact, was what was happening with respect
21 to the operation.

22 Q. And your -- I should say the CCG's
23 input was not requested in the making of that
24 decision to stop?

25 A. No, there was no -- no, it wasn't

1 formally discussed at the CCG. We were informed
2 that the work was stopping.

3 Q. Yeah. And what did Chief Officer
4 tell you what was the reason for the stoppage in
5 your conversation?

6 A. Well, there had been engineers who
7 had been observing the building and that they had
8 been detecting movement on the structure itself,
9 and that indications were that the beam that was
10 supporting the concrete slab that was resting on
11 the escalator, that that beam was considerably
12 overstressed and that there could be -- the
13 collapse basically was imminent there. And with
14 that, that put all the people who were working at
15 the rubble -- on the scene in peril in terms of
16 that material coming down upon them.

17 Q. And in light of what he told you,
18 did Chief Officer tell you whether he agreed or
19 disagreed with the order in light of what he knew?

20 A. No, he didn't. We didn't discuss
21 that, not that I recall.

22 Q. And then could I take you to page
23 33 of Exhibit No. 3743. And you will see just down
24 at the bottom, this is -- first of all, at the top,
25 it is the 3:00 p.m. CCG meeting?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And at the bottom section, Bill
3 Neadles is speaking, and he says:

4 "Decision -- tough one. Based on
5 advice by engineer MOL remove HUSAR
6 team from structure as it has been
7 deemed unsafe.

8 Stress on stairwell and escalator
9 beams -- excess of 100% of strength
10 capacity.

11 Could fall any time -- decision
12 had to be made for safety of
13 workers.

14 3:50 official designation
15 reclassified from rescue to
16 recovery. Turned back to ELFD
17 jurisdiction."

18 And then MOL goes on to say:

19 "Experienced continuous movement
20 on stairway and escalator.

21 MOL and HUSAR engineer -- do not
22 know why structure is still in
23 place. Beam is bowed under all
24 weight shifting. It is opening up
25 more and more. Tracking movement.

1 Things are moving. 100%
2 overstressed".

3 And then the last sentence:

4 "When it goes it will go
5 catastrophically. MOL stop order so
6 no one can enter."

7 So when you got this, you had the bad
8 news prior to this meeting --

9 A. Correct.

10 Q. -- as you have indicated.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And from the standpoint of the
13 speakers here, we know Bill Neadles spoke for
14 HUSAR. Who spoke for MOL?

15 A. I believe it was Roger Jeffreys.

16 Q. And Mr. Jones was there. Did he
17 speak at all, according to your memory?

18 A. Yeah. He -- I'm sure he would
19 have contributed to the conversation. Generally
20 the roundtable discussion involved everybody at the
21 table.

22 Q. Okay. And the parts that are
23 quoted there by MOL, before you get back to the
24 OPP, who spoke those words to you?

25 A. I believe it was Roger Jeffreys.

1 He was the engineer.

2 Q. And he also said at the last
3 sentence:

4 "When it goes it will go
5 catastrophically. MOL stop order so
6 no one can enter."

7 He said those words?

8 A. I believe so.

9 Q. Mr. Jeffreys did?

10 A. I believe so.

11 Q. Were there any questions about
12 what MOL's position was at your meeting?

13 A. Not that I can recall.

14 Q. And --

15 A. I mean -- you know, there was --
16 obviously there was concern about what are we going
17 to do now, but -- and then the next -- you know,
18 what were our next steps? What were our options?
19 And we went through a series of steps that, as the
20 MOL described to us, might be a course of action.

21 Q. And so nobody wanted to challenge
22 them on their decision to stop at the CCG?

23 A. I don't remember any direct
24 challenges about the stop. I mean, we weren't
25 happy with the information that they provided to

1 us, and obviously we knew we had to find an
2 alternate -- come up with an alternate plan to get
3 into the -- get back into -- continue performing
4 the work. But certainly at -- I can't remember if
5 it was exactly at that point in time, but there was
6 the mention of, you know, that the site and the
7 scene would be turned back over to the owner, and
8 the owner would have to get an engineer to come in
9 and do an assessment of the structure before
10 anybody could get back into the scene.

11 Q. Just slow down a bit.

12 A. Oh, sorry. My apologies. To get
13 back into the scene to continue with the
14 rescue/recovery efforts, and we knew at that point
15 in time that that wasn't an acceptable option. And
16 we had to -- then it was not until after the press
17 conference, I believe, that we reconvened over at
18 the OPP station to have some further discussion
19 about what exactly our next steps would be.

20 Q. Okay. And did you take from the
21 last point from Mr. Jeffreys when he said the "MOL
22 stop order so no one can enter", that they were
23 stopping anyone from entering -- rescuer,
24 non-rescue, recovery. Nobody was going on the
25 site.

1 A. Well, certainly when it was put
2 out on that context, yes, it sounded like the order
3 was explicit that nobody was to enter. I believe
4 the order, when it was finally written up, I
5 believe it indicated that access for rescue or
6 recovery would be permitted.

7 Q. But at the time, your impression
8 was that nobody was going to be --

9 A. Well, again, first off, hearing
10 that information, yes, it sounded like it was just
11 a complete -- we were coming to a complete
12 standstill on the operation.

13 Q. Well, given that they were telling
14 you that it could collapse at any time
15 catastrophically and without notice and was well
16 overstressed, did you consider that anyone would go
17 back in there, rescue or otherwise?

18 A. I don't think anybody would have
19 -- given the knowledge that was being provided to
20 us with respect to a structural engineer giving us
21 his opinion on the situations he observed, I don't
22 think it would have been prudent on anybody's part
23 to permit somebody to go back into that area until
24 it was made safe to do so.

25 Q. In fact, they were pulling out

1 their own rescuers?

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. Now, you told us that you did have
4 some conversations after this bad news. Was this
5 between the 3 o'clock meeting and the 5 o'clock
6 press conference?

7 A. No. The majority of it was after
8 the 5 o'clock press conference.

9 Q. Okay. And so can you tell us what
10 you did then after the 5 o'clock press conference?

11 A. Yeah. After the press conference
12 we reconvened at the police station, and they have
13 a meeting room there, and there was a -- as far as
14 I can recall, there were the -- Inspector Jollymore
15 was there; Chief Officer was there; Mr. Jeffreys;
16 Mr. Jones, I believe; and some representation from
17 HUSAR. Bill Neadles was not there at that
18 particular time. And there was discussion about
19 what we needed to do to continue on with the
20 operation, and we had identified that we knew in
21 order to get back at the face of the operation,
22 that we would need to first take care of the slab
23 that was resting on the escalator and that
24 particular beam, so it was -- we were formulating a
25 plan basically to try and somehow get that

1 structure down in a way that it would not (a)
2 impact the work area that we had already been
3 working on and (b) do it in a manner that we would
4 be able to do it expeditiously and get in there as
5 quickly as we could to continue on with the
6 operation.

7 Q. And you were in a recovery mode at
8 this point?

9 A. That is what they were saying.

10 Q. Yeah. And so what you were
11 talking about was getting the building down as
12 quickly as possible and also any bodies that were
13 there out with dignity as well?

14 A. Correct. We were looking at it
15 from a very controlled aspect. We didn't want to
16 give any indication that we were going in there
17 with a wrecking ball just to knock the structure
18 down. It was to be what we described as a
19 controlled demolition, to -- and all efforts to be
20 made to get the structure down away from the rubble
21 pile where the victims were.

22 Q. Okay. I gather, just to
23 fast-forward this, after the press conference,
24 after, while you were having this meeting, the CCG,
25 Mr. Neadles arrived, and there had been a CCG

1 meeting at 8:30 p.m. that night.

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. And what you had been talking
4 about of the group of you meeting at the Chambers,
5 was that a CCG meeting or just a meeting of
6 concerned individuals?

7 A. At the 8 o'clock?

8 Q. No. The one that you described to
9 me with Jeffreys and --

10 A. Over at the police station?

11 Q. Yes. The police station, I beg
12 your pardon.

13 A. Yeah. It was basically -- it
14 wasn't a CCG meeting.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. We were just --

17 Q. Brainstorming?

18 A. People were there brainstorming
19 because we knew we had to come up with another
20 plan.

21 Q. And so later on, though, there was
22 an 8:30 p.m. CCG meeting.

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. And it appears to start at page 40
25 of Exhibit No. 3743, and I just want to take you to

1 page 43. And in the middle of that page, you will
2 see Bill Neadles arrived, so can I summarize it to
3 you by saying that up until Mr. Neadles arrived,
4 you were still discussing along the lines you had
5 just described to me at the police station?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And then Mr. Neadles arrived, and
8 what did he have to say, and what impact did that
9 have on your course?

10 A. Well, Mr. Neadles arrived, and at
11 that particular point in time, he brought the news
12 forward that, you know, he had been given
13 authorization to secure equipment -- and, as we
14 found out, it was from Priestly -- that would be
15 coming up. It was a very specialized piece of
16 equipment with a very long-reaching arm and a
17 grappling hand, if you want to call it that, that
18 would be able to reach over the roof of the mall as
19 it stood and apply the appropriate force on the
20 beam to force it down and away from the rubble
21 pile.

22 Yeah. At that point in time, you know,
23 there was definitely a mood change in the room. We
24 were very, very happy to know that we were -- there
25 was another plan that was going to be, you know,

1 expedited as quickly as we can get the equipment
2 here and carry on, because we -- the other options
3 that had been discussed, as I mentioned earlier,
4 you know, the time frames were simply, in our case,
5 in our view, were unacceptable.

6 Q. So as I think it is recorded in
7 the notes at some point, the effort was back on,
8 and TF-3 and HUSAR was still back in business?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And was it your understanding
11 until you heard this from Mr. Neadles that evening
12 that HUSAR was packing up and going to be leaving
13 in the next little while?

14 A. I was never under the impression
15 they were leaving. I knew they had come to the end
16 of their mandate in terms of the resources that
17 they could utilize to facilitate the
18 rescue/recovery up until the point in time where
19 the order was -- or the news was given that the
20 site was not safe to work in.

21 And I was never under the impression
22 they were packing up and leaving.

23 Q. Well, I can take you to it, but he
24 said that they were -- their mandate had been
25 exhausted and that it was unsafe for their people,

1 and they were turning it back over to the Fire
2 Department.

3 A. Yeah. He did say --

4 Q. And those are all clear
5 statements. And what did you take from those
6 statements?

7 A. Well, I understood from the fact
8 of the matter that, yes, they were no longer going
9 to be the head, leading operations in the
10 rescue/recovery at that time, but then they were
11 turning it back over to the Fire Hall -- the Fire
12 Chief, rather, but I was never under the impression
13 that they were getting ready to pack up to leave.

14 Q. Now, how did the public react to
15 this news after the press conference on the 25th at
16 5 o'clock?

17 A. Well, I mean, the reaction was
18 what I would have expected. There was -- I mean,
19 the public was probably sharing a lot of the
20 emotion and disappointment that we were sharing.
21 There was -- you know, there were -- many
22 individuals got up during that conference and
23 expressed their concern about what appeared to be
24 the halt of the operation, and I think I made
25 mention at that particular time that we had not yet

1 reviewed all our options, and, therefore, we
2 weren't able to really give them, I know,
3 information that they probably so desperately
4 craved at that time to know what the next step was
5 going to be, but we were still -- that was a work
6 in progress, and it would have been premature for
7 us to say anything at that point in time.

8 But after that, there was -- you know,
9 like I say, there were individuals who stood up and
10 made their disappointment well-known, and then
11 after that, when we retreated back to City Hall, we
12 were -- there was a crowd starting to amass outside
13 City Hall around the mall property again. Their
14 sentiments were displeasure with the fact that they
15 were under the impression that things were coming
16 to an end.

17 Q. Well, if the intention was to
18 consider other options, one option would have been
19 to delay the press conference until you had a
20 chance to think through some options that you could
21 offer. Was that ever considered?

22 A. Not at that particular point in
23 time. There was so much happening that, you know,
24 we were trying to do the best for the community
25 that we thought was the right course of action at

1 the time, and we wanted them to know that at this
2 particular point in time, because there was an
3 obvious air of quiet that developed on the scene.
4 I mean, the cranes stopped working, and everything
5 had gone still. People are going to read into
6 that, and we had to let them know why that was.
7 And it was simply because the fact that that beam
8 was determined to be overstressed, and at that
9 particular point in time mit made very good sense
10 to have the rescuers out of there because they were
11 at risk.

12 Q. Michael Mantha, when he was here,
13 he described the atmosphere in Elliot Lake that
14 night after the press conference with the groups of
15 people that had gathered in the vicinity of the
16 mall and the City Hall as toxic. They were angry,
17 and he described it as toxic. Do you agree with
18 that description?

19 A. I wasn't out in the crowd with
20 Michael Mantha, so it would really be unfair for me
21 to give any --

22 Q. Did you know what was going on
23 outside with the crowds?

24 A. I could see. I could see what was
25 happening outside of City Hall. There were people

1 starting to form. Again, like I said to you
2 already, they were disappointed with the news that
3 they had heard, and you know, wanted -- all of good
4 intention, wanted to, you know, some way that they
5 felt they could go ahead and help us out, but
6 really, I mean, it wasn't the right thing to be
7 doing at the time.

8 So whatever Michael Mantha's assessment
9 of the situation is Michael Mantha's. I mean, mine
10 is mine. I viewed it from the back door of City
11 Hall. I don't know where Michael was when he was
12 making his assessment of the mood of the crowd.

13 Q. And did you go down at any point
14 and try to speak to any members of the crowd that
15 was gathering?

16 A. No, I did not.

17 Q. And why not?

18 A. Well, because I was focused on
19 trying to find a solution to get back to work on
20 the scene, and I --

21 Q. Okay. Now, Mr. deBortoli, did you
22 ever speak to the families at Collins Hall?

23 A. No, I did not.

24 Q. You never went to the Collins
25 Hall?

1 A. I did not.

2 Q. And did you ever speak to the
3 Aylwins or the Perizzolo families during the
4 emergency or after?

5 A. I expressed my condolences to the
6 Aylwins at the service they had at the Collins
7 Hall, and I wasn't -- I didn't have an opportunity
8 to express my condolences to the Perizzolos, but I
9 did attend both services.

10 Q. You are speaking of the funerals?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. And when were the funerals?

13 A. Oh, I don't remember the specific
14 dates.

15 Q. Now, can I change the subject to
16 the debrief or post-emergency assessment of how the
17 City did in terms of their plan and ask you a
18 couple of questions?

19 The City, I understand, has not done a
20 debrief at this point.

21 A. Not officially, no.

22 Q. Are you aware whether it is
23 required under the statute and regulations?

24 A. I believe it is required upon
25 termination of the emergency, which we have not yet

1 done as well.

2 Q. And what that means -- am I
3 correct -- that they want it done sooner rather
4 than later?

5 A. I would anticipate under some --
6 yeah, under circumstances, that is the general
7 intent, but under special circumstances like this,
8 I believe we, as a group, had met and decided that
9 we would debrief once everything was concluded.

10 Q. I have seen an e-mail -- I don't
11 know whether you have, and I can bring it up for
12 you -- between Inspector Jollymore and Ms. Rheume
13 about the timeliness of this, and one of the points
14 that Mr. Jollymore makes is that if you do it now,
15 that is, the debrief, then the findings will have
16 to be produced to the Inquiry.

17 Do you believe that the findings --
18 having findings available to the Inquiry is not a
19 desirable thing?

20 A. No. I don't think there is
21 anything wrong. If we had done a debrief and
22 whatever the findings were would have been -- that
23 there would have been no issue with having that
24 information brought forward.

25 Q. This is my last question, so this

1 will encourage you. Could you identify what could
2 have been done better from your perspective as the
3 CAO and Director of Operations under the plan in
4 terms of this emergency response?

5 A. Well, that question I think will
6 be -- I could better answer that once the
7 Commissioner produces his report. I have got to
8 say, though, that I believe under the circumstances
9 -- let's put it this way. None of us got up on
10 Saturday morning thinking we were going to have to
11 deal with a mall collapse, but as it turned out, we
12 did. Everybody that worked on that event gave 110
13 percent and -- excuse me.

14 We all wanted a better outcome. It
15 just didn't happen. And you know, reflecting back
16 now, I think, you know, I would have to say
17 everybody that worked on that happen event did a
18 very good job.

19 Q. Is there anything you would do
20 differently? I mean, I'm not trying to point the
21 finger or blame. I'm just saying from what you
22 saw --

23 A. Hindsight is a wonderful tool.

24 Q. And that is --

25 A. And I wish we would have had all

1 kinds of hindsight to help us through this event,
2 but we didn't, and we had --

3 Q. But my point is you have it now.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And I am asking you now, with the
6 benefit of hindsight, what might you have done
7 differently?

8 A. I don't think a whole lot, really.
9 You know, there is some minor, minor areas we could
10 have probably tweaked. We identified, I think,
11 even during the process, and I will just go back to
12 the communications aspect of it, that you know,
13 there were some gaps there that, you know, we could
14 have probably have been more proficient. I think
15 now if we ever have an event as such, we will
16 definitely -- you know, having gone through the
17 experience, we'll definitely get somebody to assist
18 is us in media relations. It was certainly a
19 baptism by fire from that aspect.

20 But apart from that, I do have to say,
21 though, that Mr. Commissioner, if I may, I do have
22 to thank all the people who worked so hard during
23 that event, and as the administrator of the
24 organization, you know, we are very, very proud of
25 all.

1 Q. Thank you, those are my questions,
2 Mr. deBortoli.

3 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

4 Mr. Cassan, in-chief.

5 EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR. CASSAN:

6 Q. Good morning, Mr. deBortoli.

7 A. Good morning.

8 Q. Did the City offer the CCG members
9 or any of the rescuers any form of personal
10 debriefing?

11 A. Oh, yes. Actually, with regards
12 to critical incident stress, there were a number of
13 opportunities, not only during the emergency
14 itself, but afterwards where people were afforded
15 the opportunity to go and either speak as a group
16 or individually with a counsellor regarding any
17 stress issues that they may be or any other issues
18 that they had with respect to the event.

19 Q. And I am not asking you to name
20 any names, but do you know if people took advantage
21 of that opportunity?

22 A. Yes, they did.

23 Q. Tell us the CCG's role with
24 respect to supervising or mandating the technical
25 rescue.

1 A. As far as the technical aspect
2 goes, you know, our mandate there is minimal. I
3 mean, we are not the on-the-ground people
4 performing the operation. We are the people who
5 are gathering together with key functions to assist
6 those who were working on the ground and to, again,
7 liaise with the community and the media with
8 respect to information.

9 Q. During your tenure with the CCG,
10 has the CCG ever had to release information
11 previous to this incident about a fatality?

12 A. No, we have not.

13 Q. Have you personally ever had to
14 deal with that sort of an issue?

15 A. No, I have not.

16 Q. And does the CCG generally or do
17 you have any training in dealing with releasing
18 this information or dealing with families?

19 A. No, I do not.

20 Q. Was the CCG involved in the
21 decision on June the 25th to stop the rescue?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Those are my questions in-chief.

24 Thank you.

25 A. Thank you.

1 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

2 Cross-examination? Ms. Smith.

3 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. SMITH:

4 Q. Good morning, Mr. deBortoli. My
5 name is Kristin Smith, and I am counsel for the
6 Province of Ontario.

7 A. Good morning.

8 Q. I want to start with just
9 clarifying how you got most of your information
10 during the incident, and you indicated that
11 throughout the incident you had direct contact with
12 Chief Paul Officer; is that correct?

13 A. Yes. We conversed many times
14 during the incident.

15 Q. And you indicated in your
16 testimony you understood that he was the Incident
17 Commander throughout the incident?

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. Okay. And he kept you informed
20 mostly through face-to-face contact or, as you
21 indicated, through maybe telephone conversations on
22 your cell phone about the progress of the
23 operation; is that fair?

24 A. We -- when he felt there was
25 information that I needed to know, he would make an

1 effort to provide that to me, yes.

2 Q. So it would be fair to say he was
3 your main source of information about what was
4 happening on the ground?

5 A. He was one of the main sources.
6 There were other people that were also involved.
7 You know, I didn't just speak exclusively to Paul,
8 or Chief Officer. I also spoke with Mr. Neadles
9 and others, the Ministry of Labour people from time
10 to time, but my most frequent contact, obviously by
11 virtue of our relationship within the organization,
12 was between myself and Paul.

13 Q. And we saw that Mr. Neadles
14 started attending some of the CCG meetings later on
15 the afternoon of the 24th, the Sunday.

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. And did you speak with Mr.
18 Neadles, then, on the scene as well as at those CCG
19 meetings that he attended?

20 A. On occasion I had the opportunity
21 to speak with Mr. Neadles on scene.

22 Q. Okay. You indicated that one of
23 the roles of the CCG is to gather information about
24 the rescue efforts and assess that information in
25 order for the municipality to effectively respond

1 to the emergency; is that fair?

2 A. That is fair.

3 Q. And that the CCG was also to keep
4 the public informed about -- one of their roles was
5 to keep the public informed about what was going
6 on?

7 A. That is fair.

8 Q. And this information, as we saw,
9 was released to the public through the means of
10 both press releases and the press conferences;
11 correct?

12 A. Those were two avenues of
13 information being provided to the media and the
14 public. There was also other opportunities where
15 the Mayor himself did some one-on-one interviews
16 with the media, and that got information out as
17 well.

18 Q. And Mr. Carr-Harris asked you
19 about a discussion that the CCG had, he indicated,
20 either late on the 23rd or early on the 24th about
21 releasing information about the number of victims
22 or the number of potential casualties; do you
23 remember him asking you about that?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. To be fair to you, I want to try

1 to situate the timing of that discussion. If we
2 could go to the notes from the CCG meeting. I'm
3 sorry I don't know the tab number for you, but it
4 is Exhibit No. 3743, page 16.

5 We'll look at the screen here. So page
6 36.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. This is the meeting, 8 o'clock
9 a.m. on June the 24th, and this is the meeting that
10 we heard was held right before the press release
11 was issued at 9 o'clock that morning and also right
12 before the press conference at 9 o'clock that
13 Sunday morning.

14 If we can go to the next page, and then
15 we have the heading "Media", about halfway through
16 that paragraph, it indicates:

17 "Strategy, how much are we going
18 to release -- how do we approach
19 injuries or missing people".

20 So I take it that this discussion you
21 indicated was about media and closing gaps in the
22 information, but is it also fair that this was a
23 discussion about how much information to release
24 about the numbers of potential victims?

25 A. Again, this just goes back to my

1 comments that I made to Mr. Carr-Harris regarding
2 the discussions with respect to how we were going
3 to deal with the at that time presumed victims in
4 the rubble.

5 Q. So is it your recollection that
6 that discussion that the CCG had about how much
7 information to release was at this meeting at 8
8 o'clock on June 24th?

9 A. I would say that is fair, yes.

10 Q. Okay. If we can just go back one
11 page, we'll look at the attendees for this meeting,
12 right down to the bottom. If we look through the
13 list there, I don't see Trudy Rheaume's name on
14 that list. Do you recall whether she was at this
15 meeting?

16 A. No. I don't believe Trudy arrived
17 until later that day.

18 Q. Okay. But we do see that Bruce
19 Ewald's name is on the list of attendees, and I
20 understand that he was the alternate CEMC,
21 Community Emergency Management Coordinator; is that
22 your understanding?

23 A. I believe that is correct.

24 Q. You also indicated in your
25 testimony that the Mayor was primarily responsible

1 for keeping provincial officials informed about
2 what was going on?

3 A. Uhm-hmm.

4 Q. Is that correct?

5 A. That is, yes.

6 Q. And I take it that when you refer
7 to provincial officials in that context with the
8 Mayor, that that includes elected officials, such
9 as the MPP Mr. Mantha?

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. And also the Premier as well?

12 A. If so required, and I do believe
13 the Mayor did have some conversations with the
14 Premier.

15 Q. Okay. So you would agree with me
16 that part of the CCG's role was to keep the
17 Province informed through the Provincial Emergency
18 Operations Centre; is that fair?

19 A. I believe it speaks to -- our plan
20 speaks to who the Mayor has direct contact with,
21 and I believe the MPP, the MP, the Province, and if
22 it has to go to the federal level, it is done so
23 through the Province. We don't have any direct
24 contact with the feds, per se.

25 Q. Okay. And I am just going to take

1 you to a log that was prepared by the PEOC, and
2 this is Exhibit No. 9290, and if we can start at
3 the page ending 004. And this log tracks the
4 information that came into the PEOC throughout the
5 incident. We'll just start at the top of the page.
6 If we can zoom in a bit, it is a bit small.

7 So we see at 4:22 this is a log made by
8 the EMO, Emergency Management Ontario DO, Duty
9 Officer, "Called to CEMC". You indicate there at
10 4:22 on June the 24th that a call was made for an
11 update, and there was no response; do you see that?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. And then at 5:31, a second call
14 was made for an update, and it says:

15 "He advised that he has no
16 confirmed numbers [...]"

17 So it indicates, given that it is a he
18 being referred to, that it was, at this time,
19 Mr. Ewald who was acting as the CEMC on the morning
20 of the 24th?

21 A. I wasn't aware of this log, and I
22 don't know who this person is talking to, but if
23 they are talking to the CEMC, I'm assuming it would
24 be Bruce that he was speaking with or the
25 individual from the Province was speaking with.

1 Q. Okay. So if we look at that log
2 at 5:31, it indicates:

3 "He advised that he has no
4 confirmed numbers as yet, they are
5 having an 8 a.m. CCG meeting there
6 after they will be able to give
7 definite answers, but he will still
8 get back to the DO with some
9 numbers."

10 And if we can look at the one at 6:02,
11 if we can just scroll down, we can see there under
12 6:02 it says "source: Bruce Ewald". Do you see
13 that?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Alternate CEMC, and it indicates
16 that Mr. Ewald:

17 "[...] called back and advised
18 that there are no confirmed numbers,
19 for now it is believed that only 5
20 people are unaccounted for. He will
21 update the PEOC after 0800 hrs CCG
22 meeting."

23 And then if we could go to the page
24 ending 005, if we can just scroll down to the
25 bottom there, there is a 9:57 update, and you can

1 see there, 0900:

2 "TC received call from Bruce Ewald
3 (Alternate CEMC [...])"

4 Do you see that?

5 A. Yes, I do.

6 Q. And the third bullet point under
7 there says at the bottom of the page:

8 "Officially, no casualties have
9 been located in the debris.
10 Unofficially (not for wide
11 distribution), 2 people are thought
12 to be in the debris and are likely
13 VSA".

14 So you would agree with me this
15 information Mr. Ewald was providing to the PEOC as
16 reflected in this log?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. If we can go to the next page,
19 ending 007, and just do you recall whether at that
20 CCG meeting at 8 o'clock there was any discussion
21 or mention about an update to be provided to the
22 PEOC by Mr. Ewald?

23 A. No. I don't believe there was any
24 discussion with regards to that.

25 Q. If we look at the entry 11:23,

1 there is a call. It indicates a call made to Bruce
2 Ewald:

3 "[...] to confirm what info we are
4 currently at liberty to include in
5 the next PEOC SitRep update
6 regarding casualties. Bruce Ewald
7 stated the ONLY numbers we can use
8 at this time are the 22 who were
9 seen/treated/released from
10 hospital".

11 Do you see that entry?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. So you would agree with me that
14 Mr. Ewald had said to the PEOC to only release
15 those numbers of the 22 who were
16 seen/treated/released from hospital; is that
17 correct?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. I want to move on to -- you were
20 asked about your understanding at the time of the
21 collapse about the MOL's authority during a rescue
22 operation; do you recall Mr. Carr-Harris asking you
23 about that?

24 A. I do.

25 Q. And you testified at that time of

1 the collapse you did not have any knowledge about
2 their authority during a rescue operation; correct?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. And we saw some e-mails that Chief
5 Officer sent to you on the morning of June 24th,
6 very early, reporting to yourself and Mr. Hamilton
7 that the Ministry of Labour was on the scene, and
8 you stated that you didn't see those e-mails at the
9 time, but you saw them after they were sent.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And did you ever meet any MOL
12 staff on the scene? We saw that there was two
13 staff --

14 A. Over the course of the emergency?

15 Q. Yes.

16 A. Yeah. I met several MOL staff.

17 Q. And who did you meet? Did you
18 meet the inspectors?

19 A. Mr. Jones, Mr. Jewett.

20 Q. Mr. Jewett was the manager from
21 the Thunder Bay office?

22 A. I'm not sure where -- is that
23 where he is from? If that is where you say he is
24 from, then I guess I'll take your word for it. I
25 wasn't aware he was --

1 Q. Anybody else?

2 A. There was Mr. Jeffreys and the
3 other fellow I believe, Agruzzo, Peter Agruzzo. I
4 think those were the five people I remember having
5 some interaction with over the course of the
6 emergency.

7 Q. And at any point in time did you
8 ask any of those individuals directly what the
9 Ministry of Labour's authority was during a rescue
10 operation?

11 A. No, I did not.

12 Q. Okay. And did you ever ask Chief
13 Officer, from whom you were getting some of your
14 information at the scene, what MOL's authority was
15 during the operation?

16 A. Well, I came to -- I didn't ask
17 him specifically, but I came to learn through
18 discussions at the various meetings that obviously
19 the MOL had a mandate that exceeded my knowledge of
20 their capabilities and, you know, so, yeah, I did
21 learn --

22 Q. And when you refer to meetings,
23 I'm assuming you are referring to the CCG meetings
24 at the ministry --

25 A. The CCG meetings, the meetings we

1 had with the group over at the police station when
2 we were trying to come up with an alternate plan to
3 deal with the efforts after the workers had been
4 ordered off the scene.

5 Q. That was the meeting at -- after
6 the press conference on the 25th, after the 5
7 o'clock press conference?

8 A. Yes, after the 5 o'clock.

9 Q. So I want to take you back to the
10 CCG meeting on June 25th at 3 o'clock. You
11 indicated you found out before this meeting that
12 the rescue operation had been stopped; that's
13 correct?

14 A. I had found out that the workers
15 were ordered out of the work area prior to that
16 meeting, yes.

17 Q. And you were told that at the
18 scene of the collapse prior to going to the CCG
19 meeting at City Hall?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. And it was Chief Officer who
22 provided this information to you?

23 A. Yes, it was.

24 Q. And did you speak to anyone else
25 prior to the CCG meeting besides Chief Officer?

1 A. Well, I mean, I talked to a few of
2 the other fire fighters that were there at the
3 time. I mean, we all shared an equal sense of
4 disappointment, and I think we were just having,
5 you know, a conversation with regards to our
6 feelings at that point in time.

7 But as far as specifics in terms of a
8 moving forward conversation, no, it didn't happen
9 until we got back together again at the CCG.

10 Q. Okay. And I take it that you
11 understood that at this point in time in the
12 afternoon of the 25th that the HUSAR team were the
13 search and rescue experts on the scene; that's
14 correct?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. And you said that you had had some
17 discussions with Mr. Neadles throughout the
18 incident on the scene. Did you have a conversation
19 with him at this time prior to the CCG meeting?

20 A. I don't believe I did.

21 Q. So if we can go to the notes from
22 that meeting -- it is Exhibit No. 3743 -- starting
23 at page 33, and we can see there when the meeting
24 started, you were the first to communicate to the
25 group; is that correct?

1 A. According to the minutes, yes. It
2 looks like I did, yes.

3 Q. And it looks like from the notes
4 that you indicated to the group:

5 "Rescue efforts have been called
6 off -- attempt for rescue cannot
7 happen -- safety reasons".

8 And I take it that this was information
9 that you were provided by Chief Officer before the
10 CCG meeting; correct?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And then as you indicated, you
13 were the moderator of the group. I take it that it
14 was you who would then turn the floor over to
15 Mr. Neadles to describe that decision?

16 A. No. I was not the moderator of
17 this group. The Mayor, in fact, was the Chair of
18 these meetings, the CCG meetings.

19 Q. I apologize.

20 A. I moderated the press conferences.

21 Q. I apologize. I was getting
22 confused with the press conferences. So it would
23 have then been Mayor Hamilton who would have asked
24 Mr. Neadles to discuss that decision, or can you
25 describe to us how that meeting went? Was somebody

1 asking him to discuss the decision, or did he just
2 start discussing it?

3 A. Well, it was -- the meetings all
4 followed the same basic format. There was --
5 obviously, I started this meeting off, providing
6 the group with the information that I had received,
7 and then Mr. Neadles by virtue of these minutes
8 followed me. I would imagine the Mayor would have
9 asked him to speak at that point in time, and he
10 provided his perspective and his information over
11 and above what I had mentioned to the group.

12 Q. Okay. And the first thing he
13 indicates, according to the notes, is that:

14 "Decision -- tough one".

15 So I take it you understood from what
16 he said that this was a decision that he had made
17 as the HUSAR lead of the search and rescue team?

18 A. Well, the decision, yeah, but
19 obviously he is -- but he is basing his decision on
20 information he has received from MOL engineers.

21 Q. And he goes on to say that that
22 was advice that he received from the engineer. Is
23 that how you understood it, that he had received
24 advice from the engineer as to the stability of the
25 structure?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And that:

3 "Stress on stairwell and escalator
4 beams -- excess of 100% of strength
5 capacity."

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. And if we could go to the next
8 page, please. It indicates that he said:

9 "Could fall any time -- decision
10 had to be made for safety of
11 workers".

12 And at 3:05:

13 "Official designation reclassified
14 from rescue to recovery. Turned
15 back to ELFD jurisdiction."

16 And you recall him providing that
17 message to the group?

18 A. That is -- yeah. I believe those
19 were the words he used, yes.

20 Q. Those are all the questions that I
21 have.

22 A. Thank you.

23 Q. Thank you very much.

24 THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Moyer.

25 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. MOYER:

1 Q. Good morning, Mr. deBortoli.

2 A. Good morning.

3 Q. For the record, I'm Keith Moyer
4 here to represent SAGE.

5 I understand that during the incident,
6 you were in the position of the manager of the CCG.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Okay. Was the Deputy Mayor
9 included in the CCG meetings, any of them?

10 A. The Deputy Mayor was in attendance
11 at a few of the meetings initially, I believe, up
12 until Monday morning.

13 Q. Was he still considered as the
14 alternate for the head of Council?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. But he never actually sat in that
17 position?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Was he or any other Members of
20 Council ever asked to leave any of the CCG
21 meetings?

22 A. Yes. Actually there came a point
23 in time where I had asked people who weren't
24 actually required to be in the room to leave
25 because we were running, for one thing, out of

1 space, and we were experiencing some problems in
2 terms of efficiency and effectiveness of the CCG.

3 Q. Okay. I would like to bring up
4 Exhibit No. 6609, please. Near the bottom of this
5 press release, it says:

6 "The Information Centre for the
7 public continues at the WH Collins
8 Hall."

9 Just a short question. Who actually
10 manned that facility on behalf of the CCG?

11 A. On behalf of the CCG?

12 Q. Yes.

13 A. Well, actually, we had one of our
14 staff was, Jocelyn Labreche, was present at the
15 Collins Hall for most of the time that it was being
16 made available to the public.

17 Q. So all the information was fed up
18 to her because you never know what the public is
19 going to ask?

20 A. No. I think efforts were made to
21 specifically visit the Collins Hall and provide
22 information to those folks who were there. I
23 recall the Mayor and the Inspector attending
24 several times to provide information to the people
25 who had assembled there.

1 Q. Okay. And one more: The plan
2 called for a critical incident maintenance -- or
3 Critical Incident Stress Management. Was that just
4 for the staff, or was the public able to avail
5 themselves of that?

6 A. Well, at that particular point in
7 time, it was for the people who were involved in
8 the incident. There was ongoing assistance
9 provided or made available during the course of the
10 emergency, but as far as I recall, there was also
11 efforts made to reach out to the public as well
12 through various agencies within the community to
13 help anybody who was dealing with the critical
14 stress.

15 Q. Was that ever communicated that
16 such assistance was available to the public?

17 A. I don't recall off the top of my
18 head.

19 Q. Okay. Thank you. That is all I
20 have.

21 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you,
22 Mr. Moyer.

23 Across the room?

24 Mr. Richard.

25 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. RICHARD:

1 Q. Good morning, Mr. deBortoli. My
2 name is Shawn Richard. I'm one of the Counsel for
3 ELMAC.

4 A. Good morning.

5 Q. Who was responsible for
6 communicating with the families on behalf of the
7 CCG?

8 A. Actually, the OPP were the agency
9 that was going to be providing information to the
10 families. We did have -- on occasion, the Mayor
11 did attend along with Inspector Jollymore.

12 Q. Earlier you spoke about a 1:00
13 p.m. press conference, and I believe you said at
14 the end of that press conference, a Levon Nazarian
15 read a statement. I believe that was on June 24th.

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. Did you meet with the Nazarians
18 after that press conference?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Could you tell me what happened at
21 that meeting?

22 A. It was a very -- a very brief
23 meeting. I'm just trying to see if I have my notes
24 here somewhere. While I'm searching -- yeah. We
25 met directly. I believe the press conference

1 concluded at 1:50 p.m. according to my notes here.
2 Then we went upstairs into our what we call our
3 boardroom at City Hall. There was myself, the
4 Mayor, Natalie Bray, Bruce Ewald, Bob Nazarian,
5 Levon Nazarian, and their solicitor Mr. Fabris.

6 And basically, you know, we just had a
7 brief discussion about the incident. Then, again,
8 they conveyed their concern and their -- you know,
9 that they were wanting to assist in any way that
10 they could. You know, they were very remorseful
11 for what had happened, and the meeting concluded.
12 According to my notes here, it was -- I have got it
13 at 1:58, so it was about an eight-minute encounter.

14 Q. You said they were very remorseful
15 for what had happened. How did they convey that to
16 you?

17 A. Oh, they were very emotional. I
18 mean, they were both very upset. They were both --
19 I believe both of them actually cried during the
20 conversation. And, yeah, that is basically how I
21 determined that they were, you know -- they had
22 been severely impacted in terms of the emotion of
23 this event.

24 Q. May I have Exhibit No. 9305,
25 please. And I don't want to till the field too

1 much. Mr. Carr-Harris brought you to:

2 "There is no confirmation on any
3 loss of life."

4 And that was 1:00 p.m., June 24, 2012.

5 And my understanding is that this statement was
6 made following the advice of Inspector Jollymore.

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. Can we have Exhibit No. 9304,
9 please. This is a few hours later, and if we look
10 -- sorry, if we could blow it up a little bit -- on
11 the fourth paragraph down, the second sentence:

12 "Evidence has been uncovered that
13 leads us to suspect that there may
14 be a casualty."

15 What changed?

16 A. Well, I think, basically, as time
17 went on, we knew that in all likelihood that we
18 were going to be facing that situation, and that
19 was the -- from what we could see, that was visible
20 to us, it did appear that there may be a casualty
21 there, and that is why we put that out.

22 Q. Did Inspector Jollymore's advice
23 change?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Was it just a consensus amongst

1 the CCG that in spite of Inspector Jollymore's
2 continued advice, that they don't have the evidence
3 to confirm a casualty, that now it is appropriate
4 to provide additional information to suggest that
5 there may, in fact, be?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. And by "casualty", you actually do
8 mean a possible death?

9 A. I would say that's correct, yes.

10 Q. Those are my questions.

11 A. Thank you.

12 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. FEAVER:

13 Q. Good morning, Mr. deBortoli. It
14 is Norm Feaver. I'm one of the lawyers for the
15 OPP.

16 A. Good morning.

17 Q. Just on that last point, and maybe
18 I'm misunderstanding this, but the information that
19 I understand is that Inspector Jollymore's concerns
20 were primarily about releasing the name of a victim
21 and about releasing that someone had died; is that
22 your recollection?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And if we could perhaps go to
25 Exhibit No. 3743, page 004, Ms. Kuka. This is from

1 some questions from Mr. Carr-Harris, and it left
2 some confusion in my mind, and I just want to
3 clarify this.

4 We are dealing about a third of the way
5 down where it says:

6 "2 trapped locations are known".

7 And Mr. Carr-Harris hesitated and said
8 "2 trapped locations are known", and from what I
9 have heard in Phase II, my understanding was that
10 there was a limb that was viewed in one location
11 and some tapping heard in another. So can you shed
12 some light on what your understanding of what this
13 sentence means? Is it that they are knowing that
14 there are two people, or that they are knowing that
15 there are two locations?

16 A. I believe what is trying to be
17 described through the notes there is that there is
18 suspected that we have two individuals in the -- at
19 two different locations.

20 Q. And if we could go to page 018 of
21 these notes. And about two-thirds of the way down
22 the paragraph Mr. Carr-Harris took you to about:

23 "Confusion on crane. HUSAR has
24 not ordered crane. The other group
25 ordered the crane and it is on

1 site".

2 Is it fair to say that the confusion
3 was about the two rescue groups and who had ordered
4 the crane?

5 A. Really, I don't know where the
6 confusion manifested itself, but obviously it
7 appears to me that one group was anticipating that
8 the other group was doing the ordering and vice
9 versa, and as a result, the ordering didn't get
10 done as quickly as it was anticipated.

11 Q. But certainly on June 24th when
12 these notes are written, everybody would have been
13 aware that the crane had already been ordered and
14 it was en route?

15 A. Correct. And this is making
16 reference back to the events of the night before.

17 Q. Okay. But certainly HUSAR wasn't
18 there the night before.

19 A. No, you are right.

20 Q. So could it be perhaps that the
21 confusion was about perhaps HUSAR not ordering a
22 crane and not being aware that a crane was coming?

23 A. Yeah. I'm not -- I'm not 100
24 percent sure.

25 Q. Okay. And in terms of your

1 understanding about the crane issue generally, I
2 gather that it was a fairly well-known fact amongst
3 the CCG that the crane couldn't be put in operation
4 until the shoring at the north end of the building
5 could be completed so that the workers would have a
6 safe exit.

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. Thank you. Those are all my
9 questions.

10 THE COMMISSIONER: Have we covered
11 everybody?

12 Re-examination.

13 RE-EXAMINATION BY MR. CASSAN:

14 Q. Mr. deBortoli, with respect to the
15 decision on June the 25th to pull the rescuers out,
16 was there any disagreement in any of the meetings
17 that you were in, whether it was the earlier
18 meeting with Paul Officer or the CCG meeting, from
19 anybody about that decision?

20 A. No.

21 Q. On another issue, who was on the
22 press release team for the CCG?

23 A. We had our municipal individual,
24 Kate Matuszewski, and she worked in conjunction
25 with the OPP communications person, Ms. Christine

1 Ouimet.

2 Q. And after Christine Ouimet left --

3 A. Oh, we also had Marc Depatie from
4 the OPP as well.

5 Q. All right. Mr. Carr-Harris was
6 asking you -- no, actually it was Ms. Smith that
7 was asking you about updating the Province of
8 issues at the CCG. Were there Ontario Fire Marshal
9 people there as well doing that same task?

10 A. I'm not sure if they were doing
11 the same task. They were definitely there in their
12 capacity as being provincial representatives, so
13 they were getting the information firsthand, so to
14 speak.

15 Q. And then with respect to the issue
16 of disclosing information to the public, there has
17 been some discussion about whether or not the
18 identity of the person should be publicized, but
19 tell me in the CCG meetings and in anything you
20 heard, when only the hand and the foot of the first
21 victim was seen, did anybody know who that was?

22 A. Not to my knowledge.

23 Q. So how could it be that somebody
24 wanted to release that person's name?

25 A. I don't -- well, I can't say I

1 recall that there ever was a conversation about the
2 name.

3 Q. Thank you. Those are my
4 questions.

5 THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Carr-Harris?

6 MR. CARR-HARRIS: No re-examination.
7 Thank you, Commissioner.

8 THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. deBortoli -- I
9 will get that right, and I will get it out right --
10 thank you very much for being here once more.

11 THE WITNESS: All right. Thank you.

12 THE COMMISSIONER: We'll take five
13 minutes, Mr. Carr-Harris.

14 MR. CARR-HARRIS: Thank you,
15 Mr. Commissioner.

16 THE COMMISSIONER: Then we'll start
17 with Mayor Hamilton, I gather.

18 -- RECESSED AT 12:03 P.M.

19 -- RESUMED AT 12:07 P.M.

20 MR. CARR-HARRIS: I call Mayor Richard
21 Hamilton, Mr. Commissioner.

22 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

23 Good afternoon, Mr. Mayor. You are
24 still under oath, sir.

25 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

1 RICHARD HAMILTON: UNDER PRIOR OATH.

2 EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR.

3 CARR-HARRIS:

4 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Mayor. I
5 gather your background and history with the City
6 and your employment as the Mayor hasn't changed
7 since your evidence previously that you gave before
8 this Inquiry?

9 A. Not at all, sir.

10 Q. And can I ask you in terms of your
11 CCG role, Mayor, how much training you have had in
12 regard to that, the function that you perform on
13 the CCG?

14 A. I believe we provided a list, so I
15 would have to go from my recollection.

16 Q. I'll save you some time?

17 A. Oh, that would be great, yes.

18 Q. May I just put this on the ELMO
19 and get some guidance. So there will be a list
20 that will pop up there. And you will see a list of
21 training, starting in 2004. When did you become
22 Deputy Mayor?

23 A. That would have been 2002 or '03,
24 I believe.

25 Q. And when did you become Mayor?

1 A. 2006.

2 Q. So you were -- you have had
3 training since 2004 in those capacities, and is
4 that an accurate list of your training?

5 A. Yes. And that is kept up to date
6 by Trudy Rheume.

7 Q. And is there any further training
8 beyond what you have had on that list so far until
9 this date in 2013?

10 A. No, sir.

11 Q. Okay. Can we make that an
12 exhibit, please?

13 THE COMMISSIONER: The next number?

14 MS. KUKA: Exhibit No. 9913.

15 THE COMMISSIONER: Exhibit No. 9913.

16 EXHIBIT NO. 9913: List of training
17 received by Mayor Rick Hamilton.

18 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

19 Q. Now, after the collapse, Mayor
20 Hamilton, what was your first function as head of
21 the CCG?

22 A. My first function was to get a
23 handle on what was happening, to have the Emergency
24 Control Group pull together, and then ultimately
25 determine whether an emergency should be declared

1 pursuant to the legislation.

2 Q. And at the CCG, the CCG had notes,
3 we have heard, done by Natalie Bray?

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. In connection with the activities
6 on the CCG?

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. That's correct. And you have had
9 a chance to review those notes, and as far as you
10 are concerned, they are accurate to the extent they
11 go?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. And can you tell us, sir, when did
14 you first learn of the collapse on June 23rd?

15 A. It would have been about 20
16 minutes to 3:00. I was attending a function at the
17 Maplegate Centre For Women. They were having an
18 open house, and, frankly, I got a call from my son
19 who had advised me that he had heard through the
20 grapevine that the mall had collapsed. So
21 immediately I hung up the phone, and I called the
22 Chief, and the Chief confirmed that for me, at
23 which time we agreed we should pull the Community
24 Control Group together right away.

25 Q. I'm sorry. The last part was?

1 A. That we should pull the Community
2 Control Group together right away.

3 Q. Okay. And you did that, and if we
4 look at Exhibit No. 3743, Ms. Bray's notes, tab
5 201-B, if you want to look at the hard copy,
6 Mr. Mayor.

7 A. Yes, I have it.

8 Q. You have that open in front of
9 you?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Then you should be seeing a 3:00
12 p.m. meeting note on June 23rd; is that the first
13 meeting of the CCG?

14 A. Yes. It took me about 20 minutes
15 to get to City Hall.

16 Q. Okay. And we have heard that
17 there was an emergency declared.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And there is a note about
20 two-thirds of the way down that says:

21 "Not necessary to declare an
22 emergency right now."

23 And why did you delay declaring the
24 emergency?

25 A. When I first got into the room,

1 not all of the people were there yet, and it wasn't
2 clear in my mind that an emergency needed to be
3 declared because we didn't have all the information
4 at the table. It took a little bit longer than
5 expected to get it to the table, but it did
6 eventually get there, and I believe we declared
7 about almost 4 o'clock or 3:30, 4 o'clock.

8 Q. Okay. And I just want to get the
9 -- I think the evidence has been that the time of
10 the emergency was declared was 15:55 that
11 afternoon, which would be about 5 to 4:00.

12 A. Yeah. I have it on the next page.
13 It says 3:55.

14 Q. Correct. And I just want to take
15 you to Exhibit No. 8114, please, Ms. Kuka. And you
16 should be looking at a chronology. We are not
17 entirely sure who prepared it, but it has got the
18 timeline here. If you look at the top of the page,
19 this is Saturday, June 23rd at 15:09, shortly after
20 3 o'clock. It says:

21 "Provincial Emergency Operations
22 Centre receives call from Elliot
23 Lake Fire requesting Office of the
24 Fire Marshal/Heavy Urban Search and
25 Rescue assistance following the roof

1 collapse [...]"

2 And so on. And you required that
3 assistance:

4 "At least one person believed to
5 be trapped. No fire/no explosion".

6 Then if you come down the 15:58, a few
7 minutes later:

8 "DOC advises community to submit
9 declaration of emergency, along with
10 HUSAR request in order to facilitate
11 provision of HUSAR support if/as
12 required. DOC also suggests use of
13 OPP Urban Search and Rescue/Chemical
14 Biological Nuclear Radio logical
15 Emergency Response Team (UCERT)
16 (with a search dog) as possible
17 means of providing expedited support
18 on-scene".

19 And then if you go down to 16:03, it
20 says:

21 "Declaration of Emergency received
22 from Elliot Lake by fax."

23 Which would have been about eight
24 minutes after you declared it.

25 A. That's correct. Because I had to

1 sign the appropriate form, and it had to be faxed,
2 so the 3:55 would have been the declaration, and
3 the 16:03 would have been the fax.

4 Q. And this time frame that is given
5 in this chronology of the interaction between you,
6 Elliot Lake, and the PEOC is accurate, to the best
7 of your knowledge?

8 A. It fits into the time frame, yes.

9 Q. You agree that you take no issue
10 with it?

11 A. No, I take no issues with that.

12 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, if I could
13 take you to Exhibit No. 3743 again at page 2 this
14 time, and at the top of the page, you will see:

15 "2 trapped people in kiosk area.

16 One female talking".

17 It says:

18 "[Shuffled]", it looks like

19 "[Stuffed or shuffled] concrete -
20 can't hear her anymore".

21 We have had some evidence that from
22 another set of notes indicating that one female
23 talking and concrete shifted is what is intended
24 there for that to mean:

25 "Can't hear her anymore."

1 Do you agree with that interpretation?

2 A. Yeah, that is what was written
3 down by Natalie, yes.

4 Q. In other words, that the concrete
5 had shifted, shifted concrete, rather than whatever
6 that word is?

7 A. Yeah. That would have been
8 reported by Mr. Jollymore.

9 MR. CASSAN: Mr. Commissioner, the word
10 there is "shuffled". I don't think that
11 Mr. Carr-Harris can indicate what Natalie Bray's
12 intentions were.

13 THE COMMISSIONER: Elsewhere it said
14 shifted.

15 MR. CASSAN: Other people did, yes.

16 MR. CARR-HARRIS: So it --

17 THE COMMISSIONER: I just can't make it
18 out. Nobody can make it out, but it --

19 MR. CARR-HARRIS: We have --

20 THE COMMISSIONER: -- shuffled wouldn't
21 make much sense, would it?

22 MR. CASSAN: Well, actually, I don't
23 necessarily agree with that, Mr. Commissioner,
24 because certainly the rescuer --

25 THE COMMISSIONER: You shuffle cards.

1 MR. CASSAN: You shuffle cards, but the
2 rescuers talked about moving pieces of concrete, so
3 I'm not sure that --

4 THE COMMISSIONER: Shifted would be
5 more appropriate. In any event, it doesn't really
6 matter, does it?

7 MR. CASSAN: Thank you.

8 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

9 Q. Yes, well, Your Honour, Mr. Cassan
10 was here when we put the other set of notes to the
11 witness, and I was just trying to save some time.
12 But it is pretty -- you were also here too,
13 Mr. Hamilton, in the Court this morning, and do you
14 have a recollection of whether it was said at the
15 time, whether it was shifted or shuffled, as
16 Mr. Cassan would have it?

17 A. No, sir.

18 Q. Then can you go, then, to page 3
19 of Exhibit No. 3743?

20 A. Which --

21 Q. At page 3, 003 at the bottom
22 right-hand --

23 A. Oh, I see, okay, because I have 4
24 at the top. I'm sorry. I've been following the
25 other pagination.

1 Q. Yeah. I think that is a different
2 page number.

3 A. Okay.

4 Q. It says at 4:40:

5 "Confirmed death?

6 Code 5 -- located an arm as per

7 EMS -- not confirmed".

8 And did you understand what Code 5

9 meant, Mr. Mayor?

10 A. No, sir.

11 Q. And "located an arm as per EMS",

12 what does that tell us?

13 A. Well, they had located an arm in

14 the pile, and they couldn't get a pulse. That is

15 what I recall from that discussion.

16 Q. And this was an EMS who was a

17 medical specialist, emergency medical specialist;

18 is that correct?

19 A. That is what was reported to us,

20 yes.

21 Q. You remember this at the time,

22 what was said about it?

23 A. I think the EMS person was a

24 Volunteer Fire Fighter as well.

25 Q. Yes.

1 A. Yeah. And he was actually there
2 as a Volunteer Fire Fighter, not as an EMS person.

3 Q. But he is the one that took the
4 pulse.

5 A. That is what was reported to us,
6 correct.

7 Q. Yes. And when you say he is a
8 volunteer, you mean he is attached to the Fire
9 Department as an emergency medical specialist?

10 A. No, no. His regular job was with
11 EMS. They are not employed by the City. They are
12 employed by the Algoma District Services
13 Administration Board, and one of his jobs on the
14 side was a Volunteer Fire Fighter. It happens
15 often in our community.

16 Q. And in many communities, but one
17 of his specialties is as a medical specialist, so
18 is he not used for medical advice on the scene?

19 A. I wouldn't think so.

20 Q. You wouldn't? Okay. Then can we
21 go to page 4. It says just under "OPP" -- this is
22 Inspector Jollymore:

23 "2 trapped locations are known".

24 And you understand that to mean that
25 there were two individuals who were trapped in

1 separate locations?

2 A. Yes. There would have been two
3 trapped individuals in two separate locations, but
4 we weren't certain that there were only two trapped
5 people at that time.

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. There could have been a number
8 more.

9 Q. And when you say in the next
10 paragraph:

11 "No confirmed fatalities as of
12 yet".

13 We have been trying to sort through
14 this definition of "confirmed" or not. Was there
15 any doubt in your mind that the lady with no pulse
16 in her arm and her foot was deceased, as the EMS
17 individual seems to have found?

18 A. Well, strictly as reported, I
19 mean, as a layperson, if you don't have a pulse,
20 that wouldn't make sense to me. But when we had a
21 discussion with the OPP, they had some issues with
22 that, about confirming fatalities, and certainly
23 that there were issues, yeah.

24 Q. Well, what was their point there,
25 Mr. Mayor?

1 A. Well, from what my recollection of
2 the discussion was is the Ontario Provincial Police
3 has a protocol or a policy or a guideline for that,
4 and to confirm a fatality there has to be some
5 evidence from a practitioner or somebody to that
6 extent. That is what I understood it to be.

7 Q. And did Inspector Jollymore tell
8 you that?

9 A. Yeah. He was the one that
10 explained that in the CCG.

11 Q. And did you ever see that
12 protocol?

13 A. No, sir.

14 Q. Okay. And again, this is
15 discussed at an earlier meeting the next day, but
16 the issue arises here. At the end, Inspector
17 Jollymore didn't release information, any
18 particular information, and what was your view
19 about what the victims' -- or what the public
20 and/or the victims' families should hear about the
21 fact that there are casualties, if you like,
22 deceased or surviving still in the rubble?

23 A. Yeah. As I understood the
24 discussion with Mr. Jollymore is he was concerned
25 about releasing information with respect to

1 fatalities in the pile without confirming it, and
2 there was a brief discussion about that. But I
3 understood that to mean that you didn't want to
4 inform the public if there was a fatality if there
5 indeed wasn't one, because it could cause a lot of
6 traumatic experience, you know, for no particular
7 reason is the way I understood it to be.

8 And they were best positioned to make
9 that call than we were. We have got no training
10 whatsoever in that regard, and we don't certainly
11 have a policy at the City. We just don't deal with
12 those matters at all.

13 Q. And when you say "they", Mayor
14 Hamilton, you mean the OPP?

15 A. Well, that is what I mean, sorry,
16 yeah, the OPP.

17 Q. So you just followed
18 Mr. Jollymore's advice on this?

19 A. That's correct, yes.

20 Q. And was Inspector Jollymore, to
21 your knowledge prepared to release information of
22 injured persons buried in the rubble without
23 identification, or was he just against any kind of
24 information at this stage?

25 A. I think he was defaulting to any

1 information at this stage given the fact we didn't
2 know whether there was a fatality or not.

3 Q. Now, can I go to Exhibit No. 6610,
4 and this is a press release on the 24th, the second
5 day. It is at tab 24 in the brief. And it is a
6 press release issued after the 9:00 a.m. press
7 release that morning, and it says in the third
8 paragraph from the bottom:

9 "At this time no casualties have
10 been reported or confirmed."

11 You were here when Mr. deBortoli when I
12 suggested this morning that this was simply untrue
13 because casualties had been reported, and do you
14 agree that it is not a truthful statement?

15 A. No. I don't agree with that,
16 because as I understood casualties, we were talking
17 about whether or not we had someone deceased in the
18 pile. That is what I understood it to be as
19 recommended by the OPP.

20 Q. Well, one of the EMS persons had
21 -- he had reported a person that was deceased in
22 the pile on June 23rd.

23 A. Yeah. He had reported he had no
24 pulse. That's correct, yes.

25 Q. Yeah. And whether or not that is

1 in conformity with your definition of whether the
2 death is confirmed or not, he certainly reported a
3 person who was deceased; is that not the case?

4 A. He reported it through the person
5 who brought it to the CCG. That's correct.

6 Q. So when you say nobody has
7 reported any casualties, that is not a true
8 statement because at least one person has?

9 A. Yeah. It was the definition of
10 "casualty" I guess that got me caught off guard on
11 this one, because I understood that, when we
12 released this, that had to do with the person that
13 was deceased.

14 Q. So you agree with me that it is
15 untrue as it stands?

16 A. Yeah. In reading it now in its
17 context, yes.

18 Q. And did you review this press
19 release before it went out, Mayor?

20 A. I reviewed it. The OPP would have
21 reviewed it. Our press person Kate as well as our
22 CAO, so four of us would have reviewed it, yes.

23 Q. And was that the rule with all
24 press releases and indeed the content of press
25 conferences?

1 A. Well, with the press releases, for
2 certain. Press conferences, I think we added a few
3 depending on the circumstances.

4 Q. Okay. And then if you go to
5 Exhibit No. 9299, you should be looking at another
6 release. This is later in the day, June 24th. And
7 it was after 1:00 p.m., as it appears from the
8 opening paragraph. And if you are up five
9 paragraphs, you will see it says:

10 "There is no confirmation on any
11 loss of life."

12 And I suggested earlier that this is
13 misleading because of the information that, again,
14 you had received from the medical person that there
15 was a person with no pulse, a Code 5, and while he
16 confirmed the loss of life, by definition, the CCG
17 wasn't going to do it because they didn't have the
18 same definition of loss of life.

19 A. Which was consistent with the
20 OPP's definition, correct.

21 Q. Yeah. Which was consistent. But
22 the plain statement that there has been no
23 confirmation on any loss of life disregards the
24 EMS's report to the CCG; do you agree with me?

25 A. Well, first of all, the EMS didn't

1 report to the CCG. It came through, I believe --
2 this actually was a Mr. Henry Allamanchuk -- you
3 are right -- reported to the CCG. So if you could
4 ask the question again? I was a little turned
5 around on that, sorry.

6 Q. Yeah. That by simply saying there
7 is no confirmation on any loss of life, you are
8 disregarding the information that was provided to
9 you from the medical technician that there were no
10 vital signs absent, Code 5 -- and no vital signs
11 present, Code 5.

12 A. That is correct and consistent
13 with the OPP's comments, yes.

14 Q. What is consistent?

15 A. That for confirmation to take
16 place, there had to be medical confirmation, yeah.

17 Q. So by the definition of the OPP,
18 this is an accurate statement, you are saying, but
19 if you are not -- by the definition of the OPP, you
20 are ignoring the fact that the EMS has reported a
21 deceased person; agreed?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Thank you. Then I want to just
24 discuss the business of the crane with you, the
25 crane that was brought onto the site, for a moment,

1 Mayor Hamilton.

2 A. Okay.

3 Q. Given what you knew, that there
4 were victims in the rubble pile, did you understand
5 that there was going to be the need for a crane on
6 this site to conduct the rescue?

7 A. At some point, yes.

8 Q. Yes. Sooner or later they were
9 going to need a crane; correct?

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. And I'll take you to page 6. It
12 starts at page 6 of Exhibit No. 3743. And you will
13 see this is the 6:30 meeting on June 23rd.

14 Inspector Jollymore is there, and he is giving an
15 update starting at the bottom of the page. Do you
16 have that in front of you?

17 A. Yes, I do.

18 Q. It says:

19 "OPP -- lead from Ryan Cox urban
20 rescue ask for equipment structural
21 engineer on-site".

22 Over, and then it says:

23 "Bruce to find:

24 1 heavy hydraulic crane issue.

25 Wedge anchors.

1 6 x 6 and 4 x 4 for bracing".

2 Do you recall that discussion on the
3 evening of the --

4 A. Is that "can't go without
5 clearance from Ministry of Labour", right after
6 that?

7 Q. Yeah. That's right. It just
8 looks like a separate --

9 A. Yeah. And it strikes out
10 "Caughill", so I'm assuming Caughill was the
11 engineer.

12 Q. Yeah. I don't think -- they seem
13 to be a different conversation, but anyway --

14 A. Oh, okay.

15 Q. But in any event, Inspector
16 Jollymore is reporting that he spoke to Ryan Cox of
17 the UCRT team, OPP team, and asked him for
18 equipment, and he lists the equipment over on the
19 next page, and at the head of that, it says:

20 "Bruce to find".

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Does that mean Bruce Ewald?

23 A. Yes. He was the only Bruce in the
24 room, I believe.

25 Q. Okay. And do you recall, first of

1 all, that mention by Inspector Jollymore about his
2 conversation with Mr. Cox and the crane?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And what did Bruce do about the
5 request to find this material and equipment?

6 A. Yeah. I believe Mr. deBortoli
7 requested Bruce to see what he could find locally
8 in regards to the list of items that are suggested
9 here, sir.

10 Q. And do you know if Mr. Ewald tried
11 to find those items?

12 A. I believe he did.

13 Q. And is that belief founded in a
14 conversation with Mr. Ewald that he was out looking
15 for it?

16 A. No.

17 Q. And why do you believe he did?

18 A. Because I know Mr. Ewald is a
19 pretty diligent fellow, and if he is asked to do
20 something, he generally does it.

21 Q. And did you ever hear any more
22 about it after this note that was made -- at the
23 time this note was made on the night of the 23rd of
24 June?

25 A. About Mr. Ewald finding this?

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. No.

3 Q. And you don't know what became of
4 that request, then?

5 A. No. I wouldn't, no.

6 Q. Then he goes on to say at the same
7 spot. It says:

8 "Suggests let them do assessment".

9 Now, this again is Mr. Jollymore
10 speaking.

11 A. Uhm-hmm.

12 Q. And do you recall him saying that?

13 A. No. I can't say I do, sir.

14 Q. And is it possible that this is a
15 reference that he wants to delay the ordering of
16 the material and the crane until "them", presumably
17 meaning the OPP, to do an assessment? Do you
18 recall any discussion of that nature?

19 A. Nothing specific about that, but
20 it seems to sort of mesh from there back to the
21 previous page, is that what you are suggesting,
22 sir?

23 Q. And what do you mean?

24 A. Well, it says:

25 "Lead from Ryan Cox Urban Rescue

1 asked for equipment structural
2 engineer on-site."

3 And then it flips over.

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. So I think you are suggesting that
6 where it says "suggests that we do assessment"
7 actually attaches to that first statement.

8 Q. And do you think that is what he
9 was indicating, that:

10 "Suggests let them do assessment".

11 Was that before or after he ordered
12 that equipment?

13 A. Oh, I couldn't say, sir.

14 Q. Okay. And as far as you know,
15 Inspector Jollymore did not call off Mr. Ewald
16 doing a search for this material?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Now, at some point, as you know,
19 the rescue and recovery was stopped, and I would
20 like to take you to page 33 of this same exhibit,
21 Exhibit No. 3743.

22 A. I'm sorry? I had a bit of a
23 tickle there, so I had to cough while you were
24 saying that. What was the page? I'm sorry.

25 Q. Page 33, in the bottom right

1 corner. I don't know if you can see it there.

2 A. Yes, I have it here.

3 Q. Okay. Now, did you -- when did
4 you first learn that the rescue and recovery was to
5 be stopped on June 25th?

6 A. During this meeting, sir.

7 Q. And you were not consulted or even
8 informed in advance by any of the actors who made
9 that decision?

10 A. No, sir.

11 Q. And would you have expected to
12 have been?

13 A. Something like this, yes.

14 Q. And Mr. Neadles and the MOL reps
15 came to your meeting at 3 o'clock that afternoon,
16 and at the bottom of page 33, Mr. Neadles says:

17 "Decision -- tough one. Based on
18 advice by engineer MOL remove HUSAR
19 team from structure as it has been
20 deemed unsafe.

21 Stress on stairwell and escalator
22 beams -- excess of 100% of strength
23 capacity.

24 Could fall any time -- decision
25 had to be made for safety of

1 workers. 3:05 official designation
2 reclassified from rescue to
3 recovery. Turned back to ELFD
4 jurisdiction."

5 And then MOL speaks next:

6 "Experienced continuous movement
7 on stairway and escalator.

8 MOL and HUSAR engineer -- do not
9 know why structure is still in
10 place. Beam is bowed under all
11 weight shifting. It is opening up
12 more and more. Tracking movement.
13 Things are moving. 100%
14 overstressed. When it goes it will
15 go catastrophically. MOL stop order
16 so no one can enter."

17 First of all, is this an accurate,
18 relative in the circumstances, an accurate
19 statement of what he said that day.

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. And what was your reaction? Were
22 you surprised? Were you --

23 A. I was shocked.

24 Q. And did you ask any questions
25 about the stoppage?

1 A. You could have heard a pin drop in
2 the room there, sir. It is one of those things
3 where you were expecting to have some good news
4 about a recovery or a rescue, and you ended up with
5 the news that nobody can go in there for what you
6 can clearly see are the right reasons.

7 So, yeah, I was -- you could have stuck
8 me with a pin, and I wouldn't have felt a thing.

9 Q. And you had no doubt that what Mr.
10 Neadles was telling you was an accurate statement
11 of the condition of the building?

12 A. Absolutely not, sir.

13 Q. And was that based entirely on his
14 word, or what were you basing that on?

15 A. Well, you can look at the players
16 in the room. I mean, some of our best and
17 brightest were in the room, two from HUSAR. We
18 have our Fire Chief there. We had the Ministry of
19 Labour there, our CAO, and all the people in the
20 room that knew how serious this was, and there
21 wasn't a single objection to this whatsoever.

22 Q. No one challenged this statement
23 at all?

24 A. No, no. And, I mean, the Ministry
25 of Labour, as well, was quite clear that nobody

1 could go in there as well, and that made sense to
2 me. I mean, if you look at the circumstances of
3 what is laid out here, sir, nobody would expect
4 anybody to send anybody in there in those
5 circumstances without at least having the ability
6 to assess how you can do this.

7 Q. And in terms of the MOL, we know
8 Mr. Jeffreys was there and Mr. Jones --

9 A. Uhm-hmm, yes.

10 Q. -- on behalf of MOL. And the part
11 that I just read to you from the MOL, who spoke
12 those words?

13 A. I believe the first, I would say,
14 three-fifths of this or four-fifths of this would
15 have been Mr. Jeffreys. The bottom one:

16 "MOL stop order so no one can
17 enter".

18 If I remember very correctly, that was
19 Mr. Jones.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. And the reason I remember that is
22 because I have known Mr. Jones for more than 25
23 years, and I remember him saying that.

24 Q. Okay. And had the MOL with this
25 order already blocked any further entry on to the

1 site?

2 A. Well, that was my understanding,
3 and that made sense.

4 Q. Now, there was an order that day
5 later in the day, after these events, that
6 restricted or limited entry, but it accepted
7 rescuers?

8 A. I was unaware of that, sir, until
9 the proceedings here today.

10 Q. And based on what you heard at the
11 3 o'clock meeting, was there anything said that
12 would lead you to believe that the rescuers were
13 not excluded?

14 A. No.

15 THE COMMISSIONER: An appropriate time,
16 Mr. Carr-Harris, to take our lunch break?

17 MR. CARR-HARRIS: Thank you,
18 Mr. Commissioner, and we will be back at 2.

19 THE COMMISSIONER: We will rise until 2
20 o'clock then.

21 -- RECESSED AT 12:44 P.M.

22 -- RESUMED AT 2:00 P.M.

23 THE COMMISSIONER: Good afternoon.

24 MR. CARR-HARRIS: Good afternoon.

25 THE COMMISSIONER: Go ahead, Mr.

1 Carr-Harris.

2 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

3 Q. Thank you, Commissioner.

4 Mayor Hamilton, just before we broke,
5 we were talking about the 3 o'clock meeting on the
6 25th of June when the news came out and
7 specifically about what Mr. Neadles said and what
8 the MOL said. And I wanted to ask you about at
9 that point in time, at the time of the collapse,
10 what your understanding was of the authority of the
11 MOL to issue that stop order they referred to.

12 A. I wasn't very familiar with what
13 the authority the MOL had at that time, but to say
14 if they said they had the ability to do it, they
15 did, and they would know better than I. Certainly
16 it is not something that I would deal with on a
17 day-to-day basis.

18 Q. So you took them at their word --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. -- that they were entitled to do
21 it.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And Mr. Neadles had told you that
24 he was turning it back to Elliot Lake Fire
25 Department; they were basically done, and they

1 reclassified it as a recovery as opposed to a
2 rescue.

3 And what did you understand that meant?

4 A. Well, what I understood that to
5 mean is that nobody was allowed to go in there at
6 that time, so if you can't rescue, the only thing
7 else you can do is to recover. That is what I
8 understood it to mean at the time, yes.

9 Q. And they had told you they were
10 done themselves, and what did you understand they
11 were going to do? Were they going to stay or go or
12 what?

13 A. Well, I had no indication that
14 anybody was leaving, if that is what you mean, sir.

15 Q. Okay. And did that suggest
16 because they turned it back over to the Elliot Lake
17 Fire Department -- what did that mean in your mind?

18 A. Well, I was a little bit confused
19 about what that really meant other than they
20 weren't being involved in the rescue at that point,
21 because my understanding is the Elliot Lake Fire
22 Department were Incident Commanders right off the
23 bat, so I was a little confused by that.

24 Q. But as far as they were concerned,
25 they were not going to be involved in a rescue any

1 longer.

2 A. They weren't going to be, and
3 neither was anybody else, according to the notes
4 here.

5 Q. And the members at that meeting,
6 what was their reaction to -- I think I asked you
7 this before, but in terms of the order and the
8 departure of TF-3, what was their reaction to those
9 actions by TF-3 and presumably the OPP and others?

10 A. In what sense, sir? I'm sorry.

11 Q. Were they upset with them or --

12 A. No. Everybody was, I think, kind
13 of in shock because, again, thinking about going
14 into a meeting where you expected to get the
15 results of the rescue efforts, and you end up with
16 a situation like this where now they can no longer
17 continue a rescue effort, I think everybody was in
18 shock, by and large. And then people were just
19 looking for answers. "Okay, what do we do next?"
20 becomes the question, yeah.

21 Q. And was Mr. Neadles able to offer
22 any options or Mr. Jeffreys as to what you would be
23 doing next?

24 A. Mr. Neadles, no. Mr. Jeffreys did
25 indicate that there was a process for which the

1 Ministry of Labour had to follow when they had to
2 approach the building owner, and in that case, he
3 was talking about issuing an order for the building
4 owner in order that person would have to hire their
5 own engineer. That engineer would have to file a
6 report, and that report would have to have certain
7 stipulations before anybody can go into the
8 building.

9 I mean, I believe that at that point
10 some discussions happened around timing. It could
11 be anywhere from a couple of days up to 14 or 15
12 days for that to happen, and I think that even put
13 everybody into an bigger tailspin as far as --

14 Q. And that is because --

15 A. Well, there was just no way that
16 we were going to accept that that had to happen,
17 but that was the reality at the end of that
18 meeting, at least that was what we were told.

19 Q. All right, and when you were
20 worried about the up to two weeks, you were
21 concerned about the persons who were still buried
22 in the rubble?

23 A. Absolutely.

24 Q. Now, I just want to turn to the
25 subject of communications, Mayor Hamilton, and

1 prior to the collapse, as Mayor -- you had been
2 Mayor for a number of years -- did you have
3 experience with interaction with the media?

4 A. Yeah. To a certain extent, yes.

5 Q. And what sort of things, what
6 would you have been --

7 A. Well, the local newspaper, which
8 is a weekly, so every couple of weeks or month,
9 they may ask me for a comment. Once in awhile, you
10 get the same from the radio station where they
11 would ask for an in-touch interview or ask a
12 comment for a news article.

13 And once -- I would say, you know,
14 maybe once a year or twice a year, you might get --
15 MCTV will show up when there was a, you know, an
16 issue within the community, and you may have to
17 deal with the media from the television standpoint.
18 But that was pretty well the extent of the media
19 experience that I had.

20 Q. Would you have described yourself
21 before the collapse as an experienced Mayor in
22 dealing with the media persons?

23 A. Well, experienced in the sense of
24 small town Northern Ontario, yes. Experience in
25 the sense of Toronto, Ottawa, or London, or one of

1 those cities, probably not.

2 Q. In terms of their media, media
3 from outside?

4 A. Correct, yes.

5 Q. Yeah. Now, following the Neadles
6 and MOL discussion that we have just been referring
7 to, you met to prepare for the 5:00 p.m. press
8 conference to the public?

9 A. Correct.

10 Q. And who was there?

11 A. At the press conference?

12 Q. Yeah. Who was at your meeting to
13 prepare for the press conference?

14 A. I believe that would have been
15 myself and the Fire Chief, Mr. Jollymore, and Mr.
16 deBortoli, and Mr. Neadles that I remember. I
17 think I have that correct.

18 Q. Okay. And in your case, Mayor
19 Hamilton, did you make notes of what you intended
20 to say?

21 A. Yes. They were brief notes, more
22 of an opening type of situation. Obviously, we
23 wanted to make sure that the people heard from the
24 rescuers themselves as to the circumstances and how
25 it led to their decision.

1 Q. And was that generally the way it
2 would go in the subsequent press conferences, that
3 you would do an introduction and then pass it over
4 to one of the others, Inspector Jollymore or
5 Mr. Neadles to do the substantial information?

6 A. Yes. And that made sense to do so
7 because they were the keepers of the information,
8 and nothing would get lost in the translation.

9 Q. And after the 5:00 p.m. press
10 conference, there was the CCG meeting at 6:15 p.m.,
11 sir?

12 A. What page is that, sir?

13 Q. I'm looking at page 37 of Exhibit
14 No. 3743, and that is it. And do you recall what
15 the subject of the matter was after the 5:00 p.m.
16 press conference, what you talked about?

17 A. I'm sorry --

18 Q. From what you are -- sorry?

19 A. I was focusing on the 6:15. You
20 had a question about the 5 o'clock?

21 Q. Yeah.

22 A. I'm sorry.

23 Q. I was just asking after the 5
24 o'clock press conference and you came to your
25 meeting, what did you talk about?

1 A. To this meeting here?

2 Q. Yeah.

3 A. Well, that is when we became aware
4 that there was people amassing themselves outside,
5 and as you see here, it talked about some security
6 and --

7 Q. Yes, I see.

8 A. And, of course, I wanted to make
9 sure that the group knew that I was very proud of
10 them and how they had handled themselves thus far.

11 Q. So at your --

12 A. And I also stated we had more work
13 to do at that time.

14 Q. So that is at the top of page 37?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. (Reading):

17 "People trying to crash the line.

18 Ramped up security for the evening".

19 And so there were people gathering, in
20 what numbers, Mayor Hamilton?

21 A. That I don't know. I wasn't
22 outside there to see the numbers. I was in the
23 meeting itself.

24 Q. And did you, at any time, speak to
25 the people that were gathering outside?

1 A. No, I did not.

2 Q. And what was their temperament, as
3 best you could assess it?

4 A. Well, they weren't pleased.

5 Q. And were they angry?

6 A. Well, sure they were, yeah.

7 Q. And why didn't you go out and
8 speak to them?

9 A. I was advised by the OPP not to do
10 so.

11 Q. And why? Were they concerned for
12 your physical being?

13 A. Yes, they were.

14 Q. And you say in your notes:

15 "Mayor -- pride in group on how
16 it's been handled, more work to do".

17 What group are you talking about that
18 you have pride in?

19 A. The CCG, because we were in the
20 CCG meeting. As you can imagine, everybody was
21 quite disheartened at that time, and I wanted to
22 make sure they understood from my perspective that
23 I was very proud of the work they had done, but we
24 had more to do.

25 Q. And from what you knew of it,

1 Mr. Michael Mantha described the environment
2 outside with the people when they were angry as
3 toxic. Would you share that description?

4 A. Well, I wasn't there, so I
5 couldn't speak to that.

6 Q. The next meeting is at 8:30 that
7 same night, and that would be at page 40 it starts.
8 What was the purpose of that meeting?

9 A. Just give me a second to look
10 here.

11 Yeah, that meeting was to try and
12 expedite the authority to demolish the building
13 because that the -- what I recall from the previous
14 meeting, we had the stop work orders that had been
15 sort of alluded to, and we were determined to find
16 a way to circumvent as much as possible the process
17 of getting into the building very quickly.

18 Q. And what was your plan, or what
19 plan were you working on?

20 A. Well, as I said, some of our crew
21 had met prior to that. I wasn't at that meeting
22 over at the OPP station, and they had started
23 putting into play some plans to see how we can get
24 in there with the authorities that we had under
25 various things, like the Building Code or the

1 various authorities such as that. And that is what
2 they were looking at that time.

3 Q. And, I mean, one of the features
4 in your plan had to include the fact that there
5 were probably a deceased person or persons in the
6 building that you were going to; correct?

7 A. That is correct, yes.

8 Q. So your concern was to get the
9 building -- it was going to have to go back to the
10 owner, but how to get this building taken down in a
11 manner that was, in other words, took into account
12 that there were victims.

13 A. Absolutely, as expeditiously but
14 also as carefully as possible, and I know that our
15 crew was working on that.

16 Q. And did they come up with any
17 ideas at that point?

18 A. Just roundtabling. They were
19 looking at different ways of actually using certain
20 statutes to allow them to get in. The equipment
21 piece was difficult because we had nothing remotely
22 close to what we eventually ended up having, so it
23 was really a brainstorming session to try to find
24 out whether we can do it. As well, we were trying
25 to get a hold of Mr. Fabris to see if he would have

1 any objections to us getting into the building
2 quicker than would be mandated by law.

3 Q. So Mr. Neadles made it clear to
4 you that TF-3 wasn't going to have anything to do
5 with this now. They were washing their hands of it
6 and turning it over to you to fix?

7 A. Yeah. They didn't have the
8 wherewithal or the equipment to continue; that's
9 correct.

10 Q. And you didn't either, did you?

11 A. Well, absolutely not. We didn't
12 have any to begin with.

13 Q. Now, Mr. Neadles arrived then in
14 the middle of the evening or some point. If you go
15 over to page 43, you will see that he arrived, and
16 he says that Mr. Hefkey and the Premier have a plan
17 to go in; that is what you were told?

18 A. Yes. He arrived halfway, maybe a
19 little bit more through the meeting, yes.

20 Q. And that would have been some
21 approximately -- it started at 8:30, and it ended
22 -- I can't tell from this where it ended, but --

23 A. I believe it was about halfway
24 through, sir.

25 Q. So approximately what time after

1 8:30 did they arrive? Do you remember?

2 A. I don't know. Maybe half an hour,
3 because most of our meetings didn't go more than 30
4 minutes to an hour.

5 Q. Okay. So around 9 o'clock they
6 arrived?

7 A. That would be my best guess, sir.

8 Q. And they had a plan to go in?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And:

11 "Will send whatever we need".

12 Now, did they tell you what the plan
13 was at that time?

14 A. Yeah. That is when I first became
15 aware of, and I can only describe it the way Mr.
16 Neadles described it to me was that the transformer
17 was coming, the big arm that was going to reach in
18 and somehow secure the escalator so that -- because
19 the biggest fear was the escalator was going to
20 fall.

21 Q. Now, Mr. Hefkey, he was there that
22 night?

23 A. Let me take a look here who was at
24 the meeting.

25 Q. Did he arrive?

1 A. Just one minute, please. I just
2 need a moment here to see if he actually was in
3 attendance. No, he wasn't in attendance at that
4 meeting, according to page 40.

5 Q. If they came in the middle of it,
6 might they not have been added to the list?

7 A. Yes. They would have, yeah.

8 Q. They would have been added?

9 A. Yeah. Well, that was Natalie's
10 practice was to add them if they showed up late.

11 Q. So what do you recall of this? It
12 says "Dan Hefkey", and then it says -- I can't tell
13 what words go where, but it says:

14 "Questioned the order from MOL".

15 Who questioned the order? Did Mr.
16 Neadles tell you that Dan Hefkey questioned the MOL
17 order?

18 A. Yeah, I don't recall that, sir.

19 Q. Now, can I take you over to page
20 44, which is the next one, at the top, and this is,
21 again, in Exhibit No. 3743. It says:

22 "Efforts to continue -- resume
23 operation is back on."

24 And then below that some words about
25 the middle of the written part:

1 "Stress = last ditch effort".

2 What does that mean?

3 A. Yeah. Mr. Neadles made no bones
4 about it that this is certainly the last ditch
5 effort; that there was a very good likelihood, even
6 with these efforts, that the escalator could end up
7 falling in an inappropriate fashion, which was our
8 worry in the first place. However, at least we had
9 a chance.

10 Q. And this was made clear to you
11 that night?

12 A. Absolutely. I believe the number
13 he used was about 90 percent chance that, frankly,
14 it could have fallen even with these efforts in
15 place.

16 Q. And just in your own mind, Mayor
17 Hamilton, how probable was it now in light of this
18 new plan that somebody would be recovered alive out
19 of the scene?

20 A. Well, what I can say is my head
21 said not likely; my heart said let's give it a
22 shot, because whenever there is a chance, you have
23 got to take it, but I don't think anybody was under
24 any misconceptions that this was a long shot.

25 Q. And when was the plan, the new

1 plan communicated to the public, generally, and the
2 families, more specifically?

3 A. I believe -- I think there was a
4 press conference at 9:45. By this time, the OPP
5 had taken over with respect to dealing with the
6 families. I think it was Constable Webb or
7 Sergeant Webb, I believe.

8 Q. Yes. And they passed the
9 information along to the families?

10 A. As far as I understand, yes.

11 Q. And the public received first news
12 of it when the press conference was held later?

13 A. Yeah. I believe it was -- it says
14 here 9:45.

15 Q. And in speaking to the families,
16 during the emergency, did you visit Collins Hall?

17 A. Yes, I did, on two occasions.

18 Q. And when was the first time?

19 A. The first one was prior to the
20 announcement that the HUSAR team can no longer
21 continue with their efforts was the first time.

22 Q. And that was on the 25th, then?

23 A. I believe so, yeah.

24 Q. All right. And who was with you?

25 A. It was myself. There was

1 Inspector Jollymore, and I am not sure if Bill
2 Neadles was at that one or not.

3 Q. Okay. And when was the second?

4 A. That would have been immediately
5 after the 3 o'clock CCG where we received the news
6 that the project -- that the process had to stop.

7 Q. So that would have been -- so that
8 was twice in a day, the same day, in other words,
9 the 25th?

10 A. Yeah. I believe so, yeah. The
11 days kind of blended together, but I believe it was
12 on the same day.

13 Q. Okay. And was one of the reasons
14 that you went -- I think it would have been the
15 first one on that day, before the 3:00 p.m.
16 meeting. Was one of the reasons you were over
17 there was that the press conference that had been
18 held on June 25th at noon, the information in it
19 hadn't been given to the families in advance?

20 A. I'm not sure of that, yeah.

21 Q. And they were upset because they
22 weren't told in advance what was going to be said,
23 and you came over with Inspector Jollymore to speak
24 to them?

25 A. Well, not just to speak to them.

1 There was still a centre for the community as well,
2 so not just the families were there. There were
3 people from the community.

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. There was still the collection
6 centre for those who wanted to find out if there
7 was somebody unaccounted for, so it was serving a
8 dual purpose in Collins Hall at that time.

9 Q. Yes. But most of the families
10 that were concerned with victims were the two
11 families, the Perizzolos and the Aylwins, and their
12 friends and family were mostly occupying the
13 Collins Hall by that time, were they not?

14 A. I think that is fair, yeah.

15 Q. And so you came over to see them,
16 and can you tell us what happened?

17 A. In the first meeting?

18 Q. Yes, in the first meeting on that
19 day.

20 A. Well, they were just -- they were
21 given an update about what is going on, and, of
22 course, they had questions. It was being led by
23 Percy, and, of course, because the OPP all the way
24 along was taking on the responsibility in making
25 sure that the families were aware of what is going

1 on. That was part of their mandate.

2 And we would be back to give them an
3 update in the not too distant future because I know
4 they were concerned about that.

5 Q. And then later on, you came back
6 and gave them an update about what happened at the
7 3:00 p.m. meeting; is that correct?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. And again, with that one, was
10 Inspector Jollymore with you on that one too?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. And what about Mr. Neadles?

13 A. Yes. He was there as well.

14 Q. Okay. And when you spoke to the
15 families on the first occasion, were one or more of
16 them upset with you and/or the Inspector?

17 A. I don't think they were upset with
18 me, no.

19 Q. What about Inspector Jollymore?

20 A. I don't think so.

21 Q. And so did you recall any occasion
22 when there was what I would describe as a somewhat
23 heated exchange between Inspector Jollymore and
24 Mr. Latulippe and the Perizzolo --

25 A. Which one was that? Was that

1 the --

2 Q. It appears from the evidence to be
3 the first one.

4 A. Oh, okay. Okay. Because
5 sometimes they just -- they blended together.
6 Yeah. I do recall that, yes.

7 Q. And can you describe that scene
8 for me, please.

9 A. Well, all I can say is the
10 Inspector was trying to explain what was going on,
11 and, obviously, Mr. Latulippe was upset, and I
12 understood that, and he was challenging Inspector
13 Jollymore to provide more information, I suppose,
14 than what he was providing.

15 Q. And do you recall, as part of the
16 exchange, that Inspector Jollicouer [sic] said to
17 Mr. Latulippe --

18 THE COMMISSIONER: Jollymore.

19 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

20 Q. Sorry, Jollymore -- said to
21 Inspector Jollymore. The two of them had this
22 conversation which was somewhat heated, and at some
23 point Inspector Jollymore said to Mr. Latulippe,
24 and I am quoting from the transcript of August 7th,
25 2013, pages 19885 and 19886, and it says, and I

1 quote that Inspector Jollymore said to
2 Mr. Latulippe:

3 "I don't really have to be here,
4 I'm doing you a favour by being
5 here."

6 A. I don't remember those exact
7 words, but I know there was a heated exchange.

8 Q. Were there words to that effect by
9 Inspector Jollymore?

10 A. It is possible, yeah.

11 Q. You don't remember?

12 A. Not word for word, no, sir.

13 Q. And did you object to that
14 statement being made to one of the victim's
15 families?

16 A. Well, I didn't object. Again, the
17 OPP were providing the information to the families.

18 Q. And I can also tell you that Ms.
19 Kerr was present. Do you know who she was?

20 A. No.

21 Q. She was the person running the
22 victim care at Collins Hall and looking after the
23 families.

24 A. Oh, okay. No, I don't think I had
25 the ability to meet with Ms. Kerr.

1 Q. And she describes in her evidence
2 that Inspector Jollymore was very aggressive when
3 he came in where the families were. Did you
4 observe that?

5 A. Well, I observed that there was a
6 heated exchange, yes.

7 Q. I'm speaking of Inspector
8 Jollymore now. Was he very aggressive when he came
9 in?

10 A. Well, he was certainly pointed,
11 yes.

12 Q. And Ms. Kerr, I'll just read you
13 what she says in her evidence, and this is in
14 answer to a question:

15 "Answer: It was actually
16 Mr. Aylwin that came over to me and
17 asked if I could contact the police
18 and have them come back to the hall,
19 so I drove to the OPP detachment,
20 and I was stopped as soon as I
21 entered and was informed -- when I
22 asked if the Inspector could come
23 and speak to the families, I was
24 told that he would be there as soon
25 as possible, but he was busy with

1 the press conference, and that was
2 his first priority.

3 Question: And how did you react
4 to that?

5 Answer: I was upset and angry."
6 This was Ms. Kerr talking.

7 "Question: Your next notation is
8 at 2:00 p.m., and you write that:

9 'Inspector Jollymore came to
10 speak to families -- first time
11 anyone attended in 7 1/2 hours.
12 Inspector Jollymore was very
13 aggressive when he came in.'

14 We heard evidence yesterday, Ms.
15 Kerr, from Inspector Jollymore that
16 had to do with this visit at Collins
17 Hall, and my first question to you
18 is: Who attended with Inspector
19 Jollymore when he came into Collins
20 Hall?

21 Answer: Mayor Hamilton was with
22 him as well as I believe it is
23 Inspector Neadles from the TF-3, you
24 are calling them?

25 Question: That's right.

1 Answer: He attended with him as
2 well.

3 Question: And you write that he
4 was very aggressive. When Inspector
5 Jollymore was asked about this
6 notation, it was his recollection
7 that he had had a private
8 conversation with you about the fact
9 that there had not been more
10 frequent updates by the OPP, and
11 that if he was aggressive, it would
12 have been in the context of that
13 private discussion. What is your
14 recollection about this notation?

15 Answer: Inspector Jollymore was
16 aggressive to the public. There was
17 an exchange of words between
18 himself, and I'm not sure if it was
19 Mr. Latulippe or Mr. Gendron in
20 regards to the attendance of the
21 OPP, but his aggression was not
22 directed at me. It was directed at
23 those family members.

24 The Commissioner: What do you
25 mean by 'aggression' or

1 'aggressive'?

2 The Witness: The families were
3 asking why he couldn't come sooner,
4 why they had to wait until after the
5 press conference, and he informed
6 them that his attendance was out of
7 the kindness of his heart. He did
8 not have to come and speak to them.
9 It was not his role, and he was
10 doing that to be polite."

11 Do you remember that?

12 A. Well, I remember a discussion with
13 Inspector Jollymore, yeah.

14 Q. And did he say that he was doing
15 them a favour by coming?

16 MR. FEAVER: Mr. Commissioner, perhaps
17 if I could object. This is the second go-around
18 that Mr. Carr-Harris has asked these questions. He
19 has asked these specific issues, and this witness
20 has on both occasions said that he didn't recall
21 the specifics. So I'm not sure why we are trying
22 again to elicit information that he clearly doesn't
23 have a recollection of.

24 THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Carr-Harris?

25 MR. CARR-HARRIS: I'm jogging his

1 memory, Commissioner. I'm trying to jog his memory
2 as to what went on and putting it to him what is
3 already in the record and giving him an opportunity
4 to respond to it.

5 THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I thought we
6 had been around that particular pole, but I will
7 give you one final jog.

8 THE WITNESS: This specific wording,
9 no, I don't recall this specific wording, but I do
10 know that there was, I'll call it, an energized
11 conversation between Inspector Jollymore and a
12 number of members of the family and other people
13 around, yes.

14 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

15 Q. Okay. And words to the effect
16 that he was doing the family a favour or a
17 politeness to be there at all?

18 A. I don't recall those words
19 specifically.

20 MR. FEAVER: Again, Mr. Commissioner,
21 if I may, I think --

22 THE COMMISSIONER: It is a more
23 specific question, and the answer has already been
24 given, Mr. Feaver. I think we can move on.

25 BY MR. CARR-HARRIS:

1 Q. Yes. Did you speak to any of the
2 families yourself, Mayor Hamilton?

3 A. During the first meeting I did
4 speak with Teresa Perizzolo, because I knew her.
5 She introduced me to her sister who I didn't know,
6 and I believe I had a discussion with
7 Mr. Latulippe. I wasn't overly familiar with the
8 Aylwin family because they had not been in town for
9 quite some time, and they didn't -- they worked at
10 the other mine. I actually worked with Teresa's
11 father, so I knew the Perizzolo family fairly well.

12 Q. And how long do you think you were
13 there that day?

14 A. It wasn't very long, maybe five or
15 ten minutes.

16 Q. And after the 25th, did you have
17 occasion to speak to the Aylwins or the Perizzolos
18 again?

19 A. I think I might have spoken to
20 Darren in passing a couple of times, but nothing to
21 any extent. And, no, I haven't spoken to the
22 Aylwins.

23 Q. Thank you. Now, just switching
24 gears, to the debriefing issue --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- and we well understand by now
2 there hasn't been a debriefing, and do you agree
3 that it is required under the statute to happen and
4 as soon as possible?

5 A. Yes, it is. It is required under
6 our plan as well to happen within the five days of
7 the emergency being called off, for lack of a
8 better definition.

9 Q. And as Mayor, were you involved in
10 the decision not to do the debriefing following the
11 emergency?

12 A. It came up at our July CCG meeting
13 about having a debriefing. Of course, it was the
14 middle of July, so there was some difficulties in
15 getting people together, but beyond that, we had
16 people going through their own personal debriefing,
17 myself included, with local services that were
18 provided for on a group basis as well as on a local
19 basis. And it was decided at that time with the
20 Inquiry, you know, happening and such that that
21 debriefing was probably best left until the
22 emergency was called off.

23 Q. And was there a concern that the
24 Inquiry would have the findings of any such
25 debriefing eventually if you held it before the

1 Inquiry was held?

2 A. Not in my mind, no.

3 Q. Anyone else's?

4 A. Not that I am aware of.

5 Q. Now, do you agree one of your
6 roles under the Emergency Plan is to be the
7 official media spokesperson?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And can I go to Exhibit No. 8087,
10 please, and page 22.

11 A. Is that in the book here?

12 Q. Yeah. I'm not sure that it is
13 actually. This is the Annex Section II. There it
14 is, page 22. It is an annex to the plan actually.

15 A. So by this or this?

16 Q. Yes, by this.

17 A. Okay.

18 Q. And if you tip it down a bit so we
19 can read the bits at the very top, Ms. Kuka, on the
20 right-hand side. It is part of the "Emergency
21 Information Plan, City of Elliot Lake, Annex
22 Section II, Tab 2", and it deals with the other
23 positions but also with the official media
24 spokesperson. And the objective, as you can see,
25 is that:

1 "It is the goal of the Emergency
2 Information Plan to ensure the
3 release of accurate information to
4 the news media and issue
5 authoritative instructions to the
6 public as well as respond to and
7 redirect individual requests for
8 reports on information concerning
9 any aspect of the emergency. The
10 Emergency Information Plan allows
11 control of the public affairs
12 agenda.

13 Direct communication from the
14 Mayor provides the sought-after
15 reassurance to the people from
16 someone trusted and respected.
17 Keeping the public well informed
18 prevents panic, dispels rumours, and
19 precludes the need for people to
20 wander around to see what has
21 happened."

22 And then if you drop down, it says "Key
23 Players Duties and Responsibilities, "and it
24 lists -- this is the "Official Media Spokesperson".
25 It lists the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor and the

1 alternate, and it says:

2 "The Mayor or his alternate will
3 act as the Official Media
4 Spokesperson in the event of an
5 emergency and will be responsible
6 for the following:

7 1. Providing vital information
8 to the media, general public and
9 other concerned audiences in a
10 timely, complete and accurate manner
11 (unless restricted legally).

12 2. Providing assurances to the
13 media, general public and other
14 concerned audiences that the
15 emergency is being managed
16 effectively.

17 3. Building public confidence.

18 4. Interacting with the media in
19 a positive, co-operative and
20 respectful manner, even when dealing
21 with 'bad news' issues.

22 5. Liaison with the Emergency
23 Information Officer to keep informed
24 and up-to-date on the status of the
25 emergency and its effect on the

1 community."

2 Had you seen that before, sir?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. And in terms of the overall
5 requirement, do you believe that you met the role
6 of official media spokesperson for the City of
7 Elliot Lake?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 Q. And you will recall that there
10 were a couple of -- at least a couple of press
11 releases that you had that you agreed were -- or at
12 least one of them that you agreed wasn't an
13 accurate reflection. Would you think that was in
14 compliance with the plan?

15 A. Yeah. When we weighed all of the
16 different information that went out there, yes, it
17 was.

18 Q. And in terms of your presence in
19 the public eye, your typical role, I believe you
20 said, was -- and correct me if I'm wrong -- that
21 because of the nature of the emergency, you are
22 making an introduction and then others speak to the
23 more technical matters in the collapse.

24 A. As well as I would be available
25 for any questions and answers thereafter, yes.

1 Q. And I think the record shows that
2 a couple of times you were asked questions.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And do you think that is the
5 presence that is expected of the Mayor to earn the
6 trust of the community while handling this
7 collapse?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Can I ask you, then, is there
10 anything that you think could have been done better
11 than it was done from your perspective as Mayor?

12 A. With respect to media relations?
13 Well, certainly I know about Day 3 into the event,
14 I was happened to be able to visit the OPP -- we'll
15 call it the trailer. That is what I call their
16 media control station. And certainly having
17 something like that at our disposal early on likely
18 would have helped a lot.

19 Where I found that we were having some
20 difficulties, we were getting the information out,
21 but we weren't getting the information back in, and
22 certainly a unit like that or something similar to
23 that would be extremely helpful because they were
24 getting the feedback in as well.

25 Q. What do you mean by the "feedback

1 in"?

2 A. Well, whatever you would put out
3 there. We didn't have TV sets and monitors and
4 Twitter and all of the new age technology inside
5 the control centre. What we, in essence, had was
6 myself, Christine, Kate with a notebook and me with
7 a BlackBerry, and that was our view to the world
8 when it came to the media.

9 Q. That was your communications?

10 A. As well as the unrelenting
11 telephone calls to the media we were scheduling
12 about every 15 minutes, which seemed to go on
13 forever and ever. That was our view to the world.

14 Q. So that would be part of your
15 debrief then?

16 A. Yeah. And if it is a
17 recommendation you are looking for from me is
18 having that kind of support in a small community
19 when this kind of big-city tragedy does take place
20 would go miles in assisting that seamless
21 communication with, we'll call it, the big boys in
22 the media, the ones that are accustomed to seeing
23 that when they roll up to a disaster on Bloor
24 Street, for instance. That is already in place.
25 We just don't have it here.

1 Q. And thank you for that. Is there
2 anything else that you see could have been better
3 done with hindsight at this point?

4 A. Well, hindsight is a wonderful
5 tool, but what I do want to say is sort of in the
6 closing piece. The work done by our local Fire
7 Departments, our local constabulary, all of the
8 volunteers that worked tirelessly on the rescue,
9 including my colleagues in the CCG, I couldn't have
10 asked anymore from them. They worked relentlessly
11 for the five- or six-day period. They gave it
12 everything they had. They did so with the utmost
13 humility, the utmost of care, and I just couldn't
14 ask for any more from them.

15 Q. Thank you. Just in closing, I
16 want to ask you a question about your log. You are
17 aware that as a member of the CCG, you are supposed
18 to keep a daily log of activities?

19 A. Yeah. That log was being kept by
20 Natalie Bray. That's correct.

21 Q. Yes. But that was just of the CCG
22 meetings, not of all your activities; correct?

23 A. Well, I understand where you are
24 going with this, sir, yeah.

25 Q. I just want to ask you: Did you

1 keep a log consistent with the plan? It is at
2 Exhibit No. 8090, which is the plan, Mayor
3 Hamilton, and if I take you to the Mayor, which is
4 at page 19, "Mayor or Acting Mayor", if you -- have
5 you got that in front of you? You have read that
6 before, I'm sure.

7 A. Yes, uhm-hmm.

8 Q. The bullets down there, the
9 second-last one from the bottom says:

10 "Maintaining a personal log of all
11 actions taken".

12 A. Yes. No, I did not.

13 Q. All right. Were you aware that
14 you were supposed to under the statute?

15 A. Well, this is our plan, and for a
16 number of our mock emergencies as well, we had the
17 scribe in the meeting. In this particular
18 emergency, we also had the flip charts going. We
19 also had scribes for both the OPP and the Fire
20 Department, so we had four or five logs going at
21 the same time. As you can imagine, a lot of things
22 were happening in the CCG meetings, so I was
23 focusing on making sure that they were run well. I
24 was focusing on making sure that as much
25 information got disseminated to the CCG as

1 possible, knowing full well that there was a very
2 distinct log of everything that was going on.

3 Q. And I understand. And did you
4 understand this personal log:

5 "Maintaining a personal log of all
6 actions taken".

7 Includes the CCG, but it refers to all
8 your actions in addition, anything else you do in
9 the community apart from the CCG doing this.

10 A. All I can say to that is I would
11 be doing nothing but a log, because I was on the
12 phone almost steady with either media outlets, with
13 various government agencies, with various
14 government people. I had Mayors from all over the
15 country calling me, so, I mean, the log would be --
16 I would be writing a perpetual log and actually not
17 doing my job.

18 Q. It is in the statute.

19 A. I understand that.

20 Q. One last question. The flip
21 charts, which we have heard about that was in the
22 EOC, what was the purpose of that?

23 A. Well, it is visual. Everybody
24 could see it. We could post them on the walls if
25 we needed to. They were very, very helpful in

1 developing the media releases because now we had a
2 visual of everything that was going on. And it was
3 just a second set of notes so we can make sure we
4 were getting it right.

5 But I use them primarily for a visual,
6 and they were very helpful with the media piece
7 that we were putting out.

8 Q. And to your observation, did other
9 CCG members also use it for the same purpose?

10 A. I don't know. That was my
11 observation for it.

12 Q. Okay. Thank you. Those are my
13 questions, Mayor Hamilton.

14 A. Thank you.

15 EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR. CASSAN:

16 Q. Good afternoon, Your Worship. The
17 first question is: Is the emergency declared over
18 yet?

19 A. No.

20 Q. Why?

21 A. Well, there were a number of
22 factors with the old mall site, that it still
23 remained, even though the mall is no longer there.
24 As you are aware, there is equipment, and there is
25 other things still happening on the site. So we

1 thought it prudent not to remove the emergency
2 until all of those matters had been addressed once
3 and for all.

4 Q. Who were you called to or what
5 media organizations do you recall being contacted
6 by?

7 A. I think if I told you the ones I
8 wasn't contacted by it would be a shorter list,
9 quite frankly. It was -- I was getting contacted
10 by media outlets that I had no idea even existed,
11 as far away as Houston, Texas. I was getting media
12 inquiries from Europe, from those right across the
13 country, all the major news chains, both
14 television, newspapers, radio stations. And in
15 fact, we were lining them up in ten-minute
16 increments, and we were going for two or three or
17 four hours at a time.

18 Q. Have you ever had to do that
19 before?

20 A. Absolutely not. It was
21 frightening.

22 Q. Mayor Hamilton, is it your role
23 with the CCG to provide information to the
24 families?

25 A. No, it is not. No, that was the

1 purview of the OPP.

2 Q. And have you had any training with
3 that sort of thing?

4 A. Goodness, no.

5 Q. Have you ever had to tell people
6 in the course of your role as a Mayor or CCG member
7 about a fatality?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Have you ever in your professional
10 life had to do that?

11 A. No, I haven't.

12 Q. Tell me about how you kept the MP
13 and the MPP informed of what was going on.

14 A. Well, other than the coincidental
15 contact we would have with each other, because we
16 know each other fairly well, they were also invited
17 to the Council updates. So when Council was
18 updated immediately after a CCG, they were invited
19 into the Council Chambers along with Council, and
20 Mr. deBortoli would provide them along with Council
21 an update of what happened in the CCG meeting just
22 immediately preceding that.

23 Q. And at any point did you receive a
24 complaint that that wasn't working?

25 A. No.

1 Q. With respect to the debriefing and
2 the implementation of recommendations perhaps from
3 the Commissioner, what are the issues that you may
4 be concerned about, or why would you wait until
5 after the Commissioner provides his report?

6 A. Well, certainly the findings in
7 such an important report is going to go a long ways
8 in us doing a lot of things, and certainly a
9 debriefing and how we do it, how we modify, if need
10 be, our Emergency Plan, I mean, how we do things
11 better. I mean, I am going to assume, and I think
12 rightfully so, that Mr. Commissioner is going to
13 provide us with some of those recommendations that
14 is going to make us do things better, if that is at
15 all possible, as well as that for the people in the
16 Province of Ontario.

17 Q. And do you think that that might
18 impact issues such as budget or personnel?

19 A. It always does. I mean, certainly
20 that is always a factor that we have to look at,
21 yes.

22 Q. Thank you, Your Worship. Those
23 are my questions in-chief.

24 A. Thank you.

25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

1 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Cross?
2 Mr. Feaver or Mr. Moyer?

3 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. MOYER:

4 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Hamilton.

5 A. Mr. Moyer.

6 Q. As you know, I'm representing
7 SAGE, very briefly. The ERP states that the Mayor
8 must provide overall leadership in responding to an
9 emergency. Besides officially declaring the
10 emergency and Chairing the CCG meetings, can you
11 give us any idea of what other things that you got
12 caught up in? And I am sure there were many.

13 A. Oh, certainly. By way of example,
14 I attended and participated in all of the news
15 conferences that were called, both at City Hall and
16 at the Pearson Centre. I provided media coverage
17 when requested with respect to print, with respect
18 to radio, with respect to television, and probably
19 where I also did an interview with Peter
20 Mansbridge, so I certainly did everything that I
21 thought was required of me to provide that
22 leadership.

23 Q. Okay. Did you attend and Chair
24 every CCG meeting?

25 A. Yes, I did.

1 Q. And one last thing:
2 Mr. Carr-Harris touched on your personal log.

3 A. Uhm-hmm.

4 Q. And after reviewing the ERP, it
5 says that there is a requirement that all staff
6 involved in the emergency should keep personal
7 logs. Are you aware of any of them that have or if
8 they have not?

9 A. I am not aware of those that have
10 not. As I expressed, I had not for the reasons
11 that I outlined. As well, we had what I call our
12 expert note-taker. Ms. Natalie Bray did a
13 wonderful job. She is also trained. She is a
14 legal secretary, took training in taking notes, so
15 I had full confidence that she was going to have a
16 very good contemporaneous log.

17 Q. Well, the reason I ask is some of
18 the staff were shot all over the place, you know,
19 go pick up this, find out about this, check on
20 that, and that was only summarized at best at the
21 CCG meetings, but we don't know what they did.

22 A. Well, we would have to see if they
23 had personal logs about that, but I'm not aware if
24 they did.

25 Q. Okay. That is all I have. Thank

1 you.

2 A. Thank you.

3 THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Richard?

4 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. RICHARD:

5 Q. Good afternoon, Mayor Hamilton.

6 A. Good afternoon, sir.

7 Q. My name is Shawn Richard. I'm one
8 of the Counsel for ELMAC.

9 Did the Chamber of Commerce express
10 concerns about the merchants', I guess, merchandise
11 in the mall and personal effects?

12 A. They didn't express it personally
13 to me, but it did come through, and I can't recall
14 who, but to the CCG, yes.

15 Q. But did they ask if the City had a
16 plan to recover the merchandise and effects?

17 A. They had requested -- they had
18 asked us whether or not through that person whether
19 that was the case, but, again, that wasn't our
20 focus at the time. Obviously, our focus was the
21 rescue.

22 Q. And after, obviously, the 23rd,
23 the 24th, the 25th, 26th, 27th, it is clear that
24 your focus is on the rescue and the recovery.

25 After the recovery of the bodies, did the City turn

1 its mind to the concerns about the merchants'
2 merchandise and the personal effects that were left
3 in the mall?

4 A. Yeah. We had turned our mind to
5 it in the sense of whether we could have any
6 influence on it or not, and that is how we turned
7 our mind to it. And as I understood, once the
8 property was turned over to the Ministry of Labour,
9 that trying to -- or the coroner first and then to
10 the Ministry of Labour, there would have to be
11 substantial, we'll call it, safety precautions put
12 in place by the owner prior to anybody going in
13 there, including our people. Only under
14 exceptional circumstances could anybody go in
15 there.

16 Q. Did you pose the question to the
17 Ministry of Labour and/or the coroner whether or
18 not some arrangements could be made for someone to
19 recover the merchandise and personal effects?

20 A. I believe that was done through
21 Mr. deBortoli, and I think the answer was
22 categorically no. There was no way we could get in
23 there or anybody could get in there.

24 Q. And earlier you were speaking with
25 Mr. Carr-Harris about the meeting with the family

1 on June 25th when they were informed about the stop
2 to the rescue operation. I understand that you
3 were present, yes?

4 A. Yes. I was, yes.

5 Q. Inspector Jollymore and Bill
6 Neadles?

7 A. That's correct, yes.

8 Q. Can you tell me why Bill Neadles
9 communicated that information to the family?

10 A. Well, it was my understanding that
11 Mr. Jollymore was supposed to take a lead on that,
12 but obviously Mr. Neadles had information that even
13 Mr. Jollymore may not have had in detail. So I
14 believe Mr. Neadles took it upon himself to relay
15 the information, being the keeper of the, I'll call
16 it, the firsthand knowledge.

17 Q. Mr. Neadles testified that -- and
18 the question to him was:

19 "Why are you delivering this
20 message?"

21 And his answer was:

22 "It was a personal request from
23 the Mayor; he asked me to join
24 them."

25 Do you recall making a personal request

1 of Bill Neadles to communicate the stop of the
2 rescue to the families?

3 A. No. What I had asked for Mr.
4 Neadles is if he would come with us in the event
5 there was a question about specifics, since, of
6 course, he was the one and the only one with the
7 specifics, and it ended up he was giving most of
8 the information since, quite frankly, he had it in
9 his mind to do so, as far as the knowledge goes.

10 Q. So did you think it may have been
11 more appropriate for you to communicate that
12 information if Inspector Jollymore was unwilling to
13 do it?

14 A. I'm not sure Mr. Jollymore was
15 unwilling to do it. The OPP had taken the position
16 since Day 1 that they were going to deal with the
17 families, so certainly it was his duty to do so,
18 and he would be trained to do that.

19 Q. Well, did you ask him why he is
20 not doing it?

21 A. No. I did not, no.

22 Q. We also heard from Teresa
23 Perizzolo that at the time the information was
24 communicated to her, that she was alone, that
25 everyone else had gone home. Now, we know that you

1 are familiar with her, and she had introduced you
2 to her sister, and you are familiar with
3 Mr. Latulippe.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. So I guess the question is: When
6 Bill Neadles was about to communicate that
7 information, did you look at the group and consider
8 that all the family members are not there at the
9 time?

10 A. Yeah. The group was rather large,
11 10 or 15 people, so I did not notice them in the
12 group. No, I did not.

13 Q. Now, they were going to announce
14 the end to what was going to be the rescue, and I
15 think it is not controversial that at that time if
16 there were two people you suspected were in the
17 pile, it was going to be someone from the Aylwin
18 family and someone from the Perizzolo family. So
19 why wouldn't you be looking for them if that
20 message is going to be communicated effectively to
21 them?

22 A. I really can't answer that
23 question other than they weren't there, and it
24 certainly wasn't the best situation.

25 Q. Those are my questions. Thank

1 you.

2 A. Thank you.

3 THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Feaver, I think
4 you are next.

5 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. FEAVER:

6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

7 Just very briefly. We met earlier.
8 I'm Norm Feaver, one of the counsel for the OPP,
9 and I just have a few questions around a particular
10 issue. I have gone through the Emergency Response
11 Plan in the two various locations in the appendices
12 and stuff, and it doesn't seem quite clear to me,
13 but it does appear that in terms of what the plan
14 says, that you would be the most likely person who
15 would be charged with having contact with the
16 family, as they are members of the public.

17 A. It was my understanding from Day
18 1, and you'll see it in a number of the documents,
19 that the OPP took that matter on right from the
20 outset and were going on a regular basis to the
21 Collins Hall to not just update the families but to
22 update the community on what we call the list of
23 unaccounted for as well.

24 So it was my understanding they were
25 going to continue with that all the way through.

1 Q. No, no. I appreciate that, but
2 when we take a strict look at the plan, it does
3 appear that that falls under your purview.

4 A. Well, I don't believe it does, no.

5 Q. Okay. But I think you would agree
6 with me that it is fair to say that as this
7 emergency unfolded, different people took on
8 different roles where they may be required under
9 the plan.

10 A. Well, obviously it was -- the
11 emergency became a very big emergency, so obviously
12 some people had to take on various roles, yeah.

13 Q. And certainly Inspector Jollymore
14 and his staff took on roles under the plan that
15 they weren't normally part of; that is fair to say?

16 A. Well, I don't know what those
17 would be.

18 Q. Well, for example, the ordering of
19 the crane, I think that was Mr. Ewald's
20 responsibility --

21 A. Oh, I see, okay.

22 Q. -- as logistics person, and
23 ultimately it was the OPP that ordered the crane;
24 right?

25 A. Yeah, that is possible.

1 Q. And certainly, there was some
2 assistance that was needed with your media person,
3 and the OPP supplied someone to assist with the
4 media.

5 A. Yeah, and that person was there
6 from Day 1.

7 Q. Those are all the questions I
8 have. Thank you.

9 A. Thank you.

10 THE COMMISSIONER: Ms. Smith?

11 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. SMITH:

12 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Hamilton. My
13 name is Kristin Smith, and I am counsel for the
14 Province of Ontario. You indicated that you were
15 the official media spokesperson for the City of
16 Elliot Lake during the incident; correct?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. And you made statements to the
19 media and also responded to media requests that
20 came to you for information throughout the
21 incident.

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. Okay. I'm going to pull up a
24 document here. It is Exhibit No. 6748.

25 A. Is it in the book or just the

1 screen?

2 Q. It isn't. It will just be on the
3 screen.

4 A. Okay.

5 Q. Thanks. And we can see this is an
6 e-mail that Carol-Lyn Chambers -- she is with the
7 Office of the Fire Marshal. We heard her testify a
8 few weeks ago -- she sent to Bill Neadles on June
9 24th at 8:15 a.m., and she says in the e-mail to
10 Mr. Neadles:

11 "Still seeing MOL holding things
12 up on the CTV news ticker: 'MOL
13 must assess safety before allowing
14 rescue according to EL Mayor'".

15 And did you make any statements to the
16 media specifically about the Ministry of Labour
17 before June 24th at about 8 o'clock in the morning?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Okay. So you wouldn't have any
20 reason to know why the CTV news ticker was
21 reporting that, according to you, the MOL must
22 assess the safety before allowing the rescue?

23 A. Yeah. I mean not sure where they
24 got that.

25 Q. Okay. You stated in your

1 testimony that you did not have any knowledge about
2 the MOL's authority to stop a rescue operation back
3 in June 2012 when this happened.

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. And you stated that Mr. Jones and
6 Mr. Jeffreys, both of the Ministry of Labour, were
7 at the CCG meeting on June 25th at 3 o'clock in the
8 afternoon?

9 A. Yes. I believe it was the first
10 time I saw them was at that meeting.

11 Q. So that was the first time you saw
12 anybody from MOL at --

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. -- during the incident?

15 A. That is correct, yes.

16 Q. Okay. And did you ask either
17 Mr. Jones or Mr. Jeffreys anything about the MOL's
18 authority when you saw them at that meeting?

19 A. No. And to be quite frank with
20 you, I think I was still in shock, and, quite
21 frankly, I wasn't overly talkative. I was just
22 trying to absorb what we had just been told,
23 because if you can imagine, if you put yourself in
24 that position, we were going from, you know, a
25 fairly robust rescue to a stop, and it was quite a

1 lot to absorb.

2 Q. And did you ask either Mr. Jones
3 or Mr. Jeffreys at any point after this meeting any
4 questions about the Ministry of Labour's authority?

5 A. No, I did not.

6 Q. Okay. And I want to look at the
7 order that was issued by the Ministry of Labour, if
8 we can go to Exhibit No. 5052, and I want to give
9 you a chance to see the order.

10 A. Yeah. I seen it once going
11 through the documents.

12 Q. Okay. So when was the first time
13 you actually saw the order?

14 A. When I was provided with the book.

15 Q. So during the Inquiry proceedings?

16 A. Oh, absolutely. Yeah, yeah.

17 Q. So if we can look at the second
18 page, and we see there Order No. 1. It is a
19 requirement under the OHSA, and the text of the
20 order you will see in the middle of the page there
21 is that:

22 "An inspector may, for the
23 purposes of carrying out his or her
24 duties and powers under this act and
25 the regulations, (m) require in

1 writing an owner, constructor or
2 employer to provide, at the expense
3 of the owner, constructor or
4 employer, a report bearing the seal
5 and signature of a professional
6 engineer stating, that a building,
7 structure, or any part thereof, or
8 any other part of a workplace,
9 whether temporary or permanent, is
10 capable of supporting any loads that
11 may be applied to it".

12 And just stopping there, if we look in
13 the final column, there is a "comply by" date. Do
14 you see that on the far right?

15 A. Yeah. June 27th, 2012.

16 Q. So you would agree with me that
17 this requirement for the owner to obtain a report
18 from an engineer was to be complied by, by June
19 27th?

20 A. That is what this says, yes.

21 Q. Okay. And during the incident,
22 did you ever ask Mr. Jones or Mr. Jeffreys whether
23 you could see a copy of the Ministry of Labour
24 order?

25 A. No, I did not.

1 Q. Okay. Those are my questions.
2 Thank you.

3 A. Thank you.

4 THE COMMISSIONER: Re-examination?

5 RE-EXAMINATION BY MR. CASSAN:

6 Q. Your Worship, did you keep any
7 notes at all during the incident?

8 A. We kept a few notes on when I
9 would get a press release. I would mark things out
10 or add words and various things such as that, yes.

11 Q. And I am sorry. I haven't been
12 able to find them in Relativity. Have they been
13 disclosed to the Commission?

14 A. Everything I had was disclosed to
15 the Commission. In fact, that would have been done
16 when we released the flip charts, and that was
17 quite some time later. I think in Mr. deBortoli's
18 evidence somebody had asked where the OPP had taken
19 those pictures of the flip charts. It was actually
20 you took the pictures of the flip charts in my
21 office, and you submitted them to the OPP.

22 Q. I'm not looking to trade places
23 with you right now.

24 A. Okay. Well, I'm just telling you
25 that is where they came from, just to clarify the

1 record.

2 Q. With respect to the media
3 releases, where did you get your advice, and who
4 was on the media team?

5 A. The media team, by and large, was
6 myself, Kate Matuszewski, whose responsibility in
7 the CCG is for the municipality, and Christine
8 Ouimet who was assigned by the OPP, and I am
9 assuming because she was the Community Relations
10 Officer, she had a fair bit of experience in media
11 relations.

12 Q. And with respect to the groups
13 that formed the CCG, who or what group had the most
14 experience with dealing with the media on a larger
15 event like this?

16 A. Well, it would have been the OPP.

17 Q. And did you follow their advice?

18 A. In most cases, yes.

19 Q. Thank you, sir. Those are my
20 questions.

21 THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Carr-Harris?

22 MR. CARR-HARRIS: No re-examination.
23 Thank you, Commissioner.

24 THE COMMISSIONER: Your Worship, once
25 again, thank you very much for your evidence at

1 this Inquiry. It will be the last time.

2 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

3 THE COMMISSIONER: And I gather you
4 have no further evidence to offer this afternoon,
5 Mr. Carr-Harris? We start with Mr. Hefkey tomorrow
6 morning?

7 MR. CARR-HARRIS: That's correct,
8 Mr. Commissioner. Thank you.

9 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, we'll
10 rise until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

11

12 -- Adjourned at 3:04 p.m.

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I, DEANA SANTEDICOLA, RPR, CRR,
CSR, Certified Shorthand Reporter, certify:

That the foregoing proceedings were
taken before me at the time and place therein set
forth;

That the testimony of the witness
and all objections made at the time of the
examination were recorded stenographically by me
and were thereafter transcribed;

That the foregoing is a true and
correct transcript of my shorthand notes so taken.

Dated this 7th day of September, 2013.

Deana Santedicola

NEESON & ASSOCIATES

COURT REPORTING AND CAPTIONING INC.

PER: DEANA SANTEDICOLA, RPR, CRR, CSR

0	12 28431:16	28479:11	28441:24	36 28474:6
003 28508:21	12:00 28447:24	28495:6,8	28442:20 28443:7	37 28534:13
004 28477:3	12:03 28499:18	28506:13,15	28446:22 28447:5	28535:14
28494:25	12:07 28499:19	28510:23	28472:15	3743 28393:8
005 28478:24	12:44 28527:21	28527:18,19	28473:20 28474:9	28395:16
007 28479:19	13 28434:4,13	28556:22	28475:8	28399:15
018 28495:20	13:55 28391:10	28558:12	28477:10,20	28400:17
023 28446:18	14 28376:4,7	20 28502:15	28481:5 28491:15	28406:23 28417:2
03 28500:23	28435:15	28503:14	28496:11 28514:4	28431:17 28434:4
0800 28478:21	28531:11	2002 28500:23	28516:6 28571:23	28436:19
0900 28479:1	28575:11	2004 28500:21	28579:9,17	28439:11
1	15 28434:1	28501:3	25 28426:8,10,11	28446:19
1 28391:17	28531:11	2006 28501:1	28526:22	28450:23
28395:15,17	28561:12	201-B 28393:9	25th 28447:12,	28458:25 28474:4
28399:13,15	28575:11	28395:16 28503:5	14,22,23	28484:22
28400:2 28434:22	15:09 28391:19,	2012 28374:19	28461:15	28494:25 28503:4
28518:24 28558:7	22 28504:19	28413:7 28423:16	28470:21	28506:13
28574:16	15:18 28392:11	28424:11 28493:4	28483:6,10	28508:19
28576:18 28578:6	15:55 28504:10	28580:3 28582:15	28484:12	28518:12
28581:18	15:58 28505:6	2013 28501:9	28497:15 28523:5	28522:21
1/2 28550:11	16 28436:19	28547:25	28528:6 28543:22	28534:14
10 28434:1	28474:4	2115 28388:3	28544:9,18	28541:21
28435:13	16:03 28392:17	2120 28424:9	28554:16	3:00 28393:10
28575:11	28505:19 28506:3	22 28480:8,15	28571:23 28573:1	28448:11
100 28496:23	17 28436:18,21	28556:10,14	28580:7	28450:25
100% 28451:9	18 28439:10	23rd 28391:5	26th 28571:23	28502:16
28452:1 28487:4	19 28563:4	28393:9 28395:11	27th 28571:23	28503:11
28523:22	19885 28547:25	28407:19	28582:15,19	28544:15 28546:7
28524:13	19886 28547:25	28425:22	2:00 28448:9	3:05 28487:12
10:00 28431:18,	1:00 28426:14	28431:20	28527:22 28550:8	28524:1
19 28434:11	28444:4,11	28435:14	2:20 28385:23	3:30 28504:7
10:05 28431:18	28491:12 28493:4	28473:20	2:35 28389:10	3:50 28451:14
10:30 28439:6	28516:7	28502:14	2:40 28389:10	3:55 28391:11
10:50 28439:7	1:50 28492:1	28503:12	3	28504:13 28506:2
11 28374:18	1:55 28391:10	28504:19	4	
110 28467:12	1:58 28492:13	28514:22	3 28394:5	4 28406:22
11:15 28436:12	1st 28434:13	28518:13	28400:14	28418:20 28435:1
28442:17	2	28520:23	28434:24 28456:5	28504:7 28508:23
11:23 28479:25	2 28396:24,25	28571:22	28483:10	28510:21 28519:1
	28400:2 28407:7	24 28423:7	28504:20	28558:18
	28434:23	28493:4 28514:5	28508:18,21	40 28458:24
		24th 28407:19	28523:15	28537:7 28541:4
		28413:6 28423:16	28527:11 28544:5	43 28459:1
		28424:11	28558:17	28539:15
		28426:8,13,15	28560:13 28580:7	44 28413:2
		28431:24	30 28540:3	28541:20
		28436:17,20	33 28484:23	4:00 28446:13,
		28439:12	28522:20,25	
		28440:19	28523:16	

21,25 28504:11 4:20 28396:14 28399:16,25 4:22 28477:7,10 4:25 28413:7 4:40 28400:18,19 28401:8 28509:4 <hr/> 5 <hr/> 5 28400:20,21,22 28401:13 28404:24 28412:3 28427:4,12,23,25 28428:4,8,12 28429:15 28456:5,8,10 28461:16 28478:19 28483:6,8 28504:11 28509:6,8 28516:15 28517:10,11 28534:20,23 28558:22 5052 28581:8 51961 28414:7 58 28414:8 5:00 28447:2 28533:7 28534:9, 15 5:05 28406:24 5:10 28412:5 5:31 28477:13 28478:2 <hr/> 6 <hr/> 6 28417:2 28418:20 28518:11,12 28519:1 6609 28423:7 28489:4 6610 28424:10 28514:3	6657 28413:2 28414:1 6658 28414:7 6748 28578:24 6:00 28442:20 6:02 28478:10,12 6:15 28534:10,19 6:30 28417:3 28418:22 28518:13 <hr/> 7 <hr/> 7 28420:2 28422:7 28550:11 7965 28398:6,16 28399:23 7th 28547:24 <hr/> 8 <hr/> 8 28441:23 28442:22 28458:7 28474:8 28475:7 28478:5 28479:20 28579:17 8087 28556:9 8090 28376:3 28563:2 8114 28391:17 28504:15 8:00 28436:19 28439:11 28440:18 8:15 28579:9 8:30 28458:1,22 28537:6 28539:21 28540:1 <hr/> 9 <hr/> 9 28423:6 28424:11,13 28474:11,12 28540:5	90 28542:13 9290 28477:2 9299 28426:12, 13 28516:5 9304 28493:8 9305 28492:24 9913 28501:14, 15,16 9:00 28370:1 28423:17 28440:24 28514:6 9:30 28419:14 9:45 28543:4,14 9:57 28478:25 <hr/> A <hr/> a.m. 28370:1 28423:17 28436:19 28439:6,11 28440:18,24 28474:9 28478:5 28514:6 28579:9 ability 28526:5 28528:14 28548:25 abreast 28438:15 absence 28378:5 absent 28401:1, 11 28402:14 28403:9 28517:10 absolutely 28408:9 28430:6 28525:12 28531:23 28538:13 28539:11 28542:12 28566:20 28581:16 absorb 28580:22 28581:1 accept 28392:8 28531:16	acceptable 28454:15 accepted 28402:9 28527:6 access 28455:5 accord 28391:14 account 28538:11 accurate 28390:13 28392:24 28426:1 28433:18 28501:4 28502:10 28506:6 28517:18 28524:17,18 28525:10 28557:3 28558:10 28559:13 accurately 28390:20 28423:11 accustomed 28561:22 acquiring 28377:5 act 28374:6 28558:3 28581:24 acting 28477:19 28563:4 action 28397:23, 24 28409:7,12 28432:24 28433:23 28453:20 28462:25 actions 28530:9 28563:11 28564:6,8 activate 28379:7 activated 28389:13,17 active 28381:24 28382:3 actively 28396:6 activities 28432:25 28502:5 28562:18,22	activity 28441:13 actors 28523:8 actual 28383:15 adamant 28415:23 add 28541:10 added 28516:2 28541:6,8 addition 28564:8 additional 28494:4 addressed 28566:2 adept 28408:6 adequate 28379:13 Adjustments 28372:17 administration 28432:17 28510:13 Administrative 28370:12 28371:11 administrator 28468:23 advance 28523:8 28544:19,22 advantage 28469:20 advice 28408:7 28409:19 28410:22,25 28451:5 28486:22,24 28493:6,22 28494:2 28523:18 advised 28410:21 28413:9 28477:15 28478:3,17 28502:19 28536:9
---	--	---	---	--

advisers 28425:2	agreed 28413:11 28450:18 28502:23 28517:21 28559:11,12	angry 28463:16 28536:5 28537:2 28550:5	appendage 28402:17 28403:1,5	arrangements 28572:18
advises 28392:12 28505:8	agreement 28439:16	annex 28556:13, 14,21	appendices 28576:11	arrive 28540:1, 25
advising 28409:6	Agruzzo 28482:3	announce 28575:13	applied 28582:11	arrived 28417:16 28419:14 28422:18 28442:1,8 28457:25 28459:2,3,7,10 28475:16 28539:13,15,18 28540:6
affairs 28557:11	ahead 28372:22 28376:15 28413:10 28446:8 28464:5 28527:25	announcement 28405:6 28543:20	apply 28459:19	arriving 28420:25
afforded 28469:14	air 28463:3	annual 28373:21	apprised 28378:12	article 28532:12
afternoon 28432:9 28472:15 28484:12 28499:23 28500:4 28504:11 28523:15 28527:23,24 28565:16 28569:4 28571:5,6 28578:12 28580:8	Algoma 28510:12	annually 28374:8	approach 28384:11 28403:4 28474:18 28531:2	aspect 28381:12,18 28421:17 28457:15 28468:12,19 28470:1 28557:9
age 28561:4	alive 28401:21 28405:2 28431:7 28542:18	anomaly 28377:3	appropriately 28403:17	assembled 28489:25
agencies 28490:12 28564:13	Allamanchuk 28401:24 28517:2	answers 28478:7 28530:19 28559:25	approval 28438:22	assess 28381:19 28383:5 28472:24 28526:6 28536:3 28579:13,22
agency 28491:8	allowed 28529:5	anticipate 28466:5	approve 28426:3	assessment 28384:13 28387:5 28394:2 28422:10,19,25 28439:15 28454:9 28464:8,12 28465:16 28521:8,17 28522:6,10
agenda 28557:12	allowing 28579:13,22	anticipated 28440:14 28496:10	approved 28426:6	assist 28403:24 28468:17 28470:5 28492:9 28578:3
aggression 28551:21	alluded 28537:15	anticipating 28386:19 28496:7	approximately 28539:21,25	assistance 28392:3 28446:9 28490:8,16 28504:25 28505:3 28578:2
aggression' 28551:25	alternate 28378:6 28380:12 28454:2 28475:20 28478:15 28479:3 28483:2 28488:14 28558:1,2	anxiety 28438:10	area 28384:20 28387:21 28396:25 28397:17 28412:2 28413:12 28416:15 28434:1 28435:8 28455:23 28457:2 28506:15	Assistant 28380:13
aggressive 28549:2,8 28550:13 28551:4,11,16	amass 28462:12	anybody's 28455:22	areas 28377:1 28407:11 28468:9	
aggressive' 28552:1	amassing 28535:4	anymore 28400:4 28506:20,25 28562:10	argument 28429:7,21	
agree 28391:9 28425:20 28430:11,23 28463:17 28476:15 28479:14 28480:13 28506:9 28507:1,23 28514:14,15 28515:14 28516:24 28555:2 28577:5 28582:16	amount 28381:5	apologies 28377:18,21 28391:1 28454:12	arise 28375:23 28381:7	
	Analyze 28434:23	apologize 28485:19,21	arises 28512:16	
	anchors 28418:19 28420:5 28518:25	apparently 28429:17	arm 28400:24 28401:17 28402:16 28403:6 28404:24 28459:16 28509:6,11,13 28511:16 28540:17	
	and/or 28411:11 28512:20 28546:16 28572:17	appeared 28461:23		
	angle 28376:12	appears 28395:10 28458:24 28516:7 28547:2		

<p>assisting 28420:16 28561:20</p> <p>assume 28397:11 28407:3 28418:5 28568:11</p> <p>assuming 28387:2 28437:8 28482:23 28519:10</p> <p>assumption 28440:12</p> <p>assurances 28558:12</p> <p>atmosphere 28463:13</p> <p>attached 28510:8</p> <p>attaches 28522:7</p> <p>attempt 28375:21 28421:7 28485:6</p> <p>attempted 28385:21 28400:6 28438:18</p> <p>attend 28465:9 28491:11 28569:23</p> <p>attendance 28418:6 28443:22 28444:20 28488:10 28541:3 28551:20 28552:6</p> <p>attended 28472:19 28550:11,18 28551:1 28569:14</p> <p>attendees 28417:6,12 28475:11,19</p> <p>attending 28472:14 28489:23 28502:16</p> <p>audiences 28558:9,14</p>	<p>audio-visual 28372:18</p> <p>August 28547:24</p> <p>authoritative 28557:5</p> <p>authorities 28537:24 28538:1</p> <p>authority 28416:9 28480:21 28481:2 28482:9, 14 28528:10,13 28537:12 28580:2,18 28581:4</p> <p>authorization 28459:13</p> <p>avail 28490:4</p> <p>avenues 28473:12</p> <p>aware 28378:4 28388:19 28396:8 28400:22 28416:14,24 28419:1,7,9,10,15 28436:16 28437:7 28465:22 28477:21 28481:25 28496:13,22 28535:3 28540:15 28545:25 28556:4 28562:17 28563:13 28565:24 28570:7,9,23</p> <p>awhile 28532:9</p> <p>Aylwin 28549:16 28554:8 28575:17</p> <p>Aylwins 28465:3,6 28545:11 28554:17,22</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">B</p> <hr/> <p>back 28372:21 28382:15 28395:21</p>	<p>28396:1,4 28399:22 28416:4 28417:1 28441:16,17 28442:25 28451:16 28452:23 28454:3,7,10,13 28455:17,23 28456:21 28460:7,8 28461:1, 28462:11 28464:10,19 28467:15 28468:11 28474:25 28475:10 28478:8,17 28484:9 28487:15 28496:16 28521:20 28524:3 28527:18 28528:24 28529:16 28538:9 28541:23 28546:2,5 28549:18 28560:21 28580:2</p> <p>background 28371:6 28500:5</p> <p>backup 28380:11</p> <p>bad 28452:7 28456:4 28558:21</p> <p>ball 28440:9 28457:17</p> <p>baptism 28468:19</p> <p>based 28384:20 28429:5 28431:2 28432:21 28451:4 28523:17 28525:13 28527:10</p> <p>bases 28394:9</p> <p>basic 28374:12 28441:9 28486:4</p> <p>basically 28372:1 28375:20 28377:23,25</p>	<p>28380:21 28384:14,16 28387:21 28408:2 28433:15 28438:6 28443:15 28446:3 28450:13 28456:25 28458:13 28492:6,20 28493:16 28528:25</p> <p>basics 28394:22</p> <p>basing 28486:19 28525:14</p> <p>basis 28373:24 28378:2 28396:11 28417:16 28528:17 28555:18,19 28576:20</p> <p>bat 28529:23</p> <p>Bay 28481:21</p> <p>beam 28450:9, 11 28451:23 28456:24 28459:20 28463:7 28524:10</p> <p>beams 28451:9 28487:4 28523:22</p> <p>bearing 28582:4</p> <p>beg 28458:11</p> <p>began 28447:9</p> <p>begin 28539:12</p> <p>beginning 28416:7 28441:10</p> <p>begins 28393:9</p> <p>behalf 28396:20 28489:10,11 28491:6 28526:10</p> <p>belief 28520:13</p> <p>believed 28392:6 28428:18 28478:19 28505:4</p> <p>bells 28402:4</p> <p>beneath 28389:4</p>	<p>benefit 28468:6</p> <p>big 28384:2 28386:4 28442:16 28540:17 28561:21 28577:11</p> <p>big-city 28561:19</p> <p>bigger 28531:13</p> <p>biggest 28540:19</p> <p>Bill 28417:13 28451:2 28452:13 28456:17 28459:2 28544:1 28573:5, 8 28574:1 28575:6 28579:8</p> <p>Biological 28505:14</p> <p>bit 28377:14 28380:7 28388:10 28454:11 28477:6 28493:10 28504:4 28522:22 28529:18 28539:19 28556:18</p> <p>bits 28556:19</p> <p>Blackberry 28414:18,19 28415:11,13 28561:7</p> <p>blame 28467:21</p> <p>blended 28544:11 28547:5</p> <p>Blind 28434:16</p> <p>blocked 28526:25</p> <p>Bloor 28561:23</p> <p>blow 28493:10</p> <p>Board 28510:13</p> <p>boardroom 28492:3</p> <p>Bob 28417:5,15, 23 28445:8 28492:4</p>
---	---	--	---	--

<p>bodies 28430:17 28457:12 28571:25</p> <p>body 28406:9</p> <p>bomb 28374:21</p> <p>bombshell 28449:10</p> <p>bones 28542:3</p> <p>book 28376:10 28423:8 28556:11 28578:25 28581:14</p> <p>bottom 28399:11,12 28400:18 28407:5 28418:1,9 28423:22 28424:14 28436:18 28450:24 28451:2 28475:12 28478:25 28479:7 28489:4 28508:21 28514:8 28518:15 28522:25 28523:16 28526:15 28563:9</p> <p>bowed 28451:23 28524:10</p> <p>box 28431:21</p> <p>boys 28561:21</p> <p>bracing 28418:20 28420:6 28519:1</p> <p>brainstorming 28458:17,18 28538:23</p> <p>Bray 28389:24 28492:4 28502:3 28562:20 28570:12</p> <p>Bray's 28393:8 28400:6 28503:4 28507:11</p> <p>break 28376:24 28385:19 28386:20 28439:1 28527:16</p>	<p>briefed 28417:22</p> <p>briefly 28576:7</p> <p>bright 28414:12</p> <p>brightest 28525:17</p> <p>bring 28396:1,3 28408:19 28441:6 28466:11 28489:3</p> <p>bringing 28417:23 28434:20</p> <p>broke 28528:4</p> <p>brought 28419:4 28459:11 28466:24 28493:1 28515:5 28517:25</p> <p>Bruce 28418:17 28420:3,8,12,16, 22 28421:13 28475:18 28477:24 28478:12 28479:2 28480:1,6 28492:4 28518:23 28519:20,22,23 28520:4,7</p> <p>Bruce's 28420:15</p> <p>budget 28568:18</p> <p>building 28435:1 28443:10 28448:16 28450:7 28457:11 28497:4 28525:11 28531:2,3,8 28537:12,17,25 28538:6,9,10 28539:1 28558:17 28582:6</p> <p>bullet 28439:14 28479:6</p> <p>bullets 28563:8</p> <p>buried 28513:22 28531:21</p> <p>burst 28385:21</p>	<p>business 28460:8 28517:24</p> <p>busy 28549:25</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">C</p> <hr/> <p>CAA 28436:22</p> <p>call 28374:14 28378:19 28385:13,18 28386:6,11,21,24 28389:15 28390:1 28391:25 28418:23 28459:17 28477:10,13 28479:2 28480:1 28492:2 28499:20 28502:18 28504:22 28513:9 28522:15 28553:10 28560:15 28561:21 28572:11 28573:15 28576:22</p> <p>called 28373:15 28378:24 28384:16 28385:22,23,25 28394:18 28477:9 28478:17 28485:5 28490:2 28502:21 28555:7,22 28566:4 28569:15</p> <p>calling 28370:8 28373:18 28550:24 28564:15</p> <p>calls 28389:16, 18 28561:11</p> <p>camera 28388:25</p> <p>CAO 28371:18 28376:17 28377:9 28403:16 28467:3 28515:22 28525:19</p> <p>capabilities 28482:20</p>	<p>capable 28582:10</p> <p>capacities 28501:3</p> <p>capacity 28451:10 28487:5 28498:12 28523:23</p> <p>cards 28507:25 28508:1</p> <p>care 28421:1 28548:22 28562:13</p> <p>carefully 28538:14</p> <p>Carol-lyn 28579:6</p> <p>Carr-harris 28370:5,7,8,11,15 28371:2 28372:23 28379:15 28391:2 28399:3 28400:16 28404:1,2,8,15,21 28410:8 28411:4 28413:24 28414:2,6,9 28424:7 28425:15 28427:6,10 28429:2 28430:4, 22 28431:13,14 28439:2,3,8 28440:17,18,21 28442:2,14 28473:18 28475:1 28480:22 28495:1,7,22 28499:5,6,13,14, 20 28500:3 28501:18 28507:11,16,19 28508:8 28527:16,17,24 28528:1,2 28547:19 28552:18,24,25 28553:14,25 28570:2 28572:25</p> <p>carried 28411:19</p> <p>carry 28460:2</p>	<p>carrying 28414:19 28581:23</p> <p>case 28379:9 28380:2 28381:11 28405:22,23 28406:6 28433:3 28460:4 28515:3 28531:2 28533:18 28571:19</p> <p>Cassan 28398:25 28404:11,16, 28410:19 28411:3 28427:5,20 28428:10 28469:4,5 28497:13 28507:9,15,22 28508:1,7,9,16 28565:15</p> <p>casualties 28410:11,17 28423:24 28424:16,22,25 28425:4,7,16,24 28473:22 28479:8 28480:6 28512:21 28514:9,13,16 28515:7</p> <p>casualty 28408:5 28412:1 28493:14,20 28494:3,7 28515:10</p> <p>catastrophic 28378:20</p> <p>catastrophicall y 28453:5 28524:15</p> <p>categorically 28572:22</p> <p>Caughill 28519:10</p> <p>caught 28515:10 28569:12</p> <p>CBC 28443:25</p> <p>CCG 28372:5 28373:17 28374:3,5</p>
--	---	--	--	---

28376:22	28569:10,24	28581:9	Christine	28542:10
28380:18,19	28570:21	change	28497:25 28498:2	28571:23
28381:10,15,16, 17 28382:3,5,8	28571:14 28580:7	28428:24	28561:6	28576:12
28383:3,5,20	CCG'S 28449:22	28459:23	chronological	clearance
28384:5,9,14,23	28469:23	28465:15	28392:25	28519:5
28389:13,16,22, 25 28391:4	28476:16	28493:23	chronological	close 28538:22
28392:21	ceiling 28387:3	changed	y 28392:25	closed 28437:23
28394:17	CELE 28414:7	28371:7 28493:15	chronology	closing
28395:19	cell 28414:24	28500:6	28391:18,22	28474:21
28403:16	28415:4,7,12,25	characterize	28504:16 28506:5	28562:6,15
28405:18	28471:22	28380:19	circumstance	co-operative
28407:20	CEMC 28475:20	charge 28379:20	28388:20 28408:6	28558:19
28411:15	28477:9,19,23	28385:13	28411:22	Code 28400:20, 21,22 28401:13
28417:3,9,18	28478:15 28479:3	charged	28429:23 28431:4	28404:24
28420:17	centre 28389:19, 21 28391:25	28576:15	circumstances	28427:4,12,23,25
28423:10	28476:18 28489:6	chart 28398:8, 13,24 28399:10	28402:25	28428:4,8,12
28438:23	28502:17	charts 28563:18	28443:4,17	28429:15
28446:16	28504:22	28564:21	28466:6,7	28509:6,8
28449:15	28545:1,6	check 28375:10	28467:8 28516:3	28516:15
28450:1,25	28561:5 28569:16	28570:19	28524:18	28517:10,11
28453:22	cetera 28381:3	checked	28526:2,5	28537:25
28457:24,25	28382:19 28384:1	28428:16	28533:24	coincidental
28458:5,14,22	28392:16	chief 28370:12	28572:14	28567:14
28469:8 28470:9, 10,16,20	chains 28566:13	28371:11	circumvent	collapse
28472:14,18,23	Chair 28378:6	28381:23 28382:6	28537:16	28374:17 28380:7
28473:3,19	28384:14	28388:9,22	cities 28533:1	28383:15 28385:7
28474:2 28475:6	28485:17	28389:7	City 28370:12	28387:16
28478:5,21	28569:23	28395:20,24	28371:7,18	28388:24,25
28479:20	Chairing	28409:13,16,21	28380:25	28392:4 28393:19
28482:23,25	28569:10	28411:17,23	28383:18 28391:9	28394:13
28483:10,18,25	challenge	28414:11	28429:14	28395:12
28484:9,19	28453:21	28417:22	28445:10 28448:5	28399:10
28485:10,18	challenged	28439:13	28462:11,13	28416:7,22
28488:6,9,20	28525:22	28441:2,3	28463:16,25	28432:12
28489:2,10,11	challenges	28442:7 28443:2	28464:10	28450:13
28491:7 28494:1	28377:5 28453:24	28448:4,14,23	28465:17,19	28455:14
28497:3,18,22	challenging	28450:3,18	28469:8 28483:19	28467:11
28498:8,19	28547:12	28456:15	28492:3 28500:5	28480:21 28481:1
28500:11,13	Chamber	28471:12 28472:8	28503:15	28483:18
28501:21	28571:9	28481:4 28482:12	28513:11	28501:19
28502:2,6	Chambers	28483:21,25	28556:21 28559:6	28502:14 28505:1
28503:13	28445:13 28458:4	28485:9 28502:22	28571:15,25	28528:9 28532:1, 21 28559:23
28512:10 28515:5	28567:19 28579:6	28525:18	28578:15	28560:7
28516:16,24	chance	28533:15	clarify 28397:6	collapsed
28517:1,3	28462:20	choices 28411:9	28495:3	28386:25
28534:10	28542:9,13,22	choose	clarifying	28502:20
28536:19,20		28415:21	28471:9	colleagues
28544:5 28555:12		chose 28409:19	clear 28444:21	28562:9
28562:9,17,21			28461:4 28504:2	
28563:22,25			28525:25 28539:3	
28564:7, 28565:9				
28566:23				
28567:6,18,21				

collection 28545:5	28440:15,20 28441:15 28442:5 28467:7 28468:21 28469:3 28471:1 28487:24 28490:21 28497:10 28499:5,7,8,12, 15,16,21,22 28501:13,15 28507:9,13,17,20, 23,25 28508:4 28527:15,18,19, 23,25 28528:3 28547:18 28551:24 28552:16,24 28553:1,5,20,22 28568:3,5,12,25 28569:1 28576:3, 6 28578:10	28389:20 28390:5 28409:12 28432:8,25 28437:23 28438:10 28449:16 28462:24 28470:7 28475:21 28490:12 28502:23 28503:1 28505:8 28510:15 28532:16 28545:1,3 28559:1 28560:6 28561:18 28564:9 28576:22	28536:11 28545:10 28546:4 28558:9,14 28568:4	28491:13,14,18, 25 28533:8,11,13 28534:10,16,24 28543:4,12 28544:17 28550:1 28552:5
Collins 28464:22,24 28465:6 28489:7, 15,21 28543:16 28545:8,13 28548:22 28550:16,19 28576:21			concerns 28494:19 28571:10 28572:1	conferences 28433:4,24,25 28438:18,21 28473:10 28485:20,22 28515:25 28534:2 28569:15
column 28582:13			concluded 28445:2 28466:9 28492:1,11	
comfortable 28410:14,15 28448:18			conclusion 28406:13	
Commander 28382:1 28471:17		complaint 28567:24	concrete 28397:3,8,10,12, 13,14,20 28400:3 28412:9 28421:21 28450:10 28506:19,23 28507:4,5 28508:2	confidence 28558:17 28570:15
Commanders 28529:22	common 28403:3 28422:4, 5	complete 28455:11 28558:10	concur 28392:22	confident 28390:19
commencing 28370:1		completed 28390:24 28497:5	condition 28525:11	confirm 28402:12 28420:9 28424:24 28425:5 28428:22 28494:3 28512:4
comment 28422:20 28431:1 28532:9,12	communicate 28484:24 28574:1,11 28575:6	compliance 28559:14	condolences 28446:3 28465:5, 8	confirmation 28402:9 28426:17 28427:16,23 28429:10,17,22 28430:7,14 28435:21 28436:5,13,15 28493:2 28516:10,23 28517:7,15,16
comments 28475:1 28517:13	communicated 28490:15 28543:1 28573:9 28574:24 28575:20	complied 28582:18	conduct 28518:6	confirmations 28408:9
Commerce 28571:9	communicatin g 28414:11 28415:8 28491:6	comply 28582:13	conducted 28374:1,24 28423:18	confirmatory 28430:6
Commission 28403:24	communicatio n 28398:4 28557:13 28561:21	component 28432:18	conference 28424:11 28426:14,15 28431:22 28433:7,13 28440:23 28441:7 28443:1,3,14,16, 23 28444:3,13,18, 22 28445:1,13 28446:22 28447:1,4,13,14, 17,23 28454:17 28456:6,8,10,11 28457:23 28461:15,22 28462:19 28463:14 28474:12 28483:6,7	confirmed 28400:19 28401:4,18 28404:5,25 28406:5,17,20 28407:14 28423:25 28424:17 28426:23 28427:1,2,17 28428:21 28429:15 28477:16 28478:4,18 28502:22
Commissioner 28370:3,6,7,10, 14,17,20,21,24 28372:14,20 28377:13,16,19, 22 28399:1 28403:11 28404:1,14,20 28410:2,19,24 28413:21,23 28414:3,8 28417:14 28424:3,5 28425:6,12,14 28427:5,8,18,21 28428:7 28429:1 28430:2,23 28431:5,12 28438:25 28439:4,5,9	communicatio ns 28438:15 28468:12 28531:25 28561:9	components 28435:7		
	communities 28510:16	composure 28381:23		
	community 28371:20 28373:8,17 28375:2 28376:6 28378:1,11,22,24 28379:5 28381:25	conceived 28373:5		
		concentration 28449:8		
		concern 28453:16 28461:23 28538:8 28555:23		
		concerned 28403:22 28408:12 28458:6 28502:10 28529:24 28531:21		

28509:5,7 28511:11,14 28514:10 28515:2 28516:16 confirming 28511:22 28513:1 conformity 28515:1 confused 28485:22 28529:18,23 confusion 28439:21 28440:4 28441:19 28442:11 28495:2,23 28496:2,6,21 conjunction 28374:20 28497:24 connection 28415:20 28502:5 consensus 28493:25 consequences 28388:24 considerably 28450:11 considered 28447:6 28462:21 28488:13 consistency 28390:15 consistent 28516:19,21 28517:12,14 28563:1 consistently 28417:10 Constable 28543:6 constabulary 28562:7 constructor 28582:1,3 consulted 28523:7	contact 28392:9 28397:20 28414:23 28471:11,20 28472:10 28476:20,24 28549:17 28576:15 contacted 28566:5,8,9 contacts 28382:22 contained 28404:6 contemporaneous 28570:16 content 28515:24 context 28455:2 28476:7 28515:17 28551:12 continue 28454:3,13 28456:19 28457:5 28530:17 28539:8 28541:22 28543:21 28576:25 continued 28494:2 continues 28489:7 continuing 28394:2 continuous 28451:19 28524:6 contractor 28382:23 contrary 28430:1 contribute 28373:15 contributed 28452:19 contribution 28373:11	contributor 28373:3 control 28373:17 28376:6 28378:1,11,25 28381:9 28382:1 28389:19 28390:6 28409:12 28502:24 28503:2 28557:11 28560:16 28561:5 controlled 28457:15,19 controversial 28575:15 conversation 28404:4 28435:23 28450:5 28452:19 28484:5,8,18 28492:20 28499:1 28519:13 28520:2,14 28547:22 28551:8 28553:11 conversations 28390:5 28456:4 28471:21 28476:13 conversed 28471:13 convey 28492:15 conveyed 28492:8 coordinated 28373:23 coordinating 28382:4 coordination 28437:17 Coordinator 28475:21 copy 28503:5 28582:23 corner 28436:22 28523:1 coroner 28405:5,13	28406:8 28428:21 28572:9,17 correct 28372:9, 10 28373:19 28375:1 28376:19 28379:22 28380:4,5 28382:14 28383:19,20 28384:3,4,24,25 28387:6,14 28388:6 28389:23,24 28391:6 28393:23 28394:10 28395:13,14 28396:22 28398:10 28400:12,13 28405:11 28406:15,24 28407:25 28409:1,6 28410:18 28411:20,21 28415:14,18 28416:25 28418:3 28419:25 28421:24 28423:12 28425:19 28426:2 28431:25 28432:1 28433:8 28435:11 28438:23,24 28439:19 28440:24,25 28443:7,8 28444:9 28446:15,18 28447:10,11,25 28452:9 28456:2 28457:14 28458:2,23 28465:11 28466:3 28471:12,18 28472:16 28473:11 28475:23 28476:4,10 28480:17,18 28481:2,3 28483:13,20 28484:14,15,25 28485:10 28487:6 28491:16 28493:7 28494:6,9	28496:15 28497:7 28502:4,7,8,12 28504:14 28505:25 28509:18 28510:6 28513:19 28514:24 28515:5 28516:20 28517:12 28518:9,10 28533:4,9,17 28535:15 28538:6,7 28539:9 28546:7, 8,11 28562:20,22 28573:7 28578:16,17,22 28580:4,13,15 correctly 28448:8 28526:18 correspondence 28414:22 cough 28522:23 Council 28378:10 28445:13 28488:14,20 28567:17,19,20 counsel 28471:5 28491:2 28576:8 28578:13 counsellor 28469:16 country 28564:15 28566:13 couple 28465:18 28531:11 28532:8 28554:20 28559:10 28560:2 courses 28375:6 28432:16 Court 28390:22 28508:13 coverage 28569:16 covered 28497:10
---	---	---	--	---

<p>Cox 28418:12,23 28419:6,12,24 28434:10,12 28518:19 28519:16 28520:2 28521:25</p> <p>crane 28418:18 28420:4 28421:5, 20 28422:1 28435:13,20 28436:1,11,13,14 28439:21,22,23 28440:5,6,10,12 28441:17,19,20, 21,23 28442:8,12, 16,21 28495:23, 24,25 28496:4,13, 22 28497:1,3 28517:24,25 28518:5,9,24 28520:2 28521:16 28577:19,23</p> <p>crane-related 28421:17</p> <p>cranes 28443:6 28444:10 28447:9 28463:4</p> <p>crash 28535:17</p> <p>craved 28462:4</p> <p>crew 28537:20 28538:15</p> <p>cried 28492:19</p> <p>critical 28416:16 28469:12 28490:2,3,13</p> <p>Cross 28569:1</p> <p>Cross- examination 28471:2,3 28490:25 28494:12 28569:3 28571:4 28576:5 28578:11</p> <p>cross- examining 28429:3</p> <p>crowd 28462:12 28463:19 28464:12,14</p>	<p>crowds 28463:23</p> <p>cruiser 28386:14</p> <p>crushed 28403:1</p> <p>CTV 28579:12,20</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">D</p> <hr/> <p>dads 28385:12</p> <p>daily 28562:18</p> <p>Dan 28417:15 28541:12,16</p> <p>Darren 28554:20</p> <p>date 28372:3 28447:21 28501:5,9 28582:13</p> <p>dated 28413:6</p> <p>dates 28465:14</p> <p>day 28385:3,14 28389:6 28390:9 28391:5,10,18 28392:21 28404:23 28411:18 28440:19 28442:1,13 28444:4 28446:16,23 28475:17 28512:15 28514:5 28516:6 28524:19 28527:4,5 28544:8,12,15 28545:19 28560:13 28574:16 28576:17 28578:6</p> <p>day-to-day 28432:25 28528:17</p> <p>days 28385:2 28433:23 28531:11,12 28544:11 28555:6</p> <p>dead 28425:11,</p>	<p>12 28428:1,14</p> <p>deal 28379:14 28380:22 28381:6 28467:11 28470:14 28483:3 28513:11 28528:16 28532:17 28574:16</p> <p>dealing 28378:14 28379:1,21 28406:4 28408:6 28470:17,18 28490:13 28495:4 28532:22 28543:5 28558:20</p> <p>deals 28556:22</p> <p>dealt 28433:1</p> <p>death 28400:19 28404:5 28427:17,23 28428:11,22 28430:6,7 28494:8 28509:5 28515:2</p> <p>debate 28411:15</p> <p>debortoli 28370:9,18,25 28372:12 28376:17 28384:6 28385:7 28390:22 28393:15 28403:13 28424:19 28425:8,18 28428:17,24 28430:3,13,24 28432:3,12 28435:3 28440:1 28464:21 28469:2,6 28471:4 28491:1 28494:13 28497:14 28499:8 28514:11 28520:6 28533:16 28567:20 28572:21</p> <p>debrief 28465:16,20 28466:9,15,21</p>	<p>28561:15</p> <p>debriefing 28469:10 28554:24 28555:2,10,13,16, 21,25 28568:1,9</p> <p>debris 28479:9, 12</p> <p>decapitation 28428:3</p> <p>deceased 28401:13 28402:8,10,13,18 28403:7 28405:6, 19 28406:1,5,9, 14,21 28408:10, 24 28410:11 28411:12,14 28425:11,13,17 28427:4,13 28428:19 28429:15 28511:16 28512:22 28514:17,21 28515:3,13 28517:21 28538:5</p> <p>decided 28386:8,12 28466:8 28555:19</p> <p>decision 28394:21 28411:2 28448:25 28449:14,17,24 28451:4,11 28453:22 28470:21 28485:15,24 28486:1,14,16,18, 19 28487:9 28497:15,19 28523:9,17,24 28533:25 28555:10</p> <p>deck 28387:4</p> <p>declaration 28391:12 28392:13,18, 28393:21 28394:7 28505:9,21 28506:2</p>	<p>declare 28379:8 28393:12,18,24 28394:19 28427:25 28428:11 28503:21</p> <p>declared 28391:9 28394:4 28406:9 28427:3 28428:14 28501:25 28503:17 28504:3,6,10 28505:24 28565:17</p> <p>declaring 28394:13 28503:23 28569:9</p> <p>decomposition 28428:3</p> <p>deemed 28451:7 28523:20</p> <p>defaulting 28513:25</p> <p>definite 28478:7</p> <p>definition 28511:14 28515:1,9 28516:16,18,20 28517:17,19 28555:8</p> <p>degree 28432:15,23</p> <p>delay 28422:23 28423:2 28436:14 28462:19 28503:23 28521:15</p> <p>delegate 28382:24</p> <p>deliver 28431:2 28433:12</p> <p>delivering 28433:14 28441:11 28573:19</p> <p>delivers 28378:21</p>
--	--	---	---	--

delivery 28440:10	detachment 28549:19	direction 28430:17	28473:19 28474:1,20,23 28475:6 28479:20,24 28492:7 28498:17 28509:15 28511:21 28512:2,24 28519:2 28521:18 28533:6 28551:13 28552:12 28554:6	28578:24
demolish 28537:12	detail 28388:10 28409:25 28410:6 28419:10 28573:13	directly 28482:8 28491:25	Director 28373:5 28376:21 28377:4 28378:16,18,23 28379:16,20 28380:13 28382:15,20 28467:3	documentation 28394:15
demolition 28457:19	detecting 28450:8	disagree 28409:14 28426:22	discussions 28419:9,10 28475:2 28482:18 28484:17 28531:10	documents 28576:18 28581:11
departed 28389:16	determine 28501:25	disagreed 28411:18 28450:19	disheartened 28536:21	dog 28505:16
Department 28379:3,24 28380:11 28389:17 28429:14 28461:2 28510:9 28528:25 28529:17,22 28563:20	determined 28441:5 28463:8 28492:21 28537:15	disagreement 28497:16	displeasure 28462:14	door 28387:21 28464:10
departments 28417:19 28562:7	devastated 28446:5	disappointed 28464:2	dispels 28557:18	doubt 28511:15 28525:9
department 28417:19 28562:7	devastating 28449:11	disappointment 28461:20 28462:10 28484:4	disposal 28560:17	drafted 28433:22
departure 28530:8	developed 28437:10 28463:3	disaster 28561:23	disregarding 28517:8	drafting 28373:2
Depatie 28498:3	developing 28372:12 28437:16 28565:1	disclosing 28498:16	disregards 28516:23	draw 28383:14 28398:1
depending 28373:13 28516:3	development 28372:25	discuss 28450:20 28485:24 28486:1 28517:24	disseminated 28437:22 28444:17 28563:25	drive-up 28387:20
Deputy 28488:8, 10 28500:22 28557:25	developments 28438:7	discussed 28450:1 28460:3 28512:15	distant 28546:3	drop 28423:21 28424:14 28525:1 28557:22
describe 28371:19 28375:15 28387:22 28432:20 28485:15,25 28540:15 28546:22 28547:7	devices 28420:25	discussing 28459:4 28486:2	distinct 28564:2	dropped 28440:9 28449:10
describes 28549:1	died 28494:21	discussion 28394:20 28407:18,22,23 28408:1,2 28409:19 28410:7 28414:25 28435:5 28437:19,21 28452:20 28456:18	distribution 28479:11	dropping 28392:11
description 28463:18 28537:3	differently 28467:20 28468:7		District 28510:12	drove 28549:19
designations 28451:14 28487:13 28524:1	difficult 28538:21		ditch 28542:1,4	dual 28545:8
desirable 28466:19	difficulties 28555:14 28560:20		DOC 28392:12 28505:8,12	due 28403:1
desktop 28374:14,23	dignity 28457:13		doctor 28428:21	duties 28377:10, 25 28557:23 28581:24
desperately 28462:3	diligent 28520:19		document 28373:4 28393:2 28395:17 28398:15 28413:24,25 28414:6 28424:4	duty 28390:2 28477:8 28574:17
	direct 28453:23 28471:11 28476:20,23 28557:13			
	directed 28551:22			
				E
				e-mail 28413:3, 18,19,22 28414:17 28415:2,20 28466:10 28579:6,9
				e-mails 28414:21 28415:16 28481:4,8

<p>earlier 28371:8 28384:13 28460:3 28491:12 28497:17 28512:15 28516:12 28572:24 28576:7</p> <p>early 28374:19 28385:2 28395:18 28407:19 28411:17 28414:12 28443:7 28473:20 28481:6 28560:17</p> <p>earn 28560:5</p> <p>easier 28376:10</p> <p>effect 28548:8 28553:15 28558:25</p> <p>effective 28383:9</p> <p>effectively 28381:6 28472:25 28558:16 28575:20</p> <p>effectiveness 28489:2</p> <p>effects 28571:11,16 28572:2,19</p> <p>efficiency 28489:2</p> <p>effort 28426:19, 25 28435:6 28460:7 28472:1 28530:17 28542:1,5</p> <p>efforts 28449:7 28454:14 28457:19 28472:24 28483:3 28485:5 28489:20 28490:11 28530:15 28541:22 28542:6,14 28543:21</p> <p>eight-minute 28492:13</p>	<p>EL 28579:14</p> <p>elapsed 28433:23</p> <p>elected 28476:8</p> <p>elements 28439:18</p> <p>ELFD 28451:16 28487:15 28524:3</p> <p>elicit 28552:22</p> <p>Elizabeth 28398:23 28399:1,5</p> <p>Elliot 28370:13 28371:7 28391:25 28392:19 28463:13 28505:22 28506:6 28528:24 28529:16, 28556:21 28559:7 28578:16</p> <p>ELMAC 28491:3 28571:8</p> <p>ELMO 28500:18</p> <p>else's 28556:3</p> <p>emergencies 28373:8 28563:16</p> <p>emergency 28371:17,20,22 28372:25 28374:12,16,25 28375:3,22 28376:18 28378:12 28379:9,19,24 28380:20,22,25 28381:18 28382:10 28383:7 28384:8,21 28385:5,15 28391:9,12,24 28392:13,18 28393:13,18,21, 25 28394:4,13,20, 24 28395:6 28403:15 28414:23 28416:8,9,18,23 28421:18 28465:4,25</p>	<p>28467:4 28469:13 28473:1 28475:21 28476:17 28477:8 28481:14 28482:6 28490:10 28501:23,25 28503:17,22,24 28504:2,10,21 28505:9,15,21 28509:17 28510:9 28543:16 28555:7,11,22 28556:6,20 28557:1,9,10 28558:5,15,22,25 28559:21 28563:18 28565:17 28566:1 28568:10 28569:9,10 28570:6 28576:10 28577:7,11</p> <p>EMO 28477:8</p> <p>emotion 28461:20 28492:22</p> <p>emotional 28492:17</p> <p>employed 28510:11,12</p> <p>employer 28582:2,4</p> <p>employment 28500:6</p> <p>EMS 28381:2 28401:22,23,25 28427:1,12,16,24 28428:11,14,15 28429:19 28509:7,11,16,23 28510:2,11 28511:16 28514:20 28516:25 28517:20</p> <p>EMS'S 28516:24</p> <p>en 28418:25 28419:7 28496:14</p> <p>encounter 28492:13</p>	<p>encourage 28467:1</p> <p>end 28411:18 28447:5 28460:15 28462:16 28491:14 28497:4 28512:16 28530:15 28531:17 28542:6 28575:14</p> <p>ended 28444:14 28525:4 28538:22 28539:21,22 28574:7</p> <p>ending 28477:3 28478:24 28479:19</p> <p>energized 28553:10</p> <p>engineer 28413:10 28434:14 28437:4,6,7 28451:5,21 28453:1 28454:8 28455:20 28486:22,24 28518:21 28519:11 28522:2 28523:18 28524:8 28531:5 28582:6, 18</p> <p>engineering 28422:3</p> <p>engineers 28450:6 28486:20</p> <p>ensure 28372:2 28377:12 28378:1 28393:23 28394:25 28395:1 28396:7 28433:15 28437:23 28557:2</p> <p>ensuring 28378:3 28379:13 28420:24</p> <p>entail 28433:9</p> <p>enter 28453:6 28454:22 28455:3 28524:16 28526:17</p>	<p>entered 28549:21</p> <p>entering 28454:23</p> <p>entire 28445:13</p> <p>entitled 28428:11 28528:20</p> <p>entrance 28388:3</p> <p>entranceway 28386:15</p> <p>entries 28398:23</p> <p>entry 28479:25 28480:11 28526:25 28527:6</p> <p>environment 28537:1</p> <p>EOC 28377:9,23 28398:9 28404:3 28415:6, 28564:22</p> <p>equal 28484:3</p> <p>equipment 28372:18 28418:13 28419:1,7 28420:20 28421:17 28459:13,16 28460:1 28518:20 28519:18 28520:5 28522:1,12 28538:20 28539:8 28565:24</p> <p>ERP 28569:7 28570:4</p> <p>escalator 28448:17 28450:11 28451:8,20 28456:23 28487:3 28523:21 28524:7 28540:18,19 28542:6</p> <p>essence 28449:12 28561:5</p>
---	--	--	---	---

establish 28393:24	28547:2 28549:1, 13 28550:14	exhibit 28376:3 28388:2,3 28391:16,17 28393:8 28395:15 28398:6, 28399:15,23 28400:15,17 28406:23 28414:1,7 28417:2 28423:7 28424:8,10 28426:12 28431:17 28434:4 28436:19 28439:10 28446:19 28450:23 28458:25 28474:4 28477:2 28484:22 28489:4 28492:24 28493:8 28494:25 28501:12,14,15, 16 28503:4 28504:15 28506:13 28508:19 28514:3 28516:5 28518:12 28522:20,21 28534:13 28541:21 28556:9 28563:2 28578:24 28581:8	28582:2	eye 28559:19
established 28403:13,14	Ewald 28420:8 28477:19 28478:12,16 28479:2,15,22 28480:2,6,14 28492:4 28519:22 28520:10,14,18, 25 28522:15	existed 28566:10	experience 28402:8 28403:25 28416:11 28432:13 28468:17 28513:6 28532:3,19,24	<hr/> F <hr/>
Europe 28566:12	Ewald's 28577:19	exit 28497:6	experienced 28432:21 28451:19 28524:6 28532:21,23	Fabris 28445:9 28492:5 28538:25
evacuate 28416:21	exact 28548:6	EXAMINATION 28371:1 28469:5 28500:2 28565:15	experts 28383:8 28484:13	face 28449:2,4 28456:21
Evacuated 28412:8	examined 28437:4	examples 28410:12	explain 28411:1 28547:10	face-to-face 28471:20
evacuation 28382:18 28412:11,25 28414:13 28415:1	exceeded 28482:19	excess 28451:9 28487:4 28523:22	explained 28512:10	facilitate 28392:14 28460:17 28505:10
evening 28419:14 28432:9 28440:3 28442:20 28460:11 28519:3 28535:18 28539:14	exceptional 28572:14	exchange 28393:14 28546:23 28547:16 28548:7 28549:6 28551:17	explanation 28389:7	facility 28489:10
event 28373:11 28375:22 28393:4 28429:20 28432:10 28446:5 28467:12,17 28468:1,15,23 28469:18 28492:23 28508:5 28519:15 28558:4 28560:13 28574:4	excluded 28527:13	existed 28566:10	explicit 28455:3	facing 28493:18
events 28391:18 28392:25 28393:1 28496:16 28527:5	exclusively 28472:7	exit 28497:6	explosion 28392:7 28505:5	fact 28402:13 28405:4 28410:17,18 28415:5 28419:11 28429:14,24,25 28442:3 28449:20 28455:25 28461:7 28462:14 28463:7 28485:17 28494:5 28497:2 28512:21 28514:1 28517:20 28538:4 28551:8 28566:15
eventually 28405:8 28504:6 28538:22 28555:25	excuse 28372:14 28427:6 28467:13	expect 28402:20 28526:3	express 28465:8 28571:9, 12	factor 28568:20
evidence 28391:8 28398:7 28401:12 28403:22 28406:3 28408:18 28412:13 28418:21 28419:13 28427:24 28428:1,15,25 28442:15 28493:12 28494:2 28500:7 28504:9 28506:21 28512:5	exercise 28374:21,24 28375:4 28395:6	expected 28420:22 28461:18 28504:5 28523:11 28530:14 28560:5	expressed 28461:23 28465:5 28570:10	factors 28565:22
	exercises 28373:23 28374:14	expecting 28525:3	expressing 28446:3	facts 28404:5
	exhausted 28460:25	expedite 28537:12	expression 28425:7	failure 28378:20 28387:1
		expedited 28460:1 28505:17	extent 28375:24 28502:10 28512:6 28532:4,18 28554:21	fair 28384:12 28428:25 28431:11 28471:23 28472:2 28473:1,2,7,25 28474:22 28475:9 28476:18 28496:2 28545:14 28577:6,15
		expeditiously 28457:4 28538:13	extraction 28437:2	fairly 28388:15 28399:11 28497:2 28554:11 28567:16 28580:25
		expense	extremely 28560:23	

<p>fall 28451:11 28487:9 28523:24 28540:20</p> <p>fallen 28387:7 28542:14</p> <p>falling 28542:7</p> <p>falls 28417:20 28577:3</p> <p>familiar 28528:12 28554:7 28575:1,2</p> <p>families 28464:22 28465:3 28470:18 28491:6,10 28512:20 28543:2,6,9,15 28544:19 28545:2,9,11,25 28548:15,17,23 28549:3,23 28550:10 28554:2 28566:24 28574:2,17 28576:21</p> <p>family 28385:9 28545:12 28551:23 28553:12,16 28554:8,11 28572:25 28573:9 28575:8,18 28576:16</p> <p>fashion 28542:7</p> <p>fast-forward 28457:23</p> <p>fatalities 28407:14 28511:11,22 28513:1</p> <p>fatality 28470:11 28513:4 28514:2 28567:7</p> <p>father 28445:8 28554:11</p> <p>favour 28385:24 28386:3 28548:4 28552:15 28553:16</p>	<p>fax 28392:19 28505:22 28506:3</p> <p>faxed 28506:1</p> <p>fear 28540:19</p> <p>features 28538:3</p> <p>Feaver 28413:21 28424:3 28494:12,14 28552:16 28553:20,24 28569:2 28576:3, 5,8</p> <p>fed 28489:17</p> <p>federal 28476:22</p> <p>feds 28476:24</p> <p>feedback 28560:24,25</p> <p>feelings 28484:6</p> <p>fellow 28385:13 28482:3 28520:19</p> <p>felt 28432:6 28438:14 28464:5 28471:24 28525:8</p> <p>female 28397:1 28506:16,22</p> <p>field 28396:12 28429:19 28492:25</p> <p>Fighter 28509:24 28510:2,14</p> <p>fighters 28484:2</p> <p>file 28531:5</p> <p>filled 28394:16</p> <p>final 28553:7 28582:13</p> <p>finally 28455:4</p> <p>find 28376:14 28380:6 28383:24 28389:3 28390:14 28416:1 28418:17 28420:3 28446:18 28454:1 28464:19 28518:23</p>	<p>28519:20 28520:5,7,11 28537:15 28538:23 28545:6 28570:19</p> <p>finding 28429:19 28520:25</p> <p>findings 28466:15,17,18, 22 28555:24 28568:6</p> <p>fine 28376:13,15</p> <p>finger 28467:21</p> <p>finish 28427:7 28448:21</p> <p>finished 28443:15</p> <p>fire 28381:2,23 28382:6 28388:4 28389:17 28392:1,2,6 28395:24 28429:14 28461:1,11 28468:19 28484:2 28498:8 28504:23, 28509:24 28510:2,8,14 28525:18 28528:24 28529:17,21 28533:15 28562:6 28563:19 28579:7</p> <p>fire/no 28505:5</p> <p>firsthand 28498:13 28573:16</p> <p>fits 28506:8</p> <p>five- 28562:11</p> <p>fix 28539:6</p> <p>flip 28398:8,12, 24 28399:10 28563:18 28564:20</p> <p>flips 28522:3</p>	<p>floor 28485:14</p> <p>focus 28571:20, 24</p> <p>focused 28464:18</p> <p>focusing 28534:19 28563:23,24</p> <p>folks 28381:4,21 28489:22</p> <p>follow 28409:7, 19 28531:1</p> <p>foot 28401:12 28428:16 28498:20 28511:16</p> <p>force 28459:19, 20</p> <p>forever 28561:13</p> <p>Forgive 28389:5</p> <p>form 28464:1 28469:9 28506:1</p> <p>formally 28450:1</p> <p>format 28384:6, 10,15 28486:4</p> <p>forms 28394:24 28395:7</p> <p>formulating 28456:24</p> <p>fortunate 28379:8</p> <p>forward 28370:14,16 28408:19 28459:12 28466:24 28484:8</p> <p>found 28373:4 28390:12 28405:7 28428:16 28459:14 28483:11,14 28511:17 28560:19</p> <p>founded 28520:13</p>	<p>four-fifths 28526:14</p> <p>fourth 28493:11</p> <p>frame 28392:8 28440:13 28506:4,8</p> <p>frames 28460:4</p> <p>frank 28580:19</p> <p>frankly 28403:17,23,25 28502:18 28542:13 28566:9 28574:8 28580:21</p> <p>French 28443:25</p> <p>frequent 28551:10</p> <p>fresh 28379:6</p> <p>friend 28427:22 28428:13 28429:6</p> <p>friends 28545:12</p> <p>frightening 28566:21</p> <p>front 28387:21 28398:15 28503:8 28518:16 28563:5</p> <p>full 28564:1 28570:15</p> <p>function 28375:21 28378:7,8 28500:12 28501:20,22 28502:16</p> <p>functions 28470:5</p> <p>fundamentals 28411:1</p> <p>funerals 28465:10,12</p> <p>future 28546:3</p>
--	---	---	---	--

<p style="text-align: center;">G</p> <p>gaps 28437:16, 21 28438:4 28468:13 28474:21</p> <p>gather 28375:3 28383:6 28404:16 28410:15 28434:6 28441:4 28457:22 28472:23 28497:2 28499:17 28500:5</p> <p>gathered 28463:15</p> <p>gathering 28381:4 28464:15 28470:5 28535:19,25</p> <p>gathers 28375:2</p> <p>gave 28371:8 28467:12 28500:7 28546:6 28562:11</p> <p>gears 28554:24</p> <p>Gendron 28551:19</p> <p>general 28375:18 28394:14 28396:3 28404:17 28430:20 28466:6 28558:8,13</p> <p>generally 28374:11 28375:15 28376:25 28390:13 28433:10 28452:19 28470:16 28497:1 28520:20 28543:1</p> <p>get-together 28385:10</p> <p>give 28378:19 28382:7 28411:6, 28457:16 28462:2 28463:21 28478:6 28537:9 28542:21 28546:2 28553:7 28569:11 28581:8</p>	<p>giving 28404:14 28407:4 28408:22 28455:20 28518:14 28553:3 28574:7</p> <p>Global 28444:2</p> <p>go-around 28552:17</p> <p>goal 28557:1</p> <p>good 28370:3,5, 17,19 28371:3,4 28439:1 28463:9 28464:3 28467:18 28469:6,7 28471:4,7 28488:1,2 28491:1,4 28494:13,16 28499:23 28500:4 28525:3 28527:23,24 28542:5 28565:16 28569:4 28570:16 28571:5,6 28578:12</p> <p>Goodness 28567:4</p> <p>government 28393:3 28564:13,14</p> <p>grapevine 28502:20</p> <p>grappling 28459:17</p> <p>great 28500:17</p> <p>ground 28381:24 28383:8 28386:17 28396:9 28428:23 28441:9 28470:6 28472:4</p> <p>group 28373:17 28375:1 28376:6 28378:1,11,25 28379:7 28380:21 28381:9 28382:1 28390:6 28394:20 28396:1 28409:7, 12,18 28410:10 28433:13 28439:22</p>	<p>28441:20 28449:19 28458:4 28466:8 28469:15 28483:1 28484:25 28485:4,13,17 28486:6,11 28487:17 28495:24 28496:7,8 28502:24 28503:2 28535:9 28536:15,17 28555:18 28575:7,10,12</p> <p>groups 28443:24 28463:14 28496:3</p> <p>guard 28515:10</p> <p>guess 28375:12 28387:22 28481:24 28515:10 28540:7 28571:10 28575:5</p> <p>guidance 28431:3 28500:19</p> <p>guideline 28512:3</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">H</p> <hr/> <p>half 28540:2</p> <p>halfway 28426:16 28474:15 28539:18,23</p> <p>hall 28448:6 28462:11,13 28463:16,25 28464:11,22,25 28465:7 28483:19 28489:8,15,21 28492:3 28503:15 28543:16 28545:8,13 28548:22 28549:18 28550:17,20 28569:15 28576:21</p> <p>halt 28461:24</p>	<p>Hamilton 28481:6 28485:23 28499:17,21 28500:1 28501:17,20 28508:13 28513:14 28518:1 28528:4 28531:25 28533:19 28535:20 28542:17 28550:21 28554:2 28563:3 28565:13 28566:22 28569:4 28571:5 28578:12</p> <p>Hamlin 28402:3</p> <p>hand 28380:23 28400:25 28428:16 28459:17 28498:20</p> <p>handle 28501:23</p> <p>handled 28535:10 28536:16</p> <p>handling 28560:6</p> <p>hands 28539:5</p> <p>handwriting 28398:14,19,20</p> <p>hanging 28412:10</p> <p>happen 28379:19 28467:15,17 28484:8 28485:7 28531:12,16 28555:3,6</p> <p>happened 28388:15 28389:12 28397:15 28420:7 28436:12 28446:4 28448:2 28491:20 28492:11,15 28531:10 28545:16 28546:6 28557:21 28560:14 28567:21 28580:3</p>	<p>happening 28390:5 28395:12 28443:13 28449:20 28462:23 28463:25 28472:4 28501:23 28555:20 28563:22 28565:25</p> <p>happy 28449:5 28453:25 28459:24</p> <p>hard 28468:22 28503:5</p> <p>harder 28376:11</p> <p>hardware 28384:1</p> <p>head 28375:9 28404:3 28415:5, 22 28461:9 28488:14 28490:18 28501:20 28519:19 28542:20</p> <p>heading 28474:15</p> <p>health 28381:2 28416:13</p> <p>hear 28387:9 28404:4 28410:3 28427:8,9 28443:21 28449:5,7 28506:20,25 28512:20 28520:21</p> <p>heard 28371:16 28375:5 28384:10 28391:8 28397:25 28401:12 28403:16 28424:19,20 28428:1 28460:11 28464:3 28474:10 28495:9,11 28498:20 28502:3,19 28503:16 28525:1 28527:10</p>
---	--	---	--	--

28533:23 28550:14 28564:21 28574:22 28579:7	Honour 28404:2 28429:12 28431:1,15 28508:9	I	imply 28422:17	incredible 28381:5
hearing 28372:18 28397:24 28455:9	hopes 28449:7	IC 28412:21	important 28378:8 28421:17 28568:7	increments 28566:16
heart 28542:21 28552:7	hoping 28426:9, 12	ID'ING 28411:12	impression 28455:7 28460:14,21 28461:12 28462:15	independent 28380:3
heated 28546:23 28547:22 28548:7 28549:6	hospital 28374:20,22 28480:10,16	idea 28566:10 28569:11	improve 28438:14	indicating 28388:2 28428:1 28506:22 28522:9
heavy 28418:18 28420:4 28518:24	hotel 28387:22	ideas 28538:17	IMS 28375:5,6, 17,18,25	indication 28394:4 28405:21 28428:19 28430:6 28457:16 28529:13
Hefkey 28417:15 28539:16 28540:21 28541:12,16	hotels 28383:17	identification 28513:23	in-chief 28371:1 28469:4,5 28470:23 28500:2 28565:15 28568:23	indications 28430:16 28431:8 28450:9
held 28380:7 28424:12 28433:4 28436:20 28474:10 28543:12 28544:18 28555:25 28556:1	hours 28419:15 28493:9 28550:11 28566:17	identified 28407:21 28408:22 28456:20 28468:10	in-touch 28532:11	individual 28377:4,6 28380:3 28382:24 28387:17 28405:6 28406:5 28477:25 28497:23 28511:17 28557:7
helped 28560:18	house 28385:10, 20 28502:18	identify 28408:14 28410:13 28467:1	in.' 28550:13	individually 28469:16
helpful 28560:23 28564:25 28565:6	Houston 28566:11	identifying 28408:22	inappropriate 28542:7	individuals 28372:4 28379:23 28407:12 28458:6 28461:22 28462:9 28482:8 28495:18 28510:25 28511:3
Henry 28401:23 28517:2	hrs 28478:21	identity 28498:18	incident 28375:7 28382:1 28469:12 28470:11 28471:10,11,14, 16,17 28477:5 28484:18 28488:5 28490:2,3,8 28492:7 28529:22 28578:16,21 28580:14 28582:21	influence 28572:6
hesitated 28495:7	humility 28562:13	if/as 28505:11	ignoring 28517:20	info 28480:3
hindsight 28467:23 28468:1,6 28562:3,4	hundred 28434:25	ignoring 28517:20	II 28495:9 28556:13,22	inform 28513:4
hire 28531:4	hung 28502:21	imagine 28486:8 28536:20 28563:21 28580:23	immediately 28387:10 28502:21 28544:4 28567:18,22	information 28373:3 28381:20 28383:6 28396:1, 3 28403:21 28405:18 28407:20,24 28408:4,25 28409:17,23,24 28410:1,5,6 28411:17 28425:1,22 28427:11,14 28429:4, 28430:5 28432:4 28433:17
Hirsh' 28434:18	HUSAR 28381:18 28383:22 28392:14 28439:21 28441:19 28451:5,21 28452:14 28456:17 28460:8, 28484:12 28486:17 28495:23 28496:17,21 28505:10,11 28523:18 28524:8 28525:17 28543:20	imminent 28450:13	immediately 28387:10 28502:21 28544:4 28567:18,22	
history 28500:5	hold 28415:24 28538:25	impact 28388:25 28457:2 28459:8 28568:18	immediately 28387:10 28502:21 28544:4 28567:18,22	
holding 28579:11	hold 28415:24 28538:25	impacted 28492:22	immediately 28387:10 28502:21 28544:4 28567:18,22	
home 28385:8 28389:15 28574:25	hydraulic 28418:18 28420:4 28421:5 28518:24	implementatio n 28374:5 28568:2	include 28425:17 28538:4	
			included 28488:9 28555:17	
			includes 28425:16 28476:8 28564:7	
			including 28562:9 28572:13	
			inconvenience 28386:2	
			incorrect 28428:5	

28436:3 28437:22 28438:5,7 28440:8 28442:10 28443:20 28444:17 28448:4 28453:25 28455:10 28462:3 28466:24 28470:8,10,18 28471:9,25 28472:3,23,24 28473:8,13,16,21 28474:22,23 28475:7 28477:4 28479:15 28482:14 28483:22 28485:8 28486:6,10,20 28489:6,17,22,24 28491:9 28494:4, 18 28498:13,16 28504:3 28512:17,18,25 28513:21,24 28514:1 28516:13 28517:8 28534:5, 7 28543:9 28544:18 28547:13 28548:17 28552:22 28556:21 28557:2,3,8,10 28558:7,23 28559:16 28560:20,21 28563:25 28566:23 28573:9,12,15 28574:8,12,23 28575:7 28578:20	initially 28488:11 initiate 28394:12 injured 28408:24 28411:13 28425:17 28513:22 injuries 28410:18 28411:11 28474:19 injury 28416:16 input 28383:7 28405:4 28449:15,23 inquiries 28435:17,20,25 28436:1 28566:12 Inquiry 28371:8 28466:16,18 28500:8 28555:20,24 28556:1 28581:15 insecure 28412:9 inside 28561:4 inspector 28400:11 28403:18,20 28407:2 28408:7, 11 28409:4,14 28411:16,19 28412:6,16,18 28418:2,24 28419:23 28422:11,17 28434:6 28436:10,23 28441:1,2 28443:1 28456:14 28466:12 28489:23 28491:11 28493:6,22 28494:1,19 28510:22 28512:7,16 28513:20 28518:14 28519:15 28520:1	28522:15 28534:4 28544:1,23 28546:10,16,19, 23 28547:10,12, 16,21,23 28548:1, 9 28549:2,7,22 28550:9,12,15,18, 23 28551:4,15 28552:13 28553:11 28573:5 28574:12 28577:13 28581:22 inspectors 28481:18 instance 28380:15 28382:17 28561:24 instances 28416:15 instantaneousl y 28438:13 instruction 28421:13 28434:16 instructions 28557:5 instrumental 28420:24 integrity 28448:16 intelligent 28405:17 intended 28506:23 28533:19 intent 28466:7 intention 28402:12 28462:17 28464:4 intentions 28507:12 Interacting 28558:18 interaction 28432:14 28506:5 28532:3	interpret 28403:20 interpretation 28406:4 28507:1 interpreters 28372:16 interrupt 28448:21 interrupting 28389:5 interview 28532:11 28569:19 interviews 28473:15 introduced 28554:5 28575:1 introduction 28441:8 28534:3 28559:22 investigate 28386:13 invited 28384:18 28567:16,18 involved 28375:3 28381:11 28394:1 28396:6 28399:7 28470:20 28472:6 28490:7 28529:20,25 28555:9 28570:6 involvement 28416:14 issue 28391:21 28393:20 28409:15 28413:20 28414:11 28415:1 28428:4 28441:17 28466:23 28470:14 28497:1,21 28498:15 28506:9 28512:16 28518:24 28528:11 28532:16 28554:24 28557:4 28576:10	issued 28474:11 28514:6 28581:7 issues 28379:10,18 28469:17 28498:8 28506:11 28511:21,23 28552:19 28558:21 28568:3,18 issuing 28531:3 items 28520:8, 11 <hr/> J <hr/> Jeffreys 28452:15,25 28453:9 28454:21 28456:15 28458:9 28482:2 28526:8, 15 28530:22,24 28580:6,17 28581:3 28582:22 Jewett 28481:19,20 job 28373:2 28379:17 28416:16 28467:18 28510:10 28564:17 28570:13 jobs 28376:16 28380:1 28510:13 Jocelyn 28489:14 jog 28553:1,7 jogging 28552:25 join 28573:23 Jollicouer 28547:16 Jollymore 28396:15,19 28399:20,25 28403:19,20 28407:2,16 28408:8,11
--	---	--	--	--

28409:5 28411:16,19 28412:6,16,18 28418:3,24 28419:23 28422:11,17 28434:6 28435:18 28436:10,23 28441:1,3 28443:2 28456:14 28466:12,14 28491:11 28493:6 28507:8 28510:22 28512:7,17,24 28513:20 28518:14 28519:16 28520:1 28521:9 28533:15 28534:4 28544:1, 23 28546:10,19, 23 28547:13,18, 20,21,23 28548:1, 9 28549:2,8 28550:9,12,15,19 28551:5,15 28552:13 28553:11 28573:5,11,13 28574:12,14 28577:13	28439:12 28443:7 28447:12 28470:21 28474:9 28475:8 28477:10 28481:5 28483:10 28491:15 28493:4 28496:11 28497:15 28502:14 28503:12 28504:19 28514:22 28516:6 28518:13 28520:24 28523:5 28528:6 28544:18 28573:1 28579:8, 17 28580:3,7 28582:15,18 jurisdiction 28451:17 28487:15 28524:4 <hr/> K <hr/> Kate 28497:24 28515:21 28561:6 keeper 28372:1 28573:15 keepers 28534:7 keeping 28476:1 28557:17 Keith 28488:3 Kerr 28548:19,25 28549:12 28550:6,15 key 28372:7 28375:2 28377:12,25 28378:7 28420:24 28435:7 28470:5 28557:22 kind 28374:10 28377:7 28385:12 28416:9 28429:23 28438:5 28513:23 28530:12 28544:11 28561:18,19 kindness	28552:7 kinds 28383:17 28438:11 28468:1 kiosk 28396:25 28400:2 28506:15 knew 28394:15, 17 28400:9 28401:16 28404:23 28407:9 28416:1 28419:3 28421:25 28450:19 28454:1,14 28456:20 28458:19 28460:15 28493:17 28518:3 28525:20 28535:9 28536:25 28554:4,11 knock 28457:17 knowing 28495:13,14 28564:1 knowledge 28375:25 28391:6 28416:20 28427:4 28444:12 28449:15 28455:19 28481:1 28482:19 28498:22 28506:7 28513:21 28573:16 28574:9 28580:1 Kristin 28471:5 28578:13 Kuka 28399:23 28400:15 28414:5 28494:25 28501:14 28504:15 28556:19 <hr/> L <hr/> Labour 28434:15,17 28439:16 28472:9 28481:7 28519:5 28525:19,25	28531:1 28572:8, 10,17 28579:16 28580:6 28581:7 28582:23 Labour's 28482:9 28581:4 Labreche 28489:14 lack 28374:15 28449:10 28555:7 lacks 28430:20 lady 28424:20 28511:15 laid 28526:3 Lake 28370:13 28371:7 28380:25 28392:1,19 28463:13 28504:23 28505:22 28506:6 28528:24 28529:16, 28556:21 28559:7 28578:16 language 28400:1 large 28412:9 28530:18 28575:10 late 28407:18 28473:20 28541:10 Latulippe 28546:24 28547:11,17,23 28548:2 28551:19 28554:7 28575:3 law 28539:2 lawyers 28494:14 layperson 28511:19 lead 28405:21 28418:12 28486:17 28518:19 28521:25 28527:12	28573:11 leadership 28569:8,22 leading 28461:9 leads 28493:13 learn 28385:6 28448:2 28482:17,21 28502:14 28523:4 leave 28461:13 28488:20,24 leaving 28460:12,15,22 28529:14 led 28421:19 28423:1 28533:25 28545:22 left 28385:13,14 28387:10 28400:18 28436:22 28445:15 28495:1 28498:2 28555:21 28572:2 legal 28570:14 legally 28558:11 legislation 28502:1 Leslie 28399:6 level 28387:8 28476:22 Levon 28444:19 28445:7 28491:14 28492:5 Lewis 28398:23 Lewis's 28399:2 liaise 28378:10 28470:7 Liaison 28558:22 liberty 28480:4 life 28426:18,24 28427:16 28429:11,22 28430:15 28431:8 28493:3
--	--	---	--	--

28516:11,16,18, 23 28517:7 28567:10	location 28382:19 28495:10	28461:19 28468:8 28513:5 28560:18 28563:21 28568:8 28581:1	maintenance 28490:2	28432:17 28475:21 28477:8 28490:3
lift 28421:20	locations 28407:7 28495:6, 8,15,19 28510:23 28511:1,3 28576:11	lots 28438:10	major 28393:20 28566:13	manager 28376:18 28377:10,24 28378:9 28481:20 28488:6
light 28402:8 28415:5 28450:17,19 28495:12 28542:17	log 28477:1,3,7, 21 28478:1 28562:16,18,19 28563:1,10 28564:2,4,5,11, 15,16 28570:2,16	lower 28387:8 28413:13	majority 28456:7	mandate 28379:2 28417:21 28460:16,24 28470:2 28482:19 28546:1
likelihood 28493:17 28542:5	logical 28505:14	lumber 28420:25 28434:18	make 28373:11 28382:12 28386:11 28394:8 28400:5 28404:9, 15 28405:5 28408:8 28411:25 28422:19, 28429:24 28433:16 28471:25 28501:11 28507:17,18,21 28511:20 28513:8 28533:19,23 28535:8 28536:22 28565:3 28568:14 28579:15	mandated 28539:2
limb 28495:10	logistics 28382:11 28577:22	lunch 28527:16	<hr/> M <hr/>	mandating 28469:24
limit 28404:18	logs 28563:20 28570:7,23	machinery 28422:6	made 28372:17 28388:8 28389:18 28394:21 28398:23 28399:4 28418:22 28419:11 28421:7 28429:19 28431:9 28438:21 28440:12 28448:5, 28449:14,18 28451:12 28455:24 28457:20 28461:24 28462:10 28463:9 28475:1 28477:7, 10,14 28480:1 28486:16 28487:10 28489:16,20 28490:9,11 28493:6 28520:22,23 28523:8,25 28526:1 28527:3 28534:6 28542:3, 10 28548:14 28578:18	manifested 28496:6
limited 28527:6	London 28532:25	machinery 28422:6	makes 28372:5 28376:18 28466:14	manned 28489:10
linear 28379:1	long 28433:20 28542:24 28554:12,14 28568:7	made 28372:17 28388:8 28389:18 28394:21 28398:23 28399:4 28418:22 28419:11 28421:7 28429:19 28431:9 28438:21 28440:12 28448:5, 28449:14,18 28451:12 28455:24 28457:20 28461:24 28462:10 28463:9 28475:1 28477:7, 10,14 28480:1 28486:16 28487:10 28489:16,20 28490:9,11 28493:6 28520:22,23 28523:8,25 28526:1 28527:3 28534:6 28542:3, 10 28548:14 28578:18	making 28396:9 28397:13 28449:23 28464:12 28496:15 28545:24 28559:22 28563:23,24 28573:25	manner 28457:3 28538:11 28558:10,20
lined 28387:18	long-reaching 28459:16	main 28385:19 28386:20 28472:3,5	making 28396:9 28397:13 28449:23 28464:12 28496:15 28545:24 28559:22 28563:23,24 28573:25	Mansbridge 28569:20
lines 28459:4	longer 28397:16,25 28461:8 28504:4 28530:1,16 28543:20 28565:23	Maintaining 28563:10 28564:5	mall 28385:24 28386:12,16,25 28387:4,12,19,23 28459:18 28462:13 28463:16 28467:11 28502:20 28565:22,23 28571:11 28572:3	Mantha 28463:12,20 28476:9 28537:1
lining 28566:15	looked 28386:16 28421:23 28426:5		managed 28558:15	Mantha's 28464:8,9
list 28373:25 28375:10 28376:5 28380:23 28384:17 28386:10 28417:6 28418:4,6 28475:13,14,19 28500:14,19,20 28501:4,8,16 28520:8 28541:6 28566:8 28576:22	loss 28426:18,24 28427:16 28429:11,22 28430:15 28431:8 28493:3 28516:11,16,18, 23 28517:7		management 28371:21 28372:8 28374:13 28375:7 28382:22 28394:25	Maplegate 28502:17
listed 28380:12	lost 28534:8		management 28371:21 28372:8 28374:13 28375:7 28382:22 28394:25	Marc 28498:3
lists 28519:18 28557:24,25	lot 28371:14 28375:6 28386:15 28387:7 28396:5, 7 28414:20 28417:23		managing 28371:21 28372:8 28374:13 28375:7 28382:22 28394:25	Marshal 28498:8 28579:7
load 28434:20			managing 28371:21 28372:8 28374:13 28375:7 28382:22 28394:25	Marshal/heavy 28392:2 28504:24
loads 28582:10			managing 28371:21 28372:8 28374:13 28375:7 28382:22 28394:25	matches 28399:11
local 28382:23 28443:24 28532:7 28555:17,18 28562:6,7			managing 28371:21 28372:8 28374:13 28375:7 28382:22 28394:25	material 28434:19 28450:16 28520:5 28522:16
locally 28520:7			managing 28371:21 28372:8 28374:13 28375:7 28382:22 28394:25	materials 28420:18
located 28400:24 28401:17 28404:24 28407:21 28479:9 28509:6,11,13			managing 28371:21 28372:8 28374:13 28375:7 28382:22 28394:25	

<p>matter 28405:14 28418:22 28461:8 28508:6 28534:15 28576:19</p> <p>matters 28399:1 28513:12 28559:23 28566:2</p> <p>Matuszewski 28497:24</p> <p>Mayor 28378:5 28384:14 28394:18,19 28433:12 28441:2,10 28443:1 28473:15 28475:25 28476:8,13,20 28485:17,23 28488:8,10 28489:23 28491:10 28492:4 28499:17,20,23 28500:4,6,11,22, 25 28501:17,19 28503:6 28509:9 28511:25 28513:13 28515:19 28518:1 28528:4 28531:25 28532:1,2,21 28533:18 28535:20 28536:15 28542:16 28550:21 28554:2 28555:9 28557:14,25 28558:2 28560:5, 11 28563:2,3,4 28565:13 28566:22 28567:6 28569:7 28571:5 28573:23</p> <p>Mayor' 28579:14</p> <p>Mayor's 28417:20</p> <p>Mayors 28564:14</p> <p>MCTV 28444:1 28532:15</p> <p>meaning 28521:17</p>	<p>meaningless 28397:9</p> <p>means 28401:5, 28427:13 28466:2 28473:9 28495:13 28505:17</p> <p>meant 28408:12, 14,16 28422:15 28509:9 28529:3, 19</p> <p>media 28410:10 28432:14,18,22 28433:1 28437:14 28443:20, 28445:24 28468:18 28470:7 28473:13,16 28474:15,21 28532:3,17,18,22 28533:2 28556:7, 23 28557:4,24 28558:3,8,13,18 28559:6 28560:12,16 28561:8,11,22 28564:12 28565:1,6 28566:5,10,11 28569:16 28578:2,4,15,19 28579:16</p> <p>medical 28403:14 28509:17 28510:9,17,18 28516:14 28517:9,16</p> <p>meet 28433:15 28481:11,17,18 28491:17 28548:25</p> <p>meeting 28378:6 28384:10,15 28389:22 28391:5 28393:10 28395:19 28396:10 28406:24 28412:5 28417:3,25 28419:15,18 28423:17 28431:20</p>	<p>28433:7,11 28434:7 28436:20 28438:22 28439:11 28440:16,19 28444:23 28446:14,17,24 28448:11,13 28449:19 28450:25 28452:8 28453:12 28456:5,13 28457:24 28458:1,4,5,14,22 28474:2,8,9 28475:7,11,15 28478:5,22 28479:20 28483:5,10,11,16, 19,25 28484:19, 22,23 28485:10, 25 28486:5 28491:21,23 28492:11 28497:18 28503:12,13 28512:15 28518:13 28523:6,15 28527:11 28530:5,14 28531:18 28533:12 28534:10,25 28535:1,23 28536:20 28537:6,8,11,14, 21 28539:19 28540:24 28541:4 28544:16 28545:17,18 28546:7 28554:3 28555:12 28563:17 28567:21 28569:24 28572:25 28580:7,10,18 28581:3</p> <p>meetings 28378:3,4 28384:5,23 28385:2,3,4 28417:9,14 28433:20,25 28472:14,19</p>	<p>28482:18,22,23, 25 28485:18 28486:3 28488:9, 11,21 28497:16 28498:19 28540:3 28563:22 28569:10 28570:21</p> <p>meets 28378:1</p> <p>member 28373:17,21 28374:3,4,8 28381:25 28382:8 28562:17 28567:6</p> <p>members 28376:5 28380:24 28381:15,16 28384:20 28441:11 28449:16 28464:14 28469:8 28488:19 28530:5 28551:23 28553:12 28565:9 28575:8 28576:16</p> <p>memory 28391:14 28397:6 28448:8 28452:17 28553:1</p> <p>mention 28429:24 28435:12 28447:18 28448:15 28454:6 28461:25 28479:21 28520:1</p> <p>mentioned 28384:13 28388:16 28414:15 28460:3 28486:11</p> <p>merchandise 28571:10,16 28572:2,19</p> <p>merchants' 28571:10 28572:1</p> <p>mesh 28521:20</p> <p>message 28431:1 28441:11 28487:17 28575:20</p>	<p>messages 28433:14,22</p> <p>met 28373:6 28374:7 28466:8 28481:16 28491:25 28533:7 28537:21 28559:5 28576:7</p> <p>Michael 28463:12,20 28464:8,9,11 28537:1</p> <p>mid-afternoon 28448:9</p> <p>middle 28412:4 28459:1 28539:14 28541:5,25 28555:14 28581:20</p> <p>midnight 28440:7</p> <p>miles 28561:20</p> <p>mind 28375:11 28504:2 28511:15 28529:17 28542:16 28556:2 28572:1,4,7 28574:9</p> <p>mine 28464:9, 28554:10</p> <p>minimal 28470:2</p> <p>ministry 28434:15,17 28439:15 28472:9 28481:7 28482:9, 24 28519:5 28525:18,24 28531:1 28572:8, 10,17 28579:16 28580:6 28581:4, 7 28582:23</p> <p>minor 28443:22 28468:9</p> <p>minute 28541:1</p> <p>minutes 28392:20 28418:23 28428:8 28485:1 28486:7</p>
---	---	--	---	---

28499:13	MOL'S 28416:8	28569:2,3,5	28484:17	28463:14
28502:16	28453:12	MP 28476:21	28485:15,24	28496:16,18
28503:14	28480:21	28567:12	28486:7	28520:23 28537:7
28505:7,24	28482:14	MPP 28476:9,21	28523:14,16	28540:22
28540:4 28554:15	28580:2,17	28567:13	28525:10	28542:11
28561:12	moment	municipal	28528:7,23	non-rescue
misconception	28372:15	28386:15	28530:21,24	28454:24
s 28542:24	28517:25 28541:2	28432:16,17	28533:5,16	noon 28442:4
misleading	Monday	28497:23	28534:5 28539:3,	28447:14
28426:21	28488:12	municipality	13 28541:16	28544:18
28429:11,23	monitors	28380:24	28542:3 28544:2	Norm 28494:14
28516:13	28561:3	28472:25	28546:12	28576:8
missing	month 28532:8	<hr/>	28550:23	normal
28474:19	mood 28459:23	N	28573:6,8,12,14,	28432:24
mission	28464:12	<hr/>	17 28574:1,4	north 28497:4
28383:4	morning	names 28408:23	28575:6 28579:8,	Northern
mistaken	28370:3,5,9,17,19	28411:14	10	28532:24
28440:23	28371:3,4	28469:20	necessarily	notation
misunderstand	28413:7 28414:12	naming	28396:10	28550:7 28551:6,
ing 28494:18	28424:13	28410:16	28402:18 28403:6	14
mit 28463:9	28436:20 28439:1	Natalie 28389:24	28507:23	note 28372:17
mix 28381:8	28440:22,	28399:5 28492:4	needed	28397:16 28400:9
mock 28374:21	28441:24	28507:3,11	28379:12	28401:3 28419:22
28563:16	28442:17,23	28562:20	28382:10,19	28420:1 28443:16
mode 28457:7	28467:10	28570:12	28383:23 28386:5	28444:14
moderated	28469:6,7	Natalie's	28419:24	28503:12,19
28485:20	28471:4,7	28398:20	28431:22 28432:2	28520:22,23
moderator	28474:11,13	28399:13 28541:9	28438:14	note-taker
28441:4 28443:2	28477:19 28481:5	nature 28378:25	28456:19	28570:12
28485:13,16	28488:1,2,12	28386:23	28471:25 28504:2	note-taking
modify 28568:9	28491:1,4	28431:10 28433:2	28564:25 28578:2	28442:11
MOL 28413:8,10,	28494:13,16	28521:18	news 28408:19	notebook
15 28416:6,11	28508:13	28559:21	28444:1 28449:5	28561:6
28437:8 28451:5,	28514:7,12	Nazarian	28452:8 28456:4	noted 28428:7,8
18,21 28452:5,14,	28579:17	28445:23 28446:1	28459:11	notes 28389:21
23 28453:5,20	move 28431:12	28491:14	28460:19	28390:3,8,11,15,
28454:21	28480:19	28492:4,5	28461:15 28464:2	17 28393:8
28481:11,16	28553:24	Nazarians	28525:3,5	28395:10
28482:19	moved 28382:19	28444:19 28445:6	28528:6 28532:12	28396:17 28398:9
28486:20	28397:14	28491:17	28543:11 28544:5	28399:2,5,13
28523:14,18	movement	Neadles	28557:4 28566:13	28400:6 28412:4
28524:5,8,15	28450:8	28417:13	28569:14	28416:3 28427:2
28526:7,10,11,16,	28451:19,25	28446:17 28451:3	28579:12,20	28429:25
24 28528:8,11,13	28524:6,12	28452:13	news' 28558:21	28445:19
28533:6	moving 28452:1	28456:17	newspaper	28447:23 28460:7
28541:14,16	28484:8 28508:2	28457:25	28443:25 28532:7	28474:2 28484:21
28579:11,12,21	28524:13	28459:2,3,7,10	newspapers	28485:3 28486:13
28580:12	Moyer 28487:24,	28460:11	28445:23	28491:23
	25 28488:3	28472:8,13,18,21	28566:14	28492:1,12
	28490:22		night 28435:14	
			28436:12 28440:7	
			28447:8 28458:1	

28495:17,21 28496:12 28502:2,9 28503:4 28506:22 28508:10 28530:3 28533:19,21 28536:14 28565:3 28570:14 notice 28455:15 28575:11 Nuclear 28505:14 number 28385:1 28411:11 28414:6 28469:12 28473:21,22 28474:3 28501:13 28509:2 28511:7 28532:2 28553:12 28563:16 28565:21 28576:18 numbers 28386:6 28388:18 28392:22 28474:24 28477:16 28478:4,9,18 28480:7,15 28535:20,22	observe 28549:4 observed 28455:21 28549:5 observing 28450:7 obtain 28394:23 28582:17 obvious 28388:15 28463:3 occasion 28444:15 28472:20 28491:10 28546:15,21 28554:17 occasions 28373:6 28433:2 28543:17 28552:20 occupational 28416:13 occupying 28545:12 occurred 28440:16 odd 28385:17 offer 28446:9 28462:21 28469:8 28530:21 offered 28387:5 office 28386:9 28392:1 28414:21 28415:18,20 28481:21 28504:23 28579:7 officer 28370:12 28371:11 28382:6 28386:22 28388:9 28389:7 28390:2, 3 28409:13,16,22 28411:18 28413:4 28414:11 28417:22 28439:13 28441:2,3 28442:7 28443:2 28448:4,14,23 28450:3,18	28456:15 28471:12 28472:8 28477:9 28481:5 28482:13 28483:21,25 28485:9 28497:18 28558:23 Officer's 28411:23 official 28405:5, 13 28406:8 28430:7 28451:14 28487:13 28524:1 28556:7,23 28557:24 28558:3 28559:6 28578:15 officially 28465:21 28479:8 28569:9 officials 28417:9,18 28476:1,7,8 OFM 28417:5 OHSA 28581:19 on-scene 28505:18 on-side 28409:8 on-site 28409:18 28418:14 28419:16 28437:2 28442:8,12 28448:19 28518:21 28522:2 on-the-ground 28381:21 28470:3 one-on-one 28473:15 ongoing 28438:7 28443:5 28490:8 onset 28432:10 Ontario 28394:25 28471:6 28498:8 28512:2 28532:24 28568:16 28578:14	open 28502:18 28503:8 opening 28451:24 28516:8 28524:11 28533:22 operating 28443:6 28444:11 operation 28372:8 28432:6 28441:14 28446:8 28449:13,21 28455:12 28456:20,21 28457:6 28461:24 28470:4 28471:23 28480:22 28481:2 28482:10,15 28483:12 28497:3 28541:23 28580:2 operational 28442:20 operations 28376:18,22 28377:4,6 28378:16,18,23 28379:16,20 28380:14 28382:16, 28389:21 28391:24 28461:9 28467:3 28476:18 28504:21 opinion 28404:7,10 28429:3 28455:21 OPP 28382:6 28396:15,21 28399:9,20 28407:1,2 28408:5,18 28409:20 28410:21,22 28412:14,17 28413:11 28418:2 28419:6,13 28425:2 28431:3 28434:5 28436:21,22 28452:24 28454:18 28491:8 28494:15	28497:25 28498:4 28505:13 28511:21 28513:14,16 28514:19 28515:20 28517:17, 28518:19 28521:17 28536:9 28537:22 28543:4 28545:23 28548:17 28549:19 28551:10,21 28560:14 28563:19 28567:1 28574:15 28576:8,19 28577:23 28578:3 OPP'S 28516:20 28517:13 opportunities 28469:13 28473:14 opportunity 28390:7 28404:15 28465:7 28469:15,21 28472:20 28553:3 opposed 28529:1 option 28411:10 28454:15 28462:18 options 28453:18 28460:2 28462:1,18,20 28530:22 order 28384:16 28392:14 28393:1,24 28412:25 28422:23 28423:2 28438:15 28440:5 28441:7 28449:17 28450:19 28453:5 28454:22 28455:2,4 28456:21 28460:19 28472:25 28505:10
---	---	--	---	--

28524:15 28526:16,25 28527:4 28528:11 28530:7 28531:3, 4 28541:14,15,17 28581:7,9,13,18, 20 28582:24	overly 28554:7 28580:21	paragraphs 28516:9	passing 28554:20	28557:15,19 28564:14 28567:5 28568:15 28572:13 28575:11,16 28577:7,12
ordered 28412:11 28439:22,23 28440:6,13 28441:20,21 28449:12 28483:4,15 28495:24,25 28496:3,13 28522:11 28577:23	overstressed 28450:12 28452:2 28455:16 28463:8 28524:14	paraphrasing 28392:5	Paul 28413:3,14 28471:12 28472:7,12 28497:18	percent 28434:25 28467:13 28496:24 28542:13
ordering 28435:21 28436:6 28496:8,9,21 28521:15 28577:18	overwhelmingl y 28375:12	parked 28386:14 28388:1,4	Pearson 28569:16	Percy 28396:15, 19 28399:20,25 28545:23
orders 28436:10,13 28537:14	owner 28454:7,8 28531:2,4 28538:10 28572:12 28582:1,3,17	parking 28386:15 28387:7	PEOC 28392:9 28393:3 28477:1, 4 28478:21 28479:15,22 28480:5,14 28506:6	perform 28449:13 28500:12
organization 28373:10,14 28378:17 28468:24 28472:11	<hr/> P <hr/>	part 28372:4 28374:18,19 28379:5 28390:2, 18 28395:19 28396:17 28397:16 28417:17 28423:22 28434:13 28435:23 28438:3 28439:11 28455:22 28476:16 28502:25 28526:10 28541:25 28546:1 28547:15 28556:20 28561:14 28577:15 28582:7,8	people 28378:3 28380:4,22 28381:1,8 28382:12,17 28383:16 28386:20 28388:16,17 28389:18 28394:24 28396:9,25 28400:2,10 28415:24 28416:22 28424:21 28427:24 28438:10,11,15 28444:20 28449:18 28450:14 28458:18 28460:25 28463:5,15,25 28468:22 28469:14,20 28470:3,4 28472:6,9 28474:19 28478:20 28479:11 28482:4 28488:23 28489:24 28490:7 28495:14 28498:9 28504:1 28507:15 28511:5 28525:19 28530:18 28533:23 28535:4,17,19,25 28537:2 28545:3 28553:12 28555:15,16	performing 28454:3 28470:4
organizations 28566:5	p.m. 28391:11 28393:10 28394:5 28417:3 28426:15 28431:18,19 28434:11 28439:7 28444:4,11 28446:13,21,25 28447:2,24 28448:11 28450:25 28458:1,22 28491:13 28492:1 28493:4 28499:18,19 28503:12 28516:7 28527:21,22 28533:7 28534:9, 10, 28544:15 28546:7 28550:8	participate 28444:22	peril 28450:15	period 28562:11
organizing 28379:12	pack 28461:13	participated 28374:14,17 28569:14	perish 28450:15	Perizzolo 28465:3 28546:24 28554:4,11 28574:23 28575:18
Ottawa 28532:25	packing 28460:12,22	participating 28378:11	permanent 28582:9	Perizzolos 28465:8 28545:11 28554:17
Ouimet 28498:1, 2	pages 28547:25	participation 28380:10 28441:14	permit 28455:23	permitted 28455:6
outcome 28467:14	pagination 28508:25	particulars 28395:25 28430:21	perpetual 28564:16	permitted 28455:6
outlets 28564:12 28566:10	panel 28433:13 28441:3,12	parts 28427:21 28452:22	person 28372:7 28392:6 28398:4 28401:9 28402:7, 9,18,20 28403:6 28404:3 28405:1, 17,19 28406:1,20 28408:10 28411:12 28427:3,25 28428:2,14,19 28429:13,15 28431:6 28432:21 28477:22	permitted 28455:6
outlined 28377:11,24 28570:11	panic 28557:18	pass 28534:3		permitted 28455:6
outset 28576:20	paragraph 28407:6 28423:19 28474:16 28493:11 28495:22 28511:10 28516:8	passed 28543:8		permitted 28455:6
overbusy 28380:7				permitted 28455:6

28497:25	28471:22	28373:2,5,16	28414:19	28397:14
28498:18 28505:4	28502:21	28374:5 28375:21	28415:23	pose 28572:16
28509:23 28510:2	28564:12	28376:3,19	28416:12	position
28514:21	photographs	28377:11,25	28419:17	28371:6 28395:3
28515:3,4,8,12,21	28399:9	28434:24	28422:23	28411:23
28516:14,15	physical	28435:7,9,13,23	28424:25 28425:3	28453:12
28517:21 28531:4	28373:1 28536:12	28437:10,11	28426:24	28488:6,17
28538:5 28548:21	physically	28439:16,17	28430:10	28574:15
28571:18	28408:13	28454:2 28456:25	28435:5,10	28580:24
28576:14	28415:17	28458:20	28442:22 28443:5	positioned
28577:22	pick 28570:19	28459:25	28444:7	28513:8
28578:2,5	picture	28465:17 28467:3	28445:14,15	positions
person's	28387:25 28388:5	28476:19 28483:2	28446:11	28376:6 28384:17
28498:24	piece 28422:8	28490:1	28448:14	28556:23
personal	28459:15	28537:18,19	28454:5,14,21	positive
28469:9 28555:16	28538:21 28565:6	28538:4 28539:16	28457:8	28443:16
28563:10	pieces 28412:9	28540:8,12	28459:11,22	28444:14
28564:4,5	28508:2	28542:18,25	28460:7,18	28558:19
28570:2,6,23	pile 28389:2	28543:1 28556:6,	28462:7,22	possibility
28571:11	28398:4 28425:11	14,21 28557:2,10	28463:2,9	28398:2
28572:2,19	28449:9 28459:21	28559:14	28464:13	post 28564:24
28573:22,25	28509:14 28513:1	28563:1,2,15	28467:20 28468:3	post-emergency
personally	28514:18,22	28568:10	28479:6 28482:7	28465:16
28395:8	28518:4 28575:17	28571:16	28484:6,11	potable
28412:19,24	pin 28525:1,8	28576:11,13	28486:9 28488:22	28378:21 28379:6
28470:13	pinpointed	28577:2,9,14	28490:6 28494:17	potential
28571:12	28407:11	planned	28511:24 28518:7	28379:5 28408:4
personnel	pipes 28389:1	28446:8	28522:18 28528:9	28410:11 28412:1
28387:11	pit 28408:13	plans 28438:8	28529:20 28531:9	28473:22
28413:12	28421:23	28537:23	28538:17	28474:24
28568:18	place 28377:8	play 28537:23	28539:14	pothole
persons	28378:4 28397:23	played 28382:2	28547:23 28562:3	28385:18
28380:11 28407:9	28401:8 28410:23	players 28375:2	28567:23 28581:3	powers
28411:12,14	28416:15	28432:7 28525:15	pointed 28443:6	28581:24
28425:18	28444:24	28557:23	28549:10	practice
28513:22	28451:23	pleased	points 28466:13	28433:5 28541:10
28514:20	28517:16	28448:24 28536:4	pole 28553:6	practitioner
28531:21	28524:10	pluming	police 28381:2	28512:5
28532:22 28538:5	28542:8,15	28385:21	28386:14	precautions
perspective	28561:19,24	point 28374:2	28412:13,21	28572:11
28467:2 28486:10	28570:18	28378:24	28456:12	preceding
28536:22	28572:12	28387:15	28458:10,11	28567:22
28560:11	placing 28395:2	28388:13,18	28459:5 28483:1	precisely
Peter 28482:3	28440:5	28389:13	28512:2 28549:17	28399:12
28569:19	plain 28516:22	28390:16	policy 28410:21	precludes
Phase 28495:9	plan 28371:18,	28393:19 28394:5	28512:3 28513:11	
phone 28385:12,	23,24,25 28372:1,	28398:11	polite 28552:10	
14 28386:5	6,8,12,25	28402:15,19	politeness	
28414:24		28403:7 28404:18	28553:17	
28415:5,8,12,25		28407:10	pop 28500:20	
28418:23		28409:14	portions	
		28412:23		

28557:19	28456:6,8,10,11	28434:1 28449:18	properly	provincial
preferable	28457:23	28452:8	28395:1 28423:11	28391:24
28380:3	28461:15	28483:15,18,25	property	28417:8,12,18
premature	28462:19	28484:19 28532:1	28387:20	28476:1,7,17
28462:6	28463:14	28537:21	28462:13 28572:8	28498:12
Premier	28474:10,12	28543:19	protocol	28504:21 28512:2
28476:11,14	28483:6,7	28572:12	28393:24	provision
28539:16	28485:20,22	priority 28550:2	28408:18	28505:11
preparation	28489:5	private 28551:7, 13	28512:3,12	prudent
28433:19	28491:13,14,18, 25 28497:22	probable	proud 28468:24	28455:22 28566:1
prepare 28433:6	28514:4,6	28542:17	28535:9 28536:23	public 28373:6
28533:7,13	28515:18,21,24	probe 28389:1	provide 28383:8	28377:7 28379:2, 24 28380:10,13
prepared	28516:1,2	problem	28405:20	28381:2 28384:3
28375:22 28393:3	28533:7,11,13	28383:9	28409:17 28432:7	28385:14 28386:9
28406:12 28445:4	28534:2,9,16,24	problems	28441:12 28472:1	28388:7 28410:17
28446:6 28477:1	28543:4,12	28489:1	28489:21,24	28423:11 28429:4
28504:17	28544:17 28550:1	procedure	28494:4 28547:13	28432:5 28438:19
28513:21	28552:5 28559:10	28393:23	28566:23	28461:14,19
preparing	presume	proceedings	28567:20	28473:4,5,9,14
28385:9	28410:12	28527:9 28581:15	28568:13	28489:7,16,18
presence	28414:13	process	28569:8,21	28490:4,11, 28498:16
28417:4 28559:18	28436:23	28394:6,12	28582:2	28512:19 28513:4
28560:5	presumed	28468:11	provided	28533:8 28543:1, 11 28551:16
present	28475:3	28530:25	28380:16	28557:6,11,17
28393:14	pretty 28399:24	28537:16 28544:6	28381:20 28410:5	28558:8,13,17
28402:6,25	28403:8 28508:12	produce	28427:13 28429:4	28559:19
28403:5 28404:3	28520:19	28420:23	28431:3 28443:20	28576:16
28417:4,15	28532:18	produced	28453:25	publicized
28427:3,14	prevents	28466:16	28455:19	28498:18
28434:6 28441:12	28557:18	produces	28473:13	published
28445:5,17	previous	28467:7	28479:21	28426:14
28446:18	28470:11	product	28483:22 28485:9	pull 28426:9
28489:14	28521:21	28437:25	28486:10 28490:9	28448:15
28517:11	28537:13	professional	28500:14 28517:8	28449:18
28548:19 28573:3	previously	28567:9 28582:5	28555:18	28497:15
press 28423:8, 14,15,22	28398:8 28500:7	proficient	28569:16	28501:24
28424:11	pride 28536:15, 18	28468:14	28581:14	28502:23 28503:1
28426:14,15	Priestly	progress	providing	28578:23
28430:11	28459:14	28462:6 28471:22	28433:14,17	pulled 28386:14
28431:22	primarily	project 28544:6	28479:15 28486:5	pulling 28455:25
28433:3,7,12,24, 25 28438:1,18,20, 21 28440:23	28475:25	pronounced	28487:16 28491:9	pulse 28402:1, 16,25 28403:4
28442:25	28494:20 28565:5	28402:7	28505:17	28424:20
28443:3,13,16,23	print 28569:17	proper 28382:13 28394:23	28547:14	28428:16
28444:3,13,18,22, 25 28445:12	prior 28370:25		28548:17	28509:14 28510:4
28446:22	28374:17		28558:7,12	28511:15,19
28447:1,4,13,17, 23 28454:16	28394:13		Province	28514:24
	28432:12		28394:17 28471:6	28516:15
	28433:10,12,25		28476:17,21,23	
			28477:25 28498:7	
			28568:16	
			28578:14	

purport 28440:16	28551:3 28553:23 28562:16 28564:20 28565:17 28572:16 28573:18 28575:5,23	28535:18	28422:11,14,20 28435:22 28436:3,7 28437:19 28440:1 28443:13 28450:21 28453:13 28475:14 28479:19 28480:22 28487:16 28489:23 28490:10,17 28499:1 28509:15 28519:2,25 28521:12,18 28534:14 28537:13 28541:11,18 28546:21 28547:6,15 28552:20 28553:9,18 28559:9 28566:5 28571:13 28573:25	28434:5
purpose 28545:8 28564:22 28565:9		re-examination 28497:12,13 28499:6		recollection 28392:23 28435:4 28475:5 28494:22 28500:15 28508:14 28512:1 28551:6,14 28552:23
purposes 28581:23	questioned 28541:14,15,16	reach 28403:8 28459:18 28490:11 28540:17		recommendati on 28428:20 28561:17
pursuant 28502:1	questioning 28403:12	react 28461:14 28550:3		recommendati ons 28568:2,13
purview 28567:1 28577:3	questions 28398:7 28403:17 28410:23 28453:11 28465:18 28469:1 28470:23 28487:20 28494:10 28495:1 28497:9 28499:4 28524:24 28545:22 28552:18 28559:25 28560:2 28565:13 28568:23 28575:25 28576:9 28578:7 28581:4	reaction 28461:17 28524:21 28530:6,8		recommended 28514:19
put 28399:22 28403:18 28430:13 28450:14 28455:1 28467:9 28493:21 28497:3 28500:18 28508:10 28531:12 28561:2 28572:11 28580:23		read 28376:11 28422:9 28427:12 28444:18,19,25 28445:3,7 28463:5 28491:15 28526:11 28549:12 28556:19 28563:5		reconvened 28454:17 28456:12
putting 28403:23 28425:1 28537:23 28553:2 28565:7		readily 28387:5		record 28404:6 28553:3 28560:1
Q				
qualifications 28371:6	quicker 28539:2	reading 28399:19 28445:6 28535:16	receive 28567:23	recorded 28391:23 28460:6
qualified 28377:6	quickly 28457:5, 12 28460:1 28496:10 28537:17	ready 28461:13	received 28374:1 28389:15 28392:18 28394:11 28405:18 28430:5 28443:19 28479:2 28486:6,20,22,23 28501:17 28505:21 28516:14 28543:11 28544:5	records 28390:3
quarter 28389:10	quiet 28463:3	real 28374:25		recover 28529:7 28571:16 28572:19
question 28383:11,21 28390:24 28404:11,12,17 28410:1 28411:2, 6,7 28416:6 28427:9,19 28428:25 28429:8,9 28430:13 28448:17 28466:25 28467:5 28489:9 28517:4 28534:20 28549:14 28550:3,7,17,25	quote 28548:1	reality 28531:17		recovered 28542:18
	quoted 28452:23	realize 28376:9		recovery 28451:16 28454:24 28455:6 28457:7 28487:14 28522:19 28523:4 28524:3 28525:4 28529:1 28571:24,25
	quoting 28547:24	reason 28382:18 28450:4 28513:7 28526:21 28570:17 28579:20	receives 28391:25 28504:22	redirect 28557:7
	R			
	radio 28443:24 28505:14 28532:10 28566:14 28569:18	reassurance 28557:15	receiving 28415:15	refer 28395:16 28476:6 28482:22
	raising 28429:6	recall 28373:24 28375:8 28397:7 28407:22 28412:12 28413:18,19 28420:21 28421:15	RECESSED 28439:6 28499:18 28527:21	referable 28396:17
Ramped			reclassified 28451:15 28487:13 28524:2 28529:1	reference 28395:22,23 28397:5,7,13 28400:23 28401:19,20 28402:14 28419:12 28422:8

28496:16 28521:15 references 28395:17 referencing 28397:12 referred 28399:14 28420:8 28431:19 28435:2 28438:1 28477:18 28528:11 referring 28427:22 28438:5 28482:23 28533:6 refers 28564:7 reflect 28390:20 reflected 28479:16 reflecting 28467:15 reflection 28559:13 reflective 28431:1 regard 28384:21 28500:12 28513:10 regular 28373:24 28378:2 28384:23 28385:2, 28395:11 28396:10 28398:18 28417:16 28510:10 28576:20 regulations 28465:23 28581:25 rehashing 28428:23 relates 28390:15 relating 28374:21 relations 28468:18	28560:12 relationship 28472:11 relative 28524:18 relay 28573:14 relayed 28449:19 release 28407:20 28408:4,25 28410:16 28411:24 28423:8,15,22 28430:11 28474:10,18,23 28475:7 28480:14 28489:5 28497:22 28498:24 28512:17 28513:21 28514:4,6,7 28515:19 28516:6 28557:3 released 28407:25 28423:16 28424:12 28473:9 28515:12 releases 28438:1,17,20 28473:10 28515:24 28516:1 28559:11 28565:1 releasing 28470:17 28473:21 28494:20,21 28512:25 relentlessly 28562:10 relevance 28429:8 relevant 28417:18 28429:9 relying 28405:4 28408:16 remainder 28378:10	remained 28377:7 28565:23 remains 28372:3 remember 28402:5 28446:10 28453:23 28454:4 28465:13 28473:23 28482:4 28509:21 28526:18,21,23 28533:16 28540:1 28548:6, 28552:11,12 remembered 28435:23 remind 28370:21 28390:23 remorseful 28492:10,14 remotely 28538:21 removal 28414:13 remove 28416:22 28451:5 28523:18 28566:1 repair 28379:12 repeat 28411:7 28430:3 report 28395:20 28400:12 28406:1 28407:4 28426:8 28467:7 28516:24 28517:1 28531:6 28568:5,7 28582:4,17 reported 28423:25 28424:17,22 28425:25 28507:8 28509:19 28510:5 28511:18 28514:10,13,21, 23 28515:2,4,7 28517:3,20 REPORTER 28390:22	REPORTER'S 28372:17 reporters 28445:16 reporting 28445:22 28481:6 28519:16 28579:21 reports 28392:5 28395:11 28425:22 28429:25 28441:10 28557:8 represent 28488:4 representation 28456:16 representative 28396:23 28444:2 representative s 28498:12 represented 28401:23 representing 28569:6 reps 28434:15 28523:14 request 28386:1 28392:14 28420:23 28505:10 28520:5 28521:4 28573:22,25 requested 28420:17,20 28449:23 28520:7 28571:17 requesting 28383:25 28392:1 28419:12 28504:23 requests 28557:7 28578:19 require 28382:17 28408:19 28581:25	required 28372:5,6 28373:20,21 28374:6 28379:23 28380:10,15,17 28419:1 28421:20 28422:6 28465:23,24 28476:12 28488:24 28505:2,12 28555:3,5 28569:21 28577:8 requirement 28570:5 28581:19 28582:17 requirements 28374:8 28418:24 requiring 28420:18 rescue 28381:12 28383:3,16 28392:3 28396:6 28404:13 28413:9,11 28418:12 28426:19,25 28434:13 28435:6 28446:7 28447:18 28451:15 28455:5,17 28469:25 28470:21 28472:24 28480:21 28481:2 28482:9 28483:12 28484:13 28485:5,6 28486:17 28487:14 28496:3 28504:25 28518:6,20 28521:25 28522:19 28523:4 28524:2 28525:4 28529:2,6,20,25 28530:15,17 28562:8 28571:21,24 28574:2 28579:14,22 28580:2,25
--	---	---	--	---

Rescue/ chemical 28505:13	28380:20 28381:12,18 28382:10 28421:18 28429:1 28467:4 28477:11 28505:15 28576:10	reviewing 28373:7 28414:21 28570:4	28423:9 28472:23 28473:4 28556:6 28577:8,12,14	run 28375:3 28381:18 28563:23
rescue/ recovery 28382:4 28454:14 28460:18 28461:10	responsibilitie s 28373:10 28376:25 28377:10,24 28557:23	revisions 28372:5	roll 28377:17 28561:23	running 28488:25 28548:21
rescuer 28454:23 28507:24	responsibility 28372:2 28378:9 28384:21 28545:24 28577:20	Rheahme 28371:17 28466:12 28501:6	Ron 28402:3	Ryan 28418:12 28419:6,12,23 28434:10,12 28518:19 28519:16 28521:25
rescuers 28456:1 28463:10 28469:9 28497:15 28508:2 28527:7, 12 28533:24	responsible 28378:2 28382:21 28475:25 28558:5	Rheahme's 28475:13	roof 28386:24 28392:3 28459:18 28504:25	<hr/> S <hr/>
resources 28379:13 28460:16	resting 28450:10 28456:23	Richard 28490:24,25 28491:2 28499:20 28500:1 28571:3, 4,7	rooftop 28387:7	safe 28455:24 28460:20 28497:6
respect 28371:23,25 28383:6 28384:7 28428:17 28429:2 28432:16 28442:11 28446:4 28455:20 28469:18,24 28470:8 28475:2 28497:14 28498:15 28512:25 28543:5 28560:12 28568:1 28569:17,18	restricted 28527:6 28558:11	Rick 28501:17	room 28372:19 28374:25 28384:19 28396:9 28400:24 28417:21 28456:13 28459:23 28488:24 28490:23 28503:25 28519:24 28525:2,16,17,20	safety 28416:13 28451:12 28485:7 28487:10 28523:25 28572:11 28579:13,22
respected 28557:16	result 28379:6 28380:15 28381:21 28416:16 28427:15 28428:2 28440:6 28496:9	right-hand 28508:22 28556:20	roughly 28392:21 28448:7	SAGE 28488:4 28569:7
respectful 28558:20	resulted 28397:20	rightfully 28568:12	roundtable 28384:11,16 28452:20	sat 28488:16
respond 28385:15 28472:25 28553:4 28557:6	results 28530:15	ring 28402:3	roundtabling 28538:18	satisfied 28393:5
responded 28578:19	resume 28541:22	rise 28527:19	roundtabling 28538:18	Saturday 28385:8 28436:20 28467:10 28504:19
responders 28403:15,18	RESUMED 28439:7 28499:19 28527:22	risk 28463:11	route 28418:25 28419:7 28496:14	save 28500:16 28508:11
responding 28569:8	retreated 28462:11	River 28434:16	rubble 28388:18 28389:2, 28398:4 28400:11 28402:21 28406:2 28408:13 28421:23 28424:20,21 28425:11 28449:9 28450:15 28459:20 28475:4 28513:22 28518:4 28531:22	scenario 28371:22
response 28371:17,22	returned 28387:18 28389:9	Rob 28395:20	rule 28515:23	scenarios 28373:7
	review 28390:8 28434:22 28502:9 28515:18	Robert 28370:9, 25	rules 28441:9	scene 28381:22, 25 28387:10 28388:9 28395:12,25 28413:8 28416:9, 28434:10,12,22 28448:5 28450:15 28454:7,10,13 28463:3 28464:20 28472:18,21 28481:7,12
	reviewed 28462:1 28515:20,21,22	robust 28580:25	ruling 28404:16	
		Roger 28452:15, 25	rumours 28557:18	
		role 28371:19,21 28372:12,25 28380:19 28381:17 28382:3 28390:2 28396:3 28403:16 28416:18 28417:17 28420:15 28469:23 28476:16 28500:11 28552:9 28559:5,19 28566:22 28567:6		
		roles 28373:9 28380:4,8		

28482:14 28483:4,18 28484:13, 28510:18 28542:19 28547:7	security 28535:5,18	sewer 28389:1	shuffled 28397:12 28506:18,19 28507:10,20 28508:15	site 28387:16,19 28389:9 28395:12 28416:17,23 28420:25 28421:23 28437:4 28438:8 28439:24 28441:22,23 28442:22 28449:18 28454:6,25 28460:20 28496:1 28517:25 28518:6 28527:1 28565:22,25
schedules 28372:3	seen/treated/ released 28480:9,16	share 28537:3	shuffling 28397:19	Sitrep 28480:5
scheduling 28378:3 28561:11	send 28383:25 28526:4 28540:11	shared 28484:3	sic 28547:16	sitting 28381:8 28405:17 28448:18
screen 28414:4 28441:18 28474:5 28579:1,3	sense 28400:5 28403:3 28406:8, 10 28422:4,5 28463:9 28484:3 28507:21 28511:20 28526:1 28527:3 28530:10 28532:23,25 28534:6 28572:5	sharing 28461:19,20	side 28445:10 28510:14 28556:20	situate 28474:1
scribe 28389:25 28563:17	sentence 28453:3 28493:11 28495:13	Shawn 28491:2 28571:7	signature 28582:5	situation 28379:14,19 28382:16 28395:4 28416:18 28464:9 28493:18 28530:16 28533:22 28575:24
scribe's 28398:18	sentiments 28462:14	shed 28495:11	signs 28401:1, 11 28402:13 28403:9 28404:24 28427:3,14 28428:3 28517:10	situations 28381:7 28408:17 28455:21
scribes 28389:22 28398:9 28563:19	separate 28377:3 28444:23 28511:1,3 28519:8	shifted 28397:9 28400:3 28506:23 28507:5,14 28508:4,15	signatures 28582:5	six-day 28562:11
scribing 28398:12	Sergeant 28543:7	shifting 28397:19 28451:24 28524:11	signs 28401:1, 11 28402:13 28403:9 28404:24 28427:3,14 28428:3 28517:10	slab 28448:17 28450:10 28456:22
scroll 28478:11, 24	series 28392:25 28453:19	shock 28530:13, 18 28580:20	similar 28560:22	slabs 28421:19
seal 28582:4	services 28465:9 28510:12 28555:17	shocked 28524:23	simply 28370:21 28460:4 28463:7 28514:12 28517:6	slow 28377:14 28454:11
seamless 28561:20	servicing 28545:7	shocking 28387:9	single 28525:21	small 28477:6 28532:24 28561:18
search 28381:11 28383:3 28392:2 28484:13 28486:17 28504:24 28505:13, 28522:16	service 28381:1 28465:6	shoring 28443:10 28497:4	sir 28370:14,22 28392:23 28418:3 28499:24,25 28500:9 28501:10 28502:13 28508:17 28509:10 28512:13 28520:9 28521:13,22 28522:13 28523:6,10 28524:20 28525:2,12 28526:3 28527:8 28529:14 28530:10 28534:11,12 28539:24 28540:7 28541:18 28548:12 28559:2,3 28562:24 28571:6	slows 28471:2,3, 5 28498:6 28578:10,11,13
searching 28491:24	services 28465:9 28510:12 28555:17	short 28489:9	shot 28542:22,24 28570:18	solicitor 28445:2,9 28492:5
second-last 28563:9	session 28538:23	shorter 28566:8	show 28532:15	solution 28383:9 28464:19
secretary 28570:14	set 28441:9 28442:19 28506:22 28508:10 28565:3	shortly 28385:22 28389:8 28504:19	showing 28428:2 28430:18	
section 28434:5 28451:2 28556:13,22	sets 28390:11 28561:3	showed 28442:16 28541:10	shows 28418:21 28419:13 28431:18 28560:1	
sector 28377:7 28378:17	severely 28492:22	showing 28428:2 28430:18	shuffled 28397:3,8	
sectors 28381:6		showing 28428:2 28430:18	shuffle 28507:25 28508:1	
secure 28459:13 28540:18		shows 28418:21 28419:13 28431:18 28560:1		
		shuffled 28397:3,8		
		shuffled 28389:1		
		share 28537:3		
		shared 28484:3		
		sharing 28461:19,20		
		Shawn 28491:2 28571:7		
		shed 28495:11		
		shifted 28397:9 28400:3 28506:23 28507:5,14 28508:4,15		
		shifting 28397:19 28451:24 28524:11		
		shock 28530:13, 18 28580:20		
		shocked 28524:23		
		shocking 28387:9		
		shoring 28443:10 28497:4		
		short 28489:9		
		shorter 28566:8		
		shortly 28385:22 28389:8 28504:19		
		shot 28542:22,24 28570:18		
		show 28532:15		
		showed 28442:16 28541:10		
		showing 28428:2 28430:18		
		shows 28418:21 28419:13 28431:18 28560:1		
		shuffled 28397:3,8		
		shuffle 28507:25 28508:1		
		sewer 28389:1		
		share 28537:3		
		shared 28484:3		
		sharing 28461:19,20		
		Shawn 28491:2 28571:7		
		shed 28495:11		
		shifted 28397:9 28400:3 28506:23 28507:5,14 28508:4,15		
		shifting 28397:19 28451:24 28524:11		
		shock 28530:13, 18 28580:20		
		shocked 28524:23		
		shocking 28387:9		
		shoring 28443:10 28497:4		
		short 28489:9		
		shorter 28566:8		
		shortly 28385:22 28389:8 28504:19		
		shot 28542:22,24 28570:18		
		show 28532:15		
		showed 28442:16 28541:10		
		showing 28428:2 28430:18		
		shows 28418:21 28419:13 28431:18 28560:1		
		shuffled 28397:3,8		
		shuffle 28507:25 28508:1		
		sewer 28389:1		
		share 28537:3		
		shared 28484:3		
		sharing 28461:19,20		
		Shawn 28491:2 28571:7		
		shed 28495:11		
		shifted 28397:9 28400:3 28506:23 28507:5,14 28508:4,15		
		shifting 28397:19 28451:24 28524:11		
		shock 28530:13, 18 28580:20		
		shocked 28524:23		
		shocking 28387:9		
		shoring 28443:10 28497:4		
		short 28489:9		
		shorter 28566:8		
		shortly 28385:22 28389:8 28504:19		
		shot 28542:22,24 28570:18		
		show 28532:15		
		showed 28442:16 28541:10		
		showing 28428:2 28430:18		
		shows 28418:21 28419:13 28431:18 28560:1		
		shuffled 28397:3,8		
		shuffle 28507:25 28508:1		
		sewer 28389:1		
		share 28537:3		
		shared 28484:3		
		sharing 28461:19,20		
		Shawn 28491:2 28571:7		
		shed 28495:11		
		shifted 28397:9 28400:3 28506:23 28507:5,14 28508:4,15		
		shifting 28397:19 28451:24 28524:11		
		shock 28530:13, 18 28580:20		
		shocked 28524:23		
		shocking 28387:9		
		shoring 28443:10 28497:4		
		short 28489:9		
		shorter 28566:8		
		shortly 28385:22 28389:8 28504:19		
		shot 28542:22,24 28570:18		
		show 28532:15		
		showed 28442:16 28541:10		
		showing 28428:2 28430:18		
		shows 28418:21 28419:13 28431:18 28560:1		
		shuffled 28397:3,8		
		shuffle 28507:25 28508:1		
		sewer 28389:1		
		share 28537:3		
		shared 28484:3		
		sharing 28461:19,20		
		Shawn 28491:2 28571:7		
		shed 28495:11		
		shifted 28397:9 28400:3 28506:23 28507:5,14 28508:4,15		
		shifting 28397:19 28451:24 28524:11		
		shock 28530:13, 18 28580:20		
		shocked 28524:23		
		shocking 28387:9		
		shoring 28443:10 28497:4		
		short 28489:9		
		shorter 28566:8		
		shortly 28385:22 28389:8 28504:19		
		shot 28542:22,24 28570:18		
		show 28532:15		
		showed 28442:16 28541:10		
		showing 28428:2 28430:18		
		shows 28418:21 28419:13 28431:18 28560:1		
		shuffled 28397:3,8		
		shuffle 28507:25 28508:1		
		sewer 28389:1		
		share 28537:3		
		shared 28484:3		
		sharing 28461:19,20		
		Shawn 28491:2 28571:7		
		shed 28495:11		
		shifted 28397:9 28400:3 28506:23 28507:5,14 28508:4,15		
		shifting 28397:19 28451:24 28524:11		
		shock 28530:13, 18 28580:20		
		shocked 28524:23		
		shocking 28387:9		
		shoring 28443:10 28497:4		
		short 28489:9		
		shorter 28566:8		
		shortly 28385:22 28389:8 28504:19		
		shot 28542:22,24 28570:18		
		show 28532:15		
		showed 28442:16 28541:10		
		showing 28428:2 28430:18		
		shows 28418:21 28419:13 28431:18 28560:1		
		shuffled 28397:3,8		
		shuffle 28507:25 28508:1		
		sewer 28389:1		
		share 28537:3		
		shared 28484:3		
		sharing 28461:19,20		
		Shawn 28491:2 28571:7		
		shed 28495:11		
		shifted 28397:9 28400:3 28506:23 28507:5,14 28508:4,15		
		shifting 28397:19 28451:24 28524:11		
		shock 28530:13, 18 28580:20		
		shocked 28524:23		
		shocking 28387:9		
		shoring 28443:10 28497:4		
		short 28489:9		
		shorter 28566:8		
		shortly 28385:22 28389:8 28504:19		
		shot 28542:22,24 28570:18		
		show 28532:15		
		showed 		

son 28502:18	28434:7 28436:24	spoken 28554:19,21	starting 28389:19 28417:3 28462:12 28464:1 28484:22 28500:21 28518:15	statutes 28538:20
sooner 28466:3 28518:8 28552:3	28439:13 28451:3 28465:10 28477:24,25 28521:10	spokesperson 28556:7, 28557:24 28558:4 28559:6 28578:15	starts 28418:1 28436:18 28518:12 28537:7	stay 28529:11
sort 28377:2 28378:16 28383:2 28395:7 28438:4 28441:8 28470:14 28511:13 28521:20 28532:5 28537:15 28562:5 28567:3	28543:15 28549:7 28572:24	spot 28521:7	stated 28480:7 28481:8 28535:12 28579:25 28580:5	steady 28564:12
sorting 28394:6	speaks 28476:19,20 28524:5	Sprague 28399:6	statement 28398:2 28405:13 28412:1 28429:10 28430:20 28431:10 28433:11 28444:18,20,25 28445:3,8,20,23 28491:15 28493:5 28514:14 28515:8 28516:22 28517:18 28522:7 28524:19 28525:10,22 28548:14	step 28462:4
sought-after 28557:14	special 28466:7	sprinkler 28387:3	stated 28480:7 28481:8 28535:12 28579:25 28580:5	steps 28395:7 28453:18, 28454:19
sound 28397:17	specialist 28419:6 28509:17 28510:9,17	stability 28434:23 28443:11 28486:24	stated 28480:7 28481:8 28535:12 28579:25 28580:5	stick 28375:11
sounded 28407:10 28455:2,10	specialized 28459:15	stabilization 28434:24	stated 28480:7 28481:8 28535:12 28579:25 28580:5	stipulations 28531:7
sounds 28431:7 28447:15	specialties 28510:17	Stable 28435:1	stated 28480:7 28481:8 28535:12 28579:25 28580:5	stood 28459:19 28462:9
source 28383:24 28420:17 28472:3 28478:12	specific 28378:17 28394:11 28430:12,18 28436:3 28465:13 28552:19 28553:8,9,23	staff 28481:12, 13,16 28489:14 28490:4 28570:5, 18 28577:14	stated 28480:7 28481:8 28535:12 28579:25 28580:5	stop 28386:12 28413:9 28416:21 28449:24 28453:5,22,24 28454:22 28470:21 28524:15 28526:16 28528:11 28537:14 28544:6 28574:1 28580:2, 25
sources 28472:5	specifically 28431:6 28482:17 28489:21 28528:7 28543:2 28553:19 28579:16	stage 28411:17 28513:24 28514:1	stated 28480:7 28481:8 28535:12 28579:25 28580:5	stoppage 28448:2 28450:4 28524:25
sourcing 28379:23 28382:25	specifics 28420:22 28484:7 28552:21 28574:5,7	stairway 28451:20 28524:7	stated 28480:7 28481:8 28535:12 28579:25 28580:5	stopped 28447:19 28463:4 28483:12 28522:19 28523:5 28549:20
space 28489:1	speed 28396:11 28417:24	stairwell 28451:8 28487:3 28523:21	stated 28480:7 28481:8 28535:12 28579:25 28580:5	store 28384:1
speak 28396:13 28452:17 28464:14,22 28465:2 28469:15 28472:7,17,21 28483:24 28486:9 28498:14 28535:24 28536:8 28537:5 28544:23,25 28549:23 28550:10 28552:8 28554:1,4,17 28559:22	spend 28396:7	stands 28515:15	stated 28480:7 28481:8 28535:12 28579:25 28580:5	strategy 28437:18 28474:17
speakers 28452:13	spending 28414:20	standstill 28455:12	stated 28480:7 28481:8 28535:12 28579:25 28580:5	Street 28561:24
speaking 28381:13 28407:16 28412:6 28418:3 28432:11	spent 28396:5 28417:22	start 28391:19 28458:24 28471:8 28477:2,5 28486:2 28499:16	stated 28480:7 28481:8 28535:12 28579:25 28580:5	strength 28451:9 28487:4 28523:22
	spite 28494:1	started 28419:15 28472:14 28484:24 28486:5 28537:22 28539:21	stated 28480:7 28481:8 28535:12 28579:25 28580:5	stress 28451:8 28469:12,17 28490:3,14 28523:21 28542:1

strict 28577:2	suggestion 28422:22 28436:9	28495:18 28575:16	tapping 28495:11	term 28374:15 28449:10
strictly 28416:12 28511:18	suggests 28397:22,23 28422:10 28440:8 28505:12 28521:8 28522:6,10	switching 28554:23	task 28498:9,11	termination 28465:25
strikes 28519:9	summarize 28383:2 28443:3 28459:2	symptoms 28428:12	TC 28479:2	terms 28372:13 28373:9 28377:5 28378:13,15 28379:11, 28380:18,24 28382:9 28384:17 28386:19 28387:1,20 28390:17 28394:14 28404:22 28408:18 28416:17 28431:3 28432:5,10,18,24 28435:25 28437:22 28441:13 28450:15 28460:16 28465:17 28467:4 28484:7 28489:2 28492:22 28496:25 28500:10 28530:7 28533:2 28559:4, 18 28576:13
strong 28380:11 28394:3 28430:16	summarized 28570:20	system 28375:7, 17,18 28387:3	team 28451:6 28484:12 28486:17 28497:22 28505:15 28519:17 28523:19 28543:20	
structural 28387:1 28418:13 28434:14 28448:16 28518:20 28522:1	Sunday 28440:24 28472:15 28474:13	T	teams 28434:13	
structure 28441:7 28450:8 28451:6,22 28454:9 28457:1, 17,20 28486:25 28523:19 28524:9 28582:7	supervising 28469:24	tab 28376:7,8 28393:9 28395:16 28413:2 28423:7 28426:8,10,11 28474:3 28503:4 28514:5 28556:22	technical 28469:24 28470:1 28559:23	
stuck 28525:7	supplied 28578:3	table 28381:1 28432:7 28452:21 28504:4,5	technicalities 28404:13	
stuff 28576:12	supply 28379:6, 18	table-top 28375:4	Technically 28381:14	
stuffed 28397:3 28506:19	supplying 28382:9	tailspin 28531:13	technician 28517:9	
subdivision 28378:22	support 28380:16 28382:13 28383:3 28505:11,17 28561:18	taking 28378:4 28398:10 28421:1 28545:24 28570:14	technology 28561:4	
subject 28410:7 28465:15 28531:25 28534:15	supporting 28582:10	talk 28394:24 28395:20,24 28534:25	telephone 28471:21 28561:11	testified 28480:25 28573:17
submit 28392:12 28505:8	suppose 28547:13	talkative 28580:21	television 28532:17 28566:14 28569:18	testify 28579:7
submitted 28394:16	supposed 28562:17 28563:14 28573:11	talked 28425:23 28437:11 28439:18 28484:1 28508:2 28534:16 28535:5	telling 28410:16 28455:13 28525:10	testimony 28471:16 28475:25 28580:1
subsequent 28534:2	surprised 28524:22	talking 28387:24 28388:22 28397:1 28400:3 28405:12 28413:15 28419:23 28422:4 28457:11 28458:3 28477:22,23 28506:16,23 28514:16 28528:5 28531:3 28536:17 28550:6	temperament 28536:2	Texas 28566:11
substantial 28534:5 28572:11	surrounding 28408:3		temporary 28582:9	text 28581:19
Sudbury 28444:1	surviving 28512:22		ten 28554:15	TF-3 28530:8,9 28539:4 28550:23
suggest 28430:25 28494:4 28529:15	suspect 28403:9 28493:13		ten-minute 28566:15	thereof 28582:7
suggested 28397:19 28425:2 28516:12 28520:8	suspected 28388:17		tenure 28470:9	thing 28385:12 28410:13 28464:6 28466:19 28486:12 28488:25 28525:8 28529:6 28567:3 28570:1
suggesting 28429:12 28521:21 28522:5			Teresa 28554:4 28574:22	things 28383:18
			Teresa's 28554:10	

28385:11 28452:1 28462:15 28524:13 28525:2 28532:5 28537:25 28563:21 28565:25 28568:8,10,14 28579:11	28423:24 28424:16,22 28425:1,3,21, 28426:24 28433:23 28435:5 28439:1 28440:13,16 28442:12 28443:13 28445:15 28448:7,14 28449:7 28451:11 28454:5,15 28455:7,14 28456:18 28459:11,22 28460:4,18 28461:10,25 28462:4,7,23 28463:1,2,9 28464:7 28472:9, 10 28475:3 28477:18 28480:8,20,25 28481:9 28482:7 28484:3,6,11,19 28487:9 28488:23 28489:15 28490:7 28500:16 28502:23 28504:9 28506:4,8,14 28508:11,15 28509:21 28511:5 28514:9 28520:23 28523:24 28527:15 28528:9,13 28529:6,8 28535:13,24 28536:21 28538:2 28539:25 28540:13 28543:4,18,21 28545:8,13 28550:10 28554:9 28555:19 28563:21 28566:17 28571:20 28574:23 28575:9,15 28580:10,11 28581:12	timeliness 28466:13 timely 28558:10 times 28395:24 28396:10 28471:13 28489:24 28554:20 28560:2 timing 28474:1 28531:10 tip 28556:18 tirelessly 28562:8 today 28371:14 28421:13 28527:9 told 28404:23 28406:16 28411:15 28421:10,11 28423:10 28427:12 28450:17 28456:3 28483:17 28528:23 28529:9 28531:18 28539:17 28544:22 28549:24 28566:7 28580:22 tomorrow 28431:23 tool 28467:23 28562:5 top 28375:9 28391:19 28399:21 28406:24 28422:8 28431:17 28436:21,22 28439:12 28450:24 28477:5 28490:17 28504:18 28506:14 28508:24 28535:14 28541:20 28556:19 Toronto 28532:25	touched 28394:9 28570:2 tough 28451:4 28486:14 28523:17 town 28532:24 28554:8 toxic 28463:16, 17 28537:3 Tracking 28451:25 28524:12 tracks 28477:3 tractor 28434:20 tragedy 28561:19 tragic 28446:5 trailer 28434:20 28560:15 trained 28570:13 28574:18 training 28372:4 28373:21,23,25 28374:7,11,13 28394:12 28403:14 28432:13 28470:17 28500:11,21 28501:3,4,7,16 28513:9 28567:2 28570:14 transcript 28372:15 28547:24 transformer 28540:16 transit 28382:21,23 28383:17 translated 28377:17,20 translation 28534:8 transmission 28378:20,21	transpired 28390:20 28417:24 28432:8 28440:2 transpiring 28396:8 transportation 28382:25 transported 28382:18 trapped 28388:17 28392:6 28396:25 28400:2,10 28407:7 28495:6, 8 28505:5 28506:15 28510:23,25 28511:3,4 traumatic 28513:6 treating 28426:25 truck 28388:1,4 Trudy 28371:17, 25 28373:23 28475:13,16 28501:6 Trudy's 28373:2 true 28371:13,15 28444:8 28515:7 trust 28560:6 trusted 28557:16 trusting 28408:16 truthful 28514:14 turn 28385:25 28386:7 28387:18 28485:14 28531:24 28571:25 turned 28385:20 28386:21 28387:12,13 28451:16 28454:7 28467:11
---	---	---	--	---

28487:14 28517:4 28524:3 28529:16 28572:4,6,8 turning 28461:1, 11 28528:24 28539:6 TV 28561:3 tweaked 28468:10 Twitter 28561:4 two-thirds 28393:10 28395:18 28495:21 28503:20 type 28408:6 28533:22 typical 28559:19 typically 28381:10,17 28433:19	uncovered 28493:12 uncovering 28408:12 understand 28371:19 28379:25 28389:21 28391:4 28407:8,17 28465:19 28475:20 28488:5 28494:19 28509:8 28510:24 28518:4 28529:3, 28543:10 28555:1 28562:23 28564:3,4,19 28573:2 understanding 28375:18 28408:21 28409:2 28416:8 28425:7 28442:6 28460:10 28475:22 28480:20 28493:5 28495:9,12 28497:1 28527:2 28528:10 28529:21 28573:10 28576:17,24 understood 28421:16 28461:7 28471:16 28484:11 28486:15,23 28512:6,23 28513:3,7 28514:16,18 28515:11 28529:4,8 28536:22 28547:12 28572:7 undertakings 28390:4 28432:19 unfair 28463:20 unfold 28435:6 unfolded 28577:7 unit 28419:14 28434:13,18	28560:22 units 28437:2 unnamed 28410:12 Unofficially 28479:10 unrelenting 28561:10 unsafe 28451:7 28460:25 28523:20 untrue 28424:18,23 28514:12 28515:15 unwilling 28574:12,15 up-to-date 28558:24 update 28384:20 28418:1 28432:8 28477:11,14 28478:21,25 28479:21 28480:5 28518:15 28545:21 28546:3,6 28576:21,22 updated 28384:23 28567:18 updates 28382:7 28433:14 28441:13 28551:10 28567:17 updating 28444:6 28498:7 upper 28387:4 upset 28492:18 28530:11 28544:21 28546:16,17 28547:11 28550:5 upstairs 28492:2 urban 28392:2 28418:12	28504:24 28505:13 28518:19 28521:25 utilize 28460:17 utmost 28562:12,13	V	Vaguely 28437:20 vehicle 28388:7 ventured 28387:19 verbal 28398:3 versa 28496:9 versed 28416:17 versions 28429:16 vice 28496:8 vicinity 28463:15 victim 28397:21 28400:25 28401:21 28402:12 28494:20 28498:21 28548:22 victim's 28548:14 victims 28407:21 28449:8 28473:21 28474:24 28475:3 28518:4 28538:12 28545:10 victims' 28512:19,20 view 28389:3 28405:2,3 28409:22 28429:18 28460:5 28512:18 28561:7,13	viewed 28495:10 virtue 28472:11 28486:7 visible 28493:19 visit 28489:21 28550:16 28560:14 visited 28421:22 visual 28564:23 28565:2,5 vital 28400:25 28401:11 28402:13 28403:9 28404:24 28427:3,14 28517:10 28558:7 voice 28397:24, 25 voids 28389:3 volunteer 28509:24 28510:2,8,14 volunteers 28562:8 VSA 28479:13	W	wait 28390:23 28422:18 28568:4 waited 28445:1 walk 28395:7 28402:21 28403:10 walls 28564:24 wander 28557:20 wanted 28393:22 28394:8 28395:1 28409:5 28411:25 28432:4 28433:16 28436:14 28437:23 28438:11,12 28453:21 28463:1
---	--	---	---	----------	--	--	----------	---

28464:3,4 28467:14 28498:24 28528:8 28533:23 28535:8 28536:21 28545:6	wonderful 28467:23 28562:4 28570:13	workplace 28582:8
wanting 28434:16 28443:21 28492:9	word 28481:24 28507:6,9 28525:14 28528:18 28548:12	works 28373:6 28375:19 28377:7 28379:2,24 28380:10,13 28385:14 28386:9 28388:7 28429:13
washing 28539:5	wording 28553:8,9	world 28561:7, 13
waste 28371:13	words 28397:18 28408:23 28409:21 28430:20 28452:24 28453:7 28487:19 28507:4 28526:12 28538:11 28541:13,24 28544:8 28548:7, 8 28551:17 28553:15,18	worried 28531:20
water 28378:21, 22 28379:6,18 28385:19,20,25 28386:7,17,19,20, 21 28387:12,13, 18	work 28379:9,12 28416:15 28437:16 28443:4 28447:9 28450:2 28454:4 28457:2 28460:20 28462:5 28464:19 28483:15 28535:12 28536:16,23 28537:14 28562:6	worry 28542:8
ways 28438:18 28538:19 28568:7		Worship 28565:16 28568:22
Webb 28543:6,7		wrecking 28457:17
Wedge 28418:19 28420:5 28518:25		write 28550:8 28551:3
weekend 28385:18		writing 28564:16 28582:1
weekly 28532:8		written 28455:4 28496:12 28507:2 28541:25
weeks 28531:20 28579:8		wrong 28387:2 28424:4 28466:21 28559:20
weighed 28559:15		<hr/> Y <hr/>
weight 28403:22 28451:24 28524:11	worked 28467:12,17 28468:22 28497:24 28554:9,10 28562:8,10	year 28373:25 28374:8 28532:14
well-known 28462:10 28497:2	workers 28448:19 28451:13 28483:3,14 28487:11 28497:5 28524:1	years 28526:23 28532:2
WH 28489:7		yellow 28388:1, 4
whatsoever 28513:10 28525:21		yesterday 28550:14
wherewithal 28539:8		<hr/> Z <hr/>
wide 28479:10	working 28374:15 28437:3 28450:14 28457:3 28463:4 28470:6 28537:19 28538:15 28567:24	zone 28382:12
will-say 28414:16		zoom 28477:6
wins 28429:20		
Women 28502:17		